3rd meeting, 12th Session of Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations

Good morning.

A very good morning. Your Excellencies, distinguished participants, I call to order the third meeting of the 12th session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other enterprises with respect to human rights. As you will remember, at yesterday's meeting in the afternoon, I had made my presentation of proposal 4 in a bid to provide a new draft of article 14.5 to make sure it was entirely in line with international law. I can now therefore open the floor for comments on this proposed new draft of article 14.5. In the first instance, the floor is open for States who wish to make suggestions, proposals or comments. The first speaker is the European Union.

Thank you very much and good morning to everybody. Concerning Article 14.5 and the proposal, we continue to have doubts about both the need for this provision and its current drafting. The proposed wording could have significant implications potentially suggesting the need for amendments to agreements falling within its scope, including free trade agreements, investment protection agreements, and possibly also WTO agreements. At the same time, we would like to say that international agreements entered by the EU, including trade and investment treaties, already take into account human rights aspects, in particular through human rights clauses which provide that respect for human rights is essential elements of the agreement, and trade and sustainable development chapters of free trade agreements, which include commitments to ratify and effectively implement fundamental ILO labour standards, and also to promote international responsible business conduct standards. The agreements can therefore be interpreted in a way that is consistent with human rights obligations and human rights protection. We also question the need to deviate from the rules and principles already existing in international law, in particular Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. We continue to have questions about the content of the provision. We would like to have clarification on the intended legal effects of the words "State Parties shall ensure that", which could be interpreted as establishing an obligation of result. This raises questions where no interpretation of an existing agreement would permit a State Party to fulfill its obligation under the LBI. The scope covering both interpretation and implementation appears overly broad, as it could affect the application or non-application of other agreements. The text also lacks clarity as to how the provision would operate where the parties to those agreements and to the LBI are not identical. Finally, we would be interested in better understanding what constitutes issues relevant to the LBI and which agreements and relevant human rights agreements would be covered. While identifying the agreements concerned would provide greater clarity, listing them could prove unpractical, particularly if the provision is intended to cover both existing and future agreements. In conclusion, should article 14.5 be maintained, it would be worthwhile considering its formulation as a reference to the customary rule of treaty interpretation reflected in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, with an express reference to Article 31. In that context, more cautious language referring to an obligation of means could be considered. It would also be useful to clarify whether retaining the reference to implementation would be consistent with such an approach. Thank you.

Thank you very much, European Union. And I'll give the floor to Malaysia.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, rapporteur. Regarding Article 14.5, nation notes the chair reporter suggested redrafting concerning the relationship between the proposed LBI and existing international agreements, including free trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties. While Malaysia notes that the proposed provision expressly refers to existing trade and investment agreements, Malaysia would appreciate further clarification on its practical legal implications for agreements concluded before the entry into force of the proposed LBI, particularly where existing treaty commitments may give rise to questions of compatibility. In this regard, Malaysia would appreciate clarification on the practical legal consequences of such incompatibility, particularly where state parties would be expected to review, renegotiate or amend their existing trade investment agreements to ensure compatibility with the proposed LBI. Malaysia would also appreciate clarification on how the proposed provision would take into account the sovereignty of states, particularly their right to conclude and implement international trade and investment agreements, as well as their existing commitments under such agreements. Malaysia looks forward to further clarification Our observations are without prejudice to Malaysia's overall position on the proposed LBI. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Malaysia. I recognize Japan.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. On proposal four by the special, um, sorry. the tail border on Article 14.5. As a general matter, there is no practice of broadly referencing other treaties in an individual treaty or including provisions to govern how a treaty applies under existing international law. Rather, the relationship between international agreements is governed by the rules of general international law as reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. From the perspective of legal certainty, this LBI should not establish its own rules regarding interpretation or application of the treaties. Therefore, we consider it inappropriate and unacceptable that this LBI stipulates state parties' obligations by using the phrase "shall ensure" and that all other agreements should be interpreted or implemented in a manner compatible with the obligations under this LBI. The formulation of all agreements on issues relevant to this LBI is overly broad and it is unclear what is included in issues relevant to this LBI in the first place. This makes it difficult to identify which agreement is within the scope of this article. We believe that the relationship between this LBI and other agreements should not be governed by this LBI, but should be determined on a case by case basis. We are also concerned that a country that is not a State Party might be indirectly bound by this LEI when a State Party interprets and implements the bilateral or multilateral agreements between them in a manner compatible with the obligations under this LEI. For these reasons, we suggest that the whole Article 14.5 be deleted. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Japan. I recognize Saudi Arabia.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, regarding article 14.5, investment and trade agreements, we appreciated the efforts of the chair rapporteur to align this paragraph with the rules of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, VCLT. However, the proposed formulation did not tackle the two problems that we have raised earlier during the informal consultations. On the contrary, implementation of all bilateral and multilateral agreements, including investment and trade agreements, and implementing them in a manner that does not only align with the LBI, but also with relevant human rights instruments, which could include some non-binding issues. The sentence does not undermine or restrict a clear indication which could lead to divergent interpretations and deleting the word existing from this paragraph could extend this obligation to future agreements. In this context, we consider that this obligation could not compel non-state parties in the LBI according to Article 30 and 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and will not find a solution to this contradiction. On the contrary, the state party will be only held accountable for the consequences, including the risks of investment disputes, and this will hamper legal stability and investment climate. Article 30 of the same convention stipulates that if an agreement is not compatible with another treaty, the obligations of the other treaty shall prevail. That's why legal certainty requires a clear text that will guarantee the continuation of the enforcement of existing agreement and not to reformulate what has been here in the paragraph. That's why we propose to replace the paragraph with a text that stipulates the following: this LBI not prejudice state parties' rights and obligations, including vis-a-vis non-state parties, in accordance with existing bilateral or multilateral agreements, including regional, sub-regional agreements, as well as trade and investment agreements. These agreements should be implemented, interpreted, and enforced according to international law rules when it comes to the law of treaties and the VCLT, based on the coherence of obligations between countries, we also propose that the paragraph should also comprise the recognition of state parties, that the commitment of any state parties in international human rights agreements to which they are aligned should be applied in line with their commitment, and their commitments in line with other international agreements, including investment and trade agreements, and that should be mutually supportive. This will guarantee legal uncertainty and preserve the relationship with the human rights objectives without creating any hierarchy when it comes to states' international obligations. In this context, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia reserves its right regarding paragraph 14.4, which was not a subject of a proposal by the chairperson rapporteur, and we consider that the obligations pertaining to existing agreement should be tackled in a comprehensive manner without giving any any automatic priority to the LBI at the expense of other existing international obligations. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Muchas gracias.

Thank you very much, Saudi Arabia. I recognize Brazil.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. On Article 14.5. We welcome the elimination of the reference to existing as proposed by the Chair, as we see it that it can broaden the application of the article as well, given the discussion between past and future agreements that has marked this discussion. We support the provision in general, as we see as another dimension of reaffirming the primacy of human rights over trade and investment agreements. Many have quoted the Vienna Convention here, might recall as well that in some of its articles they mentioned that any treaty provision that conflicts with jus cogens or peremptory norm is void and most core human rights also constitute jus cogens. We have an additional proposal to the article, which would read, including trade and investment agreements and their dispute settlement mechanisms, which we feel may be lacking in the proposal as well. If the Chair may consider that this proposal is helpful in bringing additional legal certainty to the provision as it is something that many delegations have expressed doubt regarding the provision. and in particular, in regards to the primacy of human rights in the adjudication of disputes between transnational corporations and states.

Thank you.

Thank you very much, Brazil. The State of Palestine has the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, Rapporteur, and good morning, all colleagues. On paragraph 14.5, we see a lot of value in this article, in particular the wording "States Parties shall ensure." In terms of scope, we believe that both existing and future bilateral and multilateral agreements must be covered, and therefore we welcome the deletion of the word "existing." However, our preference would still be for an explicit reference to all existing and future agreements. In addition, we believe that the words "interpreted and implemented in a manner compatible" is not sufficient. Compatibility only asks whether two sets of obligations can coexist on paper. It does not say which prevails. when they diverge. We therefore propose restoring the words "reviewed" and "adapted" before "interpreted" and "implemented", and to require that new agreements be designed to be consistent with this instrument from the outset. I thank you.

Thank you very much to the State of Palestine. I recognize Iceland.

Thank you, Chair, and good morning. On this article, 14.5, Iceland would like to start to say we fully share the objective of ensuring that economic agreements do not undermine human rights. Having said that, this provision must operate within the law of treaties. As the article stands now, it would include agreements concluded with states that may perhaps never become party to this LBI. As known, a state cannot unilaterally guarantee the interpretation of a bilateral treaty, nor can obligations be created or imposed for a third party or third state without their own consent. Moreover, the current drafting of this article may result in pivoting from an interpretative rule to states' obligation of result, which has also been mentioned. Iceland, therefore, would suggest distinguishing between existing and future agreements. And the intent behind this suggestion is for the text to reflect two different legal situations. For existing agreements, states can only act through interpretation and implementation as modification requires the consent of all parties as provided in articles 39 to 41 of the Vienna Convention. And for future agreements, states retain the full freedom at the negotiation stage. Having said that, and in relation to this same point, I would also like to respectfully note that Iceland would also not be in a position to support language on agreements being reviewed and adapted. That's it for this cluster.

Thank you.

Thank you, Iceland. Mexico has the floor.

Thank you, Chair. I wanted to send in my apologies because actually I want to comment on a previous article, 14.3, when we considered this yesterday afternoon and I'm sorry for not having said what I'm about to yesterday. On that article, we wanted to say that we agree with the proposal to move that article to 16 on implementation. We also support the proposed changes to the language to ensure that it is in line with the provisions of applicable law and also the introduction of the reference to reparations. However, it does not seem to us to be necessary to add a reference to violations when it comes to business activities. It seems to us that, if we speak of victims of human rights abuses in the context of business activities, that specifically refers to business activities. And if we look at the UN guiding principles on business and human rights, there is a distinction between abuse committed by enterprises and violations that are the responsibility of states. And here, given that we're talking about business activities only, then it would be better to just mention human rights abuses and nothing else. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Mexico. Pakistan has the floor.

Thank you very much and good morning, Chair, Rapporteur and all colleagues. We had a question about the proposed legal architecture and its legal consequences in Article 14.5. We note that the Chair's proposal adopted compatibility as the standard governing the relationship between the LBI and other agreements. We understand the intent, but if an existing trade or investment agreement were found to be incompatible with the LBI, does the LBI or the earlier agreement prevail, or does the provision in article 14.5 simply create an obligation of interpretation without resolving potential conflict? Moreover, we note that article 14.5 as proposed does not specify the consequence of such incompatibility. It does not state what happens where compatibility may not be present. Is the chair's intention that article 14.5 operate as a conflict clause, specifying that the LBI prevails over incompatible agreements? Or is it intended merely as an interpretative provision guiding how agreements should be read, but not resolving what happens when they conflict? From the explanations provided, it appears that the latter was the intent. In that event, the language should be clarified to clarify that the provision does not create a hierarchy of treaties or alter the legal effect of existing agreements. We note that clarity on that point could be the difference between a provision that guides interpretation and one that seeks to subordinate an entire body of international economic law to a treaty that has not yet been adopted. Thank you.

Thank you very much to Pakistan. I give the floor to Costa Rica.

