THE HAGUE – The International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivers its Judgment in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar: 11 States intervening) International Court of Justice Date: 19 November 2026 Language: Floor (Original) Transcript: https://transcripts.un.org/ar/asset/k17/k17p1wcdm0?lang=floor Transcripts available through this tool are created by using automatic speech recognition and are not official records nor official documents of the United Nations. Official records and official documents are available on the Official Document System of the United Nations. --- Speaker 1 [0:00]: Là ! Cours ! ICJ · President [1:06]: Please be seated. The sitting is open. the court meets today, pursuant to article 58 of its statute and article 94 of its rules, to read out in open court its judgment in the case. concerning application of the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, the Gambia versus Myanmar 11 states intervening. For a reason duly known to me, Judge Brandt, who participated in the deliberations and the final vote in this case, is unable to sit with us this morning. I recall that the proceeding in the present case were instituted on the 11th of November 2019 by the Republic of the Gambia against the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, concerning alleged violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. I shall refer to that convention as the Genocide Convention or the Convention. I further recall that by two orders dated the 3rd of July 2024 and the 25th of July 2025, respectively, the court decided that the declarations of intervention under Article 63 of the statute, submitted by 11 states, were admissible insofar as they concerned the construction of provisions of the Genocide Convention. In accordance with the UJ practice, I should not read out the introductory paragraphs of the judgment, which set out the procedure history of the case. Some paragraphs will be omitted and others summarized. I shall therefore begin reading the judgment at paragraph 64. The full text of the judgment will be available at the close of the sitting. The court begins by providing some general background about Myanmar. The court explained that the current state located in the westernmost part of Myanmar, is inhabited predominantly by ethnic Rakhine and by a sizable group referred to in the judgment as the Rohingya. This group self-identifies as such and claims a long standing connection to Rakhine State. The Rohingya are predominantly Muslim and speaks a language known as Rohingya. The court explained that over many decades, Rakhine state has experienced outbreaks of sectarian and intercommunal violence leading on various occasions to the internal and cross-border displacement of large sections of the Rohingya population. More recently, armed confrontations and acts of violence took place in 2012, involving members of Rakhine State's Buddhist and Muslim communities, as well as members of the armed forces known as the Tatmadaw, the border guard police and the and the police referred to collectively as Myanmar's security forces. Following these events, in 2013, Rohingya insurgents formed an armed group known as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, or ASA. In October 2016, and again in August 2017, ASA members launched attacks against certain police and military installations and personnel in northern Rakhine state. Thereafter, Myanmar security forces conducted a number of clearance operations in various localities in the area. As a result of these operations, thousands of Rohingya were displaced and fled to Bangladesh in 2016 and 2017. The court recalls that on the 24th of March 2017, the United Nations Human Rights Council established the United Nations Independent International Factoring Mission on Myanmar, to which I shall refer as the FFM. On the 27th of September 2018, the Council established the Independent Investigative Mechanisms for Myanmar, to which I shall refer as the IIMM or the mechanism. Myanmar did not allow either the FFM or the IIMM to enter its territory. The court next turns to questioner proof, which it observes assume particular significance in the present case because the parties disagree on the relevant facts. In terms of the burden of proof, the court's established jurisprudence confirms that, as a general rule, it is for the party which alleges the fact in support of its claim claims to prove the existence of that fact. For this reason, the Gambia bears the burden of identifying and proving facts to establish the alleged breaches of the genocide convention by Myanmar. However, insofar as Myanmar has invoked certain facts, in support of its own contentions, it carries the burden of establishing those acts. The court has, however, acknowledged that there are situations where this general rule would have to be applied flexibly in particular, where the respondent may be in a better position to establish certain facts. While the exercise of such flexibility does not reverse the burden proof, it may have an effect on the assessment of the evidence. For example, in circumstances where the applicant state applicant state lacks access to evidence located in the respondent's territory owing to the Lada's lack of cooperation. In terms of the standard proof, referring to its previous jurisprudence, the court states that claims alleging the commission of acts enumerated in Article III of the Genocide Convention, including genocide, must be proved by fully conclusive evidence. As regards claims of violation of the obligation to prevent and punish genocide, the court requires proof at the high level of certainty appropriate to the seriousness of the allegation. This standard proof also applies to the alleged violation of obligations under Articles 1,4 and 6 of the convention at issue in the current case. Next, the court described the evidence relied on by the parties and notes that in assessing its weight, the court must make its own determination of the facts that that are relevant to the legal obligations at issue. In the Bosnia and Croatia cases, the court was able to rely on the factual findings of the ICTY as a basis for its own findings, to which it accorded the great weight. Whereas in this case, the court does not have comparable judicial decisions available to support its factual findings and can only rely on the evidence provided by the parties to make its own determination of the facts. To that end, the court explains that it will be guided by its approach to evidence in previous cases. The court first considers witness testimony and other statements. It recalls that in determining the evidential weight of any statement by an by an individual, the court necessarily takes into account its form and the circumstances in which it was made. These considerations include whether the witness was an interested state official or a disinterested private, individual. Whether the state whether the state was made was by a person with direct knowledge of the events, and whether it was contemporaneous with the relevant events. The court will accord evidential weight to statements that are not eyewitness accounts only when, only where, they have been corroborated by credible evidence. Myanmar has provided evidence that criminal and armed groups, including ASA, have a presence in the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh and suggest that the Gambia's witnesses may have been reticent about ASA for fear of reprisals. The court observed that numerous Rohingya witnesses, in statements submitted to the court, also expressed concern for their own safety if they returned to Myanmar and for the safety of family members still present there, if it became known that they had cooperated with international investigations. While the court takes fear of reprisal into account when evaluating witness evidence, it does not consider that this factor impugns the credibility of the Gambia's witnesses generally. During the oral proceedings, the court heard from four witnesses who had direct experience of violence in the last week of August 2017, three of whom were called by the Gambia and one by Myanmar. These witnesses were heard in closed session for reasons of witness protection. The court found the Gambia's witnesses credible in their account of the particular events to which they testified. Many of the witnesses key statements were unchallenged in cross examination. The descriptions offered by the Gambia's witnesses are consistent with other evidence before the court. regarding the events in these locations. Myanmar's witness testified to an alleged attack in which Assa allegedly killed around 100 civilians. A count of the attacks attack is consistent with the evidence in the record. The court then outlines the written testimony and other written statements of Rohingya persons introduced by the parties. In conducting its assessment, the court explains that IBO distinguish unsigned witness statements from statements originally signed, but subsequently redacted for witness protection. Recognizing that reductions may reduce evidential weight without precluding their consideration altogether, the Court indicates that it will take particular care to ensure that corroborating statements from different sources come from different witnesses. Regarding the unsigned statements, it will rely on them only cautiously and warily, where they faithfully record witness evidence and are corroborated by other, more reliable evidence. With respect to signed witness statements, having assessed their credibility and and taken into account whether they are based on direct knowledge, the court finds them largely consistent with other evidence before the court. The court accords considerable weight to statements collected by the IIMM because of its careful methodology, and considers the less detailed statements collected by legal action worldwide as generally reliable, but of lower evidential weight. The court next considers third party fact finding, noting that in evaluating such evidence, the court has generally considered the independence and qualification of the author, the methodology used in the preparation of the evidence, and the comprehensive nature and overall quality of the. evidence. The court recalls that, in its jurisprudence, it has it has made extensive use of reports prepared by independent United Nations bodies. In the prison case, the court explained that it will carefully assess the evidential weight to be given to third party factorying reports in accordance with the criteria set up in its jurisprudence. Where such evidence is corroborated by other evidence, the court will accord greater weight to it. Evidence that has limited weight on its own may nevertheless be used to corroborate other evidence that emanates from a stronger source. Moreover, the fact that the court determines that the particular report is entitled to evidential weight, does not mean that all its contents have evidential value. The court will apply its standard criteria in assessing the factual findings of the reports. However, it will not ascribe any probative value to the legal assessments. contained therein. The court proceeds to consider the reports of the FFM. The court recalls that in making its factual determinations, the FFM adopted a reasonable grounds standard of proof, consistent with the practice of United Nations fact finding bodies. The FFM investigated in the area the events of 2016 and 2017 in Northern Rakhine State, and produced two major reports in 2018. and 2019. The court recalls however that the FFM lacked access access to Myanmar. Since the FFM applied a lower standard of proof than that applicable in the prison case, the court has assessed the evidential weight of its report with caution. Nevertheless, it finds the two major reports generally reliable as sources of factual evidence. While taking account of the restrictions on access to Myanmar, the court notes that substantial field work in Bangladesh did not depend on such access, and concludes that the report saw sought to provide a comprehensive account of the relevant facts through an independent and impartial investigation. The court turns next to the reports of the IAMM. It recalls that the mechanism's mandate is to collect and preserve evidence of serious international crimes, and facilitate their prosecution. Its six thematic reports draw on a broad range of sources. The court accords them considerable evidential weight, imbued of the demanding standard of proof and methodology applied by the mechanism. Turning to the other evidence relied on by the parties, the court attaches considerable evidential weight to the satellite imagery and satellite based fire detection data produced by the Gambia, which also corroborate. witness accounts and factual information in the FFM and IIMM reports. The court relies where appropriate on other United Nations materials, Nations materials, assessed in accordance with with its established criteria, and takes account of reports by non-government organizations while recognizing the they're generally lower evidential weight. The court treats some government documents and reports with caution because of concerns about their reliability as evidence, except to the extent they are independently corroborated by credible evidence, or are contrary to the interests or contentions of the State Conserved concerned or relate to matters not controverted. Finally, the court has considered The Gambia's expert evidence only to the extent that it falls within the scope of the expert's mandate and expertise. In assessing the evidence, the court takes account of Myanmar's failure genuinely to investigate the alleged atrocities and its refusal refusal to facilitate access to evidence and witnesses, or provide information requested. Accordingly, the court may have more liberal recourse to inferences of fact concerning events largely or wholly within Myanmar's exclusive knowledge for which it has provided no satisfactory or convincing explanation. The court next turns to the examination of factual evidence, much of which is contested between the parties. Rather than examining every incident reported, it is sufficient for the court to examine those facts which view viewed in their context, would elucidate whether acts prohibited under the genocide convention were committed. The court, therefore, places its main focus on the clearance operations of 2017 and related events. In the interest of time, I shall omit the paragraphs setting out in more detail the court examination of facts and summarize summarize the court findings. In summary, the court first observes that the Rohingya have been present in what is now Myanmar, including Rakhine State, for generations. As regards the historical treatment of Rohingya, the Court finds that discriminatory laws and restrictions progressively eroded their rights and left them marginalized and particularly vulnerable, while military sponsored hate speech fueled hostility against them. Turning to the events leading up to the August 2017 2017 clearance operations the court recognizes Assad's attacks on security outposts and civilians including its