Pramila Patten (Special Representative) on Sexual Violence in Conflict - Press Conference

report especially for you. Alright, good afternoon to all of you here in the room, and I know all of you are joining online. We are delighted to be joined by Pramila Patten, who, as you know, is the Secretary-General's Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict. She's here to brief you on the Secretary-General's report that was submitted to the Security Council late yesterday. So, Miss Patten will have some opening remarks, and then we will take your questions. Ms. Phan, please, welcome. Don't worry, yep, there we go, don't worry, it's done.

Good morning, distinguished members of the press. I'm here to provide a briefing on the 17th Annual Report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence, covering the period from January to December 2025. I must say at the outset that this morning I woke up with a WhatsApp message from a survivor whom I had met in Port Sudan. She's a 25-year-old woman, uh, a diploma, a graduate in international relations, who was dragged from a bus and gang raped by 4 RSF soldiers. And she sent me a message asking me whether the report is only about two countries. And, and that made me think that this report— I felt I had to make the point that this report is not just about two countries but spans 21 conflict-affected countries. It's true that the headlines may focus on who has been listed, but my focus and the focus of the report is on women, girls, men, and boys whose bodies, minds, and futures have been shattered by unacceptable violence. Their plight, their rights should remain at the center of this conversation, and at its heart This report is about the human suffering of all these survivors and communities living in the shadow of war. It is about innocent civilians from Sudan to South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Haiti, Myanmar, and elsewhere, whose lives and livelihoods have been shattered by conflict-related sexual violence. So I really urge you this morning not to forget them. Let me come to the global context. In 2025, documented cases of sexual violence as a tactic of war, torture, terrorism, and political repression, marked by extreme brutality and overwhelmingly targeting women and girls, increased dramatically while multiple and overlapping political, security, and humanitarian crises worsened. Civilians were targeted with rape,— gang rape, abductions and sexual slavery by state and non-state actors. Expenditures linked to rising militarization, straining national budgets, coupled with acute funding cuts for United Nations entities, had a devastating impact, with services for survivors being slashed when women and girls caught up in conflict need them most. In terms of qualitative trends, against this backdrop, trends and patterns of conflict-related sexual violence have worsened. The report documents extreme physical violence often accompanying sexual violence, including the killing of victims after rape and incidents of suicide among victims. Victims, including persons with disabilities, ranged in age from 1 to 70 years old. Non-state armed groups, including organized criminal groups, entities under sanctions by the Security Council, and transnational criminal networks used sexual violence as a tactic to gain territorial control, including over lucrative natural resource sites, with abductions, forced marriage, trafficking, and kidnapping as part of the strategic objectives and ideology of certain groups. In the context of abduction and trafficking, rape, gang rape, and other forms of sexual violence were perpetrated predominantly by non-state armed actors in Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and the Syrian Arab Republic. The convergence of organized criminal groups and armed groups, as in Haiti and Colombia, also fuelled sexual violence in the context of trafficking and kidnapping, including to extort ransom, fund their operations, and exert control over populations. In detention settings, patterns of conflict-related sexual violence perpetrated mainly against men and boys were reported, including as a form of torture, used to humiliate, and extract information, as in Libya, Myanmar, Israel, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and Yemen. LGBTQI+ persons face heightened risk of targeted persecution and harassment across a range of contexts. Displaced and refugee women and girls experience heightened risk of sexual violence in conflict settings, exacerbated in remote and border areas where they lacked community networks, notably in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, South Sudan, and the Sudan. Lastly, across settings covered in the report, the illicit proliferation and widespread availability of small arms and their ammunition directly facilitated and fuelled sexual violence. In terms of quantitative data, the report documents 9,000 7,888 cases of conflict-related sexual violence, which has more than doubled from last year. These cases convey the severity and brutality of these crimes, not their totality, which we can never capture. Ongoing conflict, insecurity, and restrictions on humanitarian access increasingly obstruct reporting and documentation, which is further undermined by mission drawdowns and budget cuts in which specialized capacity on gender and women protection are often the first to be reduced. Without protection and assistance, survivors are less likely or even able to report. Accordingly, the figures contained in this report should be understood not as the full picture, but as an indication of a much broader pattern of violations that remain largely unseen and underreported. In terms of the methodology underpinning this report, I want to stress that it is based on information on incidents, patterns, and trends of conflict-related sexual violence gathered by the UN system through a rigorous and well-established documentation and verification methodology, including independent verification by United Nations human rights monitors which is reliable, credible, and impartial. All information is assessed and presented in accordance with United Nations standards on safety, confidentiality, and survivor protection. Nonetheless, the data in the report is indicative of patterns and trends and is not comprehensive, as there are many challenges to monitoring and reporting, which include the denial of access to human rights monitors, escalating security threats, and growing risk of reprisal against frontline responders and humanitarian workers. These challenges were compounded by critical capacity shortfalls, with Women Protection Advisers, though mandated across all relevant conflict-affected settings, deployed in only 9 of the contexts covered by this report. Coming to the annex in the Secretary-General's report, the report lists 77 parties in its annex, the majority of which are non-state actors, 62 of them. New listings include 3 non-state actors and 2 state actors. The 3 non-state actors operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were listed, and they are: Wazalendo Armed Elements, Forces Nationales de Libération, and Mai Mai Group Armée de l'Union des Patriotes pour la Libération du Congo. Two new state actors are listed: firstly, the Israeli armed and security forces, namely the Israel Defense Forces, Israel Prison Service, including the Keter Special Forces, and the Police Counter-Terrorism Unit, Yamam, are listed on the basis of credible information indicating continued patterns of rape and other forms of sexual violence, with an increase in the number of verified cases this year. In last year's report covering 2024, this party was put on notice for potential listing by the Secretary-General owing to significant concerns regarding consistent denial of access for UN monitors and patterns of sexual violence documented by the UN. Since last year's notice, both the patterns of sexual violence and the denial of access have persisted. As a result, UN human rights monitors continue to face severe access constraints, which significantly impede their capacity to document cases in a timely manner. With regard to detainees, it has