Addressing the Growing Threat of Terrorist Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS): International Cooperation and Implementation Priorities (Counter-Terrorism Week Side Event)

Good afternoon, everyone. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, colleagues, good afternoon. It's my pleasure to welcome you to this high-level side event on addressing the growing threat of terrorist use of unmanned aircraft systems, international cooperation and implementation priorities. On behalf of the United Nations Office of Counterterrorism, Together with our partners from CTED and IKEO, I thank you for joining us today, both here at the UN headquarters and online. I would also like to express our sincere appreciation to our co-organizers, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Portugal, and the United Arab Emirates, for their valued support in making today's event possible. Allow me to briefly set the scene. The terrorist use of unmanned aircraft system is not a new development. More than 3 decades ago, one of the earliest recorded attempts involved the planned dispersal of a chemical agent using a remotely piloted aircraft. Although unsuccessful, it foreshadowed a threat that has since evolved significantly. By the latter part of the last decade, terrorist groups had began systematically adapting commercially available drones for surveillance and attack, demonstrating how quickly these technologies could be weaponized. Today, the threat has evolved yet again. Terrorists increasingly exploit unmanned systems because they are affordable, widely accessible, adaptable, and difficult to detect. From aerial drones to improvised unmanned drone boats, these technologies have become part of the operational toolkit of a growing number of terrorist and armed, armed groups. This evolution from isolated experimentation to an increasingly accessible operational capability underscores why today's discussion is so timely. It also highlights the importance of strengthening international cooperation, enhancing regulatory frameworks, and translating existing commitments into practical implementation. So today, our opening speakers will offer strategic and institutional perspectives on the international response. We will then turn to an expert panel to examine the legal, regulatory, and operational measures needed to prevent terrorists from exploiting these rapidly evolving technologies. It is now my pleasure to invite Mr. Alexander Zouev, Acting Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, to deliver his opening remarks. Under-Secretary-General, you have the floor.

Thank you very much, Jurena. Your Excellency, Maxime Kruse. Envoy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Countering Extremism and Terrorism from United Arab Emirates. Your Excellency, Mr. Jeong Chul, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations. Your Excellency, Ambassador Hiroyuki Minami, Ambassador in Charge of International Cooperation for Countering Terrorism and International Organized Kuraymin from Japan, and His Excellency Mr. Ruiz Viñas, Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations. Distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, 5 years ago the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism launched the Global Programme on Autonomous and Remotely Operated Systems, or ARAS, the first UN program to address in the context of counterterrorism autonomous and remotely operated systems in the air, on the ground, and even underwater. That decision reflected an operational reality that has only further intensified. Ever since the '90s, terrorist groups have been building or adapting commercial systems, including unmanned aircraft systems, U.S. for surveillance, propaganda, and attacks. They target civilian security forces and UN operations. Regulatory frameworks remain fragmented and national capacities limited. The gap between innovation and institutional response is widening. We are working to reduce that gap every day. The AROS program has certified 130 operators and 14 national trainers and provided equipment across Ghana, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Malaysia, Mozambique, Niger, and Togo. About 50 operators and 16 trainers will be certified by the end of this year, 2026. The AROS training team also certified 1,000 operators on behalf of UN entities, mostly in Africa. Through its events and knowledge products, UNOCT has reached over 5,000 participants from more than 60 member states and dozens of partners across academia, the private sector, and intergovernmental organizations, enabling us to produce the first joint global report on—

Oh.

—UAS use for terrorism purposes. And this report, as you which you probably know was produced in 2023. An independent evaluation confirmed our work has helped identify, prevent, and respond to attacks while supporting maritime security and search and rescue in Africa and Asia. Through the program, UNOCT co-founded UN-wide task forces on unmanned systems and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, while we support working groups on counter-UAS and peacekeeping intelligence. And as you know, my previous job, 8 years I spent in the United Nations peacekeeping operations, I mean, and was very much connected to the problem because I was very often— I was number 2, but very often when Jean-Pierre Lacroix traveled, I was in charge of all peacekeeping operations, and I can tell you we faced very, very frequent attacks of unmanned systems, I mean, on our peacekeepers, and some of them were deadly attacks. I mean, and we lost our officers and soldiers in many countries, mostly in African countries, I can tell you, where we have our peacekeeping operations. All our work has been made possible thanks to our funding partners: the State of Qatar, China through the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund, Germany, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States. Yet assistance requests continue to outweigh resources available to this program. I also want to pay tribute to the work of our partners of choice and trusted friends and colleagues from the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, and I am very glad to be seated next to the Executive Director, A.S.G. Gherman, and the International Civil Aviation Organization, in developing the so-called Abu Dhabi Non-Binding Guiding Principles and helping us operationalize them through the AROHS program. You clearly understand that no one UN entity can succeed alone, and we cannot do it without partnerships. The AROHS program works closely together with other UNOCT global programs, and with UN partners on unmanned systems in support of border security, critical infrastructure protection, and vulnerable targets protection. This is three main directions in which we are— UNCT Global Programme on Countering Terrorist Use of Weapons, for instance, plays a key role in enhancing national capacities to prevent and respond to terrorist acquisition and use of conventional and non-conventional weapons. Its work has benefited over 9,000 officials from 120 member states, advancing the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2370 alongside CITEAD, ECOWAS, UNIDIR, and other important UN partners. The program developed technical guidelines that provide an effective methodology for countering terrorist use of U.S. Collaboration is the only way forward as threats become increasingly agile and sophisticated. Unmanned threats are— it's not a future problem. We have faced this problem already right now. Advances in autonomy, AI, 3D printing continue to lower barriers to acquisition, adaptation, and deployment of such weapons. The shift from principles to practice must be accelerated. This is why I sincerely thank the United Arab Emirates, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Portugal for convening this important side event with us today. Of course, UNCT looks forward to collaborating with all of you in tackling this common challenge. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much, Mr. Zui, for your remarks. I now have the floor— the honor to invite Mr. His Excellency Mr. Maqsoud Khrush, Envoy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Countering Extremism and Terrorism of the United Arab Emirates. Excellency, you have the floor.

