Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons — Ninth Biennial Meeting of States, (1st Meeting) Open-Ended Technical Expert Group General Assembly Date: 4 June 2026 Language: English Transcript: https://transcripts.un.org/ar/asset/k1w/k1wfktchk0?lang=en Transcripts available through this tool are created by using automatic speech recognition and are not official records nor official documents of the United Nations. Official records and official documents are available on the Official Document System of the United Nations. --- Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [0:01]: Okay, I think we should be starting now. Excellencies, Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, delegates and experts, ladies and gentlemen, it is my pleasure to declare open the first meeting of the Open-Ended Technical Expert Group on Development in the Manufacturing Technology and Design of Small Arms and Light Weapons, established under the UN Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument. At the outset, let me thank all delegations for electing me as Chair on 1st June and for the trust placed in me to lead this important process. Over the past months in my role as Chair-designate, I have become familiar with how developments in manufacturing, technology, and design of small arms and light weapons are impacting the effective implementation of the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument. This week, in the course of the BMS, under the leadership of the Chair, Ambassador James Larsen of Australia, my good friend. We've heard from delegations from all regions about how technologies are reshaping how weapons can be produced, marked, and trafficked. Combating illicit small arms and light weapons is a matter of profound importance to my country, Sierra Leone, a nation that has seen firsthand the devastating consequence of the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons. During our Security Council tenure and our presidency last year, we made small arms a priority issue. Distinguished delegates, the establishment of this open-ended technical expert group represents an important step forward. Over the past months, I have held several informal consultations with states, as well as with intergovernmental organizations, civil society, and industry representatives. As mandated by the General Assembly through the Fourth Review Conference of the POA, our task is clear: to develop agreed recommendations by consensus to ensure the full and effective implementation of the POA and the ITI in light of developments in the manufacturing, technology, and design of small arms and light weapons. Thank you. I want to underline that this session of the OETG is the beginning of a longer process. The Group will meet again in 2028 with a view to formulating recommendations by consensus for the consideration by the 10th Biennial Meeting of States and at least by the 5th Review Conference in 2030. Accordingly, we are not expected to negotiate recommendations this week. Instead, our objective over these two days is to engage in substantive technical discussions that will help us identify key issues, emerging priorities, and areas where further work is required. Over the next two days, our work will be structured around three thematic panels. This morning, we will begin our thematic panels with a focus on challenges. In particular, challenges posed by developments in the manufacturing technology and design of small arms and light weapons, in particular polymers, modular, and illicit 3D printing. These developments raise complex questions for marking, record keeping, and tracing. In the afternoon, we will turn to opportunities. Technological developments are not only a source of concern, They can also be harnessed to implement the ITI and improve marking, tracing, record keeping, and other national control systems. Tomorrow morning, our discussions will focus on international cooperation and assistance. Addressing both the challenges and opportunities before us will require strengthening capacities, knowledge sharing, and technical support. Tomorrow we also discuss the way forward. I welcome ideas for the intercessional program, how we can structure the continued work of the OETG towards the development of recommendations. I encourage us to think creatively, collaboratively, and pragmatically. Distinguished delegates, at the conclusion of both today's and tomorrow's meeting, I intend to introduce to you the main elements from the discussion that will be included in the Chair's Summary. I will aim to be as close to the final text as possible. Tomorrow afternoon, I will present the entire Chair's Summary to BMS IX. The Summary will not capture the entirety of our discussion, but rather reflect my assessment of the main points of our discussions. In line with the modalities set out in the Outcome Document of the Fourth Review Conference, I invite briefings by relevant subject matter experts. I invited briefings by relevant subject matter experts. Members will recall that in advance of the meeting, I circulated the lists of such experts, which took into account technical expertise, regional representation, and gender balance. Following expert briefings, there will be opportunities for interventions. I urge delegations to be concise and focused. I recall the guiding questions for our session, which have been issued in the six languages as Document A/Conf.129/BMS/2026/L5. We are also benefiting from interpretation for all our meetings. I take the opportunity to thank our interpreters for their support over the next sessions. While I am aware that it was not possible for all States to include subject matter technical experts in their delegations, I am encouraged to see that many delegations have included subject matter experts. Please note that the meeting is being webcast on UN Web TV for those following from outside New York. For organizational and procedural matters related to this meeting, I refer to the information note circulated before the meeting. In preparation for the meeting, I welcome delegations to serve in a facilitator role during the OETG as Friends of the Chair. I am already engaging interested delegations and I thank them for their interest in the role and supporting me in leading a successful OETAG process. I note the importance of the expert group being able to continue its work during the intersessional period. I propose that the group consider the role of supporters, champions, or friends of chairs, and provide their views thereon during our discussions tomorrow. Thank you. Distinguished delegates, as Chair, I will strive to conduct our work in a manner that is transparent, inclusive, and pragmatic. I remain open to your ideas and suggestions. I encourage all delegations to approach this meeting in the spirit of openness and collaboration. The issues before us are undeniably complex, but they are also critically important. Ensuring that the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument remain effective in a changing technological landscape is essential to our collective efforts to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. I am confident that working together, we can lay a strong foundation over these two days for the important work that lies ahead. Having heard from me for too long, I now have the pleasure to request the Director of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, Adediji Ibo, to deliver opening remarks. You have the floor. UNODA · Director, Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs · Adediji Ibo [8:41]: Thank you, Chair. Mr. Chair, Ambassador Michael Imran Khanu, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, experts, ladies and gentlemen, it is my pleasure to welcome you all to the inaugural meeting of the Open-Ended Technical Expert Group, or OETEG, as it begins its work. I want to begin by thanking Ambassador Kanu for taking on the role as Chair and for his excellent leadership in bringing us this far. I would also like to thank all the delegates, all the experts, and all the briefers who will contribute to the discussion over the coming days. The OETEG mandate originates from the Fourth Review Conference of the POA in 2024, following discussions dating back to 2018 at the Third Review Conference. However, the POA has addressed technology's impact on small arms control for nearly two decades. In 2011, the first meeting of government experts examined challenges from modular and polymer weapons. In 2014, the Secretary-General warned that emerging technologies could affect international tracing instrument implementation. The second meeting of governmental experts in 2015 Further discussed polymer, modular, and 3D weapons. The Chair's summary noted that 3D printers had been shown to be capable of producing working firearms, although the cost of 3D printers made them out of reach for ordinary individuals. Back then, the first fully 3D-printed pistol had been produced, and the company SIG Sauer released its P320, marking a significant shift in modular firearms. But the challenges that this development could pose had not yet materialized on the ground. Well, that has since changed. By 2026, illicit 3D-printed weapons exist worldwide, are increasingly capable, and are sought after by criminal and terrorist groups. Modular weapons like the P-320 are now widespread in civilian and in military markets. Excellencies, dear delegates, against this backdrop and as you begin your deliberations, allow me to highlight 3 points. First, the POA processes have advanced slower than the pace of technological change. Your mandate requires the OETEG to put forward consensus recommendations by 2028 and no later than 2030. I urge you to ensure that the OETEG can advance recommendations before BMS X in 2018. This will require intersectoral work between now and then. UNODA is ready to support that work. Second, technological development, as with all development, is not evenly distributed across the world. I encourage you to use this week's meeting as an opportunity to exchange, share national experiences, and identify both needs and offers of assistance. Third, I urge you to approach the task of the OETEG with the intention of bringing together technical experts, and policymakers to put forward actionable recommendations. This means ensuring that you actively engage experts, including from industry, where relevant. It also means taking into account gender perspectives and the voices of young people, which are essential to developing effective and inclusive responses. Thank you. Mr. Chair, I wish you every success in guiding this meeting over the coming day and a half, and I wish you all a rich and constructive exchange. Thank you. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [14:19]: Many thanks to the Deputy to the High Representative and Director, Mr. Ibo. Thank you for your statement and well wishes. I take this opportunity to also thank colleagues in the Secretariat, particularly in UNODA, in providing the necessary support in preparation for this meeting and during this meeting. Colleagues, distinguished delegates, we shall now turn to the first thematic panel discussion on challenges posed by development in the manufacturing technology and design of small arms and light weapons, in particular polymer Modular and Illicit 3D Printing. So as we get to that, certainly we'll ask the briefer to join us in the— at the podium. To set the scene, we've established panel of expert briefers. I shall then open the floor for views from state. Thank you. As we get through the changes in the podium, I will get to the scene setting. As I just said, to set the scene, we have a distinguished panel of expert briefers. I shall then open the floor for views from states after they have set the scene. There is no established list of speakers for those discussions. Experts and delegates are reminded to request the floor by pressing the speaker's button in front of you. While this is intended to be an interactive discussion, delegations intending to take the floor should bear in mind that we have limited time and are asked to limit interventions to 3 minutes when speaking on behalf of your delegation and would certainly respect the 5 minutes for interventions on behalf of group of states. Written inputs or statements should be submitted to eastatement@un.org with a copy to conventionalarms-unoda@un.org. Thank you. I thank member states, international and regional organizations, non-governmental organizations for the working papers and other submissions that have been received thus far. We shall now move on to our briefers. The bios have been made available on Milton Place. In the interest of time, I shall not go through the bios, and it gives me great pleasure to give the floor to Dr. Rachel Bolton Keane, Associate Professor of Forensic Science at Nottingham Trent University. You have the floor, please. Associate Professor of Forensic Science · Rachel Bolton-King [17:47]: Thank you. Good morning, everybody, and thank you for inviting me and providing me the opportunity to start this important discussion with you all. The focus of my briefing is on the challenges and the potential interventions for consideration with respect to the Programme of Action, the International Tracing Instrument, and potentially their connectivity to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. So in recent years, there's been the growth in the use of manufacturers to produce and use polymer, predominantly plastic parts, in their weapons. Also to create modular weapons that are designed to be reconfigured to reduce the number of weapons an individual might need to carry to make shooting more efficient and economical. Further, in the use of what we call additive manufacturing, also referred to as 3D printing, to both legally and illegally manufacture firearms and ammunition. All these innovations and new applications of technology are leading to a rise in violent and organized crime and increased challenges for law enforcement and our ability to create a safe and secure secure society, both domestically and internationally. The gaps that currently exist in our policies are also creating challenges for us in tackling small arms and light weapons manufacture, trafficking, and our ability to effectively combat this. So my briefing focuses on sharing the challenges that are being created by polymer, modular, and 3D-printed weapons. Broadly, we define these as follows. So on the left you can see a polymer weapon. The frame in this case of a Glock pistol is what is made of the plastic, the polymer. And a polymer weapon by definition is a firearm with at least one part that is made of plastic or polymer. Typically this part is the frame or the receiver, which is shown in the pink box. In this particular example, these polymer parts have a metal tag that's inserted into the frame with the serial number, as you can see beneath it. And this currently complies with the ITI. However, not all of the manufacturers across member states are currently meeting the requirements stipulated in the ITI because some of these metal tags are quite easily removed and they don't destroy part of the firearm if they're removed as they're required or should do. The middle image shows a modular weapon. So this is a firearm that's deliberately designed by the manufacturer to be altered or adapted to the desire and need of the shooter by changing specific parts or modules. By example, one of the most common is to switch the barrel so you can shoot