only been possible to verify cases after release. Obstructed access to Gaza, where many detainees have been released following the October 2025 agreement, further impedes their ability to document cases. In this challenging context, in 2025, the UN was able to verify 31 cases —primarily in detention settings, but also at checkpoints and during military operations—against 14 men, 7 women, 9 boys, and 1 girl from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. This is part of a pattern of sexual violence against Palestinians, including as a form of torture. Access limitations resulted in delayed verification of cases. As such, 13 of these cases occurred in 2025, while 18 occurred in 2024 and 2023. As set out in paragraph 35 of the report, violations consisted of rape, including with objects, gang rape, attempted rape, physical violence to the genitals, instances of targeted shooting of the genitals, touching of breasts and genitals, strip and cavity searches conducted without apparent security justification, forced nudity, and threats of rape. Rape and gang rape were perpetrated against 9 of these victims, with 4 suffering repeated rape on multiple occasions. Perpetrators included Israeli armed and security forces, as I mentioned, namely the Israel Defense Forces, Israel Prison Service, including the Keter Special Forces, and the Border Police Counterterrorism Unit, Yamam. These violations occurred primarily during detention and interrogation and across 12 sites, including military camps under Israeli control, Israeli Prison Service facilities, and in one Israeli police station, in a climate of total impunity. Moreover, explicit threats were made by Israeli armed and security forces, warning detainees not to report abuse to media or human rights organizations. I wish to acknowledge the engagement between the Permanent Mission of Israel and my Office, including my visit to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory in 2024. Upon putting on notice Israeli armed and security forces in last year's report, In a letter dated 11 August 2025, the Secretary-General communicated a number of preventive measures to be undertaken in line with relevant Security Council resolutions. He stressed in that letter that while the implementation of these preventive measures will be taken into account in the consideration of listing, the primary factors are the immediate cessation of all acts of sexual violence, and the unimpeded access for relevant UN entities, including to monitor compliance. The Permanent Representative of Israel responded to the Secretary-General's letter the very next day in a letter dated 12 August, rejecting both the notice of potential listing as well as the content of the report. On 24 November 2025, Following up on the Secretary-General's letter, I sent a letter to the Permanent Mission reiterating the readiness of my Office to provide technical support to Israeli authorities in their implementation of the preventive measures outlined by the Secretary-General. I did not receive a response to my letter, nor was information shared on the implementation of any of these measures, although there was engagement between my Office and the Permanent Mission, especially around a potential second visit to Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory, including Gaza. It was only after the country section of the report was communicated to the Permanent Mission of Israel on 13 March 2026, as per usual practice, that the government responded on 31 March, rejecting any patterns of sexual violence against Palestinians, but also submitting a document which sets out laws, policies, and directives in place within the Israeli Defense Forces, Prison Service, Police and Security Agency, as well as trainings of personnel, in addition to the legal framework governing detention. The submission did not contain information on any fully-fledged investigation prosecution or conviction for sexual violence cases. For instance, with regard to the emblematic Cédé Teman case, not only was sexual violence not in the indictment, but the charges were even dropped altogether by the Military Advocate General. This is the case, you may recall, which had triggered demonstrations by some NESSET members to protest against the arrest of the soldiers including attacks on the Sayyidit Taman camp and those investigating the case. On the issue of denial of access to UN monitors, the Government of Israel in its submission maintains that it will not provide access on account of what it alleges to be institutional bias in UN bodies and mechanisms. It also confirmed that since October 7th, 2023, ICRC has been denied access to detention facilities due to security concerns. Turning to the Russian Federation. The other party that was put on notice in last year's report is the Russian armed and security forces, which have also been listed by the Secretary-General this year based on UN-verified information indicating continued patterns of rape and other forms of sexual violence perpetrated primarily against Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilian detainees. Consistent denial of access for UN monitors to temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine and to the Russian Federation resulted in cases being verified only after their release. As set out in paragraph 72 of the report, in 2025, the UN was able to verify 310 cases of conflict-related sexual violence, including rape, gang rape, genital mutilation, electric shocks, and beatings to the genitals, affecting 280 men, 26 women, and 4 girls, perpetrated by the Russian armed and security forces, including the Federal Penitentiary Service, the Russian Armed Forces, and the Federal Security Service. Of these cases, 52 cases were perpetrated during 2025, mainly against male prisoners of war and civilian detainees. The remaining cases, while verified and documented in 2025, occurred between February 2022 and December 2024. Of these cases documented, 232 involved multiple forms of sexual violence, while 195 involved repeated incidents of sexual violence. There has been no engagement between my Office and the Government of the Russian Federation since July 2022. Upon putting the Russian armed and security forces on notice for potential listing in last year's report, the Secretary-General communicated a number of preventive measures to be undertaken in line with relevant Security Council resolutions in a letter dated 11 August 2025. Unfortunately, no response was received and none of these measures have been implemented to date. Before winding up my remarks, I just want to mention a positive trend noted in the report. The report acknowledges a downward trend in UN-verified cases of conflict-related sexual violence attributed to the Congolese National Police over the past 5 years. This positive development coincides with the continued constructive engagement of the government of the DRC with my mandate, as well as the commitment of national authorities to addressing conflict-related sexual violence. This political commitment is expressed with the development of a dedicated roadmap for the police and continued work within the framework of the Addendum to the Joint Communiqué on Prevention of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, which I signed with the Government in 2019. The Secretary-General has accordingly indicated an intention to delist the Congolese National Police from the Annex of the report in the next reporting cycle, provided the current decline in cases and implementation of preventive measures, including accountability and oversight, are maintained. In conclusion, I would like to say that— to reiterate that we must not lose sight of the broader message and purpose of this report. These violations are neither isolated nor confined to a handful of contexts. They are global in scale, devastating in impact, and demand a response centered not on political posturing, selective outrage, or preconceived narratives, but on the rights, needs, and dignity of victims and survivors and communities affected who are in desperate need of healing and hope. I thank you and stand ready to respond to your questions.