Excellencies, distinguished delegates, allow me to begin by expressing my utmost It is my privilege to welcome you to this side event on addressing the growing threat of terrorist use of unmanned aircraft systems, strengthening international cooperation and implementation. I would like to extend our highest appreciation and sincerest gratitude to our co-organizers, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Portugal, and the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism for their distinguished partnership and excellent collaboration in convening this event. A special thanks to our esteemed speakers and participants for joining us today. The terrorist exploitation of unmanned aircraft systems is no longer an emerging challenge. Or a future risk. It is an operational reality. Across multiple regions, terrorist groups are exploiting unmanned systems for surveillance, reconnaissance, and information collection, targeting, and attacks. Technologies, tactics, and expertise are spreading rapidly across borders, making this a truly global issue. For the United Arab Emirates, this is not a hypothetical concern. In 2022, the UAE experienced deadly drone attacks by the Houthi terrorist militia against civilian, civilian targets, including Abu Dhabi International Airport. More recently, our region and my country have witnessed unlawful attacks by Iran, including through its proxies, launching attacks from Iraqi territory against civilians, civilian objects, and critical infrastructure in the UAE and other GCC states and countries in the region. In May, one such unlawful attack targeted an electricity generator outside the Ener the perimeter of the Barakah nuclear power plant, in flagrant violation of international law. These incidences demonstrate how unmanned aircraft systems can enable terrorists and armed groups to project violence across borders, threaten civilians and critical infrastructure, and undermine regional and international security— and stability. They have also revealed something broader. Unmanned aircraft systems are transforming the terrorist threat landscape by increasingly reshaping how terrorism activities are conducted across borders and how states think about deterrence, defence and resilience. Against this backdrop, the issue before us is not the absence of principles. It is the need to translate those principles into practice. Many member states continue to face gaps in legislation, regulation, detection capabilities, information sharing, and operational coordination. Addressing these gaps requires stronger national frameworks, greater preparedness, targeted capacity building, and practical cooperation. Important foundations already exist. The Abu Dhabi Guiding Principles adopted by the Counter-Terrorism Committee under the UAE's chairmanship in 2023 provide practical guidance for member states in addressing the terrorist exploitation of UAS, Our task now is to turn that guidance into implementation. No state can address this issue alone. Information sharing, operational cooperation, public-private partnerships, and the exchange of lessons learned will all be essential if we are to keep pace with an evolving threat environment. That is the purpose of today's discussion. To identify practical pathways forward, strengthening cooperation and support member states in translating existing guidance into operational reality. The UAE looks forward to working with all of you in that spirit. Thank you.

Thank you, Your Excellency Mr. Cruz. It is now my pleasure to invite His Excellency Mr. Jihoon Cha, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations. Your Excellency, the floor is yours.

Thank you, Ms. Moderator, Acting USG Joep, distinguished delegates, and excellencies. It's a profound honor to welcome you to this vital segment of the 2026 Counterterrorism Week. Allow me to extend my deepest appreciation to the UN OCT, CTED, and ECAO, as well as to our fellow co-sponsors, Japan, Portugal, the United Arab Emirates, who have joined my own country, the Republic of Korea, in organizing this critical side event. We gather today to confront a dramatic shift in the global security landscape. The rapid commercial proliferation of unmanned aircraft systems, or drones, has handed unprecedented asymmetry capabilities to violent non-state actors and terrorist networks. Today, UAS have evolved into highly accessible, low-cost, and lethal weapons. This threat is exponentially amplified by the integration of 3D printing, the convergence of artificial intelligence, and the emergence of fiber optic guidance systems. As you are all acutely aware, our regulatory and legislative frameworks are struggling to keep pace with these relevant speed of technology innovation. The universal challenges posed by UAS cannot be solved by any single nation or sector in isolation. They demand the exact model of broad collaboration we witness in this room today, a strategic synergy among our four co-sponsoring nations. And by the international bodies like ECO and CTED. Furthermore, we must actively engage technology developers, academia, and civil society as indispensable partners in this mission. Our immediate priority must be to fortify national capacity to actively investigate detect, and counter the complex threats arising from the illicit use of UAS and the illicit procurement of dual-use components. Currently, a significant majority of member states lack the technical expertise, operational infrastructure, and regulatory frameworks required to manage this sophisticated dual-use landscape. In this regard, the Republic of Korea stands fully prepared to play a leading role, leveraging our advanced technology sector and regulatory experience. We are committed to empowering member states to better understand, safely deploy, and actively regulate UAS technologies. Moving forward, We will continue to work hand in hand with the UNOCT and all our partners to translate today's dialogue into concrete, actionable global programs and technical assistance. Excellencies, the evolving nature of UAS technology demands a unified global response that transcends national boundaries. Let us draw on the immense expertise assembled in this room today to protect our shared airspace, secure our communities, and uphold international peace and security. I look forward to an enriching and informative discussion with our distinguished panelists. I thank you.

Thank you, Ambassador. I now have the honor to invite His Excellency Mr. Hiroyuki Minami, Ambassador in Charge of International Cooperation for Countering Terrorism and International Organized Crime of Japan. Excellency, you have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude My gratitude to the chair, to the co-sponsoring countries, the United Arab Emirates, the Republic of Korea, and Portugal, and to UNOCT, CTIT, IKO, and all those who have contributed to organizing this side event. On behalf of the Government of Japan, I am honored to speak as a co-sponsor at this very timely and important side event on unmanned aircraft systems or drone. Commercial drones are becoming more capable, affordable, and accessible than ever before. They can fly autonomously, travel longer distance, be manufactured through 3D printing, and carry increasingly sophisticated AI-enabled payloads. These innovations bring significant benefits to our societies and improve the way we live and work. At the same time, however, they can also be exploited by terrorists. They may pose a serious threat to civilian aviation, critical infrastructure, and the safety of our civilians. It is therefore essential to build an effective shield against the terrorist misuse of drones before such threats materialize. The challenge before us is no longer to recognize the threat. The challenge is to translate our shared principles into practical implementation. A resilient counter-drone framework requires not only sound domestic governance but also the effective implementation of international principles. Countering drone threats is not simply about deploying new technologies. Rather, it requires an integrated approach that brings together robust legal frameworks, effective operational arrangements, close cooperation among relevant authorities, and continuous investment in human resources. Japan has built a comprehensive counter-drone framework by integrating these elements under the Act on the Prohibition of Flight of Small Unmanned Aircraft. Drone flights are strictly restricted around critical facilities. At major airports, drone detection and jamming systems have been deployed to strengthen aviation security. Japan has also enhanced a wide range of operational capabilities, including vehicle-mounted detection systems and net-capturing equipment. Equally important is the way these capabilities are put into practice. Police, aviation authorities, and airport operators work closely together. They also conduct practical exercises on a regular basis in order to strengthen operational readiness and ensure effective coordination in responding to drone incidents. During CTEDS— CTAD's assessment visit to Japan in February this year, these efforts are highlighted as practical example of effective counter-drone measures. CTAD also expressed its expectation that Japan's experience would be shared with other member countries— member states. We believe these achievements demonstrate the operationalization envisioned by the Abu Dhabi Guiding Principles. Japan stands ready to share both our experience and our lessons learned with the wider international community. Allow me to raise one important point. Many drones misused by terrorists are assembled from commercially available components. Components, semiconductors, the dual-use technologies that circulate through global supply chains. In reality, through front companies' illicit procurement networks and diversion through third countries, these components too often end up in the hands of terrorists. Our response, therefore, should not begin only after a drone appears in the sky. It must begin much earlier. We need a nonproliferation approach, one that prevents critical components from falling into the hands of terrorists before they are misused. International export control regime, including the Wassenaar Arrangement, together with national export export control systems already provide robust frameworks for controlling sensitive technologies. Japan also maintains rigorous export controls, including strict end-use and end-user verification under its Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act. However, no country can secure global supply chains alone. Existing export control regimes must be fully implemented. At the same time, we must deepen international cooperation through stronger information sharing and enforcement cooperation to counter diversion through third countries and illicit procurement. In this regard, Japan highly appreciates the informal Expert Knowledge Sharing Initiative currently being developed under UNOCT's AROS program. Practical cooperation among experts is exactly what we need to keep peace with these rapidly evolving technologies. Ultimately, building resilient and trusted global supply chains is indispensable if we are to prevent terrorists from exploiting emerging technologies. Japan remains fully committed to working with member states and international organizations to achieve this goal. Drones are technologies that can be used both by terrorists and by law enforcement agencies also. For that reason, our response must be practical, coordinated, and forward-looking. Japan fully supports the steady implementation of the Abu Dhabi Guiding Principles. Working closely with the United Nations, AKO, and all member states, Japan will continue to contribute to strengthening counter-drone capabilities and counter-proliferation efforts around the world through capacity building. Japan's human resource development and the sharing of best practices. At the same time, we will continue to advance our law enforcement cooperation, public-private partnership, and open international cooperation as mutually reinforcing pillars of effective global response. Together, let's ensure that drones remain a force for innovation and progress, not a tool for terrorism. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much, Your Excellency. It is my pleasure now to invite His Excellency Mr. Rui Vinaes, Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations. The floor is yours.

