4th Meeting - 2nd Session Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems 2026

Excellencies, distinguished delegates, could you please take your seats again? Thank you for your patience and understanding for our late start this afternoon. I have quite a list for the rest of the afternoon. I think we have a now also, I don't know. So I'm not going to read out the entire list. Let me read out the first four on the list now. That's Greece, Panama, Singapore, Bangladesh. So let me pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Greece. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

At the outset, our delegation would like to highlight that in our view, it is of paramount importance to ensure.

That the use of laws will remain subject to human judgment and control.

Exercised under appropriate human chain of command and control. In this regard, although our delegation prefers the initial wording used in paragraph 36 concerning the relevant element, we can support the new wording, namely, control and human judgment, as the text clarifies that such control is exercised by humans.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank the distinguished representative of Greece, and let me now pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Panama. You have the floor, ma'am.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Regarding paragraph 35, I would say the following: We support the drafting as it is. This is because IHL is not the only branch of international law that is applicable to armed conflict. As mentioned, other colleagues, such as Chile, referring to IHL, human rights law, et cetera, international customary law would also apply. As regards to paragraphs 36, 37, and 38, we believe that this is the heart of our discussion here. Those of us who have discussed or defended the centrality of human control and oversight, that is what has supported the creation of this GGE 10 years ago. That is to say specifically to have a venue for regulating this type of weapon that would be operating without such control. So this was a preventative measure. Now, we do know that these weapons are being used, however, but it is for that reason that it's important that we can stop any attempt to cross a dangerous moral red line, as we have heard from the Secretary-General as well as the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross. The issue of human control is not new or vague. It is the result of more than 10 years of discussion, deep discussion, particularly in recent years, as well as the progressive development of IHL to clarify the existing norms given drastic technological changes in the use and methods of war, as would be the case with autonomous weapon systems. in addition to respecting IHL, that govern the conduct of hostilities, and in particular, the principles of distinction, proportionality, and care in the attack that require a great deal of human control and reasoning. Another crucial aspect for which it is important that we keep the concept of human control is that it is necessary to determine who would be legally responsible should operations of an autonomous weapon system lead to a IHL violation or a war crime. Hence, while our preference was the original version of paragraph 36, as always, my delegation, in an effort to show full flexibility, good faith, and political will, and move toward consensus, ensuring that this is robust and consistent with all instruments. We would like to support, we can support this paragraph incorporating the proposal made by Ireland. Turning to paragraph 37 now. For my delegation, it's important that we retain this paragraph in the document, in the final document. However, we do agree with that which we heard from Mexico namely that it would be important to include the word "necessary". We would also support the proposals from Austria and Ireland when it comes to reflecting the issue of the protection of civilians. Lastly, in paragraph 38, it is also important for my delegation that we keep this paragraph as it was proposed with its subparagraphs, and we would be open to the suggestion made by Ireland and other delegations on how to keep a compulsory feature in the chapeau. But we do support this as drafted, including the sub-points. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And I thank the distinguished representative of Panama for stating the views of our delegation, commenting on positions of others. Next on my list is Singapore, to be followed by Bangladesh and the UK. Let me now pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Singapore.

Thank you, Chair. Good afternoon, colleagues. My delegation's view is that the edits to paragraphs 36 and 37 in the Chair's additional suggestions are moving in the right direction. We thank the Chair for your effort to reconcile the views of different delegations on the complex issue of the human element. We listened carefully to interventions earlier, including that from the distinguished representative of Ireland. We note that our Irish colleagues had also suggested those edits for paragraph 36 at the last informal consultation, and these suggestions have given us food for thought. My delegation welcomes efforts made by our Irish colleagues to address the link between control and judgment as exercised by a human. That is it. My delegation has a few concerns about how defence and security practitioners are expected to operationalise some of the proposed edits. Firstly, we were of the view that the word "anticipated" should be retained in reference to the effects of the use of force. My delegation notes that under IHL, the legal standard is prospective and not of perfect prediction. The ICRC's commentaries to the Geneva Conventions accept that the effects of a weapon are assessed based on the weapon's normal, intended, or expected use in combat. Secondly, on the phrase, and I quote, "retain the capacity to give effect to that judgment throughout the operation of the system," end quote, My delegation has concerns with the feasibility of this proposal. The suggestion of giving effect to judgments throughout the operation of the system seems to imply that constant human control must be imposed on laws. Conceptually, this seems to contradict the very notion of autonomy. Practically, this is also impossible to operationalise. If we cite a hypothetical example of using laws for air defence, where incoming threats approaching you do so in a matter of seconds. In such a short window, it is not likely that a human would have the cognitive ability or the capacity to intervene meaningfully during the operation of the air defence system. In this regard, we would welcome the opportunity to work with fellow delegations on alternative proposals to address the concerns about the technical feasibility of the text. Thank you, Chair.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Singapore. Next on my list is Bangladesh, to be followed by the UK and ICRC. Let me now pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Bangladesh. You have the floor, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for proposing revised text for the rolling text. Before I turn to our observations on paragraphs 35 to 38, Allow me to inform the GGE that my delegation aligns itself with the joint statement delivered yesterday by a group of states calling for the immediate commencement of negotiations on a legally binding instrument based on the current ruling text. On the legal framework governing the use of laws in para 35, we support the formulation international law, in particular IHL. While IHL is fundamental to the use of weapons in armed conflict, the legality of using laws should not be understood as arising from the IHL alone. Depending on the circumstances, other applicable rules of international law may also be relevant, including the law governing the use of force, state responsibility, applicable human rights obligations, and definitely international criminal law principles. A broader reference to international law, in particular IHL, therefore provides the more comprehensive and future-proof standard. It ensures that the use of laws remains subject to all applicable international legal obligations, while expressly reaffirming the central role of IHL in situations of armed conflict. For us, this is not about expanding obligations beyond what international law requires, but about ensuring that the formulation does not unintentionally narrow the legal framework applicable to the use of laws. Having said so, we also support the overall direction of paragraphs 36 to 38, but we see some formulations that warrant further clarification. First, in para 36, the reference to human beings exercise control directly or indirectly should not allow human involvement to become merely remote or procedural. Human judgment must remain meaningful in relation to the circumstances in which force is applied. Second, in paragraph 36, provided the determine should ensure more than a general legal assessment. It should require human determination based on the anticipated effects and circumstances of the attack, and that the use of the system complies with applicable international law. Finally, we are concerned that the measures in paragraph 38 are framed largely as permissive or indicative measures rather than clear regulatory obligations. Expressions such as "include inter alia", "can limit" and "taking into account" risk turning essential safeguards into options. If meaningful human judgment and control are to be effective, these measures should establish clear obligations for States and those responsible for the use of LAWS, rather than merely identify practices that may be considered. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Bangladesh for stating the position of his delegation and commenting on text proposals. Next on my list is the UK, to be followed by the ICRC, Canada and Israel. Let me now first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. We're focusing this intervention on the structure and concepts within the paragraphs 35 through to the chapeau to 38. rather than the detail of the measures within paragraph 38. In principle, the United Kingdom supports the approach that you have taken in those paragraphs. We see them as reflecting the practical reality of how humans maintain legal accountability for the operation of a system and how that accountability is given effect through appropriate measures of control. We consider the overall structure of your package to be important in that respect. It usefully sets out a framework that addresses the law, the legal agent to whom the law is addressed, and the factors that must be addressed by that legal agent in order to give effect to legally salient judgments through measures of control applied both to the system itself and to the manner and environment of its use. In our view, we need to ensure that we can clearly understand the conceptual linkages between these paragraphs. On paragraph 35, the United Kingdom agrees that the term applicable IHL focuses the paragraph on the relevant applicable rules. However, we also recognize the formulation suggested by the United States this morning. We agree that this formulation is consistent with the preamble of the convention and would cover all relevant legal obligations. Should the group consider that a specific reference to IHL is still needed, in that paragraph, it could read as follows. "Laws must only be used in accordance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, in particular, the IHL principles and requirements of distinction, proportionality, and precaution in attack." On paragraph 36, The United Kingdom supports the change in this text to control and human judgment. We agree that this better reflects the series of interventions that we, along with a number of other states in this room, have made addressing the way in which states exercise control over their armed forces and over the capabilities that they use in order to achieve military and strategic effect. We noted Portugal's point this morning that control must be inherently human, and we understand the concern underlying that point. However, we would respectfully suggest that human mechanisms of control are only one facet of the broader set of controls that may be required to ensure compliance with IHL. What is critical is that we maintain human judgment to implement the requirements within the law. This group has recognised that the lifecycle approach introduces systems of governance and control. If we focus too narrowly here on specific responsibility at a single point in the lifecycle, we risk missing an important category of governance and control that supports the lawful conduct of hostilities. Paragraph 38 addresses measures of control, some of which require measures to be in place either in the governance of human beings or in the governance of capabilities. However, having reflected on the interventions we've heard during the intercessional period and the positions expressed this morning, we consider that paragraph 36, which introduces the nexus between control and human judgment, should also refer to the connection between measures of control and the way in which they are applied to give effect to legally salient judgments. It is the exercise of judgment in relation to anticipated effects that provides the legal framework for the application of the relevant IHL rules. We see this in Article 57 of Additional Protocol I, which requires that judgments to be made in relation to expected effects and anticipated military advantage. Those judgments are given effect through measures of control, the way in which armed forces and the capabilities they use fulfill their relevant legal obligations. The United Kingdom would therefore suggest that paragraph 36 could introduce the concepts of measures of control and their relationship to judgment, with further elaboration of the measures then provided in paragraph 38. Paragraph 37 then usefully introduces the contextual factors relevant to the exercise of judgment in the context of applying the law to the circumstances. This determines the manner of application of the measures of control, and where paragraph 38 would provide more detail, articulation of what those measures may be. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom for stating the positions of her delegation and making concrete proposals. Next on my list is the ICRC, to be followed by Canada, Israel, and Nigeria. Let me now pass the floor to the distinguished representative of the ICRC.