different types of ammunition. To shoot different targets, for example, maybe big animals or small animals. For some modular pistols, for example, they might have what we call this firearm control unit or a chassis, and that's where— and what is considered to be an essential part and therefore houses the serial number. So in this case, in the middle image, you can see the pink box shows the serial number through the window of the plastic polymer frame. However, a modular rifle instead of this pistol may have a, what we call a split receiver with an upper and a lower part. And the lower part might house the trigger, the hammer, the safety, whereas the upper might manage the mechanism of firing and the pressure. So in some countries, this lower receiver is the only bit that's controlled, and it's the only part that requires to have a serial number. Whereas the upper receiver might have the barrel, for example, which can be changed. And this may not be regulated and therefore is often unserialized. But in some states, say for example Brazil, the UK, all of these parts are essential. They bear the pressure of the firearm. Mm-hmm. And they are therefore legally required to be marked with a serial number. So not just that one primary or essential part. The final is an example of the 3D-printed weapon. And this is where either a part of that weapon or the whole weapon might be made by printing in layers, which is why we call it additive manufacturing. To form the object. The material is often a plastic polymer, but these printers can be designed to print metals. I've even seen 3D printers that print houses and cement. So there are lots of different types of, of additive manufacturing and types of printer. So as Reuben will explain further, these 3D models used to illegally and legally produce firearms widely accessible and they're now very cheap to buy and being exploited by criminals and terrorists to make weapons and now even ammunition at home. So one of these challenges that at the moment the International Tracing Instrument doesn't define terms polymer, modular, or additively manufactured or 3D-printed weapons. So to support member states to to make domestic policy changes and improve our ability to meet the requirements and implementation of the ITI and the Programme of Action? Potentially, could the ITI itself or an annex of it be created to provide better understanding, consistency, and clarity to all parties on what these weapons and these terms mean in the context of the ITI and what we're trying to achieve through the Programme of Action? Thank you. The second challenge and intervention I want to focus on respects to tracing firearms and combating trafficking of small arms and light weapons. And these are challenges that are being caused in the different markings requirements between member states. Firearms and parts that are manufactured in different countries have different legislation regarding the marks that are required to be put on marks— on parts. And there is not necessarily clarity on which is the most effective method to produce these serial numbers or these marks and to help us improve the recovery of obliterated serial numbers and to support us in tracing these weapons across— and parts across borders. Thank you. In addition, actors are finding it challenging to identify the primary core and an essential part of the firearm due to these different legal manufacturing requirements. And again, this is impacting our efforts to accurately record and therefore trace these firearms. A number of interventions could therefore be considered by the United United Nations and member states to provide clarity and again promote consistency. These include mandating firearm producers and manufacturers to specify which primary or core essential part of the firearm should be serialized. In the case of modular firearms, the parts may have different serial numbers, which is actually shown in this bottom image. You may not be able to see it, but The— one of the parts, the slide, has a different serial number to the frame and the barrel of that particular firearm. And therefore, when you seize this weapon, which serial number do you recover and record? Do you record all of them? How do you go about tracing these? And so that challenge could be rectified and made— easier for everyone to understand. We could also ask those manufacturers that are being— for firearms being made in our state to provide us with information to decode and interpret the marks that they are putting on their firearms, not just the serial number. Things like import marks, export marks, even codes that help them in tracking marking and quality control process of these firearms. And this would then help law enforcement and forensic scientists to analyze and trace firearms when the serial numbers themselves cannot be recovered. We could also advocate for consistency of the essential part across firearm types and ask member states to legislate for, uh, those manufacturers and producers to mark serial numbers on all of those important component parts that are required for the firearm to function, including the barrel, the slide or the cylinder, the frame, the upper and the lower receiver. So not just that one part as being essential. Firearm manufacturers could also provide a list of which is the core essential part for each make— for each model of firearm they produce. Which they deem to be those secondary parts or accessories. So again, this is about consistently understanding and applying to our recording practice across all states and across borders. The information from manufacturers could then be collected by states and supplied to the United Nations, for example, to collate and distribute across all member states to provide an improved consistency in that recording practice and the ability to trace the movement of those firearms. The ITI or an annex could also specify that metal tags, um, are made of stainless steel in— specifically so that manufacturers aren't using less dense or cheaper thinner materials like aluminium that again make it more difficult to recover those firearms those serial numbers and those marks for tracing purposes. It could specify a minimum tag— metal tag thickness and dimensions to create space on the tag for those additional marks such as proof marks, import and export marks to be added because you can't easily add those to the polymer-framed weapons in particular. Thank Finally, you. that methods to create serial numbers should involve material compression, so stamping methods, dot peening, for example, rather than laser engraving for those serial numbers to improve potential recovery of the serial numbers that do try to be changed and obliterated. All of these potential interventions could help us improve our consistency of recording, ability to track and trace firearm movement and detect emerging threats across the world much more effectively than we currently can. The final challenge I'd like to raise is associated with the different practices and policies that we have in our states and between our states for recovering those obliterated serial numbers and the technologies that we use to compare fired ammunition components to link criminal firearm discharges across borders. For example, some states use only destructive chemical methods like acids to recover these serial numbers, whereas others have started to use non-destructive methods like the Eddy current, which you'll hear about later this afternoon, which is preferable for retaining the integrity of the weapon, enabling replication by others, and increasing its potential use in criminal procedures. These destructive non-chemical approaches are also more sustainable and provide opportunities for states to also meet some of the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Difference in ballistic imaging systems that we use in our states to investigate and link firearm discharges across borders is challenging at the moment. Where one country might use one technology like IBIS, another might use EvoFinder. And in the past, this data has not previously been able to be shared and correlated to help law enforcement in connecting crime and tackling particularly organized crime. However, this is changing. The manufacturers are now working more effectively together to provide some capability to export and import the 3D data of these fired ammunition components to help us to compare with and identify crimes operating across and criminals operating across borders. Member states should and could therefore continue to push technology providers to develop these consistent approaches and develop their software and their technology to foster forensic comparison and data sharing between systems between our states. So some of the interventions and challenges I've posed this morning will also be raised in more depth in the subsequent briefings this morning, as well as the briefings this afternoon, and will further add to our discussions over the next 2 days. So thank you all for your time and your consideration, and I look forward to hearing your perspectives after the remaining briefings this morning. Thank you. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [31:48]: Thank you very much, Dr. King, for your briefing, certainly for the clarity of your presentation and for being here. I now turn to Mr. Ruben Das, who is an Associate Research Fellow at the S. Jaan Tam School of International Studies, Singapore, who is joining us online. You have the floor, Mr. Das. Associate Research Fellow · Ruben Das [32:13]: Thank you very much, Ambassador. Very good morning, dear excellencies. So my name is Ruben Das, and today I'll be giving you a brief overview of the state of play of 3D printed firearms from a global perspective. Next slide, please. So 3D printed firearms have really come a long way since the first fully 3D printed firearm was released in 2013 called the Liberator. In 2020, we saw the release of the FGC-9, which is a hybrid pistol-caliber carbine that consists of 3D printed components and commercially available unregulated parts that one can source from a hardware store. This firearm does not depend on any regulated components and is currently the most frequently encountered 3D-printed firearm in seizures globally. The FGC-9 really was a game changer within the 3D-printed firearm space. Since then, we have seen a shift in designs that are becoming increasingly independent of regulated components, increasingly do-it-yourself or DIY, and also increasingly easier to manufacture, like the Not a Glock, for example, and also the Rogue-9. In 2024, in August of 2024, we saw the release of the URU-TAU, which is also a hybrid pistol-caliber carbine. Like the FGC-9, it does not require any regulated components, and it's notably easier to manufacture than the FGC-9. Thank you. Apart from hybrid weapons, we have also seen the proliferation of part kit completions or kit builds. Now, these are mostly Glock-type handguns which have a 3D-printed lower receiver, which are then completed with commercially available components like the barrel and the slides. Now, these types of firearms are prevalent particularly in, in the North American region. Next slide, please. So the efficacy of a 3D-printed firearm is highly dependent on the skill of the individual who is making it. If it is made well, they are lethal and relatively durable. Of course, it requires a certain amount of skill, practice, time, and experience, but it's definitely not impossible. There have been several reported cases of shootings and assassination attempts worldwide involving these weapons. And there's a video in the, in the slide which will demonstrate the workings of an FGC-9. So as you can see, it's made well, it's definitely lethal and durable. Some firearms can even last between 500 and 1,000 rounds. Next slide, please. So if we look at the impact on the PoA, these weapons definitely have posed several challenges to the PoA. First would be the decentralized and unregulated production of these weapons stemming from the commercial availability of 3D printers. These, this definitely poses a regulatory challenge. Secondly, these weapons are also unmarked So they lack any form of serial number or tracing mechanism, which again poses several challenges to tracing, identification, and detection. Finally, the proliferation of digital firearm blueprints remains a serious challenge. And, you know, the, the flows of knowledge online has really shifted the challenge from the physical to the virtual. Next slide, please. So these are examples of online platforms where digital blueprints are very readily available. So, you know, as you can see, they're available on open websites, on social media platforms like Reddit, X, Odyssey, Facebook, Discord, Telegram, many of the online communities that responsible for the development of these blueprints are decentralized. They function as peer-to-peer networks where designers are able to share new designs, interact with each other, and also provide information and technical support to each other. And these online communities and online platforms really are the lifeblood of the 3D printed firearm movement. Next slide, please. If we look at global seizure trends, we've seen a high increase in the number of 3D printed firearm incidents post-2021, with North America facing the highest number of cases, followed by Europe, especially Western European countries. Australia and New Zealand have, have seen several large seizures over the last 2 years. Latin America, and particularly Brazil, has seen a few cases over the last year. Asia comparatively has the lowest number of cases. But overall, while 3D-printed firearms are still on the periphery of the illicit arms spectrum, we are definitely seeing a growth in the number of incidents worldwide. Next slide, please. These weapons, you know, At present, primarily linked to criminal actors and criminal activity. These include organized crime actors, individuals associated with narcotics, and illicit manufacturing and trafficking networks. These weapons have also been used as protection weapons and also offensive weapons in several shootings, in attempted assassinations, and also extortion. Next slide, please. While most of the cases have been linked to criminal activity, there have been at least 52 cases of terrorist engagement with these weapons. Most of the cases have been linked to the far right, but individuals associated with other ideologies have also— exist and have also been arrested for their attempted use and manufacture of these weapons. Next slide, please. Another important issue that I'd like to highlight is also the involvement of youth with these weapons. And we've seen an increase in the number of youths attempting to either manufacture, use, or traffic these weapons. Post-2021. Most of them have been linked to criminal activity. However, there have been at least 21 cases of youths linked to terrorism as well. There have been at least 8 cases where youths below the age of 15 were detected for either attempting to manufacture, traffic, or use these firearms. And, and youths are a highly vulnerable subset of individuals. Moving to the intersection between online and gaming subcultures with the 3D-printed firearm community. Next slide, please. So some trends to look out for in the future. I think we should be looking out for designs that are increasingly DIY, that are increasingly independent of regulated components. Many of these designs are also concealable and made to evade detection. And we've also seen a rise in print-in-place designs, which are designs that require minimal assembly and are relatively easy to put together. Next slide, please. Also, another two trends that I'd like to highlight are also the proliferation, the proliferation of conversion devices. These are small benign-looking devices that are— that can be 3D-printed and that function to convert semi-automatic firearms to fully automatic firearms. And these devices have been used in several lethal shootings. And, you know, as you can see, they've been sold on e-commerce platforms as benign objects. And these really pose a lethal threat. Another issue would be ammunition. Ammunition is being heavily researched and experimented with within the 3D-printed firearm community. At present, the lethality and range is limited owing to the weight. But, you know, this could potentially be a game changer if significant breakthroughs are made. Next slide, please. My final point, I think, If we look at countermeasures, the issue of 3D-printed firearms requires a holistic, multi-pronged approach. International frameworks like the UNPOA and the ITI remain key control mechanisms that need to be updated to account for the technological developments within this sphere. These frameworks are, you know, will only be effective if national-level legislation is also updated and reviewed and enforced. Intelligence sharing and regional cooperation between states and also with the additive manufacturing community is key. We also should be looking at integrating new technologies like, you know, new forensic techniques and also the incorporation of AI, which really has the potential to disrupt illicit manufacture and also be used in detecting new designs. Finally, I think capacity building, training, and awareness raising, particularly that of first responding officers and law enforcement personnel, of utmost importance. Thank you very much. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [43:03]: Many thanks to Mr. Das for really a very valuable briefing on the particular evolution of 3D-printed small arms and light weapons. I will now turn to our next briefer. Also, she will be online, so I see most of you doing it already, but to help with hearing briefers online, I recommend that you use your ear shells and so you can hear from them clearly. I will now turn to Ms. Samantha Allen, who is Senior Policy Director, Protective Security and Small Arms at the Ministry of National Security of Jamaica. You have the floor, Ms. Allen. Jamaica · Senior Policy Director, Protective Security and Small Arms · Samantha Allen [43:47]: Thank you so much. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. I'd like to begin by thanking the Chair-Designate for this invitation to Jamaica. To share some inputs on this very important topic at the open-ended technical expert group. So I will just begin by recognizing the inputs that would have been shared before by Dr. Bolton King as well as Mr. Das, and to just reiterate that we in the Caribbean and the region are very much confronted by the realities surrounding these technological advancements. From Jamaica's perspective, we would have undertaken a comprehensive review of our firearms legislation, and in fact, that took us quite a while to ensure that we— Thank you. Looked at all of the various areas. The limitations based on the operational capacity of the persons would be using the legislation to ensure that their respective duties are undertaken, and I'm referring to our Director of Prosecution or our National Licensing Authority, as well as our security forces. So during that comprehensive review, we saw the need to ensure that the legislation was modernized and that it actually takes into consideration or recognizing the technological advancements that would have basically been emerging over the past years. And we saw the need to ensure that— Thank you. as a part of that process, those advancements were properly reflected in our legislation. So in 2022, we would have passed our new Firearms Act, and that is the Firearms Prohibition, Restriction, and Regulation Act. And in that act, notably, we saw the need to introduce some critical provisions that would put the state in a position to arrest persons and prosecute persons for the possession of certain items that basically would reflect an intent for the illicit manufacturing of firearms. So the possession of digital blueprint of a prohibited weapon, as well as the digital blueprint of any device with the intent to manufacture 3D printed firearm, those in fact were some prohibitions that were reflected in the new legislation when passed. Um, some of the key definitions that we introduced were reference to the term 3D printed weapons, and that would be in the definition of a firearm. And we also went beyond that to make general reference to any weapons that are used or that are created, I should say, through the use of electronic technology. So we, we saw the need to ensure that those critical terms were now introduced in our domestic legislation in order to enable the state to be able to properly recognize those things. The Act also introduces a broad definition for the term digital blueprint. And this actually means any type of digital or electronic reproduction of a technical drawing of the design of an object. Next slide, please. So we also would have criminalized the possession of digital blueprints of what we have defined as a prohibited weapon. As well as the digital blueprint of any device with the intent to manufacture a 3D-printed firearm that is a prohibited weapon. And the penalty for an offense under that section of the Act is actually a sentence of imprisonment for life with a mandatory term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years before being eligible for parole. So we saw the need to ensure that these critical provisions were included and the penalties were strong enough to discourage persons from trying to acquire these items in order to produce weapons illicitly. And we would have recognized the need to ensure that— legislation actually reflects the current realities in terms of the advancement in these technological manufacturing practices. Next slide, please. So in our new legislation, there's also a mandatory requirement for all weapons to be marked, and this includes weapons that are seized or recovered by members of the security forces. And of course, this would include 3D-printed firearms. These weapons will be marked in accordance with our national firearms marking standards, and those standards actually provide the flexibility for the state marking agents or entities to address the intensity of the marks that are placed on the various parts of weapons made of various types of polymers, materials, to ensure the durability of the mark. So while I reflect this as a legislative advancement, this will also be a significant operational advancement as it pertains to our ability to mark and trace firearms. Next slide, please. So operationally, too, while at the onset we did not see the need to regulate 3D printing technology, when we looked back and when we also, you looked at some recent activities that would suggest that there's a potential for those printing technology to be used, you know, illicitly, we recognize the need to implement some kind of a framework to regulate the importation and the use of these 3D-printed devices. Thank you. So that framework is currently being developed, and the intention is to ensure that the importation and use of 3D printers is basically in keeping with some strict guidelines and regulations to ensure that those items are only used for legitimate business purpose or recreational purposes. Next slide, please. Operationally, too, we have ongoing interagency cooperation, and this includes constant collaboration, constant ongoing collaboration between our law enforcement and security personnel, border officials, in terms of The information sharing and allowing those persons— Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [52:23]: Ms. Allen, could you check to see if you can hear us from the— Jamaica · Senior Policy Director, Protective Security and Small Arms · Samantha Allen [52:28]: I am hearing you, but the screen went blank. But I will stay. Continue. Um, so we would have also placed focus on ensuring that our border security as well as our law enforcement personnel have continued dialogue and ongoing information sharing to ensure that from a border security perspective, those mechanisms are, are strengthened in order to allow us to be in a better position to detect and intercept these weapons when attempts are being made to illicitly import them into the island. Next slide, please. And that is the— that's my short presentation. Thank you so much. I welcome any questions. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [53:22]: I really want to thank you, Ms. Allen, for your very helpful briefing.— focusing on Jamaica's response to technological advancement in manufacturing and design of small arms and light weapons, and also for your reaction to the screen going blank. Thank you so much to all of our briefers for setting the scene. Colleagues, we are now going to our speakers list. We're going to open the floor to hear from states. Experts and delegates are reminded to request the floor by pressing the speaker's button in front of you. So please, if you do have interest to speak on this thematic issue, I will invite you to do so now, having heard from our briefers. And I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Saudi Arabia, please. Saudi Arabia [54:29]: Thank you, Chair. At the outset, I wish to express our gratitude to you and to the Secretariat for organizing this first meeting of the Open-Ended Technical Experts Group. We also thank the briefers for their interesting briefings. Chairman, recent progress in the manufacturing, the technology, and the design of small arms and light weapons bring about many practical and operational challenges, and also regulatory challenges for our national efforts. In particular, the increasing use of polymer components and parts, and the use of 3D printing for illicit purposes is bound to complicate marking and stock management and tracing efforts as well as holding registers and upholding the law. Polymer parts can pose difficulties where traditional marking methods are not easily applicable or where they are not sufficiently durable. Furthermore, modular weapons can make identifying certain weapons and tracing certain weapons more difficult when parts can be replaced or assembled differently. On 3D printing, this brings about particular concerns, especially when components or weapons are produced outside of the authorized manufacturing chains, which makes their authorization, control, and tracing more difficult. In this context, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia believes that it's important for discussions within this group to remain practical and technical, focused on research and looking for a common understanding of these issues and implementation issues, and without creating any new regulatory obligations that could go beyond the frameworks agreed on in the Programme of Action and the ITI. My delegation believes that any approach that would deal with these emerging issues must be focused on the following. First of all, states must preserve the primary responsibility when it comes to regulating the transfer, manufacturing, and tracing of weapons on their territory, and this in line with domestic legislation. Secondly, responses to new technological evolutions must be in line with the framework of existing obligations, in particular the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument. All responses and measures— none of them should replace these programmes or instruments. Thirdly, international cooperation and assistance to states remains essential in particular when it comes to capacity building, technical training, and boosting the legal capacities and information exchange, border control, etc. Fourth, the group must avoid any uniform approach that does not take account of differing national realities between countries. Chair, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia calls for a balanced discussion that would recognize the risks that could stem from an abusive use of this technology for illicit purposes, whilst at the same time underscoring that technical progress in itself is not necessarily negative. Indeed, certain tools and new technologies can help states to improve marking, tracing, and the security of stocks, and the detection and management of registers, whilst respecting domestic legislation and international obligations. By way of conclusion, Saudi Arabia wishes to commit constructively to the work of this group. We encourage the implementation of an exchange center to exchange technical know-how and to draw on the practical experience of different countries to help states to implement their national programs and the ITI, whilst respecting national sovereignty and intellectual property rights and the legal frameworks of states. Thank you very much, Chair. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [58:41]: Thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of Saudi Arabia for the intervention. On the list of speakers, I have for the next three speakers Belgium, Colombia, and Ghana. I continue to remind of the 3-minute time limit, and I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Belgium, please. Belgium [59:03]: Thank you very much, Chair. I don't know if my intervention will be more of a kind of a question and an input. So we produced a working paper for the OETG, and this working paper is also based first on the work we've done in the fellowship, for which I'm very grateful to, you know, that, and also to Dr. Richard Bottomking, and also to a discussion we had with the industry, in particular FNR-STAL and engineers at FNR-STAL. And I had a comment on the issue of the methods of of engraving for the marking of the serial number, particularly the issue of laser engraving. So for example, for some pistols that are made of, with a polymer frame, we of course have this metal tag which is made of stainless steel. But then of course this tag is quite small because I mean, every hole we made in the structure of the pistol could also make it more fragile when shooting. So of course this method is relatively small, which, which makes the other methods than laser, than laser engraving difficult for marking. So like stamping is not possible either because the pistol is actually marked at the end of the, the, um, the assembly line. Um, so basically first the metal tag is embedded into the polymer and then all the, the components from, from the pistol are assembled. They're also marked, internal marking of course, that are there to be, um, that have to be be matching with the last final serial number. And when all those components are assembled together, then the serial number is engraved through laser at the end of the process. But so we can't do stamping at the end of the process because of course you can't stamp the polymer that would produce some shock on the polymer that would make it more fragile. So it's more of a question. We are bidding a kind of conundrum here in terms of— the method, which is laser engraving, which is less durable than dot peening or stamping. But at the same time, this is a bit like the issue we have. We cannot make a metal tag that would be too big because that would fragilize the structure of the pistol. So also, I don't know if it's possible to have question and answer with the expert, but that's one— the comment from our side. Thank you. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [1:01:15]: I thank the distinguished representative of Belgium for, of course, the intervention in the form of a question. The plan would be to give our expert briefers the floor at the end of the interventions for response to the questions and interventions that would have been made, particularly for Dr. Kien, who is here with us. We may not be able to get the other briefers who are online to respond. So that is also encouraged. And thanks to Belgium for the working paper. And I'll give the floor to to the distinguished representative of Colombia, to be followed by Ghana and South Africa. Colombia, please. Colombia [1:01:55]: Señor Presidente, muy buenos días. Chairman, a very good morning. My fraternal and respectful regards to you and everyone here in the room this morning. I just wanted to put a proposal on the table that would enable us, like we've heard from the briefers, and by the way, grateful to them for their briefings that would enable us to comprehensively use these meetings to deal with important inputs from all of the people that work on the tracing and control of weapons— researchers, judges, prosecutors, etc., etc. We are grateful for your answers to to these concerns that require us to engage, first of all, in a comprehensive global diagnostic. Each country has its own experiences and lessons learned. However, we cannot be fully aware of them as individual countries. The first issue is engaging in a diagnosis based on all of the knowledge that countries have, first of all, starting with— Mr. Secretary-General. Manufacturing, what skills we have in weapons manufacturing. We're seeing that. And also we heard from you, Chair, in your statement that thus far we are responding mainly to traditionally manufactured weapons and not dealing with issues like 3D printing, modular weapons, and also the use of technology in criminal dynamics. That is— evolving rapidly. So it's necessary to implement general recommendations, control on replacement of parts, et cetera. And then the second thing is trafficking. If we have this diagnosis from manufacturing countries, it's important to know about transit and destination countries also. Generally, the trafficking of weapons is addressed on an individual basis. We look at drug trafficking, for example, but we don't really address them, um, um, fundamentally as structures. So how they're moving through transit countries to destination countries, platform countries. And of course, when it comes to transnational organized crime groups that Send weapons to our country, but there's also the legal deviation of weapons and also the use of technology by organizations without legal elements, a lot of illegal elements to avoid traceability of crimes using weapons with different parts, mixed parts, or that are manufactured within the country. And then the next thing that's important is exchange of information, these mechanisms. With Interpol, with 96 member states, for example, they have a mechanism that enables us to have a platform to receive information, but we're wondering whether this is the right mechanism and also if it could be a feedback channel for different trends. There's the orange and purple warnings, and it's necessary to look at this mechanism. And then the fifth thing is the regulatory aspect. Each country has legislation that researchers, judges, prosecutors need to grapple with. However, there's also crossing of information with other countries, and in my country, this requires control. We need to look at what the voids are, the loopholes, try and close those and look at the possibility of having special groups working where police and prosecutors can work to close these gaps and look at how they can incorporate them in the information processes and use that as guidance for us to be able to anticipate. Now, does the structural prosecution of these groups. Of course, drug trafficking and arms trafficking are linked. And training is essential for researchers, judges, prosecutors, investigators. They need the right tools. And the last thing based on these 5 initial elements is the need to engage in adjustments— Mr. President. To adopt comprehensively and look at the timeframes because looking towards 2028, we could see new trends emerge, and so we need to ensure that we have follow-up and constant feedback, and of course feedback on what is working well and what needs to be corrected. And the last thing is financing. Organizations have good economic capacities to invest in technology. So the question here is whether the capacities that we have as states with our investigators, judges, prosecutors, whether we have the information and the right economic investment for technology to be a counterweight to that and anticipate new and emerging trends. Thank you. Thank you. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [1:07:24]: I thank the distinguished representative of Colombia for the intervention. Certainly, thank you for the consideration you've raised. I will recall or remind us that we also have to think about this within the framework of the mandate that we have as OECG, so thank you so much. I will now give the floor to Ghana, to be followed by South Africa and United States. —Ghana, please. Ghana [1:07:50]: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mine is in the form of a question. The data that was presented, it looks like the African region with regards to seizures in relation to this type of firearms, there was no data on seizures. So I want to know whether those who collected— I mean, the delegation from Ghana wants to know, because we belong to a subregion that is being eaten up by terrorists. We belong to a subregion that is being beaten by terrorists every day, every night. But unfortunately, it looks like the data that has been collected, the entire continent is excluded. I want to know whether 3D weapons or these type of weapons we haven't found— none of it has been seized in the region. Thank you very much. So this is in the form of a question. Thank you. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [1:08:51]: Many thanks to the distinguished representative of Ghana for the question. We hope that Mr. Das will be online, or we can try to get a response to the question. I'll now give the floor to South Africa, to be followed by United States South Africa [1:09:08]: Thank you, Chair. Similar to Ghana, we also noted— oh, first of all, let me thank the panelists for their presentations, very insightful indeed. As I indicated, similar to Ghana, we also noted in the presentation by Mr. Das that there is mention of other regions. With the exception of Africa and the Caribbean, especially when it comes to the number of incidents when it comes to 3D-printed weapons, as well as youth involvement in that. So I'm not sure whether we should interpret that as Africa and the Caribbean not having those challenges. However, we would want to have an collaboration of the trends on the African continent and other regions that were not covered specifically when it comes to the incidences as well as youth involvement in 3D printing. Secondly, we also wanted to just comment to say that we would want to also just— if the panelists are able to do so, to hear more on the lessons learned on the role of industry in addressing the challenges related to the emerging technologies, obviously, as it relates to 3D printing, modular, and polymer. So if they could, if they are in a position to do so, just share some of the lessons learned with specific reference to the role of industry. Thanks. Thank you. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [1:10:50]: I thank the distinguished representative of South Africa, and I will give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States, to be followed by Canada and United Kingdom. United States of America [1:11:01]: Thank you, Chair, and good morning, colleagues. Thank you, Ambassador, for steering our work and leading us through this process today. I have a comment first and then a question, if I may, just from the United States perspective. Perspective, it would be helpful if we could share the presentations on, you know, the meeting place to inform particularly our intercessional work. Thank you to the panelists. I want to reflect, I think, primarily on a comment made by Dr. Bolton King regarding the definition of polymer weapons being one that has— where the firearm has at least one component that is made of plastic. Since this includes a significant number —of firearms, a growing number of firearms. The United States notes that the Program of Action does not have a distinct, explicit kind of standalone definition of firearms, though the UN Protocol— Firearms Protocol does. Not all parties here are parties to that framework. Dr. Bolton King and other panelists, the United States would be interested to know what aspects aspects or elements of polymer weapons in particular would you have us focus on in defining our work in particular to ensure that our practice includes polymer weapons along with other firearms? Just how would you guide us at least in that preliminary question? Thank you, Chair. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [1:12:27]: I thank the distinguished representative of the United States. I think, Mr. Secretary, I have had you on the comment. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Canada, to be followed by United Kingdom and Republic of Korea. Canada [1:12:44]: Thank you, Chair, and congratulations on your election earlier this week, and thank you, of course, to our panelists and expert briefers. These were excellent and very informative presentations. I'll also take the opportunity on behalf of Canada to reiterate our strong strong support for the OETG and the work that we'll be doing over the next few days to address emerging technologies, and of course over the next few years as well. Thanks. I just wanted to take a brief moment to highlight a success that Canada has had in our national context, not dissimilar to the success that our expert briefer from Jamaica highlighted in their national context earlier this morning. So perhaps I'll just be somewhat underlining her, her presentation. Um, in Canada, uh, we're taking action, uh, to curb the rise in illicit firearm manufacturing, including 3D printing. Um, unlawfully manufactured firearms, uh, known as ghost guns as well, are classified as prohibited firearms in Canada. And similar to Jamaica, uh, criminal offenses exist for possessing or distributing computer data for use in a 3D printer or any other computer system for the purpose of manufacturing or trafficking a firearm or prohibited device. A firearms license is also required to purchase, transfer, or import firearm barrels, handgun slides, magazines, and ammunition to reduce access to these key firearm parts for those seeking to unlawfully manufacture firearms. Uh, by criminalizing the possession and distribution of computer data for the 3D printing of firearms, and not only the manufacture of these weapons, these policies have enabled Canadian law enforcement to better address the threat of unlawfully manufactured firearms. Uh, in this vein, we encourage all states considered methods to address the rise of new technologies relating to the use of 3D printing to unlawfully manufacture firearms. And Canada looks forward to the further deliberations of this expert group on additional means and methods to strengthen our collective approach to combat English at Saul. Thank you. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [1:14:34]: I thank the distinguished representative of Canada for the intervention. And I'll give the floor to the distinguished representative of United Kingdom, to be followed followed by Republic of Korea, and then Argentina. United Kingdom, please. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [1:14:48]: Thank you, Chair. And I'd also like to thank the briefers for their excellent presentations, which were highly informative. The United Kingdom recognizes that developments in firearms manufacturing, particularly polymer frames, modular designs, and 3D printing, presents challenges for the durability, integrity, and recoverability of markings required under the ITI. Under UK firearms law, markings must be clear, permanent, visible, and unique. The framework is outcomes-based, relying on permanence and traceability rather than a fixed manufacturing specification. UK legislation already captures privately manufactured firearms and components including 3D-printed weapons, treating them the same as conventionally manufactured weapons. UK evidence indicates that the primary risk currently arises from hybrid designs which combine 3D-printed and metal components rather than fully printed weapons. Thank you very much for your time, and I look forward to hearing the interventions of other delegations. Thank you. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [1:16:00]: I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom for the intervention. I now give the floor to the Republic of Korea, to be followed by Argentina and Switzerland. Republic of Korea [1:16:11]: Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor. I would like to thank the briefers for their insightful presentations, which provide a valuable basis for the work of the OETG. At the outset, the Republic of Korea welcomes the convening of the first meeting of the OETG. We believe that this process will help ensure that the POA and the ITI remain effective and responsive in the face of rapid developments in the manufacturing technology and design of small arms and light weapons. The Republic of Korea recognized that emerging technologies present both opportunities and challenges for the implementation of the POA and the ITI. AI-enabled data systems and enhanced marking and tracking tools can strengthen diversion prevention and supply chain monitoring, while additive manufacturing and modular weapon designs complicate enforcement. In this context, I'd like to briefly share some national practices of the ROK in addressing both the challenges and opportunities arising from technological developments. First, we have strengthened— similar to Jamaica and Canada, we have strengthened its legal and regulatory framework to address the dissemination of information related to the illicit manufacture of weapons, including through 3D printing technologies. Under our domestic legislation, the online posting or distribution of instructions, designs, or methods for manufacturing weapons constitute a criminal offense. In case involving online content hosted outside our jurisdiction, we also employ measures to restrict domestic access to to such content. Second, we have established a community-based reporting mechanism through close cooperation with citizens. Thousands of volunteer cyber monitors support efforts to identify and report online content related to illicit weapons trafficking, weapons manufacturing, and other unlawful activities. In addition, incentive schemes are also in place to encourage reporting. These measures contribute to the early detection of emerging risks and facilitate timely responses by relevant authorities. Additionally, we continue to strengthen international information sharing and analytical cooperation through Interpol. In this regard, we will host the Stonefish Regional Meeting in July this year to strengthen regional cooperation aimed at reducing the risk of weapons proliferation, diversion, trafficking, and illicit acquisition, particularly in the Southeast Asia in the Pacific region. Also, we recently joined Interpol's Arsenal Criminal Analysis File, CAF, initiative to support international efforts to secure sharing and analysis of intelligence related to 3D-printed firearms trafficking. The Republic of Korea reaffirms its strong support for the work of the OETG and stands ready to contribute constructively to these discussions. We look forward to the chair summary and the recommendations that will emerge from this process. I thank you. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [1:19:09]: I thank the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea for the intervention. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Argentina, to be followed by Switzerland and Australia. Argentina [1:19:20]: Muchas gracias, Señor Presidente. Thank you very much, Chair. First of all, I'd like to thank you for taking up the chairmanship of this group and also for your efforts. We wish you every success and you can certainly count on Argentina. We'd also like to thank the panelists for their briefings. Unfortunately, I arrived a bit late to the presentations. We are a small mission, we have lots of meetings going on. However, this is a very important issue that Argentina is very much interested in, and I'd like to ask a few questions and make some comments. We observe the growing modularity of firearms, um, and also polymer and 3D-printed weapons that pose challenges for the marking, tracing, and tracing criminal activities. While firearms have legitimate uses, they can— these can make it very difficult to trace the different components and weapons. So I'd like to know what practical measures have been the most effective to guarantee the traceability of weapons and parts manufactured and assembled using this new technology, and what type of international cooperation do you think is necessary in order to strengthen the capacities of states here? Our second question is to do with the Programme of Action, and I'm wondering whether in light of this new open-ended technical working group in the framework of the POA, whether we can make any specific contribution here. I'm thinking about the example of triangular cooperation with the UN, with cooperating and receiving countries and the UN, that triangular cooperation. I'm wondering what frameworks you think could be useful for everyone here. Thank you very much. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [1:21:13]: I thank the distinguished representative of Argentina. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Switzerland, to be followed by Australia and Iraq. Switzerland [1:21:26]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Switzerland thanks you for convening this first session of the OETG, and we would also like to thank our briefers today for their valuable inputs to this discussion. Mr. Chair, these technical questions have now been on our agenda for over a decade, and this group now can translate that network into concrete recommendations. On polymer frames and receivers, the core challenge is well documented. Surface markings on polymer cannot meet ITI durability requirements. We see two emerging approaches: embedded metal takings and windows exposing underlying metal components. Recent technical research reinforces this concern, finding that laser engraving, now the most widespread minimum surface deformation, which is limiting recovery prospects. Switzerland believes that these gaps could be addressed through interpretive guidance under the existing ITI without amendment, including on minimum marking depth and underlying material. On modular weapons, REFCON 4— the REFCON 4 outcome document already commits us to a shared understanding of essential structural and control components. Practical guidance should cover consistent designation of a primary marking component, the serialization of other essential modular parts with clear visual distinction, and the common marking protocol across industry. Without that third element, the mix and match of differently marked components creates exactly the loophole that ghost guns exploit. And evidence confirms that the serial numbers are consistently the primary target of obliteration efforts. On 3D-printed weapons, the key enabler is now the digital blueprint. We see two potential tracks: regulatory measures, including criminalization of weapon-specific digital files, and technical controls on the regulated metal components that hybrid printed weapons still require. The task of this expert group is to produce guidance that that states, industry, and law enforcement can apply. This could also include endorsing the systematic recording and imaging of obliteration methods on seized weapons as good practice to enable pattern analysis across seizures and national jurisdictions. We would also like to refer the chair to our written statements as submitted for further detail on the positions outlined today, including research by UNIDIR, the Small Arms Survey, the Institute tutus opas and conflict armament research. I thank you, Mr. Chair. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [1:23:57]: I thank the distinguished representative of Switzerland for the intervention and the written statement referred to, and I give the floor to Australia, to be followed by Iraq and Germany. Australia [1:24:11]: Thank you, Chair, and on the outset, Australia congratulates you on your election as Chair to the first Open-Ended Technical Expert Group. Chair, as we have heard from other states and noted in your opening statement, the OETG aims to address highly technical topics, and we stress the importance in embracing the jargon and minutiae which is inherent when discussing firearms and all their aspects. Australia, like the rest of the world, faces serious challenges regarding illicit small arms and light weapons. The evolving landscape of modern firearm design, particularly due to the rapid advancement in many forms of manufacturing and technology. To effectively combat the illicit use of these developments requires that the international community share a robust, technically accurate, and evergreen set of standards which lay the framework for discussing these topics. Chair, a holistic common language on firearms in all their aspects is needed. This would set the standard for all technical firearm definitions and naming conventions for firearms, firearm parts, firearm accessories, and their universally used components. Only then can an informed discussion take place on the topics like universal standards of manufacturing processes, serialization, transportation, and storage. Establishing these clear definitions is the first essential step towards creating a harmonized global policy. Determining exactly what structural components must be identified to allow for effective technical discussion on the implementation of tracking and tracing of small arms and light weapons. While states can impose regulation on manufacturer and marking standards domestically, if these are developed in isolation from industry, it is historically evident that the regulations will always be behind the curve, and the gap is only widening in the age of AI. Chair, to address the To address these challenges domestically, Australia relies on the National Firearm Identification Database and our National Firearm Register, known as the NFID and NFR respectively. Working hand in hand, these systems establish a nationally agreed standard to accurately identify, characterize, and trace firearms and their essential components. By continuously upgrading these capabilities, we are ensuring our data quality keeps pace with the rapid advancements in technology. technology. An established data model such as the National Firearm Register can be used to inform practical global models for tracing of illicit firearms and— sorry, illicit firearms and light weapons. Chair, looking internationally, we must address the unique challenges around material permanence. With hybridized polymer materials now frequently being used, we need to ensure that identification markings maintain a high level of permanence and recoverability. Fortunately, the advancements in 3D printing technology will make it increasingly viable to integrate these unique markings directly into components during the manufacturing phase. Chair, Australia notes that tracing modular and polymer firearms is more effectively achieved by focusing on the point of export rather than import. Establishing robust data collection at the export level and linking it directly to reciprocal systems at the import level, ensuring all states can benefit from clear manufacture and origin markings. This would avoid the need for any secondary markings. Chair, in the past 20-plus years that Australia has been actively tracing recovered firearms, we have found little to no benefit in the secondary markings and see it only as a hurdle which inhibits our ability to engage with possibly the most important stakeholder for achieving sustained long-term success in combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. This, Chair, is the private firearm industry and community. Firearm manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and owners play the most critical role in avoiding firearm diversion, and we must engage with them proactively. Chair, as we look to align our national frameworks, we must remain practical. Non-firearm-specific Many construction parts such as pipes, bolts, screws and springs are easily repurposed from other commercial sectors. Regulators cannot control everyday multipurpose construction items and any effort to do so will be in vain. We must carefully consider the impact on legitimate industry before attempting to regulate such items. Furthermore, we recognize that serious organized criminal groups possess resources and the capacity to actively circumvent legislation, regulatory and technical environments, our international efforts must remain sharply targeted to disrupt the illicit networks without placing undue burden on the functioning of licit markets. Chair, thank you for your time and attention. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [1:28:56]: I thank the distinguished representative of Australia for the intervention. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Iraq, to be followed by Germany and Mexico. Iraq [1:29:14]: Good morning, Chair, and congratulations on your election. I'd like to thank all the panellists for their presentations. I have a few suggestions that I'd like to make. For the OETG as an expert from my own country. The SALW, small arms and light weapons, doesn't only cover firearms, but there are other types of weapons covered by small arms and light weapons. And states, in line with Article 51 and Article 2 of the UN Charter, States have the right to manufacture weapons for their own defense. There are quite advanced types of weapons such as laser weapons. That's why the international instrument and the program of action are— enjoy consensus, do enjoy consensus, and the UN and also the Arms Trade Treaty is the reference for this. Because this is a major challenge that we should take into account. I'd also like to draw your attention to the fact that it's important to encourage states to work in line with the certification of end-user certification. And then thirdly— I wish to say that Interpol registers are vast. They contain millions of weapons. And that could be used— and that was the case in Iraq. We presented more than 142,000 weapons 1,000 entries into this register to Interpol. In our experience in Iraq, and using that, I'd like to insist that control on— there should be controls on arms owned by the government, because sometimes hunting weapons are used to commit crimes. In conclusion, I'd like to thank you, and I'm sorry to have taken the floor for so long. Thank you. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [1:31:43]: I thank the distinguished representative of Iraq for the intervention, and I think your intervention was right in time, so thank you for the suggestion. I'll now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Germany, to be followed by Mexico and France. Germany [1:32:00]: Let me join previous speakers in congratulating you, Mr. Kanu, upon your appointment as chair of this first meeting of the OETEG, thank you and your team for the excellent preparation of this meeting and also to the speakers of the preceding briefings. Let me assure you Germany's full support and constructive engagement for this OETEG to fulfill its mandate. Germany stands ready to develop agreed recommendations in order to address challenges and harness opportunities and best practices for self-control to strengthen the United Nations POA and ITI and their full and effective implementation. Mr. Chair, from our experience supporting implementation in the field suggests that integrated and internationally harmonized approach to the control of illicit additive, on illicit manufactured small arms and light weapons, their parts and components, and related technologies will be the most effective. Such an approach may recognize that addressing only one dimension, including the unlawful production, sharing, or use of digital blueprints, will be not sufficient to effectively mitigate associated risks. Thank you. Instead, measures may cover the full lifecycle of relevant files and technologies, including the design, distribution, access, and end use. Beside the production of illicitly manufactured firearms through additive and subtractive manufacturing techniques, the production of parts and components designed to modify or enhance the characteristics characteristics of legally owned firearms poses a significant and emerging risk. Against this background and in line with the OP95 of the fourth outcome document of RevCon4, consideration may be given to including additive and subtractive manufactured parts and components, particularly those that enhance or modify the characteristics of a firearm more systematically in the discussions of the OETEG. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [1:34:24]: I thank the distinguished representative of Germany for the intervention. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico, to be followed by France and the Dominican Republic. Mexico [1:34:36]: Muchas gracias, Presidente. Thank you very much, Chairman. Mexico reiterates its congratulations to you upon your election to head up this group. And we also thank the panelists for their briefings this morning. Mexico would like to make two general comments on the work of the group, and we have some short— some thoughts and questions we'd like to share as well. Mexico recognizes that while polymer, modular, and 3D-printed weapons do pose real challenges for the marking, registration, and tracing of these weapons within the framework of the ITI. The main source of armed violence in Latin America and the Caribbean remains the diversion of conventionally manufactured weapons, and this is a reality that we really hope will be reflected in the work of the OETG in a balanced manner. From our perspective, the gender dimensions of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons must guide the work of the Open-Ended Technical Experts Group from the very beginning. UNIREC and GENSAC data confirm that firearms in domestic and conflict situations have a disproportionate effect on women and girls. They represent 95% of the victims of sexual viol— conflict-related sexual violence. In this regard, the group must ensure that its future recommendations reflect these differential impacts and that we support the compilation of data disaggregated by sex, age, and disability in order to strengthen the establishment of evidence-based public policies. Now, as for the information that we heard this morning, something that Mexico has been thinking about is how we can ensure that discussions on new technologies and the development of weapons by individuals are properly in line with the real magnitude of the challenge that these phenomena currently represent. We'd like to know whether the panelists have any proposals on how we can strike a balance between addressing the risks of emerging technologies, but at the same time continuing to focus our efforts on the diversion of traditionally manufactured weapons and legally manufactured weapons that remains the main source of weapons. And something that we have seen with some initiatives is how to explore the possibility of moving from arms control logic to control of digital manufacturing capacities logic, including software restrictions, design archives, and production technologies. So, In this regard, and we heard about this this morning, by the way, and so in this regard, we'd like to know what practical lessons we can learn from these experiences, and most importantly, how can we ensure that this type of approach complements and does not displace the ultimate goal of the POA and the ITI, which remains to prevent and detect the diversion of small arms and light weapons throughout their whole life cycle. Thank you very much, Chairman. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [1:37:47]: I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for the intervention and question. I now give the floor to the representative, distinguished representative of France, to be followed by Dominican Republic and Brazil. France [1:37:59]: Merci, Monsieur le Président. Thank you, Chair. Allow me, first of all, to congratulate you on your election to chair this group, to chair this group, and for organizing this first meeting. France would also like to thank the panelists for their presentations. Today I'd like to share some national practices from France to address the challenges posed by developments in the manufacture, technology, and the creation of small arms and light weapons, particularly polymer weapons, modular weapons, and also illegal 3D printing. On polymer weapons, the decree from the 20th of April 2020 on marking firearms, which reflects the EU Directive 2019/68, stipulates for frames or receiver housings made by a non-metallic material— from a non-metallic material— the marking should be on a metallic plate which is durably included in the material of the housings or frames so that the plate cannot be easily taken off. But nor should it destroy part of the frames or receiver housings. The minimum depth of the marking should be 0.0762mm or 0.003 inches, and this is applicable to all types of marking, including those that are done in polymer on a metallic plaque. The metallic plaque should be strongly— solidly integrated into the polymer and visible in a window, which would be a hole in the polymer, so which means that the plaque with the marking on it is clearly visible. Other marking techniques for receiver housings and frames can be used as the manufacturer's choice, as long as these techniques have been demonstrated to show an equivalent level— to show that the marking is long-lasting and clear, and it also respects the minimum depth standards. On modular firearms, in line with the provisions of our Internal Security Code in France, the marking is applied on to each weapon or component of the weapon, so the barrel, the frame, or the housing, including, if necessary, on the upper and lower parts of it. The housing, including, if necessary, the additional mobile set of, of components, as well as cylinders, bolts, and conversion systems. Finally, in terms of regulatory and technical measures that states could apply to prevent the illicit manufacture of small arms and light weapons, including those produced illicitly, uh, with additional with additional manufacturing, as long as the— there is authorisation from the weapons manufacturer to create, retain, or use these kind of files, that can be then penalised. And indeed, this is up to— covers virtually or holding one or several arms. Thank you very much, Chair. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [1:41:10]: Thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of France for the intervention. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Dominican Republic, to be followed by Brazil and Republic of Moldova, who is so far the last speaker on my list. Dominican Republic [1:41:29]: Muchas gracias, señor presidente. Thank you very much, Chair, and thank you to the experts for sharing your experiences. In line with what the delegation of Saudi Arabia said on the challenge that this issue poses. These challenges require us to work together to share experiences, data, and to establish collaboration and interoperability strategies where protocols can be created that are accessible to all states. Since 2014, the Dominican Republic has been implementing our national arms system, the CISNA, system. We are capturing the ballistic fingerprint of weapons in our laboratories and a biometric register of weapons holders to link each weapon to its owner. These technological registers— Other delegations have said this. There's a symmetry between states in terms of the level of development. Cuba said that. And so we require collaboration between all of us so that we can share experience and better share the information frameworks on software development. And this for us really is a challenge. The Dominican Republic is not an arms manufacturer. We currently import weapons for civilian use. Only when the president decides that we can, we can import weapons for a specific period of time. We also have some antique, old weapons in our country. Yes. In— so it's been almost 20 years since 2006 that we've been working on that. Prohibition, of course, has advantages and disadvantages. So we've had prohibition since 2006, but prohibition also can encourage illicit trafficking. So last month, in terms of collaboration, we had a workshop on trafficking online, looking at the different challenges that we face, and we benefited from cooperation from Germany, the police from Spain, and other actors, and this is fundamental. To help us to gather experience for us to be able to tackle this issue. Our regulations from 2016 are also currently being reviewed in order to bring them in line with the current moment. And there are lots of new elements on new weapons. There's sentences for 5 to 10 years. For anyone who modifies structurally or attempts to manufacture any firearm. We also have interoperability between states. And just like was said previously, we have the IT frameworks that exist to this end. And— [SPEAKING SPANISH] It's important for different systems to be interoperable and the iTRACE, the databases that we have, the I-24, but for a lot of countries having— getting licenses is costly and maintaining these licenses is often not possible. However, we know, and Dr. King mentioned this, that we can create— Thank you. A common framework for cooperation, capturing the ballistic footprint, for example. There are ways of having an open format like the CPL, for example. So that's all for now that I wanted to share with you. Thank you very much, Chairman. Thank you. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [1:45:41]: I thank the distinguished representative of Dominican Republic for the intervention. Of course, after indicating that Republic of Moldova was the last speaker on the list, we've had further requests for the floor, and I just wanted to remind distinguished delegates that if you do want to take the floor, please press the speaker button in front of you. Next, I'll give the floor to Brazil, to be followed by Republic of Moldova, and then Thank you, Chair. Brazil [1:46:12]: First, allow us to congratulate you on your election to chair this Open-Ended Working Group. Do count on the support of Brazil throughout your tenure. And we also thank the three panelists for the very valuable inputs. And my delegation would like to make two points in two specific issues and ask the panelists perhaps to comment a little bit on those. First of all is regarding the scope of regulation and ghost guns. We highlight the relevance to extend legal controls beyond the concept of the firearm itself, as it is ultimately an assembly of parts. And as was mentioned by Dr. Bouldering, uh, the Brazilian legislation do foresee the marking registration and control of firearms and their parts. Also, earlier in the afternoon, we'll have a chance to share a little bit more on the Brazilian experience in the next panel. We highlight the growing problem of unregulated manufactured firearms, that they can be hybrid in nature and not necessarily 3D printed. Our core concern is that they are produced outside legal frameworks, commonly referred to as ghost guns because they cannot be traced. Then we will— I'd like to ask the panelists to comment on the challenges involved in the possibility of commercializing manufactured firearm components before they are fully complement— completed. And the second issue is regarding the control of intangible digital files and intent of use. We know that in some jurisdictions, possession alone is unlawful. In others, intent is also a key component. This creates a broader legal debate, particularly whether it's intent to instruct or incentivize the unlawful production of firearms or specific components. And then we would like to hear the panelists' on lessons learned related to the challenges of law enforcement in this regard. Thank you so much, Chair. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [1:48:25]: I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil for the intervention and the question. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Republic of Moldova, to be followed by Pakistan and Nigeria. Republic of Moldova [1:48:40]: Mr. Chair, the Republic of Moldova welcomes the launch of the Open-Ended Technical Expert Group, and we thank you, Chair Ambassador Michael Imran Khanu, for guiding this important process. We consider the OETEG a valuable platform for technical dialogue and practical cooperation on emerging technologies— on emerging challenges, sorry, related to developments in the manufacturing technology and design of small arms and light Weapons. weapons. The rapid evolution of technologies, including modular weapon systems, polymer components, and illicit additive manufacturing, creates new risks for tracing, identification, and law enforcement activities. At the same time, technological innovation can also strengthen prevention, detection, and tracing capacities when supported by adequate legal frameworks, operational tools, and international cooperation. Thank you. For the Republic of Moldova, ensuring traceability remains a central priority. Our national authorities continue to strengthen mechanisms related to marking, registration, and information exchange concerning firearms and essential components. The State Register of Weapons serves as the principal electronic platform for maintaining records related to civilian firearms authorizations, and transfers, thereby contributing to accountability and oversight. The Republic of Moldova also continues to strengthen institutional coordination through the National Firearms Focal Point within the General Police Inspectorate. The focal point supports operational cooperation, risks analysis, and international information exchange, including through the systematic introduction of identified lost and stolen firearms into the Interpol's iARMS database. In our view, discussions within the OITAG should focus on preserving the effectiveness of international tracing standards despite evolving manufacturing methods and materials. This includes consideration of durable and recoverable markings applicable to polymer-based and modular firearms, as well as improved methods for recovering obliterated markings and identifying illicitly manufactured weapons. We also attach great importance to preventive measures addressing illicit manufacturing, including illicit 3D printing. Such efforts require strengthened— oversight Strengthened. of essential components, updated regulatory approaches, enhanced online monitoring capabilities, and specialized technical expertise for law enforcement and forensic services. Given the increasingly complex regional security environment, the Republic of Moldova attaches great importance to the effective international cooperation information sharing, and technical assistance. In this regard, we believe that capacity building remains essential, particularly for states seeking to modernize tracing systems, strengthen stockpile management, improve forensic capacities, and respond to emerging technological threats. The Republic of Moldova highly values the support provided through regional and international cooperation frameworks and remains committed to sharing relevant experiences and good practices. For instance, the SALL Fellowship Program has provided an important platform for the development of the international cooperation and dialogue. For this reason, the Republic of Moldova sees great merit in continuing it so that all countries could benefit on this important initiative. Thank you. We look forward to constructive technical discussions during this meeting and to contributing to the development of practical recommendations that will strengthen the implementation of the POA and the ITI. I thank you, Mr. Chair. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [1:52:57]: I thank the distinguished representative of the Republic of Moldova for the intervention. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Pakistan, to be followed followed by Nigeria and then Morocco. Thank you, Chair. Pakistan [1:53:12]: We congratulate you on assuming this important position and we wish to extend our support. Chair, Pakistan once again underlines the close nexus between illicit trade of small arms and light weapons and terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking. We reiterate our call for a comprehensive approach to addressing these interconnected threats. These unauthorized users, including non-state actors, use sophisticated weapons and are increasingly using emerging technologies. Our primary concern remains the acquisition and use of modern and sophisticated small arms and light weapons by non-state actors and UN-listed terrorist organizations. There is a need to strengthen international cooperation to effectively address disrupting accumulation of small arms and light weapons and their diversion. Efforts must be enhanced to prevent the diversion of arms to unauthorized users and to ensure strict adherence to arms embargoes. We should also increase international efforts to investigate and disrupt how terrorist groups and criminal organizations acquire sophisticated weapons, which are often sourced from illicit markets or entities seeking to destabilize our region. We also wish to highlight challenges posed by new technologies in small arms and and light weapons manufacturing, such as 3D printing, ghost guns, and UAVs. In this respect, we believe that there is need to share national experience in implementing robust legislative, regulatory, and enforcement mechanisms in marking, tracing, and record keeping. We would like to get more insight insights from panelists on the potential for best practices and international instruments on this important issue. Thank you, Chair. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [1:55:28]: I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan for the intervention, and I will give the floor to the distinguished representative of Nigeria, to be followed by Morocco and then India. Nigeria [1:55:43]: Mr. Chair, allow me to congratulate you on your election and make the following remarks. Nigeria believes that developments in weapon design must not undermine the core obligations of the International Tracing Instrument. Regardless of whether weapons are manufactured with polymer components or modular designs, markings must remain durable, unique, recoverable, and capable of supporting effective tracing throughout the lifecycle of the weapon. States should therefore explore technical standards requiring permanent markings on essential components, including those components that determine the legal identity of the weapon. For modular systems, markings should remain linked to all critical components to prevent substitution, concealment, or diversion. Nigeria supports strengthened national regulatory frameworks governing the manufacture of firearms and critical components, enhanced monitoring of sensitive equipment and materials, and closer cooperation among law enforcement, customs, and forensic authorities. Preventive measures should focus on disrupting illicit production while preserving the legitimate civilian, industrial, and research uses of emerging technologies. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [1:57:21]: I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria for the intervention. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Morocco, to be followed by India, the last speaker on the list. Morocco [1:57:37]: Thank you, Chair. Allow me, first of all, to warmly congratulate you, as well as Sierra Leone, on your election to chair this technical group. Morocco would like to assure you, Your Excellency, that you have our full support and full cooperation throughout our work. I would also like to thank the panelists for their extremely rich presentations. Current developments pose concrete challenges for trust— traceability and control of small arms and light weapons, and it's in this context that national legislatures legislation requires the imposition of serial numbers and normalized and standardized marking for manufacturers to guarantee strict traceability for firearms. I'd also like to pick up on some— on polymer weapons and discussion of that. The growing use of this makes legible marking more difficult, as well as detection, and it can weaken the traceability chain if it is not well adapted. In terms of modular weapons, the possibility to interchange components is very difficult to have a single— therefore, a single marking to identify and trace each weapon. And this raises the question of how to deal with the different components. Finally, in terms of illicit manufacturing with 3D printers, this opens the way to decentralize production without any marking and without being— avoiding registers. And there's a risk of diversion here. So when faced with these real and ever-changing, quickly changing challenges, Ambassador, I'd like to raise a couple of questions for the panelists. The first is, as a large— the majority of the challenge is in tutorials or in files that are available online on the manufacture of weapons. These are widely available. So we would like to ask what proportional and concrete measures could be taken to limit the spread of this kind of information, and how can international cooperation have— play its role for that? My second question, is it not time perhaps to look at the opportunity for implementing complementary measures on marking of weapons and strengthened measures. The aim, of course, is to make it— this task— as difficult as possible for criminal organizations to efface tracing marks, and it allows the governments to restore this marking and be able to then trace the weapons themselves. Thank you. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [2:00:26]: I thank the distinguished representative of Morocco for the intervention and certainly for the questions that have been posed. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of India. India [2:00:37]: At the very outset, we thank the panelists for their enlightening views on the subject, and we also respect and appreciate the views of all the representatives who've given us their concerns, as well as their perceptions of the good practices which are being followed. Uh, from the technical point of view, uh, we look at 3 or 4 issues which pertain to this session as such. Uh, that would be polymer frames and modular weapons, 3D printing of weapons, and blueprint proliferation. Uh, coming to the first, that is polymer frames and modular weapons. These have been initiated by the security forces and police forces, uh, for reasons well known of making the weapon light and interchangeability. I think they are here to stay. We need to cement this by making sure that the markings, the methodologies of markings, are strict and, uh, they are permanent. I'm sure we have subsequent sessions which are dealing with this particular topic also. Coming to the 3D printing of the weapons, I would request Rubin to enlighten us more subsequently on the efficacy of these weapons as such. As technical experts, many of us would agree that the weapon would always require certain metallic aspects to make sure that it is efficient and lethal. However, the threat remains. Uh, we would look forward to the panel clarifying the certain aspects. Uh, that goes same for the ammunition, in which we have seen that caseless ammunition has been under trial under various phases for a couple of years. Uh, the entire dynamics requires more thought about it. A blueprint Proliferation is very serious business and we would again like to understand what would be the electronic measures in which such proliferation could be stopped or banned. To put it in a gist, we need to focus on marking techniques and effective record keeping which would help in tracing of sensitive parts which would be the basic building block of a weapon around them. We would need strong national regulations and most importantly, as brought out earlier, a sharing of information and the advancements in technology would need to be shared at regional, sub-regional, and global level effectively. India has, on its part, adopted the Arms Act as recently as 2019. We have ensured very strictly licensing procedures now, and we have increased our digitization in our nation. India maintains a national database of arms and ammunition, arms licensing issuance system, the NDAL, ALIS, and a computerized inventory control system for information management. Salient features of this effective data management system are the unique ID number, electronic licensing, and effective tracing. Thank you. All of these lead to more visibility and transparency that achieves our security and state. To conclude, we look forward to more info-sharing amongst member states to counter this imminent threat. Thank you, Chair. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [2:04:12]: I thank the distinguished representative of India for the intervention, and I believe some questions as well. In the intervention. Distinguished delegates, dear colleagues, I see no further requests for the floor. Firstly, let me take this opportunity to thank you for your very kind words directed to me as Chair in my election and to my country in terms of prioritization of this issue and certainly to the panel for their contributions this morning. I am informed that we have Mr. Das online because some questions have been directed to him, and certainly we have Dr. Kien here with us in the panel. And so, since we have not yet exhausted our time, I will go to our panelists to respond to the questions, and hopefully we'll have— Associate Professor of Forensic Science · Rachel Bolton-King [2:05:11]: Thank you, Mr. President. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [2:05:11]: Time for further interaction, but there were many questions, so I think Dr. King will have a lot to respond to, and then I'll go to Mr. Das for the specific questions and data, and from India as well. Dr. King. Associate Professor of Forensic Science · Rachel Bolton-King [2:05:31]: Thank you very much for all of your interventions and also your questions. I've tried to take note of of the questions that came down, so if the Chair has any, or that I've missed, then hopefully I will address as many as I can. Not necessarily being an expert in policy, or— and some of the panel members this afternoon may also be able to elaborate in in much more detail about some of the questions and their evidence and experiences for some of the questions raised that can further add to these discussions. So in terms of the first question that I made note of was for Belgium, and in particular associated with— the method of producing marks on the metal tags for polymer frames in particular. There are a number of manufacturers, one particularly in the US who has done an awful lot of work to look at their manufacturing process and has enabled a stamping method or a compression method to be applied to their tags before they actually embed them into the polymer. And this could be a mechanism that could be explored rather than providing the serial numbers on the tags after they've been embedded. been put in the polymer frame. There are also manufacturers who have created hidden marks, you know, either fully duplicated serial numbers or partial serial numbers that have again been produced and placed into the internal areas, which again can provide good opportunities for marks and tracing, because if criminals don't know their location, then they can actually utilize those alternative marks or those those hidden locations because again they're less likely to have been obliterated and so can further help with that, with that traceability. So I know it's not an easy or a cheap thing for manufacturers to do to, to change their manufacturing processes. I've been to these factories, I know how well the factories are designed and laid out to make things as effective and efficient for factory production as possible. But through those conversations that are being had, there could be some good opportunity to see how those options could be applied. And they may not be the only ones, but they're one of the solutions that could be considered sort of moving forwards. So I think that was the question that you raised primarily. But likewise, I'm also happy to support and continue discussions after today and tomorrow's meetings if there's things I can assist with or anything I didn't cover. Do I move on to the next? Okay. So, I know that sort of Ghana had raised some questions and South Africa around the data that was shared by Reuben. So, I'll defer those questions to Reuben because I know he's able to answer those in more detail. For the USA, You asked the question around— sorry, I was trying to find you. You asked the question around the definitions of a polymer weapon, and, you know, I really appreciate those comments. As you say, there are a number of parts that are made of plastic and that aren't necessarily essential to the functioning of that particular firearm. And therefore, perhaps in, in part of that definition, we need to specify, um, those parts that are essential to the function of the firearm, which are similarly those that are, um, used to house serial numbers and, and marks. for marks and tracing purposes. So understandably, we don't want all of the unnecessary parts to define something as being a polymer weapon. So it would be one of those, those major components or major parts. Um. I think that one was your main question. In terms of Argentina, I think you were asking questions around the practical methods to increase tracing and mechanisms to support support cooperation and information sharing, as well as any of the particular frameworks for triangulation. And I'm sure many will agree, and myself included, we want to make use of the things that are already in existence and develop those where appropriate and practical to do to do so. The practical methods to improve that tracing potential, I know some of those are— we sort of shared earlier in terms of providing that ability to recover those marks, but also having that better understanding about the marks that manufacturers are making. Mm-hmm. And trying to ensure that all of our stakeholders, both states, the forensic providers, forensic scientists, researchers, those that are on the front line seizing and investigating, are understanding what these marks mean and enabling us to make better use of the data and the information that's available to us to help with those tracing efforts. In terms of that international cooperation, again, using the United Nations, the particular offices, Interpol, Europol, as many of those existing organizations and structures as possible, and improving our data sharing agreements, maybe, between member states, so that whether it's ballistics data, whether it's information and data we have on 3D-printed weapons, our emerging threats, the, the best practice processes, the ways in which we are implementing and changing our policies, not only when they're done, but those discussions of what we're considering doing, and sharing those maybe more earlier on might also really help with that discussion and what we can do moving forwards. Thank you. So thank you all for those questions so far. The next question I had note of was from Mexico. And how new technologies— how do we balance the risks and focus our efforts on not only the, the new and emerging technologies, uh, such as additive and subtractive, um, manufacturing methods, but also on those traditional, um, manufactured and conventionally manufactured firearms. And as well as thinking about, um, how do we regulate against, uh, the digital side as opposed to just the firearm side. And again, I know Robyn can, can cover this potentially in, in more depth, but, um, the technology providers, um, are definitely able to put blockers, um, into the software, a little bit like when, um, photocopiers, uh, try to print, um, you know, uh, either scan in and print, um, money and banknotes. Exactly the same can be done by the printer software and the software providers. But they do need legislation to be able to put that into practice. So we understand in some states there might be privacy laws that might prevent that from happening. But in other countries, other states, they are willing to— Yes. Have that legislation in place, and the technology providers are willing to put those kinds of blockages in place within their software. The challenge around those blockers that we've been discussing is primarily because these items, these objects— Excuse me. Can change so quickly over time, in a very short amount of time. And we can use computer vision, we can use object classification and machine learning to help us to identify what objects might be being printed. So there are definitely new technologies and ways where we could look to implement