Thank you. Mr. Madam Chair, Mr. Acting Under-Secretary-General, distinguished delegates. It is a great pleasure to join this distinguished panel at this important side event. I wish also to begin by expressing our appreciation to the other co-sponsors, well represented in this podium, for this timely discussion. I also commend UNLCT, CTED, and ICOW for their exemplary work through the Autonomous and Remotely Operated Systems programme, which has proven essential in building member states' capacities to address the complex and rapidly evolving threats posed by unmanned aircraft systems. Portugal recognizes that the threat of terrorists' use of UAS is not a distant or hypothetical concern. It is real. It is growing. And it demands our urgent and collective attention. The evolving threat landscape has dramatically lowered the barriers that prevent terrorist actors from acquiring, adapting, and deploying UAS. These developments, combined with the cross-regional diffusion of tactics, are increasing risks to civil aviation, critical infrastructures, maritime security borders, and civilian populations. Portugal has direct knowledge about these implications of this— the implications of this threat. As a country with strategic maritime borders, critical infrastructures, and the commitment to the security of the Atlantic space, we are acutely aware of the vulnerabilities that UAS can exploit. We are also mindful of the regulatory and operational gaps that persist— as gaps that terrorist actors are quick to identify and exploit. For Portugal, the response to this threat must always be anchored in international law. The law is what distinguishes us from terrorists. This principle must guide our collective efforts to counter the terrorists' use of UAS. The Abu Dhabi Guiding Principles adopted by the Counterterrorism Terrorism Committee in 2023, provide an essential framework. They offer flexible, non-binding guidance that respects national sovereignty while promoting a common understanding of the legal, regulatory, and operational measures needed to address the UAS threats. We fully support their operationalization and calls on all member states to draw upon them in developing national responses. Portugal is committed to moving from principles to practice. We are investing in modernizing our national capabilities, and we are also supporting national innovation, including the development of dual-use technologies for public security and defense. At the same time, we recognize that national measures alone are insufficient. The transnational nature of the UAS demand— uh, threat demands enhanced international cooperation, including better alignment of legal, regulatory, technical, and operational responses. And also to improve coordination across national authorities and the UN system and relevant partners. Excellencies, we must be frank. The pace of technological innovation is outstripping the ability of institutions regulatory frameworks and operational systems to adapt. This gap is the space in which terrorist actors operate. Closing it requires sustained investment in capacity building, technical assistance, and knowledge sharing. My country has been, and will continue to be, as an elected member of the Security Council for the 2027-2028 mandate, for the 2018-2019 term, a consistent supporter of the UNSCT's capacity-building efforts, including those delivered through the AROWS programme in Africa and elsewhere. We see this as an opportunity to further strengthen the UN's counter-terrorism architecture and to ensure that our collective responses are effective, coherent and principled. In closing, let me make three brief appeals. First, let us accelerate the operationalization of the Abu Dhabi Guiding Principles, ensuring they are translated into practical tools, training, and technical assistance for member states. Second, let us strengthen our partnerships with the private sector, academia, and civil society—actors that are essential to understanding technological developments and developing effective countermeasures. Third and last, let us never forget that our counterterrorism efforts must be fully consistent with international law and human rights. The fight against terrorism— it's a good reason to uphold these values with greater determination. My country stands ready to work with all of you in this vital endeavor. I thank you very much for your attention.

Thank you very much, Ambassador. To conclude our opening segment, I'm pleased to invite Ms. Natalia German, Assistant Secretary General and Executive Director of the Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate, CTED.

Assistant Secretary General, you have the floor.

Thank you very much, dear Madam Moderator. Good afternoon, Excellencies, distinguished participants, dear colleagues. First of all, I would like to thank the Permanent Missions of the United Arab Emirates, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Portugal, represented today by their distinguished ambassadors, for sponsoring this important event, and also our close partners, UNOCT and IKEA, for their strong collaboration. In preventing the use of unmanned aircraft systems for terrorist purposes. While the international community has made important progress in recognizing and addressing this challenge, the urgency to act has never been greater. Through the Counter-Terrorist Committee and with the support of CTAD, the Security Council has played plays a central role in shaping global response to evolving terrorist threats. Terrorist groups continue to adapt and exploit emerging technologies, and UAS are a clear example, offering low-cost, accessible, and effective means for surveillance, delivery of payloads, and attacks. This threat is recognized in key Security Council resolutions, including 2370, adopted in 2017, and 2617, adopted in 2021. The Counter-Terrorist Committee has further reinforced this focus by adopting the Abu Dhabi Guiding Principles in 2023. These principles represent a significant milestone, consolidating global expertise and reinforcing a shared commitment to prevent the use of UAS for terrorist purposes. Their importance lies in their practical, structured approach built around four interconnected pillars. First, the legal and regulatory framework emphasizes the need for clear, consistent, and internationally aligned frameworks to control access to UAS and their components while enabling legitimate use. The principles draw on established standards, including those developed by the International Civil Aviation Organization, ensuring that responses are both effective effective and harmonized across jurisdiction. Second, institutional coordination highlights the need for a whole-of-government approach, bringing together law enforcement, aviation authorities, border agencies, intelligence services, alongside strong partnerships with international organizations, the private sector, academia, and civil society. Thirdly, operational and technical preparedness is essential. Member states must strengthen their capacity to detect, prevent, and respond to UAS threats through appropriate technologies, training, and timely information sharing. And fourth, technical assistance remains critical. Many member states continue to face capacity gaps in developing and implementing comprehensive responses. The guiding principles serve as a foundation for targeted support. In this regard, CTAD's recommendations support capacity-building efforts, including the Global Counterterrorism Programme on Autonomous and Remotely Operated Systems, led by UNOCT. These principles reinforce existing international frameworks and guide the work of the Counter-Terrorist Committee and CTAD's engagement with the member states, while underscoring the need for responses that support legitimate use of UAS, ensuring that all measures comply with international law and human rights law remains essential to maintaining public trust and sustainability of all our efforts. In conclusion, while the Abu Dhabi Guiding Principles mark an important step forward, their true impact will depend on effective implementation. Through sustained cooperation and practical action across sectors and across borders, we can ensure that technological progress is harnessed responsibly and not exploited for terrorist purposes. I thank you for your kind attention.