Thank you, Chair. We welcome the new structure of your additional suggestions. We also agree with the points that have been made this morning, including by Switzerland, Ireland, France and others, that IHL obligations do not necessarily demand direct human control over a weapon system itself. Rather, IHL requires humans to control the weapon's effects in the circumstances of a specific attack. We do not view this as a new rule or standard, but as stemming from existing IHL rules that require users to be able to anticipate, direct and limit the effects of their weapons. This concept of control over effects is reflected in the draft text, in the proposal shared by Ireland this morning, and also in your additional suggestions. Specifically, in the second sentence of paragraph 36, though we share the concern raised by New Zealand that compliance should be carried through into action rather than stopping at the determination. In terms of what the actions are, we see control being operationalised through a layered response, ruling out systems posing the highest challenge to exercising control and judgement, and then imposing restrictions or measures, including at minimum those in paragraph 38. So moving to 38, the measures there are crucial to operationalize the concepts of human judgment, particularly subparagraph A, and control in subparagraphs B to D, and thereby they assist users of autonomous weapons to do so in compliance with IHL. As has been said already, including by Egypt this morning, these measures cannot be diluted or framed as optional. They are all required with respect to autonomous weapons, even if their specific details will vary in each case. Indeed, they are already framed in general terms. They don't prescribe specific thresholds. For example, there's no precise limitation as to the size of the geographic area or the maximum temporal scope over which an autonomous weapon should be allowed to operate. Further, they reflect existing military practice in the use of any weapon, including existing autonomous weapons. Subparagraphs B and D are also already qualified with the word "can". That is, they require a user can do the things listed, not that they necessarily do even. As they represent a minimum baseline already, they cannot be diluted or presented as optional, lest they become meaningless. In this vein, Chair, to ensure that the measures do indeed provide meaningful weapon-specific guidance, We see it necessary to reinstate specificity about the types of targets referred to in subparagraph B, notably reinstating language which appeared in a previous version of the rolling text restricting the use of autonomous weapons to military objectives by nature. Limiting an autonomous weapon to such targets presents a significantly lower risk when compared to military objectives by purpose, use, or location that the object eventually struck will in fact be protected as a civilian object at that time. And finally, we also echo the proposals made this morning by Portugal, Ireland, Egypt, and others to reinstate the reference to number of engagements. As has been said, we see this as providing useful and concrete guidance about the concept of the scale of operation, rather than being merely duplicative or redundant. Thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of the ICSC for commenting on the text. Next on my list is Canada, to be followed by Israel, Nigeria and Norway. Let me now pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Canada.

You have the floor.

Thank you very much, Chair. My delegation considers that this part of text is at the heart of our discussions this week. We appreciate the efforts that you have undertaken to bring together our point of view and achieve a consensus. Regarding paragraph 35, my delegation welcomes the changes proposed by the USA, and we support this here, in accordance with which laws must be in accordance with IHL. in armed conflicts. Regarding 36, we understand the concept of judgment as the fundamental role played by human beings in the determination of necessary actions to guarantee that anticipated effects of attacks by laws should be in compliance with IHL. These actions can represent a form of direct control or indirect control and could be taken before or during an attack, depending on the variety of factors that human beings must take into consideration. The context of such a situation, which depends on circumstances, will require different measures, including direct and indirect forms of control and human judgment. is of paramount importance in order to determine the level of control required as well as the manner in which this control must be exercised, whether that is direct or indirect. Our preference is to preserve the initial concept of human judgment and control. Nevertheless, in a spirit of consensus, our delegation could also support the wording that is proposed under the condition that the second part of the paragraph 36 be maintained in order to reflect the role of human beings in the determination of the degree of control necessary in order to ensure compliance with IHL. With regard to 37, our delegation supports the concept of human judgment and control depending on the context, and we support the preservation of the concept of context in this paragraph. As we have just explained, context is important in order for human beings to exercise their judgment with regard to the control measures required in order to address any anticipated effects of attacks in accordance with IHL. For this reason, Canada believes that the expression "should be considered" should be maintained in this text. My delegation would be open to the use of the wording "provided they determine" in paragraph 37, which would enable us to address the concerns of certain delegations. Tomorrow, we could also see added interest in the term "reasonably" so that the text would read as following, "effects that can be reasonably anticipated." Having said that, in 38, my delegation believes that the proposal voiced by the Chair is acceptable. Measures should depend on the context so that States can respond in accordance with their particular circumstances. We do not believe that measures are existing or cumulative obligations. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Canada for commenting on the text and making proposals. Next on my list is Israel, to be followed by Nigeria and Norway. Let me now pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Israel. You have the floor.

Thank you so much, Chair, and good afternoon, colleagues. Mr. Chair, firstly, we would like to express our support for the terminological change to control and human judgment. which we believe moves the text in the right direction. We would like to recall that some states, including Israel, have objected to using the term "human judgment and control" in our previous discussions. As we have noted in the past, human judgment and control, when presented as a single concept, may lead to some to read it as suggesting a form of ongoing human control over the operation of the system. While this is not the only possible reading of this wording, the coupling of the two elements in this way strongly invites such reading. In practice, human judgment might be exercised through a range of mechanisms, including system design, operational parameters, mission planning and activation, decisions without implying continuous human supervision throughout all the stages of the operation. Chair, we have also a number of additional comments to the text of paragraph 35 to 38. Regarding paragraph 35, as several other delegations mentioned before, my delegation has also concerns with the phrase, "applicable international law, in particular IHL." As this paragraph specifically addresses the use of laws in armed conflict, we believe it should refer directly to applicable IHL. The current formulation risks suggesting a broader legal standard by importing obligations from other legal regimes. In this regard, we reaffirm our view that existing IHL fully applies to lethal autonomous weapons systems. We also maintain that the current IHL is sufficient for regulating the use of any weapon system that possess autonomous capabilities. We will therefore suggest deleting international law, in particular, I quote, so that the paragraph will read, "Laws must only be used in accordance with applicable IHL, including the principles and requirements of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack." We can positively consider the US suggestion mentioned also by the Republic of Korea and Switzerland regarding the rules of international law applicable in armed conflicts. Regarding paragraph 36, Firstly, similar to our previous suggestion, here too, we will request deleting international law in particular and focusing on IHL. Secondly, we see value in the clarification that human beings may exercise control directly or indirectly. However, we remain concerned with the second part of the sentence, quote, "provided they determine on the basis of the anticipated effects of the attack that such use will comply with applicable IHL." This may be interpreted as requiring human determination in each specific use and does not sufficiently reflect the judgment and control may also be exercised through measures implemented prior to use. Human determination, as mentioned by others, is not a requirement under AHL and seems to contradict the very idea of indirect control, which is found in the beginning of the sentence. Regarding the Irish proposal, similarly to other delegations, we have serious concerns with the proposed language. For this reason, we think we should focus our efforts on the Chair's proposal, which we believe can offer a basis for bridging views and moving forward. In our view, the paragraph should focus on the legal outcome of required by IHL rather than on specific decision-making processes through which that outcome must be achieved. Accordingly, we suggest that paragraph 36 should read, I quote, "To uphold compliance with IHL, control and human judgment with regards to laws are needed. Human beings exercise such control directly or indirectly, provided that the use of laws will comply with applicable IHL." Regarding paragraph 37, we would like to prefer to return to the previous wording of this paragraph, as in our view, the current wording is confusing. Additionally, we'll suggest adding to the list of factors to be considered, the measures implemented prior to use. Therefore, it could read, including the operational context, comma, measures implemented prior to use, comma, and the characteristics and capabilities of weapon system as a whole. We can also positively consider the US suggestion to clarify the range of factors that should be considered in good faith-based on information reasonably available at the time. In our view, this will help to ensure that the assessment remains practical and grounded in the circumstances actually known to those making the relevant judgment. Finally, regarding paragraph 38. We share the same understanding of this paragraph as the Republic of Korea, the United States, and several other delegations. In our understanding, this is not a list of requirements that need to be fulfilled in every situation, but rather a practical tools that may be used in specific circumstances to assist in facilitating compliance with IHL, depending on the context. We note that there may be other measures that can be applied to enhance the complaints with IHL and it's merely a list of potential examples. It is also critical for us that these measures are framed as tools for meeting applicable legal requirements. We wish to emphasize that in any case, it is important that the language used in this paragraph reflect the fact that concepts relating to a human-machine interaction, judgment and control are not themselves a standalone rule of IHL, but rather possible means of supporting compliance with such rules. We therefore will suggest qualifying the chapeau to reflect its practical and non-obligatory nature, so it will read, measures to exercise control and human judgment with regards to loss can include, where appropriate, the following. Regarding paragraph 38A, we find the coupling of assessment of legal and ethical considerations with the concept of responsible chain of command and control to be confusing and mixed together too many concepts and terms. For this reason, we think that in this subparagraph, only the first sentence could remain. Regarding paragraph 3.8, additionally, we believe that the words "including inter alia" should be replaced by "with, for example", or alternatively, items from the list should be deleted or qualified significantly, as the examples given are only practical tools that may be used in specific circumstances to limit the effects, rather than a mandatory requirement in every situation. Finally, regarding paragraph 38, we suggest replacing the language "unless such modification is executed or authorized by a human" with "in a way that would violate IHL", which is more simple and it's right. Conditioning systems, modifications or direct human involvement is problematic as lawful systems updates may occur within a predefined legal and technical constraints without requiring real-time human involvement during the operation. Thus, we believe that the current wording misses the ultimate goal here, which is the prevention of violation of IHL. And we suggest changing the text to clarify this. Thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Israel for commenting on the text proposals from the Chair and also reacting to other proposals and making proposals himself. Next on my list is Nigeria, to be followed by Norway. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Nigeria.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation appreciates your indefatigable effort to.