Thank you, Chair. Costa Rica welcomes favourably the updated text proposed by the Chair for article 14.5. It is important to maintain that provision in the future instrument. That article contributes to guaranteeing a coherent interpretation of international obligations of states so that commitments assumed as part of bilateral or multilateral agreements, including trade and investment agreements, are not interpreted as being applied in a way that could undermine fulfilment of international obligations in the field of human rights. For my country, that provision is also relevant in preserving the regulatory space of states to adopt legitimate measures to protect human rights. It would offer a very useful reference framework when those measures are examined in the context of investment or trade-related disputes. We think that the article could contribute to giving greater guidance to organs that are responsible for implementing those agreements, including arbitration tribunals, fostering a harmonious interpretation of the various international obligations of the state and reducing the risk of trade and investment regimes being considered in isolation from the relevant obligations in human rights. For those reasons, Costa Rica supports keeping article 14.5 in the text. We think that it is appropriate to maintain sufficiently broad language that enables us to take into consideration, where appropriate, international human rights law, other agreements and international environmental law. Thank you.

Thank you very much. Costa Rica? Uruguay?

Thank you, chair. Good morning, everyone. I think it's important that the interpretation and implementation of trade investment agreements and other international commitments shouldn't undermine or restrict the capacity of states to fully uphold their human rights obligations. What's particularly relevant is the guiding principle on human rights, which stresses the need for states to preserve an adequate normative space to comply with their human rights obligations, when they assume commitments related to business activities. We take note of the chair's proposal to resort to a standard of compatibility between multilateral and multilateral agreements that are relevant and obligations deriving from the future instrument and relevant human rights instruments. At the same time, we believe that any reformulation should specifically maintain the principle that other international commitments do not undermine or restrict the capacity of states to live up to their human rights obligations. Therefore, although we think that it is crucial to maintain a specific provision on that theme in the future instrument, we also believe that it is still necessary to examine its formulation to ensure that it maintains specifically the capacity of states to fully live up to their human rights obligations and giving them the necessary normative space to that end. The LBI therefore needs to make unequivocal that no other obligations don't undermine human rights in the context of business activities. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Uruguay. I give the floor to China.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

China also have reservations regarding the potential impact of relevant formulations on existing investment and trade agreements.

At the same time, we wish to emphasize that the interpretation.

And application of treaties should comply with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the relevant legal principles which we should always adhere to in the process of treaty formulation.

We also suggest that after territorial integrity, we add non-interference in internal affairs of states.

Thank you.

Thank you very much, China. Sorry, I will give the floor to the UK.

Good morning, colleagues.

We recognise the objective of the article, given the potential for conflict between, for example, international investment law on the one hand and international human rights law on the other.

Our Brazilian colleague has alluded to some of the complexities.

Of the relationship between those bodies of law and how they have been highlighted in investor-state tribunal cases.

However, as others have observed.

We do note that this provision is potentially very broad in scope, including in its application to existing agreements.

As Pakistan, Iceland, Japan and other States have also noted, we would be quite cautious about language that could create uncertainty for States in relation to existing international commitments or make.

Implementation more complex in a way that could deter widespread ratification of this instrument from States.

And as many have noted, there is of course already customary international law rules on the compatibility between treaties, particularly as set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. There is a legitimate question about the necessity for this clause. For now, we will reserve our position on this article, pending further consideration of those issues.

Thank you.

Thank you very much to the UK. I give the floor to South Africa.

Chair, South Africa welcomes the proposed compatibility standard in Article 14.5. Relevant trade and investment agreements should be interpreted and implemented consistently with States' human rights obligations and preserve the capacity to fulfill these obligations. As the Chair Rapporteur's addendum notes, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires treaty interpretation to take into account relevant rules of international law applicable between the parties. These include applicable human rights obligations when interpreting and implementing trade and investment agreements. We also find the guidance in paragraph 13 of General Comment No. 24 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to be relevant, because it addresses how States should fulfil the human rights obligations when concluding and implementing economic agreements. We support retaining the Chair's compatibility standard and believe that this would preserve the rules of treaty law while requiring States to assess and address the human rights impacts of the agreements. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much to South Africa. Would any other state like to take the floor at this point? If not, we'll move then to statements from civil society organizations and other stakeholders. I give the floor to to the International Organization of Employers.

Thank you, Chair. I speak jointly on behalf of IOE and USCIB. We share the concerns expressed by many delegations in this room and do not support this proposal, requiring states to ensure that all their agreements, existing and future, including trade and investment agreements, are interpreted and implemented in a manner compatible with this instrument would, read together with Article 14.4, establish a clear hierarchy in favor of this instrument over states' other international commitments. States must keep the freedom to negotiate their agreements and to balance different priorities. UN Guiding Principle 9, cited in the background, asks states to maintain adequate policy space when concluding such agreements. It does not subordinate them to any other instrument. The relationship between treaty is already governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and no conflict between this instrument and trade and investment agreements has been demonstrated. The result will be legal uncertainty for states and investors alike at a time when investment is essential for development and job creation. Finally, on Article 14 more broadly, respecting states' existing international commitments is part of the sovereign equality that Articles 14.1 and 14.2 rightly affirm, and these safeguards should stay in the operative text. And while this proposal calls settled commitments into question, state immunity under Article 14.4 is left untouched. We call on states to clarify that it cannot shield state-owned enterprises engaged in commercial activities so that all businesses are treated on an equal footing. Thank you.

Muchas gracias.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to Sudwind.

Mr. Chair. Thank you, Chair. I'm speaking on behalf of ZODWIN Association and the Electropower Consortium against forced labour in the electronics sector, and Industrial Global Union as its member. On Article 14.5, we call for an explicit recognition that international human rights include international labour rights, and that references to relevant human rights conventions and instruments include the fundamental ILO conventions. For workers in electronic supply chains, particularly women and migrant workers, this connection is essential. Recruitment debt, withheld wages, and restrictions on leaving employment must be understood through the labor standards that help identify and address exploitation. We therefore recommend that Article 14.5 expressly refer to the fundamental ILO conventions, including those concerning forced labor, freedom of association, and collective bargaining. We also call for the ILO indicators of forced labor to inform implementation as practical tools for identifying risk and abuses. Workers must be able to organize, raise concerns collectively, and seek remedy without fear of retaliation. Explicit recognition of international labour standards would strengthen the connection between this instrument and the protections workers need in practice. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to CIDSE.

Thank you, Chair Rapporteur. I speak on behalf of CIDSE. We welcome the proposal from Brazil on Article 14.5 to guarantee that trade investment agreements, including future agreements, comply with state obligations and relevant human rights instruments. We support the proposal to include a specific reference to the dispute settlement mechanism between state and investors. An important element should also be maintained, which is the requirement to interpret and implement those agreements in line with state obligations and human rights, but also to re-examine existing agreements and, if necessary, adapt them to ensure that they that compliance, as stated by Palestine. This is to ensure that existing trade investment goals don't restrict the capacity of states to discharge their obligations under the LBI and other human rights norms recognised at international level. In countries where our partners work, we have noted the negative impact of those agreements on legal immunities and indigenous peoples, since they encourage violent repression of peaceful protests against extractive activities and they limit the capacity of states to prevent violations or put an end to them. We encourage, therefore, the chair and states to maintain an explicit requirement for re-examination and, if necessary, adaptation of existing agreements to ensure that they don't compromise implementation of the instrument. Thank you.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to

Mr. Amisse Reor.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm speaking on behalf of MISIA, FIAN International, the Society of Threatened Peoples, Global Policy Forum Europe, and Women Engage for a Common Future. We observe that trade and investment agreements limit policy spaces of states to respect, protect, and fulfill rights to food, housing, health, and other human rights of peasant workers, indigenous people, and especially women. Therefore, we welcome that Article 14.5 of the draft LBI obliges states to interpret and implement trade and investment agreements in a manner compatible with states' obligations under the LBI without undermining their capacity to fulfill these obligations. We welcome Also, the latest suggestion of the chair to delete the explicit limitation to this position to existing trade and investment agreements, which would exclude coverage of future agreements. For the sake of clarity, we propose additional explicit obligations for states to negotiate, conclude, and review trade and investment agreements in a manner that they do not restrict states' capacity to fulfill their obligations under the LBI and other human rights, environmental, and climate agreements. Otherwise, the LBI would leave a serious gap in international human rights law. Closing this gap is an urgency in times of geopolitical conflicts where the EU and other states and regions are rushing to conclude trade agreements without prior and proper human rights impact assessments, without adequate general exemption clauses, and without binding sustainability chapters with strong enforcement mechanisms. Thank you very much.

Muchas gracias. Thank you very much. I give the floor to Friends of the Earth International.

Thank you, Chair. I'm speaking on behalf of Friends of the Earth International, a member of the global campaign. As pointed out yesterday by Costa Rica in its general comments, many human rights violations where corporations are involved are related to environmental damage, including climate change, water and land contamination, and air pollution, and biodiversity destruction. Such is the case of the destruction of livelihoods and the environment perpetrated by Texaco, now Chevron, in the Ecuadorian Amazon, and the ensuing violations of the human rights of five indigenous people nations and numerous peasant communities in the area. The highest courts in Ecuador have sanctioned Chevron to pay reparations for such destruction for an amount of 9.5 billion US dollars. The affected indigenous peoples and peasant communities have not been able to enforce that judgment either in Ecuador or anywhere where Chevron holds assets. Moreover, an international investment tribunal has recently decided that Ecuador must overturn the sentence of its highest courts against Chevron and prevent the affected claimants from having the sentence enforced in other jurisdictions. and, in addition, that it must pay reparations to each Chevron for damaging its image. Both the ICJ, the International Court of Justice, and the Inter-American Human Rights Court have issued conclusive opinions in 2025 regarding the threat that ISDS poses to the climate action that states must undertake to prevent uncontrolled climate change. and even the experts group advising this working group issued a very detailed response to a question from a delegation in the 11th session past last year that brilliantly exposed the potential that ISDS threats and arbitral decisions have for the realization of human rights by the population and the ability of states to comply with their human rights obligations. Nevertheless, Neither in the current Chair's proposals on Article 14, nor anywhere in the updated draft text, is there a single word confronting this glaring asymmetry between toothless human rights law and powerful trade and investment law that gives exorbitant privileges to foreign investors and transnational corporations, enforced through private and exclusive international arbitration tribunals such as the World Bank-hosted ICSID. We and the peoples of the world strongly demand that the primacy of international human rights law over other instruments of international law, particularly free trade and investment agreements, be operationalized in Article 14.5, and that the consistency with this LBI and international human trade law be clearly established as an obligation, as suggested today by Brazil, Palestine, Costa Rica, and Uruguay. However, instead for a soft compatibility standard, we uphold that a stronger compliance standard is needed. Moreover, and in support of Brazil's request in this regard today, and as numerous civil society organizations have stated also, we demand the explicit inclusion of provisions in Article 14 addressing the potential inconsistency of ISDS corporate threats and arbitral decisions with this LBI and international human rights law. In the course of this session, Mr. Chair, we will share with you and all delegations a briefing note on this urgent issue containing concrete drafting proposals to address the threats that ISDS poses to human rights and the ability of states to comply with their human rights obligations, requesting both you and states delegations to make sure that this issue is properly and explicitly addressed under Article 14. I thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to International Federation for Human Rights.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. FIDH welcomes the elimination of the reference to existing bilateral and multilateral agreements, as this term was restricting the application of this article only to agreements already in place, while both existing and new or future agreements should be interpreted in a manner that is compatible with States parties' obligations under the LBI. However, the proposed reformulation still does not fully address all potential challenges. Existing agreements that are incompatible with States Parties' obligations under the LBI may need reviewing as an interpretation that is in line with States Parties' obligation under the LBI may not be possible, especially when certain principles or clauses are clear and leave no room for interpretation. Regarding new or future agreements, it is much more effective and logical to design and conclude them from the outset in a manner that takes into account State Parties' obligation under the LBI and that does not make compliance more difficult, rather than seeking to ensure compatibility through interpretation after agreements have been signed. And for these reasons, we would like to suggest the following adjustments to the proposed new article, and to add that agreements are as appropriate, designed, reviewed and/or interpreted and implemented in a manner compatible. Lastly, we would like to reflect based on what has been said so far, that the existing rules of interpretation under the Vienna Convention have unfortunately not prevented trade and investment agreements trumping states' human rights obligations, and that in practice, there is a hierarchy, but this is of trade and investment agreements over human rights. This clause is thus necessary to rebalance that hierarchy and to ensure that states' capacity to implement human rights is not undermined by detrimental provisions in trade and investment agreements. Thank you.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to CRNet.