Thank you very much, Assistant Secretary General Gherman, and thank you to all of our distinguished opening speakers. We now move to the interactive part of today's program. It's my pleasure to hand over to our moderator and partner, Dr. James James Patton Rogers, Executive Director of the Brooks Tech Policy Institute at Cornell University, who will guide our expert panel discussion. Dr. Rogers, the floor is yours. Thank you.

And let me start by thanking Your Excellencies for your opening remarks. They were both insightful and helpful.

Thank you.

One of the most important to national security. We now get to dig deeper into this concerning and growing threat with our expert panel that we have here today, each of whom I will introduce in turn. I will start by handing the floor to His Excellency Dr. Mohammed Al-Kuwaiti, who is the head of cybersecurity for the United Arab Emirates, who will discuss national measures and lessons learned in countering and responding to UAS threats. Your Excellency, over to you. Thank you.

Thank you very much for this opportunity, for allowing us to present a use case in that perspective.

We all know that the threat we gather to address is no longer approaching, it has arrived. And unmanned systems have already been turned against our cities. Our infrastructures and our people, and they will be turned against them again if we did not act fast. It's a weapon that once required significant military capabilities can now be built or improvised by a single individual for a fraction of the cost of the system designed to stop it. It can be guided by software written, a content a way or a continent away and increased enabled by artificial intelligence and greater autonomy. This is the new asymmetry of terror. It favors the attacker and it demands that we think differently. I speak today not from theory, but from a perspective of a national preparedness informed by the director experience of a nation that has faced this threat, confronted it, and learned where the true center of gravity lies, and important lessons about readiness and responses. Let me state it plainly: an unmanned aircraft is not merely a machine in the sky. It is a network. It is a software. It is a chain of signal that can be read, blocked, turned against its users. This means that the struggle against the terrorist use of unmanned systems is at its foundational a cybersecurity struggle. Cybersecurity is the baseline. Remove it and every other defense we build stands on the sand. The United Arab Emirates does not speak of this threat in the abstract. Unmanned systems were launched against our civilian and strategic infrastructure. We did not read about it in reports, we lived it. Since then, the pictures have only been darkened. These systems are no longer the instrument of states alone. They are in the hands of terrorist organizations and of proxy actors who operate across borders at low cost, at growing scale, and with rising sophistication. A single device can threaten an airport, an energy facility, or a gathering of civilians. And the true danger is not the airframe. It is the digital ecosystem behind it. The control links that can be hijacked, the navigation signals that can be spoofed, the software that can be weaponized, and the supply chain through which all of it's acquired and adapted. This is why I place cybersecurity at the center of any serious response and not at its edge. You cannot stop what you cannot see. You cannot see without secure sensors, resilience network, and data you can trust. And you cannot command a response if the system you depend on can be blinded, corrupted, or seized. Our detection grid, our command and control, and the critical infrastructure we defend are all at their core digital. When the cyber foundation fails, the physical defense built upon it fails with it. The countermeasure, make the system case. The most effective tool against a hostile drone are themselves depends on cyber and electronic capabilities. Detecting it, jamming it, spoofing it, or seizing it will always really add great value. These are the cyber capabilities. To wield them safely, lawfully, and with precision, a nation must first master its own digital domain. Cybersecurity is not a parallel effort. It is the baseline and an enable pillar of an integrated national response. AI now sits at the heart of this contest, and it cuts both ways. In one way, in one hand of those who would do harm, AI can reduce human involvement in critical stages of planning and operation. It enables autonomous flights, coordinates swarms, adaptive evasions, and targets selected machine speeds. In our hand, we definitely can strengthen detection, classification, and situation awareness, applying all responses, detecting, classifying, and attributing faster than any human team. The question before this body is not whether AI will defend this domain, for it will. The question is whether responses or responsible states will master it faster and govern it more wisely. Than those who would abuse it. The United Arab Emirates intend to be among those who do definitely good use of AI. Experience has taught us hard lessons, and I offer them in a spirit of partnership. Prepare before the attack because readiness cannot be improvised under fire. Coordinate across every agency because no single institute on this threat. Protect critical infrastructure as one system with a command and control, cyber and physical together, because the adversary sees no line between them. Control the entire ecosystem of acquisition, adaptation, and deployment, including the dual-use supply chain that feeds it. No nation can secure this domain alone because the threat itself honors no borders. What cross— Frontiers in attacks must be met by what crosses resilience. International cooperation must now focus on practical implementation, the exchange of operational lessons, joint exercises, technical testings, targeted capacity building, and cooperation with industries and other relevant partners. The UAE will continue to advance Abu Dhabi Guiding Principles as a practical foundational for this cooperation and to work hand in hand with the Office of Counterterrorism, the Counterterrorism Committee, Executive Directors, the International Civil Aviation Organizations, and our partners across every region. Excellencies, awareness is no longer enough. Awareness alone has never stopped a single drone. Our task now is to turn awareness into capability and warnings into readiness. That capability rests on a foundation, and that foundation is cybersecurity. Strengthening it by the responsible power of artificial intelligence. Build it, and the technologies of this century will serve humanity. Neglected, and they will turn against us. The UAE stands ready, ready to share what we have learned, ready to build capacity alongside our partners,— and ready to help ensure that the innovation meant to lift humanity are never allowed to endanger it. I thank you very much for everything. Thank you. Back to you, sir.

Draw our attention to the often overlooked cybersecurity, software-defined, and networked issues of the UAS threat. I now hand the floor to Ms. Guadalupe Megra from the who's the Officer-in-Charge, SPIB, from the UNOCT, who discusses unmanned systems as a threat and opportunity, drawing on lessons learned from 5 years of the AIROS program. I hand the floor to you.