Develop bridging language across paragraph 35 to 38.

We can support paragraph 35 and much of the proposed restructuring.

Particularly the strengthened requirement that human being determine on the basis of the anticipated effect of an attack, that the use of lethal autonomous weapon systems will comply with applicable international humanitarian law. We nevertheless have two concerns. First.

The reference to control being exercised directly or indirectly should not be understood as permitting nominal or ineffective human involvement.

We would prefer language clarifying that whether exercised directly or indirectly, such control must remain efficient and sufficient to enable.

Inform human judgment, and ensure compliance with international humanitarian law.

Second, in paragraph 38B, Nigeria would prefer to retain the reference to limiting the number of engagement that little autonomous weapon systems may undertake autonomously. This is a concrete and important operational safeguard, and its deletion would weaken the carefully balanced package. Subject to addressing these concerns, Nigeria can demonstrate flexibility regarding the remaining changes.

We thank you so much, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria. Next on my list is Norway. Let me pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Norway.

Thank you, Chair, and thank you for the additional suggestions on the screen. On paragraph 35, like Portugal and many others, we would like to support the reformulation that you proposed here on the screen. As I think Portugal explained well, this is not an open-ended reference to all international law. The formulation is applicable international law, which narrows down the relevant body. of international law that we're referring to here. So we took note of the US proposal, which, if we understood correctly, was for paragraph 35 to read, "Laws must only be used in accordance with rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, in particular the principles," and so forth. And for us, it seems to amount to much the same, just with additional emphasis on law that is applicable in armed conflict. So to the extent that, for instance, human rights law is applicable to armed conflict, this should, as we understand it, also be covered by the US proposal. So, I mean, we'll keep an open mind, but prefer, I must say, the formulation that you have on the screen there, which also seems to have somewhat broader support. On paragraph 36, thank you for this proposal to try and bridge the positions here. like Ireland and Portugal and others, we're very skeptical of inverting the formulation human judgment and control, which is already a major concession. We think that the development of autonomous technology has made us able to delegate more and more tasks to machines and tasks that humans previously had to undertake, and that risks diminishing the human role and the presence of the human, so to speak, in the use of force. So for us, the focus on human control is essential for at least three reasons. First, it underscores the importance of appropriately retaining the central role for humans in the use of force, the centrality of the human element, if you will. And it underscores, secondly, that humans must still interpret the law and apply the law to the facts at hand. That is to make the necessary judgments, especially in relation to distinction, proportionality and precautions. And third, it underscores that humans must be in a position to apply the outcome of those judgments to the system. That humans have the capacity to and to exercise this capacity to direct and limit the weapon system so that the way it operates and its effects remain in line with the intentions and the judgments of the human command chain. For those reasons, we have a strong preference for the text in the draft report, in which you have made clear that human judgement and control does not necessarily mean constant direct human control. That is an important clarification, because the quality, extent and form of the human control required vary, of course, with the concrete context and can be contributed to at various stages of the lifecycle. The term "human judgment and control" gives a lot of intuitive guidance, and we would have preferred to build a common understanding of what that means and what it does not mean in order to alleviate the concerns of those who feel that the formulation has the hallmark of a new legal standard. That said, as we mentioned in the informals, we are not dead set on one specific formulation and are willing to consider the inversion that you have proposed. so control and human judgment, as long as the package, as others have mentioned, reflects the essence of what we mean by human control. In that regard, we think that the structure that you propose on the screen, chair, in this new version, with paragraph 35 drawing up the principles, paragraph 36 introducing control and judgment concepts, paragraph 37 elaborating on the contextual elements that guide the exercise of human judgment and control, and finally paragraph 38, which is important to ensure proper human judgment and control. This is an essential part of the package that would underpin this reordering of human judgment and control. What we are not comfortable with in this proposal that you have on the screen here is the second sentence of paragraph 36. I mean, the first clause of the second sentence, which relates the term control to the role of the human, that is good. And also that it underscores that control can indeed be direct or indirect. However, it is the second clause that is problematic for us, because we read it to suggest that a pre-activation determination is enough. That can, of course, be the case, but it would not always be the case. The formulation is problematic, for instance, with regard to the obligation of constant care in article 57 of the additional protocol, which requires reassessment as circumstances change. So if we do inverse the order, we think wording along the lines of what Ireland have proposed could work, but we would also like to amend that proposal to capture the last point that I made. And I'll just read out what we then posted in the chat of the informal consultations last week. So we'd read to uphold compliance with international law, in particular IHL, including the principles and requirements of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack. control and human judgment with regard to laws are needed. This does not imply constant direct human control; human beings may exercise control directly or indirectly, and then we added, and at different stages of the system's life cycle. Regardless of how control is exercised, human beings must make the judgments necessary to determine that the use of laws, including its anticipated effects, complies with IHL in the circumstances of its use. and must retain the capacity to give effect to such judgments through the operation of the system, including where reassessment is required by changing circumstances. And just in response to the point, and I've sent this to you also by e-mail, just a response also to the point made by Singapore a little while ago regarding the ability to give effect to these judgments throughout the operation of the system. We do not see that formulation as suggesting a need for constant direct human control. As we read it, what that means is that, if the law requires you to make a judgment at some point, you must be able to apply the outcome of that judgment to the system at whatever time that judgment is required. On paragraph 38, which, as others have said, is also part of the package relating to human judgment and control, we find the most concrete guidance on how that can be ensured. That is not an exhaustive list, obviously, but it helps us in the right direction. We believe that the formulation of the chapeau that you have put on the screen is quite clever and should be a solution that can bridge the differences that we have in this room. It neither states that the elements are mandatory nor that they are optional. Unlike others, in sub-paragraph, we would request a reinstatement of the number of engagements. We accept that that is covered by the broader term "scale of operation", but the point here is to give as concrete guidance as we can, like we do when we expand on the scale of operation by mentioning the types of targets, duration and geographical scope. And limiting the number of engagements before some kind of reauthorization is required is a very practical way to ensure that the outcomes of the system remain in line with a human judgment and command intent prior to activation. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Norway for commenting on the text and the proposals made. Next on my list is the distinguished representative of Pakistan, to be followed by Japan, Colombia, Finland, API, less Cameroon, Denmark, China. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Pakistan.

