Localized and Whole-of-Society Approaches in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) (Counter-Terrorism Week Side Event)

Excellencies and distinguished delegates, colleagues, good afternoon again. My name is Dr. Barbara Lukonka, and I'm a Senior Policy and Program Officer at IOM, and I'm based here in New York, and I lead a team that covers peacebuilding as well as humanitarian affairs. And I am really happy to be here today to moderate this event, and I think we're going to have a very interesting discussion. And before we get started with the opening remarks, just a few scene setting. I think this event, number one, has been organized by the governments of Malaysia and Iraq together with IOM and UNOAC. And so over the next hour, you know, we're really looking forward to hearing about what it takes to make preventing and countering violent extremism conducive to terrorism genuinely local and whole of society. And we're going to be using this moment to really draw on the experiences from Malaysia and their whole of government approach under their PCVE 2024-2028 strategy. And of course, from the experiences that we've heard about in other forums as well, and Iraq's national leadership on the return, rehabilitation, and reintegration of its citizens from northeast Syria. So, we're going to take the moment to also hear from a panel that's going to delve into some of these aspects and give us sort of their practitioners' experiences, and also focusing on protecting young people from violent extremist narratives and including some of that— how it manifests on the digital space and what locally owned partnership and reintegration processes actually look like in practice. So I think we're going to have a very insightful discussion today, and I'm really looking forward to it, and I'm definitely feeling very privileged to be part of this today. So today, just to start off, I'd like to now invite our opening speakers to share national perspectives. We have the great honor here and pleasure of having His Excellency Mr. Lukman Abdurahim Al-Faili, and he's the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Iraq to the United Nations. And he will be followed by Mr. Zulkifli Bin Abdin, apologies for that, Senior Undersecretary, Security and Public Order Division at the Ministry of Home Affairs in Malaysia. So why don't we go ahead and start with you, Excellency. From your perspective in Iraq.

Good afternoon, Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. At the outset, I wish to express Iraq's sincere appreciation to the Government of Malaysia, the International Organization for Migration, and the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, and all partners for conveying this important event during the United Nations Counterterrorism week. Preventing violent extremism requires more than security responses. It calls for inclusive national policies, strong local ownership, resilient communities, and a meaningful partnership that empowers people, particularly young ones, to become active partners in building peace and inclusive societies. Iraq's experience has demonstrated that countries most affected by terrorism can also contribute meaningfully to advancing international efforts to prevent violent extremism by transforming hard-earned lessons into practical national policies and local-driven actions. In this context, Iraq has adopted a comprehensive national strategy for preventing violent extremism, implementing through a National Committee for Prevention of Violent Extremism and the National Security Advisor. The strategy reflects a whole-of-government and a whole-of-society approach, building together national institutions, local authorities, civil society, religious and tribal leaders, women, youth, academia, and the media in a shared national effort to strengthen resilience and address the root causes of violent extremism. A key feature of Iraq's approach has been localizing prevention efforts through government-level coordination mechanisms that enable communities to develop responses tailored to their own circumstances. This has strengthened local ownership while ensuring that national policies are translated into practical actions on the ground. Our efforts also place strong emphasis on youth empowerment, education, community dialogue, digital awareness, and rehabilitation and reintegration programs that contribute to reconciliation, social cohesion, and long-term stability. Including for Iraqis, detainees from northeast Syria. Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, no country can address these challenges, these challenges alone. International cooperation remains indispensable. Iraq highly values, Iraq highly values its partnership with the United Nations and international organizations in strengthening national capacity entities while preserving national ownership and leadership. As violent extremist narratives continue to evolve, our collective response must remain equally adaptive, locally grounded, and people— people-centered. In conclusion, Iraq remains committed to sharing its experiences and working with all partners to advance prevention strategies that uphold human rights, strengthen resilient communities, empowers young, and contributes to sustainable peace. I thank you and look forward to discussions with my colleagues and others. Thank you.

Thank you so much for those opening remarks. And now we'll turn to Mr. Zulkifli.