Thank you, Mr. President. I speak on behalf of SCRnet and the Feminists for the Binding Treaty. A common position that we have strongly adopted from the start of the treaty process is regarding the primacy of human rights obligations over those under bilateral or multilateral trade, investment, or other agreements. Many trade agreements and neoliberal pro-austerity and pro-privatization policies pushed forward by international financials and trade institutions limit the capacity of states, particularly in the Global South, to ensure people have access to and control over resources, public goods and services. Mr Chair, this treaty offers a historic opportunity to address these contradictions, an opportunity that must not be missed. We therefore underscore the critical importance of Article 14 and reflect positively on some suggested proposals by the Chair, which rightly proposed that States interpret trade and investment treaties in line with the objective of this instrument. This is a vital step, but it must go further. We reject the narrative that this article creates a legal hierarchy as proposed by some delegations, such as the IOE. Rather, it establishes an obligation of compatibility and seeks to safeguard the primacy of human rights obligations in the interpretation and implementation of other agreements, particularly trade and investment agreements. We'll comment just shortly on Article 14.3. The addition of reparations and violations in the paragraph is key and ensures that the treaty will go beyond the guarantees of access to justice. And we can also support moving it to Article 16. Specifically on Article 14.5, the Chair's redrafting of Article inclusion of all investment and trade agreements in the text is welcome and must be interpreted in a manner compatible with states' obligations under the treaty. Further, Article 14.4 must include language to ensure that pre-existing trade and investment agreements shall also be reviewed, adapted and implemented in compliance with and in a manner that does not undermine the obligations under this LBI and its protocols, as well as other relevant human rights and humanitarian law conventions and instruments. This is something that is not currently addressed by the Chair's proposal, but has been raised by several States in previous sessions. Therefore, we support Palestine's suggestions on the issue, and we would also support Brazil's suggestion to add other dispute settlement mechanisms. Finally, we echo the international call for an immediate moratorium on eventual restriction on ISDS mechanisms. The system grants corporations extraordinary powers that can undermine state sovereignty and block regulatory measures intended to protect human rights. Now, more than ever, states must place people's rights above corporate profits and commit to building a society grounded in justice, equality and accountability. Thank you.

Thank you very much.

I give the floor to the International Transport Workers' Federation.

Thank you, Chair. We agree that the proposed text, your proposed text clarifies the scope of application of this article and its reflection of the rules of the VCLT. And as you have noted in the rationale, the reference to all bilateral and multilateral agreements will address states' obligations to effectively interpret and manage any conflict between economic agreements and human rights, both ex-ante and ex-post stages of the conclusion of such agreements. We're therefore comfortable with the new language, as it would align the scope of the provision to cover both existing and new bilateral and multilateral agreements, including trade and investment agreements, which we see here set out in an indicative manner, and that this will help address any possible inconsistencies in this article. We would also support the proposal made by Brazil earlier to include a reference to dispute resolution to provide absolute clarity that these mechanisms, including ISDS, which are, of course, instruments of public international law entered into through investment agreements, are explicitly covered. We are also comfortable with the inclusion of the expression "compatibility" as a standard to be adopted here. In relation to the question of material scope, we agree that the term "relevant" can be taken here to refer to instruments, including international humanitarian and environmental law instruments, that relate to the object and purpose of the LBI. Finally, Chair, in line with the proposal and sentiment shared by Uruguay, we would recommend language in the text that speaks to membership in international organizations or being a party to an agreement, not limiting or undermining a state's ability to implementing the provision and indeed the LBI more broadly. I thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to the International Collective in Support of Fishworkers.

Thank you, Chair. I'm representing the World Forum of Fisherpeople, intervening on behalf of ICSF and TNI, and as part of the global campaign. From Chile to Senegal, from the US to Sri Lanka, transnational industrial aquaculture corporations and other extractive projects are privatizing commons, polluting aquatic ecosystems, displacing fishing communities from their territories, and undermining fisher people food sovereignty, with fisher women being disproportionately affected. While investment treaties and international arbitration protects the concessions and profits of these corporations with binding force, Fisher people and other affected communities struggle to hold the transnational corporation accountable, and we remain in profound asymmetry and legal vulnerability. Therefore, we are here to state that Article 14 is a decisive provision to ensure that this treaty has real effect and does not remain subordinate to the market logic and corporate power that places capital above human dignity. The treaty must ensure the primacy of human rights over trade and investment treaties. This is essential. Commercial interests cannot triumph over affected communities and their rights. Investor-state dispute settlements, ICSDS, must not be used to challenge legitimate public interest regulations. As long as the international architecture prioritized the legal uncertainty for corporations over communities and territories, the asymmetry this treaty seeks to address will remain unchanged. Presently, the unfairness is glaring, presenting a lose-lose scenario for states seeking to hold TNCs accountable through ISDS mechanisms. Therefore, we request that Article 14.5 specifically address ISDS, explicitly providing that all trade and investment agreements, both existing and future, be negotiated, applied and implemented, guaranteeing full compliance with the primacy of human rights obligation arising from this treaty, as well as broader corpus juris and existing customary international law. I thank you.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to SETIM.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'm Dada Kieram Ismoula of the Akbayan Party, an MP from the Philippines, and speak on behalf of SETIM, member of the Global Campaign. The people and the planet cannot continue to be sacrificed in the name of profit. While trade and investment agreements are strongly enforced by ISDS mechanisms and international trade organizations, their effect on human rights and their primacy is hardly considered. Profit, trade and investment mean nothing on a dead planet. First, we highlight the standard must be compliance, not compatibility, in accordance with the primacy of human rights in international human rights law. Compatibility asks only whether two sets of obligations can coexist without a formal clash, as highlighted by Palestine, a test easily satisfied on paper. It does not say which obligation prevails when they diverge. Second, we agree that the standard should be the same for all agreements, as stated by Brazil, but its implementation must differ for existing and new agreements. Existing agreements should be interpreted and even amended when needed to comply with the LBI. New trade and investment agreements should be consistent with the instrument with immediate effect, where consistency cannot be guaranteed. States should refrain from concluding these agreements. We therefore support 14.15 to keep paragraphs 14.15 and 14.15 as two separate obligations and incorporate the text currently numbered 14.5 as paragraph 14.5. Finally, on access to justice, neither the third revised draft nor the Chair's proposals address the profound asymmetry between transnational corporations and foreign investors who enjoy binding international arbitration and victims and affected communities who have no standing before those tribunals. The scale of the problem is evident. The ICJ and the Inter-American Court have recognized investor state dispute settlement as an obstacle to climate action. As another example, Mozambique faces a largely hidden but serious legal obstacle to a just energy transition, its obligations to protect fossil fuel investors through project contracts and bilateral investments treaties, all of which guarantee protections such as safeguards against expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, and full protection and security, and which investors can enforce directly against the state through investor-state dispute settlement. Fossil fuel companies increasingly use this mechanism to lock in profit and challenge state measures aimed at moving away from fossil fuels, and they have long been heavy users of it. as of 2023 they had brought 20% of all known isds cases winning at least USD 82.8 billion and where tribunals reach a decision investors prevailed in over 75% of cases We have shared a policy brief with a set of provisions on ISDS under Article 4, 6, 14, and 15, and we invite all delegations to engage with them constructively. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to the Center for International Environment.

Franciscans International, FIAN International, and International Service for Human Rights. We strongly support Article 14.5, as has been suggested by the Chair. The article as currently redrafted would ensure that the human rights obligations of states arising from this LBI shall not be trumped by other international agreements, most notably trade and investment agreements. This is a very serious and practical issue that many countries are faced with, in particular in the context of investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms, as we've heard from other intervention. And in this context, we would support Brazil's suggestion to mention dispute settlement mechanisms explicitly. ISDS allows agreed foreign investors to bypass national courts and sue states directly before supranational panels composed of arbitrators appointed on a case-by-case basis. Corporations use ISDS to sue states over environmental, labor, or human rights policies, which in turn deters governments from taking similar action, which is known as a regulatory chill. Arbitrators' decisions are not bound by precedent nor subject to appeal. Proceedings and awards are also extremely costly, which not only diverts public resources away from measures in favor of the public good, but also pushes governments to adopt austerity and other measures that further impact on the enjoyment of various human rights, including some of the rights that are trying to protect under this LBI. International investment agreements typically emphasize investor protections without imposing corresponding obligations on those investors to uphold human rights. which creates an imbalance that sidelines human rights obligations. And this is often reflected in decisions by arbitration tribunals, which often give less importance or even discard existing states' human rights obligations when assessing whether the challenged state action is reasonable, proportional, or non-discriminatory. This article does not introduce new obligations or create a legal hierarchy as proposed by some delegations. Rather, it simply emphasizes the primacy of human rights law and reiterates a principle in line with the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaty. This provision reflects current practice by the majority of states, including by some of those that are opposing this article, in reviewing their international trade and investment agreements with respect to their international obligations. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to the Association for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'm Lungi Saona, and I speak on behalf of SHUMEK and the Rural Women Assembly, members of the Global Campaign. We wish to propose that Article 14.5 We expanded with additional paragraphs addressing investor-state dispute settlements, as mentioned by Brazil. Together with the principle of compliance, we have defended these additions would respond to structural problem that the draft does not yet address. Investor-state dispute settlement allows foreign investors to bypass domestic courts and bring claims before ad hoc arbitral tribunals whenever public interest measures affect their expected profits. A general duty of reform would require states parties to bring their international investment commitments and their domestic and international investment promotion and protection regimes into full consistency with this instrument and with applicable human rights standards. Disputes with foreign investors can and should be resolved before independent, transparent domestic courts and, where applicable, through interstate mechanism. Foreign investors would thus be governed by the same legal system that applies to domestic investors, workers and communities, in keeping with the principles of sovereign equality and non-discrimination. This is already the dominant approach in most developed countries. Article 14.5 must also reflect the realities of the digital economy. The reference to trade and investment agreements should expressly include digital trade agreements and any provisions governing cross-border data flows, source codes, algorithms, and digital services. These agreements and provisions undercut the sovereign policy space of states, and in particular of states from the Global South. to regulate digital infrastructures and technologies in furtherance of the public interest and human rights, their exclusion from the scope of Article 14.5 would leave a significant gap through which obligations of this instrument could be circumvented. Finally, the additions should address disputes already underway. This instrument should serve as an interpretive framework for pending investor-state proceedings. In the event of conflict, a state's human rights obligations should prevail. We urge all delegates to consider these additions seriously. I thank you, Chair.