Thank you, Chair. Chair, it's easy to follow after Norway, since we can just also say that we agree to many of the proposals that they have put forward. But let me also highlight some of our position on the text that is in front of us and react to some proposals that were made earlier this morning as well. Chair, we also do consider this cluster of paragraphs as a package. So we would tend to see what kind of balance it achieves in the end as an outcome for negotiations. Chair, on para 35, Pakistan supports retaining the reference to international law, in particular IHL, as Ireland has also proposed. We understand that the wish to anchor the paragraph in the rules on the conduct of hostilities, and we have no difficulty with distinction, proportionality, and precautions being named. But in our view, laws do raise questions that are not exhausted by the targeting rules. For instance, questions of state responsibility, Martens Clause, obligations that may arise before any attack is contemplated. So to confine the paragraph to rules applicable in armed conflict would tell only part of the story and present formulations which names IHL in particular already gives IHL the prominence it deserves. Chair, on paragraph 36, we have two concerns on the language as it stands. First is on the words "control" and "human judgment." We continue to prefer formulation "human judgment and control." Yes. So we think the words control measures are always taken by human beings exactly as judgments are. So it is human beings who bound the geographic area, who limit the duration, who set the target profile, who retain the ability to deactivate. There is no other actor who would do these things. So if the text says human judgment, but simply says control, it invites the reading that control is something that systems might apply or a machine could control itself. On the order, we also think that the judgment should come first because that reflects how the two operate. I think it was also mentioned in the African group statement that human judgment precedes and informs control. So the judgment determines what IHL requires and control is how that judgment is made effective. Our second concern, Chair, in this paragraph is on the words "provided they determine". This is perhaps a question of grammar, but in our view, with large consequences. As drafted, the sentence tells us that human beings exercise such control directly or indirectly, and then makes that statement conditional on a determination. provided that is the language of a proviso that is often used. So what it does is establish that where the determination is made, the requirement is satisfied, and then that determination could become a substitute for the control rather than the reason for it. So my delegation does not believe that that is the intention, but it could be read as such. And the effect is that a state could make an anticipatory determination in good faith that use of a system will comply with IHL and thereby discharge this paragraph, whatever capacity it did or did not have to constrain what the systems then did. So our formulation, our preference is the formulation that was suggested by Ireland. We are also happy to consider what Norway just read out. We think that these formulations do three things with regard to essential, it states plainly that this does not imply constant direct human control, but it also preserves both requirements by saying, regardless of how control is exercised, what matters is the human judgment. And it also asks that human beings retain the capacity to give effect to that judgment, which is the point at issue in this paragraph. We also note the distance here between us and the delegations who have made proposals, different proposals, is perhaps smaller than what we would believe. We recall perhaps it was the delegation of the United States this morning, which also proposed that human beings should give effect to their judgments through direct or indirect control, including through measures that are taken before laws is used. and we certainly welcome that thought. I think where we part company is, or where we differ is on what giving effect requires. If it means only that personnel can act with care and diligence, then a commander who acted diligently discharged the obligation, whatever the system was capable of doing. This is something that has a different connotation in our mind. In our mind, Care is a standard of conduct and capacity is something different that is an ability to act. Chair, on paragraph 37, we support the retention of this paragraph and we also support Austria's proposal, which was, I think, endorsed by Ireland also to replace entails with requires. On paragraph 38, We do prefer and we support making the language of the chapeau to be made mandatory. We do not think that these measures are a menu from which states may select according to convenience, but we have also heard arguments from the other side. We also would like to request refraining from diluting the language where it could be simply turned into a menu of an items. If we cannot make it mandatory, let's not make it optional either. So we would rather retain how you have proposed the chapeau, which does not invite that debate on how the language of obligation should read like, at least at this stage where we are in the process. On the sub-elements of the sub-paragraphs of this paragraph 38, we would come at a later stage. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan for sharing his reflections with regard to the text proposals from the Chair and reactions to that from delegations. Next on my list is Japan, to be followed by Colombia and Finland, but let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Japan.

Mr. Chair, we welcome the structure of your additional suggestions and would like to make a few comments. In paragraph 36, we support the inversion and appreciate the clarification of control and judgment as they elaborate what we understand by these words. With regards to the relationship between these concepts, we concur with the point made by the joint statement by the African group yesterday that judgment precedes and involves control. We have also noted concerns expressed in the intersessional period and during this session that determination alone is not sufficient. And in this regard, we support the UK proposal to link human judgment with measures of control, which give effect to human judgment to ensure compliance with IHL. Our delegation also concurs with the French delegation The judgment, human judgment, of what is necessary to comply with IHL needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into account contextual factors articulated in paragraph 37. We are still carefully studying proposals and would like to come back with further reactions. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Japan for commenting on the text. Next on my list is Colombia, to be followed by Finland and APILS. But first, the distinguished representative of Colombia. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chairman. Colombia truly appreciates this interactive conduct of these discussions and the fact that you are proposing new texts for discussion. Obviously, this helps us to forge ahead in our conversations. We agree with you that paragraphs 35 and 38 are directly related. In our delegation, we'd like to provide or add to the following comments to the conversation. First, generating consistency in the text is of vital importance if our future conversations and next steps are to have a logical thread. that is sustainable. So similar language throughout paragraphs 35 and 36 is important. We therefore agree that reference should be made to international law, public applicable international law, and in particular, IHL. The Portuguese delegation expressed this clearly this morning as regards the term "applicable" in English, and that this was necessary as we are not just referring to one area of international law. However, if this safeguard is insufficient, we could explore the suggestion from the United States, which was presented also by Switzerland, that is to say, clarifying international law applicable in armed conflicts. My second comment has to do with human judgment and control. We understand the reasons for which this was inverted. Colombia has reiterated on numerous occasions that the issue of human responsibility is essential if we are to establish responsibility for the use of these weapons. The second sentence in paragraph 36 clearly specifies further that control should also be human. However, we have heard in the room, we have heard the room and to find solutions, our delegation could support the proposal made by Ireland. this morning. We also heard adjustments proposed by the delegations. Lastly, paragraph 37, we can also accept the suggestions made by some of the delegations for changing "entails" for "requires." That obviously provides greater legal clarity. Paragraph 38, we believe that this is a list that these states should follow for the use of laws, so we support its inclusion. I thank you kindly.

I thank the distinguished representative of Colombia for commenting on the text. Next on my list is Finland, to be followed by IPILS, Cameroon, Denmark and China. But first, let me pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Finland.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. First of all, thank you for the relentless efforts undertaken to bring us closer to a solution on what is undoubtedly one of the most difficult remaining issues before us. We appreciate your attempt to develop a package solution and believe that the current text provides a basis on which a compromise can be built. In that spirit, we can broadly support the text. Turning to paragraph 35, As many delegations before us, we support the Chair's proposals to include a broader reference to international law in addition to the IHL. With regard to paragraph 36, we consider the Chair's proposal to be a balanced one and, in the spirit of compromise, we are prepared to accept it. We agree that paragraph 36 should be considered as part of the overall package. We have also carefully considered the Irish proposal and, in this regard, share the concerns expressed by Germany and Singapore. While the Irish proposal recognises that human control may be exercised both directly and indirectly, the final sentence appears to imply a requirement for a degree of continuous direct human control, namely that a person, what must retain the capacity to give effect to that judgment throughout the operation of the system." This could be interpreted as requiring that a human operator be able to intervene at any point during the operation of the system. However, all weapon systems have a point of no return beyond which an attack can no longer be aborted. The same is true of laws, when it comes to direct human control. However, with laws, onboard intelligence and self-control of the system can abort the attack at any point of the authorized operation. Should delegations wish to proceed with the Irish proposal, we would favor deleting the end of the phrase, quote, "throughout the operation of the system," end quote. Then, paragraph 38. Taking into account that we are discussing a set of elements, we support the Chair's proposal, including the sub-paragraphs on the understanding, that it provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of possible measures. Finally, let me once again thank you, Chair, for your constructive approach and your continued efforts to identify solutions and build consensus among delegations. We believe that consensus on the text by the end of the week is still possible. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Finland for sharing the views of her delegation and showing flexibility with regard to the proposals made. Next on my list is AP-ILS, to be followed by Cameroon and Denmark. But first, AP-ILS.