those kind of things, but they are so rapidly changing that that might create a barrier in its own right in terms of how successful we're able to block the printing of these parts. So whilst we've talked a lot about firearms as complete units, obviously there are certain— Parts. Objects that are being printed. These are known as Glock switches or auto-sears, and what they are doing is they are being inserted into what would normally be a semi-automatic firearm. So every time you pull— you put your finger on the trigger and pull it, a new round of ammunition is fired. They're changing it from that single shot into a fully automatic firearm. So, and it literally blocks the capability of disengaging that trigger. So, and these, these little parts, they're tiny. You can produce thousands very, very, very, very rapidly, whereas a whole firearm takes, you know, it's often printed overnight. So it's a lot slower process. But it's these accessories as well that are very easy to conceal. They're easy to print. They're quick to print. They're very cheap to purchase. But— so it's not just around the 3D printing of the whole firearms. It's around these accessories that are being used to modify the firearms as well, which we also need to consider. Thank you. Consider and be aware of. So when we think about the sharing of digital information and the freedoms that people have to share that, a lot of the tech— the blueprints are being created and the research and development that's been done is a lot of it being done legally. Legally. We have to remember this, that dissemination is happening legally, and it's being done by those legally able to do so, but being exploited by those who should not be in places where it's, it's being prohibited. But we know that social media platforms, for example, and the sheer amount of information that's being shared digitally now is challenging to put those blockers in and for them to monitor and stop that proliferation. But it's definitely something that, you know, we could all collaboratively discuss and look at efforts to try to work with these providers, some obviously being more supportive than others. Thank you. And so, yes, it's absolutely about— and a little bit, as I said earlier, a lot of this work is being done by those legally able to do so. And so we need to make sure that our policies or the things— the legislation that we put in place don't further penalize that legitimate community. Absolutely, as Australia mentioned earlier, you know, putting legislation to prevent pipes and screws and things like that is too much, you know, in comparison to the risk. So— but the manuals that are being created and shared. If we were to prevent the manuals from being as openly and easily shared, this is what I believe, in my opinion, is really what's enabling others who really don't have any knowledge of how to do 3D printing or how to produce homemade or privately manufactured manufactured firearms. If we were to focus on stopping those manuals from being disseminated, I think that could be a really valuable way of reducing the harm globally. Because then you're— they're not educating and giving all the technical knowledge and experience to anybody who wants it. Having a 3D printer and being able to take a 3D digital file, it's not as easy as it sounds. And so, and actually getting those parts to fit together and to function, that's what these manuals are trying to make a lot easier. So if it— We So if we maybe focus on the manuals themselves, this might be a more manageable solution or something that may have more success in being able to reduce illicit production of arms and ammunition. So hopefully I've responded to that question. Thank you. Question. So Brazil, I know, raised a question around— sorry, I'm trying to interpret my notes now— Around our lessons that have been learned for law enforcement. And, um, you raised the point around commercial parts, um, that are being produced and, and sold and distributed before they're completed. And I think this links to what I raised earlier around those Glock switches or those auto-sears. And, um, and absolutely, it— we need to think about those items individually, particularly where companies are making aftermarket barrels or parts or things that can be put onto the original genuine factory-produced firearm. So I think— and this is also linking in with that concept concept of modularity, because whilst there's not as many manufacturers of deliberately designed modular weapons at the moment, there is a lot of modularity and interchangeability of parts generally, and there has been for a long time. So that when we think about that definition of modularity, is it just the weapons that are being designed by a specific manufacturer that we designate as being modular, or should we consider that wider concept of modularity in terms of the parts that are being sold by other companies and made to fit whatever platform, whatever the user might, might want? And this is where, again, having those, the other parts of the firearm with the serial number and marks on them, I think will be important moving forward. So whilst the data and the evidence is that, from some states, indicates that those secondary marks haven't been useful in the past, that may not be the case moving forwards because if you receive a firearm, so we had a case recently, so I can't say a lot about it, but we had a hunter who used a firearm illegally and they had, it wasn't designed to be a modular rifle, but they had one receiver and 3 barrels in their possession, and not all of those barrels needed to be marked— needed to be listed. And if you think about the forensic context of those 3 different barrels, if you have a shooting and you recover a firearm and that firearm has has only one of those barrels in it and it's not the barrel that was actually used in the shooting, the projectiles at that crime scene are not gonna match the barrel in the firearm that was recovered. And so if we, in our recording practices, only put in the serial number of the receiver or the frame, there is no way that we can trace and track where each of those barrels came from. If we don't write the serial numbers and if we don't put serial numbers on those barrels, how do we know which manufacturer they've come from? How do we know when they were made? How do we know when they were bought? How do we know when they came into the country or when— and a lot of this again is legal. So how do we now trace at what point it went from a legitimate owner to an illegitimate user or an illegitimate owner. So that point of diversion, we need to understand when that point of diversion happens. And at the moment, there are big gaps because even when we trace a firearm, are we actually recording all of the data and the information at more points of the chain? Yes. Than just when the firearm was produced in the first place. We're not. Countries like the United States do, for example, where you've got a pawnbroker or someone who purchases the firearm. Like in the UK, we have the registered firearms dealer who will record what gets sold, but that could be 20 years between the time a crime is committed or a time that, um, that firearm gets used criminally, and we have no idea what has happened in that 20-year period. Has it gone through lots of different owners? We don't know. So sometimes it's a short period and sometimes it's quite a long period, and so having more information and more points of, of where we're recording and retaining that that information I think can really help us as well. So apologies now if I haven't fully answered your question. But hopefully that responds to that a little bit as well. So I know Morocco was asking also about the digital files and trying to limit the spread of those. So I'll let Reuben expand on that a little bit further. Thank you., and likewise with India. I believe that was all of the questions, but apologies if I didn't quite capture all of them in my note-taking. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [2:28:34]: Thank you so much, Dr. Bolton-Kean, really for your excellent note-taking and for your comprehensive responses to the questions that were posed by our distinguished delegates. I understand that Adias is online with us, and I'll certainly invite him to respond to the direct questions from delegates of— distinguished delegates of Ghana and South Africa on the data and some of the issues which Dr. Bolton-Kean have asked you to respond to, including from Mokoko in the as well. Thank you, and you have the floor, Mr. Das. Associate Research Fellow · Ruben Das [2:29:14]: Thank you very much, Chair. Also, thank you very much to Dr. Rachel for covering quite a lot of questions. Um, so on the question regarding the data on Africa, so the data presented was based on 430 reported incidents, and by incidents I mean seizures, arrests, or discoveries of 3D-printed firearms and its associated components between April 2013 and April 2026. The data was primarily sourced from open-source media reports, press releases, and certain academic reports. And, you know, I have to note here that it does not represent absolute values due to the open-source nature of Of the— Of the data. the data. So the absence of data from Africa, you know, may be due to, you know, the lack of media reports on cases that may have happened, or it could also be due to the lack of cases in the region. However, there were cases reported in Antigua, in Haiti, and also in Trinidad and Tobago. So that was on the data. With regards to the question on blueprints, so I think Dr. Rachel has covered that quite extensively as well. Just to— and I would agree with her views that we should try and make the process a little difficult because I think it's also important to understand that, you know, with 3D printing it's not as easy as click, print, and shoot. You know, there is, um, it takes quite a lot of effort, it takes quite a lot of time, and also practicing and experience to actually develop one, the firearm, and, and develop a firearm that is efficient enough to carry out some sort of harm. And so, you know, targeting the process, making it a little difficult, I think, would definitely help to mitigate the risks associated with it. So blueprints remain a big, big challenge just due to the open-source nature of the whole issue. I think, you know, legal measures, you know, such as criminalization of blueprints is a good start, but, you know, that's— it's not the whole solution. I think, you know, we also have to look at, you know, bringing these social media platforms and providers to the table, having discussions with them, and, you know, trying to work together with them to to mitigate the use of their platforms for the spread of this knowledge and this information. Dr. Rachdi also mentioned blocking softwares. Now, these blocking softwares have been in discussion recently. And, you know, these are basically, you know, softwares that are able to detect these blueprints and block them from being printed, you know, from both the software and the firmware level. Now, the main challenge with that is that, you know, as Dr. Rachel, you know, very rightly mentioned, is that, you know, these components and the designs for these firearms are evolving, you know, really very rapidly, so rapidly that, you know, it's it would take these softwares constant updating, right? So that is a challenge there. However, you know, there are researchers and also companies out there who are experimenting with artificial intelligence and also machine learning. So AI and machine learning could possibly bridge the gap. It's still a bit early to say, but you know, this is definitely— Yeah. An avenue with some potential to mitigate the risks. Um, and on the question of the efficacy of 3D-printed firearms, um, so, um, owing to its, um, composition, you know, that's primarily made out of thermoplastic or polymers, it definitely suffers some durability issues. And the efficacy of the firearm is highly dependent on how good or how skilled and how experienced the maker of the firearm is. And so if you have someone with a lot of experience, you know, the firearm can be quite lethal, quite durable. Hybrid firearms are still not, you know, up to— definitely not up to industrial firearms yet. But they're somewhere in the middle. Kit builds or part kit completions are slightly more durable owing to the fact that the pressure-bearing components are industrially produced and commercially sourced components. So, but they still do suffer issues. So with regards to efficacy, I would say that it's, again, very much dependent on you know, how experienced the person is. However, you know, in some cases, you know, if it's used for localized sort of cases like assassinations and, and things like that, I think it's still a cause for concern because, you know, it only takes one, one shot, one lethal shot to cause some harm. So I think that was all the questions that were directed to me. I hope I didn't miss out on anything. I'm happy to address anything else that I missed out. Sierra Leone · Chair · Michael Imran Kanu [2:35:41]: Thank you so much, Mr. Das, for your also comprehensive response. For your responses to the questions that were directed to you. I believe that we've covered the range of questions according to my note that have been asked by distinguished delegates. I'm looking at the clock. We still have about 15 minutes, so still opportunity to have some reactions if possible, but it will be very limited reactions, otherwise we go over the Clock clock. from the responses that you may have had, or if indeed there is a burning question which was not responded to. So I will look around to see if— And as well, no further reaction from— from our distinguished panel member here, Dr. Bolton-King. Colleagues, it appears to be the case that we have no further requests for the floor. I know that we also have some engagement in terms of side events during lunch, so perhaps this gives you some a little time for some corridor conversation on this important discussion we've had on the first panel whilst we look forward to the second panel in the afternoon. Now, we look at opportunities. In some of your intervention, we already see the linkages to this as bridge, and then a lot was said about, of course, international cooperation and assistance, which would be the third panel tomorrow. Allow me to recall that some side events will be taking place today. We have Interpol, European Union, and the League of Arab States event, From Prevention to Investigation: Centering Cooperation Across Small Arms and Light Weapons Lifecycle, and this will be in Conference Room 11. Also, we have— UNIDID, UNIREC, the African Union, and Switzerland's event on strengthening arms— strengthening armed violence prevention, West African Insights to Transform Words into Action, and this will take place in Conference Room 6, as well as online. And then finally, we have the UNIREC event on preventing and addressing the presence of firearms in schools, and this will take place in Conference Room 1. So this gives you time to locate your conference room, have a quick lunch and conversation, and we'll see you back in the afternoon for Panel 2, which starts at 3 PM in this very conference room. If there is no further requests for the floor, we thanks— many thanks to our panelists. Dr. Rachel Bolton-Kean, Mr. Das, and then Ms. Samantha Allen, and of course to our colleagues in the Secretariat. This meeting is adjourned. Speaker 64 [2:39:05]: Thank you.