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Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons — Ninth Biennial Meeting of States, (3rd Meeting) Open-Ended Technical Expert Group — General Assembly — 5 June 2026
Language: en
Automatically generated transcript — may contain errors. Not an official United Nations record.

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OETG · Chair [0:04]:

Excellencies, distinguished delegates, experts, ladies and gentlemen, it is indeed my pleasure to declare open the third session of the Open-Ended Technical Expert Group on Development in the Manufacturing, Technology, and Design of Small Arms and Light Weapons established under the UN Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument. I thank you for your active engagement in the discussions yesterday. Today we have 3 points on our agenda. First, we have the thematic panel discussion on international cooperation and assistance, and second, a discussion on the way forward relating to the OETG Third, I will introduce to you the additional elements for today's discussion that will be included in the Chair's Summary, so the key takeaway points. Given the time consideration, we shall now turn to the third thematic panel discussion on international cooperation and assistance, building capacities, sharing expertise, and technical assistance to address the challenges and opportunities presented by developments in the manufacturing technology and design of small arms and light weapons. I wish also to refer you to the guiding questions 7 to 9 available in the 6 languages as Document A/CONF.192/BMS/2026/L.5. I also note that printed versions are available in the room. We will first hear from the panel of expert briefers. The bios have been made available on MeetingPlace. After their presentations, I shall open the floor for views from member states. Colleagues, there is no established list of speakers for these discussions. Experts and delegates are reminded to request the floor by pressing the speaker button in front of you, and to please keep your intervention to 3 minutes, particularly this morning, given the work that we have to do and the limited time that we have. Statements should also be submitted to conventionalarms-unoeda@un.org for posting and meeting place. Of course, you can also send to eStatements. [SPEAKING FOREIGN LANGUAGE] I now welcome our first briefer to present to member states, and I'm pleased to give the floor to Ms. Lynn Hyder, Specialized Officer at the Firearms Program of Interpol. You have the floor, please.


INTERPOL · Specialized Officer · Lynn Hyder [3:01]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Distinguished delegates, dear colleagues, Interpol welcomes the opportunity to contribute to this open-ended technical expert group from a global law enforcement perspective. Privately manufactured firearms, including 3D-printed and hybrid firearms, present a direct challenge to the way states identify, trace, and investigate illicit weapons. The issue is not only the firearm itself, it's the wider ecosystem that enables its production, circulation, and use. In my briefing today, I will map out the steps needed to strengthen international cooperation in response to technical developments in firearms manufacturing, technology, and design. I'll begin by highlighting the need to strengthen existing legal and operational frameworks before explaining how Interpol's global policing tools can facilitate effective police cooperation in this field. I will conclude by offering recommendations. The first priority is to strengthen legal and operational frameworks. Member States may wish to consider how national frameworks regulate digital firearm design files, precursor components, partially manufactured receivers, barrels, firing mechanisms, other critical parts, and relevant manufacturing equipment, including, for instance, electrochemical machining for barrel manufacturing or 3D printed— 3D printers. This is particularly important because 3D printed and hybrid firearms do not always fit neatly within existing legal definitions. Across jurisdictions, there are still differences in what qualifies as a firearm, a controlled component, or illicit manufacture. From a law enforcement perspective, these definitional gaps matter. They affect whether a seizure can be recorded, whether a trace can be requested, whether a case can be linked to another jurisdiction, and whether investigators can act quickly. Legal frameworks should therefore be supported by clear operational procedures. This includes the criminalization of unauthorized, unauthorized manufacture, possession, transfer, and where consistent with national law, the distribution of firearm design files. Another aspect concerns detection and traceability. Privately manufactured firearms require additional investigative approaches beyond traditional marking and tracing. Forensic material analysis can help link components to production batches or suppliers. Print signature analysis may help associate parts with printer types or individual machines under specific conditions. Chemical taggants, digital watermarking, and file tracking may also provide future opportunities even though these raise technical and legal questions. Hybrid firearms are particularly important because they combine printed parts with conventional components. Barrels, slides, bolts, firing mechanisms, and ammunition can still provide investigative entry points through supply chain analysis, ballistic comparison, and existing tracing systems. Another element is capacity building. Frontline officers, forensic experts, customs authorities, prosecutors, and investigators need to recognize 3D-printed and hybrid firearms. Preserve polymer-based evidence, understand online dissemination channels, and use international databases and tools. Private sector engagement is also essential. Manufacturers of 3D printers, raw material— materials and design software, as well as online platforms, e-commerce services, payment providers, and logistic companies are all part of this ecosystem.

Thank you.

Interpol's secure global communication system connects Interpol's 196 member countries through their national central bureaus and specialized agencies. It provides a secure channel for police-to-police communication, including the reporting of seizures, exchange of intelligence, and transmission of investigative leads in a timely manner. This infrastructure already exists. It also gives authorized users access to Interpol's 19 global databases, which contain over 150 million police records. For emerging firearm threats, this is critical. When a 3D-printed or hybrid firearm is seized, the value of the seizure depends on how quickly information can be shared, compared, and connected to other cases. Interpol Purple Notices are another relevant tool. They allow countries to seek or provide information on criminal modi operandi, objects, devices, and concealment methods. In the context of privately manufactured firearms, purple notices can support the sharing of information on new designs, technical features, concealment techniques, production methods, and trafficking patterns. This is particularly useful where the threat is evolving quickly and where early warning can help countries recognize similar threats. The next tool is the Interpol Firearms Reference Table. IFRT was developed, developed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and is hosted by Interpol. It supports the identification of seized small arms and light weapons by providing standardized reference information for law enforcement users. The idea is for all countries to speak the same language when describing a firearm. In relation to privately manufactured and 3D-printed firearms, IFRT could play an important role in supporting the identification of recurring designs, components, and technical features. The module of IFRT on markings can also help officers identify falsified markings on seized weapons. There may also be scope to consider how IFRT can be further developed to host information on 3D-printed blueprints, images of seizures and recoveries, as well as ammunition-related reference material. Interpol's Illicit Arms Record and Tracing Management System, better known as IARMS, is the only global database dedicated to illicit firearm records. It allows countries to record and trace illicit firearms, including through its search engine, which gives immediate investigative leads on whether a recovered weapon has been reported as lost, stolen, trafficked, or suspected to be smuggled. iARMS supports tracing and the identification of diversion patterns, smuggling routes, and criminal networks. The latest version of iARMS also includes the possibility to record and trace parts and components. This is particularly relevant for hybrid firearms where the strongest—

Thank you.

Investigative lead may not be the printed frame, but the barrel, slide, firing mechanism, or other controlled component. It's important to mention that through IARMS, it's also possible to search and trace arms parts and components with partially obliterated serial numbers through the use of what we call wildcards. Member states are therefore encouraged to use IARMS systematically and to support its continued enhancement so that privately manufactured, 3D-printed, and hybrid firearms can be traced and analyzed. The Interpol Ballistic Information Network enables the international comparison of ballistic data and can help connect firearms used in crime scenes across countries. This becomes even more important where firearms lack conventional markings or reliable serial numbers. In such cases, forensic examination and ballistic comparison may become one of the strongest investigative pathways. In this context, Interpol has developed the Arsenal Criminal Analysis File. For privately manufactured and 3D-printed firearms, documenting seizures is essential. Individual seizures may, may appear isolated, but when properly recorded and analyzed, they may reveal links between suppliers, manufacturers, end users, online communities, logistic routes, and financial flows. Criminal intelligence analysis can also help identify technical signatures, recurring designs, production methods, and distribution patterns. Interpol is working closely with relevant private sector actors, including manufacturers of small arms and light weapon manufacturers of 3D printers, producers of raw material— materials, design software companies, online platforms, file repositories, e-commerce platforms, payment service providers, financial intermediaries, logistic companies, and shipping providers. Engagement with these actors can support prevention, detection, reporting, evidence preservation, and the generation of risk indicators. The aim is not to shift responsibility away from states. The aim is to recognize that the supply chain and digital environment around these weapons extend beyond traditional law enforcement investigation approaches and spill over onto the private domain. Based on this, Interpol proposes several practical recommendations for member states. First, systematically use Interpol's global policing tools, including IARMS, IBIN, IFRT, its communication channel, purple notices, and Arsenal criminal analysis file to support the identification, tracing, forensic analysis and investigation of privately manufactured firearms. Second, integrate Interpol's firearms recovery protocols and investigation protocols into national standard operating procedures so that every recovered firearm is exploited for intelligence purposes and linked where possible to broader trafficking networks. Third, strengthen the timely exchange of information through Interpol's communication channels and contribute relevant data to Interpol's analytical platforms. Including information on seizures, technical features, ballistic data, trafficking routes, and emerging modus operandi. Fourth, support the continued development of Interpol tools and databases, including IARMS and IFRT, so they can better record, trace, and analyze 3D-printed, privately manufactured firearms. Fifth, increase the submission and comparison of ballistic data through IBIN, especially where conventional markings are absent unreliable. Sixth, participate in Interpol-coordinated operations, including Operation Trigger, and strengthen joint investigations, information sharing, and coordinated enforcement action. Finally, continue engaging in Interpol-led capacity building training and expert processes under the Program of Action framework. To conclude, privately manufactured firearms and 3D-printed weapons challenge traditional systems of marking, identification, and tracing, but they do not relieve us from the responsibility of tracing. They actually make it much more urgent. The response should be to adapt and strengthen existing mechanisms, connect forensic, digital, and operational evidence, and ensure that every seizure contributes to a wider intelligence picture. We have prepared a written contribution with more details to inform the work of the Open-Ended Technical Expert Group. Thank you. And Interpol stands ready to support member countries in combating small arms and light weapons and emerging threats. Thank you.


OETG · Chair [14:39]:

Many thanks to Miss Aida. Thank you for your presentation that focused on the tools which Interpol have made available to its 196 member countries in dealing with tracing. And certainly, thank you also for the submission that was made by by Interpol to the work of the OETG. Now I turn to Mr. Calistus Joseph, who is Assistant Director Policy, Strategy and Innovation, Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security, CARICOM IMPASS, for his presentation. You have the floor.