The systems program— I want to ground them in what we have actually seen over the 5 years of its existence. The program has helped member states across Africa and across Asia gain intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that were not imagined— imaginable a decade ago. The effect has been direct and practical. The programme tools help these member states detect and monitor threats to critical infrastructure and vulnerable targets, as already mentioned, secure their borders, improve intelligence collection and incident responses, and support search, rescue, and disaster operations. This is the opportunity side, and it is real. There is, of course, also a threat. What we have learned is that it is evolving faster than multilateral and regional responses can keep pace with. The barriers to acquisition and adaptation have fallen, supply chains are global, and what appear in one region rarely stays there. Working closely with partners in many of these regions has given us a clear view of how the threat is changing, where the potential for harm lies. That potential is closer than what people perceive. We have seen terrorist groups across Africa show real confidence and capability in using unmanned systems in the air and at sea, including by targeting United Nations operations. This is not, in our experience, necessarily a failure of principle. The Abu Dhabi Guiding Principles give member states practical guidance, and that foundation is sound. But principles have to continuously evolve and must then be turned into trained people working procedures and systems that function in real conditions. That gap between what is agreed and what is in place is where I would like to focus. The first lesson that we have learned is the importance of expertise. There is a real distance between policy conversations and what happens on the ground, in industry, in research institutions and within criminal and terrorist organizations. To close it, to close that gap, we need technical knowledge of our own. In 5 years, the program has grown from a small team of program managers into a team that includes engineers, geospatial information specialists, and trainers with decades of operational experience. We learned early that we cannot credibly advise a member state on a technical threat or on the responsible use of these systems without that expertise in-house. The second learn— the second lesson that we have learned is that we have to be where the technology is developed and used alongside first responders, in universities, and with the private sector. Just last month, we were at the leading research university in Asia looking at how 3D printing can build affordable and easily repairable unmanned systems kits for first responders. These conversations matter most when they take place near where they are needed, not only in distant capitals. Last year, we brought United Nations experts, CAR, Cornell, and researchers from a leading European research university to brief Senegalese law enforcement on where the threat really is and where it is heading. We should be doing more of this., but unfortunately funding constraints do not often allow it. The third lesson is that lasting capacity is built through sustainable presence. Short awareness sessions have their place, but countering this threat and using these systems responsibly is achieved by working alongside the countries we assist for extended periods of time and in a sustainable way. As we speak, one of our teams is wrapping up its third week of training in Kenya, supporting the deployment of unmanned aerial systems and underwater drones for maritime security. This is the level of engagement that delivers results. It is why we invest not only in training operators but in training national trainers, and that's why we're giving our beneficiaries the course materials, so the capability becomes truly their own. Our independent evaluation found that this approach is effective. Our work has saved lives. It has helped locate missing persons at sea. It has helped strengthen border security, and it has helped detect and prevent attacks in West Africa. The approach works when it is sustained, technical, and close to the ground. A great deal of valuable work still lies ahead. Discussions on the issue of the growing threats of UAS remain relatively closed and often stay at the national or regional levels. States can be understandably cautious about sharing their experiences. That is part of why the Programme, with its partners, has built much of its own technical capacity with the support of academia, industry and Member States. One concrete example: just a few days ago, UNOCT and its partners Cornell University Conflict Armament Research and Syracuse University we just secured funding from the Carnegie Foundation for research into how armed groups acquire, adapt and deploy unmanned systems in Africa. This is the kind of partnership that turns caution into shared knowledge. There is a real scope to open these exchanges further, and much to gain when we do. So let me close with this. The opportunity is real. The threat is closer than we often admit. And the principles we have agreed on will matter most when they are matched by sustained technical and cooperative work on the ground. This is the work that this program is committed to. Thank you.

On the horizon of threats, especially in terms of the growing maritime threat and the 3D iterative printing. Um, to keep us focused on this issue, I now hand the floor over to Mr. Christopher Barks, who is Regional Director North America, Central America, and the Caribbean, um, for ICAO, the International Civil Aviation Authority.

Over to you.

Thank you very much.

Thank you for this opportunity. Excellencies, distinguished panelists, and colleagues, it's a privilege to address this gathering on behalf of ICAO and to contribute to a discussion that sits at the very intersection of international security and the future of civil aviation. The misuse of unmanned aircraft systems by terrorist actors, as others have already pointed out, is no longer a theoretical contingency. It is a documented and growing operational reality. Rapid advances in autonomy, artificial intelligence, additive manufacturing, and modular payload design have significantly lowered the barriers to acquisition, adaptation, and deployment. These trends, combined with cross-regional diffusion —of tactics and battlefield innovation are increasing risks to civil aviation, critical infrastructure, and civilian populations worldwide. At the same time, the pace of technological change is outstripping the capacity of institutions, regulatory frameworks, and operational systems to adapt. The result is a widening gap between the availability of these technologies and the ability of states to prevent and respond effectively to their misuse. Addressing that gap is the central challenge before us today. ICAO's mandate is to foster safe, secure, and orderly development of international civil aviation. In fulfilling that mandate in the context of UAS, we must address a fundamental tension. The very technologies driving innovation in air mobility also create new vectors for misuse. Our regulatory response must be calibrated to manage both dimensions simultaneously and without sacrificing one for the other. ICAO has established a foundational international framework through its relevant annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and related guidance materials, which provide states with binding standards and tools to ensure that both safety and security for U.S. operations— UAS operations. In addition, the ICAO Aviation Security Panel assesses the specific risks posed by the misuse of UAS against civil aviation infrastructure. Airports, airspace, and air navigation services, and calls for the need for coordinated global approach, recognizing that no single measure and no single state can address this threat in isolation. Effective UAS integration and airspace security require more than standards. They require harmonized national regulatory regimes reliable detection and identification capabilities, and clearly defined pre-established protocols for response. Critically, they require whole-of-government coordination among civil aviation authorities, national security agencies, law enforcement, air traffic control, and the private sector. The Abu Dhabi Guiding Principles on Threats Posed by the Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems for Terrorist Purposes represent a landmark contribution to this effort. IKEA fully supports their operationalization, and our joint work with UNOCT through the EROS program reflects a shared conviction that the information— that the international response must be integrated legally, technically, and operationally. What this side event advances and what the international community now requires is a deliberate shift from principles to practice. ICAO stands ready to support member states in translating international frameworks into concrete national aviation, national regulatory and operational measures through technical assistance, guidance material such as UAS Toolkit and the Protection of Civil Aviation Infrastructure Against Unmanned Aircraft. And capacity building and sustained multilateral engagement. The integration of UAS into global airspace is irreversible. The obligation of the international community is to ensure that this integration proceeds on terms that protect the safety of civil aviation and the security of all populations it serves. ICAO remains fully committed to that endeavor. In partnership with the United Nations system, with member states, and with all relevant stakeholders. Thank you very much.