Great, thank you. Amélie, then Bessam.

Thank you. On behalf— I don't know if it works.

Do you need a pen?

And do I take a few questions?

No, no, sir, we'll do one-on-one.

Thank you. On behalf of the UN Correspondents Association, thank you very much for doing this briefing. I'm Amélie Botelier from AFP News Agency. I have two questions. One general first. I mean, your report notes a sharp increase of sexual violence related to conflicts from 2024 to 2025. How do you evaluate this increase, as if I'm not mistaken, there's not like a global figure? And second question, more specifically on Israel, yesterday the Israeli ambassador said that Israel invited UN representative to visit and that the UN chose not to come. You said the opposite, so what do you answer to him? Thank you very much.

Well, thank you for your question. Yes, indeed, the data presented in this report, which shows more than 100% from last year, is a very, very disturbing trend, and that number, which represents the very tip of the iceberg, must be looked at in the context of denial of access constraints when it comes to access, capacity challenges, but also security challenges. And this number can be attributed to the fact that we are going through a time when we have a record number of extremely violent conflict, and the fact that Perpetrators are feeling emboldened by a context of impunity where this crime is almost cost-free. We have challenges in terms of ensuring justice and accountability for survivors. Survivors are having difficulty to report and to access services. The increase in— in the number of cases, for me, is closely linked to the global context of escalating conflict and protracted conflict. Coming to the— to what Ambassador Danone has mentioned regarding her visit, I just want to confirm that it's true that last year, on the 25th of March, I received an invitation from the Government of Israel, the purpose of the visit being to allow for new testimonies and information from survivors and witnesses, including returned hostages, especially in the context of the Secretary-General's recent report, and also to engage with civil society organizations and survivors to amplify their voice and advance shared goals in addressing this these critical issues. I contacted the Secretary-General's office to seek emergency funding for the purpose of that visit, and the Secretary-General approved emergency funding on the 7th of May of 2025. I immediately— and I just want to flag that in the 9 years that I have been in office, the only time that I have benefited from emergency funding has been for the 2024 visit to Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory, and the Secretary-General approved emergency funding for this— for that visit too. And then we started to engage. I informed Ambassador Danon that the emergency funding had been approved and that I really wanted him to clarify the purpose of the visit, noting that in 2024 I did not meet with any survivor and ensuring that survivors will be forthcoming and trying to get clarity around the visit itself, how many hostages will be willing to speak to me. The Permanent Mission of Israel made it clear that they wanted the visit to be linked to the report of the Secretary-General for 2024, and when I made it clear that the report was locked, and that I could talk about the findings of the report during my statement at the open debate. The interest for the visit to be conducted was stalled. Then came the letter of the Secretary-General on the 11th of August, putting Israel on notice. It was on the 18th of September, 2025, that I met with Ambassador Danon, I requested a meeting and there was discussion again around the visit, and I made it very clear that the purpose of the visit had to be recalibrated, uh, in light of the appendix and the notice for, for, for listing. And I told him that the visit will have to be framed to be a verification mission focused on compliance of the measures set out in the letter of the SEC of the Secretary-General. And there has been several technical level missions around that. I have systematically made it clear that I need to know what are the preventive measures that are taking place and what verification will happen. And I also made it clear from the outset that access to my office will not resolve the issue because the access that the Secretary-General has mentioned in in his letter is about access to relevant UN entities to monitor. And even the Security Council that mandates the Secretary-General to list parties, Resolution 1960, makes it clear that the implementation of the preventive measures need to be tracked and monitored. And I made it very clear to the Permanent Mission of Israel that tracking and monitoring compliance is is critical, and that is not my— that is not my role. I have made several requests in writing and sometimes during meetings for details about initial steps, including issuance of orders of command, information on access, and information on accountability measures. but I did not get any response, any response on the substantive aspect of the preventive measures. We discussed again between December and February and noted and set dates for the visit in March. But unfortunately, that visit had to be suspended on account of the Israeli war. But throughout, we made it clear that in the absence of information on measures taken for verification, it was never forthcoming. So I do not see that the submission was only received on the 31st of March. And with hindsight, when I look at the submission, I realize that a mission would not have changed anything in the outcome of the consideration of the Secretary-General in, in listing the Israeli security and, and defense force. It would not have made any, any difference. And, and even throughout the engagement with the permanent mission, I made it clear that I will not visit detention facilities even if they offered, because that's not my mandate and that's not my role, and relevant UN entities need to have, need to have access. Thank you very much.