Thank you, Madam Director, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen. Let me start by expressing the Government of Malaysia's appreciation To the Governor of Iraq and IOM for convening this session. Malaysia's approach to countering terrorism has been shaped by nearly 5 decades of experience in responding to an evolving threat landscape. Our journey began with the communist insurgency, which lasted from the late 1940s until the early 1980s. As that threat eliminated, A new challenge emerged in the form of religiously motivated violent extremism, including the activities of Jama'ah Islamiyah during the 1980s and early 2000s. Through sustained efforts by our security agencies and support of our communities, Malaysia significantly reduced the threat posed by these groups. While our terrorism threat level has remained low in recent years, We have never regarded it as a reason for complacency. In 2024, Malaysia experienced a tragic reminder that terrorism continues to evolve. A self-radicalized youth inspired by ISIS ideology carried out an attack on a police station, killing 2 police officers. The incident shocked the nation and reaffirmed that even Countries with a relatively low threat environment must remain vigilant. It also reinforced our conviction that effective counter-terrorism requires a comprehensive and inclusive approach. Malaysia's experience has yielded 3 key lessons. Number 1, prevention begins with communities. First, building resilience against violent extremism is most effective when communities are empowered to identify risks early, foster trust, and promote social cohesion. Number two, investing in young people is one of our strongest defences against radicalisation. Youth are not merely beneficiaries of our policies. They are indispensable partners in building resilient, peaceful, and inclusive societies. By creating opportunities for meaningful participation, education, and leadership, we strengthen the most credible counter-narrative to extremist ideologies. And finally, successful rehabilitation, de-radicalization, and reintegration require a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach. Security agencies play a critical role in preventing and responding to acts of terrorism. However, lasting success depends equally on the commitment of educators, families, religious leaders, civil society, and local communities to address the underlying factors that enable violent extremism to take root. These principles continue to guide Malaysia's National Security Strategy and our contributions to regional and international counter-terrorism efforts. My colleagues today from Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Foreign Affairs will share more about our practical experience and the initiatives we have undertaken to translate these principles into action. Thank you.

Thank you both very much, Excellencies, for those opening remarks. And I think you've definitely painted a really clear picture for us in terms of the national priorities and also the leadership and pinpointing on the aspect of prevention, especially in a context where the risks might seem low, that prevention is incredibly important, but also the aspect of a whole-of-government approach. And I think at this moment we're going to segue into the panel discussion. And at this moment, what we'll try to do is hear from colleagues. I will ask them each questions that they will respond to, and what we're looking for here is to hear how they're translating some of these national commitments, some of these national priorities into action, and what that looks like in practice. Once they've answered their questions and after we've gone through that, I'm definitely going to open up the floor for questions and reflections, insights, and so forth. Hopefully, we can really have a dialogue that we can use at this moment for this discussion. Our first speaker, as we get into this panel, is from the Ministry of Home Affairs in Malaysia, Ms. Alina Roslin. She is the Senior Principal Assistant Secretary of the Security and Public Order Division. Ms. Roslin, the question that I have for you is, Um, it goes like this: Malaysia's model is distinctive in following individual— individuals through the full life cycle, from legal processing through individualized rehabilitation to reintegration with family and economic support. From the ministry's perspective, what have been the most important factors in ensuring this institutional process leads to durable reintegration once someone returns to their community, including localized approaches? Over to you.