CARICOM IMPACS · Assistant Director, Policy, Strategy and Innovation · Calistus Joseph [15:16]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair, distinguished delegates, fellow presenters. CARICOM welcomes the opportunity to present Thank you, Mr. President, and welcome to this distinguished forum. In my briefing today, I will provide a synthesis of CARICOM's experience regarding international assistance and cooperation for developing states. The focus is not on assistance as episodic support, but on— but as assistance as a mechanism for building durable national and regional capability. The central question is, whether international cooperation leaves institutions stronger, whether systems are more sustainable, and states better able to manage complex development and security challenges after external support ends. The central idea from this presentation is that assistance should be judged by the capabilities It creates. Development cooperation has moved beyond a narrow focus on delivery. The important question is not simply whether a workshop was held, whether equipment was procured, or a report was completed. The real test is whether the recipient state has stronger institutions, better systems, trained personnel, predictable financing, and ability to sustain performance after the project ends. Permit me to share with you 5 key principles for assistance and cooperation effectiveness. First, country ownership. Developing states must lead the identification of priorities and reforms. Second, alignment. Partners should support national systems and strategies rather than create parallel implementation structure. Third, harmonization. Donors should coordinate to avoid duplication and reduce administrative burden. Fourth, managing for results. Assistance should be judged by outcomes and institutional performance. Fifth, mutual accountability. Both donor and recipient states should be transparent about commitments, delivery, and results. These principles remain— Thank you. The foundation of effective international cooperation. So what works? The evidence indicates that assistance is most effective when it is designed as institutional building. That means the work starts from the needs of the country or region, and it's aligned to national strategies and sector priorities. It also means support is sequenced—diagnosis, should lead to policy reform, legal authority, operational procedures, staffing, systems, financing, and monitoring. Assistance should be embedded in national systems rather than placed outside them. The ultimate measure is not whether the project was completed, but whether the institution can perform better and sustain that performance. It is also important to understand What fails? Assistance fails when it is fragmented, donor-driven, short-term, or disconnected from national systems. It also fails when external consultants substitute for national capacity rather than build it. This often happens when consultants and development partners do the work, write the reports, design the systems, and then leave. Without transferring skills, authority, or operational control. Equipment donations can also fail where there is no maintenance plan, no recurrent budget, no trained operators, and no legal or institutional mandate. These interventions may produce visible outputs, but they do not build durable capability.

Capability.

Capability. Training individuals Training is important, but training alone is not sufficient. A trained officer cannot perform effectively if the institution lacks procedures, tools, or authority. Durable capability emerge when these levels are developed together. Capacity building should be understood at 3 levels, whether it's people, organizations, and an enabling environment. We have been engaged in interesting conversation on technology transfer over the last day and a half. Donating equipment, software, or platforms does not automatically create national capability. A major issue is the difference between technology transfer and equipment transfer. A proper technology transfer package includes training, certification, maintenance, procurement planning, interoperability, data governance, legal authority, ethical safeguards, financing, and local adaptability. Technology must fit the context of the recipient institution. Systems that work in large, well-resourced environments may not be sustainable in small administrations. The objective is not to create— Thank you. Technology dependency, but to build the capacity to use, maintain, govern, and adapt technology. Financing is also central to international cooperation, but a key issue is not only the amount of money. Financing must be predictable, adequate, and connected to outcomes. Short-term funding can support activities, but it often cannot sustain institutions. Thank you. Assistance should include recurring costs such as staffing, maintenance, licensing, data systems, training, procurement, and replacement equipment. A practical sustainable test is whether the state can maintain the systems after donor funding ends. If there is no national budget line, no lifetime or life cycle cost analysis, and no recurrent financing plan, the intervention is unlikely to be sustainable.


Speaker 5 [21:29]:

Thank you.


CARICOM IMPACS · Assistant Director, Policy, Strategy and Innovation · Calistus Joseph [21:30]:

For many developing states, especially small states, regional cooperation is a force multiplier. It allows countries to pool scarce resources, expertise, harmonize standards, coordinate partners, reduce duplication, and strengthen collective bargaining power. South-South cooperation is also important because it enables peer learning among states facing comparable constraints. Triangular cooperation can also add value by combining developing countries' experience with financing, technology, and specialist expertise from other partners. The key point is that small states do not need to build every capability alone. Regional platforms can convert limited national capacity into collective capability.


Speaker 7 [22:20]:

Thank you.


CARICOM IMPACS · Assistant Director, Policy, Strategy and Innovation · Calistus Joseph [22:22]:

One of the strongest messages is that measurement must move beyond activities. Too often we describe our support as we had a workshop, we trained 50 persons. This cannot be development. Counting workshops, missions, equipment deliveries, and reports does not demonstrate that capacity has been built. A stronger results framework tracks the movement from inputs to activities, from activities to outputs, from outputs to capabilities, and from capabilities to outcomes. The weak measure is how many workshops were delivered. The stronger measure is can the institution sustain performance? Are systems being used? Are staff also— Thank you. Able to perform? Has coordination improved? Are services better? Has risk been reduced? Now, I just want to outline a key project which will show some of the best practices that we are doing in CARICOM. This project is— which is providing licensing and registration system to countries in the Caribbean. It is actually funded by the government of Germany. But importantly for this project, we also have South-South cooperation learning from other countries. We also have in this project training in countries, and the recipient basically was the one who requested that project. So it's not just about giving countries tools, but also creating the framework, the legal framework, also creating what are some of the best practice tools those countries need. Another project I would like to just quickly state too is our Crime Gun Intelligence Unit. This project is a project between the CARICOM and the United States of America, but it works with other countries globally, whereby for this project, we looked at— looking at faster leads connecting cases in terms of looking at trends of firearms in the world, and it has increased the capabilities in all countries in the Caribbean.


Speaker 9 [24:31]:

Thank you.


CARICOM IMPACS · Assistant Director, Policy, Strategy and Innovation · Calistus Joseph [24:33]:

So in closing, and I know we only have 7 minutes, they told me, but I'm at minute number 5, so I still have 2 minutes, and the chair is watching me like I only have passed my time. So what are some of the strategic implications for developing states? The key message is that assistance should not be viewed as isolated project support, but as a mechanism for building durable institutional capability and capacity. First, assistance must be anchored in national and regional priorities rather than donor project cycles. This strengthens ownership, alignment, and long-term relevance. Second, cooperation should transfer skills, systems, and authority. External partners should not substitute for national institutions. They should help build institutions that can lead, manage and sustain results. Third, technology should be treated as a capability package. It requires maintenance, governance, legal authority. And fourth, regional platforms should be used as a pool to pool expertise. The core message is that international cooperation should be framed as a shared responsibility and capability transfer. I thank you, Mr. Chair.


OETG · Chair [25:54]:

Thank you so much, Mr. Joseph. I was looking at you because I really love listening to you, from the Security Council into your presentation this morning. Certainly, you were well within your time. Thank you for the presentation that really focused on not only the CAICOM perspective, but really the strong message on building a mechanism for sustainable and durable capacity building and capacities. I think— that was really quite valuable. Next, we move on to— and of course, since you've mentioned time, to remind the presenters of the 7 minutes given to you. Next, we'll turn to Mr. Mansour Al Sultan, who is Director of Weapons Regulation and Small Arms Liaison at the Ministry of Interior, Republic of Iraq. You have the floor, please. Shukran sayyid al-Ra'id.


Iraq · Director of Weapons Regulation and Small Arms Liaison · Mansour Al Sultan [26:43]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Good morning. Good afternoon to you all. I'm from the Republic of Iraq, the Iraqi National Focal Point for Small Arms and Light Weapons, and the rapporteur of the small arms and light weapons. We are a country that dates back to 7,000 years. We have suffered from armed conflicts due to small weapons. We've had more than 5 conflicts over the past 5— 50 years. We are one of those countries that is really yearning for and looking forward to ensure international and national peace and security. The government of Iraq has established specialized and ad hoc committees to ensure the protection of civilians and their properties and assets. We are one of the countries that have garnered support and international assistance from the U.N., the Interpol, and— NGOs, small army survey. And right now, I'll present this presentation of the Republic of Iraq, which has witnessed transformative phases following the support of specialized entities. I'll start by an introduction and some of the challenges. The challenges encompass most of the countries participating and present in this chamber. To make the best use of time and I will try to present these briefly, and then I'll outline the efforts of the government and the strategic national measures undertaken, including all government and civilian weapons that are used to commit crimes. And as you have— you can see, this is the, uh, chart explaining all kinds of arms used to commit crimes, whether they are stolen, confiscated, or seized. And this was thanks to a great cooperation with Interpol and the UNODC, which through that office we initiated the tracing procedure regionally and nationally to uncover crimes. And in this vein, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that we have achieved a great milestone thanks to the registration of citizen weapons, as you can see from this Slide. We have registered citizens' weapons for free through a cooperation between the Iraqi agencies, and the citizen can actually register his own weapons and have a— the necessary paperwork to ensure the legal use of such weapons, and we achieved two results. First, we had a full-fledged database of all weapons, uh, present, and we have, um, ensured that the citizen can own weapon. However, it has to be legally registered and kept in records. Then we, uh, started the marking process And in my previous intervention, I have touched upon this marking process, which is of great importance on the national level to prevent the stealing of such weapons and diverting it. We work with the experts' team in line with 174 and 187 and 200— 219 paragraphs on the review conference, and they have supported us in this vein. International cooperation was very important. We've made visits to the UNODC in 2020, 2022, 2023, and would like to thank Ms. Amanita, and prior to that, Mr. Mohal. Thank you. From the Disarmament Institute, Mr. Ohawa has prepared a draft for our national effort, and Small Arms Survey has also assisted us nationally and regionally. To conclude, we have some recommendations. International cooperation and capacity building is not constrained to one form that fits all. However, we have to all participate in this domain to ensure national peace and security. I would like to reiterate my thanks to the different UN agencies— UNIDIR, UNODC, UNODA, and Small Arms Survey. Peace and blessings of God be upon you.


OETG · Chair [32:07]:

Thank you so much, Major General Ali Sultan. Thank you for your presentation. It's a clear case of local ownership and international cooperation really coming together in terms of the efforts of your government and administration, as well as results achieved in the marking exercise. And indeed, yesterday you spoke about the national-level marking as well. Now I would proceed to our next briefer, and I turn to— Somewhere closer to home, Mr. Christian Marat, who is Commissioner of the Sierra Leone Commission on Arms and Ammunition, joining us online. Commissioner, you have the floor. Can you hear me? From online, Mr. Mara? While we wait to get—


Sierra Leone · Retired Commissioner · Christian Fahey Mara [33:21]:

Can you hear me now, sir?


