(Main Committee I) Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
Conferences
Date: 1 May 2026
Language: English
Transcript: https://transcripts.un.org/ar/asset/k18/k186n21q2z?lang=en
Transcripts available through this tool are created by using automatic speech recognition and are not official records nor official documents of the United Nations. Official records and official documents are available on the Official Document System of the United Nations.

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Main Committee 1 · Chair [0:01]:

Excellencies, Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and gentlemen, the second meeting of Main Committee 1 of the 2026 Review Conference of the State Parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is called to. Excellencies, Distinguished delegates, Main Committee 1 will now continue with the general exchange of views as announced this morning. The list of speakers for the general exchange of views Under Main Committee 1 has closed. Before we begin, please allow me first to remind you of the time limit for statements during the general Exchange of Views which I outlined yesterday as was advised by the President of the Conference. For the general exchange of views, there will be a timer shown on the screen indicating one minute remains for the statement, followed by a strict microphone cut off once the time limit has been reached. Delegations will recall that the time limit for statements are eight minutes for group statements and five minutes for national statements. Delegations that wish to do so are invited to provide longer versions of their statement to be posted on the website of the Review Conference. Delegations are kindly asked to provide their statements in advance for the interpretation services. They may do so by sending an electronic copy of their statement to estatementsn.org and should clearly indicate the meeting I.e. nPT Review Conference, Main Committee 1 and Delegation Name in the subject line. In addition, delegations are kindly requested to email electronic versions of their statements to the SecretariatPTN.org as early as possible for posting on the website of the Review Conference. Finally, delegations are requested to please inform the Secretariat as soon as possible if they wish to exercise their right of reply. Right of reply will be heard at the end of the meeting. With that said, I now turn to the list of speakers we have for the general exchange of views. I currently have 53 speakers on my list. The first speaker I have on my list is the distinguished representative of Norway on behalf of Group of States. You have the floor, Excellency.


Norway [3:10]:

Thank you. I'm delivering this statement on behalf of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Finland, Gabon, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Portugal, San Marino, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Timor Leste, Turkey, United Kingdom, Ukraine and my own country, Norway. The NPT is the cornerstone of the global disarmament and non proliferation regimental. We underline our unwavering commitment to the treaty and its full implementation. We reaffirm the continued validity of past agreements and obligations and that they continue to guide current and future work on the NPT implementation. State parties to the NPT have agreed on three principles which underpin the DISARMAMENT transparency, verifiability and irreversibility. These three principles are concurrent, complementary, mutually reinforcing and strongly interrelated. They represent a path for how to effectively attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons. The principle of irreversibility should be further explored. This was acknowledged during discussions of the 10th Review Conference of the NPT. States parties voiced interest in and support to building a common understanding of the application of irreversibility measures in attaining and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons and to exchanging information on the application of the principle of irreversibility in relation to the implementation of their treaty obligations, including both past and intended future actions. Efforts to understand irreversibility, like transparency and verification, are not an end in themselves. They are not a prerequisite to commence nuclear disarmament in compliance with the spirit and letter of Article 6 of the NPT, nor are they a prerequisite to implement the obligations and commitments agreed within the framework of the treaty. We are, however, convinced that the application of these three principles can ensure more effective and sustainable nuclear disarmament and non proliferation. We are equally convinced that the implementation of these obligations and commitments will benefit from work already having been done on these three principles. We reiterate that the central importance of applying the agreed principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility to any nuclear disarmament effort and towards the sustainability of all pillars of the npt. We are therefore supportive of enhanced dialogue among States Parties to building a common understanding of the application of irreversibility in its technical, legal, normative and political dimension. This dialogue could be informed by a growing body of academic work on the principle. We understand irreversibility in nuclear discernment as a spectrum of mutual reinforcing elements aimed at making reconstitution of nuclear capacities a as difficult as possible, including inter alia, legal, economic, social, societal, normative, political and technical measures. Nothing is ever truly irreversible and the capacity to develop nuclear weapons cannot go to zero, but weapons can be irreversibly eliminated in a verifiable and transparent manner. We also highlight that while all States have an interest in attaining and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons, the main focus of such a dialogue would be on irreversibility in the action and activities of nuclear weapon States to implement their agreed obligations and commitments on nuclear disarmament. These actions and activities will benefit from work already have having been done on the three principles. Moreover, we also acknowledge that nuclear disarmament efforts become significantly more irreversible when they are underpinned by a legally binding obligation on the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament should be irreversible as all States Parties of the NPT are concerned about the catastrophic consequences that would arise from the use of such weapons. We undertake to work towards the 12th NPT Review Conference with a view to further enhance our understanding of the substance and application of the principles of irreversibility and invite State Parties to engage with us in this effort. This is crucial to continuing taking forward the obligations and commitments agreed on the total elimination of nuclear weapons so that when nuclear disarmament is a reality, we have all the necessary tools to ensure its effectiveness and sustainability. Based on the foregoing, we submit the following recommendations to the review 1. The review conference should reaffirm the importance of all States applying the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility in relation to the implementation of the disarmament and non proliferation treaty obligations.

2.

The review conference should reaffirm that further work is required to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament and as a first step, encourage all States to build and understanding of the application of irreversibility measures in attaining and maintaining a world free on nuclear weapons and to exchange information on the application of the principle of irreversibility in relation to the implementation of their treaty obligations. Time should be allocated for discussion of irreversibility in the next treaty review cycle. The Review Conference should acknowledge that's number three. The Review Conference should acknowledge the importance of providing assistance in particular to developing countries through capacity building in order to enhance participation in efforts to apply the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility in nuclear disarmament and non proliferation. I thank you


Main Committee 1 · Chair [10:31]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Norway for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on behalf of the United States and France to deliver their statement.


United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [10:50]:

Mr. Chairman, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America emphasize the primacy of the NPT as the cornerstone of the international nuclear, non proliferation and disarmament regime and underline our strong commitment to the global non proliferation regime which the Treaty underpins of across all three pillars. We remain committed to our NPT obligations including Article 6 and as nuclear weapons States under the Treaty, we consider the avoidance of nuclear war and the reduction of strategic risks as serious responsibilities. We affirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought as nuclear war would have far reaching consequences. We also affirm that nuclear Weapons, for as long as they continue to exist, should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression and prevent war. In support of our shared NPT obligations, we strongly encourage all nuclear weapons States under the NPT to engage in multilateral strategic stability talks to promote mutual transparency and adopt concrete risk reduction measures such as establishing a ballistic missile and space launch notification mechanism or pursuing confidence building measures regarding nuclear explosive test monitoring, including increasing the ability to detect tests and of any yield towards ensuring nuclear weapons States adhere to a zero yield standard. Such measures contribute to avoiding misinterpretation and miscalculation and lay the foundation for further arrangements. We reaffirm our commitment to the ultimate goal of the worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all achieved through a realistic, pragmatic and responsible approach. As nuclear weapons States, we reaffirm our commitment to maintaining human control and involvement for all actions critical to informing and executing sovereign decisions concerning nuclear weapons employment. The ultimate decision to employ nuclear weapons should never be delegated to artificial intelligence. We are committed to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional States. We underline the central role of the IAEA and express our full support for its verification mandates and for strengthening the international safeguards system. We urge States to fully implement their safeguards obligations under all circumstances. Mr. Chair, Iran must never develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. We reaffirm that Iran must comply immediately and fully with its obligations under the npt, its IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, as well as its binding legal obligations pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolutions 1696-1737-1747-1803, 1835 and 1929, all of which are now in effect. We demand that the DPRK abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in accordance with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and and reiterate that the DPRK cannot and will not have the status of a nuclear weapon State in accordance with the npt, nor any special status of any kind. We remain committed to expanding access to the benefits of peaceful uses in conformity with our obligations under the npt. We emphasize the importance of access to peaceful uses to help address national priorities in areas such as health and medicine, food and agriculture, water and natural resource management, and industrial innovation, including the preservation of natural and cultural heritage. In this context, we recall the Nuclear Energy Summit organized by France in cooperation with the IAEA on 10 March to strengthen international cooperation and promote solutions for the safe, secure and responsible development of civil nuclear power and its non electric applications. We support the establishment of a new mechanism for enhanced transparency and accountability in the review process whereby all nuclear weapons states and those non nuclear weapons states willing to do so take part in an interactive discussion on their national implementation reports once per review cycle. In the face of increasing risks, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America will seek to generate new momentum within the P5 process and call upon all nuclear weapons states under the NPT to engage in good faith on their NPT Article 6 commitments. Within this format and others, we will do our utmost to achieve this aim throughout the consecutive presidencies of the United Kingdom, France and the United states. Thank you, Mr. Chair.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [16:45]:

I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Costa Rica to deliver their statement.


Costa Rica [17:03]:

Senor President Mr. President, we congratulate you on your election and we wish you much success in your work. Costa Rica wishes to highlight three aspects. First, the reciprocal commitment that gave life to this treaty has been honored unevenly. Non nuclear weapons states fulfilled their part by renouncing the nuclear option. While nuclear weapons states assume the obligation to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith, in a verifiable manner and within agreed time frames, this obligation remains unfulfilled. The commitments of 1995, 2000 and 2010 have not been implemented, arsenals are being modernized and expanded, and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty has yet to enter into force. The disarmament deficit has accumulated over decades and each year of inaction erodes the credibility of this treaty and increases the risk. In light of this reality, we call on this conference to reaffirm the measures agreed in previous review cycles and to demand greater transparency in their implementation. We further urge all nuclear weapons states to initiate multilateral or bilateral negotiations on on verifiable and legally binding measures to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race without preconditions and without delay, and to reaffirm their commitment to nuclear testing moratoria. Second, the integration of artificial intelligence into nuclear command control and communications systems compresses decision making timelines, introduces risks of miscalculation and weakens human oversight. International humanitarian law requires that decisions with consequences for the life and dignity of persons be made by human beings. Preserving human control over decisions regarding nuclear use is therefore both a legal obligation and a strategic imperative. Managing risk does not absolve the obligation to disarm. Costa Rica calls on this conference to discuss the implications of emerging technologies for nuclear risk and to agree on concrete risk risk reduction measures at that intersection. Third, Costa Rica expresses its grave concern over the modernization of nuclear arsenals, the expansion of the role of nuclear weapons and security doctrines and the lowering of the threshold for their use. In political discourse, the use of nuclear weapons is incompatible with international humanitarian law. Their consequences are catastrophic, catastrophic and irreversible fall disproportionately on women, girls and indigenous peoples and transcend borders and generations. Costa Rica calls for the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons to be condemned and stigmatized. Such threats undermine the goal and purpose of this treaty and erode the nuclear taboo that has protected humanity since 1945. The only guarantee that nuclear weapons will never be used again is their total elimination. This conference must reaffirm this clearly and without conditions. Mr. President, Costa Rica welcomes the work of the Independent Scientific Panel on the Effects of Nuclear War established pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 79 238. Its mandate covers climate, environmental and radiological effects, as well as consequences for public health, agriculture and ecosystems. We call for active support of its work and for ensuring that its conclusions guide the deliberations and commitments of future NPT meetings, including efforts on victim assistance and environmental remediation in affected communities. I thank you.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [20:58]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Costa Rica for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of New Zealand to deliver their statement. Excellence, you have the floor.


New Zealand [21:13]:

Thank you, Chair. New Zealand associates itself with previous joint statements in this main committee, including those delivered by Ireland on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition and on transparency with Ireland and Switzerland. In view of time today, I wish to focus on a few key points rather than repeat those statements and I offer this an awareness that a long era of the stabilizing US Russian bilateral arms control cooperation appears to have ended with the demise of the new START agreement and with nothing to succeed it. The five nuclear weapon states are modernizing their nuclear arsenals and related capabilities and there are indications, some of them opaque, of the build up of nuclear stockpiles. Nuclear weapons remain central to the strategic doctrines of all the nuclear weapons states and their allies. Thinly veiled nuclear threats and Balaco's rhetoric from some nuclear armed states have become more frequent. Even the norm against nuclear testing, symbolized by the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and which holds special importance for the Pacific region, including New Zealand is under pressure in new ways. Novel strategic technologies are complicating nuclear escalation and crisis management and control contributing to nuclear risk. In the face of these and other developments, implementation of NPT Article 6 is not only stalled in key respects, it is moving backwards in the face of current tensions. In this deteriorated situation what can we do? First, we need to recognise that sustained failure to deliver progress on nuclear disarmament by those in a position to do so will result in the weakening of confidence and in and credibility of the NPT which hurts all our interests. This weakening would extend to the NPT's non proliferation pillar. It means the treaty must be fully implemented, including Article 6. Frankly, as a collective we have very little if any tangible progress to show on implementing Article 6 over this 11th review cycle. Modest progress on enhancing transparency in their reporting by the five nuclear weapons States and more interactive debate about them would show good faith and build confidence. Recognising this, New Zealand, both in the New Agenda Coalition and the Ad Hoc Group on Transparency and Accountability has contributed to specific proposals for this Review Conference contained in working papers 17 and 7 respectively. As a collective NPT States, Parties urgently need to respond to the increasing danger of nuclear weapons being used. Early steps should involve more strategic dialogue between competing nuclear weapons states. We are aware that the P3 talk frequently and even Russia and the United States have long standing communications channels. We urge China and the United States to move beyond standoffs over formats and agenda and take steps to ensure they can communicate in crisis and on which guardrails they should work towards to prevent such crises from arising. Strategic dialogue and mutual confidence building are necessary elements if we expect multilateral nuclear arms control arrangements to emerge and achieve any success. Mr. Chair, it's New Zealand's expectation and that of many other NPT States Parties that the nuclear weapons States should ensure such progress, not least to substantiate their claims to being responsible or concerned with ensuring strategic stability. This is because the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use would be catastrophic and affect us all. Consistent with this, there is a general need to tone down belligerent nuclear rhetoric, including statements that could be interpreted as nuclear threats. Such language undermines nuclear non proliferation and disarmament since it creates anxiety and fuels the desire to acquire nuclear weapons. Ideally, we could agree on these elements and capture them within an outcome to this Review conference. In sum, and at a substantive minimum, an outcome of our work on nuclear disarmament should recommit without qualification to our shared goal of a nuclear weapon weapon free world based on the belief that nuclear weapons must never be used again, reaffirm the validity of this Treaty's obligations and its related commitments express States concern about nuclear threats as well as the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of use of nuclear weapons, enhance transparency and accountability measures, reinforce the importance of the norm against nuclear testing and spare no effort in the achievement of the Treaty's full universalisation. My delegation looks forward to working with other states parties toward this end. I thank you.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [26:07]:

I thank the distinguished representative of New Zealand for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of the United States to deliver their statement.