Bisana Abu-Khakeeb, Al Jazeera Arabic. So in your remarks, you said that this was— on Israel— that this was part of a pattern of sexual violence against Palestinians, including as a form of torture. And Rima El-Salem, the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women and Girls, said after the report was released that this was long overdue, listing Israel. In previous years, have you tried documenting any cases other than the ones that you mentioned in the report? Why has it just happened now and not in previous years? Was it an issue with verification? And have, uh, you tried over the years before October 7th to, uh, was this part of the research and the work that the report was doing before, uh, October 7th, 2023?

My mandate is to, uh, to address countries that are on the agenda of the Security Council, and that's why the office, since it has been established in 2009 following the adoption of Resolution 1888, has not looked at, at the situation of Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory. So it was only in, in 2023 that this situation came on the agenda of the council and, and I promptly started the, uh, the relevant engagement with both the occupied Palestinian territory and the permanent mission of Israel. And I do not do any documentation. Documentation is done through the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and UN Human Rights Monitors. My report is based on credible information received through a very rigorous methodology of verification and documentation. So it's not the responsibility of my office to do any verification. Jessica Abderrahmane, then Abdeslam.

Hello, Jessica— Jessica from France 24. Thank you for this briefing. I'm looking at your report right now, and I see that, uh, you say that there were videos of the abuse of Palestinian detainees and photos. Did you see these videos and photos? Um, would you describe them as evidence? Uh, I'd also like to know if— I remember when you had your visit to Israel, you told me that you were not able to seek any evidence. If now, with hindsight, you regret that trip, uh, seeing as it caused so many issues regarding actually being able to draw clear conclusions based on evidence, and, you know, what steps you've taken to avoid finding yourself in that situation in, in future. I'd also like to know in which areas you are lacking funding for your work and what the reason for this is and if it can be attributed at all to a withdrawal of UN— US funding for some issues that they considered gendered.

Well, thank you for your question. I mean, like I said, I receive information from UN human rights monitors. I mean, like, I do not have the mandate to go out myself And I must say, and I've said it in the past, that the visit to Israel in 2024 was of an exceptional nature because of lack of access to relevant UN human rights monitors. And that would have meant that there would have been nothing in the Secretary-General's report on the 7th of October attacks of 2023. And, and in my report, I have explained the exceptional nature, and I have made it very clear that the The mission was not investigative in nature, and that's why I was still very careful to use the OHCHR methodology of gathering, of collecting information. So in the context of this report and what is mentioned about certain violations were photographed and on video, this is the information that we received from UN human rights monitors.

Right, but seeing as, for example, you mentioned that you were in direct contact with one of the other victims in Port Sudan, for example, I wondered if you'd had that sort of contact with any of the—

No, not in the context of— I did meet with witnesses. I did not meet with survivors. I did meet with hostages and witnesses to 7th the of October attacks back in 2024. I also met with Palestinian detainees who had been released in West Bank in 2024. But in the context of this report and the, uh, the information about videos and, and photos of violation, this is the information that we receive from the UN Human Rights Monitor. On those 31 cases, on those 31 cases. So I'm not the custodian of, of, of, of the information, right?

