THE HAGUE – The International Court of Justice (ICJ) holds public hearings in the case Guyana v. Venezuela

La cour.

It's busy. The sitting is open. The Court meets this afternoon to resume hearing the first round of oral argument of Guyana on the merits in the case concerning the arbitral award of the 3rd of October 1899, Guyana v. Venezuela.

I now give the floor to Professor Alain Pellet. You have the floor, sir.

Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, Members of the Court, It is the 3rd of October 1899. This is the day when, 127 years ago, the award whose validity Venezuela now contests was rendered. And it is really by looking back at this date that we must understand its context and the law that was applicable to this still nascent institution, which was international arbitration. It was something somewhere between judicial adjudication as we know it and diplomatic negotiation. As Frederick Passy wrote in 1892, "Arbitration is not yet an institution, it is a happy incident." The best example of this was the famous Alabama arbitration case, but the bulk of precedents was made-up of awards rendered by sovereigns chosen by parties to the dispute or by joint commissions composed of representatives of the concerned states who sought a compromise, as was established by the Jay Treaty between the United States and Great Britain in 1794, or the one concluded between the United States and Mexico in 1868. The awards were very often rendered with very little or no reasoning. The president of the tribunal that rendered the sentence, which is a subject of the matter which is a dispute before the court, Frederick Fromhold Martin, and his co-arbitrators were profoundly steeped in these practices in which one could barely notice any customary rules apart from the binding nature of the award. It is in that context that this award was rendered. This must be borne in mind because the validity of this award must be assessed in the light of the contemporaneous law. It's the basic axiom of law, such as Max Huber described in his famous Palm Island award. And this principle had already been applied in previous awards. and has been done again in more recent decisions. A juridical act fact must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it and not of the law in force at the time when the dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled." End of quote. And it is in light of this principle that one must assess the seven grounds of invalidity of the sentence that Venezuela mentions in chapter five of its rejoinder with vehemence and frivolity. And you can see on your screens, Mr. Reichler demonstrated this morning the futility of the first of these reasons based on perverted invalidity of the 1897 Compromis. As to the award itself, I find it somewhat difficult to understand how one can respond separately to Venezuela's claims made in section D and under paragraphs 1, 2 and 5 of section E. Given that the arbitrators did not state their reasoning and were under no obligation to do so, the answer to these three objections is necessarily in the response to the answer to question E4, It is from the procedure it followed, it is through the deliberations that took place between the members and the attention that the members paid to the pleadings of the parties that one can infer that the Tribunal fully complied with its mandate. As to ground E3, I feel like I'm some kind of battle here. As to E3, I will briefly demonstrate in my conclusion that the Tribunal did not rule ultra petita. Venezuela believes in lack of grounds, a sufficient reason for invalidity and nullity. It is indeed tiresome to have to repeat this because the rejoinder provides nothing new, but there can be no doubt neither the text of the Compromis nor any customary rule required that reasons be given. It is clear that, contrary to other compromise concluded at the same time or earlier, the Treaty of Washington, whose provisions are, as Venezuela insists, precise and detailed with regard to the substance of the dispute and the procedure to be followed, it does not contain any provision requiring the Tribunal to motivate its award. Venezuela, nevertheless, attempts to infer from this obligation, some, and I quote, "a certain number of features characterizing it that failed to be convincing." Okay, the composition of the tribunal, yes, it is made-up of lawyers. And if it is true that more awards rendered at the end of the 19th century by joint commissions were reasoned, not all of them, but more of them were reasoned than those rendered by heads of state, It is impossible to infer from this that there was a customary obligation from this inconsistent practice. Then there's the issue of the time limit of the award. This clause was mechanically copied on those that are identical and found in the compromise between the US and the UK in 1871 in the Halifax case, or the compromise of 1892 between the United States and which provides for the submission of claims by the Venezuela Steam Transportation Company to the Joint Commission between Venezuela and the United States. It therefore seems highly risky to draw any conclusion whatsoever, particularly since this time frame was merely indicative. But the supposed ulterior motives of the Tribunal are immaterial, given that the Tribunal's working methods enabled it to fulfil its mandate. The precision of the task entrusted to the arbitrators I'll come back to it, but for now it is sufficient to note that despite the precision of the description of the task