United States of America [26:25]:

Mr. Chair, distinguished delegates. President Trump has boldly advocated for addressing nuclear threats. His vision is for a world with fewer nuclear weapons and reduced nuclear risks. The United States has been working tirelessly to make progress on that goal. We are seeking willing partners to establish new multilateral strategic stability and arms control agreements fit for purpose in the current security environment. It's one thing to come into international forums and simply talk about preventing nuclear war and a nuclear arms race. It's another thing to demonstrate action. For example, this month among the P5, the United States presented concrete proposals, including on issues related to transparency, risk reduction and confidence building measures. If agreed, those measures would benefit all states parties here and would have a real impact in preventing unintended escalation and provide a basis for further arms control arrangements. Article 6 of the treaty is unambiguous. It obligates all NPT states, parties, including all five nuclear weapon states, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. This is not a selective obligation. This is not an aspiration. The United States takes this obligation to pursue effective measures seriously. Since the 1990s, we have eliminated thousands of nuclear weapons and maintained a unilateral moratorium on fissile material production for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We have provided public transparency on our nuclear weapons stockpile, including as recently as September 2023. We routinely publish our nuclear security policies, most recently in the 2026 National Defense Strategy and National Security Strategy, demonstrating transparency in our pursuit of Article 6 and effective measures. And we recently reported a national report to this conference and yesterday held a voluntary side event to discuss it. We believe that we stand on the precipice of the next era of arms control, but we must be clear eyed about the threats we face. For years, the United States has taken concrete steps, including with Russia, to steadily reduce nuclear weapons. President Trump has been unequivocal that a future arms control agreement should be modernized to include not one, but both nuclear peers. We need these nuclear weapons states to demonstrate serious commitment to their Article 6 obligations, again, not just with words, but with actions. Russia's unlawful purported suspension of NUSTAR undermined the last bilateral nuclear arms control agreement that limited strategic nuclear weapons. But even when New START was in force, Russia developed novel nuclear weapons and maintained a large arsenal of non Strategic or theater nuclear weapons estimated to number in the thousands. China and Russia's nuclear efforts stand in STARK Contrast to U.S. nuclear modernization efforts, which are primarily designed to replace aging systems to ensure the safety, security, reliability and effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal. Meanwhile, the DPRK continues to develop its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. This should be of great concern to anyone committed to the npt. Such actions undermine core goals of the npt Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and pursuing good faith negotiations toward their complete elimination. As a result, nuclear risks continue to grow, threatening our collective security. Mr. Chair, the global security environment demands action. The United States is demonstrating leadership by proposing new multilateral strategic stability and arms control talks. This is the natural evolution of arms control. To take account of the arsenals and threats we face today, we call on every delegation in this room to join us in strongly encouraging China and Russia to come to the table and take action without further delay. After all, isn't that why we're all here? To take meaningful steps to implement this treaty? The United States has come to this review conference with concrete proposals, and we are also here to listen and adapt. Overall, we will demonstrate our continued commitment to responsible behavior as a nuclear weapons state under the npt. Thank you, Chair.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [31:20]:

I thank the distinguished representative of the United States for their statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Colombia to deliver their statement. Colombia, you have the floor.


Colombia [31:36]:

Thank you very much. Mr. President. Allow me to congratulate you for your election and your leadership at the helm of of this committee. And reiterate my country's willingness to constructively contribute to the review of the treaty. Colombia is participating in this debate, strongly committed to the comprehensive, balanced and verifiable implementation of the treaty on the basis of its objective and purpose. Over five decades after its entry into force, the treaty continues to be a central component of the international security architecture. Nevertheless, it's effectiveness directly depends upon effective compliance with the commitments assumed by all states parties without selective interpretations or asymmetric approaches. In this respect, Colombia reiterates that nuclear disarmament commitments have a clear legal character and cannot be indefinitely contingent on changing strategic considerations or unilateral evaluations of the international arena. History as well as such scientific evidence shows that the mere existence of nuclear weapons is a permanent risk for humanity and for the environment. In this context, Colombia notes with concern that the prolonged absence of substantive advances in this pillar continues to erode trust in the regime. And stressing the balance upon which the treaty rests, the persistence of nuclear arsenals, as well as their increase and Qualitative modernization contradict the spirit of alleviating tensions and strengthening collective security that gave rise to this instrument. To this, we can see an evolving strategic landscape where emerging technologies result in additional challenges. Promoting international peace and security demands real, verifiable and sustained advances that translate into the irreversible reduction of arsenals and greater levels of transparency and accountability. Risk reduction measures can work temporarily, and they do work temporarily, but they do not substitute the obligation to move towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. This is why today my country would like to also underline the value of approaches and instruments that contribute to reinforcing the international norm against these weapons and to move forward with disarmament commitments. In that sense, nuclear weapons free zones have proven to be effective mechanisms to strengthen regional security and foster trust among states. The experience of Latin America and the Caribbean continues to be proof that it is possible to build collective security without nuclear deterrence. Mr. President, the role of the treaty in strengthening international peace and security. Security will depend upon the collective capacity of States parties to produce specific results and preserve the treaty's credibility as a multilateral legal instrument. Universalizing this instrument and full compliance with its commitments continue to be key for that goal. My country is convinced that sustainable security is not built upon nuclear deterrence, but but rather upon cooperation, respect for international law and the centrality of human beings. The complex international context that currently prevails does not justify any further delays in decision making. This conference is an opportunity to reaffirm that commitments acquired should translate into concrete actions. Eliminating nuclear weapons is not an abstract goal, nor is it a faraway aspiration. It is an obligation, as I have said, that we should implement and assume we reiterate our willingness to continue working with all delegations towards effectively strengthening the treaty and towards a world free from nuclear weapons. I thank you, Mr. President.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [35:38]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Colombia for the statement. And I invite the distinguished representative of Belgium to deliver their statement. You have the floor, sir.


Belgium [35:56]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Belgium aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union. Mr. Chair, the pursuit of nuclear disarmament faces serious challenges. Strategic rivalry, nuclear expansion and innovation, coupled with the demise of armed control agreements have brought us to a decisive moment. Yet disarmament is not an aspirational dream. It is a legal obligation embedded in the MPT and a necessity dictated by the unparalleled destructive power of nuclear weapons. Although the space for progress has narrowed, meaningful advances remain possible through a pragmatic and responsible approach. We need realism and not a mantric vision of nuclear disarmament. Disconnected from the present security situation, Disarmament without verification risks becoming disarmament without trust. This is particularly evident in light of recent violations of arms control agreements. Strengthening verification must therefore be a priority. It is time to collectively establish a knowledge repository which will guide us. This is why the establishment of the GSTE is such a welcome milestone. Mr. Chairman, we regret that New START expired without a successor agreement in place. We call on the parties involved to engage constructively in negotiations on a new agreement. The strength of New START should be maintained, such as a a comprehensive verification regime, but adaptations to the current needs should also be introduced. Ideally, a new agreement would cover deployed and non deployed strategic and non strategic nuclear weapons. Pending a new agreement, interim measures could be contemplated, such as the commitment to respect the limits set by New Start or an undertaking to freeze the number of strategic launchers. While the United States and Russia retain the largest arsenals, the unchecked and opaque nuclear buildup by China should not remain unaddressed. As a minimum, China should join other nuclear weapon states in declaring a fissile material production moratorium, engage in arms control deliberations and demonstrate more transparency over its doctrine. Mr. Chairman, the promise of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty played an instrumental role in the success of the seminal 1995 review conference. The unraveling of this achievement would seriously harm the npt. For that reason, the de ratification of the treaty by Russia, the reports of secretive low yield tests and statements about the resumption of testing raise our alarm. Appeasement is not the answer. Nuclear weapons states should recommit to a policy of zero yield testing and solidify this undertaking by agreeing confidence building measures such as mutual test site visits. Non nuclear weapons states can reinforce the norm against testing too, by joining the ctbt, especially those States in the Middle east harboring or developing major nuclear programs. A State that calls for disarmament cannot credibly refuse accession to the ctbt. Nor should any State delay action while waiting for others to move first. Pending entry into force, States can take meaningful steps. Nuclear weapons States can permanently close or dismantle test sites. States, including those yet not yet party to the treaty, can can also host IMS facilities or sign facility agreements to help complete the monitoring system. Mr. Chairman, greater transparency and accountability can ease the path toward disarmament. State Parties are entitled to understand how nuclear weapons States are implementing their Article 6 obligations and how their doctrinal choices correspond to their evolving capabilities capabilities. Belgium, therefore supports the development of a systematic and structured peer to peer review of national implementation reports, especially of Nuclear Weapon States and also calls for further qualitative improvements to reporting. Belgium, as a non nuclear weapons state, stands ready to continue practicing transparency as demonstrated through our Action 20 report support submitted to this review conference. Mr. Chairman, Nuclear Weapons stage should advance efforts on nuclear risk reduction. Several practical proposals are readily available, including improving communication channels, expanding pre notification of ballistic missile launchers and ensuring meaningful human involvement in nuclear decision making. I thank you.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [40:56]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Belgium for the statement and I invite the distinguished representative of Chile to deliver their statement. Chile, you have the floor.


Chile [41:10]:

Mucha Gracia.

Thank you very much, Mr. President. As we expressed during the general debate, this Review Conference brings us together to comprehensively evaluate events when it comes to the Treaty. And in this vein, Chile considers that it is essential to make progress in a balanced manner. We recognize all that we've achieved and specifically when it comes to limiting nuclear proliferation. Nevertheless, in the framework of issues that are relevant to this Main Committee, we consider that it's necessary to redouble our disarmament efforts because there are still significant challenges in this sphere. On the one hand, we note that since the very beginning of the NPT we have been able to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, at the same time, we regret that we are not significantly moving forward with nuclear disarmament. As all delegations present here know, the purpose of the NPT is not merely preventing non nuclear weapons states from acquiring these weapons. All States Parties of the NPT know that it also includes and includes in a priority manner disarmament of nuclear weapons States. The indefinite extension of the treaty in 1995 does not in any way legitimize perpetually holding nuclear arsenals. This would be completely incompatible with with its founding purposes and principles. President Any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons constitutes a violation of international law and international humanitarian law. Merely possessing nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the principles of international humanitarian law. We note with concern rhetoric that seeks to legitimize nuclear deterrence doctrines, as if we had forgotten of the permanent responsibility that we have as an international community which is to ensure that these weapons are never used again under any circumstances. And in this line, we are convinced that the NPT continues to be an indispensable instrument. Its relevance shows that multilateral agreements can contribute to the stability, predictability and trust among States. In that sense, the NPT has an additional value, having established commitments that continue to be binding. Therefore, we call upon relevant States to comply with their multilateral legal obligations when it comes to nuclear disarmament and to implement the commitments assumed and reaffirmed in 1995, 2000 and 2010 for the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. These agreements remain fully in force and they continue to be politically binding. Consistent with these responsibilities and commitments, we insist upon the need to strengthen accountability mechanisms for nuclear weapons states with respect to to their disarmament obligations. These mechanisms should have measurable indicators and previously defined time frames for reporting. These reports should contain information that is comparable and verifiable. We call upon all nuclear weapon States to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability. To conclude, Mr. President, we would be remiss if we did not express our concern when it comes to the use of AI for the management of weapons and explosive nuclear devices. To the extent that we do not work towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it is crucial to ensure significant and effective human control of over nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. If not, the risks of a humanitarian catastrophe will grow every single day. I thank you.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [45:36]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Chile for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea to deliver their statement. You have the floor,


Republic of Korea [45:53]:

Mr. Chair. As we stated during the general debate, amid continuing geopolitical challenges and a growing gap in global disarmament and non proliferation norms, concerns about a resurgence of the nuclear arms race and arms race are mounting. In this particular precarious environment where trust among nuclear weapons state has eroded and established norms are under strain, the special responsibility of all nuclear weapons states for advancing nuclear disarmament must be reaffirmed. Efforts to launch a strategic stability dialogues among major nuclear weapons state must begin without a delay. Over the longer term, negotiations on a successor arrangement to the new START must not be deferred indefinitely. These efforts must serve as meaningful indicators of each nuclear weapon state's commitment to advancing the goal of Article 6 of the NPT. In this regard, Republic Korea welcomes the United States proposal to convene multilateral strategic stability and arms control dialogues as well as any other efforts to to address these issues within the P5 process. Mr. Chair, many experts warn that the risk of nuclear weapons use is higher today than any at any point since the end of the Cold War. The Republic of Korea firmly believes that all nuclear weapons that must engage in regular in depth and structured dialogue to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict. We further hope that concrete and substantive nuclear risk reduction measures can be agreed upon including effective crisis prevention and management mechanisms, pre launch notification arrangement and enhanced leader to leader and military to military communications channels. It is equally equally imperative to institutionalize measures that strengthen the transparency and accountability of all nuclear weapons States. The Republic of Korea supports proposals calling on all nuclear weapons States to report regularly on their implementation of NPT obligations and to engage in interactive discussions thereon. We commend the United States, the United Kingdom and Friends for submitting national implementation reports and for hosting interactive site events in this regard. In this context, we echo that no additional reporting burdens should be placed on non nuclear weapons states regarding Article 6 implementation. My delegation also rejects any attempt to create new categories of State parties which lacks any basis under the treaty. Efforts to create a new disarmament and non proliferation norms must not be allowed to stall. In this vein, the Republic Re urges the earliest possible commencement of long overdue negotiations on a fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and calls upon all remaining Annex 2 states to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Testament Treaty without further further delay. Pending the realization of these goals, we call upon all nuclear weapons States to maintain or declare mortaria on nuclear testing and on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Republic of Korea also underscores the importance of strengthening negative security assurance for non nuclear weapons states that comply with the npt. Finally, the profound implications of emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, for nuclear weapons management cannot be overstated. All nuclear weapons States should commit or reaffirm their commitment to maintaining human control and involvement over decisions concerning nuclear weapons employment, as was induced by 63 states to the Seoul Re AIM Summit and has been submitted through a working paper by the Stockholm Initiative. Mr. Chair Despite a deeply challenging international security environment, the Korea remains hopeful that our deliberations can yield meaningful and pragmatic progress on nuclear disarmament. The Republic of Korea will work constructively with all State parties toward the goal of maintaining and strengthening the NPT regime.

I thank you.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [50:41]:

I thank the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea for the statement and I invite the distinguished representative of Spain to deliver their statement.


Spain [50:57]:

Thank you very much, Mr. President. Spain would like to echo the statement made by the European Union and we would like to add the following international capacity. Spain reaffirms its commitment with the goal of achieving a world free from nuclear weapons according to Article 6 of the NPT in order to advance towards irreversible, verifiable, complete, progressive and universal nuclear disarmament. Therefore, we participate in participated in the Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament with the goal of creating bridges of understanding when it comes to nuclear disarmament. This initiative has designed specific and realistic measures which we are convinced constitute the best option to reduce nuclear risk and boost nuclear disarmament. In the current review cycle, the Initiative has presented several working documents that we hope will contribute to finding pathways so we can move forward with nuclear disarmament in a realistic fashion. President Nuclear weapons States have a special responsibility when it comes to compliance with the commitments based on Article 6 of the NPT. Therefore, we encourage them to continue working the framework of the P5 process to engage in an honest and transparent dialogue that leads to nuclear disarmament. We support the holding of strategic multilateral conversations to create a new control framework for armaments amongst nuclear weapons States that addresses all nuclear weapons and their systems of delivery. We welcome the commitment of the P3 along these lines, a commitment that we hope shall be adopted by all nuclear weapons States. President it is the responsibility of all States parties, both nuclear weapons States and non nuclear weapons States to create the necessary trust in order to establish a space for dialogue that is inclusive, gradually complying with the disarmament commitments of the npt. We underline the importance of negative security security assurances as a measure to reduce risk, given its capacity to strengthen the non proliferation regime. As we move towards complete and general nuclear disarmament, it is also urgent to agree upon effective measures to reduce nuclear risk, measures that take into account the impact of emerging technologies and contribute to increasing trust. In parallel, a rise in the level of transparency and accountability is fundamental to increase trust amongst countries and set the stage for a dialogue that facilitates nuclear disarmament. In this context, Spain supports presenting periodic national reports in the framework of the review process for the treaty. In the case of nuclear Weapons States, this would foster a greater understanding, facilitate information exchange and give rise to greater confidence and credibility in terms of their nuclear doctrines. I would like to express my gratitude for the side events organized during this Review Conference by France, the UK and the United States on their own national reports on implementation. It is probably proof of their commitment to transparency. As proof of our national commitment to transparency, Spain has also introduced its national report on compliance with the treaty. In this Review Conference, we consider that no new non consensus based obligations should be imposed in terms of the national reports of non nuclear weapons States that are not listed in the provisions of the Treaty. President we regret that the CTBT has still not entered into force and we call for its ratification on behalf of all states. In Annex 2. We also call for maintaining the current moratorium on nuclear testing. Spain supports the launch of negotiations to adopt within the Disarmament Conference a treaty for the cessation of producing fissile material as well as nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, based on the mandate in document CD 1299 and call for maintaining a moratorium on its production until its adoption and entry into force. A longer version of this statement can be found online on the webpage for this conference. I thank you, President.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [55:50]:

President, I thank the distinguished representative of Spain for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Australia to deliver their statement. You have the floor, sir.


Australia [56:07]:

Thank you. Australia's commitment to a world without nuclear weapons is enduring. Underpinned by recognition of the devastating humanitarian consequences of nuclear war, the NPT obliges every one of us, without exceptional caveat, to engage in good faith dialogue towards disarmament. The implementation of Article 6 is a central part of the NPT. We call on nuclear weapons states to reaffirm this and past NPT commitments. Disarmament is a vital pillar of the mpt. But progress towards this objective is stalling. In fact, the world is heading in the wrong direction. We are deeply concerned by some nuclear weapons states expanding their nuclear arsenals. This includes one state rapidly and opaquely expanding and modernizing its nuclear arsenal, while signaling that engagement and dialogue on future arms control arrangements is a matter for others. Protecting the NPT also means exercising restraint in how we talk about nuclear weapons. Nuclear threats are not okay and should not be normalised. Leadership by and dialogue among nuclear weapons states is needed now more than ever. It is critical to making meaningful progress towards complete, irreversible and verifiable nuclear disarmament. With the New START Treaty now expired, we support the United States proposal for multilateral Strategic Stability Talks. We urge the states with the three largest arsenals to come to the table and engage without preconditions. The MPT's preamble recognises that easing international tension and strengthening trust are crucial in making progress on nuclear disarmament. How can we build trust without talking to each other? Such dialogue is a necessary step towards progressing nuclear disarmament and is in our collective security interests. Chair it is not only growing nuclear arsenals that provoke grave concern. The norm against nuclear testing is facing serious challenges with deeply concerning claims of certain states having undertaken explosive nuclear testing. The devastating impact of nuclear weapons testing lingers in the Pacific, in Australia and around the world. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, or ctbt, underpins the strong global norm that exists against nuclear weapons testing and contributes to our shared ambition of a world free of nuclear weapons. Australia is committed to advancing this CTBT and achieving universal membership. We urge all relevant states to abide by their respective moratoria and refrain from conducting nuclear explosive tests of any yield. We would welcome statements from P5 states which provide further detail on implementation of their moratoria and what more they will do to increase transparency and support verification. Chair While we do not believe believe in preconditions for nuclear disarmament, we are pragmatic. Disarmament is both a process and an endpoint. There are important steps we can take to support the path towards disarmament. Even in this challenging environment. Transparency can pave the way for dialogue. Australia will continue to pursue improved transparency and accountability in the NPT review process with a focus on encouraging nuclear weapons States to engage in interactive dialogue based on clear comparable reporting. Australia continues to be a staunch advocate for the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut off treaty and for the one remaining Nuclear Weapons State to institute a moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. Chair Reducing the risk of nuclear conflict, while not a substitute for the disarmament, is essential and has helped prevent nuclear weapons use over decades. We urge the P5 to reaffirm the value of nuclear risk reduction and agree concrete measures to build confidence and trust. These could include missile launch notifications, further discussions on doctrine and new hotlines. These and many other options are outlined both in Working Paper 12 on reducing the risk of nuclear conflict and the NPDI's landings on own paper. Nuclear weapons States have a special responsibility that all States can contribute. Finally, work to progress Credible and effective nuclear disarmament verification is core business for future disarmament agreements. Considerable progress has been made by the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification and others to build our capability and technical toolbox for this most complex of tasks essential for achieving a mandate maintaining nuclear disarmament. With the risk of nuclear conflict continuing to grow, we need to remember and reinforce.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [1:01:11]:

I thank the distinguished Representative of Australia for the statement. I now invite the distinguished Representative of the State of Palestine to deliver their statement.


State of Palestine [1:01:27]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. For over 56 years the NPT, the cornerstone treaty of Disarmament, has sought the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. 56 years since the Nuclear Weapons States and the Non Nuclear Weapons States got into a legally binding contract to conduct multilateral negotiations on effective measures for complete and full disarmament. The State of Palestine reiterates that compliance with Article 6 of the NPT is neither optional nor conditional. Likewise, the possession of nuclear weapons is not a conferred legal right, it is not an entitlement and most certainly and most certainly not indefinite. In fact, nuclear weapons have been and will always be illegal and that existence is therefore temporary. We recall that the conclusion of negotiations leading to disarmament is not an equivocation but a legal obligation clearly stated by the ICJ which requires concrete and time bound actions by the nuclear weapons States to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons in accordance with their nuclear disarmament. Legal Obligations and Commitments on this premise, the State of Palestine calls on all parties, particularly nuclear weapons States, to implement their obligations and unassuming commitments fully and effectively under the NPT, the 1995 decision and the Action Plan of 2010, among others. The State of Palestine reaffirms the urgent need for conclusion of universal, unconditional, irrevocable and non discriminatory and legally binding instrument to assure all non nuclear weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances as a matter of high priority. This year marks the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The State of Palestine was among the first states to have joined the Treaty. We recall its significance and the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Treaty, especially by nuclear weapons States and their special responsibility and others which have not acceded to the nuclear to the NPT and continue to operate unsafe guarded nuclear facilities to sign and ratify it. The State of Palestine is committed to its implementation and is engaging constructively in preparation for the first review conference. Mr. Chair, the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons has insidiously seeped into our political, military and diplomatic doctrines. It is exasperated by justifications legitimizing the existence of nuclear weapons as a matter of so called nuclear deterrence and unabated modernization of nuclear weapons, their delivery systems and infrastructure, including integrating AI control, coupled with public pronouncements and preparations suggesting the possible resumption of nuclear weapon testing, all in violation of the commitments stated under the npt. We recall that the only existential security threat that we have is the very existence of nuclear weapons. We shall not deflect from this fact. It is at the core of disarmament machinery and is at the core of this treaty. We reaffirm that nuclear deterrence is an oxymoron, is not a sane, safe or sustainable model. This is not a matter of pragmatism to be debated. Likewise, peace and stability will not arise by the threat of assured and mutual destruction. International security is a national security and cannot be achieved under the crushing burden of nuclear weapons. The State of Palestine will work towards ensuring that the conclusion of this Conference includes unequivocal reaffirmations as well as concrete actions for new multilateral negotiations on effective measures for the total disarmament and elimination of nuclear weapons. It is within the purview of this conference to assess whether nuclear weapons states are acting responsibly or irresponsibly. We reiterate that the mere existence of nuclear weapons is irresponsible. Such dichotomy, we warn, underestimates to have centuries sustained efforts of formulating and implementing the most extraordinary international disarmament machinery. Finally, the strength of the treaty lies in its totality. It lies in the political, moral and commonwealth to move together and to act quickly. The world's hopes for peace rest in our efforts here in the United nations to produce a successful outcome. It is an obligation that we must pursue and a moral, political and historic test that we cannot afford to fail.

Thank you.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [1:05:56]:

I thank the distinguished representative of the State of Palestine for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to deliver their statement. You have the floor, sir.