burning of villages. Concerning the clearance operations, the court finds that the evidence establishes that Myanmar's security forces engaged in indiscriminate killings, separation and execution of men, sexual violence, and the deliberate burning of Rohingya homes in certain locations in Mandau, Township, in Lattedown Township, and Bootedown Township. Assessing the common aspect of clearance operations across northern Rakhine State, the court finds that Myanmar's security forces killed thousands of Rohingya civilians, perpetrated widespread acts of sexual violence, as well as act of extreme extreme violence against children and attacked fleeing Rohingya as they sought to flee in large numbers to Bangladesh. The court further concludes. that the evidence demonstrate that the Rohingya villages were systematically destroyed and replaced with permanent infrastructure and resettled by non-Rohingya. Turning to the applicable law, the court first considers the definition of genocide under the convention, followed by the relationship between international humanitarian law and the convention. The court observes that according to Article two of the convention, the crime of genocide has two constituent elements. The material element of or actus reos, set forth in Article 2A2E, and the specific specific mental element of Mens Lea of genocide, dolus specialis, set forth in the chapeau of Article two, namely the intent to destroy in whole or impart a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group as such. The court recalls that each of the material acts under Article two also carries its own general mental element, dolos generales, which is distinct from genocidal intent. In order for genocide to be established, the specific intent to destroy the group in whole or in part must be present, in addition to the general intent required for each of the individual material acts involved. The requirement of genocidal intent is the essential characteristic of genocide, which distinguishes it from other serious crimes such as crimes against humanity. Acts that fall within the actus reus, when committed with genocidal intent, constitutes acts of genocide under the. convention. The court has indicated that the term destroy for the purposes of genocidal intent refers to the physical or biological destruction of the group rather than destruction of the group's culture in its various aspects. Such destruction of the group, however, is not confined to the death or biological destruction of individual members, or even their physical harm. This is demonstrated by the exhaustive list of material acts set forth in Article 2A to E of the convention, which are not cumulative. Acts causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group under Article to 2B do not per se involve their death or biological destruction, and serious mental harm may not involve physical harm physical harm at all. The injury set forth in subparagraph B can, however, impact the ability of the group as such to maintain its existence as a group. Similarly, forcibly transferring children of the group to another group under Article II e does not in and of itself involve the death or biological destruction of any. individual member of the group. It does, however, lead to the dispersal of at least a part of the group, making it difficult for that part to continue its existence as a group. The forceful transfer of children as the biological future of the group can also have consequences Consequences for the group's capacity to renew itself, and hence, to ensure its long term survival. The preparatory work regarding Article two e confirms that the concern of the draft of the convention was the was the destruction of the group, as distinguished from the physical destruction of its individual members. The court notes that the only explicit reference to physical destruction in Article two is found in subparagraph C, which prohibits, I quote, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, end of quote. This provision which concerns the actus reus of genocide, has been understood as referring to the deaths of the group's members. The absence of the term physical in the chapeau of Article two, however, further suggest that for the purposes of genocidal intent, the intent to destroy the group conveys a broader meaning than the deaths of its members. Article two of the convention recognizes that destruction of the group as such may result from any of the five materials. acts set forth therein, whether occurring individually or in combination, when directed against at least a substantial part of the group. 52 Thus, while the final text of the convention excludes specific acts relating to the destruction of historical, cultural, and religious heritage from the list of acts that must be established in order for genocide to occur. Measures such as serious bodily or mental harm, or forceful transfer of children, which can severely impact the existence of the protected group and its ability to function as a group, were considered sufficiently great to constitute Material Acts under Article two of the convention, without involving the deaths or biological destruction of individual members. The the court accordingly considers that the destruction of the group as such, in whole or in part, as set out in the Chapeau of Article Two, refers to forms of destruction of the group, in whole or in part, that may result from the acts enumerated in Article 2A to E. Article one of the convention obliges state parties to prevent and punish genocide, obligations which are further elaborated in other provisions of the convention. Article three renders genocide as defined in article two, as well as related acts punishable. The court has recognized that the state may itself be held responsible for genocide or other acts set forth in article three, if such acts are committed by its organs, or by persons or groups whose acts are attributable to it. The court has further noted that, although the convention addresses criminal responsibilities of individuals, Article one of the convention, read together with Article three, imposes obligations on states separate from their obligations, that the convention requires states to place on individuals. The court, therefore, reiterates that the obligations arising from the terms of the convention and responsibility of states that would arise from breach of such obligations are obligations and responsibilities under international law. They are not of a criminal nature. The court next turns to the relationship between international humanitarian law and the genocide convention. Article one of the convention confirms that genocide is a crime under international law, I quote, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war. End of quote. The convention thus applies by its express terms in situations of armed conflict, to which international humanitarian law also applies. The court recalls that the genocide genocide convention and international humanitarian law are two distinct bodies of rules, pursuing different aims. The court has jurisdiction in this case, to make a determination regarding breaches only of the Genocide Convention and not of international humanitarian law or any other body of international law. The court is not prevented, however, from considering in its reasoning whether a violation of international humanitarian law has occurred to the extent that this is relevant for the court's determination of whether there has been a breach of an obligation under the Genocide Convention. The court observes that, Article Two of the convention does not require the acts enumerated therein to be unlawful under another body of international law. Compliance or non-compliance with international humanitarian law, may nevertheless inform the assessment of both the intent required for the material acts and genocidal intent. Such compliance does not, however, exclude exclude conduct from the scope of the genocide convention. The fact that members of a protected group could be lawfully targeted or incidentally harmed under international humanitarian law, does not exclude the possibility that they may be killed or harmed with genocidal intent. Having examined the evidential record and applicable law, the court considers the Gambia's claim that Myanmar breached its obligation not to commit genocide, pursuant to articles one and three A of the convention. The court notes that for the purpose of establishing state responsibility under the Genocide Convention, both parties accept that the acts at issue were carried out primarily by Myanmar's security forces. It is undisputed that the conduct of Myanmar security forces and other organs of the state is attributable to Myanmar under the law of state responsibility. Turning to whether the Rohingya constitute a protected group under the convention, the court recalls that this assessment rests on a combination of objective criteria, such as nationality, ethnic origin, race or religion. And subjective criteria, such as the group's self-identification and its stigmatization by the alleged perpetrators. In the court's view, the Rohingya of Myanmar constitute a distinct ethnic group. Linguistic studies and historical evidence make make clear that the Rohingya language is distinguishable from other languages spoken spoken in Myanmar. The Rohingya are predominantly, Muslim and are identified as such by Myanmar. Moreover, the Rohingya have a distinct distinct culture with unique art forms and social and religious institutions that are used for the settlement of disputes. The court also considered it significant that the Rohingya self-identify as an ethnic. group, and that the evidential record demonstrates that they have been stigmatized by Myanmar for decades. The court thus finds that the Rohingya of Myanmar have a particular group identity, and as an ethnic group, qualify as a protected group for the purposes for the purposes of Article two. the court next considers whether the acts that are established by the evidence fall within the actus reus under Article two a to d of the convention. as claimed by the Gambia. Beginning with Article two a, the court recalls that the act of killing members of the group must be intentional to fall within the scope of that provision. In the court's view, a killing is intentional, where the perpetrator meant to cause the death of the victim, or acted with knowledge that this was a likely consequence of the act or omission. This does not include negligence or gross negligence. With respect to whether Article two a requires harm to be committed at a certain scale, in order for the actus rerus to be satisfied, the court notes that the crime of genocide under the Convention requires that the perpetrator intend to destroy the protective group in whole or in part, not merely one or more individual members. Matters of scale with respect to victims, however, form part of the inquiry into the specific intent to destroy the group in whole or in part set forth in the chapeau of Article two, specifically when genocidal intent is inferred from circumstantial evidence. The court therefore finds that these are considerations for the mens rear of genocide and not for the actus reus. Regarding the other subparagraphs of Article two, the court considers that other than Article two C the material elements under Article two do not in and of themselves require the demonstration of any quantitative impact on the group. Turning to the circumstances of this case, the facts, as previously determined by the court, establish that Myanmar's security forces committed large scale killings of members of the protective group during the course of the 2017 clearance operations. The court has also determined that the estimate of 10,000 Rohingya violently killed during those clearance operations is supported by the evidence. The court is thus fully convinced that the actors regels set forth in Article 2A of the convention is established. With reference to Article 2B, the court notes that as with killings under Article 2A, acts causing either serious bodily harm or serious mental harm to members of the protective group must be intentional. Turning to the requirement that the physical or mental harm must be serious, the court explains that this is to be assessed on a case by case basis, through a holistic evaluation of the evidence pertaining to the case. With respect to the level of physical harm inflicted by Myanmar security forces on members of the Protect Group, In view of the court, the record establishes by fully conclusive evidence that serious bodily injuries were intentionally caused within the meaning of Article 2B. A holistic assessment of the evidence also establishes that acts of Myanmar's security forces resulted in serious mental harm to members of the. protected group. Acts of rape and other forms of sexual violence contributed to lasting mental harm to survivors, as well as to those who witnessed the acts. Numerous persons who survived the Korean operations witnessed the burning of homes and villages, and over 700,000 members of the Rohingya group were forced to flee from northern Rakhine state to Bangladesh. Those making the journey experienced loss, separation and uncertainty regardless regarding their own survival and that of their community. The record also establishes that most of those who survived the journey have had little, or little to no, opportunity to return or to resume their livelihood due to the extensive destruction and bulldozing of Rohingya villages, and their replacement with other. infrastructure. These various harms were widespread. In this context, the court recalls that while forceful risk displacement does not in and of self, of itself, inflict serious mental harm for the purposes of the actus reus of genocide. The circumstances of such forceful displacement taken together can cause serious serious mental harm within the meaning of Article 2B. Relevant circumstances include, separation from and loss of family members, destruction of homes, and the inability to return home. Uncertainty regarding the fate of relatives and their whereabouts, appalling transfer of conditions and post-transfer suffering. The court considers that members of the protected group experienced such circumstances in this case? With respect to the general intent required for Article II B, the court considers at the minimum that the aforementioned violence, violent acts were committed by Myanmar security forces with knowledge that they were likely to result in serious mental harm to the Rohingya population. They thus constitute intentional acts within the meaning of Article II b. In the court's view, taken together the acts of Myanmar security forces described above have resulted in a grave and long term disadvantages to the ability of of of member of the Rohingya group to lead a normal and. constructive life, amounting to serious mental harm within the meaning of Article II B. The court does not consider that taken alone, each of the types of acts it has described caused serious mental harm to every member of the Rohingya group who experienced experienced them. The court, however, concludes that the 2000 2017 clearance