OETG · Chair [33:22]:

Oh yes, we can hear you. So please, Commissioner, you have the floor.


Sierra Leone · Retired Commissioner · Christian Fahey Mara [33:26]:

My apologies, Excellencies. Distinguished guests, experts, good morning. Let me take this opportunity to thank you, Mr. Chairman and organizers of the 9th Biennial Meeting of States, for the opportunity to brief on the topic, "Assistance Need for Technological and Digital Solutions to Support Program of Action and International Trace Instrument Implementation in Sierra Leone." I'm— as introduced, Major General Christian Fahey Mara, retired Commissioner of the Sierra Leone Commission on Arms Annihilation. As Sierra Leone notes, the continued attention this body places on the implementation of the program of action, which is intended to prevent combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects. The evidence is there for us to see, and I will not want to bother you with the detail as such an expert group you are. But to give you a background of, um, the commission's effort, the Sierra Leone Commission on Arms and Ammunition was established by an act of parliament in 2010, act by act number 6. And today, the legal framework for the commission's effort is act number 24 of 2023. This new act expanded the mandate of the Commission and ensures its compliance with the United Nations Programme of Action signed in 2001, the Arms Trade Treaty, which was signed and ratified in 2013 and 2014 respectively, the International Tracing Instrument adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005, and the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their ammunition, and other related materials. Let me now focus on the meat of the presentation, which is our national effort in program of action and international tracing instrument implementation. As the Alliance effort in the implementation of the Programme of Action and the International Trace and Instrument can be explained through the following activities: marking of state-owned weapons, number one. As part of our implementation effort, the Commission has been conducting the marking and computerization of state-owned weapons. These are weapons in the arms— and of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces and the Sierra Leone Police. These markings are done using the dot pen and laser marking machines and the ECHOART standard protocol. The availability of such a machine has enhanced the traceability and accountability of state-owned weapons. The next activity is the licensing of civilian weapons. This is done on an annual basis and licensing is issued to people for self-defense, farming, and hunting purpose. The next and third activity is the construction and rehabilitation of state-owned— State-owned— armories. The Sierra Leone Commission, through the support of the Mann's Advisory Group, has facilitated nationwide construction and rehabilitation of 22 standard armories for the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces and the Sierra Leone Police. In addition, training for security personnel as either armory stockkeepers or as armory managers is done regularly. We, um— The fourth activity is the destruction of small arms and light weapons. In 2025, through the support of the Voluntary Trust Fund of the Arms Treaty, the Commission procured 4 standard weapon destruction machines and trained 30 security personnel on the safe use of this equipment and conducted a nationwide destruction of 3,934 obsolete small arms and light weapons. The destruction and disposal of these obsolete weapons ensured a reduction in stockpiles of obsolete weapons, thereby mitigating the risk of recirculation and diversion. Our— the fifth is the decentralization of our Commission's operations. We have decentralized the operation of the Commission to 2 out of the 6 regions and to 40 out of the 110 border communities in the country through the support of the Organized Crime West Africa Response to Trafficking, or Kwati for short. 2 new regions will be established in the third quarter of this year. Other activities are the physical security and stockpile management the launch of our National Action Plan with technical support from the Small Arms Survey. The National Action Plan aligns with the Sierra Leone National Development Plan and serves as a guiding framework for the implementation of the Sierra Leone Weapons and Ammunition Management Strategy for a period of 5 years. The Commission has consistently embarked on robust stakeholder and community engagement programs aimed at increasing awareness on the role of the Commission and the importance of preventing, combating, and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects. This is achieved through radio programs, community engagement, etc. Our next activity is the survey of craft producers, local manufacturers. The Commission conducted a nationwide survey of all local firearms producers. The survey revealed that there are 377 manufacturers and repairers across the country. Fortunately, 94% of this number have opted to abandon the trade, provided they are supported with alternative livelihoods. Thank you. The bottleneck is that the Commission is challenged with the much-needed resources to provide them with such alternative livelihoods. And another important aspect is that frantic efforts are being made to acquire centralized digital record-keeping systems, such as the installation of an effective and functional arms tracker for the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces the Sierra Leone Police and the Commission. This has already been procured, and then we are expecting them in the next 6 weeks or thereabouts. Furthermore, Sierra Leone requires support to facilitate the collection and analysis of data on craft production and 3D printing of small arms and light weapons, and most importantly, the international cooperation to share data and knowledge and training for law enforcement officers are relevant for effective implementation. Supporting Sierra Leone with advanced technology to prevent, detect, and counter small arms and light weapons diversion could be a game changer as we embark on our challenge to ensure our presence is felt in every district and every chiefdom of the country. Thank you. We also want to have our presence in the entry point, the airport and the seaport, and also the Class A crossing point with the Republic of Liberia and Guinea. Thank you so much for your attention. I hope I have not gone beyond my 7 minutes, Your Excellency, sir.


OETG · Chair [42:00]:

Thank you so much. Commissioner Fahim Maga. I think on the basis that you shared Sierra Leone's experience and the Chair's bias, I think the time was fine. Thank you for listing the activities, but more importantly, you were able to link them with international cooperation and assistance made available for Sierra Leone to have undertaken some of the activities which you've cited and the challenges. Now I will turn to Mr. Johnson Asante Twum, Managing Director, International Action Network on Small Arms, for your presentation, and I hope I got the second compound name correct. You have the floor.


IANSA · Managing Director · Johnson Asante Twum [42:46]:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. You got it correct. I think most people are unable to pronounce the T-W-U, well, it's Twum, but you got it right. Thank you, Mr. Chair, distinguished delegates. Thank you for the opportunity to be part of this maiden edition of the Open-Ended Technical Expert Group on New Technology, of course, representing the International Action Network on Small Arms, IANSA. According to the International Telecommunication Union report 2024, 93% of the population in high-income countries uses the internet, approaching universality. This contrasts starkly with the situation in low-income countries, where only 27% of the population is online. This is the reflection of the technological gap between the two groups of states, the high-income and low-income, and this is the context within which the topic international cooperation and assistance will be situated. Technological advancement in the 21st century is equally affecting the production of small arms and light weapons, and of course their control. Additive manufacturing technology such as 3D printing can now be used to manufacture small arms and light weapons. Of course, this has gone on for some time. Additionally, broad range of operational requirements faced by armed forces and security agencies has driven the development of modular designs for military specification rifle.


Speaker 19 [44:15]:

Thank you.


IANSA · Managing Director · Johnson Asante Twum [44:16]:

Modern assault rifles can now be built around central components, typically the upper receiver, to which various interchangeable parts may be attached. That enables different configurations to be tailored for specific functions or mission requirements. These developments, Mr. Chair, include the adoption of unconventional materials such as polymers, as well as increasingly modular weapon configurations. Integration and technologies relevant for the marking, record keeping, and tracing of small arms and light weapons. Such innovations include laser engraving, micro stamping, and automated systems for data collection, information management, and tracking, as well as delivery and positioning of weapons. But plastics and polymers have increasingly substituted metal in the manufacture of small arms frames and receivers. And these materials have several benefits, which include the reduced production cost, production of lighter weight weapons. Weapons produced through these methods have improved resistance to moisture. Weapons have greater economic flexibility. And then they have enhanced thermal insulation properties. However, the use of such materials could hinder marking and tracing of small arms and light weapons. Weapons. And paragraph 10 of the International Tracing Instrument prescribes the application of a unique marking to essential or structural component of the weapon, such as the frame and/or the receiver, and also encourages the marking of other parts of the weapon, such as the barrel and/or slide or the cylinder. The design of such configuration may lead to increased risk of mis— identification. But what is the implication for marking? Markings placed directly on polymer frames and receivers, unlike those applied to metal components, fail to meet the ITI requirements that markings should be durable and recoverable to the greatest extent technically feasible. Mr. Chair, I will highlight just two aspects of these technology and new innovations because a lot of experts have spoken already on them and then set the tone for my conversation. Laser technology can be used for marking a large spectrum of small arms and light weapons, parts and components, including very small parts and components. The surface of such objects is marked through burning by oxidation. But again, what is the implication for the ITI? It can be erased more easily. Obfuscated laser engravings are more difficult to recover. Nonetheless, relief polishing and reflected light stereomicroscopy can, in certain cases, successfully reveal obliterated serial numbers originally marked by laser. But here is the big question: how many states have the resources and the technical capacity to recover such erased markings? Microstamping, on the other hand, are made by stamping, and it can potentially prevent or reduce illicit trading because such marks are not easily detectable for those wishing to erase them. Moreover, by micro-marking the firing pin of a weapon, an imprint can be made on each fired cartridge that could aid forensic investigation— collection of criminal investigations. The implication for marking, record keeping, and tracing is that micro-marking of parts and components may considerably reduce— enhance record keeping and traceability. For instance, when applied to the firing pin, microstamping technology makes it possible to identify a firearm solely from a recovered cartridge casing without requiring the physical access to the weapon itself. Now, international cooperation and assistance. Indeed, new technology offers both opportunities and challenges. Which opportunities need to be harnessed collectively and the challenges dealt with collaboratively if the fight against small arms and light weapon proliferation is to be won in the face of the ever rapidly developing technology. And that is where international cooperation and assistance begin. Nations and regional blocs do not have to operate in silos if progress is to be made in the fight against the ills of new technology and if the benefits are to be reaped collectively. Already, Mr. Chair, Automated Prohibition Item Detection Systems, APADS, as I may call it, are generating conversation about their efficiency in handling of large volume of baggage and parcels, complementing human effort at extremely busy airports and other terminals. At the same time, there is the fear of the system being developed on inadequate data. It is in such situations that international cooperation and assistance need to be initiated, where the system is built on datasets from all regions of the world, so that when it is deployed, it can function effectively everywhere. My call is that international cooperation and assistance should start from the initial developmental stages of new technology, so as to carry the unique circumstances of all possible future uses on board. Now, capacity building. And Mr. Chair, capacity building must be explored by states, working with civil society in the following areas. One, legal and legislative reforms that embraces new technology in existing laws to enable the effective utilization of technology and efficient control of small arms and light weapons, their parts and components manufactured by new technology. Two, capacity enhancement for regulatory agencies in the areas of standardization and certification of new technology must be explored. Mr. Chair, in most developing countries, competent national authorities need capacity enhancement on new technologies to keep up with the speed of technological development, to be able to regulate and certify technology that is either being sold to them or being developed in their own countries. We are all as strong as our weakest link, and it is therefore important that the beginning of technology is disseminated to cover all. Three, building capacity of customs police and national authorities in good practices across the world would enhance effective detection, arrest, and successful prosecution, especially in less-capacitated states. And it is important that access is granted to, uh, CISA and ballistic databases of countries that already have it to enhance effective tracing and, uh, efficient tracing. Thank you. Many of the developing countries are still grappling with the reality of artificial intelligence, let alone developing capabilities for the AI regulations. These are the areas where international cooperation and assistance is immediately required, because criminals are selling blueprints of 3D printing of small arms online, both in the dark web and through the open site. And many states have no regulatory capability or legal framework to deal with such menace. If we are to collectively benefit from the opportunities offered by technology and to fight their negative effect on small arms and light weapons proliferation, then the barriers of technology— technological transfer in this area must be removed. Mr. Chair, it is an understatement to say that there is a huge technological gap between high-income countries and low-income countries, and obviously the scale tilts in favor of the developed countries. Progress in balancing the scale of technological development would mean the removal of existing barriers if international cooperation and assistance is to benefit all. Barriers of (a) high cost of technology that enhances the ability of states a) to detect modular and polymer weapons, as well as technology that improves marking and tracing; and b) restrictive access to new technology that assists in the detection and control of weapons manufactured by new technology needs to be removed as part of international cooperation and assistance. Mr. President, developing countries also have a responsibility. A responsibility to: A, create the enabling environment that allows for the improvement in investment climate to attract innovative firms or allow existing ones to grow. B, invest in enabling technology or ballistic infrastructure such as improved telecommunication, Internet of Things, and reliable electricity. See, improved technical education that emphasizes new technology across all levels, and this is no longer— can no longer be a wish, but a reality. Concluding, Mr. President, distinguished delegates, if we are to make progress in the full and effective utilization of the positives that new technology has to offer, and deal with the ills to ensure a safe and a secure world, then it mustn't be about how fast we move forward as individual countries, but about making sure that everyone moves forward together. I thank you.