Thank you, Chair. I am delivering this intervention on behalf of the delegation of Utrecht University and my own delegation, that of the Asia Pacific Institute for Law and Security, or APLS. Paragraphs 36 through 38 together constitute the core of the document before us. They pertain to the need for human element in the use of laws, which has been the focus of the work of the group and a critical issue for many delegations. We would like to offer a few suggestions that are both substantive and structural. We do so in the hope that they contain at least food for further thought. Like previous speakers, we address these paragraphs together, as they are interlinked, and especially as we propose to move language between the paragraphs. But first, a brief observation concerning paragraph 35. The intended effect of the phrasing "international law, in particular IHL" remains unclear, especially for readers of the text who have not participated in these discussions. IHL either applies or not, it does not apply in particular. The US proposal to use the phrase "international law applicable in armed conflict" seems to be a more coherent option. This proposal was supported by several other delegations, and reflects existing CCW language. This phrase would clearly cover IHL, but also, for example, various arms control treaties. This language would also be without prejudice to any views that different states hold on the applicability of other areas of international law in armed conflict. An express reference to IHL could be retained, if necessary, by inserting it before the phrase "principles and requirements". The paragraph could then read as follows: "Laws must only be used in accordance with international law applicable in armed conflict, including the IHL principles and requirements of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack." I now turn to paragraph 36. We have heard some very constructive proposals from the floor regarding this paragraph. We will attempt to engage with these proposals rather than systematically commenting on the Chair's proposal that is currently on the screen. In every proposed version, this paragraph begins with an important sentence underscoring the need for control and human judgment. But the notion of upholding applies better to abstract concepts like values or traditions and less so to compliance, which is a very practical matter. Therefore, language such as ensuring compliance might better capture the idea that compliance is something to be actively pursued and not just endorsed as an idea. Likewise, the phrase is needed remains weak. Using the word "requires" would not only strengthen the sentence, but also simplify its structure. We have also heard proposals that this first sentence should refer to "these rules" or "these rules of international law." We would suggest avoiding a reference to rules. IHL contains important overarching principles, which also need to be considered in the use of laws. These notably include the principle of distinction and the principle precluding superfluous injury. In any event, given that the relevant international law has already been established in paragraph 35, it seems unnecessary to address this issue again here. So it might be sufficient to refer in paragraph 36 simply to applicable international law. The first sentence of this paragraph could then read, quote, Ensuring compliance with applicable international law requires control and human judgment with regard to laws." In various proposals, the second sentence of this paragraph refers to the exercise of control directly or indirectly through the taking of measures before or during the use of laws. But measures are likely to be taken both before and during the use of laws. They are not mutually exclusive. To make that clear, the conjunction "or" could be replaced with "and/or". The second sentence could then read, quote: "Human beings exercise such control directly or indirectly, including through measures taken and/or during the use of laws." End quote. proposals we have heard add a third sentence reflecting the idea that human judgment entails a determination of the relevant international law and giving effect to this judgment. The term "determine" seems to refer to an overly specific outcome or decision. A more comprehensive verb might be suitable here. For example, the word assess would capture a broader evaluative process involved in legal reasoning and the exercise of human judgment. Furthermore, the evaluation of what international law requires should not occur generally and abstractly. It would need to take into account the operational context in which the laws is used, for example, to assess compliance with the rule of proportionality. Thus, the phrase "in specific operational circumstances" could be added to make this clear. Then the sentence could then read as follows, quote, "Regardless of how control is exercised, "human beings need to exercise judgment "to assess what the applicable international law requires "in the use of laws in specific operational circumstances and to give effect to this judgment, including by limiting the anticipated effects of laws." End quote. Six, which sets out the requirement of control and human judgment generally, paragraphs 37 and 38 unpack what this entails. We believe this could be made clearer by focusing paragraph 37 specifically on the human judgment dimension and paragraph 38 on the control dimension. We propose redrafting paragraph 37 in two respects. First, being specific about whose judgment is critical with respect to the use of laws. The text could here refer to those who plan or decide upon an attack. This is widely accepted IHL language that refers to those humans who have specific legal responsibilities with respect to attacks. And second, clarifying that the exercise of human judgment is only effective where the relevant humans are able to anticipate how the laws will operate. With all this in mind, we propose rephrasing paragraph 37 as follows, quote, "Those who plan or decide upon an attack, must be able to anticipate the effects of laws in the circumstances ruling at the time, which includes assessing the operational context and the characteristics and capabilities of the weapon system as a whole." End quote. Furthermore, we note that the current subparagraph 38A elaborates on a key aspect of human judgment, namely the assessment of applicable legal obligations in relation to the critical functions of laws. We therefore suggest moving subparagraph 38A to become subparagraph 37A or 37 bis. That would also require minor changes to the beginning of that paragraph, so that it would read, quote, "To this end, laws must be operated under a responsible chain of command and control," and the text would continue as previously proposed. Finally, to focus paragraph 38 on control, we propose simplifying the chapeau to read simply as follows, quote, "Control with respect to laws is exercised inter alia, by ensuring, colon, end quote. Chair, we agree with your proposed changes to subparagraphs B and C, and if our proposal to move subparagraph A is acceptable, the subparagraphs would, of course, need to be renumbered. I thank you, Chair.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of APILS. for commenting on not only on the text, but also on the wide range of proposals that have been made today and putting them in a certain perspective. Next on my list is Cameroon, to be followed by Denmark and China. Let me now pass the floor to distinguished representative of Cameroon. You have the floor.

Thank you very much, Chair. First of all, we'd like to commend you for your leadership in the stewardship of our work, and especially on this work to achieve a consensus on this text. Distinguished Chair, my delegation would like to support this text proposed for 35 through 38, which establishes an appropriate balance between legally clear obligations in compliance with IHL and a sufficiently flexible approach in order to take into account the diversity of systems, capacities, operational context, and the need for human judgment so that there's appropriate control as well as effective limits which would enable the respect of international humanitarian law. With regard to paragraph 35, we agree with many delegations here that this paragraph in accordance with the principles of conformity with international law represents an important foundation here for these discussions, especially in the framework of this working group. With this regard and to this effect, regardless of the level of technological autonomous the autonomous nature, considering the principles of precaution, proportionality, etc. and the compliance with IHL or any other legal applicable laws. My delegation believes that this is a legal framework in the context of laws, and this should not be restricted by these innovations. We should take into account ethical risks as well, so that there is responsible use of technology. Regarding paragraph 36, we believe that here we are referring to an approach that can take into account the diversity of systems on the one hand, and on the other hand, of operational context, while maintaining the responsible role played by human beings. For my delegation, this paragraph refers to human judgment, and that is at the heart of our operational approach. Regarding the respect of IHL, that requires an appropriate level of human judgment and control. 37, we believe that here, this is a good bridge because We're referring to human control, which would guarantee substantive and effective control, rather than just a formal approach to control. Considering the complex and unpredictable circumstances that would require, these circumstances would require control and judgment. Finally, paragraph 38 reflects these concepts that are very important and show that human control should not be considered just an act at the moment of launching. It should be considered an integrated guarantee for the conduct of hostilities. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Cameroon for sharing the views of the delegation and commenting on the text. Next on my list is Denmark, to be followed by China, Ukraine and the United Arab Emirates. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Denmark. You have the floor.

Thank you for allowing my delegation to take the floor once again. As we are hearing a number of textual edits from the other delegations, we would like to add our voice to the discussion. As regards paragraph 35, my delegation supports your introduction of a reference to international law, in particular IHL. In paragraph 36, my delegation has previously expressed support for the original language contained in the draft final report. However, we are ready to accept your latest edits. including the inverted formulation, control and human judgment. It is our view that although IHL does not explicitly contain a rule to ensure human judgment and control, the use of an autonomous weapons system always requires some form of human involvement in order to ensure compliance with the different rules and principles of IHL, including the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack. And as long as this is properly reflected in the text, we can be flexible on the term used. We further consider that the appropriate level of human involvement depends heavily on contextual factors and does not necessarily require constant direct human control. We believe that your formulations in paragraph 36, 37, and 38 address our position in this matter, and therefore we can support the package that you have proposed here. delegation has also listened to proposals of other delegations and find the proposal by Ireland particularly promising. As regards paragraph 38, we welcome the deletion of number of engagements that laws can undertake autonomously in subpara B, and we also welcome the deletion of while active in an operational context in subpara C. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Denmark for commenting on the text and the proposals made. Next on my list is China, to be followed by Ukraine, United Arab Emirates and the United States. With that, we now pass the floor to the distinguished representative of China. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. China would like to thank you for your efforts in bridging divergence of all parties. Regarding paragraph 36, China believes that human control should be a core element of this provision. Human judgment is very important. However, judgment is embedded in the control of humans' efforts over weapon systems. Therefore, China hopes that this wording should better reflect the Article 11, which is the responsibilities of human beings. At the same time, in order to demonstrate flexibility and to bridge divergences of parties, China can support the proposal made by Africa, Pakistan, and Mexico, among others, which is to go back to the original formulation. To uphold compliance with international law, in particular, international humanitarian law, human judgment and control with regard to laws are needed. In 37, 38 paragraphs, the similar language should be followed. At the same time, we support the retention that doesn't mean the constant control of human beings. We support its retention. This takes full account of different scenarios of battlefields and realities. In paragraph 38, 38A, previously, China repeatedly mentioned that responsible is a subjective judgment, therefore, we don't agree the inclusion of such an expression. However, in order to demonstrate our constructive spirit and to promote consensus building, China would like to demonstrate flexibility in this regard. At the same time, considering all countries have different understandings and approaches towards responsible and legal obligations are internal affairs and we cannot have a uniform standard in this regard. In order to achieve common understanding to a maximum level, we suggest the deletion of in particular. Everything after in particular should be deleted. In 38B, in the current formulation, the scale of operation, duration, and geographical scope, this kind of expression is quite limiting. We have concerns in this regard. To judge whether the use of loss is legitimate, the key is to see whether it has met the principle of distinction and prevention. In different scenarios of battles, we can take different approaches to meet the demands of these principles. These measures cannot be exhaustive. Therefore, we suggest we keep the types of targets, this kind of expression, in this paragraph, in 38C. Here, it might lead to a situation that laws should have constant human control in the whole process. With regard to this paragraph, after being activated, the parameters of laws cannot be changed. In fact, we have excluded the possibility of having reliable authorization of humans to laws. Therefore, China has concerns over the formulation in this subparagraph. In 38D, considering that the capabilities and scenarios have their limitations. For example, some small loss after being disconnected, they will be deactivated automatically. Therefore, we can change the wording here. The lethal automatic weapons systems when they are being developed, we should already take into account the possibility of deactivation and abortion. I will read out in English. When developing laws, appropriate deactivation and self-destruction capabilities should be incorporated as needed. Thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of China for commenting on the text and sharing amendments. Next on my list is the distinguished representative of Ukraine, to be followed by the United Arab Emirates and the United States. But let me now pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Ukraine. Sir, you have the floor.