operations caused serious mental harm to a very significant number of members of the Rohingya group in northern Rakhine State. The court recalls, that for the purpose for the purpose of establishing the actus regus under Article II B, it need not set out the precise extent of the injuries suffered, or make a conclusive finding on the total number of victims. The court is fully convinced that the 2017 clearance operations cause serious bodily and mental harm to a very significant number of members of the protected group, and that the active race set forth in Article 2B is established. turning to Article 2C, concerning the deliberate infliction on the group of conditions of life, calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, the court explains that this provision covers, I quote, methods of physical destruction other than killing were wherever whereby the perpetrator ultimately seeks the deaths of the members of the group. End of quote. After examining the various elements of the provision, the court concludes that the Mentor Act set forth in Article 2C prohibits a state from engaging in conduct that deliberately deliberately deliberately, inflict condition of life that are objectively objectively capable of causing the deaths over time. At least a substantial part of the protected group. the court emphasizes that the threshold under Article II C is demanding. In the present case, the evidence indicates that for many years, numerous restrictions on the Rohingya population in northern Rakhine State, including with respect to access to citizenship and freedom of movement, prevented the Rohingya from being able to secure adequate food and medical care and to pursue livelihood. Restrictions on movement increased following the 2012 secretarian violence and tightened further at the time of the 2016 and 2017 clearance operations. The over 100,000 Rohingya who remained confined in internally displaced persons camps, following the 2012 violence, also were subject to severely limitations on their freedom of movement over crowded shelters and inadequate services. Such measures, together with the events of the 2017 clearance operation, compounded the actual hardship and vulnerability of the protected group. The requirement of Article II C, however, is that the condition of life must be capable of causing the deaths of at least a substantial part of the group over time. The court is not convinced that the evidence sufficiently establishes that the restrictions on movement and deprivation of access to food and medical care described by the applicant. We're objectively objectively capable of bringing about the ultimate death of a substantial part of the members of the protected group in this manner. The court further considers that the circumstances of the 2017 clearance operation. themselves, which involved extreme violence over a concentrated period of time, did not impose conditions of life of the character Contemplate contemplated by Article II. The court accordingly concludes that the evidence before it does not conclusively establish the commission of the Act of Actus Rails under Article 2C of the convention. Turning to Article 2D, the court recalls that the Actus Rails set forth in this provision includes a mental element, the measures must be intended to prevent births within the group. The court explains that Article two D encompasses measures intended to prevent the group from reproducing normally, whether through their physical or psychological impacts, assessed in the relevant social and cultural context. Such measures must be intended to prevent births within the group and objectively objectively capable of doing so, but proof that they actually reduce the birth rate is not required. Their scale and actual effects may nevertheless inform the assessment of intent without constituting separate requirements under that. provision. The evidence before the court establishes that from 2005 to 2018, Moundown Township, which contained the highest percentage of Rohingya of any township in the country imposed regional order 1 to 75, which required, in the area, special marriage permission requirements for people described as Bengalis, and limited the number of children married couples were allowed to have. While evidence indicates that the policies did not succeed in restricting the Rohingya birth rate to 2 to 2 children in practice, such success is not required by Article 2D. The marriage and birth restrictions in Regional Order 12005 itself were officially described by the government as processes for controlling Bengali population. Myanmar accept that the purpose of the measure was to slow the birth rate, and the evidence demonstrates its enforcement against members of the members of the Rohingya group. Under these circumstances, the court is convinced that the order was a coercive measure directed at the Rohingya group which was intended at the very least to reduce bursts within the group, including at the time of the clearance operations. The restrictions the restrictions on births in Mandau Township were coupled with the longstanding denial of birth registration and issuance of birth certificates, for Rohingya children in Rondon Rakhine State, as well as the difficulty of having Rohingya children included on household lists. In view of the court, the deny denial of legal identity of Rohingya children, and the onerous annual verification of the household list in Northern Rakhine State, are indicative of an intent to deter the Rohingya from reproducing normally. The the court further observes that the magnitude and character of the acts of sexual violence during the Koreans operations, support the conclusion that the acts were intended to physically and mentally impair the willingness and ability of the population to procreate. Acts of rape and other sexual violence cause lasting physical harm to reproductive functioning. Survivors of sexual violence and their partners also experienced lasting psychological trauma, social ostracism, and cultural stigma, which affected the possibility of marriage and procreation, particularly in light of the social structure and gender roles in the Rohingya community. The court observes that white widespread acts of sexual violence may constitute measures aimed at preventing the reproduction of members of the group for purposes of the Actus reus of genocide. With respect to intent, the court considers that the likely effects of the widespread sexual violence against Rohingya population would have been understood by Myanmar security forces who perpetrated them, particularly in light of the cultural context. The court the court further notes that the separation of sexes and killing of men in multiple villages during the clearance operations, as well as the brutal murder of infants, also supports the inference that Myanmar security forces acted with the intent to prevent births among the group. The court finds that taken together the restrictions on marriages and births on Rohingya in Moundel Township, the denial of legal registration of Rohingya children, and the large scale commission of rape targeting the Rohingya population during the 2017 clearance operations, when viewed in the context of the government messages regarding uncontrolled Rohingya population growth, establish an intent to impact the capacity of of members of the Rohingya community to reproduce normally, and thus an intent to prevent births within the group. The court is therefore fully convinced that Myanmar imposed measures intended to to prevent births within the group, and that the actus reus of genocide, within the meaning of Article 2D of the convention is established. In some, the court considers that the evidence conclusively establishes that Myanmar's security forces and other state organs committed acts falling within the actus rears, said was in Article 2A, B and D of the Genocide Convention. The evidence does not however, conclusively establish the Commission of the Act of reuse set forth in Article two c. Turning to the mens rear of genocide. The court observes that in order to constitute genocide, the actus reus must be committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group as such. The court begins by examining the meaning of the phrase in part. Where allegations of genocide are based on the targeting of a part of the protected group, the intention to destroy must relate to at least a substantial part of that group. Quoting from its jurisprudence, the court notes that the part targeted must be significant enough to have an impact on the group as a whole. The jurisprudence of a court and of international criminal tribunals identifies three elements relevant to such an assessment. The first, quantitative element, concerns the numerical size of the targeted part of the group, which should be evaluated not only in absolute terms, but also in relation to the overall size of the entire group. The second element relates to the geographic extent of the perpetrator's control. And the third element relates to the qualitative or emblematic nature of the targeted portion within the group. These conditions are not exhaustive, nor is it necessary for all three conditions to be met. However, the court has emphasized that the quantitative criterion is an essential starting point and must be given priority. The court finds that the targeted part of the protected group is the approximately 815,000 Rohingya, who lived in northern Rakhine State prior to the two 2017 clearance operations. The court considers that this number is clearly significant, both in absolute terms and in relation to the overall Rohingya population in Myanmar. The court concludes that, based on the numerical size of the group alone, the part of the Rohingya population targeted by Myanmar is substantial for the purposes of the genocide convention. Consequently, the court does not consider it necessary to examine the geographic or qualitative elements in this case. The court next turns to the requirement under Article two of the Genocide Convention, that the acts be committed with the intent to destroy the protected group. The court and international criminal tribunals have recognized that genocidal intent may be established, either through direct evidence or indirectly by relying upon relying on inferences drawing from circumstantial evidence. In the evidence, of direct evidence of intent to commit genocide, the Gambia must rely on circumstantial evidence. With respect to Gambia's argument that under the category of particular circumstances, genocidal genocidal intent can be inferred in respect of a single incident or place. Or in respect of a smaller subset of locations The court is of the view that such an approach would conflict with its finding, that the part of the group that was targeted by Myanmar was substantial for the purpose purposes of the genocide convention. It would not be appropriate for the court to consider that the entire Rohingya population of Northern Rokhine State was targeted by Myanmar's actions. while simultaneously inferring genocidal intent solely from evidence confined to a limited number of locations. The court next turns to Myanmar's argument that the inference of genocidal intent from circumstantial evidence is only possible through a pattern of conduct. As defined in the court's jurisprudence, a pattern of conduct is a consistent consistent series of acts carried out over a specific period of time. The jurisprudence of the court, and of international criminal tribunals, indicates that the inquiry into genocidal intent is not confined to determining whether certain factors reveal a pattern of conduct from which such an such an intent may be inferred. Rather, genocidal intent may be inferred from an array of different factors without necessarily requiring a prior finding that a pattern of conduct is established. The court further observes, that the circumstantial evidence that it may consider in identifying the existence of genocide intent is not limited to conduct that constitute the material acts under. Art. Article two of the Genocide Convention. Moreover, in accordance with its previous jurisprudence, the court states that it will assess the evidence holistically in order to establish whether genocidal intent may be inferred from Myanmar's conduct. In cases such as the present one, in which the court draws inferences from circumstantial evidence, genocidal intent must be the only reasonable inference from the facts. The court explains that it will consider whether the evidence supports a reasonable inference that Myanmar security forces acted with genocidal intent, and whether this is the only reasonable inference. that can be drawn from the totality of the facts. Taking into account factual background of the case, as well as the court's jurisprudence and that of international criminal tribunals. The court's assessment of the existence of genocidal intent in the present case is based on the following factors. A, the general context. B, the selective targeting of the Rohingya. C, the perpetration of acts that violate the foundation of the Rohingya group. and D, the systematic nature and the scale of Myanmar's actions. Starting with the first fact, factor, this court and international criminal tribunals have recognized that inferences concerning the existence of genocidal intent may be drawn from a general context. including the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against the same group. The expression other culpable acts is intended only to describe acts of a particularly serious nature, not as a criminal legal qualification of the conduct in question. There are four distinct elements distinct elements of Myanmar's conduct that are particularly pertinent in this regard. They are one, the long standing legislative and other forms of discrimination against the Rohingya. two, the prevalence of anti-Rohingya hate speech. three, military operations targeting the Rohingya prior to 2017. and four, the forceful displacement of the Rohingya population during and after the 2017 clearance operations. The court considers these elements to constitute both part of the relevant general context and other culpable acts that were systematically directed against the Rohingya. While the court does, not consider these elements individually to constitute evidence of Myanmar's general genocidal intent, taken together, they are important aspects of the broader contextual framework of the case, from which inferences concerning the existence of genocidal intent might be drawn. Turning to the first element which comprises legislative and other forms forms of discrimination against the Rohingya, the court refers to its finding that the citizenship law adopted in 1982, denied the Rohingya access to citizenship based on race and resulted in approximately 1 million Rohingya being left stateless. The court also identified other discriminatory regulatory systems restricting access to employment, higher education, and curtailing freedom of movement. These regulatory systems were discriminatory, both by design and in their implementation, rendering the Rohingya marginalized and particularly vulnerable. In addition, the court makes