entrusted to the Tribunal in general terms, and more specifically in Articles 3 and 4, the obligation to state reasons is precisely, despite it being so precise, the reasons are not included. The obligation to state reasons is not included. And that said, I would like to note in passing the guidelines that are set out as shown in the highlighted extracts of Article 4 of the compromise that is on the screen. And I would like to draw your attention in particular to the final clause that combines in the same sentence reason, justice, principles of international law and considerations of equity that were specific to the case. In the absence of any relevant treaty provision, Venezuela asserts that the tribunal should have motivated its award under customary law. And I quote, "Under international law applicable at the time, This is Venezuela speaking, not me. Under international law applicable at the time, arbitrators were under a general duty to state the reasons for the award. I would like to note in passing that Venezuela acknowledges that it was indeed at the time when the award was rendered that one has to put oneself, or perhaps even in 1897 when the Compromis was signed, We agree on this point, but we certainly do not agree on the content of customary law, or even on its very existence. Previous practice, as that our opponents disregard totally, was partial and inconsistent, and the obligation to provide reasons was certainly not accepted as law. Unable to establish the existence of this practice during the 19th century, Venezuela invokes the practice of the following century. This is indeed a strange concept to use an exposed practice as demonstration. The crux of Venezuela's demonstration reads, and I quote, "In sum, the 1899 arbitral award was rendered at a time when the duty to state the reason for an award was widely recognized by states, largely recognized or widely recognized by states, and on the basis of an arbitration treaty, which, because of its specific features, clearly created an expectation expectation that the tribunal would provide reasons for its decision. Now, I'm not going to criticize my opponent's prose, but I cannot help but admire the relative caution in this statement. The duty to state reasons was largely recognized and the circumstances of the case gave rise to an expectation that the tribunal would state reasons. This is far from a categorical assertion. And rightly so. It is clear that no practice that was sufficiently widespread and representative as well as consistent, likely to establish the existence of a customary rule, can be identified at the critical date. And it is even more true with regards to opinio juris. The 3 October 1899 award was, at the time, far from being an isolated case. You will find in your folders, under tab 6.1, a non-exhaustive list of awards that were without reasons or whose reasons were reduced to almost nothing. This list confirms the observation that Charles Rousseau made. that the reasoning was only established late in international arbitration procedures. And to counter these numerous precedents, Venezuela argues that some are very old. It is indeed true. And that is all the more significant. They preceded the 1899 award and thus set the tone and inspired subsequent practice. Then it says that these precedents stem in part of heads of states of third countries whose reasons for not stating reasons may have been specific. This might also be true, but they nonetheless form part of a practice that was accepted at the time as law from which it followed that motivation of awards. however useful or desirable they might be, was by no means a condition of validity of the award. Venezuela notes that in some cases, compromises called upon tribunals to decide in accordance with principles of justice and equity. Maybe, but before the adoption of the PACIJ statutes and the, the separation between principles and international law was not rigid. The text of Article 4 of the 1897 Compromis and the wording of several others blending these different sources in one common statement bear witness to this indecision and this permeability. Venezuela, again, said among the awards that were mentioned that some of them should be excluded from the list because they were allegedly reasoned. On reading them, members of the court, you cannot but agree that the reasoning was reduced to its simplest expression. Venezuela also notes that some compromise expressly provided that arbitrators were not asked to provide the reasons for the decisions. This is inaccurate for some of the cases that Venezuela mentions. And one can conclude, on the contrary, that the absence of such precise statements, that reasoning, or providing reasoning, was not mandatory. Similarly, the fact that other previous compromise provided expressly that the tribunal should state its reasons must be interpreted as meaning that this was far from being self-evident. It is true that Venezuela seems to trace the obligation to state reasons to the draft rules that were adopted in 1875 by the Institute of International Law. of this text was rather innovative at the time and applies exactly the opposite as what our opponents wish to infer. It is not a question of codification, which would have been merely doctrinal in any case. It would have been a customary norm. But in fact, it is a wish, a wish that was made by the Institute. as a kind of recommendation addressed to states. In its preamble, the Institute said, and I quote, "Desiring that recourse to arbitration for the settlement