Thank you. Thank you for your remarks. Turn our attention to the challenges that we continue to face. I now hand the floor over to Mr. Jean-Philippe Marange, the Senior Legal Officer of CTED, who will discuss operationalizing the Abu Dhabi Guiding Principles. I hand the floor to you.

Thank you, Mr. Moderator. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, colleagues. Next slide, please. CITED is grateful for the opportunity to contribute to this discussion on the growing security implication of unmanned aircraft system, UAS. US exemplify the broader challenge posed by the misuse of emerging technologies. They are accessible, adaptable, low-cost, and increasingly embedded within terrorist methodologies. The ability to bypass traditional security perimeters, including protected facilities and crowd Public space is a major appeal factor, as reflected in recent CTED engagement with member states. Terrorist groups, including ISIL and its affiliates, are increasingly using UAS for reconnaissance, targeting, and attack delivery, with experimentation involving explosive improvised explosive devices and potentially even more complex payloads. CITER assessment visits conducted on behalf of the Counter Terrorism Committee highlight a clear shift. UAVs are no longer treated solely as aviation or safety concerns, but as a credible and evolving vector for terrorist activity. Next slide. CTED assessment also recognizing the positive application of UAS by law enforcement and border forces for surveillance, situation awareness, and operational support. CTED assessments reflect this dual-use reality by examining, examining both the risks associated with terrorist exploitation of UAS and the benefit of their responsible use by authorities as part of comprehensive counterterrorism and security frameworks. This fundamentally alters the security paradigm. Traditional perimeter-based protection models are no longer sufficient when threats can approach from above, subsurface and/or underwater, often with minimal warning. The 2023 Abu Dhabi Guiding Principles have been integrated into CETAID global assessment work. CETAID observes that member states are actively adapting towards the implementation of guiding principles but remain in a transitional phases. Several consistent patterns emerge. First, most states now recognize UAS as a terrorist threat and are beginning to integrate it into national counterterrorism and critical infrastructure protection framework. Next slide, please. However, standalone counter-UAS strategies remain rare. With states relying instead on fragmented aviation, criminal, and security laws. Operationally, efforts focus heavily on detection and identification technologies such as radar and radio frequency tools. Active mitigation such as jamming or interception remains legally and technically constrained. Counter-UAS measures are typically deployed temporarily around high-risk events or sites rather than as permanent infrastructure, reflecting resource constraints and a risk-based approach. Effective counter-UAS responses require coordination across aviation authorities, law enforcement, military actors, and private operators. Yet, CTED assessment frequently identified unclear mandates and fragmented responsibilities, which can delay response and reduce effectiveness. Perhaps most importantly, CTED findings underline that intelligence-led prevention remains the most effective tools available, including monitoring procurement, online knowledge sharing, and precursor material. Across regions, CITED has identified several systematic gaps, and we can mention the lack of common terminology and regulatory coherence, insufficient integration of integration of the US scenario into national risk assessment, limited incident response planning and regular exercises, underdeveloped forensic and investigative capabilities, ongoing difficulty in balancing security measures with human rights, privacy, and data protection. These gaps highlight that the challenge is not only technological,— it's also institutional, legal, and strategic. Our findings through monitoring the implementation of the Abu Dhabi Guiding Principles underscore that effective responses must be comprehensive and structured across the four pillars of the Guiding Principles. In practical terms, this requires states to: Integrate US into— US threat into national risk and threat assessment. Establish clear national focal points and command structures. Invest in layered detection and mitigation systems rather than single solution. Conduct regular exercise and scenario-based planning. Strengthen information sharing and international cooperation. Next slide, please. Critic— crucially, it also requires moving from reactive, event-driven responses to proactive, system-wide resilience planning. CITED mandate position it as a bridge between assessment and action. In partnership with UNOCT, notably through the AROS program, The CTED-led capacity consultation plays a key role in ensuring that CTED assessment findings directly inform and drive capacity building efforts. These consultations enable CTED and UNOCT to better map needs and priorities of beneficiary states, ensuring support-based, targeted, and aligned assistance with international frameworks, including the Abu Dhabi Guiding Principles. The evolving threat posed by UAS reflects the broader, fast-adapting nature of terrorism in the digital age, requiring not only technological solutions but also coherent legal frameworks, effective institutional coordination, operational readiness, and sustained international cooperation. CETAID remains committed to strengthening collective response in partnership with all stakeholders. Thank you, Mr. Moderator.

Thank you, and thank you most importantly for raising the issue of growing cross-domain threats and the importance of intelligence led prevention. I now hand the floor to Mr. Jonah Leff, who is the Executive Director of Conflict Armament Research, who will discuss trends in the acquisition, weaponization, and deployment of unmanned systems and components by non-state armed groups. Jonah, over to you.