reference to Myanmar's imposition of policies aimed at restricting the rights of Rohingya to marry and to have children. The second element in assessing the general context is the prevalence of anti-Rohingya hate speech. The court recalls a series of speeches made by senior senior general Min An Lin, commander in chief of the military at that at that at the time, during and after the Korean operations, as well as the campaign, disseminated disseminating hate speech on Facebook, organized by the Tatmadaw. In particular, the court found that the military Myanmar military actively disseminate and promoted hate speech in a systematic and coordinated way during the 2017 clearance operations. Utterances of hate speech may be relevant in assessing the genocidal intent of the state, especially in cases where the person disseminating hate speech is a high ranking government official. Or where does dissemination of hate speech is all organized by government authorities. With regard to the context of the statements, the court notes the temporal overlap between the anti-Rohingya hate speech campaign and the clearance operations. The court recalls that the hate speech organized and disseminated by the Myanmar military in the lead up to, and during the clearance operations, portrayed the Rohingya both as subhuman and as a violent threat, thus contributing to a climate conducive to targeting a group for destruction. The third element is the previous military operations targeting the Rohingya. There have been military campaign against the Rohingya before the 1970 2017 clearance operations, which has which had caused large scale displacement, including in 1978, 1991, and 1992. In these instances, the great majority of the displaced Rohingya population was ultimately repatriated to Myanmar. In October 2016, the Myanmar military undertook clearance operations against the Rohingya following attacks by ASA on police posts. The resulting violence caused a approximately 87,000 Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh. Those who fled have not since been repatriated. The court considers that these military operations constitute other culpable acts systematically directed against the same group. The fourth element in assessing the general context is the forceful displacement. of the Rohingya population. As already noted, forced displacement cannot as such be designated as genocide. This does not, however, preclude reliance on it as a potential basis for inferring genocidal intent. Citing its previous jurisprudence, the court recalls that acts of ethnic cleansing may occur in parallel to acts prohibited by Article Two of the convention, and may be significant as indicative of the presence of a. specific intent, inspiring those acts. Forceful displacement displacement has been considered to fall within the category of other culpable acts, systematically directed against the same group, for the purpose of determining genocidal intent. The court has described the forceful displacement of the Rohingya in the context of the Actus Reus analysis, making reference to the destruction of the community security of the Rohingya, and to the danger faced by those who attempted to escape the violence. Having addressed the elements making up the general context, the court next turns to the second factor, to assess in order to determine the existence of genocidal intent, namely, the selective targeting of the Rohingya. The court first considers the selective targeting of Rohingya villages and individuals during the clearance operations. Evidence before the court indicates that in numerous locations in northern Rakhine state, only Rohingya settlements were affected by the clearance operations, indicating selective selective targeting. These operations were conducted in the region region of Myanmar with the highest Rohingya population. The the record also contains extensive evidence of direct intentional targeting of Rohingya civilians, as well as of executions of Rohingya men and boys. The court then considers the burning and raising of Rohingya villages, combined with the organized resettlement of non-Rohingya communities in formerly Rohingya areas. Approximately 392 villages, representing approximately 40 40% of the 993 villages in the three townships of Northern Rakhine State, were partially or totally destroyed during and after the 2017 clearance operations. Bulldozing and large scale terrain clearance often followed the destruction of Rohingya villages, in turn rapid construction took place on the cleared sites, including security installations, new villages and houses, and other civilian infrastructure. the burning and raising of the bridges are relevant to the question of genocidal intent. First, the fact that it was only Rohingya villages that were destroyed spoiled supports the inference that the Rohingya was selectively targeted by Myanmar. Second, the burning of houses sent a clear message that they had nothing to return to. The intention to purge Rohingya from northern Rakhine State is also evidenced by Myanmar's coordinated policy of construction of new infrastructure and resettlement. of non non Rohingya group groups in formerly Rohingya areas. The court then turns to the third factor relevant to inferring genocide intent, which is the perpetration of acts that violate the foundations of the Rohingya group. This factor includes the examination of matters relating to the nature, extent, and degree of the injuries caused to the protected population. Under this category, the the court first examines the extent and manner of the sexual violence committed against Rohingya. The court has observed the pervasive and systematic character of the sexual violence inflicted on Rohingya victims during the 2017 clearance operations, and that acts of sexual violence were often exacerbated by acts of physical brutality. For these reasons, the court considers that Myanmar's security forces committed sexual violence against members of the Rohingya population in a way that degraded the victims and their community to an extreme degree. The court then examined the targeting of children as acts that may violate the foundations of the Rohingya group. The court notes that as children are vital to the continued existence of any human group, acts targeting them will directly affect the resilience and ultimate survival of the group. There are credible estimates that at least 730 and up to 2100 and 109 Rohingya children under the age of five died as a result of violence during the clearance operations. The court considers that it is difficult to explain the targeted children, on any basis other than their membership in the protected group. The court then turns to the fourth factor in assessing genocidal intent. namely, the systematic nature and scale of the of the relevant conduct. It notes that the court and international criminal tribunals have found that the systematic targeting of the protected group may allow inferences of genocidal intent to be drawn. The evidence before the court is establishes that many of the elements of modus operandi, identified by the Gambia, occurred in a large number of locations during the 2017 clearance operations. There were incidents in numeral places of indiscriminate shooting and of Myanmar security forces shooting at fleeing Rohingya. Widespread mass or gang rape of Rohingya occurred in many locations in northern Rakhine State. The record also establishes the burning of all or parts of 392 villages, most of which took place during the clearance operations, and the subsequent large scale bulldozing of 78 villages. For actions to be considered as systematic, it is not necessary for every identified element of a given conduct to be exhibited at each specific. location. Citing its previous jurisprudence, court refers to a generally similar modus operandi. The court thus considers that the conduct of men Myanmar's security forces during the clearance operations can be considered considered as systematic. Turning to the scale of the conduct, the court observes that, while a high relative number of deaths may well be an important factor from which to infer genocidal intent, a comparatively lower percentage of deaths does not by itself necessarily preclude a finding of genocidal intent. Furthermore, the relevant number to be used as a basis of comparison is the size of the targeted group. The group that was targeted in this case was the Rohingya population of Northern Rokhine State. numbering approximately approximately 815,000. Thus, the estimated 10,000 Rohingya that were killed constituted 1.2% of the targeted population. Moreover, killing is not the only material act that is prohibited under the convention. The big victims to be taken into account as part of an assessment of the scale of the destruction include not only those who were killed, but also all those who were subjected, to any of the acts listed in Article two of the Genocide Convention. This increases the relative proportionate scale of the destruction of the protected protected group. The court next turns to Myanmar's argument that its security forces had, and did not avail themselves, of opportunities to destroy the population population concerned, as illustrated by the continued presence of Rohingya in towns and villages in Rakhine State and in IDP camps. In the court's view, a reasonable inference of genocidal intent does not depend on evidence that the perpetrators took every effort to maximize the level of harm that they caused to the protective group. In the context of this case, the court observes that the claimed purpose of Myanmar's actions was to undertake counterinsurgence insurgency operations in response to other attacks, which imposed geographic and other constraints on the opportunities that that were available to Myanmar. In particular, Myanmar does not claim that other attacks occurred in the IDP camps and the IDP camps, and therefore, by its own account, it had no basis to carry out counterinsurgency operations there. The court notes that the part of the Rohingya population living in IDT camps is not included in the targeted part of the group for establishing genocidal intent. Therefore, Myanmar's opportunity to target target them does not bear upon the court's analysis. In any event, the court observes that the total set of victims, and not just the victims of intentional killings, must be considered for the purposes of the assessment of the opportunity available to the perpetrator. In this case, the court finds that the fact that Myanmar did not take every opportunity it had to destroy members of the Rohingya group does not preclude an inference of genocidal intent. The court's examination of the four cited factors establishes that the context surrounding the 2017 clearance operations created an atmosphere that was conducive to the violence, perpetrated during those clearance operations by Myanmar security forces, and formed the basis of Myanmar's intention to destroy part of the Rohingya group. The court concludes that all the evidence before it, taken together, supports a reasonable inference that Myanmar security forces acted with genocidal intent. The court then explains that it may only establish genocidal intent by inference by inference from circumstances circumstances Circumstantial evidence, if it is the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence. The only reasonable influence standard does not derive from the genocide convention itself, but is a general test under international criminal law, applying whenever inferences are drawn from circumstantial evidence. In this regard, both the court and international criminal tribunals have recognized that genocidal intent may exist alongside other intentions, provided that such intentions are not incompatible with the existence of genocidal intent. The only reasonable influence starts standard means that the inference drawn should be capable of explaining all of the evidence taken together. When some elements of the evidential record may allow additional intentions to be inferred, but the totality of the evidence can only be explained by the perpetrator's genocidal intent. The only reasonable influence standard is met. The court recalls that the Gambia bears the burden of establishing the alleged breaches of the Genocide Convention. This entails establishing that genocidal intent is the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence. While Myanmar carries the burden of establishing the facts, upon which it relies in support of its own contentions, it is not required to reestablish to a fully conclusive standard the existence of an alternative reasonable inference. The court turned first to Myanmar's claim that the intent behind its actions were was to carry out counterinsurgency operations. The court observed, at the outset, that Myanmar's assessment of ASA as a terrorist threat does not preclude the possibility that Myanmar acted with genocidal intent. The specific locations examined by the court, where Myanmar conducted clearance operations, all correspond to areas where the evidence establishes that ASA committed attacks, or where Myanmar contends that such attacks occurred. Thus, there is a geographical and temporal correlation between other attacks and the clearance operation clearance operations that followed. Many of the characteristics of the clearance operations, however, are inconsistent with an intent to carry out counterinsurgency operations. For example, there is no evidence before the court that in the conduct of the Korean operations, Myanmar distinguished between civilians and alleged. other fighters. The court views casualties and damage far in excess of what was justified by military necessity as a factor, weighing against the influence that Myanmar's intent was to carry out counterinsurgency operations. Further, the execution of Rohingya men and boys in some locations. The widespread sexual violence, the targeting of children and babies, the methodical burning of villages and attacks on fleeing civilians are not consistent with an intent to conduct counterinsurgency operations. On this basis, the court concludes that the intention of intention of conducting genuine counterinsurgency operations does not constitute an alternative, reasonable inference. The court next turns to Myanmar's suggestion that it is reasonable to infer from the evidence that Myanmar's intent in carrying out the clearance operations was the forceful displacement of Rohingya. The court, in accordance with the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals, understands the forceful displacement displacement of a group to mean displacement where the members of groups group did not have a genuine choice to remain in the territory where they were present. The court and international criminal tribunals have observed that forceful displacement and genocide may occur in parallel. The intent to commit forcible displacement and the intent to commit genocide may coexist. The only reasonable inference standard is met, even if some elements of the evidential record allow additional intentions to be inferred. As long as the totality of the evidence can be explained, only by the perpetrator's