Thank you, Madam Moderator. To answer your questions, based on our current national action plan on PVE, that is MyPCVE, it was recently developed in 2024. Under this MyPCVE, we have 4 pillars, that is prevention, enforcement, rehabilitation, and reintegration. And what we can gather from our experiences, the most important thing as our topic today is localized, and we go down to the root from the family members of the returnees or the fighters, foreign terrorist fighters, ex-FTFs. And of course, from our perspective, we see two approaches, not only on the hard approaches, that is the punitive measures, but we focus more on the soft approaches, that is— that's the part where rehabilitation and reintegration process takes place. So if I could further share to fellow delegates our own experiences, recent experiences. So Malaysia adopts a balanced model in de-radicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration, utilizing both hard and soft approaches. While we maintain our robust defensive and enforcement postures, we have come to a fundamental realization that security is not merely the absence of violence. It is the presence of resilience. And while enforcement mechanisms are necessary, the sustainable cure for violent extremism ultimately lies in our soft approaches. Today, I would like to share our experience regarding the reintegration process of former foreign terrorist fighters as part of our DRR program. In 2024, we successfully repatriated 2 former detainees, from the Guantanamo Bay detention camp in Cuba, and crucially, our DRR process began long before the decision was made to bring them home. Early assessments are vital to ensure that all stakeholders— the individuals, the government, law enforcement, and the families— are truly prepared and fully prepared to set them back into the society. So we conducted extensive engagement with the family members prior to the repatriation, discussing their concrete plans for when the detainees return to Malaysia. Once we were confident that we had the full backing of the families, we engaged the right experts to support their arrival. These experts are academicians and from various Malaysian universities. Whose role is to evaluate the returnees' overall state of mind, their ideology, and their alignment toward the extremism. So immediately upon arrival in Malaysia, the returnees were housed in a safe, security place for 30 days. We call it a transition period, a mandatory transition period. So during the first 30 days, we focused on essential stabilization. We processed the official documentation, including issuing new identification cards, and we conducted comprehensive medical examination, providing proper and full treatment for their health conditions. From the second to fourth week, we initiated intensive session with our academic experts specialising in criminology, sociology, psychology, psychiatry, counselling, and motivation. These experts thoroughly evaluated and assessed the individuals before any release to the families could be authorised. Upon completing this 30-day period, they were reunited with their families. This marked the next phase, helping them adjust to the community life, starting with their family. We were actually fortunate that both families of the returnees were fully cooperative and supportive. We attribute this directly to the fact that we had been actively engaged with them years before the actual repatriation. So at this stage, the families are working alongside with our Special Branch, EA Counterterrorism Division, assisted them in finding jobs and place to reside. And in fact, one family of the returnees built a home for him even before he arrived in Malaysia. So today, both individuals are again fully employed, and one, one of them got married last year. So that's a good sign that what we did, what We were on the right path. So in terms of oversight, close monitoring mechanism is conducted by the district police where they reside, and regarding their movements and communication, managed carefully to respect their human rights, of course. Furthermore, periodic visitations are conducted by the police, not only with the ex-detainees, but also with family members and the neighbors and communities where they reside. To continuously evaluate the long-term effectiveness of the rehabilitation program, we regularly have engagement with them and see just how they're doing. Do they face any problems with the community or with the place of work where they work, and so on and so forth. So essentially, they will be monitored and productively engaged throughout their lives. So in conclusion, our experience highlights 4 key takeaways. First, while enforcement is necessary, the sustainable long-term cure for violent extremism relies on a soft approach centered on building resilience. And second, active family engagement years prior to repatriation is crucial to establishing the vital support system needed for a smooth transition and also, I believe, to develop trust among government and family members. And third, a multidisciplinary expert assessment involving academia is essential to evaluate an individual's state of mind and ability before reintegration. And finally, successful reintegration requires continuous lifelong support from multiple stakeholders balanced with structured police monitoring to ensure public safety without infringing upon human rights. That's all for me. Thank you.

Thank you so much. It's such an interesting example that you've just provided. And I think maybe during the discussion we might want to dig a little deeper, especially on questions of how they fare if they're are any issues like you're mentioning with the communities. We would suspect that there might be some issues regarding stigma, and I think that's something that we all kind of think about when individuals are reintegrating and some of those challenges to long-term and sustainable reintegration. But I think we'll, we'll leave that for the discussion period to just sort of hear what the experiences have been in that sense. Thank you for that. Our next speaker is from the Southeast Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counterterrorism, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Malaysia, Mr. Kenimrod Sariburaja, who is— he's also the Director of Research and Publication Division. So, the question that I have for you would be, drawing on the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counterterrorism and the work that's being done there, the work across the region, how are digital environments from gaming spaces to encrypted platforms, amplifying the grievances, the grievances based in emerging non-ideological drivers of youth engagement with violent extremist groups? And how is this shaping the design of regional prevention and capacity-building responses? Over to you.