Muchas gracias.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to Tierra de Derechos.

Chair, I speak on behalf of Tierra de Derechos, focused on the Global South, the Asia Task Force, members of the Global Campaign. Primacy of human rights is a central principle that is recognized in Article 14. No agreement should undermine the respect of human rights, including trade and investment agreements that are addressed in Article 14.5. Ambitious and comprehensive trade and investment agreements continue to raise serious human rights concerns. Trade and sustainability impact assessment done, for example, in the context of the EU-Philippines FTA have shown that the expansion of the manufacturing sector resulting from the agreement could lead to increased land conversion of agriculture for industrial manufacturing zones, potentially leading to indigenous peoples' decreased access to customary lands, as well as an increase in land disputes. Another concern is how provisions in trade agreements requiring accession to the 1991 Act of the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, or UPOV 91, impact farmers' rights to seeds. A recent report from the UNDROP working group highlighted the importance and centrality of the right to seeds in the lives of rights holders under the UNDROP. in ensuring agricultural and natural biodiversity, healthy environments, and sustainable food systems for all peoples. As the report emphasized, quote, "The right to freely develop, use, save, exchange, and sell seeds and propagating material is inextricably linked to the rights to life, food, land, natural resources, water, development, equality, health, work, culture, and self-determination." So in reality, the issue is not just of incompatibility of these agreements with human rights obligations under this proposed LBI, but these agreements in fact could pose a threat to human rights, undermining states' obligations under this proposed legally binding instrument. Recognizing the primacy of human rights in the preamble and in article 14.5 in the LBI will be a crucial guardrail to prevent possible violations of human rights arising from trade and investment agreements. Thank you.

Thank you very much. This was the last speaker on the list. My thanks to all States and civil society representatives, as well as other relevant stakeholders, for their contribution to our substantive discussion on the proposal for an alternative draft to article 14.5. Please rest assured that I have taken good note of all contributions and comments that have been made. We should now turn our attention to the fifth proposal for an alternative draft to article 15.4 on the functions of the committee. The aim is to streamline the text to make sure that it is in line with fundamental human rights treaties and with the practice of United Nations treaty bodies. We should remember that the committee was established as a specialised body overseeing the application of the instrument, whose establishment reflects consolidated practice in other human rights treaties. Among its key functions is the consideration of national reports and the drafting of general observations. The proposals submitted at the 11th session and at the intersessional thematic consultations refer, among other things, to the information that stakeholders other than States can bring. They also refer to a follow-up function, to reports, to normative harmonization and the notion of normative recommendations. In this respect, it has been seen that the framework of UN treaty bodies provides that its general recommendations or observations are based on state party reports, over and beyond the fact that in practice, committees also consider information provided by other stakeholders, and that at least eight of these treaty bodies have adopted follow-up procedures. even though there is no express specific provision for that in their respective conventions or treaties. Additional references were also seen in the relevant provisions of the nine fundamental human rights treaties. Article 9.2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination through to article 29.3 of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons against Enforced Disappearances. Having said all the above, the chair and rapporteur wishes to submit to you the following adjustments or changes. In subparagraph a, we suggest keeping the ability of the Committee to make general comments. and that there be a deletion to the reference of normative recommendations, an expression which is not to be found in the fundamental treaties. And basing such observations on the consideration of reports and the information received from States parties, and this is pursuant to the treaty frameworks that we've already mentioned. Moving on to subparagraph B, we recommend that the instrument refer more broadly to comments, observations and/or recommendations on the reports provided by States Parties, and that there be the inclusion of the possibility that the State concerned responds on its own initiative or at the request of the Committee. This would reflect the follow-up function that is already seen in practice. Subparagraphs c, d and e would be unamended. Having provided this brief introduction, I now open the floor, firstly, to States that wish to comment on proposal 5, proposing a new draft for article 15.4. I see the Philippines, you have the floor.

Mr. Chair-Rapporteur, good morning, colleagues. We thank the Chair-Rapporteur for your work on this specific article, and we positively note the effort to align the proposed committee's functions with standard UN treaty body practice. particularly on State Party reporting and adoption of general comments to clarify normative questions and interpretation of treaty provisions. We emphasize that the State reporting and review process under the envisioned article 15.4 must give primacy to inputs provided by States Parties as the duty bearers under international law. We recognize the valuable role of civil society and other non-stakeholders in the treaty body system. Nonetheless, States' official submissions should constitute the primary basis for compliance reviews to which the Committee's concluding observations and recommendations must respond. As a State party to eight out of nine core human rights treaties and having gone through six constructive dialogues in the past three years, We stress that the principles of fairness, objectivity and due process must govern the constructive dialogue between a sovereign duty bearer and a treaty body. Compliance reviews must be open and non-adversarial, aimed at providing normative guidance to States so they can better fulfil treaty body obligations, rather than a quasi-judicial process adjudicating specific claims from third parties.

Thank you.

Thank you very much, the Philippines. I recognize Iceland.

Thank you, Chair, and thank you for the redrafting of this paragraph. Iceland supports the redraft of sub-para B as it brings the Committee's functions in line with established treaty body practice, including follow-up. The explicit references to the independence and impartiality of committee members, as well as the prevention of conflicts of interest, are a welcome addition as well. Having said that, we wonder whether a communications procedure reference would be better placed in an optional protocol, building upon the design of other core international instruments. Lastly, We would like to recall the serious pressures currently facing the treaty body system and the liquidity situation at hand. We assume that the working group has that in mind, but we would also like to throw it out there in designing the committee to have efficiency and the sustainability of its resource requirements in mind and that they should be kept in view from the very start. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Iceland. I recognize Cuba.

Thank you very much, Chair, and a very good morning to all colleagues. In article 15.4, sub-paragraph, we support that a mechanism be established through which State parties can provide information about compliance with the provisions of the LBI, and that the Committee can provide recommendations about this. We recognise that it is something which is present in many existing agreements. We think the language suggested is rather comprehensive, but we have some suggestions to strengthen it. First of all, we believe that in order to remain consistent with language in CERD, CEDAW and CRPD Conventions, we suggest that it just be limited to suggestions and general recommendations in the report submitted by State Parties. I think we should stick to the language that is generally used in this kind of convention that has already been approved. We also believe that the submission of reports is an obligation of the State parties as part of their duties. So the sentence "on its own initiative or at the request of the Committee" in line 4 is a phrase that is not necessary. We would just delete it. And finally, we also believe that it's important to recognize States' rights to respond to these suggestions and general recommendations, so we support the idea that the Committee should include these responses in a report. So "may" in line 5 should be replaced by "should". The Committee should. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Cuba. I give the floor to the State of Qatar.

Thank you, Chair Rapporteur. With regard to article 15.4, our delegation appreciates the effort to clarify the functions of the proposed committee, particularly its role in examining state reports and issuing comments, concluding observations and recommendations. We recognize that treaty monitoring bodies can play a constructive role in supporting implementation and facilitating dialogue with state parties. Nevertheless, we would firstly like to draw a focal point to the article's previous clause, Article 15.1, which discusses the establishment of the committee, and would firstly like to highlight our delegation's wishes to reiterate its previous observations expressed in the 11th session concerning Article 15.1 and the proposed establishment of the committee. We consider it important that the legal establishment of the Committee be expressly linked to the entry into force of the LBI, as in our view this would ensure consistency between the creation of the treaty body and the commencement of the treaty obligations upon which its mandate and functions depend. We recognize that preparatory and administrative arrangements may be undertaken in advance, Nevertheless, such arrangements should be distinguished from the formal establishment of a body exercising powers under an international treaty. We would therefore propose clarifying that the committee shall be established upon the entry into force of the instrument, without prejudice to any necessary preparatory arrangements. Furthermore, and in regards to article 15.4, our delegation considers it important to preserve a clear distinction between the legally binding obligations established by the LBI and the comments or recommendations issued by the committee and the exercise of its monitoring functions. We also welcome the express recognition of the opportunity for state parties to respond to the committee's observations. In our view, an effective reporting mechanism should promote constructive dialogue and technical cooperation while respecting the competencies established by the treaty itself. We therefore support further clarification of the committee's functions and the legal nature of its outputs. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Muchas gracias, Alastair. Thank you very much, the State of Qatar. It gives the floor to Brazil.

Thank you, Chair. Let me just first echo Iceland's concerns regarding efficiency of committees, but I'm sure the Chair Rapporteur has that in mind when drafting this. Thank you for your efforts, too. On 15.4A, we would prefer to retain another stakeholders. But we could be flexible in accepting its deletion if it's understood that it would still preserve space for the committee to consider its own internal procedures as regards to hearing additional stakeholders, right? As you mentioned, eight out of the committees have established such protocols. So, yeah, prefer to retain, but could be flexible if that's understood like this. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Brazil. Saudi Arabia, please.

Regarding article or amendments to article 15.4, we welcome the proposal of the chair rapporteur, namely to delete and normative recommendations from paragraph A, and to limit the basis of general comments on the reports and information from State Parties, in line with the usually adopted practice of treaty bodies. and this will avoid any insinuation of a legislative role to the committee. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia does not object to the proposed amendments to paragraph B. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Saudi Arabia. I give the floor to Uruguay.

Thank you, Chair. The effectiveness of the future LBI will depend not just on the clarity of substantive provisions but on having an institutional architecture that is able to contribute effectively to implementation. For that reason, we think that it is important that the future committee should have sufficiently clear and robust powers to live up to its mandate. We think it's important for that institutional architecture to contribute to effective implementation of the provisions of the LBI, including those relating to protection of victims, access to justice, effective recourse and reparations. We are troubled that some of the amendments proposed in a and b of article 15 could reduce the clarity or scope of certain functions that are currently attributed to the committee. We think that we should maintain specifically the power of making general comments and normative recommendations and the possibility of considering information coming from other stakeholders, it's also necessary to maintain the specific reference to formulating final observations and recommendations on reports submitted by states parties. in line with the oversight function that should lie with the future committee. For that reason, we think that it is relevant to maintain the current wording in the draft as a basis to continue negotiations on the provision. We think that any subsequent amendment should preserve and, if possible, strengthen the necessary powers for the committee to be able to effectively discharge its mandate.

Thank you very much, Uruguay. State of Palestine.