genocidal intent. While, as Myanmar contends, a state accused of genocide is not required to incriminate itself by pleading other criminal acts, the question that the court has to resolve is whether, on the totality of the evidence, Myanmar's actions can be reasonably reasonably explained. by inferring that it acted with an intention to forcibly displace the Rohingya population. In its prior application of the Genocide Convention, The court has, at times, treated evidence of intent to displace the population as supporting a conclusion that genocidal intent had not been established. The court observed that in two earlier cases concerning alleged violation of the genocide convention, it found that forcible displacement, occurred in the context of a policy of ethnic cleansing. By contrast, in the president case, there is no evidence in the record of any effort or plan by the Myanmar government to transfer or evacuate the Rohingya population. And Myanmar's actions also do not indicate such an intention. While there is evidence that the number of fleeing Rohingya were allowed to pass into Bangladesh Bangladesh unharmed, the evidential record also contains many instances of Myanmar security forces attacking and killing civilians, both when they were fleeing from their villages during the clearance operations and when they were traveling traveling to Bangladesh. The court does consider considers that an intent to forcefully displace the population does not explain the totality of the evidence before the court. For this reason, in the court's view, an intent to forcefully displace the population does not constitute an alternative, reasonable inference. The court finally turns to Myanmar's suggestion that an intention to punish the Rohingya population in retaliation for the activities of ASA could constitute an alternative, reasonable inference in this case. The courtrillionecalls that genocidal intent may coexist with other intentions, as long as such intentions are not incompatible with the existence of genocidal intent. In the court's view, genocidal intent is likely to be accompanied by intent to punish, particularly in the context of collective punishment. Genocidal and punitive intentions may often be untwined in the sense that the destruction of a protected group is an extreme form of punishment. And the two intentions may not. always be capable of meaningful separation for the purpose of drawing alternative inferences. The court considers that in the present case, the scale and nature of Myanmar's actions and the methods it employed went well beyond what would be required to punish the population, and and are instead characteristic of an intent to destroy a substantial part of the group. In light of the reasons set out above, the court finds the punishment of the Rohingya population does not constitute an alternative reasonable influence on the evidence before it. Accordingly, on the basis of all the evidence taken together, the court is of the view that the only reasonable inference that can explain Myanmar's actions is an intention to destroy a substantial part of the protective group. namely the Rohingya population in Northern Rakhine State. For the reasons above, the court is fully convinced that that Myanmar committed acts falling under Article 2AB, 2AB and D of the Genocide Convention, with an intent to destroy a substantial part of the Rohingya population of Myanmar. The the court finds that Myanmar breached its obligations under Article I and Article III A of the convention. I will not turn to the allegation that Myanmar failed to prevent genocide, pursuant to Article One of the convention. The courtrillionecalls that in paragraph one of the Gambia's final submissions, it is requested to find that Myanmar's Myanmar is responsible for genocide. perpetrated by its security forces and individuals acting under their instruction, direction or control. In paragraph two, however, with respect to the obligation to prevent genocide, the Gambia requests a court to find only that Myanmar has failed to prevent acts of genocide perpetrated by individual individuals, alongside its security forces. In the view of the court, the reference in paragraph two to acts perpetrated by individuals alongside its security forces shows that the claim regarding their duty to prevent only concerns acts committed by persons whose conduct is not attributable to Myanmar. We, Referring to its previous jurisprudence, the court recalls that the obligation to prevent genocide under Article I is one of conduct, not of result, and required states to employ all means reasonably available to prevent genocide so far as possible. The state's obligation to prevent and to and the corresponding duty to act. arrives as soon as the state knows what should normally have known of a serious risk that genocide will be committed. Without requiring certainty that genocide is imminent or underway. From that moment, the state must use any means likely to deter those suspect of preparing genocide or reasonably suspect of harboring genocidal genocidal intent, as the circumstances permit. The responsibility arises where the state manifestly fails to take measures within its power that might have contributed to prevention, assessed in light of the due diligence required in the particular circumstances. The court has recognized that the obligation to prevent and article one applies to any any act punishable under article three of the convention. The assessment of a serious risk with respect to the obligation to prevent, involves a determination on both the material and mental element of genocide, as well as any other elements of the relevant provisions by Article III. In particular, absent the serious risk of the presence of genocidal intent, the obligation to prevent under article one of the convention does not arise. The court has held that if a state itself is found responsible for genocide, then that state has necessarily breached the obligation to to prevent those same acts. Under such circumstances, there is no need for the court to make a separate determination that the obligation to to prevent those same acts pursuant to Article one of the convention has been violated. The same reasoning applies to the responsibility of a state for the other offenses enumerated in Article three of the convention. In the present case, however, the Gambia the Gambia contends that Myanmar failed to prevent genocide committed by persons acting alongside its security forces and not under its instructions direction or control. This claim is not subsumed by the finding that Myanmar itself is responsible for committing genocide. Evidence before the court establishes that non-Rohingya civilians entered villages with Myanmar security forces and participated alongside them in acts such as killings and burning houses. The evidence does not clarify, however, whether such civilians were acting under Myanmar's command or control. The court recalls that the conduct of non-state actors may be attributable to a state for the purposes of international responsibility. If they were acting in accordance with the state state's instructions or under its effective control. Based on the record before it, the court cannot conclude that all acts committed by non-Rohingya civilians during the clearance operations were taken in accordance with Myanmar's instructions or under its effective control, such that their conduct is attributable to the state. The court therefore considers that at least some of the above acts above acts of civilians during the clearance operations must be considered to be those of non-state actors, whose conduct is not attributable to the respondent. In light of the evidence regarding the nature of the conduct of non-Rohingya civilians, the court considers that the participation of such civilians in the Korean's operations, alongside Myanmar's security forces, posed a serious risk of risk of genocide, of which the state should normally have been aware. Myanmar does not contend that it was unaware of the participation of non-Rohingya civilians, or that it lacked the capacity to take action, to address it. The record contains no evidence, however, that Myanmar authorities made any attempt to discourage non-Rohingya civilians from participating in the attacks on the Rohingya. To the contrary, Myanmar acknowledges that it recruited some Rohingya civilians. Moreover, the court has found that prior to and during the clearance operations, Myanmar's military broadly spread hatred of the Rohingya through the Facebook military network, and at least one video posted on that platform showed a soldier encouraging non-Rohingya residents to join the fight. Under the circumstances, the court is convinced that Myanmar had means available to it that might have contributed to preventing acts likely to constitute genocide by persons acting alongside its security forces, and failed to avail itself. of them. Given the limited evidence before it on this question, the court is not in a position to conclusively determine whether the non-Rohingya civilians participating in the Koreans operations, whose conduct is not attributable to the state, themselves acted with the with the genocidal intent. This finding does not, however, affect the conclusion that such civilians civilians participated in the clearance operations where acts of genocide were committed by Myanmar's security forces. And that the acts of civilians pose a serious risk of genocide. In this regard, the court recalls that the instant that the state learns of, or should normally have learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed, the due diligence obligation to prevent genocide under Article one of the convention arises. This duty is breached and the response responsibility of a state is engaged. When a state should normally have been aware of a serious risk that genocide would be committed, and manifestly fail to take all measures to prevent genocide, which were within its power. As the court has emphasized, the obligation to prevent is not one of the result. A state does not incur responsibility simply because its efforts do not succeed. On the other hand, the obligation to prevent genocide does not allow a state that is in a position to act in the face of a serious risk of genocide, to remain idle and gamble that the risk might not ultimately materialize. Like other obligations in the convention, with a preventive character, including the prohibition of incitement to commit genocide, the obligation to adopt legislation to give effect to convention. And obligation to investigate acts of genocide under the duty to punish. International responsibility for breach of duty, of the duty to prevent genocide is not conditioned on a finding that genocide has a occurred. Such an interpretation served the protective humanizing and civilizing purpose of the convention. In the prison case, the court concludes that Myanmar knew, or should have known, of a serious risk of acts of genocide being committed by non-Rohingya civilians alongside its security forces during the 2017 clearance operations, that it had the means to take action to prevent such acts, and that it manifestly manifestly refrained from using them. Myanmar thus violated its obligation to prevent genocide pursuant to Article one of the convention. The court next turns to the Gambia's claim. that Myanmar Myanmar has directly and publicly incited genocide in violation of Article 3C of the genocide convention. As with the duty to prevent genocide. The court has held that where a state has been found to be responsible for genocide pursuant to Article III a, it is unnecessary to determine whether it may also have incurred responsibility for direct and public incitement to commit genocide under Article 3C, with respect to those same acts. The responsibility of the state under Article III C, for incitement of its own agent or organs to commit genocide, is established and absorbed by the finding that the state itself has committed genocide. Thus, the court need not separately address the Gambia's contention that members of the Tatmadao and the civilian government exhorted the military to commit genocide. The court observed, however, that the prohibition of direct and public incitement to commit genocide under Article 3C is not limited to incitement by the state of genocide committed by state or agent or organs. The provision also prohibits incitement by the state of genocide committed by private. actors, namely persons and entities whose conduct is not attributable to the state. Thus, the court finding court finding that Myanmar itself committed genocide in violation of Article 3A does not address the Gambia's the Gambia's contention that Myanmar may have incited private actors to commit genocide. The court, accordingly, will examine this question. The the prohibition on incitement to commit genocide has a preventative purpose. It is well established that incitement can be committed irrespective of whether genocide itself takes place. Thus, the crime is completed as soon as the discourse in question is uttered. A state is responsible for direct and public incitement to commit genocide, pursuant to article three C of the genocide convention, when a person or organ whose conduct is attributable to state, communicate in public messages that that directly prompt, encourage, or provoke the commission of genocide. The material element of incitement encompasses the intent to directly and publicly incite other actors to commit genocide and presupposes a genocide a genocidal intent on the part of the speaker. The court considers that incitement to commit genocide under the under the convention does not require require a call for killing or extermination. The speaker may seek to provoke the audience to commit any material act set forth in Article two with genocidal intent against a protected group. In considering the evidence before it, the court has found that the Koreans operations were accompanied by speeches by Senior General Minang Lai fueling hatred against the Rohingya, as well as widespread hate speech on official sites of the Myanmar military and the Facebook military net network, among other sources. For hate speech to constitute incitement, however, it must involve a call to commit genocide when viewed in context. With respect to the speeches delivered delivered by Senior General Line, the court recalls that these speeches were delivered in the middest or immediate aftermath of widespread violence against the Rohingya. Their purpose was to raise funds for and honor the security forces conducting those operations. In the court's view, these messages appear to have been directed primarily at Myanmar's security forces and other state agent organs rather than constituting an effort to directly incite genocide by civilians. The court according accordingly considers that the speeches do not constitute direct calls to private. actors to engage in genocide. With reference to the alleged incitement to genocide contained in statements by Buddhist monks and politicians, in view of the court, the evidence in the record is not sufficient to conclusively establish that the conduct of these actors