OETG · Chair [54:22]:

Many thanks to you, Mr. Assante-Choom, for your briefing, and of course many thanks to Ayasan for work in this area and bringing together the element of international cooperation as well as views on the opportunities with technology and of course the challenges that were discussed yesterday. So colleagues, we've heard from all of our briefers. They've set the scene, I think, in a very helpful and valuable way. I will now open the floor for states to intervene. I encourage all delegates that want to speak to kindly request the floor now so we know how best to manage the time, given the tight time constraints that we will be working under. So the floor is open, and I really appeal to all to request as early as possible and also to keep to the 3-minute time. And I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, please.


Iran (Islamic Republic of) [55:29]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. At the outset, I would like to congratulate you on your election as chair of the Open-Ended Technical Expert Group. My delegation assures you of its readiness to engage constructively in the work of the group and to contribute to outcome that remains balanced and fully consistent with its agreed mandate. We would also like to express our appreciation to the distinguished panelists for their insightful presentations. Mr. Chair, references to international cooperation and assistance alongside other substantive issues, in this case, the opportunities and challenges arising from development in the manufacturing technology and design of small arms and light weapons, should not be treated as merely procedural or symbolic. Doing so could create the impression that international cooperation and assistance are being invoked primarily to secure the support of developing countries for other substantive initiatives, rather than reflecting a genuine commitment to addressing their actual needs and priorities through concrete, practical, and operational measures. My delegation wishes to emphasize that pursuant to paragraphs paragraphs 174 and 175 of the outcome document of the Fourth Review Conference, the OETEG has been explicitly mandated not only to consider the opportunities and challenges arising from development in the manufacturing technology and design of small arms and light weapons, but also to prioritize the identification of concrete recommendations on international cooperation and assistance. This element of the mandate was neither incidental nor procedural. Rather, it was a key basis upon which many developing countries agreed to the establishment of the OETEG— Identifying challenges and opportunities arising from technological developments and on that basis introducing new commitments for states must be accompanied by practical measures that enable all states, particularly developing countries, to effectively address those challenges and benefit from new technologies. Without such a balance, new measures or expectations will create additional burdens, particularly for developing countries, without providing the necessary means for their effective implementation. Accordingly, my delegation believes that any consensus recommendations emerging from the work of the group should place concrete, predictable, non-discriminatory, and sustainable international cooperation and assistance at the center of its outcomes. This should include technical and financial assistance, capacity capacity building, transfer of technology, and the provision of equipment necessary for implementation. In this regard, Mr. Chair, I would like to seek the views of the panelists on the following question: What specific technologies and equipment should be made available to developing countries to enable them to address the challenges posed by technological developments, particularly polymer and modular weapons, and firearms produced through 3D printing, while also benefiting from the opportunities these developments may offer. I thank you, Mr. Chair.


OETG · Chair [59:07]:

I thank the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the intervention and the question. Next on my list I have Cameroon, to be followed by Switzerland and Australia. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Cameroon, please. Merci, Mr. Chair.


Cameroon [59:26]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor. I— is this the first time I'm taking the floor?— would also like to congratulate you on your election to lead our work, and you can count on our support. I have very closely followed the briefings presented by the experts, and I commend all of these remarks that have shed light on the various perspectives. I retained a number of keywords. First of all, technological development— Technology constraints. As well as technological gaps in the firearms ecosystem. Also, there is the agility of traffickers and the complicity of certain other actors. So I'd like to ask the experts, given this constellation, how do we help the most vulnerable states not get bogged down in this battle, given that until all of us are safe, none of us are safe. Thank you.


OETG · Chair [1:00:51]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Cameroon for the intervention, certainly the kind words directed to the chair, and for the question as well. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Switzerland, to be followed by Australia and Germany.


Switzerland [1:01:07]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. And I would also like to thank our briefers today for their valuable inputs to this discussion. International cooperation and assistance is the connective tissue of the POA and the ITI. The technologies cross borders easily while the capacity to respond is often unevenly distributed. The recommendations we develop today and over the next few iterations of the technical expert group will deliver their full value only if states can act on them. Switzerland has long supported cooperation through funding and secondment of technical expertise, and we will continue to do so. Let me offer three considerations. First, with regards to the architecture of assistance, RevCon IV mandated a structured procedure to match offers and requests. We see this as the principal vehicle for technology-related assistance under the POA and the ITI.— and appreciate UNODA's update during this week's meeting. Second, assistance works best when needs-driven, nationally owned, sustainable, and aligned with international and regional instruments. Technological integration must respond to existing systems, not duplicate or override them. A clear endorsement of this principle in the recommendations would be welcomed. Third, on the technology gap, RevCon IV calls on states in a position to do so to facilitate transfer of technology, knowledge, and equipment. Switzerland supports this through concrete projects in stockpile security, marking equipment, customs capacity, and forensic identification. In our view, a recommendation systematizing good practice on technology transfer and technological— technical assistance in general would be useful. In Switzerland's view, this group's recommendations will be most valuable if aimed at sharpening existing tools, processes, and instruments rather than adding new ones. I thank you, Mr. Chair.


OETG · Chair [1:02:58]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Switzerland for the intervention, certainly citing some recommendations already. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Australia, to be followed by Germany and Mexico. Australia, please.


Australia [1:03:14]:

Thank you, Chair. Australia welcomes the opportunity to contribute to this technical discussion on strengthening international cooperation and assistance to address the challenges and opportunities presented by developments in manufacturing technology and design of small arms and light weapons. Australia experience— Australia's experience demonstrates that investing in practical, sustainable technologies, practices, and systems is essential for effective implementation of the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument. Chair, firstly, on good practices, Australia is continuing to further develop our robust system across marking, record keeping, and tracing, and— apologies— record keeping and tracing that are both effective and scalable. Australia ensures that firearms are uniquely identified and marked at the point of manufacture or import where necessary, ensuring traceability across across the full lifecycle. These markings are supported by centralized electronic registries maintained at the state and territory level with our national— with national interoperability. Our approach has shown that a layered, near-real-time integrated electronic database can effectively balance the cost and ensure long-term sustainability while leveraging existing law enforcement infrastructure rather than creating entirely new systems. Thank you. Chair, in tracing and analysis, Australia uses these integrated databases and intelligence sharing platforms to support investigative— investigations and disrupt illicit trafficking. Importantly, these systems are designed to be user-friendly, enabling the adaptability— adaptable integration with our policing partners, depending on their varying technical capacity. International cooperation has shown the value of information sharing networks and joint operations, particularly in responding to emerging risks such as 3D printed firearms and illicit online procurement. Australia works closely with regional organizations and partners to enhance border detection capabilities, forensic identification techniques, and digital investigation skills. Critically, Australia's approach emphasizes practical assistance over complexity. Focusing on solutions that are affordable, maintainable, and locally owned. This ensures long-term sustainability and genuine capacity building. Chair, in conclusion, Australia stands ready to continue sharing expertise and supporting cooperation efforts that strengthen global implementation of the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument. By combining proven technologies with regional collaboration and tailored assistance, we can collectively address both current and emerging challenges. Thank you.


OETG · Chair [1:05:58]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Australia for the intervention. Next on the list, I have Germany to be followed by Mexico. That is the last speaker on the list for now. I give the floor to Germany, please.