Thank you, Mr. Chair Rapporteur. A treaty without effective monitoring and enforcement is a declaration of intent. Article 15 is where this instrument gains authority or loses it. On article 15.4, the committee can support the streamlined paragraph, but the reference to other stakeholders in 15.4 must be reinstated so that information from affected communities and civil society is sought and considered as a matter of course. The functions of the committee should expressly include follow-up on recommendations and requests for supplementary information. which your proposal notes eight treaty bodies already practice. They should also include an individual complaints procedure and an interstate communications procedure, as in CERD, CAT, the Migrant Workers Convention, and the Enforced Disappearance Convention. Mr. Chair-Rapporteur, a committee alone, however good, cannot issue binding judgments against corporations. As we indicated in the 11th session, the State of Palestine supports an international tribunal on human rights and transnational corporations established by this treaty itself. The idea has been on the table since the Chair's 2017 elements paper. We know the questions that States have raised, so let us plainly state what the tribunal would look like. It would be a human rights tribunal, not a criminal court. It would determine whether the obligations in this treaty, in particular those in articles 4, 5, and 6, have been breached, and what follows legally, including full reparation. It would have no power to prosecute or sanction natural persons. It would hear claims against corporations, not against states. It would be a tool for states as much as for communities. Cases could be brought by victims, their representatives and affected communities, and also by states parties. A state whose territory, people or environment have been harmed by a corporation would have an international forum in which to hold that corporation to account, alongside its own courts. Victims and affected communities would take part as full parties with the right to intervene at every stage and to access information. The international tribunal would not replace national jurisdictions, as the principle of complementarity and subsidiarity would apply. Primary responsibility for justice would remain with states. The Tribunal would not be an appeals body for national judgments. It would act only where the national system fails, where domestic law gives no due process, where victims are denied remedies or cannot exhaust them, or where judgment is unwarrantedly delayed. Nobody would have to pursue remedies in more than one jurisdiction. Contentious jurisdiction would be optional, and the statute would be adopted by the Conference of State Parties no later than its second session after entry into force. The tribunal would have the power to issue provisional measures in cases of extreme gravity and urgency where irreparable harm threatens people, communities, territories, or the environment. It would also be able to issue advisory opinions at the request of any state party or civil society organization, and final binding and directly enforceable rulings with states parties undertaking to enforce them within their jurisdiction. On costs, funding would come from assessed contributions by capacity, supplemented by a levy on transnational corporations operating in states' territories. Corporations found liable would bear the full cost of the proceedings. Mr. Chair, investors already enjoy international arbitration, investment treaties, and trade agreements. Victims and affected communities have nothing comparable. Such a tribunal would help redress that imbalance by beginning to close that gap between the protection that investors enjoy and the justice available to victims. Deferring the Tribunal to an optional protocol would leave the liability gap open for another generation, and therefore we reiterate that the establishment of the Tribunal should be included as a provision in this treaty. We have concrete language that we are ready to share with the chairmanship and interested delegations. I thank you.

Thank you very much, State of Palestine. Egypt has the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. We welcome the new drafting that you are suggesting on 15.4 and, which would bring the functions of the committee in line with the common practice of other treaty bodies. And on 15.4, we are still assessing the added value of this provision. We understand it's taken verbatim from Article 45 of the CRC, but we note that the vast majority of other treaty bodies and committees don't have this function, this specific function on the studies. And we understand that there's nothing in this text that undermines the capacity of the committee to issue thematic studies. Our only consideration here is that this provision might add some duplication to the work. It is something that we are not used to seeing, except in the CRC and with different wording in the CRPD. But we think we're, I don't have like clear, clear instruction on, on the retention or the removal of, of the E, uh, sub-provision, but just wanted for the sake of clarity to share, uh, uh, with you and other delegates our consideration of this. Uh, thank you so much.

Thank you very much, Egypt. I'll give the floor to the UK.

Thank you, Chair.

We note the current constraints on the treaty body system and are supportive of attempts to streamline and ensure the efficiency of new mechanisms, as Iceland has already raised. We also recognise that the state is the primary duty bearer under international human rights law, as the Philippines has said. Nevertheless, like Brazil and Palestine, we would query the deletion of and other stakeholders here in article 15.4A. We consider that a multi-stakeholder engagement approach is particularly important in an issue such as this. Indeed, paragraph D.2 of the addendum to the summary report recognises that consideration of information submitted by other stakeholders reflects established treaty body practice. We would be open to considering proposals to accommodate the views of different stakeholders.

Thank you, UK. Pakistan.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. We note the spirit of the proposals presented in the conference room paper that aim to streamline the Committee's functions to align with the practice of existing UN human rights treaty bodies. We note also, however, that a conventional reporting mechanism modeled on the core human rights treaties may not fully serve the LBI's implementation. The added value of the legally binding instrument lies in its provisions on jurisdiction, applicable law, mutual legal assistance, and enforcement, as contained in articles 7 to 13. The institutional arrangements in 15.4 could therefore be reconceived to support those provisions. Specifically, we invite the Chair to consider the following approaches or models. First, a facilitative or advisory function, providing technical assistance and capacity building to states parties at their request, particularly developing countries, rather than a reporting function. Second, a clearinghouse function, which compiles and disseminates information on corporate conduct and on obstacles to remedy. And this could draw upon comparable practice, for instance, at the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights database. on business enterprises involved in certain settlement activities. Third, a coordinating function for mutual legal assistance, building on the proposal in article 12.2 bis for designated central authorities. And finally, and fourthly, a victim support function working in tandem with the international fund conceived under article 15.7. Mr. Chair, Rapporteur, in our view, the Conference of States Parties already established in Article 15.5 is well placed to perform the political governance functions, including reviewing implementation trends and adopting guidance. We offer these observations and suggestions in the spirit of strengthening the instrument's effectiveness and would welcome your consideration. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Pakistan. South Africa.

Chair, South Africa values institutional arrangements that provide independent oversight in an efficient manner and to assist States in implementing the obligations under the LBI. On Article 15.4, we support simplifying the Committee's functions and retaining its competence to provide guidance on interpretation and implementation. within the mandate of the established instrument. We would have a preference to retain the reference to information received from other stakeholders in paragraph A. Your explanatory note, Chair, recognizes this practice within the treaty body system. In its absence, to an expressed reference, we would be interested to know how affected communities, civil society and others can contribute relevant information to this process. We also support the proposed wording allowing States to respond on their own initiative or at the Committee's request. Thank you, Chair.

Muchas gracias.

Thank you, South Africa. Any other State wishing to speak? Very well, thank you. Qatar is asking for the floor. Thank you for the clarification. Okay. We will then move to the list of speakers from civil society and other stakeholders. I give the floor to Alliance Defending Freedom.

Mr. Chair Rapporteur, ADF International welcomes the opportunity to offer views on article 15, paragraph 4, sub-paragraph a, of the draft LBI, which sets out one of the functions of the monitoring body to be established under this instrument. As currently drafted, the provision would enable the committee to, inter alia, adopt normative recommendations on the understanding and implementation of the LBI. That goes beyond the functions of existing treaty monitoring bodies, which generally prepare comments, suggestions or recommendations based on their examination of States' reports, without a normative guidance role on implementation. The interpretation of a treaty should remain the prerogative of States parties, informed by subsequent agreements and State practice. We therefore believe that normative gaps and legal uncertainties are best resolved by States during the drafting process, rather than delegated a priori to the Committee. This would help ensure that the instrument is applied uniformly and remains faithful to its letter and spirit over time. In that light, we welcome the Chair-Rapporteur's suggestion to delete "and normative recommendations and other stakeholders" from sub-paragraph of Article 15.4. To further strengthen consistency and legal certainty, we encourage States to consider aligning Article 15 with the language used for treaty monitoring bodies in existing UN human rights treaties. Thank you.

Muchas gracias.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to International Organization of Employers.

Thank you, Chair. I speak on behalf of IOE and USIB. We welcome the deletion of normative recommendations in Article 15.4A, which responds to a concern we have consistently raised. A committee of experts should support implementation, not set norms. However, the Committee will still issue general comments on the understanding of the instrument, and the background still refers to advice on the normative harmonisation of domestic legislation. Saying what the law means is the role of national courts, and this should remain the case. We also note that the reference to other stakeholders has been deleted from the same subparagraph. Business and employers' organizations, which will be directly concerned by implementation, must be able to contribute to the Committee's work, including any recommendations or studies, and this should be explicitly recognized. More broadly, Article 15 remains very detailed and will build a heavy structure. In light of the severe liquidity crisis, States should consider whether this will duplicate the work of UN agencies and bodies. For the same reason, we cautioned against giving the Committee any power to receive individual complaints or interstate communications, which will turn it into a quasi-judicial body. Thank you.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to ESCR-Net.

Thank you, Chair. I speak on behalf of ESCRNet, and I'm also representing my colleagues from AfriWatch and RAID, who cannot be present today. The urgent adoption of a legally binding instrument is essential to ending corporate impunity and ensuring access to remedy for victims of corporate-related human rights violations. The 2004 Kilwa case in the Democratic Republic of Congo is an example of why this instrument is so urgently needed. In this case, approximately 72 civilians were killed by the Congolese army, and it was later exposed that the Australian-Canadian mining company, Anvil Mining, provided crucial logistical support enabling the massacre. More than two decades later, victims have yet to obtain justice. 72 is not just an abstract number. Those are 72 families forever affected by corporate greed. The proposed changes in article 15.4 do not adequately address the evolution of an international accountability mechanism in line with the objectives of this mandate. We are concerned that the committee, as currently proposed in this article, is limited and risks falling short of what is required to address gaps in accountability for transnational corporations. States must agree on a stronger enforcement mechanism, such as an international tribunal that will review businesses in an institutionalized manner, making them subject to accountability and providing an international avenue for victims to bring cases and complaints, particularly against transnational corporations. This would not be new in the context of the UN. Under the mandate of the OHCHR, we know that there are existing processes where corporations are subject to review for complicity in human rights violations and abuses. The database exposing corporations complicit in the Israeli settler colonial enterprise is one example. There is also a painful irony in speaking here about the Kilwa community who have waited more than 20 years for justice while a forum that's discussing the future of mining is taking place just next door. So this serves as another reminder of why we urgently need a legally binding instrument with an effective international accountability mechanism. Thank you.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to Sudwind. Microphone, please. Thank you.

My name is Natalia Jishamberi. I speak on behalf of the Association for Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, SUME, for the Movement for Health of Peoples, both members of the global campaign. We think that the creation of a committee should not be a substitute for, or weaken, the establishment of an effective international legal mechanism. The global campaign calls for a legally binding treaty and an international tribunal that will ensure implementation of the provisions of the treaty and will ensure that the obligations of TNCs and transnational activities prevent carrying out human rights violations. We welcome the arrangements proposed and the functions of the committee, but we think that its functions should be viewed jointly with those of the future tribunal. Therefore, we want to point out that the interpretative functions of the committee in the document and of the proposed tribunal require specific analysis to make sure that there is no overlap of powers and to guarantee institutional consistency. For those reasons, we reiterate that we think that it is important to discuss provisions on the international tribunal in a comprehensive manner, in conjunction with the definition of the functions and mandates of the committee. Without prejudice to that, we propose that the future committee acts as an entry point to international legal mechanisms, taking as its reference, in some aspects, the existing institutional relationship between the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and the Inter-American Human Rights Court, for example. Its functions could include receiving and considering individual communications requesting urgent protection measures, making visits to countries where TNCs are based and monitoring human rights situations referral of cases to the international tribunal as per the commission's established in the treaty, follow-up of compliance with its recommendations formulated for businesses, facilitating protection of evidence and support in implementing the future treaty. In that regard, we support what Uruguay and Pakistan said regarding bolstering and expanding the functions of the future committee, and with Palestine, regarding the creation of a future international tribunal with the aforementioned scope. That mandate would allow the committee to discharge an active role in enabling access to international justice for communities and not just an advisory or interpretive body, as currently proposed. Therefore, the institutional architecture of the treaty should be viewed as a consistent vision that strengthens access to justice for victims and for affected communities, enables jurisdictional barriers to be overcome and ensures effective remedy and comprehensive reparations for victims and communities that live in vulnerable zones and areas. Thank you.

Muchas gracias.

Thank you very much. Just one clarification. I understand that you speak on behalf of SUMEC, for the protection and promotion of human rights. I give the floor to Sudwind now. Or they were part of that statement.

Thank you, Chair. I am speaking on behalf of the Austrian association Sudwind and International Electropower Partners, being a project consortium against forced labour in the electronic supply chain. We call for Article 15 to explicitly mandate the Committee to collaborate and share information with UN human rights treaty bodies and ILO supervisory bodies. Such cooperation is essential to ensure coherence and complementarity across international human rights and labor standards mechanisms. In particular, the Committee should be able to draw on relevant findings, concluding observations, recommendations and expertise developed by these bodies.