is attributable to Myanmar. With regard to the Facebook military Facebook military network, the court is of the view that the evidence establishes that the posts on that platform were made by persons and organs, and organs whose conduct is attributable to Myanmar, that the posts were broadly and publicly disseminated to the civilian population, and that the messages targeted the Rohingya as a group. The court considers that some of the Facebook military network messages sought to encourage the non-Rohingya population to engage in violence. the Rohingya as a group. The court is not, however, is not persuaded, however, that the evidence before it conclusively establishes that the post even when taken in context, were made with a specific intent to destroy the group in whole or in part, or constituted a direct appeal for the commission of genocide, or that the intended audience would have understood the messages as such. The court is therefore not fully convinced that the Gambia has established that Myanmar violates its obligation under Article 3C of the convention, by directly and publicly inciting genocide against the Rohingya. by private actors. The court next turns to the Gambia's claim that Myanmar has failed to punish acts prohibited under Article III of the convention. The obligation to punish the crime of genocide is set forth in Article one of the Genocide Convention, and Article three set out the acts that shall be punishable. The obligation to further the obligation is further elaborated in Articles 456 of the convention. This suite of duties together constitutes the obligation of state parties to punish genocide under the convention. Collectively, their purpose is to enable proceedings to be brought against suspects and to achieve the object and purpose of a convention, by avoiding impunity for the perpetrators. The obligation to punish arises whenever any of the offenses enumerated in Article three are perpetrated. Furthermore, the obligation to punish extends to acts committed by private actors whose conduct is not attributable to the state. and does not require a showing of genocidal intent on the part of the state. Nor is the duty to punish subsumed by a finding that the state has committed genocide. With regard to the duty to investigate, the court observes that the convention imposes on states an obligation to prosecute and punish and that ordinarily an investigation is a necessary prerequisite to the fulfillment of these obligations. The obligation to investigate is necessarily antecedent to any determination of a violation of Article III. It arises as soon as there are reasonable grounds to suspect that acts of genocide or other acts punishable punishable under Article three of the convention have been committed in a state's territorial jurisdiction. This includes an assessment of the presence of genocidal intent. The obligation to investigate is one of due diligence. Once a state knows or should know that there are reasonable grounds to suspect, the violation of Article three have been committed, steps must be taken to proceed with an effective investigation. The court considers that investigation must be conducted in good faith in a manner designed to achieve their purpose of identifying violations and bringing persons responsible to justice. Investigation must be prompt, thorough, effective, independent, and impartial, and capable of grounding a fair trial. Article four and six of the convention further obliges the state to prosecute and punish any individual who may be responsible for committing acts prescribed by Article three within its territorial jurisdiction, if there is a sufficient sufficient. evidence to do so. National authorities have some discretion in determining whether prosecution is warranted. Such decisions, however, must be based on the available evidence and applicable legal rules, and taken in the same manner as in the case of other grave offences under the law of that state. Such discretion must also be exercised independently, impartially and in good faith. The investigation, prosecution and trial must be sufficiently sufficiently transparent for the integrity of the process to be assessed. One of the most effective ways of preventing criminal acts is to provide penalties and impose them effectively on those who commit the criminal acts. It follows that, to be effective, penalties must be proportionate to the gravity of the crime of genocide and sufficient to prevent such crime, to prevent such acts in the future. The court observes that the obligation to investigate, prosecute, and punish genocide applies only to acts falling within articles two and three of the convention. Unless a crime provided for under a under a state's domestic criminal law encompasses genocidal intent, as well as other elements of the crime of genocide, its enforcement will not fulfill the obligation to punish genocide. The court then turns to the principle of superior responsibility. According to which, superior incur responsibility for offenses committed by their subordinates if they knew or should have known that the subordinates committed or were likely to commit punishable acts. And if the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or punish those, offenses. The court considers that the specific recognition of punishment of constitutional world rulers and other high level officials in Article four, particularly when read in light of the convention's object and purpose, encompasses the principle of superior responsibility. Under Myanmar's constitution, criminal responsibility for members of the military can generally be imposed only within the military justice system. In this respect, the court observes, that the Genocide Convention does not mandate any particular domestic legal arrangement for a state party, so long as those arrangements do not preclude effective punishment, as mandated by the convention. A state cannot, however, invoke its domestic legal system to justify failure to comply with the convention. In sum, The obligation to punish obliges the state party to effectively effectively investigate, prosecute, and punish persons, including commanders having committed offenses under Article III, in a competent tribunal and to impose effective penalties commensurate with the severity of the crime in a manner consistent with the considerations set forth by the Court. The court next turns to the question of Myanmar's compliance with the obligation to punish in this case. The court observes that Myanmar established established various commissions in relation to the situation in Rakhine State, a number of which predated the 2017 clearance operations. These mechanisms were not, however, capable of fulfilling Myanmar's investigative obligations with respect to the 2017 clearance operations. Regarding the entities that had an investigative investigative mandate in relation to events surrounding the 2017 clearance operations, the parties discuss the Tatmados Inquiry Board established in 2017, the Independent Commission of Inquiry, or ICOE, established in 2018, and the Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Body established in 2020. Having considered the conduct of each of these entities, the court observes that none of the measures taken by them involved investigation or prosecution of individual members, members of the DATMADAL. With respect to prosecution within the military military justice system, only a small number of officers or soldiers were convicted. and the penalties involved were generally lenient or substantially curtailed by pardons. Pardons The court recalls that the FFM's September 2018 report contained extensive information regarding the conduct of the clearance operations across northern Rakhine State, and found sufficient information to warrant initiation of proceedings for genocide, including with respect to named individuals. The court therefore considers that at least as of that date, Myanmar had both reasonable grounds to suspect that genocide may have been committed in its territory and sufficient evidence to commence an investigation. It was therefore incumbent upon Myanmar to conduct a prompt, effective, thorough, independent and impartial investigation with a view to ensuring the identification, prosecution and punishment of all persons responsible for acts of genocide. It is clear from the record that Myanmar did not take such action. despite having the capacity to do so. With regard to the ICOE investigation, the record establishes that, despite that entity having found some evidence consistent with that before the court regarding the conduct of the 2017 clearance operations, the criminal investigation and prosecution, body's subsequent investigation and prosecutions of the Border Guard police have been very limited, and that it had no jurisdiction to investigate the military. With respect to criminal proceedings involving the military, the court considers that Myanmar has not genuinely investigate or if warranted prosecuted its soldiers and commanders and punished them with penalties that could be considered commensurate with the crime of genocide. The court further observes that Myanmar did not criminalize genocide in any form until 2021. There was thus no offense of genocide under Myanmar's domestic law for the IC ICOE to investigate. Moreover, there were no further investigations into the acts punishable under the convention after that date. With respect to the punishment of direct and public incitement to commit genocide, the Court notes that the obligation to investigate acts of incitement is engaged once a state knows, or should know, that there is a reasonable grounds, reasonable basis for suspecting that the violation of Article 3C of the convention may have occurred. The court considers that the record contains sufficient information to establish such a reasonable basis, thus engaging Myanmar's duty at the minimum to investigate potential acts of incitement by both state and non-state actors. Although Myanmar contends that some penalties have been imposed on certain Buddhist monks and entities relating to political activities, this does not establish that Myanmar has met its obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish acts of direct and public incitement to genocide. Having examined Myanmar's efforts to investigate prosecute and punish allegation of crime genocide arising from the clearance operations, the court next considers The Gambia's allegations regarding the destruction of the evidence. and lack of cooperation with independent United Nations investigations. On the on the basis of the evidence before it, the court considers that Myanmar engaged in an extensive destruction of evidence by burning or otherwise disposing of bodies, burning and bulldozing sites, where clear and operations took place, and erecting new infrastructure, thus materially obstructing the ability of Myanmar or any other entity to effectively to effectively investigate the 2017 events. With respect to Myanmar's cooperation with the United Nations investigative investigative entities, in the court's view, Myanmar created obstacles to effective investigation and prosecution by either a competent domestic or international tribunal. It also limits limited the evidence available to this court through its destruction of evidence, denial of access to United Nations investigative entities, and failure itself to adequately investigate the possibility of genocide during the clearance operations. In light of all all the above, the court considers that Myanmar has failed to investigate and, if warranted, to prosecute and punish persons, including commanders committing offenses under Article III in a competent tribunal and to impose effective penalties commensurate with the severity of the crime. It therefore concludes that Myanmar has failed to punish genocide under Article 14 and six of the genocide convention. The court next turns to the Gambia's claim that Myanmar has Myanmar has breached its obligation under Article five. of the convention, to enact the necessary legislation to give effect to the provision of the convention. The court begins by noting that the adoption of such legislation is an essential prerequisite to the obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish acts of genocide and to provide effective penalties for those responsible. 13. Prior to 2021, Myanmar had no legislation specifically criminalizing genocide. The court will accordingly first consider whether Myanmar could nevertheless fulfill the obligation to enact the necessary legislation set forth in Article five through reliance on its general domestic. criminal law. The court considers that Article five requires state parties to adopt legislation criminalizing genocide as a distinct offense, which encompasses all the elements of Articles two and three of the convention. This includes, in particular, incorporating the elements of genocidal intent, In the court's view, failure to enact legislation that prohibits acts of genocide are set forth in these articles. We're adopting legislation that addresses only some of those acts, or applies only to some individuals, breaches Article five of the genocide convention. Prior to the enactment of the 2021 amendment to Myanmar's criminal court. Therefore, Myanmar was in breach of its obligation to enact necessary legislation under Article five. The court next turns to the question whether Myanmar's enactment of legislation in 2021 satisfied its obligation under Article Five. Section 311 A of the penal code enacts a crime qualified as genocide, which is defined in terms of the Five Material Acts under Article Two of the convention, together with the intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial, racial or religious group. The provision is articulated in terms of generally comparable to the definition of Article two of the Genocide Convention. The respondent indicated to the satisfaction of the court that the crime of genocide in Section 311 A applies to members of the military, by virtue of the Defense Services Act 1959. The court considers, however, that the material disparity arises between the new law and Article two 2D of the convention. Section 311 A defines this actus reus of genocide as applying to whoever, I quote, imposes many measures not in accordance with any existing laws intended to prevent births within the group. End of quote. This limitation allows me Myanmar to impose the very measures which Article 2D prohibits, and creates the possibility that conduct classified as genocide under the convention escapes. punishment under Myanmar's domestic law. The court further observes that the duty to enact legislation obliges the state to give effect to the entire entirety of Articles two and three. Section 311 A of the Penal Code addresses only the crime of genocide itself, and it does not it does not on its face implement the provisions of Article 3B to E of the convention. The court considers that the above mentioned characteristics of Section 333 311A of the penal code failed to meet Myanmar's obligations under Article five. Myanmar is therefore in breach of the obligation to adopt necessary legislation under Article