Thank you very much, and thank you all for the opportunity to speak here today. Um, next slide, please. By way of introduction, Conflict Armament Research is an investigative research organization, uh, that has worked for the last 15 years with governments and industry to document and trace the supply of weapons, including UAS, in more than 25 conflicts globally. We also document advancements in technology that produces knowledge that we can share among our partners. We do this through direct access on the ground with our partners to weapons that have been seized or recovered in conflicts, and we cooperate with governments and industry in an endeavor to map the supply chains of those items to understand how they ended up with terrorist groups and non-state armed groups. Next slide, please. Um, my presentation today really comes on the back of a decade of research on the issue of UAS going back to the Islamic State, um, and their operations in Iraq and Syria, as well as the Houthis in Yemen. Most recently, um, as mentioned, we, uh, partnered with UNOCT on a global study, uh, that was released in 2024. And I should plug that we have just released a new report today, in fact, tracking non-state armed group modifications to UAVs. This is available on X, so all of you can check it out there on our site. And of course, the most recent project that we are just starting in partnership with UNOCT and Cornell University looking at UAS procurement and deployment and weaponization across non-state actors focusing in Africa. Next slide, please. Next. So, to discuss the evolution of the UAS threat, I think it's important to look at the last 5 or so years where there has been a demonstrable increase in access to technology not just by state actors, but also by non-state actors. Next. This, of course, has enhanced non-state actors' capabilities, while at the same time, there has been decreasing barriers to production, both for state and non-state actors. Next, please. Oh, yeah. So, what we've seen then is a convergence of capabilities where national defense actors now have capabilities really that mirror those of non-state armed groups in the realm of UAS and that— and related technology. Next slide, please. I think a good example of this since the conflict in— between Russia and Ukraine commenced is really a trend in technology where advancements and technical know-how has emanated from that conflict to the hands of non-state actors across the world. On the right-hand side of the slide is an example of a fiber optic first-person view drone that was first documented by our teams in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, and then most recently this year in the custodianship of an armed— a non-state armed group in the Middle East. Notably, fiber optic technology makes drones impervious to countermeasures, so this is a growing and new and emerging threat. Next slide. I think among all non-state armed groups, the Houthis in Yemen exemplify the greatest achievement in the evolution of their deployment of these systems. Going back 10 years, when they were deploying small commercial quadcopters, and then over time increasing range and ability to release explosive payloads up to 2022. And now most recently— next slide— we've seen advancements that, that go beyond the, the, the threat, where there is now documented evidence of hydrogen fuel cells that have been used— not yet used, but have been procured by the Houthis. This technology accelerates the range and the ability to power uncrewed systems with great stealth. Notably, these systems were mislabeled as oxygen cylinders, which also goes to show that There are really complicated concealment practices that non-state groups and their suppliers are undertaking. We have not seen this being used by the Houthis, as I mentioned, but there is potential use for this in uncrewed underwater vehicles. So, we are on the lookout for that. Next slide, please. Going back again to the Islamic State in Iraq, these were fairly rudimentary and basic, deployments of airdrop munitions. Some of them were improvised. Next slide. Fast forward, more recently in the last couple of years, these are examples from Somalia and Syria where we've seen 3D printing used to, to release airdrop munitions from small commercially available systems. Next slide, please. The threat also spreads as far as Mexico, where we've also documented transnational organized crime groups using commercially available UAS that have been modified for greater impact against authorities in Mexico. Next slide, please. I mentioned first-person view drones, or FPVs. This is a relatively new threat that we, we only first documented a few years ago, again at the start of the conflict in between Ukraine and Russia. Now we've seen these items across 6 non-state armed groups since 2024, and we expect for this threat to, to increase as we, as we go forward. Next slide. Next slide. I wanted to note that, uh, looking at the systems themselves does not give you the full picture. So in an endeavor to trace UAS, it's really important that you look at the components inside, not just to identify the date of them, when they were transferred, but also to identify the manufacturer of the various components, um, that are being used in the construction of these items And it's only through doing analysis and tracing of the internal components that one can identify and start to understand the supply chains, where the items may have been produced, and all of the vectors and channels, um, that supported the, um, incorporation of these components into the systems that are being used by non-state actors. Next slide, please. With one piece of evidence, literally one component, you can build out an understanding through tracing and through trade data and analysis of other open-source pieces of evidence, a whole picture of the supply chain and all the entities involved. And this is just one example of, of how you can build out that picture just based off on one documentation of an item in conflict. Next slide, please. So just to conclude with some key observations. Next slide. One, strengthening customs and border control. It's critical to develop the expertise through training and support of officials for them to be able to identify and seize diverted items and components at ports and at border points. Improving international information sharing. Of course, no one acts independently on this issue. Um, and so identifying UAS trafficking routes, the concealment methods that I mentioned, recovered components, the facilitators, and emerging capabilities that are identified through existing regional and international mechanisms is important. As well as engaging with industry, we found that without this understanding the supply of items, is nearly impossible because it is industry that holds the information on what are often dual-use items that they are supplying lawfully but are then being diverted down, down the supply chain. So cooperating with industry and working with them to map out these supply chains and identifying these diversion points is critical in understanding the problem. Next slide, please. And of course, a multidisciplinary action plan To respond to the UAS threat is paramount. We can't leave this to one agency alone, but law enforcement, military, aviation authorities, of course, all need to be involved in addressing from their respective mandates. Taking a control strategy that is balanced and targeted rather than broad is also important. So, especially when you're looking at components, it's important to understand that these are supplied in the millions across the world to, you know, hundreds of end users. So, focusing on those strategic components that are prioritized, that demonstrate operational impact and diversion risk is also useful so that we are not, you spreading ourselves too thin across, you know, a wide array of different types of components and end users, whereas we can focus that effort and really focus on the problem where it exists. I'll leave it there in the interest of time. Thank you very much for your attention.

Thank you, Jonah, and thank you for the work that you and CAR do, especially in supply chain tracking and in-country analysis. Without the information you give us on components, we wouldn't understand the nature of the current threat in the way we do. It is my pleasure to give our final talk to Mr. Reda Laya Mawri, who is the Senior Fellow for the Policy Centre for the New South, who will discuss low-cost technology, non-state armed groups, with West Africa as a case study. Mr. Laya Mawri, the floor is yours.

The stage is yours.

Thank you, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, colleagues. I will be speaking about the evolution of use of using drones by non-state— non-armed states, armed groups, and terrorist organizations in West Africa and Lake Chad Basin, a region that I have been working on for 15 years, supporting governments, non-government institutions as well as private companies. I think we all agree today, and that's— that it's no news, that no, it's not new that non-state armed groups, terrorist groups, use drones during— for operations. The past 3 years, however, witnessed a rapid evolution in West Africa. In 2023, there was one incident recorded in Mali. In 2024, there were 25. In 2026, there were 136 incidents. And in 2020— in 2025, there were 136. But in 2026, so far there are 39. So we can see that the use of drones by terrorist organizations is established and developed by these organizations. So they moved from just dropping artisanal IEDs to carrying kamikaze drone attacks to also swarm drone attacks, and happened just in April 2026 in Mali. How these groups— it's important for us to understand, not just to be fascinated by the evolution, but also look at and analyze what these groups have been doing. Um, these groups did not just happen to carry an attack that they learned about, um, a day before. Um, looking at, um, looking at available, publicly available data, myself and colleague that we've been studying for 18 months that these groups spend months training their pilots before they can carry an attack. What does this tell us is that while they are carrying an attack today, they are preparing for the next one 3, 4, 6 months from now. We also found out that, um, the first attack that occurred in 2023 in Mali took at least 3 months of preparation. Of course, the recent coordinated attacks in the region, uh, took more time, took more equipment, more hours of preparation, and more drones. Why I say more drones? Because inventory is important, and that is the good news so far. For the region because inventory is not good for these groups operating there. Because when you are training, every trainer, in order to become an expert on flying a drone and carrying attack, needs 3 to 4 drones. However, this might change with inventory that might be available with the end— after the end of maybe the Ukrainian and the Russian war. Some individuals with bad intentions, they will do whatever it takes to get their hands on that inventory. And that will be a high risk, not just for West Africa, but also other parts of the continent and around the world. So far, the response in the region have been almost nonexistent. Um, the 202 attacks that have been recorded the past 3 years Only 10 times there have been responses to these attacks by these terrorist organizations. Only one time, one jamming, um, one jamming, uh, the jamming mechanism was used, but also was used just by Afrikakorps, which is a Russian-affiliated mercenary group. And only one time a defender have used air defense system. So the response have been almost non-existent by nations in the region. And as I said, we have not just been fascinated, um, and examining and by the evolution of these groups and the use of, uh, of, of drones, but also thinking of solutions. And if you allow me, I have at least 3 recommendations, suggestions. The first one, and it is the most important, as everyone said, capacity building/training. What we have developed is a database based on this incident, looking at every indicators related to these drones and this incident and the data collected, and develop training for security forces on how to anticipate and prevent these attacks by use of AI. And this will help security forces protect fixed assets as their bases and also mobile assets, their convoys. In addition, as we have seen, there have been repeated attacks against fixed and mobile assets, against convoys carrying fuel and against the airports, against airports of Bamako as well as in Niamey, at least. Everyone talked about coordination and sharing of intelligence and information. This is key because it helps protect and— protect and also the— eliminates and reduce access to drones. The third recommendation is Helping security forces become not just military officers, but also analysts. When you look at the use of drones, we look at the data, most of the attacks carried using drones took place between February and April and May. Why is that? Because that's when the sky is clear for them. That's because then June the rainy season starts in the, in the region and sandstorms, so it becomes very difficult to use drones to carry their attacks. Additionally, also, so developing in the training that we developed and how to implement these factors in, into their analysis, the heat as well. They are aware of like that the heat does, um, the does affect the battery and the, the distance that the drone can, can fly. So the importance of, of being able to analyze this, you implementing these factors help them prevent, anticipate and prevent such attacks. Thank you very much for your attention.