Germany [1:06:15]:

Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor. I would also like to thank the panelists for the insightful Recent developments in the manufacturing technology and design of small arms and light weapons have created new challenges for states and regional organizations alike. At the same time, these developments also provide valuable opportunities to strengthen prevention, detection, tracing, and control efforts. As a strong supporter of multilateral cooperation, Germany has been actively supporting regional and sub-regional organizations in addressing these emerg— —challenges in the development of innovative responses. For example, the German-supported SADC Chapter to Silence the Guns, the Caribbean Firearms Roadmap, and the curriculum of the African Union Fellowship on Disarmament are actively addressing challenges related to modular weapons, polymer-framed weapons, and privately manufactured firearms produced through additive or subtractive manufacturing processes. These experiences clearly demonstrate the value of regional cooperation in identifying emerging risks and developing context-specific responses. Furthermore, Mr. Chair, Germany provides capacity-building, policy, and technical support to a wide range of states and partners. In this regard, Germany wishes to highlight, as outlined in our working paper submitted to the website of the 9th Biennial Meeting of States, that effective responses posed to the technological developments require close coordination, cooperation, and practical implementation among a broad range of stakeholders on a strategic, operational, and technical level. This includes specialized technical entities, relevant regional and sub-regional organization, governmental authorities such as the German Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control and the German Armed Forces Verification Center, as well as non-governmental organizations and research institutions. One of the key lessons learned from these regional and sub-regional initiatives The fact is that cooperation amongst actors with complementary expertise considerably enhances the effectiveness of responses. Such cooperation is particularly relevant in the context of increasingly blurred distinctions between weapon system parts, components, and ammunition, which create additional challenges for effective weapons and ammunition management, as well as for identification, tracing, and regulatory oversight. Germany's experience from these regional initiatives and multi-stakeholder interventions demonstrates that collaborative and multidisciplinary approaches help define regions' priorities at the political and policy level, facilitate the exchange of expertise and good practices, strengthen both preventive and operational responses at the national, sub-regional, regional level, and contribute to the more efficient use of available resources. Germany therefore encouraged the Chair to reflect this cooperative model in the summary report of the meeting and to recognize the important role that partnerships amongst technical, governmental, regional, and civil society actors can play in addressing both the challenges and opportunities presented by the developments in the manufacturing technology and design of small arms and light weapons. I thank you, Chair.


OETG · Chair [1:09:28]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Germany for the intervention. On the list now I have Mexico, Nigeria, United States, and Dominican Republic. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico, please. Muchas gracias. Thank you very much, Chair.


Mexico [1:09:45]:

We are grateful to the panelists for the information shared with us. I now wish to make a number of comments, general comments, And then I will raise a question in view of what has been said this morning. Mexico supports an architecture for international cooperation which is consistent, complementary, and mutually reinforcing when it comes to arms control. The Programme of Action, the Arms Trade Treaty, the Firearms Protocol, the CISTA, our other regional initiatives, as well as the global framework for conventional ammunitions throughout the lifecycle— these tools are all more more effective when they work in synergy and when they harness existing synergies. With this in mind, Mexico is of the view that future recommendations of the OETEG must serve to strengthen this normative and institutional ecosystem, avoiding overlapping efforts or the creation of parallel processes. This is particularly important as we are in the midst of a financial liquidity crisis. Moreover, international cooperation sustained over time is vital to harness opportunities offered by technological progress. No marking, tracing, or detection system can function effectively without information exchange, exchange of technical assistance, and without capacity building. This is particularly important in regions in which criminal networks operate transnationally and are highly organized, flexible, and able to adapt. As such, we reaffirm the importance of North-South cooperation, South-South cooperation, and triangular cooperation as crucial tools to make progress with these goals. In our view, the group must focus on issuing practical, action-focused, implementation-focused, applicable recommendations that can be tailored to different national contexts. We should avoid reopening normative debates. For Latin America and the Caribbean, our priority remains bolstering the effective implementation of already existing commitments guaranteeing that technologies access is accessible and tailored to the needs of states without— with different operational capacities without creating dependencies on external financial systems. And we also shouldn't create systems that are difficult to to maintain. Finally, I wish to go back to what was said in terms of the valuable experience shared this morning by international organizations and various regional mechanisms. We are particularly interested to learn of examples of international cooperation and assistance that are not limited to technology or equipment transfer, rather initiatives which involve systems for cooperation between governments and other stakeholders. Very specifically, we'd like to know whether there are experiences in which states, particularly developing states, have worked with academia, the private sector, industry, or other relevant stakeholders to identify diversion risks, the risks of diversion that is into the hands of non-authorized actors. And how have they worked on good practices to prevent that diversion? If such initiatives do exist, could the panelists share with us the lessons that have been learned that the group could incorporate into future recommendations that it will issue? Thank you.


OETG · Chair [1:13:23]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for the intervention as well as the question. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Nigeria. Nigeria, to be followed by United States and the Dominican Republic.


Nigeria [1:13:37]:

Let me thank Mr. Chair and the panelists. In the area of international cooperation and assistance, Nigeria has undertaken important institutional reforms, including the establishment of the National Centre for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, which serves as a national mechanism for implementation of the POA and ITI. International cooperation and assistance, of course, will be required in the area of arms destruction technology, tracing, marking, forensics, and a lot more. Nigeria's experience has demonstrated that sustainable solutions require not only technology acquisition, but also long-term training, maintenance support, and national ownership. Cost-effective and adaptable technologies are particularly important for developing countries facing significant resource constraints. I thank you.


OETG · Chair [1:14:44]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria for the intervention, and I will give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States Followed by Dominika Niepomblik.


United States of America [1:14:54]:

Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor, and good morning, colleagues. Let me start by also thanking the panelists for their informative interventions this morning and looking forward to sharing further views. For the United States, assistance and international cooperation is a cornerstone of our support to implementing the UN Programme of Action. Last year, we provided over $380 million alone loan for demining and weapons stockpile security, which is the highest one-year total for such assistance from the United States. Our objectives in supporting the implementation of the POA are clear. The projects that we fund counter the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons to deny firearms to cartels, terrorists, and criminal gangs targeting American citizens. As we consider our security assistance going forward, we are targeting that assistance assistance to maximize impacts. Our expectation is for implementers to make progress towards our goals while host countries devote resources of their own to sustain the gains that we've made possible together. Chair, as we reflect on international cooperation and assistance in this working group, we understand the need to balance these considerations going forward. I want to highlight in particular the United States— The Thank you. United States' assistance to CARICOM, both at the excellent side event on Monday with MINES Advisory Group, as well as the information provided from the representative from CARICOM this morning. Regional cooperation we see as an area to pursue further for assistance. In the case of CARICOM, our Weapons Stockpile Security Assistance is expanding work this year to the Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago, as well as Guyana, and we are pleased to continue support for ongoing work with the CARICOM Crime Gun Intelligence Unit and look forward to other opportunities at the regional and sub-regional levels. Thank you, Chair.


OETG · Chair [1:16:53]:

I thank the distinguished representative of the United States for the intervention, and I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Dominican Republic. Who is the last speaker on the list?


Dominican Republic [1:17:08]:

Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor. A good morning to colleagues. I greatly appreciate learning about the experiences shared by the panelists. I want to focus on the technological tools and most specifically on IT resources. The representative of Interpol talked to us about iARMS and talked to us about the arms catalogue of the Mounted Police of Canada. I think what most of us are aware of that initiative, that register. I think these are good examples. And I want to put all of this in context. [FOREIGN LANGUAGE] when we look at technological asymmetries between states. I think there are asymmetries. However, all of us here nevertheless have IT skills and technical capacities. So it's a responsibility of each and every state to recruit the technicians and the technical experts they need to serve whatever the overarching cause of their country might be and to work properly in this area. These Technical resources. Let's look at these. If we had a common framework, a common IT framework for registration and arms control systems, well, we'd now all be here singing from the same hymn sheet. When we go to the Republic of Korea or Brazil, if we don't take an interfax to connect up to the power grid, we don't have proper adapters, then we will run into difficulties in terms of accessing power and technology. I think this so-called interfax is the sort of intermediary between the software architecture that countries develop and a protocol that should be established as part of our work. [SPEAKING RUSSIAN] If we did that, it wouldn't matter what level of technological development a country had in comparison with another. If we focus on adhering to an established framework, for example, like a policy— that wouldn't be mandatory, but a policy that could be embraced by various states— we'd be singing from the same hymn sheet in terms then of sharing data and standardizing IT systems. If technological systems do have one benefit, it's that they standardise processes, and that avoids situations whereby different parties do things in different ways. Rather, what you see is the standardisation, the uniformisation of work. So, I would recommend that the working group think about how to establish a framework, such a framework, regardless of the programming language a country uses regardless of its level of development, a framework which would allow this interface to act as a filter between these various systems to uniformize them. Maybe I'm being a bit technical when I'm talking about this interface, but I do think there are examples. You can't simply implement a software tool. We all know about different softwares. Countries develop their own softwares. But I think the representative of Iraq discussed their unique annual licensing protocol. Licensing in other countries is done more often or less often, not every year, but licensing, for example, licensing operations are very unique to every country. As far as the Dominican Republic's concerned anyway, and maybe this is more broadly the case, there's not one piece of software in the world that could do what we do in terms of licensing and monitoring weapons and when they fall into the hands or are in the hands of civilians. So I think every country has their own unique features and their own unique operations. For example, in terms of licensing, licensing, and we should establish a core framework for work, but this licensing and arms control model, for example, is something that's very unique to every country. Thank you.


OETG · Chair [1:21:43]:

I thank the distinguished representative of the Dominican Republic for his intervention. Certainly this is an open-ended technical expert group, so we can always as well be technical in, in our submissions, so thank you for that suggestion. I have a request from another member state, so I give the floor to the distinguished representative of India, please.


India [1:22:06]:

Thank you, Chair. Our compliments and gratitude to the eminent speakers for their valuable insights. India reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the full and effective implementation of the UN Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument. India brings both a principled and a practical technical perspective to these OETG deliberations. Our delegation requests and calls on the OETG to recommend updating the ITI with specific technical guidance on marking mechanisms for polymer frames and modular weapon markings, drawing on practical experience from the affected states. Also, endorse technology-neutral —regulatory frameworks for additive manufacture of SALW at all levels, supported by POA-aligned model legislations. We need to strengthen international forensic cooperation through expanded participation in Interpol, IAMS, and IBN, with prioritized resourcing of national points of contact and national agencies. Adopt proactive approach in capacity building assistance to ensure ensure sustainability of marking, record-keeping, tracing, and PSSM technologies. We need to address proliferation of design blueprints by endorsing technical provisions to block the same at the global level. India stands ready to exchange constructively with all states in the OETG process to contribute its national experience, technical expertise, and capacity-building resources towards agreed recommendations by 2028. Thank you, Chair.


OETG · Chair [1:23:45]:

I thank the distinguished representative of India for the intervention and the helpful suggestions and recommendations. Distinguished colleagues, I do not see any further requests for the floor at the moment. What I will do, because of course we had questions posed to the panelists is to go back to the panelists and ask for their responses to the questions and also if they have any further— further more to say in terms of reacting to the interventions that have been made by member states. Yesterday, I went online to check to see if panelists online was there and wanted to comment first, so I I would check with Commissioner Faimaha whether you are online. I see a blue screen. Oh, we now see you. I don't know if you have any question that you want to respond to or reaction to the intervention. You have the floor, Commissioner. Thank you. We can't hear you, so perhaps maybe you are on mute.