Excellencies, Ladies and gentlemen, Madam Moderator, thank you for the introduction. So for Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counterterrorism, which is an agency under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we do have a few initiatives looking at youth and also gaming. Spaces. Siasat recognized that young people are increasingly exposed to harmful narratives in digital spaces and put a significant emphasis on preventing and also resilient building. So in terms of research, Siasat conducted exploratory research on gaming and PCVE to better understand how gaming spaces can be leveraged in PCVE initiatives. In doing so, SHA-SAT has developed a better understanding of the online gaming ecosystem, including who the credible messengers are and the potential roles of moderators, streamers, and players in preventing extremism within these spaces. From the research, we found out that many of young people are not initially attracted by ideology itself, but by social and psychological needs. Feeling of isolation, loneliness, the search for identity, the desire to belong to a community, and also the need to be recognized, to find recognition among peers, can make them vulnerable to exploitation. Online communities often provide these social spaces where relationships and trust are built long before extremist narratives are introduced. This changing landscape reinforces the need to understand violent extremism as an interdisciplinary challenge rather than solely a security issue. It requires insight from psychology, education, linguistics, and digital culture alongside traditional security perspective. We have worked with psychologists, linguists, educators, and other specialists to better understand how online narrative evolve. So in doing so, SEASAT has also expanded its engagement with schools through programs such as Leveraging Educators Against Radical Narratives, or LEARN, initiative. This initiative in collaboration with the Ministry of Education Malaysia, the Royal Malaysian Police, the Ministry of Economy, and also the United Nations Development Programme, UNDP. We recognize that educators are often among the first to observe behavioral changes and can help build resilience before vulnerabilities escalate. At the same time, we continuously update our own understanding of emerging threats by engaging researchers and practitioners on new developments, including our recent workshop that we held in collaboration with the Australian government in Kuala Lumpur last week with regards to from nihilistic violent extremism. So among other initiatives that we also are currently ongoing, our public awareness program called the University Lecture Series, and also we developed the module, Terrorism and Violent Extremism module under the Malaysian National Service Training Program. 3.0. This one we've developed together with our partner Malaysia Institute of Defense and Security, or MIDAS. This, um, with the aim to equip our young people with knowledge on terrorism, online radicalizations, misinformation, disinformation, also critical thinking. So this initiative have reached thousands of young people. As of now, we are looking at maybe around 9,000 to 10,000 individuals nationwide, and increasingly address emerging issues such as online propaganda and the exploitation of gaming platforms, and also artificial intelligence by the extremists. Other than that, we also have a regional program. We call it Sharing Together for Online Resilience Among Youth, or STORI. This initiative will empower young people to become partners in prevention through dialogues, peer engagement, media literacy, and community-based resilience initiatives. These efforts are completed by— complemented by strategic communication initiatives, including social media awareness campaigns, short educational videos, and collaborations with nano-influencers and youth digital creators to disseminate positive narratives and evidence-based information on emerging online threats and promoting responsible digital citizenship. So these are among the initiatives. So we're looking at from the research perspective, and then we develop our programs from there.

Excellent. Thank you so much. And I do think that the gaming industry does provide— I mean, of course, there are definitely some risks. But I think the way that you're framing it, where there are opportunities for that to be an innovative way to actually counter that, I think that's a very interesting way, and being able to provide those lessons and those best practices is really critical. I think it's sort of a global challenge in our age. So thank you for that. Our next speaker is from Iraq. He's the Director General at the Ministry of Migration and Refugees and Displacement, Mr. Ali Abbas Badrawi. And I have the question for you, which goes like this: Now that large-scale repatriation from al-Hawl camp is nearing completion, what have been the main challenges in reintegrating returnees at the community level in Iraq, particularly in ensuring that national leadership efforts are effectively translated into locally led approaches, including coordination with local authorities, communities, and UN and civil society partners. Over to you.

Shukran lak, Dr. Barbara.

Thank you, Dr. Barbara.

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, may the peace, mercy, and blessings of God be upon you.

If we are talking about the Iraq experience, Everyone knows what Iraq went through in terms of the control of Daesh over large spaces of Iraq and the recruitment of large numbers of youth, especially from outside of the country. The whole camp— al-Hol camp included around 31,000 Iraqis, including elderly people, and women, and children. Iraq was committed towards its citizens to play a role in returning these people to the country in coordination and cooperation with international organizations. So we started to transfer 21,500 of them— more than 21,500— since 2021 until today. We rehabilitated more than 18,000. They have been reintegrated, and we are currently working with 4,000 people from different age groups. In truth, the challenges facing Iraq are different than those facing other countries because those who were in the center or in al-Hol camp throughout their stay. They were there for 10 years. This was a major challenge because those who grew up there, especially children, they grew up in an environment where the only thing they saw was the camp. So there were ideas that were entrenched in their minds and that forced them to adopt certain practices and ideas. This is why rehabilitation requires a larger time. Sometimes it needs 6 months to say that they have been really rehabilitated and they can really be reintegrated in the community. Second, reintegration in their community was a major challenge because the victim and the perpetrator lived in the same area. So In certain areas, there were people who had lost loved ones because of the practices of ISIS. And here we are bringing the families of the perpetrators to reintegrate them in that community. So this was the second challenge. The third challenge is that the documents that prove that these people are Iraqi citizens require a lot of legal procedures. So proving that they belong to Iraq, that they are Iraqi citizens, was a major challenge. It was a major challenge. However, Iraq was committed to finding solutions, so we adopted realistic procedures to make that happen. In addition, in the Iraqi society, The community is different between areas, so we cannot impose the same reintegration model all across. The challenges are different, the nature of the families is different, the problem is different. So there was a big— so we accumulated a lot of experience because of the work that we have done. The success that we have made was was great and the experience was very successful. There were a lot of success stories that we have identified. There are a lot of people who were reintegrated. They are now students. They are good students in Iraqi universities. There are business owners now who live in their areas. But let's not forget that the situation in northeast Syria is still shaky and it is affecting the situation. And we will now have 10,000 people again that we were not able to transfer back then from the camp.— and this is not because we did not want to. So right now, organizations have worked on this, and we would like to commend the work of the IOM in this to ensure the return of these citizens and to transfer those who want to come back. We ensure their psychological rehabilitation also through the Amal Center. This center is monitored by the Ministry of Migration, and there are more than 88 programs with college professors and experts through which we try to rehabilitate these people, to reintegrate them. We also try to address the challenges in the return area. There is a program or a, a paper that is filled out on a daily basis regarding the people facing challenges. This also happens in the area of reintegration to help us address the problems it is facing. So when the 4 to 6 months rehabilitation period is done, we can transfer these people to the return areas and reintegrate them into the society and community. The community plays a major role. The host community plays a major role. It needs to take into account the importance of meeting these people's needs. So we have to ensure equality here. Thank you so much.