—growing UAS activity across West Africa and the Sahel. Your Excellencies, distinguished delegates and members, what we've heard from our experts here today is very clearly the growing cyber policy and hardware challenges that we face into the future. And you will have heard that we have our new project funded by the Carnegie Foundation that will bring together those from civil society, industry, policy, and also academia to address these threats over the next 2 years, and I look forward to briefing you once again on that in the near future. I now hand over the floor to Mr. Masquesud Cruz for the closing remarks. Your Excellency, over to you.

Excellencies, Distinguished colleagues, allow me on behalf of the co-organizers to thank all the speakers, panelists, and participants for their valuable contributions to today's discussion. We are also grateful to the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, including its autonomous Autonomous and Remote— including its Autonomous and Remotely Operated Systems program, as well as CTED, ICOW, and other partners for their continued work in supporting Member States and for their partnership in making this event possible. Our discussion today reinforced a shared reality. And 3 practical priorities. First, the terrorist exploitation of unmanned aircraft systems is not a future concern. It is a present and evolving challenge shaped by rapid technological change, wider accessibility, and the growing ability of terrorist actors to adapt and innovate. Participants Mr. Secretary Mattis highlighted the risks that the exploitation of UAS for terrorist purposes can pose to civilians, critical infrastructure, aviation, borders, maritime security, public events, and national security. It is a global and cross-border threat requiring a coordinated and practical international response. The central challenge is implementation. While important progress has been made in developing guidance, frameworks, and good practices, many Member States continue to face gaps in preparedness, capacity, and coordination. Technology alone is not enough. Effective responses require readiness, trained personnel, clear responsibilities and strong cooperation between governments, international organizations, industry and technical experts. Third, existing guidance and good practices, including the United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy, the Delhi Declaration and the Abu Dhabi Guiding Principles, remain valuable tools for supporting national implementation and international cooperation. The priority now is ensuring that Member States can translate that guidance into stronger preparedness, greater resilience, and practical capability. Looking ahead, our shared priority must be turning principles into practice. This means helping Member States identify implementation gaps strengthening national capacities, and develop practical tools that can be adopted to different national contexts. It also means ensuring that our efforts remain balanced. Preventing terrorist exploitations of UAS must preserve the legitimate and beneficial uses of unmanned technologies across development, humanitarian action, infrastructure, and public services. In light of today's discussion, we intend to engage interested member states, international organizations, and technical partners on ways to strengthening practical cooperation in addressing the terrorist use of unmanned aircraft systems, including by exploring opportunities for more regular exchanges of experiences, lessons learned, and good practices. Strengthening such exchanges can help ensure that good practice travels at least as fast as the threat itself. Any future arrangement would be developed in consultation among interested partners. Complement existing member state and UN initiatives and would not seek to create new norms or obligations. In this spirit, the co-sponsors look forward to continuing to work with Member States, UNOCT and its EROS Programme, SEATED, ECOWAS Member States and other partners to support practical capacity-building efforts and help address identified implementation gaps. Ultimately, success will depend on our collective ability to translate existing guidance into effective action. The threat is evolving quickly. Our response must evolve with it. Thank you.

Excellencies, distinguished delegates and colleagues, let me begin by thanking our co-sponsors, the Permanent Missions of Japan, the Republic of Korea, Portugal and the United Arab Emirates, and our co-organizers, particularly CETAID and IKEO, for making this discussion possible. And I also thank our moderators, and our panelists for a substantive and practical exchange. I want to express particularly our sincere gratitude for the words of support shared by the United Arab Emirates, in particular Dr. Al-Khawairi and Dr. Kruse, also on behalf of the other co-sponsors towards the work we do, the Arab Programme, and UNOCT in general. What we have heard this afternoon underlines a simple point: that the threat posed by the terrorist use of UAS is not a single problem with a single solution. It cuts across several aspects at once, and our response has to do the same. We heard about the threat itself, how these systems are acquired, adapted and used by non-state armed groups for terrorist purposes.— and how quickly that picture is changing, including in regions where low-cost technology is widely available. We heard about the regulatory and aviation dimension, and the importance of airspace management, registration, and clear frameworks that allow legitimate use while reducing the space for misuse. We also heard about the legal and normative dimension,— and in particular the work of translating the commitments Member States have already made, including through the Abu Dhabi Guiding Principles, into concrete national measures. And we heard about national and regional experience, the practical lessons of those who are working to detect, deter and respond to these threats on the ground. Taken together, these aspects point to We have all come to the same conclusion: that no government and no organization can address this challenge alone. It requires the security, aviation, legal, and technical communities to work together, and it requires sustained international cooperation. This is where the United Nations can add value. Through the AIRAS program and several other UNOCT initiatives and programs, we are working with member states globally to build the capacity to detect, deter, and respond to the misuse of unmanned systems, and to support the implementation of the guidance that Member States themselves have agreed. The Global Counter-Terror Strategy and its reviews give us the mandate, but our tasks remain to continue the implementation efforts and bring the principles to practice. We are committed to continuing this work with all of you, and to doing so in close partnership with CTED, with ECHEL, and the wider United Nations system, and equally importantly with those who hold the expertise within the academia, the civil society, and the industry. The upcoming launch of the joint effort between the IRIS Programme, Conflict Armament Research, Cornell and Syracuse Universities is a testament to this. Let me close on behalf of UNOCT by thanking each of you for your engagement today and by reaffirming our readiness to support Member States as they take this agenda forward. And I thank you.