This would help identify patterns.

Of human rights abuses linked to business activities, strengthen the consistency of international standards and support more effective implementation at the national level. We further encourage the Committee to facilitate the exchange of relevant information with civil society organisations, trade unions and affected communities, whose experiences are essential to understanding the real-world impacts of business activities. Thank you.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to International Human Rights Internship Programme.

Thank you, Chair. I'm speaking on behalf of the Feminists for a Binding Treaty. It is essential to assure that the current text and definition of the Committee's functions do not create any retrogression compared to the existing functions and practices of other committees under other international human rights treaties. Articles 33 to 39 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which is the latest UN international human rights treaty, establishing a committee to monitor a human rights treaty should be considered to ensure that there is no regression. In this regard, and as noted by Uruguay, South Africa and Palestine, we are very concerned with the deletion of the reference to and other stakeholders at the end of Article 15.4. given that UN treaty bodies make comments and recommendations to review states not only based on information received from state parties, but also from NGOs. NHRIs and the UN system. We also reject the deletion of "and normative recommendations" from article 15.4a, as it is a central function and established practice of UN treaty bodies, critical for the interpretation of international human rights law, which also supports States in implementing their obligations. To conclude, the Committee's capacity to hear from individuals, affected communities and NGO representatives should be kept by making an explicit reference to them in Article 15.4. Their lived experience, expertise and local knowledge are a vital element for the holistic and effective review and improvement of the implementation of the Treaty.

Thank you.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to the International Transport Workers' Federation.

Thank you, Chair. I speak on behalf of the Global Labour Movement. We broadly support your redrafting of article 15.4 with a view to bringing the provision into line with existing international human rights law instruments and to the practice of the treaty bodies. Nevertheless, as we've been hearing from some States and civil society delegations, While appreciating the specific practice of other treaty bodies accepting information from stakeholders, we do not see why it is necessary to strike the reference to other stakeholders in 15.4a and would urge its retention. We also welcome consideration of explicitly including language on a follow-up procedure to monitor the implementation of recommendations of a State Party. as was noted in the narrative section of your paper. Chair, while proposals that were previously raised around the possible examination of individual complaints have not been addressed in the redrafting exercise, we do note a reference in the commentary to proposal 6 of a possibility of adopting an optional protocol allowing the committee to receive and consider communications. On that basis, we would still urge the working group to support a communications procedure in the LBI itself without having to resort to an optional protocol. Finally, Chair, as we also highlighted in the last session and during the intersessionals earlier this year, we believe that any consideration of a communications procedure, which you mentioned in your paper as a possibility at a later stage, We think that consideration would also benefit from a discussion around an international tribunal to adjudicate corporate human rights abuse in the context of business activities of a transnational character. Here again, we join some governments and our siblings across civil society in calling for such an international mechanism that can not only deliver justice to victims of corporate human rights abuse, where national systems are either ineffective or unwilling to adjudicate, but also one that can act as a deterrent to corporate impunity. As we mentioned earlier this year, I mean, such an exercise will require serious deliberation on issues concerning sovereignty and subsidiarity, jurisdiction and costs, among a plethora of other things. So to that end, we would welcome a dedicated portion of a future intercessional consultation to discuss the matter, of course, should state delegations welcome such a proposal. And we believe that the draft text and elements proposed by the Global Campaign and indeed the elements outlined by the State of Palestine earlier this morning provide an excellent foundation for such a discussion. I thank you, Chair.

Muchas gracias.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to CIDSE.

I am speaking on behalf of CIDSE and its member organisations, Manos Unidas, Misereor, CCFD-Terre Solidaire, Broderick Dellen, Trocaire, Fasten Action and CAFOD. On Article 15.4, we welcome the chair's proposal to streamline and broaden the committee's functions. However, we would welcome clarification from the legal experts on the implications of removing the capacity to make normative recommendations in sub-paragraph and its non-inclusion in sub-paragraph. We understand from the non-paper that issuing normative recommendations and supporting State parties in this regard is an established function of treaty bodies. Furthermore, to strengthen the committee's protective and accountability role, we support authorising it to receive and consider information and reports from affected or potentially affected individuals and communities and their legitimate representatives, subject to appropriate admissibility criteria. We also regret that the proposal does not include a robust monitoring mechanism as suggested by Uruguay during the 11th session, including, one, the capacity to receive individual and group communications regarding alleged human rights abuses and violations in the context of business activities, and two, the capacity to order urgent provisional measures to prevent irreparable harm. A mechanism of this nature would provide an important avenue for those most affected to bring their experiences and concerns directly to the Committee, ensuring that their voices inform its work and address the existing accountability gaps. Together, these mechanisms would help to ensure the Committee remains responsive to those most affected by business-related human rights abuses and violations, and is equipped to contribute meaningfully to the effective implementation of the LBI. Finally, we call on the working group to table the proposal by Palestine, and supported by the Global Campaign and many other civil society organizations, for the creation of an international tribunal for a dedicated future discussion and consideration at an intersessional consultation. I thank you.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to DKA Austria.

I speak on behalf of DKA Austria, ECPAT International, and the Human Rights Clinics of UFMG and PUC-Parana. We welcome the Chair's proposals on Article 15.4. Regarding 15.4, we take this opportunity to suggest adding: quote, "accompanied by a child-friendly version to facilitate understanding and engagement by children," end quote, at the end. With this addition, we wish to highlight the importance of child-friendly versions of the Committee's reports. Access to information and the right to education are fundamental preconditions for children's meaningful participation in decision-making processes that affect them. Without accessible and age-appropriate information, children are effectively excluded from engagement with the Committee's work. We also suggest adding a subparagraph as follows: "15.d.f. The Committee shall establish child participation mechanisms to hear children's views and experiences relevant to business-related human rights impacts." This provision would institutionalize child participation as a structural element of the committee's work, ensuring that children are not merely passive recipients of protection, but active active right holders whose perspectives inform monitoring and implementation. Although we would also be comfortable with Brazil's proposal supported by the UK and South Africa to ensure that procedures remain in place for the committee to continue hearing from stakeholders. I thank you.

Many thanks. I give the floor to the International Federation for Human Rights.

Mr. Chair, the International Federation for Human Rights generally welcomes the proposed amendments to the current text, with the exception of the deletion of the reference to other stakeholders under Article 15.4a, which should be reinstated. And in this sense, we won't dwell into any details, as it has already been raised by many states and other colleagues. In addition to that, we would like to recommend that two further functions are added explicitly to the list of the committee's functions. One of them is a follow-up function. We note the chair's observation that a number of UN human rights treaty bodies have adopted the practice of following up on the implementation of recommendations. issued to state parties, even though this function is not expressly included in the relevant conventions. However, we believe that this function should be explicitly listed to ensure it is actually exercised, rather than deferred to a discretionary practice, which the committee will hopefully adopt based on the experience of other treaty bodies. So we recommend that the following functions are explicitly listed: the ability to request additional information from state parties and follow up on such requests; and the ability to follow up on the implementation of recommendations to State Parties and on the commitments by State Parties articulated in concluding observations. And the second function that we insist should be explicitly listed is that of communications function. which we agree in this with the global labor movement comment that shouldn't be deferred to an optional protocol and should ideally be listed expressly in the LBI. The committee could then... adopt its functions and other rules of procedure at a later stage. That would also help the chair in achieving the stated objective of aligning the LVI with the existing practice of many UN treaty bodies. We would like to explicitly mention as guidance the state-to-state complaints mechanism that is provided for in the body of the CAT. That is in the body of the instrument, the Convention on Migrant Workers, CERD, ICCPR and the Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. An individual complaints mechanism is also explicitly mentioned in the main body of the CERD, the CAT, the Convention on Migrant Workers and the CED. And their explicit inclusion as functions of the committee in the LBI does not mean that state parties automatically accept their jurisdiction, as this can still be the subject of an express declaration later on. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much. Thank you once again. The Secretariat will ensure that interpretation is provided throughout the proceedings. I now give the floor to the International Collective in Support of Fishworkers.

Chair, I speak on behalf of the Global Fishworkers Forum and also speaking on behalf of CFF as part of the global campaign. The negotiations underway to adopt this legally binding instrument are for a historic opportunity to make up for one of the persistent gaps in international law. This relates to the constant violation of human rights committed by TNCs. We need an effective mechanism. Even a most rigorous treaty could simply turn out to be an expression of intentions. The creation of There have been various demands made by the Global Forum, the Global Campaign from the beginning of this process. So having a tribunal as suggested by the State of Palestine, holding TNCs to account for human rights violations would be an essential tool for victims, ensuring access to justice and comprehensive remedies. But it wouldn't just be this, it would be an excellent instrument available to states as well. It is states that have to continue to pay using public funds to make up for the damage done by TNCs. Our proposal therefore includes active legitimation to make sure that cases can be brought to this tribunal for environmental damage and human rights damage. This is something which can't be done yet, given that there are so many corporate cases before arbitration courts at the moment. We know that such proposals don't have precedence in international law, but we mustn't lose any of the ground that we've gained in the human rights sector. Just like human rights courts, An international tribunal would be essential to ensure access to justice and reparations for victims, but it would also make sure that the treaty would have interpretive value. It would be a living instrument which could be used as a guide by states in regulating companies and putting an end to impunity. For this reason, we would urge states to include in article 15.4 a specific provision which would provide for the establishment of this tribunal to make sure that it's compatible with the work of the committee. We can make available to delegations a technical document with proposed draft suggested by our organizations. Thank you.

Thank you. I give the floor to Setim.

Chair, my name is Susanna de Govia and I'm a member of the Catalanian Parliament and I'm speaking for SETIM here as part of the global campaign. This article 15.4 should not stand in the way of setting up an effective LBI. There must be an international tribunal. Both bodies, the committee and the tribunal, should be considered together to make sure there's no overlaps. There could be the possibility of receiving individual communications, and there are examples of similar bodies that try and make progress in this sector. In the Catalonia Parliament in July, we adopted a new law establishing a business and human rights centre, which is an independent state body, which is state funded, and it ensures there's the possibility of investigating TNC activities and putting an end to impunity. The Parliament elects the members of the body. We have to think about what the centre will be able to do. It can receive complaints from communities that have seen violations, and they can also act independently. They can investigate any activity in Catalonia. It will also produce public reports. This centre, for example, can investigate a Spanish company that has participated in building a hydroelectric plant that has affected the lives of communities in Guatemala. This has led to the pollution of the river, lack of food and it has affected hundreds of families. It will also ensure that there is prior informed consent, as provided for in the relevant ILO convention, which has been ratified in both Spain and Guatemala. The company is also operating in Catalonia, so the centre has the capacity to investigate and can produce a report on the impact on human rights of the Guatemalan communities. That could be an example to all states. It is part of the bid to have an effective treaty. Thank you very much.