Sierra Leone · Retired Commissioner · Christian Fahey Mara [1:25:07]:

Thank you so much, Your Excellency. Not so much to react to now, but I've been following the conversations and the other presentations and the questions. But if you have any directed to me, I will feel free ready to answer.


OETG · Chair [1:25:27]:

Thank you. Thank you so much. Thank you. And now I would invite, again, going by— I know there were a lot of questions for you, Ms. Lynn Aida, but yesterday I went by reverse order, so if you would permit me, I will start with Asante Chum, if you have any, and then of course go to—


Speaker 44 [1:25:48]:

Sir, please keep your camera on. Thank you.


OETG · Chair [1:25:55]:

I believe that's for the panelists online, and then I will continue with the rest of the panelists. Mr. Asante-Chiume.


IANSA · Managing Director · Johnson Asante Twum [1:26:06]:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I think there was a question from the distinguished delegate from the People's Republic of Iran. Forgive me if I didn't mention it correctly, wanting to know what specific equipment should be made available. I think from what has been presented and also taking cue from the lessons learned previously, this should be something that is agreed between the requesting states and the— state that is making the provision and based on your national priorities and specific needs. So you should be able to discuss this and make those recommendations based on your needs. Most times recommendation is that you would have conducted specific needs assessment to then arrive at what you think your needs are in this area and then you come you can make the request. So it's solely based on your priority, your needs, and then you make the request. So there is no hard and fast rule about what should be, but it is what you need and what works for you. And so it is context-specific, country-specific, and need-specific. I think this is the question I penciled down. There was another one about academia and all that. I do not have a specific example about academia, but what I do know in terms of unearthing diversion note, but I do know that in the specific case of Ghana, they conducted baseline surveys with the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Institute. So this is an example of collaboration between national authorities and also academic institutions, but I know there are a plethora of examples around where there are academic institutions that are conducting surveys. Small arms surveys and others are a typical example, but I'm sure colleagues can give specifics. Thank you very much.


OETG · Chair [1:28:18]:

Many thanks to you, Mr. Sante-Chum, for the response to the To question. two of the questions. I now go over to you, Major General Ali Sultan. Please, if you could react to some of the questions or intervention. The floor is yours.


Iraq · Director of Weapons Regulation and Small Arms Liaison · Mansour Al Sultan [1:28:41]:

I thank you, Chair. We're talking here about international assistance and this meeting demonstrates that international cooperation does exist and helps in terms of exchanging experiences and understanding country-specific situations' needs and is useful in terms of harnessing their experiences. I wish to pay tribute to the Dominican Republic that talked about national measures. Indeed, crime is a social phenomenon. However, we need deterrence. And among such measures, we can point to the experiences of countries and of their suffering and difficulties. Our region is beset by many conflicts. As authorities, we need to adopt national policies. I spoke about the Disarmament Office, UNIDIR. They provided us with assistance as part of that international cooperation, and with that assistance we developed a national policy. As you know, Chair, as you know, ladies and gentlemen, light weapons—


Speaker 49 [1:30:07]:

Thank you.


Iraq · Director of Weapons Regulation and Small Arms Liaison · Mansour Al Sultan [1:30:08]:

80% of light weapons are held by civilians, 13% are in the hands of armed forces, 2% lie with law enforcement authorities. We discussed our experience, our experiences of electronic registration through a portal under the aegis of the Home Affairs Ministry. This portal The portal is free. It can be freely accessed by businesses, by individuals. They can register a light weapon freely. The government does not ask for any payment to be made, and we through this have been able to learn about stolen weapons, and we've received information in connection with crimes. We've worked with the judiciary to learn about which weapons are authorized and which are not. So here I'm talking about national measures. As regards what Iran said, you talked about equipment. As an expert, I can talk about— Weapons. What's happening nationally, measures that have been launched nationally. We need legislation, we need a regulatory framework. These need to be created and designed to take account of international experiences and to learn from that experiences in order then to serve the interests of individuals and citizens. Thank you.


OETG · Chair [1:31:52]:

Many thanks to you, Ms. Ali Sultan, for the responses provided. And thank you for sharing your experience at the national level. Next, I'll move on to Mr. Callistus Joseph. You had quite a few interventions and questions directed to you and the excellent examples you shared, so I give you the floor to respond.


CARICOM IMPACS · Assistant Director, Policy, Strategy and Innovation · Calistus Joseph [1:32:15]:

Thank you, Chair, Your Excellency. I'd also like to thank the distinguished representatives for their interventions. Their questions and their comments. Firstly, the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, I think what his question was, what specific technology should be made for developing states? With regard to that question, we believe that countries should lead their priorities. It should be based on countries' priorities in terms of what technology should be made. Also, the evidence indicates that assistance is most effective when it is designed as institutional building. Donations of equipment does not automatically create national capabilities. A proper technology transfer package includes whether you look at training, certification, maintenance, data governance, and legal authority. So we must ensure that we build capacity capacity to use, maintain, govern, and adapt technology. The transfer of knowledge is critical and critically important. There are many existing systems, so we must learn how to leverage those existing systems, whether it's at the regional level or whether it's at the global level. So take, for instance, at the global level, we have Interpol, which is seated next to me. Interpol have I.A.M. system. How do we leverage that system? System and make it better for gain of everyone. At the regional level, we have systems such as registration systems, licensing systems. How do we leverage those systems? Now, what you may get is that you may get other developing partners may bring those same systems, but there is no interoperability, and this creates more problem than what we want in terms of international cooperation. So take, for instance, you are implementing a system for a region and then you get an expander coming and bringing a system that there is no interoperability. So those are some of the challenges we have. I'd like to also thank the United States of America and Germany in terms of the cooperation and support that they are giving to the CARICOM region in terms of international cooperation. And that international cooperation is based on partnership between those states and CARICOM and member states of CARICOM. I thank you.


OETG · Chair [1:34:44]:

Thank you so much, Mr. Joseph. Thank you for focusing on the question relating to equipment and technology and, of course, made available to countries. Certainly, Most of the other questions were directed to you, Ms. Linh Hai Da. I also just noted that there was a question on vulnerability, so how to help the most vulnerable countries— states. I was wondering how do we define vulnerability in this context and how, of course, they could be helped, which is more— I don't think it's an Interpol-only question, that's why I'm also just putting it out just in case there's interest from the other panelists, So I give you the floor, Ms. Aida, for response to the other questions which are really directed or focused to you. Thank you.


INTERPOL · Specialized Officer · Lynn Hyder [1:35:38]:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Allow me to first thank all the delegations that have raised very important questions on this matter. I will attempt to answer all the questions with a few comments that will touch upon all the comments made. We're aware that This is a big problem and that we have big ambitions to solve it, but we must start with small steps. Otherwise, it won't be sustainable and feasible to implement these solutions. So first of all, one of the most basic aspects of addressing emerging technologies, but small arms and light weapons trafficking in general, is information sharing. We need to enhance information sharing, reporting of seizures, and to use secure channels for that matter in order to capture the picture of the threat, which currently does not have any data, or the data is not available currently to describe it or identify it. And the first step of solving a problem is to be able to measure it and to understand it better. The next point is to take advantage of institutionalized platforms that all member countries here have access to. So one of the delegations pointed out the matter of increasing burden on beneficiary countries. It's extremely important that you make use and leverage tools that are currently available to you, such as the ones that Interpol offers to its member countries. The other point is also to what CARICOM has mentioned, which is the importance of updating and expanding already available systems. We often see on the international level that a new problem emerges and it's much easier to create a new platform or a new solution instead of looking back into what is already available and how to expand it and how to improve that system.— system. And this is particularly important because we don't want to burden the end user who's making use of those systems. They cannot afford to be using 100 systems to make one consultation on a small arms and light weapon recovered. So it's very important, especially for countries that have less resources, countries that are less developed, and countries who are more vulnerable in that matter. This would also not only— this is important because not only does it enhance the centralization and convergence of information, but also avoids the dispersion of resources and the dispersion of information. The fourth point is how to increase cooperation between countries who have a discrepancy in their capacities. One such method or approach is operations trigger. Interpol runs these operations where countries in a specific region or across the globe with different capacities are able to mobilize at the same time their resources. And this is very important because it's a unique way to share experiences on the field between countries with different levels of capacities. It's not only an— it's not only an initiative that removes guns the from the streets, that disrupts criminals, that helps undertake effective measures to counter the proliferation of illicit arms, but it also helps implement sustainable protocols at the— at the field level, which is very important for the development of risk indicators, for example, and to capture the picture of the threat.


Speaker 55 [1:39:21]:

Thank you.


INTERPOL · Specialized Officer · Lynn Hyder [1:39:23]:

Fifth point is back again to what we do with all this information that is captured or that is generated from operations or from the frontline. How do we make sure that we have this information being reflective— reflected here in political processes and at the strategic level? We really need to triangulate data. We really need to generate information and generate strategies that are informed Formed from the frontline. And for this reason, we have been heavily engaged in developing what we call the Arsenal Criminal Analysis File to be able to bring back to the countries information that comes from different parts of the world, information that comes from different cases so that you have concrete information to inform your policymaking. Sixth point is the interoperability between systems. It was mentioned also in one of the comments, I think from the Dominican Republic, how do we ensure the connection or interoperability between systems? This is one of the biggest priorities of Interpol at the moment. With regards, for instance, of IARMS, which is particular to this topic, we are looking into connecting IARMS or generating interoperability between IARMS and national systems in such a way whereby whenever you consult your national databases, you're already having access directly to Interpol's information as well. This serves not only to enhance access across the jurisdiction and make sure that every frontline officer is able to verify Interpol databases when making a consultation, when they make an arrest, or when they seize a firearm, but also to decrease the burden again on the end user. So this is a very important topic as well. Now, just to conclude, I want to also mention the differential point of Interpol, which is that Interpol is a neutral police organization, and it aims to enhance the resilience of member countries, whether this is before the conflict starts, during the conflict, or after the conflict has ended. And this is quite important because for us, catching a criminal anywhere is a success to security everywhere. Thank you very much.