The delegation of Ukraine would like to express gratitude to you, Chair, and your team for the development of this working text of paragraphs 35 and 38, which are truly central to the work of the GGE, and we are delighted to see that these paragraphs are in good shape. Therefore, our intervention primarily aims to support the existing text and to address certain doubts. As regards paragraph 35, the delegation of Ukraine echoes the position of multiple delegations in stating that both international law in general and IHL in particular must be clearly mentioned here. Human rights law is a frequently cited example of other law that applies in armed conflict, but we must also be mindful of international maritime law, international air and space law, the law of state responsibility, and other areas of law. To support the mention of both international law and international humanitarian law, We can recall several already existing and widely recognized provisions, including the first article of CCW, as well as, for example, Article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention, which establishes an obligation based on all applicable provisions of law, not only those of international humanitarian law. These examples clearly demonstrate that references to international law in general are very common in the existing IHL. Further, our delegation takes note of the relevant statements by the delegation of the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and others, and we acknowledge the possibility of a formulation of the text while maintaining reference to both international law and IHL in particular. Further, elaborating on paragraph 35, our delegation welcomes the inclusion of a list of principles of international law. However, this list is incomplete and can create an impression that certain principles matter more than others. We would therefore welcome the inclusion of the principles of humanity and, importantly, military necessity into the list. Given that the enumerated paragraphs are meant to work together, we would also welcome the inclusion of a full set of principles into paragraph 36. Further elaborating on that paragraph, we find that the notions of control and judgment remain not entirely defined. This is not necessarily a shortcoming, since, as has been mentioned by our delegation before, an absence of a definition can be a deliberate strategy. But if we choose this strategy, we must do it with our eyes open. With this in mind, we fully support the inclusion into paragraph 36, as well as paragraph 38 alpha, of certain criteria, including the ability to determine on the basis of the anticipated effects of the attack that the use of a weapon will comply with international humanitarian law. In this regard, we oppose any proposals to remove the definition of control as allegedly uncommon for international humanitarian law. The absence of the definition can be used by certain actors for actions contrary to the letter and spirit of international humanitarian law. We further remind that the idea of anticipated effects of the attack as an element of human decision-making can be found in the existing practice of international criminal law for example, in the form of the reasonable military commander standard developed by the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and ever since reaffirmed. Our delegation is comfortable with the formulation of paragraph 37 and would just like to underline once more the importance of the operational context for determining the level of judgement and control. Speaking of paragraph 38, we would like to briefly comment on the doubts expressed by some speakers concerning paragraph 38. We support the inclusion of this point and the retention of this point as well founded in IHL and which has parallels since the 1907 Hague Conventions and Declarations. Thank you. This concludes our intervention.