United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [1:06:14]:

Chair The NPT remains the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and the only realistic framework through which we can achieve a world without nuclear weapons. As our Minister set out this week, the United Kingdom remains fully committed to the NPT, including our obligations under Article 6. As debate this week has illustrated, this review conference takes place against a challenging international security environment. Heightened tensions, irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and the introduction by some of novel nuclear systems has constrained the pace of progress on disarmament. Despite these challenges, the UK has continued throughout this review cycle to pursue practical measures that seek to reduce nuclear risks, strengthen trust and lay the foundations for future disarmament. The UK established the P5 process in 2009 to build trust and confidence among the nuclear weapons states. The very fact that nuclear weapon states continue to have frank and regular exchanges within the P5 process, most recently meeting in Casablanca, helps to build mutual understanding. The UK strongly supports US proposals that the P5 should engage in multilateral strategic stability talks. Chair. The CTBT and its universalization is as a vital part of of the step by step approach to nuclear disarmament. We are a strong supporter of the CTBTO and its verification regime. The UK has maintained a voluntary moratorium and has not conducted nuclear test explosions for 35 years. The UK also maintains a voluntary moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and supports negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a fissile material cut off treaty, a central focus of the UK Disarmament action during this review cycle has been to strengthen the practical enablers of disarmament. This includes work on verification, irreversibility, transparency and risk reduction, elements we address in detail in our working paper, Imagining a World Without Nuclear Weapons. We support efforts to advance verification expertise and cooperation. Last year marked 10 years of the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership through which the UK has worked with the US, Norway and Sweden to develop practical approaches to future disarmament verification. We place significant importance on the work of irreversibility. We have supported multiple expert level dialogues to deepen shared understanding of how future disarmament can not only be achieved but sustained. We will hold a side event with Norway on this theme on the 11th of May. Chair transparency is fundamental to effective disarmament and to confidence in the npt. It enables accountability, reduces misunderstanding and supports meaningful dialogue. The United Kingdom published our third national report in February. It sets out work to implement our NPT obligations and past review conference commitments. We welcome State Party engagement on it at our side event on Tuesday. Such important discussions should not be reserved for voluntary side events with France. We have proposed that all nuclear weapons states could agree to an on agenda presentation and interactive dialogue on their national reports. We hope that this can be agreed at this Review conference for introduction at future sessions. Chair the UK recognizes the growing importance and use of AI in defense. The UK will use and develop AI in a safe and responsible manner. To this end, the UK has made commitments to ensure that regardless of any use of AI in our strategic systems, human political control of our nuclear weapons is maintained at all times. Chairman the United Kingdom is committed to maintaining only the minimum credible nuclear deterrent necessary for our security and to pursuing disarmament in a way that is responsive to the security environment while remaining faithful to our long standing obligations under the NPT. Progress on disarmament will not be linear. Over 50 years, disarmament has reflected the security environment which we all live. Future progress demands collective investment in dialogue and the practical groundwork required for further reductions. Chair I conclude by reaffirming the United Kingdom's readiness to work tirelessly towards a positive outcome at this Review Conference. Thank you.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [1:11:06]:

I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of France to deliver their statement. Madam, you have the floor.


France [1:11:24]:

Mr. Chairman, France aligns itself with the statement of the European Union and would like to add a few points in its national capacity. The drastic deterioration of the strategic and security environment reminds us of the importance of upholding the centrality and primacy of the npt, which is the cornerstone of the international security architecture. This treaty, based on a phased approach that takes the strategic context into account, is the only instrument capable of enabling us to achieve our nuclear disarmament and non proliferation objectives through relevant verification measures grounded in a robust regime. From a geopolitical perspective, we are currently experiencing a major shift that that entails many risks. On the European continent, Russia pursues its war of aggression in flagrant violation of international law and the principles of the United Nations Charter. It increasingly employs stalling tactics in response to peace overtures from the United States and Ukraine. It is engaged in a brutal imperialism and continues to develop new weapons, including a particularly dangerous project to place nuclear weapons in outer space. China, for its part, produces more weapons today than any other country. Recently it even exhibited the latest upgrades of its nuclear triad. Generally speaking, nuclear threats are growing, diversifying and are becoming more interconnected. These observations have led France to adapt its nuclear posture as the President of the Republic outlined in his statement at Lilong on March 2 Mr. Chairman, despite this deteriorating situation, France remains driven by the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. While upholding the principle of undiminished security for all, it has demonstrated a steadfast commitment to fulfilling its obligations under Article 6 of the NPT. In this regard, I would first like to highlight the major unilateral measures taken by France since the 1990s a 50% reduction of France's nuclear arsenal, the complete dismantlement of our ground to ground nuclear component, a 1/3 reduction of our submarine and airborne components and the irreversible dismantling of fissile material production facilities for nuclear weapons as well as the Pacific Test Site. France has always treated the issue of the impact of nuclear testing with the utmost seriousness and respect, notably by establishing a compensation scheme for victims of testing in Algeria and French Polynesia under the Maurin law of 01-05-2010. I would also like to recall the negative security assurances granted by France to all non nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT that respect their non proliferation commitments. France is thus a party to nearly all the protocols to treaties establishing nuclear weapons free zones. It supports the creation of a zone free of nuclear free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle east and reiterates its willingness to move forward with ASEAN States towards the signature of the protocol to the Bangkok Treaty. Mr. Chairman, under the current circumstances we must be realistic about the goals that can be achieved by this Conference. Reaching gradual and concrete milestones remains the surest path to make progress towards nuclear disarmament. That is the very Purpose of the five point roadmap proposed by the Minister for Europe and Foreign affairs at the opening of this Conference. First, intensify work on concrete measures to reduce strategic risks among nuclear weapons states, but also with non nuclear weapons states to build confidence and reduce the risks of escalation. Second, the States concerned must declare and maintain a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons until the launch of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on an FMCT treaty. Based on document CD 1299 and the mandate contained therein. This treaty is the only credible path to ending the arms race and moving towards nuclear disarmament. Third, preserve the objective of the CTBT's entry into force as soon as possible. The rest of the statement will be available online. Thank you.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [1:16:22]:

I thank the distinguished representative of France for the statement and I invite the distinguished representative of Algeria to deliver their statement. Algeria, you have the floor.


Algeria [1:16:34]:

Thank you. Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor. And since this is the first intervention of my delegation in Main Committee 1, allow me to join previous speakers in congratulating you on assuming the chairmanship of this Committee. And Algeria aligns itself with the statements delivered on behalf of the Non Aligned Movement, the African Group, the Arab Group, and wishes to add some points in its national capacity. Chair, as we heard from NGOs this morning, and particularly through the moving testimonies of victims, it is clear nuclear weapons are not instruments of security. They are instrument of annihilation and discriminate, irreversible and incompatible with international humanitarian law. The Conferences on Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons of Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna established this with scientific certainty. And yet the arsenals remain, the doctrines persist, the modernization programs continue. We must ask ourselves honestly, what are we doing here if not to change this? The NPT rests on a fundamental bargain. Mutual responsibilities, mutual rights. Non Nuclear weapon States honor their end result, announcing their nuclear option permanently in 1995. In exchange, nuclear weapons states undertook under Article 6 to pursue negotiations leading to complete disarmament and obligation. The International Court of Justice confirmed its legal binding and requires result. More than 50 years on Article 6 has not been implemented. The 13 practical steps of 2000 have not been taken. The 2010 Action Plan has not been implemented. This conference gathers in the shadow of two consecutive review conferences, 2015 and 2022 that ended without consensus. Algeria deeply regrets this record. This conference must chart a different cost and the work of this Committee is pivotal to that objective. Algeria welcomes the work conducted under the tpnw, including the last meeting of State parties. The TPNW does not contradict the NPT. It reinforces it, giving concrete legal expression to Article 6. This conference should acknowledge that momentum. Chair Algeria urges entry into force of the CTBT without further delay and supports negotiations on a verifiable fissile material cutoff treaty including existing stockpiles. Algeria reaffirms the right of of non nuclear weapon States to credible legally binding negative security assurances. The right to self defense cannot justify the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States that have renounced them. Unilateral declarations are insufficient. A legally binding international instrument must be negotiated. Mr. Chair, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is not an idealist dream. It is a legal obligation humanitarian imperative. In conclusion, Algeria's details positions on all these issues as well as recommendations are reflected in the working paper submitted by Algeria to this Conference, contained in document NPT CONF2026WP23, available in all six official UN languages on UNODA website and I thank you, Mr.

Chair.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [1:20:40]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Algeria for the statement and I invite the distinguished representative of Switzerland to deliver their statement. Merci, Monsieur President.


Switzerland [1:20:54]:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On nuclear disarmament, Switzerland believes that the outcome document should reflect concerns expressed during this review cycle. Thousands of nuclear weapons remain deployed and stockpiled in arsenals. Many are still maintained at high levels of readiness. Arms control arrangements have eroded with no negotiations currently underway. Nuclear weapons have gained prominence in security doctrines. Arsenals are being modernized and in some cases expanded. The risk of nuclear weapon use has also increased. Given these developments, the outcome document should send a clear signal against a new nuclear arms race. Switzerland specifically supports, including the principle a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, which embodies the NPT's goal as set out in the treaty's preamble. Mr. Chairman, Nuclear Weapons States must take urgent, concrete and sustained measures to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, whether deployed or non deployed. The role of nuclear weapons in security policies and postures must be reduced. The outcome document should recall the legal obligations on disarmament under the Treaty as well as reiterate the unequivocal undertaken by the nuclear weapons States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The document should also point to the need for credible progress on the implementation of Article 6 and reaffirm the validity of the 19952010 nuclear disarmament commitments, as well as indicate how and when to implement them. The deep concern over the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons has been a key driver of nuclear disarmament efforts. Considerations on this matter are articulated in the Cross Regional working paper number 57 on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, whose recommendations we fully support. Mr. Chair, given the humanitarian and environmental consequences that define the legacy of nuclear testing, it is important for the Conference to uphold the anti testing norm. All States should uphold existing moratorium and refrain from any action that would undermine the object and purpose of the CTBT. We regret that the number of remaining Annex 2 states required for entry into force has grown during this NPT review cycle. States who have not yet done so should sign and ratify the CTBT without further delay. Its entry into force would significantly strengthen the Treaty's already robust verification regime. It would be the best way to ensure that no State is conducting a nuclear test explosion. In the meantime, we support any voluntary measure that would improve confidence in this matter. Mr. Chair, for Switzerland, past commitments are the foundation from which nuclear disarmament should be taken forward. However, this Conference should also take new steps in two priority areas that are of particular importance to our delegation and should be clearly reflected in the outcome document. First, risk reduction Reaching shared understandings on how to reduce nuclear risks and is paramount for this Review Conference. Let us be clear, nuclear risk reduction is not a substitute for nuclear disarmament. Urgent steps are needed in the meantime to reduce the danger of use by accident, miscalculation, misperception, escalation or unauthorized action. Many points that we would have liked to see reflected in the outcome document are contained in the Cross Regional working paper number 12. In addition, a forthcoming joint statement by over 40 states will illustrate the strong support that nuclear risk reduction enjoys and we invite all States who have not yet done so to join this call. Second, transparency, reporting and accountability. There is a strong expectation from a vast majority of States Parties that this Review Conference will take this matter forward. Switzerland with Ireland and New Zealand has sought to advance discussions on this issue. As we've highlighted in a Joint Statement and in Working Paper Number seven, we call for enhanced national reporting by nuclear weapons States as well as the establishment of a regular practice of in person interactive dialogue integrated into the review cycle. We also thank the UK and France as well as the USA for presenting their national reports during this Conference. Thank you for your attention.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [1:25:46]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Switzerland for the statement and I invite the online representative of Kenya to deliver their statement.


Kenya [1:26:02]:

Mr. Chair, the Kenya delegation congratulates you and members of the Bureau of on your election to preside over this Committee and assure you of our full support and Constructive engagement. Kenya reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non proliferation regime and a critical instrument for advancing international peace and security. My delegation enters this Review Conference convicted by the preamble of the UN Charter and cognizant of its urgency. In this age defined by the shadow of nuclear weapons, its pledge to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war fundamentally stands in direct tension with a continued reliance on nuclear armament and deterrence. The heightening risk of this willful or accidental accidental use or threat of use will be devastating for the present and future generations. This Committee's discussion must therefore reflect on the Charter's preamble in view of the prevailing nuclear deterrence rhetoric and growing military expenditure. Mr. Chair, my delegation encourages the commitment to the aspirations of of the United nations enshrined in the Charter. As we ponder on the commitment, I will pose two pertinent questions. One, are states truly honoring the Charter's pledge to protect future generations when existing nuclear doctrines threaten overwhelming destruction? And two, to what extent is genuine international cooperation being advanced when progress on disarmament remains slow and military investments in deterrence in deterrence grow? Kenya reiterates that the total elimination of nuclear weapons remains the only absolute guarantee against the use of or threat of use of nuclear weapons and call upon nuclear weapons States to fully implement their obligations under Article 6 of the treaty. We acknowledge the importance of effective international arrangements to assure non nuclear weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, including through implementation of Security Council resolutions 255 and 984 as well as legally binding security assurances. Strengthens confidence in disarmament commitments. Kenya affirms that early entry into force and universalization of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is vital in advancing nuclear disarmament. Additionally, strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards provides viable pathways for credible and verifiable prohibition on nuclear testing to constrain the development of nuclear weapons and strengthen the non proliferation regime. Mr. Chair, Kenya expresses concern over the rapid advancement and militarization of emerging technologies including artificial intelligence and autonomous weapon systems. While these technologies hold promise for development, their application in warfare raises profound ethical, legal and security challenges. We further stress the importance of capacity building for national and regional disarmament officials. Considering the evolving strategic environment and the increasing prominence of nuclear weapons in military doctrines. Such efforts should incorporate emerging security challenges including cyber risks, dual use technologies and the implications of artificial intelligence in nuclear command, control and communication systems. Kenya underscores the importance of strengthening cooperation among States we support the institutionalization of regular inter regional conferences to facilitate the exchange of best practices and coordinated engagement of with nuclear weapon states. In addition, Kenya supports consideration of function based nuclear weapon free commitments focused on specific domains such as prohibitions on attacks against nuclear facilities or measures to protect civilian nuclear infrastructure. These arrangements may serve as practical confidence building measures, particularly where comprehensive and regional.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [1:31:08]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Kenya for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of China to deliver their statement.