Thank you very much. That was really interesting, and I think you've brought— you've raised a lot of points that we hopefully will touch upon in the discussion, especially the question of how to really deal with individuals that move back or return back into communities after a process of rehabilitation or integration, but they're also in the same space as those who feel aggrieved.. And I think that's something that is— it's a very sensitive aspect of this process, and that makes it doubly complicated. So thank you, thank you for the lessons that you've shared. So just moving on to our last two panelists on here, our next speaker is from IOM Iraq, my colleague Mohammed Yasser. He's the program officer working on return and reintegration. So, Mohammed, the question that I have for you: In complex return and crisis-affected settings like the ones where IOM operates, how can rehabilitation and reintegration efforts be designed and delivered in a locally led and community-based way that not only supports affected youth but also strengthens social cohesion and contributes to the broader prevention outcomes? Over to you.

Thank you, Dr. Barber. Excellencies, distinguished colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, the remarks delivered by the Government of Iraq reminded us of a central point: preventing violent extremism is not a question of security. It is a question of trust, dignity, belonging, and the ability of communities to recover After violence, Iraq has taken the difficult but necessary decision to bring its nationals back from northeast Syria through a nationally led process. Al-Amr Rehabilitation Center has been central to this pathway, serving as a transitional space between repatriation and reintegration. But the experience of Iraq also shows that the real challenge does not end at the point of return. In many ways, it begins there. When families return from a highly sensitive environment, they do not return to a blank page. They return with complex needs and fears. At the same time, communities receiving them are often communities that have suffered terrorism. They also carry grief, mistrust, and legitimate questions about justice and fairness. If these realities are not addressed together, reintegration can remain fragile. IOM's role in Iraq has therefore been to support the government's national pathway with practical approaches that connect individuals, families, communities, and local systems. One important approach is to understand vulnerability without stigmatizing people. IOM uses structured and context-tailored tools to better understand the needs of returnees, especially youth. The purpose is not to label young people as risks. The purpose is to understand what support they need in order to move forward safely. Another approach is to create safe and practical opportunities for interaction. One important lesson from Iraq is that dialogue does not always begin with words. Sometimes it is much more impactful when it begins with action. For example, when returnees from the host community and returnees from the— and sorry, when youth from the host community and youth from returnees work together on a school activity, sport initiative, public space, or a volunteer project, they begin to see each other differently. That shared task becomes a bridge that can eventually build trust. The broader lesson from Iraq is that localized prevention requires more than a set of connected services. It requires a specific working model. First, reintegration must be treated as a sequenced pathway, not as a single moment of return. This means preparing individuals and families before departure, supporting them during transition, and maintaining follow-up after they arrive to their areas of return. Second, reintegration must work through trusted local actors. It cannot be delivered only through national institutions or international partners. It must be complemented by local actors who have legitimacy in the community because they best understand local fears, dynamic and the entry points for acceptance. Third, victims and affected communities must remain at the center of reintegration efforts. Community acceptance cannot be requested without acknowledging harm. Victim-sensitive reintegration means recognizing that returnees do need support, but also communities also need justice and confidence that their suffering has never been overlooked.. This balance is essential for prevention, because perceived unfairness can become a source of renewed grievance. These approaches show that effective prevention is practical and that local systems are able to sustain reintegration beyond the life of a return program. I would conclude by reaffirming that IOM remains committed to supporting the Government of Iraq its local communities and the partners in advancing this approach.