But seeing as you made that trip to Israel to— well, that was in 2020, right?

But are you reading my report of 2024?

Right, right, right.

But then when it comes to the Palestinian detainees who have made— said that they were sexually abused, you didn't have the same sort of direct contact or—

I did in 2024 during the visit.

Right, right.

But now for the follow-up here, that it's explicitly stated that there are these—

General, for the report of the— we're talking— there are two reports, my report on the 7th of October attacks of 2024. Now what is before you is the report of the Secretary-General, which compiled by my office. So I compile the information that I receive from the Office of the High Commissioner through its country offices.

Jessica, I think if we could—

My question is regarding all of the problems that we've had due to you not being able to have access to evidence. Did you get access to the evidence that is mentioned in this report?

I don't have to access. I mean, like, the information is verified with a very robust methodology of verification and documentation.— I am a recipient. I compile that information and I present it to the Secretary-General.

Right, I just wondered if you'd viewed it with your own eyes.

No, no, because that's—

this is not my job. And to your second question about funding, yes, we— like many other UN agencies, funding is becoming very scarce. It's not only Yes, the US funding has been— we have not received the US funding since last year. But in addition to the US funding, there are cuts everywhere, which is impacting our work, the work of my team, of my two implementing arms, the work of my team of experts on the rule of law with regard to their work on justice and accountability, where they have to make hard choices and to prioritize country, one country over the other, and also the work of the UN Action Network Against Sexual Violence in Conflict that fund projects, catalytic projects targeting survivors of sexual violence, ensuring that they have access to holistic services. It is being impacted. Currently, we only have a couple of projects running in Sudan, in South Sudan, and in Ukraine. We would have liked to bring to scale because the needs are huge as we are speaking. And we have— so we have the expertise, we know what the survivors need, we just have to bring to scale what the work that we are doing.

And which ones have you regrettably been forced to drop?

Well, I mean, like, when there's no money for— there's no earmarked funding for a particular country, I wish I could do projects in Somalia, in DRC, and Haiti. We've just received money and we are going to start a big project targeting survivors of sexual violence in Haiti. But we have good examples of very, very holistic services being provided to survivors of sexual violence, including men and boys, for example, in Ukraine, which I would like to translate it to other countries.

Abd al-Hamid Ibtisam, then we'll go to the screen, we'll come back to the room.

Thank you, Ms. Patton. Abd al-Hamid Ibtisam from the Arabic Daily, Al Quds Al Arabi. I remember I asked you questions after you came back from that 2024 trip here and asked you if you also had access to the Israeli-claimed victims. And Palestinians, and you said no. But now my question is why you didn't try to go to visit Gaza, for example, after the ceasefire, what is called ceasefire. And second, there are so many Palestinian victims who are now not necessarily in Gaza, they are in Cairo, in Jordan, in Turkey, and in Qatar. So you could have access to them and talk to them. And the other Related question about the Israeli victims you spoke about. Do you believe that if that is true, Israel will not fly them first class and bring them to your office the way they were bringing the families of the hostages? They've been camping in front of the Secretary General's house. They've been meeting with him almost every, every week, every month. Why Israel did not bring those what they call victims of sexual violence by Palestinians?

Thank you. Well, I cannot answer for the government of Israel, and you may have a valid question. I mean, like, I'm not saying it's not a valid question, but unfortunately, it's not for me to answer. But I must say that it has never, in the 9 years that I've been in office, It has never been the practice for any member state to bring survivors to me. But I take your point about Gaza. I just want to clarify that in engagement over a second visit, I made a visit to Gaza a non-negotiable parameter of the visit, and I must in all fairness say that that parameter which I had insisted on was agreed. During the negotiations around the second visit. And even the length of the visit to West Bank was also a non-negotiable parameter, that it had to be more days on the Palestinian side. And even that was agreed. But the visit became moot with the security situation and confirmation from UN DSS that no travel was advisable. Yes, I mean, like, I mean, that is not for me. I have not received any request. I have an outstanding invitation from the Minister of Gender of Palestine to come back and to go to Gaza, but I have never received any invitation to go anywhere, be it from NGOs, to go and meet with Palestinian survivors of sexual violence in any country. I suppose if that had been the case, I would have probably referred it to the relevant UN bodies with the mandate to document, to document cases. Thank you.

Ibtisam, and then we'll go to Efrat on screen.

Thank you. My name is Ibtisam Azim, Al Arab Al-Jadeed newspaper. I have first a follow-up to your answer to my colleague Bisan, because I think I didn't really understand the answer, and I will paraphrase what I didn't understand. If I understood correctly, the question was why didn't you investigate allegation of sexual violence against Palestinians before 2023, and it wasn't clear for me why not, because there is well-documented—

Number one, I do not have any investigative mandate, and I do not do it.