China [1:31:22]:

Chair the Chinese delegation congratulates you on assuming the Chairmanship of Main Committee 1. China has consistently supported the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Today, the international security situation is undergoing profound and complex changes, seriously worsening the environment for advancing nuclear disarmament. One certain nuclear weapon superpower has wantonly violated the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, launched wars in various places and stoked bloc confrontation affecting countries, assessments of security threats and risks in driving up the risk of international and regional arms races. One certain nuclear weapon superpower is investing enormous sums in modernizing its nuclear triads, strengthening technical preparations for the actual use of nuclear weapons, developing low yield nuclear weapons and exhibiting an impulse to seek absolute strategic advantage that exceeds its political will to fulfill its special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament. The REVCON should focus on the above issues, encourage all parties to return to a rational and pragmatic approach and push the nuclear disarmament agenda and process back onto the right track. China holds that first, the important consensus principles of maintaining global strategic stability and undiminished security for all should be upheld and nuclear disarmament should be advanced in a step by step manner. Nuclear weapons states with the largest arsenals should earnestly fulfill their special and primary responsibilities for nuclear disarmament by further reducing their nuclear stockpiles, thereby creating conditions for other nuclear weapon states to join the nuclear disarmament process. China is concerned about the expiration of the New START Treaty and calls on the relevant country to seriously consider the Russian proposal as and address the successor arrangements in a responsible manner. Second, international security and global strategic stability should be safeguarded. The REVCON should express concerns over the lapse of arms control legal instruments such as the ABM Treaty and the INF Treaty. Relevant countries are urged to stop developing and deploying missile defense systems that undermine global strategic stability. Relevant nuclear weapons states should withdraw all nuclear weapons deployed abroad back to their own territories as soon as possible and should not deploy nuclear weapons or build nuclear weapons infrastructure in other countries. Countries under nuclear sharing and extended deterrence arrangements must reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policies and stop creating obstacles to nuclear disarmament. Third, the shared resolve of all countries to prevent nuclear war should be strengthened, with particular emphasis on enhancing security assurances for non nuclear weapons states. The P5 should continue to implement the Joint Statement on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races and should not list any country as a target of nuclear strikes. As a first step, all nuclear weapons States should pass publicly, commit to not seeking permanent possession of nuclear weapons, abandon the erroneous notion of using nuclear weapons in actual combat, renounce policies of first use of nuclear weapons and begin negotiations as early as possible to conclude a treaty on mutual no first use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons States should respond positively to the legitimate demands of non nuclear weapon States to be free free from nuclear threats, begin negotiations at an early date to conclude an international legal instrument providing negative security assurances to non nuclear weapons States and promptly sign and ratify the protocols to nuclear weapon free zone treaties. Fourth, nuclear transparency should be viewed rationally. Differences exist among nuclear weapons States in their nuclear forces, nuclear policies and strategic security environments, leading to differing emphasis regarding nuclear transparency. There are no one size fits all nuclear transparency measures. Nuclear weapons States should, on a voluntary and equal basis and without undermining national security, explore nuclear transparency measures to enhance strategic mutual trust. Non nuclear weapons states under nuclear sharing arrangements should likewise assume transparency or responsibilities. China has already submitted multiple position papers elaborating its policies and stances on nuclear disarmament. China will continue to take concrete actions to uphold the international nuclear disarmament system and make contributions to strengthening the treaty mechanisms. Thank you, Chair.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [1:36:16]:

I thank the distinguished representative of China for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Iraq to deliver their statement.


Iraq [1:36:31]:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At the outset, the delegation of Iraq would like to express its support for the statements delivered by the Arab Group and the non aligned movement. Mr. Chair, Iraq reiterates that the need to keep nuclear disarmament at the top of our priorities within the npt. It constitutes the first and most important pillar of the treaty, given its significant impact on enhancing peace and security at both the regional and international levels. We also stress the need to work towards achieving a fair balance between the reciprocal obligations imposed on nuclear weapons States in the area of nuclear disarmament and non nuclear weapon States in the area of non proliferation, as per Articles 1 and 2 of the NPT. Mr. Chair, the increasing tensions and the escalation of conflicts in the international security environment, together with the slow progress towards nuclear disarmament, underscore without any doubt the need to take all measures possible in order to prevent the use of these weapons or the threat of their use and to avert their catastrophic consequences. In this regard, Iraq stresses the importance of achieving urgent, tangible progress in the field of nuclear disarmament through the Nuclear Weapon States taking the necessary measures and entering into serious negotiations aimed at freeing the world of nuclear weapons. Iraq also expresses its profound concern over the continued increase and modernization of nuclear arsenals by some Nuclear Weapon States and the development of new generations of such weapons. The prominent role these weapons occupy in their military doctrines. Despite it being nearly six kids since the adoption of the npt, this constitutes a stark contradiction of the obligations and provisions enshrined in the treaty. Accordingly, Iraq calls upon all Nuclear Weapon States to work seriously and urgently toward the final and complete elimination of these nuclear arsons. Because the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee against their use or the threat of their use, it is the measure necessary to lead to the ultimate goal of a world free of these catastrophic weapons. Mr. Chair, Iraq believes that strengthening the universality of all agreements and treaties related to the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction, foremost among them nuclear weapons, is a necessary and important and extremely urgent step, especially at the present time, as the international community experiences complex security circumstances that require us to demonstrate full responsibility and require a genuine political will. At a time when Iraq stresses the need to support the universalization of the npt, we call upon all states and parties that have not yet signed or ratified the CTBT, in particular, as per Annex 2, including the Israeli entity, to expedite their accession to the treaty in order to achieve its entry into force. Mr. Chair, Iraq reiterates the need to attach the highest priority to negotiations on a non discriminatory multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. This will reflect positively in the manner that will promote both the nuclear disarmament and non proliferation regimes. In this context, and pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, Iraq affirms its support for legally binding international instruments that provide negative security assurances that are effective, non conditional and non discriminatory to non nuclear weapons in a manner that guarantees that nuclear weapons will not be used or threatened to be used against them. Thank you, Mr. Chair.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [1:41:08]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Iraq for the statement and I invite the distinguished representative of Bulgaria to deliver their statement.


Bulgaria [1:41:21]:

Thank you, Chair. Bulgaria aligns itself with the statement by the European Union and we make the following as international capacity, we remain fully committed to world without nuclear weapons. This shared objective of the international community requires a step by step approach based on mutual trust while fully taking into account the security environment and the present strategic context. This approach stems from Article 6 of the NPT and calls for concrete progress toward the pursuit of global nuclear disarmament, especially through the strict, full and universal implementation of the NPT obligations and commitments from previous review conferences, the overall reduction of the nuclear arsenals and strengthened nuclear arms control dialogue aimed at meaningful and constructive results in today's world. All States should prevent the use of Nuclear weapons Russia's announced deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus, its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and threats to use nuclear force in the course of its war of aggression against Ukraine clearly demonstrate how severely Russia undermines the global nuclear disarmament and non proliferation architecture. Bulgaria urges Russia and Belarus to adhere to their NPT obligations and other relevant international commitments. We also call on Belarus, DPRK and Iran to immediately stop their direct military assistance and on China and other countries to refrain from providing material support to Russia's war against Ukraine. Bulgaria reaffirms its support for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace that upholds Ukraine Ukraine's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. Mr. Chair, nuclear disarmament should be effective, verifiable and irreversible. We believe that it can be achieved only within the NPT framework and in Article 6. We thus welcome the discussions on improved defense effectiveness, transparency, accountability and risk reduction and will continue working to build on them. The entry into force of the CTBT is an important step in the global nuclear disarmament effort. In this regard, we regret the withdrawal of Russia's certification of the CTBT as one of the first annexed two states to sign and ratify the ctb. Bulgaria calls on Russia to continue to adhere to the goals of the treaty to renew its CTBT ratification and we urge the other annexed two states to sign and to ratify the CTBT without preconditions of further delay. We also call for a complete moratorium on nuclear testing. The immediate commencement of the long overdue negotiations of a fissile material cut off treaty remains a top priority. Such treaty will bring the international community closer to a world without nuclear weapons and will further the implementation of NPT Article 6 by reinforcing the disarmament commitments. Pending an FMCT entry into force, all States should abide by a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The challenges posed by the current international security environment reinforce the need for every ever more pressing trust and confidence building efforts. In this sense, a credible verification is indispensable for the advancement of nuclear disarmament and establishing confidence following the recent expiration of the new START trademark, the last bilateral nuclear arms control agreement limiting the world's two largest nuclear arsenals. We underlined the importance of responsibility and restraint in the nuclear domain. Nuclear arms control is crucial to global security and we call for renewal, multilateral efforts and timely process to dissent. It is in this context that we join the calls on China to engage more meaningfully in an arms control dialogue, including on nuclear risk reduction measures, as well as to enhance its transparency. In conclusion, I would like to once again emphasize Bulgaria's strong commitment to the NNPT and Article 6 for achieving a world free from nuclear weapons in a realistic, pragmatic and progressive manner that will contribute to.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [1:46:23]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Bulgaria for the statement and I invite the distinguished representative of Argentina to deliver their statement. You have the floor. Mucha gracias, senor.


Argentina [1:46:38]:

Thank you very much. Mr. President, I would like to first congratulate you for spearheading this Main Committee and express Argentina's support. For the upcoming weeks. We reaffirm our commitment to nuclear disarmament as one of the guiding principles in the NPT's implementation. And we advocate for complete, general, irreversible, transparent and verifiable nuclear disarmament. Mr. President, it is clear that the Nuclear Disarmament pillar is facing important implementation challenges and this situation is one of the causes of negative perception about the treaty. This issue is even more relevant if we consider that the NPT establishes a balance of obligations amongst nuclear weapons states and non nuclear weapons states. This balance is a foundational element of the agreement that gave rise to the treaty. In that sense, nuclear weapons States have a special responsibility when it comes to complying with their disarmament commitments to this is why we would like to speak to the risks associated to nuclear rhetoric, the growing role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines and the growth and modernization of nuclear arsenals. Proliferation, horizontal as well as vertical should be warning signs for the international community because they undermine the spirit of the treaty. Mr. President, we would like to highlight a series of issues that we believe should should somehow be reflected in our final document. First, the validity of pre existing commitments such as the 13 practical steps of 2000, the 2010 action plan and the need to advance in their implementation. Second, the importance of moving towards the prompt entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We invite states that have not ratified this treaty to do it without delay. Moreover, we'd like to express our concern over any action that could undermine the integrity of the treaty or is inconsistent, incompatible with its provisions. Third, we reiterate the call to negotiate a fissile material cutoff treaty and a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances. Fourth, we deeply regret the prolonged paralysis in the disarmament conference and we highlight the urgency of redoubling our efforts to reactivate its work. President in order to strengthen the disarmament pillar, Argentina actually participates in initiatives that seek to create tangible advances, such as the Stockholm Initiative and the Initiative to Reduce the Risk of Nuclear Conflict. We hope that the working documents presented are taken on board as inputs in order to prepare a final document. We'd also like to highlight that our country is part of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament verification that has contributed to the development of verifiable capacities when it comes to nuclear disarmament. All of these initiatives allow us to address aspects that complement and uphold disarmament. In terms of nuclear weapons free zones, we value their contribution as key tools for disarmament and non proliferation. In this context, we reiterate the importance of preserving the integrity of these regimes and structures, strengthening their assurances. Specifically, in relation to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, we reiterate the importance that nuclear weapons states revise their interpretive declarations that were drafted upon the signature of the additional protocols of the treaty, taking into account a possible withdrawal. President I would like to conclude by highlighting that Argentina supports any initiative that leads to to tank, reduce nuclear risk and control armaments. In this context, we understand that it is imperative to advance specific measures to foster and build confidence, to reestablish channels for dialogue and measures that are conducive, therefore, to the main goal of nuclear disarmament. I thank you.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [1:50:38]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Argentina for the state statement, and I invite the distinguished representative of the Holy See to deliver their statement. You have the floor.