OETG · Chair [1:41:47]:

Thank you so much to you, Ms. Haider, for the comprehensive responses, putting together the questions which have been posed by member states. I do not see any further requests and I don't see— you want to come back? So I will go back to Mr. Asante-Chium for response to the question of vulnerability. You have the floor, please.


IANSA · Managing Director · Johnson Asante Twum [1:42:16]:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I think that question was posed by the distinguished representative of Cameroon and he wanted to know what's Can be done to help vulnerable states. So this is a big question and we need to determine where the area of vulnerabilities are and that's also part of the international cooperation assistance arrangement where you are able to answer those questions and then make, you know, requests based on your needs. So is it in the area of illicit arms flows, that you are not able to detect at the entry point or in the specific context of new technology, you have no capability to detect, like modular weapons and 3D-printed weapons, et cetera? Or two, is it in the area of diversion due to weak physical security and stockpile management? The third question you could ask also, whether it's in the area of weak legislative framework that's not allowing for institutions to be able to function properly. Four is the lack of human resource capacity that's also affecting the— or creating the vulnerability. And then five may be the weak institutional capacity to deal with this. So these are questions that need to be answered properly so that when these questions are answered, the area of vulnerability can be determined and then you can make the request for support, for the appropriate support. Thank you, sir.


OETG · Chair [1:43:46]:

Thank you indeed to you, Mr. Asante-Choom, for really responding to this specific question of vulnerability and how it could be assessed or defined. I don't see any further requests for the floor. I think I'll join delegates that took the floor to really express deep appreciation to our panelists for what has been really valuable contribution to our work on the area of international cooperation and assistance, and so I thank them kindly for your engagement. We will move on to the second point of our discussion this morning, so I give you a moment not to hold you to the podium, but of course— Thank you. Thank you for your contributions. Thank you. So whilst our colleagues will be resuming their seats, I would like to move on to the next point of our discussion this morning. Which is really a focus on the next steps for the OETG. Already in the course of being chair-designate and the intervention yesterday, two concrete ideas have been expressed. We also had at least for one robust intercessional period, should take place between now and the next meeting of the OETG for 2 years. That's one of the ideas that have been expressed clearly. And also, I wish to remind states that I'd expressed the view that I welcome delegations to serve as OETG Friends of the Chair, or champions, as the case may be. I also would welcome views on that and how we can take our work forward. Thank you. From yesterday to today, I think we'll all agree that the views have been quite substantive, important, and critical, technical as well, and I've heard already in terms of the potential recommendations, suggestions for more discussions. So this is a time for you to put through your views so that we know exactly what we will do in the intercessional period, and to do so, on the basis of transparency, ensuring that everyone is included, but also having substantive contribution in the process. So I would open the floor and invite your views on discussions of the next steps. And I give the floor to the Distinguished Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, please.


Iran (Islamic Republic of) [1:46:51]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Regarding the intersessional discussions, recognizing that virtual meetings cannot fully substitute for the in-person participation and engagement of technical experts, we suggest that at least one of the intersessional discussions be conducted in person during the 2-year intersessional period. Period. I thank you, Mr. Chair.


OETG · Chair [1:47:15]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Islamic Republic of Iran for the very concrete suggestion on the intercessional work, and I continue to open the floor to see if we have further comment. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico, please.


Mexico [1:47:39]:

Thank you very much, Chair. On this agenda item, I will be brief, but I did just want to take note of the interest in convening an intercessional meeting. The colleague from Iran is of the same view as us insofar as we believe virtual consultations can be important, But it's also invaluable to consider in-person meetings and where both are concerned, it's important to seek to ensure that the principle of multilingualism be respected so that the participation of experts from capital can be facilitated. Moreover, I also wish to underscore that for Mexico, it is important to ensure that the group continues to contemplate harnessing the expertise and convening capacity of regional centers, UN regional centers. In my region's case, that would be UNIREC. We should harness their convening capacity to support intercessional work. We're of the view that regional platforms have proven to be effective in terms of fostering a common understanding of the challenges that we have considered over the last few days. And that was also confirmed during the web seminar that was prepared and hosted by UNIREC in my region in early May. So, we believe that making best use of the expertise and the contacts that regional centers have and also their convening power would be desirable in terms of ensuring the success of future recommendations on which we will work. Thank you.


OETG · Chair [1:49:24]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for the intervention and suggestion. Another concrete element in addition to the view expressed by Ayaan on having in-person— some in-person convening at the intersessional period. Because I don't see any requests for the floor, to react to that quickly. I already see Switzerland, so perhaps before PM in Switzerland, I give the floor to Switzerland and I'll come back to reactions.


Switzerland [1:49:59]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. On the next steps for this expert group, Switzerland strongly supports an informal dialogue between now and BMS X and further on. The technical issues discussed over these two days cannot be fully resolved in a meeting of this format. The momentum built through through these discussions over these last two days is valuable and must be carried forward. We need sustained, inclusive, expert-driven conversations into intercessional periods, bringing together states, international as well as regional centers and organizations, specialized technical institutions, and civil society actors. Switzerland stands ready to work with the chair and interested states to help this— to help take this forward. I thank you, Mr. Thank you, Mr. Chair.


OETG · Chair [1:50:42]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Switzerland for the intervention and, of course, the particular interest in helping with the transitional work. Thank you for your patience. I see a request from the distinguished representative of Japan. I give the floor to Japan. Japan, please.


Japan [1:51:36]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

For the cost efficiency and in order to secure participation of experts from the capitals, we prefer that inter-session work will be conducted virtually. Thank you.


OETG · Chair [1:51:52]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Japan for the other concrete suggestion. Of course, I Since there is no request for the floor, maybe a point on the format of the intercessional work. I think what we have all agreed so far from those who have intervened is that we need intercessional work and we will have to work out the format, the means to do so. But I will give the floor to the distinguished representative from Australia and we will continue to discuss the means and what the best available way to do it.


Australia [1:52:33]:

Thank you, Chair. Perhaps a suggestion on the format around that is to conduct virtual sessions on very targeted specifics for experts to be able to attend, and then perhaps holding one or two in-person intersessional works to sort of confirm what's just been discussed virtually, as obviously that's a limited capability. Thank you.


OETG · Chair [1:52:59]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Australia for the additional concrete suggestion. I was referring to the means in the sense that it's linked to resources. Certainly, we do not have resources that have been allocated to convene, as it were, intercessional work for the OETG. Um, [FOREIGN LANGUAGE] have been made to online engagement simply because that it's the most cost-effective way to do so. What I think is important for us to consider, for those who have the means to do so, is to to think about how we can have a good mix of online work and also good targeted point for in-person convening where the resources are available. And so this is the invitation to states that may be in a position to do so. I think this also goes towards supporting international cooperation, if we're able to get our experts together to really work on very concrete— Thank you. Draft— I wouldn't say recommendation, but drafts which could then be put forward in a space where everybody would be able to contribute to their further development when we get to BMS X, as per the mandate. And this is something that the chair will continue to engage on. Of course, with the assistance of the Secretariat to see how this can be made possible. And so the idea of champions and friends goes towards, of course, assisting with the substantive work, but also those member states that are in a position to move forward this work, given its importance and critical nature. What also may be helpful in the next steps going forward is to have a sort of a roadmap for member states to have an idea of when, if we're going to convene, whether online or in person, when we will be able to do so. Mexico has been clear on the regional— the Commission's also playing an important role in this. It may be good to be able to consolidate and sequence this so that We'll have information in advance to ensure that we have good representation in all of those meetings, whether online or in person. Otherwise, I think I would also encourage delegations and member states to continue to discuss the issue, engage your experts from time to time, if you may, submit papers which will also help with furthering our work. I see a request from Germany and I give the floor to Germany, please.


Germany [1:56:04]:

Dear Chair, so I'd like to state that Germany would welcome virtual meetings during the international—


OETG · Chair [1:56:12]:

intercessional period very much. Thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of Germany for the concrete suggestion. Colleagues, I see no further requests for the floor. The commitment is that we'll find ways in which we'll continue to engage on the issue in the intersessional period. We'll work out the best format based on the resources, but of course clearly there is the interest to continue our work between now and the next convening. I give the floor to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, please.


Democratic Republic of the Congo [1:57:00]:

Merci beaucoup.

Thank you very much, Chair. My delegation is taking the floor to support the proposal by Mexico With regard to our intercessional meeting, to take into account the importance of multilingualism. And I also here would like to speak about capacity building and the sharing of experiences. It is important for there to be sufficient resources for your bureau so that this meeting can take place because we don't know how to make progress, particularly cooperation and expertise, if we don't have enough resources. So that is a key element. I'd like to express my support to the bureau to ensure that our work can make progress and to ensure that all the states have the means to participate on equal footing. Thank you.


OETG · Chair [1:58:07]:

I thank the distinguished representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the intervention and indeed joining Mexico on the point of multilingualism and the other concrete suggestions that you've made. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Pakistan, please.


Pakistan [1:58:26]:

Thank you. Thank you, Chair. I don't want to prolong the discussion on this issue, but our understanding is that we have to include resource request in G8 resolution that will be coming up later this year for the 81st session. If this is the case, then of course there is an opportunity for member states to look into it and then their requests that have been made with respect to multilingualism or in-person meeting could be— sorry— could be worked out. But absent that, I think there is an opportunity that for the preparatory process, the chair could take an initiative and host meetings here at the UN in which which are in-person meetings, of course, most accessible for those who are stationed here in New York, but also with the possibility that it could be open up— opened up for virtual participation from capitals. So I think there are several proposals that could be worked out, and we would be happy to to look into them and support you, Chair, in this respect. Thank you.


OETG · Chair [1:59:55]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan for the intervention. Of course, financing the organization is in the hands of member states, so if there is agreement with member states on taking some of the issues forward, I don't think that the Chair will be averse. Of course, we welcome that and we'll work with the Secretariat. It will be in our hands, essentially, so thank you for that. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of AEAC. Shukran.


Iraq · Director of Weapons Regulation and Small Arms Liaison · Mansour Al Sultan [2:00:35]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I hope That you, Mr. Chair, and the Secretariat would mention in the recommendations that the 3D printing weapons are prohibited in all member states of the United Nations. So how can we give it a legal character when it is prohibited? We hope that we could stress that the 3D printing weapons are hard to trace and most of the countries prohibit the manufacturing of such weapons. Thank you very much.