five of the Genocide Convention. Having concluded that Myanmar has breached obligation, obligations under the Genocide Convention, the court turns to the questions of legal consequences and remedies. It first addresses Myanmar's challenges to its jurisdiction to order reparation. As the court has confirmed in the past, Where jurisdiction is founded on Article nine of the convention, the court may determine not only whether a party breached its obligation obligations under the convention, but also the legal consequences that would flow from such breaches and that the rules on the responsibility of state for internationally wrongful. acts. The court recalls that its 2022 judgments on preliminary objections confirmed that it had jurisdiction on the basis of Article nine of the convention to entertain the application filed by the Gambia. In that application, the Gambia requested the court to adjudicate and declare that Myanmar inter-alias must perform the obligation of reparation in the interest of the victims of genocide, and provide assurances and guarantees of non-repetition. Accordingly, the court considers that its jurisdiction encompasses all aspects of the Gambia's first submissions, including its claims for remedies. The court next turns to the question whether the Gambia has standing to claim remedies for Myanmar's violations of the genocide convention. The court recalls that all state parties have a common legal interest in ensuring compliance with the obligations, it governments parties under the genocide convention. States seeking to protect obligations at the governance parties may request assurances and guarantees of non-repetition. As well as the performance of the performance of the obligation of reparation in the interest of the beneficiaries of the obligation obligation breached. In this regard, with respect to reparation, the court notes that it has long been established that where obligations involve the protection of human rights, the individuals concerned should be regarded. as the ultimate beneficiaries. While the genocide convention protects certain groups, like other human rights treaties, individuals are also beneficiaries of the protected right, in this case, not to be subjected, not to be subject to genocide. The court accordingly accordingly considers that when remedies in the interest of the protected group and the individual victims of genocide, serve the object and purpose of the convention, and advance the collective interest of the State parties. In the court's view, therefore, in light of its legal interest in protecting the rights enshrined in the genocide convention, the Gambia is entitled to invoke Myanmar's obligation to offer assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, and to make reparation in the interest of the Rohingya as a group and as individuals. who were harmed by acts in violation of the genocide convention for which Myanmar is responsible. The court turns to the remedies sought, namely the cessation of Internship Wrongful Act, assurances and guarantees of non-repetition and reparation for the victims. Beginning with cessation, the court notes that a state responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to cease that act if it is continuing. and obligation breached remains in force. With respect to the Gambia's request for cessation regarding direct and public incitement to genocide, the court observed that its finding of genocide is limited to the period around the 2017 clearance operations, and that Myanmar's violation of the prohibition on incitement, it's subsumed in the finding of genocide. Since neither the genocide nor the related incitement has been found to be ongoing, the court cannot order cessation in this regard. With regard to Myanmar's failure to enact legislation to give full effect its obligations under the convention, and its failure to investigate, prosecute, and punish persons who committed acts punishable under Article three of the convention, the court finds that these constitute ongoing broach breaches of the genocide convention. The court therefore considers considers it appropriate to order the cessation of these continuing breaches. Myanmar is accordingly obliged to enact relevant legislation and to take immediate and effective steps to carry out investigations and, if warranted, prosecution prosecutions with a view to punishing perpetrators of acts prohibited by Article three of the convention in connection with the 2017 clearance operations. The court then turns to the assurances and guarantees of non-repetition requested by La Gambia. The court observes that obligations under the genocide convention are ergominous partis, and that the prohibition of genocide has a peremptory character under international law. The court considers that the violations of the genocide convention are of exceptional gravity, and that in the present case, they also arise in the context of long standing and deeply entrenched hostility towards the Rohingya as a group. Myanmar has failed to investigate, and if warranted prosecute and punish persons, suspected of having committed acts prohibited by Article three of the convention, has provided no remedies to the victims and continues to deny that the harms at issue ever occurred. The court considers that, in view of the circumstances before it, it is appropriate to require Myanmar to provide assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, and that Myanmar is under obligation to prevent similar violations from occurring in the future. the court turns to the question of what guarantees are appropriate. The court considers that ordering the provision of citizenship for all members of the Rohingya group, is beyond the scope of appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition. For acts of genocide in the circumstances before it. The court observed that other remedies ordered by the court in the present case, including the measures of cessation and restitution, also constitute appropriate measures appropriate guarantees. of of non-repetition. The court considers, however, that beyond these measures, Myanmar is under an obligation to prevent similar violations from occurring in the future. In this regard, additional appropriate guarantees may include in the area legal and institutional reform to ensure compliance with relevant international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and international criminal law obligations, including adequate avenues for redress. Training of security forces personnel in these applications. And ensuring effective civilian control of the security forces. The court considers that beyond the other measures ordered by it, the choice of additional means must be left to Myanmar. With respect to the question of reparation, the Gambia submits that Myanmar is obliged to provide full reparation to all Rohingya victims of its punishable act. The court has found that the Internationally Wrongful Act for which Myanmar has been found responsible, resulted in resulted in injury to the Rohingya as a group and as individuals, and that this injury was caused by Myanmar. The court finds that Myanmar has an obligation to make reparation. Because reparation constitutes a constitutes a remedy for harm suffered, states seeking to enforce a common interest in compliance with obligations at governance or at governance parties, such as the Gambia, are in a different situation than a directly injured or especially affected state claiming reparation. While a non-injured or non-affected state may pursue a claim against another state for breach of a collective obligation, it may not claim reparation for itself. Rather, it may only make a claim for the the performance of the of the obligation of reparation in the interest of the injured state. Or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached. While the Gambia cannot seek reparation for itself, it may make claim for reparation in the interest of the Rohingya as a group and as individual victims. Reparation should be proportional to the gravity of the violations and the harm suffered. The Gambia accordingly may seek, and Myanmar is obliged to provide adequate, effective and prompt reparation for the harm suffered by the Rohingya population as a group and as individuals, as a result of Myanmar's wrongful acts. The court thus turns to the question of what measures of reparation may be appropriate. Starting with restitution. In light of the harms to the Rohingya, which resulted from the respondent's breach of its obligation under the genocide convention, the court determines that the following measures of restitution by Myanmar, are appropriate in this case. One, allow and facilitate the safe, voluntary and dignified return to their place of residence and reunite reunification families for the Rohingya who were displaced as a result of the respondents wrongful acts, whether they were displaced within Myanmar or abroad. Two, return or place in kind, all individual and collective property of the Rohingya that has been lost or damaged as a result of the respondents wrong facts. Three, facilitate the search for the disappeared and assist in the recovery, identification, and reburial with dignity in accordance with Rohingya tradition, traditions of the bodies of the Rohingya who were killed as a result of the respondents. wrong fact. Four, provide for the physical and psychological rehabilitation of the Rohingya who are physically or mentally injured as a result of the respondents wrongful act. Five, ensure the protection of the Rohingya from discrimination and persecution. The court considers these measures necessary to adequately redress the harm suffered by the protective group. The court then considers compensation and full reparation, recalling that when restitution is materially impossible, a state may have an obligation to compensate natural or legal persons or population populations that have suffered material damage. In the court's view, the Rohingya are entitled to adequate compensation for the injury caused by the violations of Myanmar, in so far as such damage is not made good by restitution. Accordingly, to the extent that full reparation by restitution is materially impossible, the respondent is obliged to provide adequate compensation in accordance with the applicable rules of international law to all of the Rohingya, individually and as a group, having suffered any form of material damage as a result of Myanmar's wrongful acts in an amount adequate to fully repair the injuries caused. The court is not requested at this stage of the proceedings to indicate a specific amount of compensation, or the modalities pursuant to which such compensation must be made to the injured. Rohingya. Moreover, the amount of compensation must be determined in light of the adoption by the respondent of the measures of restitution, which the court has deemed to be appropriate in this case. In the present case, the court has determined that measures of restitution are appropriate. Were the court unable to determine compensation, where restitution proves impossible or insufficient. The entitlement to seek reparation would in practice fail to give full effect to the principle. that reparation must, insofar as possible, wipe out the consequences of the international wrongful act. Accordingly, the court sees no obstacle to proceed proceedings to a determination of compensation or other appropriate reparation in the prison case. Under these circumstances, the court considers that the question of the amount and modalities of compensation or other appropriate reparation should be determined in a subsequent phase of the proceedings. To that end, Myanmar Shal, within a period period of two years of the delivery of the present judgment, transmit to the court a report setting out the measures of restitution that he has adopted and to the extent that full reparation by restitution is materially impossible, specifying the amount and modalities of compensation. Thereafter, and after ascertaining the views of the parties, the court will make such orders as may be required for the further conduct of the proceedings with a view to determining the nature, form, and amount of compensation or other appropriate reparation. In a manner consistent with the interests of the protected group and its members. The court then examines Myanmar's compliance with the court's order of 23rd of January 2020, indicating provision measures. In that regard, it recalls that the Gambia alleges that that Myanmar has acted in breach of the first three measures. In its first provision measure, the court ordered Myanmar to take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of all acts within the scope of Article two of the convention. The court is unable to find that, on the evidence, the acts alleged by The Gambia, occurring after the order of the 23rd of January 2020, 2020, fall within the scope of the active layers of Article Two. The court finds therefore that Myanmar has not breached its obligations in respect of the first provisional measure. In its second provisional measure, the court ordered Myanmar to ensure that its military, as well as any irregular armed units which may be directed or supported by it. And any any organizations or persons which may be subject to its control, direction, or influence did not commit acts described in Article two of the convention, or any acts prohibited under Article 3B2DE of the convention. On the basis of the evidence before it, with specific reference to the court's conclusions in relation to Myanmar's Facebook military network messages and the materials disseminated by Myanmar since the 23rd of January 2020, targeting the Rohingya group, the court finds that Myanmar has not breached its obligations in respect of the second provision measure. In the third provision measure, the court ordered Myanmar to take effective measures to prevent the destruction and ensure the preservation of evidence related to allegations of the act within the scope of Article two of the convention. The court finds convincing evidence that after its order of the 23rd of January 2020, Myanmar completed the construction of at least one government base in 2021, on the sites of former Rohingya villages in Mandal Township, and burned and destroyed the remnants of at least five Rohingya villages in Buddhidan Township in May 2020. The court finds that through these acts, Myanmar breached its obligation under the court's third provisional measure. In addition to claiming declaratory relief, the Gambia has also claimed reparation for Myanmar's breach of the court's order, indicating provisional measures. The court notes that its order that Myanmar cease the continuing breach of the obligation to punish is necessarily applicable in the context of Myanmar's breach of its obligation under the court's third provision measure. For these reasons, the Court finds declaratory belief to be an appropriate remedy in the prison case, and that no further form of remedy is required. I shall now read out the operative part of the judgment. For these reasons, the Court, one, by nine votes to six, finds that the Republic of the Union of Myanmar has committed genocide