of international disputes be resorted to more and more by civilized peoples, hopes to be of service to the realization of such progress. by proposing for arbitral tribunals the following eventual regulations. It recommends them for adoption in whole or in part to States that may conclude compromi. Article 23 provides that the arbitral award must be reduced to writing and contain a statement of reasons, unless that is dispensed with under the stipulations of the compromise. And most importantly, under Article 24, the award with the reasons, if stated, if stated, that is to say that they may not be stated, is notified to each party, which indicates clearly that the Institute does not rule out the possibility of unreasoned awards, even if it recommended that it should be done. And as it was written a few years later, the draft of the Institute was a draft to be consulted. It was a possible rule. Mr. President, I do not claim that it existed before the 1899 award, that before the award there was a norm that existed excluding reasoning from arbitral awards because it would be contrary to the very idea of the basis of arbitral institution, which is the autonomy of the will of the contracting parties. What these precedents clearly show is that there wasn't another customary rule either imposing that the award be reasoned, making the absence of reasoning a cause of nullity. To take shape, to determine the existence and content of a rule of customary international law, it is necessary to ascertain whether there is a general practice that is accepted as law, opinio juris. Such a practice didn't exist in 1899, and for sure, it was obviously not accepted as law. It is only later on that it crystallized into a customary obligation. In fact, Venezuela doesn't insist, and it quickly abandons the line of reasoning based on the 1875 rule by quoting Kaspar that the obligation to state reasons was definitively enshrined in positive international law by virtue of Article 52 of the 1899 Convention for the Convention for Peaceful Settlement of International Conflicts. This implies, on the contrary, that this norm didn't preexist to the convention. It may be noted that with one exception, positive law that is being referred to here is purely conventional. This exception, because there is an exception which is retroactive, dates from over 60 years before, 60 years earlier. after the award rendered by the King of Spain, absence of motivation in an award is a cause of nullity. As my colleague Nilufer Oral will show later on, the Court didn't say any such thing. As to Article 52 of the Institute's rules, the award given by majority votes is accompanied by a statement of reasons, but it is always a progressive text looking to the future and does not claim to codify any existent rule. In fact, Casbergue immediately adds, pertaining to the Cleveland award in the Chiruchi case, that When the award was rendered, that is to say in 1897, one couldn't establish that positive international law stated that arbitral awards should be motivated. In the wake of this first argument, which backfired on it, Venezuela invoked another one, which was just as ill-advised, the accession of Augusto Pierantoni, according to which, and I quote, "The grounds of fact and law, whilst they are a guarantee required by procedural law, are a requirement of international society." This quote is taken from a consultation drafted by this Italian lawyer at the request of the Colombian government, unhappy with the solution retained by President Cleveland in the Cerutti case. It is a pro domo argument in favor of the advantages of arbitration as it should be practiced, according to him. And it is not a demonstration of the existence of a positive law norm requiring reasoning and making the absence of reasoning a cause of nullity. This award was then revised, but for it to be revised, the two states had to reach a new compromise. As to the travaux preparatoires of the Hague Convention of 1899, even though it shows that the position of Martens was opposed to the treaty principle, It was, if not marginal, at least in the minority. There was a vote. But the delegates of the conference did not consider that the statement of reasons was already an obligation enshrined in positive law. Rather, that in the eyes of the majority, it was highly desirable. And that was a position that Martins shared as well, in principle. The award, which is the subject matter of the dispute, was not reason because it was not necessary, neither in the 1897 treaty nor under customary law. There was nothing scandalous or unusual or unlawful about it. Respected members of the Court, do you think that it is useful to open the door to challenge awards without statements of reasons rendered in the 19th century? Do you think it is advisable to open these cases again and have the parties that have lost come before the Court 100 years later to seek retrials? I'm not convinced that that would be a good idea. In section E of chapter 5 of its rejoinder, Venezuela alleges that the arbitral tribunal committed five other breaches that constitute grounds of nullity on the basis of abuse of power. These are essentially direct consequences of the absence of reasoning and are so dismissed on that ground. I shall analyze them, distinguishing between those that amount to the Tribunal being accused of failing to respect the Compromis by not exercising the jurisdiction conferred on it, and the third, which on the contrary, consist in criticising it for having gone beyond ultra petita.