Thank you.

Thank you so much. I feel like I want to say so much, but I have to remember I'm the moderator here. But, um, just to say this point about the victims and the importance of ensuring this sort of whole-of-community approach so that— because in so many instances, I think we do feel people might feel that there's an incentive to get into violence, right? There's incentive because then you get rehabilitated, you get reintegrated, and you get all of these incentives, and that creates that sense of injustice, that unfairness. So very interesting, and we can get into that in the discussion. So why don't we move on to our last but certainly not least speaker, um, is from the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, Mr. Alessandro Ghirola, who is the chief of the Programming and Projects Unit at that office. So the question that I have for you, Alessandro, from UNAOC's perspective, what role can youth play in preventing radicalization and strengthening community resilience, and what lessons have you learned from working with young people around the world?

Thank you, Madam Moderator. One of the most important lessons from UNAOC's work is that young people should not be viewed primarily as a group at risk, but as essential partners in prevention efforts. At UNAOC, our work is guided by a simple principle: prevention is most effective when it addresses the conditions that can make individuals and communities vulnerable to polarization, exclusion, discrimination, and extremism. This understanding is also reflected in the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy, which recognizes that addressing this condition is an integral part of a comprehensive response. While of course security responses are important, lasting prevention requires investment in social cohesion, education, dialogue, inclusion, and opportunities for meaningful participation. Through our work during the past for two decades, we have seen that when young people are given the opportunities to meaningfully participate in their communities, engage across differences, and contribute to decision-making process, they can become powerful agents of positive change. They are often first to identify emerging challenges, including those in the digital space, and are uniquely positioned to come up with solutions and responses that can well resonate with their peers. And this is why UNAOC places youth at the center of its programming. Through initiatives such as the Young Peacebuilder Program or the Youth Solidarity Fund, we support women, young women and men, in developing the skills, the network, and the opportunities needed to address challenges within their communities. We also promote intercultural, interfaith dialogue, leadership development, and community engagement, all of which contribute to building resilience and strengthening trust. Across the communities. The Youth Solidarity Fund in particular is a good example in this context. It has been designed specifically to support youth-led organizations. It has invested approximately $2.6 million in support of 80 youth-led projects across 43 countries. These projects promote intercultural and interfaith dialogue, prevention of violent extremism, civic engagement, and community trust, all factors that contribute to stronger resilience against divisive and extremist narratives. And as we are meeting today with colleagues from Malaysia, let me briefly mention a project that has been supported by UNEOC Malaysia a couple of years back. UNEOC partnered with the Malaysian youth-led organization Architects of Diversity to implement a project named Bridging the Past, Present and Future. The initiative created opportunities for young people from diverse communities to come together through dialogue, learning, and collaborative activities that promoted mutual understanding, critical thinking, and overall appreciation of Malaysian rich cultural diversity. The project contributed to build trust, social cohesion, resilience at community level by strengthening media and information literacy, encouraging dialogue, and fostering an overall greater sense of belonging. These examples illustrate an important point: that prevention is most— is often most effective when it's locally owned. Rather than imposing solutions through our programming, we are trying to support young people in designing initiatives that reflect their realities, their priorities, their aspirations in their own communities. And this not only strengthens the relevance and sustainability of these efforts, but also builds trust, ownership from the ground up.

From the ground up.

Perhaps, in concluding, one of the most important lessons that we have learned is that when we move beyond seeing youth solely as beneficiaries and instead recognize them as partner and leader in the process, prevention efforts become more sustainable, more inclusive, and ultimately more effective. Investing in youth today is not simply an investment, but it's also an investment in more peaceful resilience and cohesive society today.

Thank you. All right, thank you so much for that. And I think the key point there about youth being agents of peace and change, I think that's really important, and I think sometimes that narrative gets lost. So thank you, thank you for that. So now we've reached the point where we can open up the floor for questions. We're running a little bit behind time, but I think maybe if we give about 10-15 minutes for a couple of questions and reflections, even examples that you might have from where you're sitting. Those are most welcome. So, maybe we'll take a first round. Yeah, go ahead.