Holy See [1:50:53]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. In an era of increasing strain on the foundations of international security, it is crucial to consider the core conditions necessary for lasting peace. As Pope Leo XIV observes, when peace is not a reality that is lived, cultivated and protected, then aggression spreads into domestic and public life. In the relations between citizens and rulers, it could even be considered a fault not to be sufficiently prepared for war, not to react to attacks, and not to return violence for violence. This warning speaks directly to the present moment. It is precisely this logic that nuclear disarmament seeks to overcome. A model of security grounded in fear, in the threat of force, and in the perpetuation of mutual vulnerability cannot provide a stable or lasting foundation for peace. Concurrently, there are evident trends that are moving in the opposite direction, including the resurgence of nuclear rhetoric, the expansion and modernization of nuclear arsenals, and the evolution of deterrence doctrines in ways that risk lowering thresholds. These trends continue to divert significant resources from pressing human needs and sustainable development. These concerns are further compounded by the erosion of long standing arms control and disarmament agreements, which have long contributed to stability, transparency and trust. The obligation enshrined in Article 6 must be implemented with clarity and renewed determination. It constitutes a binding commitment to pursue in good faith concrete and verifiable progress towards nuclear disarmament. The total elimination of nuclear weapons is not a distant aspiration, but a necessary responsibility that calls for concrete and credible steps directed at achieving a more just, secure and enduring peace. Mr. Chair, the rapid integration of emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, into nuclear systems, is a cause for serious concern. These developments not only further complicate efforts towards nuclear disarmament, but also carry the risk of increasing misjudgment and accelerating escalation. They also compress the time available for human decision making in moments of crisis. In particular, delegating decision taking over nuclear weapons to automated systems raises profound ethical and security concerns. Therefore, efforts to prohibit and regulate the use of such technologies in relation to nuclear weapons are of particular importance. Against this backdrop, the need to advance nuclear risk reduction and de escalation measures have never been greater. In a context marked by heightened tensions and diminishing trust, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines, enhancing transparency and strengthening channels of communication remain essential. Mr. Chair, the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences of the use of nuclear weapons must remain at the center of our reflections as it would have devastating and far reaching effects transcending borders and generations. In this regard, the Holy See calls upon all states that have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as it offers a necessary and complementary path toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Rather than perpetuating deterrence, what is needed is a renewed commitment to disarmament, the only foundation for a just, secure and lasting peace. Thank you, Mr.

Chair.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [1:55:13]:

I thank the distinguished representative of the Holy See for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Thailand to deliver their statement.


Thailand [1:55:28]:

Thank you, Mr.

Chair.

Thailand joins other delegates in congratulating your appointment. Please rest assured of our support. We align ourselves with the statement of the non aligned movement. Mr. Chair. Amidst unprecedented geopolitical turbulence, the weakening of international law and the absence of an arms control arrangement among nuclear weapon states, the international community stands at the nuclear precipice. Nuclear rhetoric, nuclear deterrence and expansion of nuclear warheads and delivery systems, systems both in numbers and capabilities, as well as the inclusion of nuclear weapons into security doctrines, have amplified the risk of nuclear conflicts. To lower the chances that such weapons are ever used, we must advance the study of the humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons as a preventive measure. Thailand fully endorses the point made by the Secretary General earlier this week that States must keep their promises under the Treaty without caveats, without delays, without excuses and without conditions. The recommitment to disarmament and non proliferation is the only path to peace. The NPT is the only legal framework binding all nuclear weapons states. This Review Conference is the only platform obliging the States to demonstrate their transparency and accountability by renewing their adherence to disarmament obligations under the Treaty and past commitments. In our view, the implementation of Article 6 on the three interrelated principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability must not be compromised by measures of arms control, non proliferation or risk reduction. Such measures must not complement, must not only complement, not replace disarmament efforts Mr. Chair, Thailand will continue to advocate the international efforts to achieve a nuclear free world, including promoting universalization of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as a practical and effective disarmament measures under Article 6 of the NPT. Since its inception, the TPNW has complemented and reinforced the npt, the CTBT and other disarmament and non proliferation architectures at international and regional levels, including Nuclear Weapon Free Zone treaties. Beyond their disarmament and non proliferation features, Nuclear Weapon Free Zone treaties serve as a confidence building measures for their member and for the Nuclear Weapon States in the Zones. As a depository of the Bangkok Treaty, Thailand will continue to engage with all nuclear weapons States to breach their differences with the goal of securing their ratification to the Treaty's protocol without reservation. Mr. Chair, while the NPT has been a fundamental and integral part of international and regional security, the Treaty must deliver more. The wider and meaningful engagement of stakeholders, including members of civil society, academia, women, youth and affected communities is crucial to ensure that a treaty remain relevant and can address challenges posed by rapidly evolving technologies including AI Quantum and outer Space talent views. That particular attention must be given to the following decisive steps. First, we must remain committed to strengthening transparency and accountability in disarmament, particularly through voluntary reporting consistent with the 2010 action plan. Second, we must preserve the existing moratoria against nuclear test and ratify the CTBT, particularly by Annex 2 states without delay. Third, we must declare a moratorium against the production of fissile materials used for military purposes, with the final aim to eliminate all weapon grade fissile materials. Finally, we must refrain from any activities to go against that objects and purposes of the treaty and undermine its integrity and credibility. Thailand stands ready to work closely with all States parties to ensure the much needed substantive outcome of this Review Conference. Thank you.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [1:59:58]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Thailand for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of El Salvador to deliver their statement.


El Salvador [2:00:12]:

Gracias, President thank you. Chair El Salvador is pleased to participate in this main committee 1. Considering that the disarmament pillar continues to see the least progress from our view, without balance progress across all the pillars of the treaty, it will not be possible to achieve meaningful results. While one of the objectives of the NPT is preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Article 6 is unequivocal regarding the obligation to move towards nuclear disarmament. My delegation reaffirms its position of principle in favor of nuclear disarmament, which has been expressed consistently in multilateral fora and backed by our accession to key instruments of the international regime in this era, including the npt, the Tlateloco Treaty, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. We consider these to be integral and complementary elements of the disarmament and non proliferation regime. Chair the indefinite extension of the NPT agreed in 1995 should not be interpreted as authorization for the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons that would be contrary to the object and purpose of the Treaty. As we have pointed out, the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons are contrary to the Charter of the United nations, incompatible with international humanitarian law and international human rights law. In that regard, we call on nuclear weapons States to fully comply with their obligations under Article 6 as well as with the commitments undertaken during the review conferences in 2000 and 2010. El Salvador reaffirms that the sole guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons is their irreversible and complete elimination under an effective verification framework, we remain firmly committed to the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Until the Treaty enters into force, we believe that maintaining moratoria on nuclear testing is an imperative. Any attempt to resume nuclear testing would represent a serious setback, undermining decades of progress and putting international strategic stability at risk. With the potential of unleashing a new nuclear arms race, we therefore urgently call for political will to move towards the total, verifiable and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons, as well as to reject security doctrines based on nuclear deterrence. Chair, El Salvador believes that the TPNW complements the NPT regime and strengthens its disarmament pillar. We are currently preparing for the first Review Conference of the TPNW under the Presidency of South Africa, and we are participating actively during the intercessional period. Likewise, we have pointed out that the current international context should not be used as a justification to perpetuate the existence or the modernization of nuclear arsenals. With regard to that modernization, we reiterate our concern regarding the risks associated with incorporating emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum technologies in nuclear systems. In that context, we believe that it is fundamental that while the objective nuclear disarmament is being pursued, the maintenance of meaningful human control over these weapons and their delivery systems be guaranteed. Nuclear weapons states must commit to maintain human control. However, we reiterate that the only way to eliminate risks is through the total elimination of such weapons. To conclude, El Salvador reiterates its commitment to total, irreversible and unconditional disarmament. We express our readiness to work constructively and cooperatively to ensure the success of the 2026 review conference. Thank you very much, Chair.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [2:05:00]:

I thank the distinguished representative of El Salvador for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Italy to deliver their statement. Italy, you have the floor.


Italy [2:05:14]:

Thank you, Chair. Congratulations on your election as Chair of this Committee. Italy aligns itself with a statement delivered earlier by the European Union, by Norway on the principle of irreversibility, and by Japan on disarmament education. I would like to add the following remarks in my national capacity. Italy believes that a secure and peaceful world must ultimately be a world free of nuclear weapons. This is the goal that should guide our collective efforts. But nuclear disarmament does not happen in a vacuum. It can be achieved through a progressive approach grounded in concrete measures. It should result in an effective, verifiable and irreversible process that promotes undiminished security for all. Through Article 6, the NPT provides the only realistic legal framework for achieving a world without nuclear weapons. In the face of the current geopolitical tensions, the adoption of measures targeted towards the reduction of nuclear risk becomes even more important. We reject the false dichotomy between nuclear disarmament and nuclear risk reduction. In fact, the two go hand in hand. Far from being a substitute for nuclear disarmament, risk reduction is a necessary tool not only to prevent nuclear war, but also to build trust and foster a climate conducive to arms control and disarmament negotiations. While recognizing the meaningful role non nuclear weapons states can play in Advancing risk reduction initiatives. We emphasize that the primary responsibility rests with nuclear weapons states. We call for the adoption of a range of concrete measures. Among them, I would recall negative security assurances, technically safe and secure channels of communication communication ballistic missile and space launch notification mechanisms, intensified dialogue between and among nuclear weapons states on policies and measures and information sharing initiatives, dealerting and de targeting. We welcome the statement delivered a while ago by the United Kingdom whereby France, the United Kingdom and the United States commitment to strategic stability talks and to the establishment of a transparency mechanism in the review process. We also welcome measures already taken by the P3 to promote effective transparency, including by presenting and discussing their respective reports at this Review Conference in an open and interactive manner. We call on others to follow suit. Italy has submitted its national report as a conference document for this Review Conference. We consider transparency an essential step to advance nuclear disarmament. Transparency fosters accountability. It also helps build confidence and trust among states and therefore it promotes dialogue and negotiation on concrete and effective measures. We hope that some of the proposals presented and discussed within the 2023 Working Group on the further strengthening of the review process, including on transparency and reporting, can make their way into the final document of this Review Conference. The absence of testing is an essential contribution to irreversible disarmament and non proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the 30th anniversary of the signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, it is more pressing than ever that the remaining annexed two states that have not yet done so take urgent steps to ratify the treaty so as to allow its entry into force. In the meanwhile, we call on all nuclear weapons states to uphold their long standing moratoria on nuclear testing and adhere to a zero yield standard. The role of artificial intelligence and its responsible application in the nuclear domain is garnering growing attention. It is important to examine whether and to what extent the integration of AI into decision making processes could affect strategic stability, including by potentially increasing the risk of unintended escalation. At the same time, consideration should be given to the ways in which AI might contribute to strategic risk reduction and to nuclear disarmament verification. In this regard, we welcome the ongoing work of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification as well as the establishment of a group of scientific and technical experts on nuclear disarmament verification. I thank you, Mr. Chair.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [2:10:09]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Italy for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Estonia to deliver their statement.


Estonia [2:10:23]:

Thank you, Mr.

Chair.

Estonia aligns itself with the statement of the European Union and will highlight a few issues in our national capacity. The NPT remains essential in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. It is the cornerstone of the global nuclear and non proliferation regulation regime, the only credible pathway to nuclear disarmament and a key framework for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy science and technology. We cannot discuss nuclear non proliferation without addressing Russia's reckless, irresponsible and provocative nuclear rhetoric and threats. These are in direct contradiction to its obligations under the NPT and they undermine strategic strategies and erode confidence in global nuclear risk reduction. By threatening nuclear use and de ratifying the ctpt, Russia has further undermined long standing norms of nuclear restraint. It has also violated the Budapest Memorandum, suspended participation in a new START treaty without pursuing a successor arrangement and lowered the threshold for nuclear use use. These actions demonstrate Russia's clear disregard for the international non proliferation and disarmament regime. Estonia strongly condemns the continued military support provided by Belarus, Iran and the TPRK to Russia enabling it sustain its war of aggression against Ukraine. We also call on China to end its role as a decisive enabler of this war. We also condemn Russia's announced deployment of nuclear weapons and nuclear capable systems on Belarusian territory which further undermines Euro Atlantic security and raises serious concerns regarding nuclear restraint. Chair China's rapid and opaque expansion of its nuclear arsenal raises serious concerns regarding transparency and consistency with its disarmament commitments under the the lack of clarity surrounding its nuclear doctrine, including its declared no first use policy, further fuels mistrust and strategic uncertainty. We call on China to engage constructively in nuclear risk reduction to enhance transparency and to clarify its strategic intentions. The integrity of the global non proliferation regime also depends on the effective implementation of of the IAEA safeguards. Full and verifiable cooperation with the Agency is essential to ensure that nuclear material and technology are used exclusively for peaceful purposes. We call on all states to uphold the safeguards obligations without exception. In this regard. Iran's continued lack of cooperation with the IAEA is deeply concerning and undermines confidence in the peacefulness nature of Agency its nuclear program. Iran must urgently and fully engage with the agency, ensure complete transparency and comply with the safeguards obligations under the international law. We call on Iran to reverse its current nuclear course and to return to full compliance with its non profiluation commitments under the npt. Estonian strongly condemns the TPR case continued development of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. These pose a threat to international and regional peace and security. We also condemn its transfer of ballistic missiles to Russia in violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions and undermining the non profilioration regime. We call on the DPRK to return to the compliance with the NPT and its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol thereto. Estonia supports all international efforts towards the entry into force of the CTPT and urges all states, particularly the Annex 2 states, to sign and ratify the Treaty. We also support immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile Material cut Off Treaty. We call on all nuclear weapons standards to declare or maintain moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. I thank you.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [2:14:48]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Estonia for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Malaysia to deliver their statement.