Mr. President, the Tribunal exercised its jurisdiction in accordance with its Statute. Article 3 of the Treaty of Washington fixes the subject matter of the dispute. Article 4 specifies how the latter should be settled. Pursuant to Article 3, the arbitrators sought to investigate and ascertain the extent of the territories belonging to, or that might lawfully be claimed by, the United Netherlands or by the Kingdom of Spain, respectively, at the time of the acquisition by Great Britain of the colony of British Guiana. To that end, the arbitrators explained that they had duly heard and considered the oral and written arguments of the Council representing, respectively, Her Majesty the Queen and the United States of Venezuela, and have impartially and carefully examined the questions laid before them." That's precisely what they did, and I'll come back to that in a moment. As to claiming that the tribunal provided, should have provided a separate answer to the part of the question concerning the extent of the territory on the one hand and the determination of the boundary line on the other. I remember that a young lawyer in 1986 had tried to convince the Chamber of the Court constituted in the case Burkina Faso v. Mali of the merit of the distinction, but to no avail. Not without common sense, the Chamber considered, and I quote, that the effect of any judicial decision rendered either in a dispute as to attribution of territory or in a delimitation dispute is necessarily to establish a frontier. In support of its accusation of misuse of power, Venezuela relies on a decision of the ICSID ad hoc committee in the Glockner case, handed down in 1985, to assert that tribunals are not called on merely postulating the existence of a principle without demonstrating it. This reasoning is anachronistic and amounts to criticising the 1899 award of not stating reasons, although, as I pointed out, it didn't have to. Venezuela's reasoning, if we can call it that, reminds me of those nursery rhymes whose last verse refers to the first. The award doesn't state reasons. Venezuela claims that it is invalid because it does not state reasons. It's impossible to prove because it is invalid, because it is devoid of any statements, et cetera. Mr. President, instead of discussing the legal arguments presented by the parties, the arbitrators, as Venezuela wrote, rushed to a decision and saw fit to resolve the various complex legal issues in the space of less than six days before pronouncing its unreasoned award on midday of 3 October 1899. Rather than the award itself, the transcripts of the hearings held in 1899 and the written testimonies of the members of the court relating to the conduct of the proceedings and deliberations show that the attention paid by the arbitrators was to the titles claimed by both states. And as Venezuela insists, deliberations amongst the arbitrators occurred after the filing of lengthy memorials and the presentation of oral pleadings of parties in a lengthy legal contest comprising 56 sessions running to 3,200 pages of transcript. During those long days spent listening to both the legal and factual arguments adduced by the parties, In full compliance with the adversarial principle, the arbitrators had ample time to share their impressions on this subject and did so. The communication between the five members of the tribunal related in a letter from Lord Russell to Lord Salisbury on the 7th of October 1899, which is summarised in paragraph 8.44 of our memorial, are a perfect illustration inter alia, of the existence and serious nature of these deliberations. A lot of other evidence in the case file relating to the conduct of the hearings fully confirms that the Tribunal faithfully applied the Compromis. The arbitrators questioned parties on both legal and factual aspects of the case on several occasions during the hearings, for example, on the application of the rules agreed in Article 4. the compromis on the Dutch and Spanish activities in the disputed zone, on the critical date, on the territorial title, or the 50-year prescription. The case file also shows that Martens was very much eager to ensure the adoption of a unanimous award. This desire, which Venezuela criticized, in fact, didn't have anything reprehensible. On 21 October 1899, Martens wrote in his journal that he considered, and I quote, that he had not only had the right, but a moral duty to carry out such negotiations to ensure full unanimity between the arbitrators and to achieve the greatest objective, a unanimous arbitral award. However, and this is important, He nonetheless did not sacrifice the fundamental principles governing arbitral proceedings. After having formed his own opinion on the facts and applicable law, he sought the approval of his colleagues. Martin's Journal, the interview of Judge Brewer, one of the American arbitrators appointed by Venezuela, published in the New York Times of the 5th of October 1899, confirm that this was indeed what happened. For want of time, I cannot comment in detail the relevant pages of these two documents, but they're extremely significant. We've included them in the Judges' folders. They appear in tab 6.2 and 6.3. With your permission, Members of the Court, I would like to urge you to read them carefully. These extracts show that each of the arbitrators formed their own legal opinion and that they subsequently subscribed to the solution put forward by the President, somewhat grudgingly when it came to the two British members of the Tribunal, who can qualify as belonging to the minority. Yet they all signed the award without protesting. And the work of the Tribunal, moreover, was