This was the last speaker on our list. My thanks to all States and civil society representatives and other relevant stakeholders who have contributed with the valuable comments and proposals relating to proposal 5 on article 15.4 of our future legally binding instrument. We have taken good note of all comments made. We can now turn our attention to proposal 6, an alternative draft for article 15.7 on the International Fund for Victims. This is a proposal which aims to clarify the original provision. Now this is a paragraph which provides for the establishment at a time or within a deadline yet to be decided after the entry into force of the instrument, of a fund to provide legal and financial assistance to victims, bearing in mind the additional barriers that specific individuals or groups have or meet when accessing reparation. At the 11th session and during the intersessional thematic consultation, proposals were made to delete the paragraph. There were also comments relating to the voluntary nature of the fund, and references to a new article 15 on contributions, and to the list of groups of persons. Some delegations also asked questions about its governance and financing of such a fund. In this respect, it was reminded that we already have funds of different kinds. There is the trust fund to benefit victims, provided for by articles 75 and 79 of the Rome Statute, and this is mainly derived from confiscated assets. And then there are other United Nations funds, such as the Voluntary Contributions Fund for Victims of Torture, established pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 36/151. And this is based on voluntary contributions. There was also a constant recognition of the rights to equality and non-discrimination, and of how appropriate it would be to have open-ended formulation which would not limit it to a closed list of individuals or groups in a vulnerable situation. So on this basis, the new proposed wording suggests the following. There would be an express link between legal and financial assistance of the fund with victims seeking access to remedies. It would also adopt an open-ended formulation referring to persons or groups in a situation of vulnerability or marginalisation, so that the mention of specific groups would simply be by way of illustration and would not be limiting. As part of this mention of different categories and bearing in mind proposals presented at the 11th session, it would include older persons and would use capitals for the expression indigenous peoples. The timescale for establishing the fund and the competency of the conference of the state parties to define its operations remain unchanged. I think it's appropriate to mention that states could also consider this provision at a later stage, for example, when the States will consider a possible future optional protocol allowing the Committee to receive communications. So having made this introduction, then I would give the floor in the first instance to States that wish to comment to proposal 6 in relation to a new draft for article 15.7. I see the European Union asking for the floor.

As regards Article 15.7 and the related considerations, it would be.

Worthwhile expressly clarifying the voluntary nature of contributions to the International Fund for Victims in coherence with Article 13.2.

We would also welcome clarification of its interaction with other provisions on legal and financial assistance. An open-ended reference to situations of vulnerability or marginalization followed by examples could be useful. A consistent approach throughout this LBI, moving from general language to non-exhaustive examples, could help avoid unintended differences in coverage.

Thank you.

Thank you very much, European Union. I give the floor to Malaysia.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Regarding Article 15.7, Malaysia wishes to make some observations. First, Malaysia notes that the Chair's suggested redrafting does not incorporate the proposed explicit references to sexual orientation and gender identity contained in the earlier proposals by certain delegations. Malaysia welcomes this drafting approach, which is consistent with its position expressed during the 11th session of the working group. Malaysia also wishes to reiterate and maintain its previous proposal to delete these references from the negotiating text. Second, regarding the proposed International Fund for Victims, Malaysia would appreciate further clarification on the proposed financing arrangements. First, Who would be expected to contribute to the fund? Would contributions by State Parties be mandatory or voluntary? Could contributions also be made by other organizations or stakeholders? Second, could contributions include technical assistance or other forms of non-financial support or would they be limited to financial contributions? Finally, how would the amount of frequency of financial contributions be determined? Would the different capacities and available resources of states be taken into account? Third, Malaysia would also appreciate the clarification regarding the references to refugees in Article 15.7. In particular, Malaysia would like to understand whether this reference is intended to create any additional obligations concerning the recognition of refugee status or refugees protection for states that are not parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 7 protocol. Malaysia considers it important that the proposed provision should not be interpreted as requiring States to assume obligations under the international instruments to which they are not parties. Malaysia looks forward to further clarification. Its observations on the drafting of article 15.7 are without prejudice to its overall position on the proposed LBI. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much, Malaysia. The State of Qatar has the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair Rapporteur. Our delegation wishes to address article 15.7 concerning the proposed establishment of an international fund for victims. Our delegation strongly recognizes the significance of facilitating access to legal and financial assistance particularly for individuals and communities facing additional barriers to effective remedies and wish to portray a relentless support for the facilitation of such assistance. Our concerns, however, lay in the structural elements of the establishment of such funds, and thus our delegation requires and requests further clarification of the suggested fund's legal, institutional, and financial arrangements. In particular, we would appreciate clarification as to whether contributions from state parties would be voluntary or mandatory. If mandatory contributions are envisaged, it would be necessary to determine the basis on which such contributions would be calculated, the relevant financial obligations of state parties, and the mechanisms governing the administration and oversight of the fund. We also note that the proposed provision leaves the period for establishment to the Fund, as well as its source, undetermined. Our delegation considers that these matters should be addressed before the States are asked to accept a binding obligation to establish or finance the proposed mechanism. and thus our delegation agrees with Mr. Chair Rapporteur's recommendation to delay the approval of this article's finalized phrasing to the concluding stages of this LBI's drafting. Finally, the delegation of the State of Qatar welcomes further consultations on the financial and institutional aspects of Article 15.7, including the possibility of voluntary funding arrangements.

Thank you.

Thank you to the State of Qatar. I recognize Saudi Arabia.

Thank you very much, Chair-Rapporteur. On Article 15.7, We reiterate our position, which is that any financial arrangement, including any assistance provided to victims, should be voluntary. That is in line with international practice. In that context, the formulation of article 15.7 does not clarify how such a fund would be financed. We would like to make a proposal to include a mention of voluntary contributions for the fund. And nothing in this article should be interpreted as an obligation of states to contribute. Pursuant to the approach that has been followed elsewhere, we wanted the paragraph to mention individuals or vulnerable groups. We do not think that there should be a defined list; there should be a general mention of groups in a vulnerable situation.

Thank you, Saudi Arabia. The United Kingdom has the floor.

The UK reserves its position on this article. We recognise that this fund has a laudable purpose. However, it is an unusual provision in a human rights treaty. Given the current UN financial and liquidity crisis, we are concerned that the fund would face challenges. It might be worth further exploring flexibilities in funding models and providing for that in the drafting of the provision.

Thank you, chair.

Thank you very much, UK. I give the floor to Brazil.

Thank you, chair. regarding article 15.7, we will support the redrafting. Appreciate capitalizing indigenous peoples as well and including older persons that are other vulnerable groups that we would like to see reflected on the draft, such as people of African descent and people in street situations, LGBTI as well. But we understand if the point is to harmonize with the remaining of the text, then we can support as well. And regarding the fund, we've been advocating for the establishment of a mixed fund that does not rely exclusively on public budgets or voluntary contributions, but also financed by assets and property confiscated from perpetrators, corporate perpetrators of human rights violations, just to make that point clear. But we could discuss the details of such fund in an additional protocol as you have proposed.

Thank you.

Thank you very much, Brazil. State of Palestine has the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Very briefly, on paragraph 15.7, we welcome that the Chair's proposal keeps the words "shall establish" and lists older persons, we ask that peasants and other people working in rural areas, as well as protected persons in conflict-affected areas, including situations of occupation, be added, as we previously proposed, and that the fund not be deferred to an optional protocol. I thank you.

Thank you very much, State of Palestine. Uruguay.

Thank you, chair. We think it's very important for the future instrument to provide for an international fund for victims as a mechanism to guarantee facilitating access to effective remedy so that those people facing greatest obstacles to access justice We welcome the fact that the bill recognises the additional barriers that persons or groups in situations of vulnerability could face in accessing effective recourse. In that regard, it is positive that the wording remains open in terms of identifying certain groups. That does not limit access for other persons who may face obstacles. We welcome the reference to older persons, and based on what Brazil said, we could also support the inclusion of the reference to people of African descent. At the same time, we think it's necessary to continue examining modalities for financing, governance and administration, as well as criteria for the functioning and timeline for establishment of the fund, especially. We think that we need to address issues relating to the nature and sources of financing and ensure an institutional mechanism that enables the fund to effectively and sustainably comply with its purpose. As the chair of the committee has said, we think that it is useful to examine the experience and practice that exists in other funds for victims that already exist in the international system. That would help us to identify both the mechanisms that have been effective and the difficulties that have been met in their functioning. to be able to identify elements that could guide the design and implementation of the future fund. Thank you.

Thank you, Uruguay. Any other state wishing to take the floor at this point? I give the floor to South Africa.

Thank you, Chair. On article 15.7, We would certainly not support deleting this provision, but rather its retention. We support the Chair's clarification that the Fund would assist victims seeking access to remedies and the open wording that is proposed. We would also support Brazil's proposal to include reference to persons of African descent. In our view, Chair, voluntary contributions must form part of those arrangements together with other funding sources, some of which have already been alluded to. It would also be important to establish an independent and adequately resourced mechanism that supports implementation and provides practical assistance to victims. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much. Any other State wishing to take the floor? If not, we can move to statements from representatives of civil society and other stakeholders. I give the floor to the.

National Human Rights Internship Programme.

I am delivering this statement on behalf of the Feminists for a Binding Treaty. The treaty text must acknowledge the multiple and intersecting barriers that victims face when seeking access to justice against corporate harm. For that, substantive equality and non-discrimination must be addressed consistently throughout the text, consistent with states' existing human rights obligations and the reality of victims. We welcome and support the Chair's rapporteur proposal in article 15.7 to refer to persons or groups in a situation of vulnerability or marginalization. This formulation recognizes that vulnerability and marginalization are not inherent to a person or group, but instead result from structural inequalities, historical dispossession, discrimination, and unequal power relations, including those created or deepened by business activities. This allows for considering how multiple forms of discrimination can be compounded and shape access to justice and remedy. As it is common practice in many existing human rights instruments, listing particular groups can be important to call attention to the specific needs and situation of those groups and to flag different axes of inequality in our societies. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in General Comment No. 24 specifically acknowledges the differentiated impacts of business activities on these groups. Naming groups provides clear guidance to states when developing legislation, conducting human rights impact assessment, ensuring meaningful participation and designing remedies. A broad reference to situations of marginalization and vulnerability should complement this recognition, but should not entirely replace it. We therefore defend the formulation in the Chair's proposal. Wherever such listings are included in the paragraphs of the LBI, we recommend states make explicit that the list is open and unexhaustive. This can be accomplished by consistently introducing any such list, including but not limited to. This serves to keep specific groups visible without limiting protection through a closed list. These observations respond to the Chair's proposal on article 15.7, but we encourage states to use this terminology throughout the LBI, whatever reference is made to particular persons or groups. These recommendations are in line with the Chair's own suggestion to align terminology across the instrument and allow for retaining explicit references to women and to gender-responsive approaches. I thank you.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to the Catholic Lenten Fund.

The Catholic Lenten Fund and the Center for Applied Legal Studies wish to make a recommendation regarding the institutional arrangements under Article 15. While the current draft provides for a fund and a committee, it does not establish an independent international judicial mechanism to adjudicate claims against transnational corporations and other business enterprises of a transnational character. We believe this is a significant gap. Victims and affected communities continue to face barriers of justice, including jurisdictional challenges, difficulties accessing cross-border evidence, and obstacles to hold parent companies accountable for harms arising through complex corporate structures. We therefore recommend that Article 15 provide for the establishment of an independent international tribunal on business and human rights, empowered to adjudicate violations under the treaty and issue binding and enforceable decisions, including orders for full and effective reparation. The tribunal should complement international courts and provide an avenue for justice where domestic remedies are unavailable, ineffective or unduly delayed. These procedures must also guarantee meaningful participation by affected communities, access to legal assistance and evidence, and effective remedies for individual, collective and environmental harm. Finally, we recommend a clear implementation pathway, including a mandate for the Conference of States Parties to develop the tribunal statute within a defined timeframe and to be supported by adequate and independent funding. Chair, a strong treaty requires not only substantive obligations, but credible mechanisms to enforce them. An independent international tribunal would help close accountability gaps, and ensure that justice for victims does not stop at national borders. Thank you.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to the International Organization of Employers.