I do not— In the report, included in the report, cannot be in the report because it's what—

it's not on the agenda of the Security Council. I mean, the, the There are many more conflicts, as you can imagine, than 21, and my report covers 21 countries that are on the agenda of the Security Council.

What do you mean on the agenda of the Security Council? Like that you have— that the Security Council have a resolution specifically about specific countries?

Is this what you mean?

Yes, yes.

For example, to give you a context, I mean Ukraine. I only address Ukraine. In 2022 when it came on the agenda of the Security Council. So my mandate is a Security Council mandate, and this is how countries fall within the purview of the mandate. It's based on whether it is— and this is spelled out in Security Council Resolution 1960— and even the Secretary-General can only list parties credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of sexual violence for countries that are on the agenda of the Security Council.

Okay, but the conflict—

okay, but, uh, okay, so my question is, you, you talk about— or two questions— you talk about patterns and, um, of sexual violence against Palestinian detainees, um, and, um, incidents. When you talk about patterns Can you clarify that? Does that mean that sexual violence against Palestinians is used as a weapon of war? Can you say more to that? And then on challenges to report— reporting of sexual violence against Palestinians, did you also investigate violence regarding sexual violence perpetrated by settlers?

Right. To your question about settler violence, I have been following the news, following every report, including reports from special procedures, but the information that I received for the purpose of preparing The report of the Secretary-General on Israel and occupied Palestinian territory did not contain any verified information on settler violence. And so it's not for me to go out and to request. We have a procedure when we send questionnaires out around October, November to request information from field offices. So we have a methodology on how we compile. My responsibility is to compile the annual report of the Secretary-General. I don't do counter-verification, I don't do documentation, I don't do verification. I take what I get at face value, but knowing the robust verification and documentation methodology of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. So I did not receive information on settler violence, but every year we sent out a questionnaire. So for— I can assure you that I will ensure that attention be paid to settler violence, and, and we revise the questionnaire every, every year. So the questionnaire that will go out for the next reporting cycle of the Secretary-General's report will certainly include— provide a with information, if available, information that's verified on settler violence. But it is a disturbing fact because I'm following every report on settler violence. But I did not receive report— verified information on sexual violence perpetrated by settler violence, let me put it this way. Thank you. The first question. Yes, I mean, like, the, the only, uh, threshold for the Secretary-General is to establish— to, to, to ensure that there are patterns. And in fact, the Secretary-General has been extremely transparent, uh, in, um, in, in explaining what is the threshold for listing. He lists on the basis of pattern. And he has very clearly in his report of '90— of 2010, immediately after being provided— it was in 2010 that he got the mandate to list parties— and he has explained in that report of 2010 his methodology, the threshold for listing. So basically it revolves around the notion of pattern. Pattern requiring a methodical plan, a system, a collectivity of victims. These are the important considerations for him. And he looks at multiple commission of act. He makes a differentiation between individual cases which can add up to a pattern depending on the time, location, motivation, and profile of the perpetrators with the victim and the victims. As opposed to isolated cases that cannot. He looks at systematicity, that is, the organized nature of the act of violence and the improbability of their random occurrence. So this is what is— is the evaluation exercise that's done. And the report are to be analyzed on a cumulative basis so that the systematic nature of the pattern can be established by cases occurring over the course of several reporting cycles. So that is the only criteria, patterns of conflict-related sexual violence, as opposed to isolated cases.

And the second part of my question, in this context, in the Palestinian context, pattern against Palestinian— sexual violence against Palestinians, do you believe Giving what you said, do you believe that violence was used as a weapon of war against Palestine? I can't hear you. Sexual violence was used as a weapon of war against Palestinians?

I go by the Security Council. I go by strictly by the mandate given to me by the Security Council and the mandate given to the Secretary-General to list in what circumstances to list. And all we we have to establish is pattern, is pattern of conflict-related sexual violence, credible, credible suspicion of pattern of sexual violence. So it's not for me to qualify, to, to qualify one way or, or the other. Thank you.

We'll go on screen for a couple of questions. Uh, Efrat, uh, and then, uh, Lisa.

Efrat, go ahead. Thank you so much. Uh, thank you, Special Representative Patton, for taking the time and Obviously, your work is very hard. I could tell you, you know, as a reporter who also works extensively in conflict zones documenting sexual violence, so I know firsthand exactly how rigorous and exhaustive the event— vendetta process must be to, you know, to confirm one single case of rape, let alone blacklist a nation's military. You just admitted on record that you have not seen a single video or even a photo mentioned in your report with your own eyes firsthand, and that you had zero direct contact with these allegedly 31 victims, and your office simply complied, um, data from outside field monitors. Furthermore, you stated that reviewing Israel's legal defense would not have made a difference anyway. Um, as a journalist, you know, again, if I published an accusation of break without verifying the primary evidence process or speaking to the people, you know, I would probably be fired. And I really want to ask you, isn't it a failure of due process to blacklist a democratic nation's military based on a report when the official presenting it has never actually looked at the evidence firsthand, but only, as you said, compiled them?