Thank you very much. I had a question for both colleagues from Malaysia and as well as from Iraq. So, for my Malaysian colleagues, you mentioned getting families involved years in advance. To the reintegration process. Did you find when dealing with families over a period of years that there was perhaps some anger towards the government that it would take so long to bring people back, that they would feel like the process was too slow because it was a years-long process before everyone came home? And for my Iraqi colleagues, I was wondering about the host communities in which you spoke about them being such big parts about this process. So we talked about the balancing between reintegration and support for the returnees as well as justice for victims of terrorism. In this circumstance, are there specific communities that you would send people back to with specific experts in mind? Did they have to have previous ties to those communities, like familial relations? And were they allowed to move and belong to communities with, let's say, friends or people people that they created communities with from the Al-Hol camp, considering they had spent 10 years there building their own new connections. Thank you.

Thank you for those questions. Anybody else want to take the floor? Yes, please go ahead. And sorry, if you don't mind introducing yourself. Thank you very much.

I'm Mira Sumarini from Indonesia. I'd like to know, uh, from the panelists whether you have an experience relating to the returnees engaging or returning to a radical family.

So do you have any approach to address this issue?

And then secondly, do you have an experience, returnees or former inmates who experience relapse? Do you have any experience approach in this issue as well?

Thank you.

Okay.

Can we take maybe one more and then we'll go back to the panel? Okay, I don't see any hands being raised, so why don't we go ahead and start with the first question that was posed to Malaysia about potential anger that might have been felt because of how long the process was.

Thank you, Madam Moderator. Thank you for the question. Yes, of course, we went through all that, all emotions, sort of emotions from family members. It was frustrating even for us. The process took longer than we expect, but it's a process that we have to go through. And it's not something that is— because you have to convince a lot of people, a lot of parties. So once you get that confirmation, you have convinced one part of group, the others might not be happy about what you already have. So yes, we face multiple— many, many frustrations from the families, but when we frequently visited the families, and we did constant engagement with the family members. And in fact, we allowed them to contact the detainees directly via video call once in a while. So that gives them hope. But we know that the decision initially is not on us when we want to repatriate them. We did not want to give them false hope, but we do explain to them carefully every single detail that— things that we have done just to get them— to give them some assurance that this initially will be accomplished and they finally can get back to the families. Yes, thank you.

All right, thank you. I think the next question was to Iraq and the specific communities that they might have been going to. Over to you.

Shukran.

Thank you, thank you, uh, Barbara, and thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Honestly, I can answer the question in a number of ways, but I will be, be— I will be brief. In practice, in Iraq, there were 6 governorates outside the control of the state and under the control of ISIS. And those who were affected by extremism and these ideas in this— in these regions were not many. There were 3.5 people living in that area, and only hundreds or dozens of people went into the area and controlled it. But their stay in these government— at the governorates was the reason that these people were affected by these ideas. They were affected because ISIS continued to control the region during that period. So if we want to talk about that, there were indicators that prove that what happened was something perverted that happened in Iraq. And Iraq will manage to get rid of these ideas because The percentage of participation in elections in the west was close to 60%, whereas in central Iraq and other areas was only 20%. This proves that they are convinced that there is a new political era in Iraq, and they want to work on the political scene in Iraq. Second, if we want to talk about those we brought from al-Hol camp, of course their cause is different because The rehabilitation should take into account the need and the effect left by ISIS on the families that were victims— for example, rebuilding their homes, providing them with job opportunities, and ensuring they feel equal. And ensuring that people know that the government is aware of their grievances. In addition, there is no indicator that— so in Iraq, we make sure that families stay together, but we do not separate them. We do not make sure that all the community knows that they came back from Al-Hol camp. So we call everyone for a conference. We address the problem together and we try to find solutions through our elders in the community to solve the problem. There were victims and, um, that, that gave their experiences. There were more than 57 families yesterday, for example. We spoke about this with these families. During that period, there were around 90 families. There are 57 now left. So 90 families that wanted to return to their regions, but they were not allowed because, as we said, because of the situation and what happened. So the government decided to transfer the influencers in Al-Haditha region, and we brought them to Al-Amal Center. They met with the families. When they met them, there was apologies, there were a lot of emotions. They spoke with these families and they found that most of these families were led into extremism and involuntarily, either by force of arms or by luring them through different means. And they realized that these— and these people are now calling for releasing these families from the centers, and they said that they were willing to welcome them in al-Haditha area. This proves that when work happens face to face, when we hold the dialogue between these different parties, it We can succeed. They were more focused on calling for peace and peaceful coexistence because they think that what happened was something exceptional that happened in Iraq, and Iraq had nothing to do with that. It was rather something imported to Iraq and supported by other parties. So Iraq today is now recovering, and communities have woken up. We have another indicator, too. We do not look at this file in isolation of what's happening in the region. The region in general was affected by extremism and violent extremism, so we look into rehabilitating cities, entire cities, cities where people were leaving and were not good for living. Today we are using them to, um, attract these families to return. We have more than one experience in southern Salahdin and Anbar, and even in Ninua there was a big a wake-up call in terms of the return of these families to their regions. And we cannot forget that there are a lot of challenges that we need to address because we cannot reach a level of excellence, but we have to address the challenges for the next phase. There were a lot of things that I can talk about if time permits. Thank you so much.