Malaysia [2:15:00]:

Thank you. Mr. Chairman. My delegation congratulates you on your appointment as Chair of Main Committee 1 of the 11th NPT Review Conference and assures you of our full cooperation. Malaysia associates itself with the statement delivered by Indonesia on behalf of NAAM. Mr. Chair, the NPT remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non proliferation regime. Malaysia is of the view that the Treaty continues to play a critical role in maintaining international peace and security. Its continued credibility, however, depends on the full implementation of its obligations and the delivery of concrete and irreversible progress. It is deeply concerning that more than five decades after the entry into force of the npt, the world continues to face the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding obligations under the Treaty and commitments towards the total elimination of nuclear arsenals, a great by consensus in 1995, 2000 and 2010, these weapons continue to pose grave risk to humanity and future generations. Mr. Chair, Malaysia reaffirms its position that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, Malaysia maintains that doctrines of nuclear deterrence, including extended deterrence and security assurances, are incompatible with both the letter and the spirit of the npt. In this regard, Nasir further notes with concern the inconsistency of positions where calls for nuclear disarmament are made alongside continued reliance on nuclear deterrence arrangements. Such divergences risk undermining the credibility of disarmament effort and the integrity of the Treaty. Messi underlines that the effectiveness and credibility of the Treaty depends on its universal application and the implementation of its obligations by all States parties. As we strive to uphold the integrity of the npt, greater transparency and accountability on the part of nuclear weapons States must be advanced as a matter of priority. Malaysia hopes that progress will be made in the current cycle towards enabling focused, constructive dialogue among all States parties. In this regard, we call on the Nuclear Weapons States to enhance transparency regarding their nuclear arsenals doctrines and reduction efforts, including through more comprehensive and substantive national reporting. Such measures are essential to rebuilding trust and confidence among state parties and to revitalizing the disarmament pillar of the Treaty. Malaysia reaffirms its support for the Treaty on the Prohibition of New Nuclear Weapons, which entered into Force in January 2021. The treaty constitutes a complementary instrument that strengthens the global normative framework against nuclear weapons and reinforces the implementation of Article 6 of the NPT. Mr. Chair in Action 25 of the Pact for the Future UN Member States emphasized their deep concern over the prevailing state of nuclear disarmament and and reiterated their commitment to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. These commitments must now be translated into tangible and irreversible actions. At a time when multilateralism faces renewed strains, contemporary security challenges must serve as a catalyst for disarmament rather than a justification for the continued reliance on nuclear weapons. Malaysia has always maintained a principled position on the general and complete disposition disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. Messius stands ready to engage constructively with all State parties to advance nuclear disarmament and to ensure that this Review Conference delivers meaningful and credible outcomes. In this vein, we reiterate that the complete and total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only solution against the possible use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. I thank you, Mr. Chair,


Main Committee 1 · Chair [2:18:58]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Malaysia for the statement and I invite the distinguished representative of Uruguay to deliver their statement.


Uruguay [2:19:12]:

Senor Precious President first allow me to truly congratulate you for your nomination to preside over the this Main Committee and express the full support of my delegation for the success of your work. I would like to greet you and greet all of our colleagues from the Secretariat, the interpreters and the Security team in this 1 May as we pointed out in the general debate, this 11th review conference is held in a context of crisis and unprecedented international tensions that threaten international peace and security, which should be A time of progress has been darkened by the partial collapse of instruments for dialogue and a warmongering rhetoric that we thought was over. Therefore, it is imperative to work on a final document that reflects the effective and strong commitment of all States parties within the NPT to disarmament, especially nuclear weapons states and that sends a positive signal to the international community. President Uruguay as a non nuclear weapons state reaffirms its unshakeable commitment to strengthening the disarmament and non proliferation regime, including the Total elimination of nuclear weapons. The reality that we face in 2026 is alarming. According to estimates, the global number of nuclear warheads is around 12,500. And programs to modernize arsenals aren't just only continuing, they have accelerated. And to this we add an additional concern that my delegation would like to underline. We have heard statements from some states that suggest the possibility of going back to nuclear testing. That rhetoric is unacceptable and dangerous. It would mean historic setback, a violation of the spirit in the letter of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the ctbt, and an erosion of mutual trust. Uruguay categorically rejects any suggestion that normalizes the idea of new nuclear testing. We also insist on the need that Countries in Annex 2 of the CTBT ratify this agreement without delay as a measure to strengthen trust and transparency in this challenging context. On the other hand, we are concerned about attacks against facilities that operate with nuclear energy, which heightens the risks of radiation, pollution and the risks to the health of populations living in surrounding areas. President Nuclear weapons States should honor the commitments that they undertook in the conferences of 1995, 2000 and 2010. Specifically, we would like to refer to the need for transparency and accountability. In the current cycle, this issue has come to the fore in terms of a common approach, despite the fact that efforts of countries to improve their reports have been very unequal. Often they cite confidentiality and national security reasons to limit transparency. But given the seriousness of nuclear weapons use, even accidental use, and cascading global effects of it, it is in the interest of all states to seek the maximum degree of transparency possible. Precedent. We reaffirm the value of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as an agreement that complements the npt. We'd like to highlight the gender perspective and humanitarian law perspective in terms of the irreversible damage caused by nuclear weapons. We are pleased to be part of the group to universalize this instrument, along with Austria and New Zealand. And we underlined that we have a significant majority of states now that have signed or ratified this multilateral agreement. This constitutes an unequivocal signal of our global commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons. We extend an open invitation to all states that still have not done so to join this treaty. President we would like to highlight the fundamental work done by the International Atomic Energy Agency under the leadership of their generation direct General, Rafael Moreno Grossi, when it comes to monitoring, verification and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Finally, for this main committee to be successful, is imperative to go beyond existing differences and concentrate our efforts in realistic measures that can be Adopted right now, we trust that there will be political will to move forward in this vein. Thank you, President.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [2:23:39]:

I thank the distinguished Republic representative of Uruguay for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Nepal to deliver their statement. Nepal, you have the floor.


Nepal [2:23:53]:

Thank you. Mr. Chair, Nepal aligns itself with the statement delivered by Indonesia on behalf of the non Alliance States parties to the NPT and wishes to deliver the following remarks in its national capabilities capacity. I congratulate you on your assumption as the Chair of Main Committee first and assure you of our delegation's full support and cooperation. Mr. Chair, for more than five decades, the NPT has served as the cornerstone of global nuclear disarmament, peaceful uses and non proliferation architecture. However, the delicate balance among its three pillars has come under increasing strain. The due to the lack of tangible progress in nuclear disarmament. Nepal firmly believes that the credibility and sustainability of the NPT Treaty depend on the balanced, comprehensive and non discriminatory implementation of the obligations across all three pillars. In this regard, we call upon the Nuclear Weapon States to fulfill their primary responsibility of nuclear disarmament in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner. Mr. Chair, Nepal reaffirms that a time bound, general and complete disarmament of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee against their use. The continued position of nuclear weapons under any pretext is against the spirit of the Treaty. We view that notions such as responsible position, nuclear deterrence and nuclear sharing perpetuate a dangerous and unjust nuclear status quo. They are neither acceptable nor legitimate. In this regard, we emphasize the effective implementation of 13 practical steps of the 2064-point action plan of the 2010 review conference. Mr. Chair, we hold that CDBT and TPNW are crucial instruments that complement the objectives of the NPT. Pending the entry into 4 of CTPT, we call for the strict observance of a universal moratorium on nuclear test explosions. We also call for an early conclusion of the Fissile Materials Cut Off Treaty. Until such a treaty is concluded, all States should uphold a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Mr. Chair, transparency and confidence building measures remain essential for reducing risks and fostering trust among States. Sustained dialogue, information sharing and the effective implementation of arms control agreements contribute to greater predictability and stability. However, we reaffirm that arms control is not a substitute for the legally binding obligation of nuclear disarmament under Article 6 of the NPT, nor for the concrete steps repeatedly agreed by consensus in review conference outcome. Mr. Chair, we underscored the importance of a successor Treaty to the new start. Nepal welcomes the UN General assembly resolution to establish a group of scientific and technical experts for nuclear disarmament verification as a step towards advancing global nuclear disarmament efforts. We are concerned over growing risks of integration of emerging technologies, including AI into nuclear weapons weapon system. Such developments risk undermining existing safeguards and increasing the possibility of miscalculation or unintended escalation. In this context, we stress the imperative of maintaining effective human control and oversight over nuclear command, control and communication systems of nuclear weapons at all times. As an avid supporter of nuclear disarmament and the host to the UN Regional center for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, we underscore the importance of of investing in education and capacity building on disarmament and non proliferation. To conclude, Mr. Chair, nuclear disarmament is not a peripheral issue. It is an urgent imperative for global peace and security, human dignity and shared prosperity of humanity. We therefore urge all States parties to deliver on their commitments under the NPT and to act with renewed political will and collective responsibility. The full version of our statement will be available online. I thank you.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [2:28:07]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Nepal for the statement. Excellence. Ladies and gentlemen, that was the last speaker on my list for this meeting. I note that there are four requests from delegations to exercise their right of reply pursuant to Rule 19 of the Rules of Procedure. We will hear them now. May I remind delegations that in accordance with Rule 19 that these statements should be as brief as possible, delegations should limit their interventions to five minutes. May I also remind delegations that in accordance with established practice, the number of interventions in the exercise of the right of reply for any delegation is limited to two. The second intervention should be limited to three minutes, consistent with the advice provided by the President of the Conference. Speaking limits will be strictly enforced. For right of reply. A timer will show on the screen indicating when there is one minute remaining after the time limit has been reached, the microphone will cut off. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation.


Russian Federation [2:29:46]:

Thank you, President. The Russian Federation has asked for the floor in exercise of the right of reply in connection with the statements that were heard today in this room at the meeting of Main Committee 1. We have heard many baseless accusations against our country. Now a particular focus on placed on Russia. Russia's alleged undermining of the fundamental foundations of the npt allegedly by creating a nuclear threat and using aggressive nuclear rhetoric. In this context, European countries, especially NATO members, tried to convey a message that their bloc is serving the Mission of peace is purely defensive in nature and contributes to strengthening the npt. It is time to shed light on what is actually true. The defensive nature of NATO has long been a myth. This was a result of NATO's aggression on Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya and its moral support to the reckless anti Iranian campaign carried out by Israel and the us. Now about strengthening the npt. Currently, the us, France and the UK have begun reviewing and rethinking positive achievements in nuclear disarmament that have been achieved over the last 15 years. As for the UK and France, their nuclear ambitions are the logical and predictable continuation of London and Paris long term course aimed at avoiding joining agreements on nuclear arms control. Disregarding the NPT the nuclear power 3 Nuclear powers of the west are expanding and building up their nuclear arsenals without limits and are involving their non nuclear partners into ever more destabilizing nuclear umbrella schemes. Under France's initiative, for example, the concept of forward deterrence is being implemented. This together with a long standing practice of nuclear sharing arrangements is meant to strengthen the nuclear fist pointed against Russia and its allies. Additionally, in the EU discussions are underway about the possibility of creating their own European nuclear military capabilities. A number of non nuclear weapons states in Europe are toying with the idea of obtaining nuclear weapons or serving as a recipient of this type of WMDs. All of these actions are causing direct and clear damage to the regime underpinned by the npt. And now a couple of words about threats. Over the last 20 years NATO has been building up its force capacities in order to exert firm pressure on countries they find undesirable. For this, the collective west has for decades been expanding its military unions and coalitions. When it comes to Europe, we have seen wave upon wave of harmful NATO expansion right up to Russia's borders, which posed a spreading geopolitical which constituted geopolitical aggression. From the point of view of Russia's security interests, it is fundamental that NATO states considered and continue to consider our country country as an opponent. As a result of the west destructive actions, we have seen a profound deterioration of the relationship between the five permanent members of the Security Council who are also the de jure nuclear powers and bear particular responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. This has led to an increase in strategic risks which could lead to direct military confrontation between the P5 and accordingly potentially catastrophic consequences for humankind in its entirety. The Ukrainian crisis continues to escalate. However, most European states continue to pursue their highly hostile course against Russia, continue to use provocative rhetoric and look for new ways to cause damage to Russia through the hands of the Kyiv regime and continue to plan dangerous ventures. At the same time, there is an intensive remilitarization of Europe, including attempts to give the Ukrainian regime deadly weapons. As for settling the Ukrainian crisis, the solution lies in NATO members abandoning their attempts to deal a strategic defeat to Russia and undermine our core interests. Thank you.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [2:34:45]:

I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation for their intervention and I invite the distinguished representative of France to make their intervention.