This is the mandate I have from the Security Council. This is my responsibility as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on sexual violence. I have made it very clear that it's not my mandate. I will be stepping beyond my mandate to go and verify and document cases and to look for evidence. This is not my mandate. And, uh, the, uh, the government of Israel has rejected last year's report and this year's report on the basis of, uh, its, its credibility and, and UN standard. But I just want to flag that, uh, I'm quite surprised by, by, by your question because my report of the 7th of October, uh, attacks was, was very much welcomed by, by the government of Israel. And although I, I made it very clear— I can refer you to a couple of paragraphs in my report, from paragraph 25 to paragraph 26 of, of my report, where I explained that the mission was not intended to be and is not a substitute for an investigation. But I explained that I still use the applicable standard of proof, uh, of reasonable grounds to believe, consistent with the methodology established by, by OHCHR. And, and I, and I explain what is the methodology of, of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, which, to be on, uh, on, uh, to, to, to be cautious, I used the same methodology, uh, that is did an assessment of the credibility and reliability of the witnesses, verifying the sources and the methodology used, cross-referencing the relevant material and information, and assessing whether in all the circumstances there was sufficient credible and reliable information. As much as my report of the 7th of October attack was welcome, although it was criticized by many quarters, but it was most welcomed by the government of Israel. I don't understand how now the section of the report on Israel is being challenged when the same methodology has been used. And I—

But with respect, Madam, you've been to Israel, you've visited Israel, you've talked with survivors, you said so.

This report contains 21 conflict contexts. Over 9,000 cases have been documented and verified by the UN, and which found itself in the report. I have not counter-verified a single of these cases because that is not my role.

I compile the report.

Uh, thank you. Lisa.

Thank you. Hi, um, thank you, uh, Undersecretary, uh, Patton, for, for doing this. Um, so really, uh, a clarification, uh, question. I, um, you were explaining why you didn't travel to Israel for the second time. And so, so you said that you put certain conditions, uh, among them, if I understood correctly, were— was access to different UN investigative bodies, right, to detention centers, etc. Uh, and I didn't quite understand if Israel in the end agreed to give this access, after which you agreed to visit Israel in March, but this was just canceled or postponed because of the war, or if there still are some principal disagreements which prevent you to travel to Israel.

Okay, I'll explain again. The invitation came in a specific context in March of 2025 to meet with survivors and hostages. So the initial discussion around the visit, after receiving a confirmation that emergency funding will be provided for the purpose of the visit, revolved around that purpose, but I wanted to make sure that I will be meeting with both survivors whom I did not meet in 2024. I fully understand that we have to give them time, so I wanted to understand whether we've— with the passage of time, that survivors will be coming forward to, to speak to me, and host— and hostages who had been released. I wanted to, to, to have some clarification around the number, approximately the number of hostages who would come forward, because in the initial invitation of 2024, I was told that there are hundreds, if not thousands, of survivors to be met. Uh, but when I went, I did not meet with a single survivor. I met with hostages released, and, and I met with, with witnesses. Uh, so I wanted that clarification, but then nothing happened. The visit was stalled, uh, because the visit was very much linked to the SG's report for the reporting cycle of January 1st to December of 2024. And when I made it clear that it will not find its way in the report because the report was already finalized, the whole conversation was stalled. So the visit— the issue of the visit revived after a meeting with Ambassador Danon in September. And then I wanted to recalibrate the purpose of the visit. I made it clear that the ground has shifted since March, and that if a visit is to happen, it has to be recalibrated. And I reminded him of the letter of the Secretary-General dated 11th of August, with setting out all the measures that is required uh, in accordance with relevant Security Council that he needs to take, that the government of Israel needs to take to be off the list. Uh, so that I, I need information around implementation of these preventive measures, and that I see the relevance of a visit around, uh, an assessment of the implementation of these, of these on these measures, which was never provided. So from that September conversation with Ambassador Danon— I think it was on the 18th of September that I met him and talked about recalibrating the purpose of the visit— till March 31st, I never received an iota of information on measures taken by the government of Israel on on implementation of the preventive measures. It was only in that submission, which submission I have said is laws on paper, legal frameworks on detention, on conditions of detention, and policies and directives from Israeli Prison Service, Israeli Defense, Israeli Police, But it's nothing on implementation. And then when information is provided on, on a handful of cases that had been investigated, that had gone through a preliminary investigation but never reached even the level of the criminal investigation because it was deemed that there was not sufficient evidence or that there was a lack of cooperation from complainants. So there's nothing concrete on accountability in that submission. And the Secretary-General has made it clear, there is a list, there is a list of preventive measures from issuance of— from code of conduct to command responsibility, but access— the Secretary-General had made it very clear that it's access to relevant UN entities to verify and document cases. And, and that was never— and, and even in the submission, they reiterated that they will not give access to, to— and during the conversation that I had with the Deputy Permanent Representative after September, at least two, two or three meetings with the Deputy around, around the visit, the issue of, of, of access was, was I was bringing it up, but there was, there was really, they were not budging on, on the issue of, of providing access to relevant UN human rights monitors. And I made it clear that when I come, I don't want to visit detention even if you give me access. This is not my mandate. I don't know what to do, what to look for in a detention facility. I've made it clear, you would roll out the red carpet for me, uh, I will not accept your offer of visiting any detention facility because this is not my mandate. And that the relevant UN entities with the, with the mandate should have access. And, and that has never happened. And the Secretary-General made it very clear the primary consideration for listing would be, one, cessation of all violations. Two is unimpeded access to relevant UN entities. So what I'm saying is that even if, even if that visit had happened, I don't know whether it would have made a difference because I would have probably reported exactly, uh, what is in the submission of the 31st of March. Yes, there are laws, there are directives, there are protocols, there's training going on, but in practice, uh, there's no cessation of violations. And, and, and I, I mentioned the Sede Teyman case where, you know, this, this is an emblematic case which shows the total lack of accountability. I mean, like, the evidence was solid. The Commission of Inquiry made it very clear that there was solid evidence of sexual violence, of sexual violence. The Palestinian detainee suffered life-threatening injuries. I will not go into the detail because you all have the details. 10 soldiers were initially arrested. For the rape of, of, of this Palestinian. 5 were immediately released within days. The 5 others were put on house arrest. And after they were put on house arrest, there were, there were members of the Knesset who actually demonstrated against their, their, their arrest. They— I know that they even occupied the Sde Teiman camp. They and they threatened those who were investigating the case. There were also strong statements made by the Minister of National Security on the arrest of those so-called heroes. And then the military advocate general just dropped this charge. So the case was initially investigated as sexual violence. The indictment did did not contain charges of sexual violence. It was on physical assault. And even those charges were dropped. So where is accountability?