against the Rohingya group in Northern Rakhine State, in violation of its obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. In favor, President Iwasawa, Judges Charles Worth Brandt, Gomes Robledo, Cleveland, Arescu, Tladi, Judge Ad hoc Pillay. Against vice presidents of Dinde, Judges Tomka, Abraham Sue Norte, Judge Judge ad hoc Crest. Two, by nine votes to six, finds that the Republic of the Union Myanmar, has violated its obligation under the convention on the prevention and punishment of the of the crime of genocide to prevent the commission of genocide by individuals alongside its security forces. In favor, President Iwasawa, Judges Charlesworth, Brand, Gomes Robledo, Cleveland, Arescu, Tladi, Umut, Judge Hardhock Pillay. Against Vice President 17de, judges Tomka, Abraham, Shue, Nolte, Judge Hardhock, Kress. three. By 14 votes to one, finds that the Republic of the Union Myanmar has not directly and publicly incited the commission of genocide against the Rohingya group by private persons in Northern Rakhine State, in violation of its obligation under the convention on the prevention and punishment of. the crime of genocide. In favor, President Iwasawa, Vice President 17 Judges Tomka, Abraham, Shue, Nolte, Charles Ross, Brand, Commissioner Bledo, Cleveland, Arescue, Tradi, Judges ad hoc Pillay, Klass against Judge Human. Four, by 11 votes to four, finds that the Republic of the Union of Myanmar has violated its obligation to punish genocide and other acts enumerated under Article three of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, in favor, President Iwasawa, Judges Nolte, Charles Worth, Brand, Commissible Robledo, Cleveland, Arasku Taddy, who moved judges ad hoc Pillay, Kress, against Vice President 17 day, Judges Tomka Arvam Sue. Five, by 14 votes to one, finds that the Republic of the Union Myanmar has violated its obligation under the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide to enact the necessary legislation to give effect the provisions of the convention. In favor, President Iwasawa, Vice President Sebentinde, judges Tomka, Abraham, Nolte, Charles Worth, Brand, Gomez Robledo, Cleveland, Arescu, Tladi, Humud, judges, ad hoc Pillay Crest against Judge Hue. Six by 14 votes to one decides that the Republic of the Union Myanmar must cease any ongoing violation of its obligations under Article five of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, by enacting legislation, giving full effect to its obligations under the convention. In favor, President Iwasawa, Vice President Sebentinde, Judges Tomka, Abraham, Nolte, Charles Ross, Brand, Gomes Robledo, Cleveland, Arescu, Tladi, Moot, Judges Haddock Pillay, Cress against Judge Hsuer. Seven, by 13 votes to two, decides that the Republic of the Union, Myanmar must take immediate and effective steps to investigate all persons reasonably suspected of having committed acts contrary to Article three of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, in relation to the 2017 clearance of operations and if warranted, to prosecute and punish them. In favor, President Iwasawa, Judges Tomka, Shue, Nolte, Charles Ross, Brand, Commissioner of Ledo, Cleveland, Arescu, Tradi, Judges ad hoc Billy Cress. Against Vice President 17th Judge Abraham. eight, by nine votes to six. Decides that the Republic of the Union of Myanmar must provide assurances and guarantees of non-repetition of the violation of its obligations under the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, and prevent similar violations from occurring in the future. In favor, President Iwasawa, judges Charles Russ, Brand, Gomes Robledo, Cleveland, Arescu, Taddy, Judge Adhok Pillay. Against Vice President 17 day, Judges Tomka, Abraham, Sue Note Judge Hadok Kress. Nine. By ten votes to five, decides that the Republic of the Union Myanmar is under an obligation to adopt the measures of restitution defined in paragraph 615 of the present judgment. In favor, President Iwasawa, Judges Tomo, Tomka, Charles Russ Brand, Congresswald Ledo, Cleveland, Aresku, Tladi, Humud, Judge Adhaq Pillay. Against, Vice President Sepetinde, Judges Abraham, Shue, Noldo, Nolte Jajara Crest. ten, by ten votes to five decides that the Republic of the Union Myanmar is under obligation to compensate the Rohingya Group and its members for the damage caused by the violation of its obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, in so far, as such damage is not made good by restitution. In favor, President Iwasawa, Judges Tomka, Charles Russ Brown, Commissioner Bledo, Cleveland, Arescu, Tradi, Humud, Judge Hadok Pilek. Against Vice President 17 Judges Abraham, Sue, Nolte, Judge Ad hoc Kress. 11, by ten votes to fight, decides that the question of the amount and modalities of compensation or other reparation due to the Rohingya Group and its members shall be settled. by the court, and that to this end, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar shall, within a period period of two years of the deliberate of the prison judgment, transmit to the court the report described in paragraph 625, and reserve for this purpose the subsequent procedure in the case. In favor, Judges Tomka, Abraham, Charles Russ, Brandt, Commissioner of Ledo, Cleveland, Lady, Humud, judges ad hoc Pillay, Kress against President Iwasawa, vice president 17 day Judge Sue Nolte Arescu. 12 by 11 votes to fall, finds that the Republic of the Union of Myanmar has violated its obligation under paragraph 863 of the order of the 23rd of January, 2020, indicating provisional measures to take effective measures to prevent the destruction and ensure the preservation of evidence related to allegations of acts within the scope of Article two of the convention on the prevention and punishment of the. crime of genocide. In favor, President Iwasawa, Judges Tomka, Charles Ross Brown, Commissible Bledo, Cleveland, Arescu Tladi, Humud, Judges Adhac Pillay, Kress. against Vice President 17 Judges Abraham Sue Norde. 13 unanimously reject all other submissions of the Republic of the Gambia. I now call upon the registrar to read the operative part of the judgment in French. ICJ · Greffier [2:42:34]: La cour, un, par neuf voix contre six, dit que la République de l'Union du Myanmar a commis un génocide contre le groupe des Rohingya dans le nord de l'État Rakhine, en violation des obligations que lui impose la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide. Pour monsieur Iwazawa, président, madame Charlesworth, monsieur Brant Gomez Roblet. Robledo, madame Cleveland, monsieur Oresco, Tladi, juge. Madame Pillay, juge ad hoc. Contre, madame Seboutinde, vice-présidente, monsieur Tomka, Abraham, Madame Chouet, Monsieur Nolte, juge, Monsieur Kraiss, juge ad hoc. Deux, par neuf voix contre six, dit que la République de l'Union du Myanmar a violé l'obligation que lui impose la Convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide, de prévenir la commission d'un génocide par certaines personnes, aux côtés de ces forces. de sécurité. Pour Monsieur Iwazawa, président, madame Charlesworth, Monsieur Brant, Gomes Robledo, madame Cleveland, Monsieur Orescu, Tladi, Moud, juge. Madame Pillay, juge ad hoc. Contre, madame Seboutine, vice-présidente, messieurs Tomka, Abraham, madame Chouet, monsieur Nolte, juge, monsieur, Kreiss, juge ad hoc. Trois, par 14 voix contre une, dit que la République de l'Union du Myanmar n'a pas, au regard de l'obligation que lui impose la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide, directement et publiquement inciter des personnes privées à commettre un génocide contre le groupe des Rohingya dans le nord de l'État Rakhine. pour monsieur Iwazawa, président, madame Seboutine des vice-présidentes, monsieur Tomka Abraham, madame Chouet, monsieur Nolte, madame Charlesworth, monsieur Brant, Gomez-Obledo, madame Cleveland, monsieur Auresco, Juge, madame Pillet, monsieur Krays, juge addoc, contre monsieur Hmood, juge. quatre, par onze voix contre quatre, dit que la République de l'Union du Myanmar a violé son obligation de punir le génocide et d'autres actes énumérés à l'article 3 de la Convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide. Pour Monsieur Iwazawa Président, Monsieur Nolte, Madame Charlesworth, Monsieur Brant Gomez-Robledo, Madame Cleveland, Monsieur Oresco Tlady, juge, madame Pillay, monsieur Craiss, juge ad hoc. Contre madame Seboutine, vice-presidente, monsieur Tomka Abraham, madame Chouet, juge. Cinq, par 14 voix contre une, dit que la République de l'Union du Myanmar a violé l'obligation que lui impose la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide, de prendre les mesures législatives nécessaires pour assurer l'application des dispositions de la convention. Pour Monsieur Iwazawa, président, madame Seboutinde, vice-présidente, monsieur Tomka, Abraham, Nolte, madame Charlesworth, monsieur Brandt Gomez-Robledo, madame Cleveland, monsieur Aurescu, Lady, Hmoud, juge. Madame Pillay, M. Creyss, juge ad hoc. Contre, madame Chouet, juge. Six. Par quatorze voix contre une, décide que la République de l'Union du Myanmar doit mettre fin à toute violation persistante des obligations que lui impose l'article cinq de la Convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide en. prenant des mesures législatives donnant effet, plein effet, à ses obligations au regard de la convention. Pour Monsieur Iwazawa, président, Madame Seboutine, vice-presidente, Monsieur Tom Tomka, Abraham, Nolte, madame Charlesworth, monsieur Brant Gomez-Robledo, madame Cleveland, monsieur Auresco Tladi, Hmoud, juge, madame Pillay, monsieur Kress, juge ad hoc, contre, Madame Chouet, juge. Sept, par treize voix contre deux, décide que la République de l'Union du Myanmar doit prendre des mesures immédiates et effectives, pour enquêter sur toutes les personnes pouvant raisonnablement être soupçonnées d'avoir commis des actes contrevenant à l'article 3 de la Convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide, dans le cadre des opérations de nettoyage de 2017. Et s'il y a lieu pour les poursuivre et les punir. Pour monsieur Iwazawa président, monsieur Tomka, madame Chouet, Monsieur Nolte, Madame Charlesworth, Monsieur Brant Gomez-Robledo, Madame Cleveland, Monsieur Aurescu, Lady, Hmoud, juge, Madame Pillay, Monsieur Grèce, juge ad hoc. Contre, madame Séboutine des vice-présidente, monsieur Abraham, juge. huit par neuf voix contre six décide que la République de l'Union du Myanmar doit fournir des assurances et garanties de non-répétition, des violations des obligations que lui impose la Convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide, et empêcher que des des violations similaires ne se produisent à l'avenir. Pour Monsieur Iwazawa président, madame Charlesworth, Monsieur Brant Gomez-Robledo, madame Cleveland, Monsieur Aurescu, Vladi Hmoud, juge, madame Pillay, juge ad hoc. Contre, madame Seboutine, la vice-présidente, monsieur Tomka, Abraham, madame Chouet, monsieur Nolte, juge, monsieur Kraiss, juge ad hoc. Neuf, par dix voix contre cinq, décide que la République de l'Union du Myanmar a l'obligation d'adopter les mesures de restitution défini au paragraphe 615 du présent arrêt. Pour Monsieur Iwazawa President, Monsieur Tomka, Madame Charlesworth, Monsieur Brant Gomez Robledo Gomez-Robledo, madame Cleveland, monsieur Aurescu, Tladi, juge, madame Pillet, juge ad hoc. Contre, madame Séboutine, vice-présidente, monsieur Abraham, madame Chouet, Monsieur Nolte, juge, Monsieur Kraiss, juge ad hoc. dix, par dix voix contre cinq, décide que la République de l'Union du Myanmar est tenu d'indemniser le groupe des Rohingyas et ses membres, pour le dommage causé par la violation des obligations que lui impose la Convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide. Pour autant que ceux dommage ne soit pas réparé par voie de restitution. Pour Monsieur Iwazawa, président, Monsieur Tomka, Madame Charlesworth, Monsieur Brant Gomez-Rojas. Gomez-Robledo, madame Cleveland, monsieur Aurescu, l'a dit, juge, madame Pillay, juge à doc. Contre madame Seboutine, vice-présidente, monsieur Abraham, Mme Chouet, Monsieur Nolte, juge, Monsieur Creiss, judge ad hoc. 11, par dix voix contre cinq, decide que la question du montant et des modalités de l'indemnisation ou de toute autre réparation due au groupe des Rohingyas et à ses membres sera réglée par la Cour et que, à cette fin, la République de l'Union du Myanmar doit, dans un délai de deux ans à compter de la date du prononcé du présent arrêt, soumettre à la Cour le rapport décrit au paragraphe 625 et réserve à cet effet la suite de la procédure. Pour monsieur Tomka Abraham, madame Charlesworth, monsieur Brant Gomes Robledo, madame Cleveland, monsieur Tladi Hmoud, juge, madame Pillay, monsieur Creyss, juge ad hoc. Contre, monsieur Iwazawa, président, madame Seboutine des vice-présidente, madame Chouet, monsieur Nolte Auresco, juge. Douze, par onze voix contre quatre, dit que la République de l'Union du Myanmar a violé l'obligation que lui imposait le point trois du dispositif, paragraphe 86, de l'ordonnance en indication des mesures conservatoires du 23 janvier 2020-vingt, de prendre des mesures effectivement pour prévenir la destruction et assurer la conservation des éléments de preuve relatifs aux actes allégués, entrant dans le champ d'application de l'article deux de la Convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide. Pour Monsieur Iwazawa Président, Monsieur Tomka, Madame Charlesworth, monsieur Brant Gomes-Obledo, madame Cleveland, monsieur Aurescu Vladi Hmoud, juge madame Pillet, monsieur Creus, juge ad hoc. Contre. madame Seboutine, vice-présidente, monsieur Abraham, madame Chouet, monsieur Nolte, juge. 13, à l'unanimité, rejettent le surplus des ICJ · President [2:52:39]: President Iwasawa appends a separate opinion to the judgment of the Court. Vice President 17 day appends a dissenting opinion to the judgment of a court. Vice President 17 day judges Tomka Abraham Sue Nolte and Judge Ad hoc Crest appends a joint dissenting opinion to the judgment of the court. Judges Tomka and Abraham append the separate opinions to the judgment of the court. Judges Shue and Nolte appends dissenting opinions to the judgment of the court. Judge Charles Ross appends a separate opinion to the judgment of the court. Judge Brand appends a declaration to the judgment of the court. Judge Brandt and Judge Ad hoc Pillay appends a joint declaration to the judgment of court. Judge Gomes Robledo appends a separate opinion to the judgment of court. Judge Cleveland appends a declaration to the judgment of court. Judge Cleveland and Judge Ad hoc Kress append a joint separate opinion to the judgment of the court. Judge Orescu appends a separate opinion to the judgment of the court. Judge Trudy appends a declaration to the judgment the court. Judge Humud appends a separate opinion to the judgment of the court. Judge Ad hoc appends a separate opinion, partly concurring and partly dissenting to the judgment of court. The text of the judgment is available from today in TypeScript. It will also be available shortly on the court's website. The printed text will be available in the near future. As the court has no further business before it today, I declare the sitting closed.