welcomed during the last days of the hearings by Mr. Harrison, lead counsel of the Venezuelan party, who congratulate the tribunal for having, and I quote, laboriously gone through this long historical inquiry and traced the title of the Netherlands and the title of Spain down to 1814. These very same arguments refute the argument which Venezuela seeks to base on a violation of Article 5 of the Compromis, which provides that arbitrators shall undertake an impartial and careful consideration of the questions submitted to them. By basing themselves on these two letters, Venezuela contends that counsel appointed by Great Britain allegedly communicated unlawfully with the British arbitrators. Here again, Venezuela persists in ignoring two centuries of the evolution of international arbitration, which in 1899 was still influenced by the practice of diplomatic negotiations. This is made evident by the fact that Venezuelan counsel met the arbitrators appointed by Venezuela the end of the hearing and before the issuance of the award. Today, such secret meetings would admittedly be frowned upon, without necessarily, moreover, leading to an annulment of the award. But, of course, we're talking about 1899. I would now like to focus on the last argument put forward by Venezuela to substantiate its accusation of excess of power, according to which the Tribunal acted inconsistently with the scope of its powers by deciding matters falling outside of its competence. In other words, it would allegedly have ruled ultra petita. May I say forthwith, we're fully aware of the fact that a tribunal has the duty to answer requests of the parties as they are worded in the compromis, and that's indeed what was done in the award, but also to refrain from ruling on points which are not included in the requests. But in that respect as well, the Martins tribunal fulfilled the requirements of arbitration law. That holds true whether it's a question of the alleged infringement of Brazil's rights or the regime governing the Amacuru and Barina rivers. President, Venezuela reads into an award an alleged prejudice to Brazil's rights. That is not the case. It suffices to read the single paragraph where reference is made to Brazil to realize that the tribunal does not rule on that countries' rights, but, on the contrary, takes care to preserve them. The delimitation line provided in the award shall be subject, and without prejudice, to any questions now existing or which may arise to be determined between the government of Her Britannic Majesty and the Republic of Brazil, or between the latter Republic and the United States of Venezuela. The tribunal could not have been any clearer: it did not wish to adjudicate, and it did not adjudicate on Brazil's rights. Secondly, although the tribunal determined the boundary between Brazil and British Guiana, that was not prejudicial to either Brazil or Venezuela's rights. As regards Brazil, it was not a party to the proceedings, and the award, as far as it was concerned, was res inter alios acta. As regards Venezuela's rights, they were fully complied with. And besides, it does not claim otherwise. The few relevant points made in its written submissions in that regard concerned the purported infringement of Brazil's rights and not its own. Therefore, no cause of action. Thirdly, the award of the Italian King Victor Emmanuel II, rendered in 1904 pursuant to the Treaty of the 6th of November 1901 between Great Britain and Venezuela, explicitly, moreover, recognized that the 1899 award cannot be cited against Brazil, which was unaffected by that judgment. Furthermore, subsequently, in the years 1920, the three states entered into a series of treaties specifying the delimitation of their respective boundaries, and in 1932, they definitively fixed the triple junction point of the line determined in the 1899 award in accordance with Venezuela's own request. And Professor Orrell will revert to that in a moment. Mr. President, Venezuela also alleges that the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by fixing a regime of freedom of navigation on the Amacuro and Barima rivers, both tributaries of the Orinoco. The relevant passage is projected on the screen. It means that in time of peace, both rivers are open to navigation by the merchant ships of all nations in exchange for payment of fees and customs duties. Both rivers, the Amakuru and the Barima, have always played an essential role for transport and trade between peoples on both sides of the border, because they were the only means of having access to the sea. According to our opponents, the treaty did not empower the tribunal to rule on the navigation regime governing these two watercourses. And it's true that the compromis did not explicitly require the arbitrators to adjust the said regime, but rule laid down in Article 4 impels them to adjust the border regime, because, in determining the boundary line, if territory of one party be found by the Tribunal to have been the state of this Treaty in the occupation of the subjects or citizens of the other Party, such effect shall be given to such occupation as reason, justice, the principles of international law, and the equities of the case shall, in the opinion of the Tribunal, require. Of course, here it's not a question of changing the boundary, but modifying in equity the negative human effects that its determination might entail. Besides, that was specifically the position adopted by Venezuela itself in its written pleadings of the 1st of November 1898 before the arbitral tribunal. This would have warranted a lengthy citation. A small extract is projected on the screen. I