Thank you, Chair. I speak on behalf of IOE and USCIB. The redrafting, unfortunately, leaves the key questions many delegations have asked open: how the Fund will be governed, how it will be financed, and whether contributions will be voluntary. These questions are all the more pressing given the current financial situation of the United Nations. We note the Chair's suggestion to examine this provision at a later stage, possibly together with an optional protocol allowing the Committee to receive communications. We strongly caution against that link. As we said on Article 15.4, the committee should not become a quasi-judicial body. The provision also continues to overlook defendants. Consider the owner of a small business in a developing country facing proceedings abroad under this instrument's broad liability and jurisdiction provisions. Defense costs alone could put the company out of business. Many legal systems provide assistance to defendants who cannot afford their defense, and this instrument should not ignore them. Thank you.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to Sudwind.

Thank you, Chair. I'm speaking on behalf of Sudwin and the Electropower Consortium against forced labour in the electronics industry and the Labour Rights Foundation in Thailand. We would like to make a specific comment on proposal 6, article 15.7. Electro Power Partners consider it important to reinforce that the list of persons or group in a situation of vulnerability or marginalization includes the groups mentioned, but it is not limited to those. It is important that this wording is wide enough to reflect a range of people and communities affected by business activities and the fact that marginalized persons and groups are disproportionately affected by negative business impacts. Furthermore, a reference to forced laborers as persons or groups in situation of vulnerability or marginalization should be included. In our work in Thailand, we see migrant workers face legal precarity, fraudulent recruitment practices, subcontracting, and precarious employment that make them vulnerable to forced labor. Thus, explicitly recognizing forced laborers in the wording is critical to ensuring that protections reach communities navigating high-risk supply chains. Thank you.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to International Transport Workers Federation.

Thank you, Chair. I speak on behalf of the global labour movement. I'll be very brief. We support the reformulation of this proposal, which provides further clarity. Thank you.

Thank you. I give the floor to Friends of the Earth International.

Mr. Chair, thank you very much for the opportunity afforded. I am Dr. Ravinara Dabiri, an attorney at law from Sri Lanka. I am speaking on behalf of the Center for Environmental Justice in Sri Lanka and Friends of the Earth International, and as a member of the global campaign. Environmental degradation transcends national boundaries. The oceans, biodiversity and ecological systems that sustain life constitute a shared global heritage, and their destruction threatens not only the present generation but also the rights and well-being of future generations. Accordingly, environmental harm caused by transnational corporations must be adequately addressed with this instrument. The Express Pearl maritime disaster as an example, which occurred in Sri Lanka, illustrates the urgent need for such mechanisms. On May 2021, the Singapore-flagged container vessel MV Express Pearl caught fire off the western coast of Sri Lanka, following explosions, and its eventual sinking in June 2021. Around 25 tons of nitric acid, caustic soda, methanol and other hazardous chemicals as well as approximately 1,680 tons of plastic pellets and other debris contaminated the marine environment. That is the largest chemical disaster, maritime chemical disaster taken place in the history. The disaster caused extensive ecological damage, disrupted fishing activities, threatened public health, and severely affected the livelihoods of coastal communities. Our organization initiated fundamental rights litigation before the Supreme Court in respect of the violations of the human rights of the Sri Lankan community. In July 2025, the Supreme Court, five bench, The Supreme Court, being the highest court, five bench, delivered a landmark judgment addressing constitutional violations, human rights violations, and ordered Express Pearl Group of companies to pay 1 billion United States dollars as an initial payment in compensation due to Sri Lankan state. But only 1 million, that is, one portion out of 1,000, has been reportedly paid to date. The continuing and glaring gap between the compensation ordered and the amount received raises serious concerns about the effectiveness of domestic court decisions against transnational corporate interests. Environmental justice must not only end at the national borders, and corporate accountability must not depend on a country's economic power. The Xpress Pearl crime demonstrates that domestic judicial recognition of wrongdoing is insufficient without effective international enforcement and without effective international mechanisms. We call upon this working group to take this logical step forward by ensuring this treaty establishes an international tribunal for transnational corporations, especially to deal with the activities of the transnational corporations. This treaty must explicitly establish that the tribunal's jurisdiction is triggered whenever national legal system fail to ensure effective protection or remedy allowing both affected people and states to submit cases. Protecting our shared environment is a collective responsibility. That responsibility must be translated into enforceable international law to safeguard the rights of present and future generations, as well as the rights of the nature. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Muchas gracias. Thank you very much. I give the floor to Tierra de Regios.

Next, Mr. Chair, I represent.

The movement affected by socio-environmental crimes of the climate crisis. In 2015, November, there was the overflowing of the Mariana Majares dam, which was flooded, belonging to the TNCs. Nine people died, a forced abortion, thousands of people were affected and 800 kilometres of waters polluted. The cases were brought against the companies involved in Brazil. They were not upheld, which forced us to access justice in the United Kingdom, where to try and sue them for their activities in November 2025. BHGP was declared guilty for the incident at the dam. This was a historic victory for the affected populations after numerous popular mobilisations. Despite our victory in Brazil, the company continues to go unpunished. This shows specifically the need for an international tribunal. Barriers to access justice as well as the sluggishness of legal procedures and the high costs that are assumed by affected persons, means a protraction of the violation of human rights and impunity. Chairman, creating an international tribunal on the human rights and on TNC and business as part of an LBI is a fundamental demand of the global campaign. Ever since the start of the process, the possibility of creating an international tribunal has already been provided for in documents and elements published by the chair-rapporteur in 2017 at the start of negotiations, but was withdrawn from subsequent documents. In recent years, that proposal has gained ground, showing an increasingly big commitment to revitalising multilateralism and protection of international human rights law. Unlike judicial organs, a tribunal would have the power to take binding decisions directly sanctioning TNCs for their violations, imposing compensation and specifically bridging gaps when it comes to accountability. The absence of that mechanism would perpetuate a fundamental asymmetry between foreign investors and TNCs. enjoy robust investment protection through the investor-state dispute settlement procedures, the free trade agreements and WTO agreements. Communities affected, on the other hand, do not have any international body in their favour that is comparable in protecting their rights or territories in the context of activities of TNCs. States don't have international organ where they can sue TNCs. This is the best moment to establish such a tribunal with key. elements of a treaty in the favor of peoples and of states, the Global Campaign makes a call to all states who participate in these negotiations to support the inclusion in Article 15 of provisions that provide for the creation of an international tribunal for TNCs with competence to try and hear reports submitted by affected peoples and representatives for violations of rights and obligations deriving from the current Treaty as well as grievances presented by states for violations of human rights, labor rights and environmental damage committed within their jurisdictions. Thank you.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to Seth.

Thank you, Chair. My name is Grace Tepula. I'm from Zambia, and I'm part of the Rural Women Assembly, a movement of over 170,000 small-scale farmers across 11 South African countries. We are members of the global campaign. To truly ensure the effectiveness of the treaty, the establishment of an international tribunal is crucial. as it would provide victims with a vital safety net for access to justice. Today, Palestine suggested and reiterated its support for the establishment of a tribunal that we strongly support. This reflects a long-standing demand of the global campaign. A tribunal represents the ultimate safeguard to ensure victims can effectively seek justice. While this proposal may seem scary at first glance, the prospect of possibly allowing TNC to continue evading accountability is far scarier. This proposal should therefore be seen not as a constraint, but as an opportunity to strengthen accountability of TNC for their human rights violations and establish establish a, sorry, while this proposal may seem, sorry, Chair, while this proposal may seem scary at first glance, the prospect of possibly allowing TNC to continue, to continue safety net for both victims and affected communities, as well as the states. Many institutions now regarded as precedents were once unprecedented. The Nuremberg Tribunal, for instance, was the first of its kind, as well as the International Criminal Court innovation in various way. Each breaking, sorry, each breaking new ground in terms of access to justice. Similarly, regional human rights courts, such as the Regional Courts of Human Rights, have delivered judgments that have reshaped domestic legal systems from requiring states to align their national legislation with international human rights standards to ordering comprehensive reparations in favor of the victims. In the same vein, the LBI represents an opportunity to advance the fight against the impunity of TNC. Perceived obstacles could be addressed. subsidiary and complementary jurisdiction would apply. The Tribunal's territorial jurisdiction, as well as its material and personal scope, would mirror those set out in the Treaty. The cost of running the tribunal could be borne by a designated proportion of a wider tax on the profits of the TNCs located in the state in question. In the event that a company is actually convicted, the judgment may sanction the company with the payment of the costs of the proceedings. An international tribunal on human rights and TNCs would also strengthen the position of states in regards to TNCs, helping to counterbalance the considerable influence and legal privileges these corporations enjoy under the existing international systems. I thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to CIDCE. CIDCE has the floor.

No, there is a mistake, Chair. We're not presenting anything.

Thanks.

Thank you. I give the floor to the Brazilian Institute for Human Rights.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I am Dr. Lichfield Chabalala. a Member of Parliament from South Africa and a Pan-African activist. Chair, it is said that for more than a decade, communities across the world have waited for international law to catch up with corporate power. Actually, it's not true, Chair. For Africa and the Global South, we have been waiting for over 600 years, six centuries to be precise, since the days of the chartered sovereign companies that merged business with colonisation. commissioned to operate in total impunity from the laws of our countries. Therefore, a binding treaty without formalizing enforcement becomes just another promise on paper. We already know what happens to instruments that lack effective enforcement mechanisms. International soft law only plays into the hands of TNCs centuries of impunity regarding human rights violations. Corporations have learned through centuries to live comfortably with only voluntary commitment and not mandatory ones. Thus, Chair, a binding treaty that cannot investigate, sanction and provide restorative justice becomes another letter of intent. It is not a statute of law. Over 600 years of transnational business has shown us that foreign investors enjoy robust international protection. Or, of late, they even enjoy it through the investor-state dispute settlement, free trade agreements, economic partnerships, and the World Trade Organization systems. They can sue states, and trust me, they do. But what about states? What about affected communities? What comparable recourse to law do they have? This asymmetric application of the law makes justice and the law itself a nasty joke, Chairperson. The evidence is before us. In a world marked by persistent corporate abuse, impunity and a vicious attack on international law, a tribunal is the only saviour for human dignity, for the law itself, for governments and most of all, for the defenceless, affected indigenous communities across the globe. The idea is not new. It was already tabled in the chair rapporteur's 2017 elements of paper. We welcome the public support expressed by Palestine. We urge all the states engaged in this working group to support the proposal to establish the International Tribunal on Human Rights and Transnational Corporations as an integral part of this binding treaty. I especially urge South Africa, my country, which initiated this process back in 2015 under President Zuma, to join hands with Palestine to lead Africa and the Global South in making sure that this tribunal becomes a reality. Global South, remember, we, the indigenous populations of your countries, have been waiting for over 600 years for justice against transnational corporations' impunity. The international tribunal is that justice. That justice is our dignity. That dignity is the foundation of our freedom. Global South, you have already proved that in your unity you achieve things. You did this with the United Nations Tax Convention. You are now standing at the precinct of history. Make that history, do not lose that opportunity. Ensure that this binding treaty has a tribunal as its foundation. We are watching you. Thank you, Chairperson.

Muchas gracias. Thank you very much. With that, we've reached the end of our meeting this morning. Thank you to all of you for your contributions. In the afternoon, we'll be continuing with the 16.3, proposal 7, conflict affected zones. We'll adjourn for now and reconvene at 3pm. Thank you.