All right, thank you so much for those, for going into those, those details. I think that paints a very important picture. I think there was one last question, so I'm going to ask for like a really short response about whether, and maybe I can turn to you, Mohammed, if that's okay, not to put you too much on the spot, but any experiences we've seen of radicalized families. I think that's the question you were, you were trying to get at. So like a 30-second Sorry to cut you short.

No worries, Barbara. We do— we do follow up as much as we can with the families after— after leaving Al-Amal Rehabilitation Center in their areas of return. And we never witnessed the return for any illegal activities. It is not documented that one single security incident was recorded at the government level. From the returnees from al-Hol, which is really remarkable. It can be a mix of the extensive efforts and some luck, and of course, the peaceful coexistence that the Iraqi population has in its nature. So no, we did not, at least in Iraq.

Thank you.

Yeah, thank you for that. So we're now going to be closing. So I just wanted to I would look to my right here and see if Ambassador and also Mr. Zulkifli, if there maybe would be like a minute of reflection that you would like to give just so that we can then wrap up. We've heard so much, so over to you.

Let me just sum up what my colleague Elina mentioned just now. During her remarks. Based on our experience, the repatriation or taking the FTF back from third country would be very easy things to do. The difficult part will start when the moment they arrive in the country. We have to be with them until the rest of their life, monitoring them, make sure that they don't go back to doing terrorism, terrorist activities anymore. So that will be the difficult part, getting everyone on board. Is the key to make sure that we have a very successful program on every returnee. Thank you.

I was ambassador in Washington during the initial issues of Daesh/ISIS from 2013-2014 onwards. So I had to deal with the global aspect of it and I would like to reflect on that, if you don't mind. Certainly, what we have heard today reflects this is not a local challenge which requires a local solution or even a national challenge requires, but it is an international issue. So here, in addition to whole of government and whole of society, I would add whole of nations need to work with each other. The issue of ideology does bypass states and transcends. And the issue of using games or others are a clear sign that we are dealing with a vicious phenomenon which requires us to have a long view, requires us to think outside the box, and requires us to be courageous in addressing it. In the Iraq situation, we are dealing with tribes and therefore in its own you have to look into the localities of how tribes interact with each other in so many ways, whether they are generous or vengeance take effect. So in that aspect, I think what we need to view is this specific phenomenon did not come overnight. It was not addressed globally. Maybe from the 1990s onward, we saw it all over the world. We saw it in different countries manifest itself. And in somewhat it tried perfected during the ISIS situation in Syria and Iraq. So this is another aspect to bear in mind. The viciousness of their attacks was beyond imagination. So I think we need to reflect back on the causes of it, global causes of it, how countries did not address it in time, an element of locals, how do we need to make sure that the local cohesiveness of society allows, or the national aspect of it, and an element of dialogue between countries to make sure that such a phenomenon, which goes beyond the issue of Islam or beyond the issue of a specific religion, is to do with populism and other aspects which we see phenomenon of it across the globe.

Now.

So for us, I think what we have talked about today is a useful microscope of the challenge, but we need to widen it to understand how we can be preventive of these issues rather than just dealing with the solutions or the afterthought of it. Thank you.

Thank you so much. I think this is where we wrap up, and I just want to say thank you to the panelists. Thank you to the co-organizers. I think my only regret was that this meeting was probably shorter than we really— and I think we could have used a little bit more time. I think there's so much to sort of unpack and so much to dive into in terms of the details, but hopefully this just means that we'll be doing more of this with the same partners. So thank you everyone and have a good evening.