don't know whether you can read it, but I have little time. And once again, members of the Court, I would like to refer you to the pleadings of Venezuela's counsel. We have provided other extracts to be found in tab 6.4 of your folders, and that is precisely what we are arguing today. The adjustment contemplated in Article 4, Rule C of the Compromis occurs subsequent to the fixing of the boundary, not as a change of its line, but to mitigate any disadvantages which might ensue for the riverside nationals of either state. And as Venezuela's counsel also wrote in 1898, and I quote, there is, it is not stated by the treaty what form of adjustment, if any, is to be adopted by the arbitrators in carrying out the provisions of rule C. The whole matter is left to their judgment and discretion." In its rejoinder, Venezuela backtracks and attempts to downplay this interpretation, which is nonetheless undeniable. It asserts that this provision provided for possible adjustments to the boundary line having regard to specific factors. That is clearly false, as Venezuela observed in its pleadings of 1898. Once this determination is made, and there is no question here of changing it, but merely to draw conclusions, the question would then arise how, with the greatest fairness both to the state in whose territory such settlers were found and to the settlers themselves, an adjustment should be made of the relations between the two, and it was accordingly provided in the treaty that the treaty should itself finally adjust." End of quote of the Venezuelan pleadings. This, in fact, does not concern the boundary, but the relations between the two states, and should occur to the benefit of the inhabitants. And that's precisely what was done by the arbitrators, by providing for a special navigation regime over the waters of both rivers in the interest of the nationals of the two parties. Furthermore, even if the Compromis had not set out a rule, nothing would have prevented the Tribunal from undertaking such an adjustment in the interest of the said inhabitants. In paragraph 5104 of its rejoinder, Venezuela finds itself once again trapped in a vicious cycle. award does not make it clear at all whether the provisions have been complied with, and thus it is impossible to determine whether the tribunal acted in compliance with its mandate, and accordingly, the award is null and void on grounds of excess of power. We're back to the endless nursery rhymes. But we can, in fact, find a solution, members of the Court. The award does not state any reasons, because the compromis does not impose that. when it was rendered. There was no unwritten rule requiring it. And in the instant case, the detailed file submitted to the court undeniably makes it possible to ensure the validity of the 1899 award when it was pronounced. It is therefore undeniable that the Tribunal remained within the limits of its jurisdiction, resolving as much as possible the controversy which had been submitted to it. And with your permission, would you be so kind as to give the floor to my colleague, Mr. President, Professor Nilufer Oral, who will, in fact, demonstrate that these conclusions are all the more unavoidable in that Venezuela welcomed the award when it was pronounced and, in fact, waited 60 years before dealing with the alleged invalidity. Thank you for your attention.

I thank Professor Pelley.

Nilufer Olal. Madame, you have the floor.

Mr. President, distinguished members of the Court, it is a great honour for me to appear on behalf of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana in these proceedings. Today, I will address the six decades of conduct by Venezuela during which it freely accepted the validity of and meticulously complied with the 1899 arbitration award and the boundary established by the 1905 boundary agreement. Mr. President, my presentation will be in two parts. In part one, starting in 1899 through the early 1960s, a period spanning more than 60 years, I will present the numerous instances of Venezuela's constant and fully given acceptance of and compliance with the award. There were no deviations, not a single one, throughout this period. In part two, I will address the legal effects of this prolonged acceptance and acquiescence to the 1899 Award and the 1905 Boundary Agreement. Mr. President, I will now take us back in time and provide overwhelming evidence that between 1899 and 1962, Venezuela accepted and recognized the legal validity of the arbitration award. Indeed, at times, Venezuela insisted that the award be implemented to the letter. and no matter how minor, refused to accept any alterations to the boundary as determined by the award. Venezuela accepted the award as valid and binding from the moment it was issued on 3rd of October, 1899. Venezuela celebrated the result as a victory, at least in part, because Venezuela had acquired the most valuable part of the disputed territory, the mouth of the Orinoco River with the territory on both banks. This gave Venezuela control over the largest and most strategically and commercially important river on the north coast of South America. Venezuela's success and the importance of the area were underscored by its council, former U.S. President Harrison and his co-counsel, Mr. Mallet-Prevost, in statements published by the Times on 4 October 1899, the day after the award was issued. "Within the Schomburgk line lay the Amacuro River and Point Barima, the latter forming the southern entrance to the great mouth of the Orinoco. No portion of the entire territory possessed more strategic value than this, both from a commercial and a military standpoint, and its