Thank you very much. I thank the distinguished representative of Ukraine for commenting on the text and making proposals. Next on my list is the distinguished representative of the United Arab Emirates, to be followed by the United States, Bulgaria and Armenia. Let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Arab Emirates. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. We would like also to thank the other delegations for their valuable interventions. The UAE would like to submit some observations about the amended formulation of paragraph 35 to 38. Regarding paragraph 35, we approve the current formulation. And we think it's very important to keep clearly that laws should not be used unless they respect international law, in particular, IHL, including the principles and requirements of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack. Regarding paragraph 36, we approve the importance of control and human judgment when it comes to respecting international law, namely international humanitarian law. We approve the amended formulation, which says that human beings exercise such control directly or indirectly, and we think that this gives flexibility and recognizes that the way human control is exercised may change to operational requirements. At the same time, we think that the text should be clear and say that regardless whether the control is directly or indirectly exercised, we need to preserve human beings' responsibility regarding the legitimacy of the systems. Mr. President, we have a particular observation on the following expression on the basis of the anticipated effects of the attack. We prefer using taking into account the anticipated effects of the attack. Our observation is not pertaining to the anticipated attacks exclusively, but it's also pertaining to the expression on the basis of, and we preferred the use of taking into account the anticipated effects. Because anticipated effects should be taken into account when we tackle IHL without being exclusive requirements. Regarding paragraph 37, we approved the amended formulation, and it's very important to mention a number or a range of factors, including the operational context and the characteristics and capabilities of the weapon system as a whole. And this is very important. Control and human judgment should be efficient if we need to secure respect of or compliance with IHL. However, the text should stay away from one model of human judgment and human control that can be applicable in all circumstances. That's why human judgment and control should be always linked to the context and to the operational context and characteristics. Regarding paragraph 38, we approve the general formulation of the amended text and its focus on operational criteria for human judgment and control. Regarding 38A, We approve the mentioning of a responsible chain of command and control, as well as ensuring assessment of legal obligations by a human. It is important to keep the legal obligation on responsible human beings and should not be referred to the autonomous systems. Regarding the mentioning of ethical considerations, we are flexible. However, it is very important to keep a clear distinction between compulsory legal obligations and ethical considerations so that the latter cannot be explained as leading to additional legal commitments or obligations. Regarding 38, paragraph B, we approve focusing on limiting the effects of flows by restricting the scale of the operation types of targets, duration, and geographical scope. And we think that these measures could lead to preserving and saving the human control and judgment. And at the same time, these measures should not be interpreted as a restrictive or constant set of criteria. They should be linked to the scale of operation and to the context and to the geographical scope. Regarding 38C, we approve the current formulation and drafting, especially that there cannot be substantially modified, that the mission parameters cannot be substantially modified unless such modifications executed or authorized by a human. This formulation reserves the control of the human beings and the substantial changes that can have an impact on laws. And this also prevent us from putting preconditions on any human intervention or control. Regarding paragraph 38D, we approve the mentioning that loss can be deactivated or neutralized in a timely manner, this, uh, represents, uh, an important, uh, uh, opportunity. operational guarantee, because if the system is not in line with the task, with the mandate or the legal requirement, this will be an important part of efficient human control. In general, Mr. Chair, we think that paragraphs 35 to 38 should keep four important components. namely full respect of international law, in particular IHL, to keep the human responsibility for the use of force, to have efficient measures in terms of human judgment and control, and finally, to keep a certain level of flexibility that takes into account legitimate military uses, operational requirements, and others. We approve the general of the amended text, and we have eliminated the proposal in terms of paragraph 36, and all drafting or formulation should keep a certain level of flexibility that is in line with developments in the future. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of the United Arab Emirates for sharing the views of her delegation commenting on proposals. Next on my list is the United States, to be followed by Bulgaria and Armenia. Let me now pass the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair, for giving us the floor for a second time today to address the subparagraphs of paragraph 38. In subparagraph A, we have previously expressed the view that responsible chain of command and control should be moved to the measures on accountability because it seemed most relevant in that section, but we can be flexible and include the measure here. But we would need to better explain its relevance, which is as a mechanism through which the IHL rules on attacks are implemented. This was the approach reflected in paragraph 17D of the 2019 report, which concluded that distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack must be applied through a chain of responsible command and control by human beings. Therefore, we would propose that the paragraph read, "The use of laws within a responsible chain of human command and control through which these rules are applied." With respect to the remainder of this subparagraph, The assessment described after the word including, in our view, doesn't stem from operating within a responsible chain of command and control. So it doesn't seem to logically flow from the first part of the sentence. But we do think it would be useful to retain the idea that the measure should include such an assessment. Now, the assessment is not one of legal obligation, to be clear. Rather, the practice that we see is always necessary under the IHL rules on attacks is to engage in some form of an assessment of the anticipated effects of using the laws. And this group has previously found consensus on this idea in paragraph 23A of the 2019 report. which stressed, inter alia, the importance of considering the risks of civilian casualties. So here, we would recommend including the idea that I think delegations such as Austria have proposed regarding combining this idea of assessment with addressing the risks of harm to civilians, and a new subparagraph ABIS could follow, which would read, "Assessments of the anticipated effects of using laws, including the expected death or injury to civilians and damage to or destruction of civilian objects." We think that gets at what the second part of A is driving at, but in a way that we think is more consistent with past consensus in this group. Regarding subparagraph B, the phrase, quote, that those responsible for the use of laws, end quote, is overly limiting because the individuals who can limit the effects of laws may be different from the individuals who are responsible for the use of laws. We also don't think that the word can is strong enough here. Complying with the IHA rules on attacks is not satisfied simply because someone can limit the effects of laws. Human beings need to limit the effects of laws as necessary under these rules. We also support the suggestion to add "adjust" to subparagraph B, since sometimes the appropriate measure to take is to change the time or location of an attack rather than limit its temporal or geographic scope. These IHL rules don't just require limiting the effects of laws against civilians and civilian objects. They also require directing the effects of laws against military objectives. So we would propose that the subparagraph read as follows. Measures that limit the loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects expected from the use of laws including those that define or restrict the scale, duration, and geographic scope of the operation of laws, and those that direct the effects of laws against military objectives, such as adjusting the types of targets the laws can engage, as well as the timing or location of its operation. So here, Chair, we're working with all of the concepts that are reflected in the text, but we are trying to orient them in a way that better relates them to the measures that we are trying to achieve consensus on, and in a way that both strengthen and clarify the subparagraphs. Now, with respect to subparagraph C and D, I think we've consistently, through the intersessional period, raised concerns about subparagraph C, and we do continue to find this subparagraph problematic from both a practical and legal perspective. Regarding subparagraph D, in a timely manner, I think from our perspective is not the right concept because IHL does not abstractly impose time limits on the operation of weapon systems. We would recommend instead drawing upon Article 6.3 of Amended Protocol II, CCW Amended Protocol II, which reflects the practical reality that self-destruct or neutralization measures are taken to the extent feasible and when the weapon no longer serves the military purpose for which it was activated. And if we approached it in that way, the subparagraph could read, measures to the extent feasible to neutralize or deactivate a laws when it no longer serves the military purpose for which it was activated. Chair, we wanted to address some of the other points that have been raised over the course of the day and to respond to some of the concerns that we've heard about the language that's being presented. We wanted to respond to the concern that we have heard from Ireland and others about the idea that long periods of time could potentially elapse between the moment that human judgments are being taken and when the effects of laws occur during military operations. We do appreciate the concern, but we also recognize that there are a number of practical issues with implementing measures to address the concern. We would recommend a subparagraph, and this could be placed before the neutralization and destruction paragraph because it would seem to flow logically in terms of the temporal nature of the measure. And the subparagraph could read, measures to the extent feasible to redirect, suspend, or cancel an engagement, or otherwise to monitor and intervene in the operation of a LOS as necessary under these rules. And this also expands the types of measures. I think it was the delegation of India that noted that there could be a variety of ways that you could apply measures to abort a laws. And so we would try to get at a wider set of measures, which we think could be useful. The language also builds on the group's previous agreement in paragraph 23F of the 2019 report, which included the idea that intervention in the operation of the weapon system, to the extent feasible, could be needed under IHL rules. Finally, Chair, since I've used the word a few times, we did want to make a general comment about how we see the idea of feasibility informing the measures in these subparagraphs. The concept of feasibility is central to certain IHL rules, including the obligation to take precautions in attack, as well as various provisions within the CCW's own protocols, including Amended Protocol II and CCW Protocol V. So it's not an unusual concept. And where we think it is helpful to include, we would encourage including it. We see three measures as always necessary under the IHL rules on attack. First, the use of laws within a responsible chain of command and control through which the rules are applied. Second, assessments of the anticipated effects of using laws. and third, measures that limit civilian harm. And while the concept of feasibility wouldn't qualify whether those three measures are needed, it will inform, for example, the nature, the quality, and the degree of the measures taken. For example, how much of an assessment can be done depends on the feasibility, how much time you have to conduct the assessment. On the other hand, Some of the other measures that come later in the subparagraphs in 38, such as measures on destruction and neutralization and measures on intervening in the operation of the system, are at times not feasible. So the feasibility concept is much more relevant there. And so, Chair, we will stop there. And again, thank you for allowing us a second intervention today on these subparagraphs. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of the United States for his extensive comments on the measures in paragraph 38 and making suggestions. Next on my list is the distinguished representative of Bulgaria, to be followed by Armenia, Belgium, Sri Lanka, Australia, Switzerland, Mali. Let's see whether we can still make that this afternoon. But first now, the distinguished representative of Bulgaria.

Thank you, Chair.

We consider the elements contained in Articles 35 to 38 to be central to the work of the group, and we want to briefly share our views on them. On Article 35, we support the inclusion of the reference to applicable international law, in particular IHL, a language that frequently appears in the outcome documents of the GGE. On Article 36, we wish to underline the importance of the human element, which has been at the heart of the group's work from the very outset. Bulgaria has consistently held the position that human judgment and control are central to compliance with IHL, and we prefer this formulation. Even though IHL does not technically demand exercising human control in all stages, it requires control of the effects and the use of force of weapon systems. Human control may accordingly be exercised in different forms, directly or indirectly, at the respective stages of the life cycle, and it doesn't require constant direct human control. It is in the spirit of compromise and flexibility that Bulgaria approaches Article 36 and we are prepared to accept the inversion of human judgment and control but as a package together with the retention of the second sentence as it captures the shared understanding reached within this group. We also stand ready to consider the Irish proposal in a constructive spirit. Article 37 reflects the fact that human judgment and control are context dependent and The measures laid out in Article 38 are acceptable to us. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Bulgaria for commenting on the text. Next on my list is Armenia, to be followed by Belgium. Let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Armenia.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I would like to thank you and your team for the considerable efforts undertaken to bring the Group to this advanced stage of its work. Armenia welcomes the progress achieved and remains committed to engaging constructively with a view to contributing to a meaningful consensus outcome this week. With regard to paragraphs 35 to 38, Armenia supports the overall direction of Chair's suggestions. We attach particular importance to the crucial role of human judgment in the use of force and to ensuring appropriate control with regard to laws in support of compliance with applicable international law, in particular international humanitarian law. We consider it important that human beings remain at the centre of decisions concerning the use of such systems. This is essential for upholding responsibility and accountability and for ensuring compliance with national law. Armenia also attaches particular importance to the reference to the Martens Clause reflected in paragraph 30, including the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience, alongside the principles and requirements of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack. we consider this an important element of the overall framework applicable to laws. We also welcome the emphasis on a responsible chain of command and control and on the assessment of applicable legal obligations by a human. We remain open to further refinements that preserve these core elements and support the group's efforts towards consensus. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Armenia for sharing the views of his delegation. Next on my list is the distinguished representative of Belgium, followed by Sri Lanka and Australia. But first, the distinguished representative of Belgium.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. Similar to Sweden and others, we would like to recall that human judgment and control is already a compromise from the starting position of many delegations, including my own. that advocated for meaningful human control. In Belgium's view, the concepts judgment and control must remain closely connected to and exercised by humans. And a number of mandatory measures to operationalize such requirement should be included in the text. Although it is not required that human beings exercise direct control, control cannot be understood as a merely technical, procedural, or systemic function detached from meaningful human judgment. Similar to Ireland and others, we want to avoid an exercise whereby these paragraphs are reduced to merely restating IHL. As you mentioned during your introduction, the concepts of human judgments and control, that human element, is needed to ensure compliance with IHL. The present exercise adds value by detailing how these concepts are operationalised in the case of laws. That being said, in the spirit of compromise, we can support the Irish proposal whereby human judgment and control are enforced, but only in turn for strengthening para 36 and keeping the chapeau of para 38 mandatory in nature, while not exhaustive. On paragraph 37, Belgium would also suggest adding the circumstances of use of the weapon system among those factors influencing the requirements of control at the end of the sentence. Regarding paragraph 38, subparagraph c, my delegation has a concern regarding the last part of the sentence, where a human, any human, executes or authorizes a substantial modification of the mission parameters. Our concern is that the text as it presently stands fails to mention that this human should be involved in the conduct of the operation. We want to avoid that this provision could be understood or applied in a way that the laws proposes a substantial modification of its mission parameters to, for example, someone working for the manufacturer, which then approves it. Therefore, we would suggest adding at the end of the sentence, "a human operating the system". I thank you.