My question was purely technical. Was your second visit to Israel agreed upon in the end, or because of what you just mentioned, You said you won't be coming until the relevant UN bodies would be given access.

Listen, I mean, like, for me, what happened on the 7th of October was horrible. And I agreed, I immediately contacted the Secretary-General upon receipt of that invitation in March, because for me, engaging with those hostages and finding out what they have, what they have, what they went through, the additional hostages, was important. So for me, engaging with the hostages is important, just as it is important for me to also engage with the survivors on the Palestinian side. And especially given the obstruction to Gaza, knowing how it has impeded verification and documentation of cases, I insisted on going to Gaza. I stand ready to still go if— when the security situation permits, but provided all the parameters, because I have always prioritized— it's not for the purpose of verification or documentation, but throughout my tenure, I have always prioritized firsthand engagement with survivors and be their voice. I consider my role to be the voice of the voiceless. And their suffering, they should not remain in the shadows. So for me, engaging with survivors of sexual violence of the 7th of October attacks, engaging firsthand with hostages, released hostages, and engaging with Palestinian survivors of sexual violence in West Bank, in Gaza, remains critical. But, I will do the visit within the purview of my mandate. I will not overstep my mandate and do the work that the International Commission of Inquiry or the Office of the High Commissioner should be doing. So that's why I made the point about I'm not asking you for access to detention facilities. I'm asking you access to hostages, to survivors, if they are willing to speak to me, but not, not detention. Inviting me, engaging with my office is very well with regard to my mandate, but it does not absolve you from your continued denial of access to relevant UN rights monitors to do their work of verification and documentation of cases. And there has to be a price for denial of access.

Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you for the brief

Good. Can you hear me?

Yeah.

Go ahead.

Yeah. Thank you for the briefing. This is Lei Zhu with China Central Television. I have a follow-up question about Israel. Since the Israeli side announced that they will sever ties with the Secretary-General's office, are you concerned that this could affect the UN's ability to verify allocate allegations going forward? How can your office continue monitoring the situation if cooperation from one of the parties is suspended? Thank you.

Well, I am the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and my focus is not politics. But protection. So, uh, I'm not concerned with the political debate, with the political debate surrounding aspects of, of the report. I'm concerned with the substance of the violations and documented within it and, and how, how to prevent their, their recurrence. So, so my mandate is really focused on, on, on ensuring, uh, measures are in place to prevent sexual violence and to assist survivors from whichever country they are. So my office, we have had a very good engagement with the permanent mission of Israel, and my entire office remains available to continue to engage, to engage. And the doors of my office are open to every country that falls within the purview of my office, and that includes the Russian Federation and every other country that falls within the purview of the mandate. My implementing arms, my team of experts on the rule of law, remain at their disposal to support members in their work on prevention and response to conflict-related sexual violence.

Great. Thank you very much, Ms.

Phan. Thank you very much for giving us a bit more than an hour, and we will see you guys soon. Thank you.