France [2:35:05]:

Chair I wish to respond to the various statements made regarding France's policy on nuclear deterrence. France is a responsible nuclear weapons state. It attaches the utmost importance to compliance with the January 3, 2022 p.5 declaration and calls on all nuclear weapons states to demonstrate the level of responsibility expected from states possessing nuclear weapons. The President of the Republic reaffirmed this at Yilong on March 2 France's nuclear deterrence is strictly defensive in nature. The President of the Republic also underscored unambiguously that France has no intention of entering into any arms race nor of adopting a logic of parity with other nuclear weapon states. France has always set the size of its arsenal at levels strictly consistent with the operational effectiveness of its deterrence. The measures announced by France cannot be compared with those taken by other nuclear weapons states. I will recall them here. The complete dismantlement of our land to land nuclear component, the now irreversible dismantlement of facilities for the production of fissile material for weapons the cessation of nuclear testing and the complete, transparent and irreversible dismantlement of the Pacific nuclear Test Site. At the same time, one must acknowledge the reality of the profound deterioration of the strategic environment, the war waged by Russia on European soil, the expansion and diversification of Russia's and China's arsenals and the deepening of proliferation crises requires to adapt our model. It is in this context that the President of the Republic recalled, building on his previous addresses, that France's vital interests have a European dimension. France has therefore proposed to certain partners the progressive establishment of a forward deterrence arrangement aimed at deepening bilateral cooperation and achieving genuine strategic convergence between our countries. Forward deterrence entails no sharing of the ultimate decision nor of its planning or implementation. It involves no transfer of control over nuclear weapons and is therefore fully compatible with the commitments of France and other states concerned under Articles 1 and 2 of the NPT. France continues to champion the goal of transparency. It has in this regard submitted a comprehensive national report on the implementation of its obligations. It supports the establishment of a dedicated interactive Dialogue on the reports of all States Parties. France also remains engaged in the P5 dialogue on doctrines and Risk Reduction. In that context, we have supported the US proposal to launch discussions on strategic stability and our Minister recalled this at the opening of this conference. Chair, allow me finally to recall that these efforts in France's view can only be pursued within the framework of the npt. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons offers none of the guarantees that would allow to move forward to a world without nuclear weapons. It counts no nuclear weapons states among its states parties nor does it have a credible verification regime. It cannot in any respect be regarded as an effective disarmament instrument within the meaning of Article 6. France did not participate in the negotiations on that treaty and does not intend to accede to the that treaty. It is not binding upon us and creates no new obligations for France. We reject any claims that it reflects or contributes in any way to development of customary norm prohibiting nuclear weapons. Thank you.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [2:40:01]:

I thank the distinguished representative of France for their statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of the United States to take the floor.


United States of America [2:40:17]:

Thank you, Chair. I take to the floor to respond to comments over the last few days. Once again China spent almost the entirety of its main Committee one remarks talking about the United States. First, I would like to reiterate some key facts. These facts are not intended to politicize or hype the threat of any country, but merely to lay out the information as recently detailed in Geneva and other forums. We are aware that China has conducted nuclear explosive tests. The People's Liberation army sought to conceal testing by obfuscating nuclear explosions which are inconsistent with its nuclear testing moratorium. China conducted one such yield producing nuclear test. On June 22, 2020. The CTBTO Preparatory Commission initially issued a statement declaring that its IMS network could detect any test anywhere. I am happy and encouraged to see that Dr. Floyd and the CTBTO PrepCom have since acknowledged that there are limitations to that capability because it means that we can make progress. But this all comes back to one salient and undeniable fact. To realize a world with fewer nuclear weapons requires more than just one state to act with restraint, which is what some in this forum ask of the United States. Reciprocity in restraint is required for there to be mutual benefit and progress toward our ultimate goal. That is why we have proposed to Russia and China and among the P5 initial steps to address nuclear testing. Among other proposals, perhaps there is some sort of stepping stone measure that the five of us can take to increase the confidence in each other's behavior regarding nuclear explosive test monitoring, increasing the ability to detect low yield tests and measures to ensure we all adhere to the same standard. Our sincere proposals must be met with good faith. We have already and will continue to engage nuclear weapons states to move forward on our shared Article 6 obligations. It is on Russia and China to change their behavior and be willing to discuss how to instill confidence that they are adhering to their stated nuclear testing moratoria. If China does not adhere to a zero yield standard, then it must admit that and detail what its standard is. These concerning behaviors are not the actions of a country that wishes to be transparent about its activities. We are presenting China with an opportunity to enhance transparency and allay international concerns about its behavior. We hope Beijing chooses this path. Other countries conducting yield producing tests while the United States does not could put the United States at an intolerable disadvantage and I need to make this very clear. We will not negotiate from a position of weakness and unreciprocated restraint. I want to conclude here by reaffirming that the United States goal is not to obtain comprehensive or numerical nuclear superiority over any other nuclear armed states. The United States has no intention of engaging in an arms race. Rather, I remain optimistic that our proposal for multilateral strategic stability and arms control talks offer a practical and realistic path forward to address these challenges. I'm encouraged to hear our Chinese colleagues stated support for transparency measures, but China hasn't provided any form of transparency, neither in terms of qualitative nor quantitative arsenal transparency. China did not host a national report side event that so many here have called for. China won't even acknowledge its well reported nuclear weapon buildup. It's time to turn these words into actions. I urge China and all of the states here today to support us in this endeavor. Thank you.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [2:44:20]:

I thank the distinguished representative of the United States for their intervention. And I invite the distinguished representative of Iran to take the floor.


Iran (Islamic Republic of) [2:44:38]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. During the general debate this week, my delegation has spoken at length both in our national statement and in several rites of reply addressing and rejecting the baseless allegations directed against Iran's peaceful nuclear program. I will therefore not revisit those points and instead refer delegations to other our previous interventions. However, I must note that the Representatives of the U.S. united Kingdom, Germany, France continue to misuse every available platform, including Main Committee 1, which is mandated to address nuclear disarmament to advance politically motivated narratives. That committee should instead be the forum in which these estates response to the concerns repeatedly raised by non nuclear weapon states and civil society organizations including during this morning's session regarding their persistent failure to fulfill their obligations under Article 6 of the treaty. Turning to the specific remarks made by the United Kingdom also on behalf of the US And France, I must respond to the inaccurate and unlawful assertions concerning Security Council resolutions related to Iran's peaceful nuclear program. It must be stated clearly and categorically that the attempt by the E3 to invoke the so called snapback mechanism is legally unfounded, politically irresponsible and procedurally abusive. Following the unilateral and unlawful withdrawal of the United States States from the JCPOA in 2018, the E3 failed to uphold their commitments to preserve the agreement. In doing so, they lost any standing to invoke claims of significant non performance, particularly when Iran's subsequent measures were lawful, proportionate and fully consistent with its rights under the JCPOA and Security council. Council Resolution 202231 Resolution 2231 reached its full and final termination on October 18, 2025, exactly as stipulated in its timeline. This is not a matter of interpretation. It is explicitly set out in the resolution itself. The official record of the Security Council confirms that the E3 notification carries no legal effect and any claim to revive previously terminated resolutions is null and void of initiative. Therefore, neither Iran nor any member of the international community is under any obligation to recognize or implement such unlawful measures. All nuclear related provisions and and restrictions under Resolution 2231 expired definitively on October 18, 2025 in full accordance with the timeline endorsed by the Security Council. I thank you, Mr. Chair.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [2:47:57]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Iran for their intervention and I invite the distinguished representative of Germany to take the floor.


Germany [2:48:12]:

Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. Chair, I'm obliged to react to the right of reply of the Russian Federation. I will not respond again to the false allegations regarding nuclear sharing. Russia is best positioned to know that these the regions are fully in line with the npt. I would just like to recall where the actual crisis in arms control and the lack in disarmament has its origins. Germany. The German government, together with allies, has seen a large increase in Russian capabilities, especially in cruise and ballistic missiles with ranges previously covered by the ENF Treaty. We have repeatedly called on Russia to refrain from from developing and stationing these capabilities or reverse its course. Russia has not positively responded to this cause and has instead increased its production of these systems. Russia is not exclusively using these capabilities in its war against Ukraine and is consciously also putting European targets at risk with capabilities that are nuclear capable. It has repeatedly warned, voiced threats to use this system against US or allies in Europe. The debates about deterrence in Europe are a clear response to the Russian threat. War is back in Europe and we need to protect our population. Regarding the right of reply of Iran, I just would like to refer to the IAEA reports and our right of republic reply during the general debate. Thank you, Mr. President.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [2:49:53]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Germany for their intervention and I invite the distinguished representative of China to take the floor.


China [2:50:07]:

Mr. Chair, some countries in recent two days continue to misrepresent and distort China's nuclear policies and our stance on nuclear arms control and we firmly reject these accusations. Just now the US Representative continues to hype the so called China's low yield nuclear explosive tests. These are very tired and very irresponsible remarks that we will not respond. China, US accusations are completely unfounded and baseless and untenable. China has never conducted any activities in violation of the CTBT provisions. The CTBTO Preparatory Committee and the Technical Secretariat has also clarified through a statement. China's stance is fair and above board. In order to evade its nuclear arms control responsibilities and create pretexts for restarting nuclear tests, the United States is trying to scapegoat and vilify other countries. These practices will continue to damage its international image and credibility. We hope that the international community can guard against these practices and jointly urge the United States to cease and desist from its irresponsible practices and continue to implement the CTBT provisions and reaffirm its moratorium on nuclear test. In order to seek absolute security. The United States is dismantling international consensus and withdrawn from international treaties and is investing huge sums in modernizing its nuclear facilities and capabilities. The United States is destroying the strategic stability. These negative activities abound in its numbers and this has all shown that this is the root cause of the heightened nuclear risks in the world. China urges the United States to do some soul searching instead of blaming others for its own failures. The United States should earnestly fulfill its special and primary responsibilities for nuclear disarmament and work more to maintain global strategic stability and maintain international peace and security. Thank you. In terms of the opaque and rapid buildup of China's nuclear arsenal, these are baseless accusations. China has already responded to these accusations in our previous statements. I wish to point out that Germany, the, the Netherlands and other countries which are under the nuclear sharing arrangements of NATO, they in disregard of nuclear consensus are hyping up the so called. 3 largest nuclear arsenal countries and we are against these irresponsible, reckless rhetoric. China's nuclear forces are not at the same level with those countries that are in possession of the 90% of the nuclear arsenal. These fake rhetoric and narratives are aimed at creating pretexts for its allies and also to create excuses and deflect international attention from its participation in the nuclear sharing arrangements. Regarding nuclear sharing, China has consistently believed that the relevant arrangements are in violation of the spirit and provisions of the Treaty. During this Review Conference, the Non Aligned Movement countries and other States have expressed their challenge and doubts regarding the arrangements. China urged the relevant countries to heed the legitimate concerns of the countries in the international community. Thank you, Mr. Chair.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [2:54:57]:

I thank the distinguished representative of China for their intervention. I now invite the distinguished representative of South Africa to take the floor.


TPNW · President [2:55:12]:

Thank you, Chair. As the current President of the tpnw, South Africa deems it necessary to exercise a right of reply in view of the statements that continue to represent the Treaty. While we recognize the sovereign right of each State to decide whether or not it would sign or ratify treaties that seek to establish higher international norms, we regret any attempts to undermine the TPNW and in particular what it endeavors to achieve. It is of concern that some Member States that advance the rules based multilateral system work actively to undermine multilateral instruments that have been agreed upon by the majority of the Member States. The TPNW represents the highest non proliferation commitment any State can make. It allows the opportunity for those States that are not located in nuclear weapon free zones to join an instrument that expresses their total opposition to nuclear weapons. Let us be clear, TPNW Member States are State Parties to the NPT and work actively to make towards the NPT's full implementation. The Treaty is fully consistent with the NPT and endeavors to contribute towards fulfilling its provisions, including the obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures towards nuclear disarmament. It neither distracts nor adds to the safeguards regime established under the NPT nor excludes the further strengthening of that regime or the additional measures that States may undertake or have already committed to. As with the npt, any State joining the Treaty will be required as a minimum to conclude and implement a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the iaea. The TPNW is an essential and effective measure to implement the NPT's disarmament obligations concern contained in Article 6. Just as the other pillars of the NPT rely on subsequent treaties to implement them, the NPT's disarmament pillar requires a prohibition norm for its implementation. Prohibitions of anti personnel mines, biological weapons and chemical weapons follow the same logic The TPNW is therefore not only fully compatible with the NPT but represents a concrete step to further its implementation on both nuclear disaster, armament and non proliferation. TPNW States are all in good standing in the npt. They actively invest in strengthening the multilateral regime and reinforcing the nuclear taboo. TPNW State parties have taken on additional obligations regarding nuclear weapons compared to the NPT so as to further ensure that these inhumane weapons will never be used again or proliferated. We hope to see a more constructive and engaging approach towards the TPNW and its state parties. Joining the TPNW is Also consistent with Action 1 of the 2010 NPT Action Plan which calls on all state parties of the NPT to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons. At a time when nuclear disarmament and non proliferation architecture is under under increased strain, the TPNW represents a strong call for multilateral cooperation to address these urgent challenges. The TPNW is fully supportive of and consistent with existing multilateral nuclear disarmament and non proliferation regime and the principles of IHL and international law on women rights. Setting a prohibition norm first as a legal basis from which the actual elimination of these weapons is to be pursued is a well established international practice. This was the case with other inhuman and indiscriminate weapons such as the biological and chemical weapons as well as anti personnel landmines and cluster munitions. I thank you Chair.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [2:59:18]:

I thank the distinguished representative of South Africa for their statement. That was the last speaker on my list. Our next meeting is on Tuesday 5th May at 10am in the Trusteeship Council Chamber where we will continue with the general exchange of views to be followed by the first meeting of Subsidiary Body one. I now give the floor to the Secretariat to make an announcement.


UN Secretariat · Secretariat [2:59:56]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Just to advise delegations that the JCMS portal of the UN Journal is currently down so statements cannot be uploaded that is published to the UN Journal until this is fixed. Technicians are working on it, but kindly in the interim, please expect some delays in uploading or edits.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [3:00:14]:

Thank you very much.


UN Secretariat · Secretariat [3:00:15]:

Back to you, sir.


Main Committee 1 · Chair [3:00:19]:

Thank you very much indeed, Excellence. Ladies and gentlemen, this meeting is adjourned.