And I thank the distinguished representative of Belgium for commenting on the text and making proposals. Next on my list is Sri Lanka, to be followed by Australia. Let me now pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Sri Lanka maintains that paragraph 35 must be firmly anchored in the foundational principles of international humanitarian law. While existing international legal frameworks were not designed for algorithmic warfare, current international law must be complemented by carefully coded, specific, and binding operational rules in the subsequent paragraphs as a package based on how autonomous systems operate in the contemporary battlefield. Regarding paragraph 36, my delegation strongly supports the centrality of human judgment and control throughout the life cycle of the lethal autonomous weapon systems. We place deliberate emphasis on leading with human judgment as this legal obligation centers on the active cognitive reasoning of human mind. Key IHL obligations such as assessing proportionality, distinguishing combatants from civilians, identifying surrenders require cognitive subjective reasoning that machines simply cannot perform. Placing judgment first ensures that control is recognized as the mechanism to enforce moral and legal reasoning rather than mere technical and administrative oversight. Furthermore, under international criminal law, legal liability for war crimes attaches to human intent and knowledge, or mens rea. If control is reduced to a purely technical exercise, attributing individual responsibility to a commander for algorithmic failure becomes exceptionally difficult. Leading with human judgment guarantees that the human decision maker remains legally accountable for the use of force. Reversing this sequence risks reducing human agency to administrative system oversight rather than active legal and ethical decision making over the use of force. Therefore, we support going back to the original formulation, human judgment and control. My delegation remains firmly of the view that introducing the term indirect creates a critical legal loophole. It permits machines to execute attacks without active real-time human supervision, thereby diluting human control into pre-mission programming or remote oversight. The distinction between direct and indirect control remains dangerously vague, eroding the precise level of human control required to ensure IHL compliance. Consequently, Sri Lanka opposes normalizing the absence of effective control through the formulation directly or indirectly in para 36. Allowing algorithms to operate autonomously without continuous oversight directly undermines the core IHL principles of distinction and precaution in dynamic combat environment. However, we understand the practical aspects of exercising human control in real operations, whether it's indirect or direct. Therefore, we welcome the constructive proposals made by the delegations to bridge this gap and look forward to a common landing zone. Additionally, real-time control is required to ensure the responsible chain of command as outlined in para 38 and timely deactivation or neutralization capability as outlined in para 38 to prevent legal responsibility gaps. We oppose making human control entirely subjective as outlined in para 37. Militaries could easily invoke operational context to lower control threshold in a dynamic conflict environment. Sri Lanka is of the view that core parameters of human control must remain mandatory, inalienable baselines, rather than discretionary choices based on operational convenience. I thank you.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka for sharing the views of her delegation. Next on my list is Australia, to be followed by Switzerland and Mali. Let me now pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Australia.

Thank you, Chair. First, let me thank you for your tireless efforts to bridge divergent positions and help us find consensus on this key aspect of the text. The current version has carefully taken into account states' positions and is a good basis for this final stretch. Australia's position is well known, that the exercise of control and human judgment is not a distinct legal obligation, but rather a means to comply with the IHL. consider the text in the final report adequately reflects this position and support the change to control and human judgment. On paragraph 35, we could support referring to the rules of international law as applicable in armed conflict, as this is the relevant body governing our work and would encompass IHL as well as other legal frameworks such as the law of state responsibility. On paragraph 36, we We welcome specifically stating that control could be direct or indirect. We have heard some concerns from delegations on the provided they determine aspect of this paragraph, and we are open to other textual suggestions. On paragraph 38, Australia's position is that the measures of control depend on what is needed in the circumstances to comply with IHL. We see this reflected in the current wording, which provides a non-exhaustive list of control measures. We would not be able to support wording that required these measures in all circumstances. We have listened to perspectives today and stand ready to work with alternative proposals to find consensus. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Australia. Next on my list is the distinguished representative of Switzerland. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving us the floor again.

I will be very brief.

Both paragraphs 37 and 38 are at the heart of our elements. We heard proposals to delete or change existing languages, but also some welcome suggestions to expand them. We certainly feel that, over the course of our deliberations, the identified practical measures contributing to compliance with international law, have been reduced considerably, perhaps already too much. Given the late stage of the discussions, however, we believe it important to keep what remains, and we can therefore support your proposals as reflected on this screen. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Switzerland. Next on my list is the distinguished representative of Mali, to be followed by Ecuador. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chairman. As this is the first time that I take the floor, my delegation thanks you and your team for your efforts, as well as thanking all of the delegations for this search for human solutions here. human solutions to the use of the laws. And this is normal, really, because it's humans that are the beginning and end of this, and they can be at the command of these. Chairman, since the beginning of this discussion, we have underscored three key points. They keep surfacing. One, the compatibility of autonomous weapons with the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law. Two, the limit of legal frameworks facing the decision-making autonomy. And third, the need for international framework that is based on human control and responsibility. It's on this last point that we see the problem. The problem of human control is what for us is probably the central point of this debate. International humanitarian law is based on obligations that are taken on by human beings and by states and not by machines. An autonomous weapon can choose and engage a target. Humans would do so individually during an attack. From paragraph 30 to paragraph 36, we do not have any observations. However, I would like to propose in little B, 38B, the following. Laws, rather the whole paragraph right through to the word legal obligations. by a human being be effectuated. For clarity here and comprehension's sake, that last bit and the number of human engagements can be struck. Now, another issue is pending, and it's the following. How, with all of this, do we guarantee that development of military usage did not get transferred to do not transfer to a machine the decisions, the consequences of which, including human death, could be put under the control, taken from human control and responsibility. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Distinguished representative of Mali. Next on my list is the distinguished representative of Ecuador, and that's the last person on my list. You have the floor, sir.

Chairman. As this is the first time that my delegation takes the floor, Ecuador would like to begin by thanking you for your efforts to bring together different positions on these paragraphs. We believe that they are essential when it comes to a substantive outcome of this GGE. As regards paragraph 35, we support the reference to applicable international law, and in particular, IHL, this being the framework for the use of laws. Paragraph 36, Ecuador believes that it is essential that we preserve the central nature of human judgment and control, and this beyond the mere order of the concepts. We do believe that it's essential that we keep this substance. A human, prior human evaluation alone cannot be considered to be enough or sufficient. We see merit in the proposal brought by Ireland, and in particular as it seeks to ensure that control seeks to make human judgment effective. Also, we understand that this does not necessarily imply direct and constant human control. As regards now paragraph 37, We would say the following. We believe that it is important that the exercise of control and human judgment bear in mind the circumstances of use, as well as the characteristics and capacity of the system, capabilities that is. This would allow for it to be applied to all contexts without reducing the need to have effective human control. Paragraph 38. Ecuador believes that it is important to preserve the relationship between this and the previous paragraphs. The measures laid out there should allow for effective human control and judgment with conditions and limits that are appropriate as regards the use of the system, its objectives, the duration and scope of implementation. as well as on meaningful modifications of the parameters, as well as the possibility of deactivating or neutralizing it in a timely manner. Lastly, Ecuador remains open to compromise solutions that will allow for us to reach consensus, so long as we preserve the centrality of the human element and its link to compliance with IHL. Much obliged, Chairman.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Ecuador for stating the position of her delegation. It's six o'clock. Let me refrain from commenting on what we have achieved today. I leave that up to you to draw conclusions on that. At the beginning of our discussions yesterday, I set out what I thought that we have to achieve with regard to, in particular, characterisation and the human element as phrased in the powers 35 to 38. We have some time later this evening to continue our discussion on the characterisation, but it is clear that, with regard to the powers 35 to 38, we are not in a very comfortable position. And of course, it's only Tuesday, but you can do the math, what we still need to do if we want to live up to the expectations and fulfill our mandate. Having said that, Speaking also again about the working characterization, we will share with you a revised suggestion on para 25, taking into account the exchanges from yesterday and this morning, and then have informal consultations for interested high contracting parties from 7:30 sharp until 10 o'clock in room 3. I kindly remind delegations that the gates to the UN premises closes at 7 o'clock. So, therefore, I encourage you either to remain inside the premises or to ensure that you re-enter before 7 o'clock. To facilitate your planning for tomorrow, I would like to inform you that I am considering to convene an informal consultation also tomorrow evening, also in the light of what we achieved and did not achieve today. from 7 to 10 in room 3, and the focus will then be on the power of 35 to 38. Before we close today, please also kindly be informed of a site event tomorrow morning. UNIDIR is organizing a workshop on their scenario compendium for the legal, operational, and technical analysis of laws. And this is the third workshop of a series of four held by UNIDIR throughout the week. It will be held tomorrow morning from 8:30 to 10:00 in room Concordia 5 in building A of the Palais. I thank you for your attention, and the meeting is adjourned.