OETG · Chair [2:01:16]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Iraq for the intervention which goes more into the substantive discussions on manufacturing and of 3D-printed weapons. And I will come to my chair's summary of the discussion. I think we dealt with that yesterday and how the discussion evolved yesterday on that specific aspect, but thank you for the intervention. The plan is not to keep us long on this issue. I think the more concrete ideas have been expressed. The more conventional way, if I may, is to really go by what the distinguished representative of Pakistan has said. It's a mandate from the GA. If it has, as they call it, a program budget implication, it has to be in the hands of members to take it forward. In the intercessional period, if we do not have the resources from the regular budget, as it may be, then we have to look at means to continue intercessional work. Whether through in person based on, of course, provision of states in the capacity to do so, or virtually— we've heard from Mexico on using the regional commissions as well and the convening power to do some further work. So I think we have all of the means and tools which have been available to us, which— for which we've had interventions on, we'll keep that in mind and try to develop a roadmap and a path towards continuing intersectional work, which I think we all agreed is very critical for our work in the OETG. [FOREIGN LANGUAGE] Dear colleagues, now we should proceed to the third part of our engagement this morning. Like yesterday, I think I will suspend the meeting for 5 minutes for the summary to be looked at, and with deep appreciation to the Chair's team, and we convene for me to give the key takeaways and invite your intervention. It will be the final opportunity for you to comment on it before the presentation of the report this afternoon, so I ask for your kind attention and your patience. So meeting is suspended for 5 minutes.


Speaker 78 [2:03:59]:

Thank you.


OETG · Chair [2:04:28]:

Excellencies, distinguished delegates, dear colleagues, the third session of the OECG is resumed. I will now proceed to give the key takeaway points for today's discussion, and then I will open the floor for any comment or additions that you may have, just like we did yesterday. I note that part of the discussions this morning actually reinforced some of the takeaway points from our panel's 1 and 2 yesterday, and so I'll make sure that those will be captured in the summary as well. Let me turn to Panel 3 on international cooperation and assistance. In this regard, some states recall that the OETG's mandate to examine and identify concrete international cooperation and assistance measures to build the capacities of states, including sharing expertise and good practices and providing training opportunities. We heard that effective assistance to address development in small arms and light weapons technologies should be demand-driven, reject one-size-fits-all approaches, and actively involve local expertise. Some states suggested that development in technologies can be considered in existing funding mechanisms like On-Scar and Salient, as well as integrated in voluntary guide tools such as MOSAIC regional best practice guides and national training modules. And certainly I should make the point that The takeaway points reflect both the discussions and the submissions that have been made. Going forward, some states noted the benefit of technology-related assistance programs received from coalitions of intergovernmental and international partners, as well as NGOs, and highlighted the importance of establishing appropriate resource— national coordination mechanisms, national policies, and action plans to support implementation and ensure long-term outcomes. The relevance of the use of existing tools, including IARMS, IBIM, and International Firearms Reference Table, and purple notices and opportunities for enhancing their interoperability with other systems, was also reinforced in this regard, as comprehensive data on Xi Zhōu is crucial for understanding emerging problems and tackling them. On the role of regional and sub-regional organizations, regional and sub-regional platforms and roadmaps prevent administrative overlap by coordinating intelligence exchange on and access to new technologies to combat illicit small arms and light weapons directly at the country and field level. They streamline information exchange and create direct lines of communication between neighboring authorities to address trafficking pipelines early. They can also facilitate the pooling of cross-border investigative and forensic resources, and can assist by drafting model laws and standard operating procedures for addressing emerging threats. Regional organizations also strengthen local ownership of assistance programs and sustainability of results, and support the development of regional pools of expertise and capabilities.


Speaker 80 [2:08:32]:

Thank you.


OETG · Chair [2:08:34]:

On the role of civil society, civil society can support, among other aspects, the development of tech-enabling legislation, the deployment of digital recordkeeping systems adapted to different contexts, and the provision of policy-relevant research on emerging threats and opportunities and baseline studies. On sustainability in technical assistance and tools, technology transfers are only as good as their durability. They need to be accompanied by long-term resources for recurring costs like replacement parts, sorry, translated guides, and software license. Inequal access to enabling technologies such as the internet, digital and ballistic systems, for instance, notably in some low-income countries, was highlighted as an important contextual parameter that should inform the provision of technology-related assistance in this context. In this regard, some states suggested the the OETG could examine technical options that would allow for greater cooperation and information exchange between countries with differing technical capabilities or systems that might not be—

Readily—

That might not be readily interoperable. Coordinated joint law enforcement operations such as Interpol, Operational Trigger, were highlighted as a successful mechanism for countries with different technical capabilities to share real-time technical— tactical intelligence, detect trafficking routes, identify diversion points, and dismantle transnational criminal networks. It was also stressed that lessons learned from failures need to be understood, with a particular focused on whether assistance enables the sustainable transfer of comprehensive and contextually adaptable technology packages and related skills. Some states noted that assistance is more sustainable when aligned with broader peace, security, and development strategies, and crucially, national priorities to ensure new technology integrates smoothly without duplicating or overriding existing cooperation and assistance frameworks. Having summarized the discussions and the submissions made for the third panel, let me now summarize my takeaways on discussions regarding the next steps for the OETG. On timeline and mandate, As per General Assembly Resolution 70/40 and 80/38, the OETG will convene during the 10th Biennial Meeting of States, BMS X, in 2028. The mandate is to develop agreed recommendations by consensus for consideration at BMS X, and not later than the 5th Review Conference in 2030. To drive this forward, states are also encouraged to consider taking on roles as supporters, champions, or friends of the chair. On the intercessional period, the intercessional period can be used to refine common technical terminologies and definitions. We also need to deepen technical consultations, including on modular and polymer frames marking, as well as marking, obliteration, and forensic recovery. This period could also serve to raise awareness and improve access to information regarding existing technology-related tools and counter-diversion assistance program and their relevance to different needs and settings. Some States suggested that at least one in-person session should be organized during the intersessional period. Sponsorship programs and interpretation will be vital to ensure technical experts can fully participate in future meetings. Some States preferred virtual sessions, in particular for the pursuit of specific technical topics to allow for the participation of experts in capitals. Some states also highlighted the useful role that regional centers can play in the intersectoral process. Noting the support expressed by some states for a strong intersectoral process, we have to work on the best option in seeking resources to accommodate the proposals. On industry engagement and inclusive participation, as discussed yesterday, moving forward, our endeavor to continue and strengthen engagement with the private sector, including arms and additive manufacturing industries, technology firms, shipping couriers, and online platforms. Discussion should also maintain inclusive participation and mainstreaming a gender perspective. This ensures we fully understand how technological developments, like 3D printing, affect patterns of misuse and diversion, and how they differentially impact women, men, girls, and boys. Now, looking beyond the current mandate, because evolving manufacturing and trafficking methods outpace the timeline of the current OETG mandate, states should use upcoming cycles to evaluate how to address the long-term implications of new technologies beyond the current mandate. With this, I now open the floor for your comments, your questions, or additions that you may have.


Speaker 82 [2:14:59]:

Thank you, Mr.


OETG · Chair [2:15:09]:

I know it was a bit much, but like yesterday, if you think that it captured the discussion and the submission, and also want to take a quick 15 minutes in addition to the launch and the side events, I'm happy to proceed to our closing for the session. And with that, I will give the floor to the distinguished representative of Belgium, please.


Belgium [2:15:36]:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, for the summary. I just would like to mention for the internal process, whether we do it online or in person, that would be very interesting to have a set of guiding questions in advance so we can see exactly who is the best expert we can send, whether it's from forensic police, industry or different— and we already had quite some work done for the MGE I, MGE II. That was quite a long time, but of course the technology has changed a bit. But it would be interesting to have those questions so we can prepare the best.


OETG · Chair [2:16:10]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Belgium for the additional comment and I think concrete suggestion on making progress with intersectoral work. And I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Switzerland, please.


Switzerland [2:16:24]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Just quickly to confirm that we support the proposal by Belgium. Guiding questions would be very useful for the process ahead. Thank you very much.


OETG · Chair [2:16:36]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Switzerland for supporting the proposal on guiding questions. Colleagues, I do not see any requests for the floor. So I thank you for your engagement with the key takeaways. Certainly in the afternoon, this will be reflected in the chair's summary to be made to the BMS IX. Since there is no further request for the floor, this really brings us to the end of the first meeting of the OETG, which I think is really important and critical milestone. So allow me to say a few words in closing before we head out for lunch, and then certainly BMS9 will reconvene in the afternoon where the summary will be delivered. Excellencies, distinguished colleagues, dear delegates, As we conclude the first meeting of the OETG, allow me to express my sincere appreciation to all of you. I thank states for your active participation, certainly your constructive spirit, and the technical depth you've brought to our discussion. My gratitude also goes to the briefers, whose insights have been invaluable in helping us better understand developments in manufacturing technology and design of small arms and light weapons and their implications for the implementation of the POA and the ITI. I am really, really profoundly grateful, and I extend my deep appreciation to to my team, the advisers on the team, and certainly to the Secretariat for their invaluable support. And I also acknowledge the indispensable work of conference management, technicians, interpreters, and all staff of the Secretariat that have made this session possible. I also thank all those who observe our proceedings online. And here in the room, the engagement I had with stakeholders as Chair-designate. Many of your contributions which have been made in other ways, including through papers, research, webinars, and consultations with me in the preparation of this meeting have been quite helpful. As I noted in my opening remarks, this meeting marks the beginning of a much longer process. The discussions we've had and the Chair's summary provide a solid foundation for the continued engagement of this group. I certainly look forward to working with all of you as we move ahead towards our next meeting and ultimately towards developing consensus recommendations. The BMS will be convening in this room at 3 PM for the final meeting where I will also be presenting my Chair's Summary. I wish to remind you of some of the events taking place— side events taking place today. We have a side event by Small Arms Survey on Making Waves: Maritime Dimensions of the UNPOA, and that will take place in Conference Room A. We also have an event by the EU and Interpol on addressing weapons emanating from conflict zones, building resilience to prevent diversion, and this will take place in Conference Room 6. I think these are the two events for which I have information on. I see no further requests for the floor. What is left of me is really to thank you for your presence and your active engagement. This concludes the meeting of the OETG and our meeting is adjourned.


Speaker 88 [2:20:56]:

Thank you.