possession by Great Britain was most jealously guarded. Counsel continued highlighting the territory that the British had lost. This in no way expressed the extent of Venezuela's victory. Great Britain had put forth a claim to more than 30,000 square miles of territory west of the Schomburgk Line. And it was this territory which in 1890, Great Britain was disposed to submit to arbitration. Every foot of this territory had been awarded to Venezuela. Venezuela's agent in the arbitration, Dr. Jose Rojas, agreed with his counsel's assessment in a telegram to the foreign minister. That telegram is preserved and quoted in a message dated 7 October 1899 from Venezuelan ambassador Jose Andrade and states the following. Sentence of tribunal, England gives up Point Barriaman, the coast until Point Playa, from thence the line goes until Schomburgk's line, which it follows until the junction of the Cuyuni and Winamo. This gives us 5,000 square miles east of the Schomburgk line. Arbiters and counsel for Venezuela were brilliant. The reference to Point Barima and the coastline west of Point Playa shows the great importance that both parties attached to this territory. This was equally voiced by Ambassador Jose Andrade's letter of 7 October 1899, who in glowing words said, "Greatly indeed did justice shine forth when in the determination of the frontier we were given exclusive dominion over the Orinoco, which was the principal aim we sought to achieve through arbitration." A press article from Nouvelles de l'etranger quoted similar satisfaction with the award from the president of Venezuela, Mr. Ignacio Andrade, dated 11 October 1899, saying, "The award was a source of satisfaction for the country, as international justice had returned a part of its territory that had been usurped and vindicated its right." While Venezuela's reaction to the 1899 award included some disappointment at not receiving a greater share of the disputed territory, this does not equate to challenging the award as being invalid or void. Venezuela never challenged the legality or the validity of the 1899 arbitral award for the next 62 years. Venezuela's failure to challenge the legality of the award for 62 years is especially prejudicial to its current claim that the award is invalid. Each and every one of the challenges to the award Venezuela now makes in these proceedings were available to it since October 1899. Yet, during the next six decades, Venezuela did not make any of these claims. Let's take them one at a time as they appear in Venezuela's rejoinder. The first reason invoked for the award's alleged invalidity is, quote, that it was rendered on the basis of an invalid treaty. Mr. Reichler showed you this morning that Venezuela's arguments against the validity of the 1897 Treaty of Washington are entirely unsustainable. Venezuela could not help but be aware of each of these alleged deficiencies in the treaty at the time it was being negotiated, agreed, and ratified. Yet, neither in 1897 nor in 1899 did Venezuela give voice to any of these allegations. Nor did it do so for another 60 plus years. Second, Venezuela argues that the award is invalid, quote, because the tribunal failed to state the reasons on which it was based. Professor Pelaez has amply demonstrated that this is not a valid basis for challenging an arbitral award issued in 1899. This point is also raised in a very telling report dated 4 May 1900, exactly 126 years ago from today, prepared by Dr. Rafael Sejas. Dr. Cejas, an international lawyer and former foreign minister who was also a member of the committee tasked with examining the wording of the 1897 treaty which conferred jurisdiction on the court, in fact expressly advised Venezuela that there were no grounds for challenging the award, including the absence of reasons. Plainly and clearly, Venezuela knew in 1899, at the moment of issue, that the award did not include a statement of reasons. Yet Venezuela chose not to complain about this or challenge the award on that basis for over 60 years. Venezuela argues that the arbitral tribunal manifestly exceeded its power, in particular by failing to respond to all the questions put to it, failing to apply the applicable law, deciding matters outside the scope of its competence, failing to act impartially, and failing to issue a decision based on law. Here again, Professor Paillait addressed these issues. Importantly for present purposes, All these alleged shortcomings of the award would have been obvious to Venezuela upon its first reading. And the facts show that for the next six decades, none was invoked as a basis for challenging the award. Venezuela argues in these proceedings that it only first acquired evidence of the purported legal defects in the 1899 award after 1949 publication of the Malaya Preval Memorandum. This is plainly untrue. It is entirely contradicted by the evidence. Every one of the challenges Venezuela now makes to the validity of the award is based on facts that were known to Venezuela at the time the award was issued in October 1899 or very shortly thereafter. One example, among many that could be offered, On 22 October 1900, Venezuela's Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote to Venezuela's commissioner on the Joint Boundary Commission that the 1899 award was, quote, "more the result of a compromise than of an essentially judicial examination," end quote, and that the boundary established by the award was, quote, "a line de facto determined without any support or reason." That was more than 61 years before Venezuela first challenged the award on these grounds. Mr. President, Venezuela did more than to fail to protest or challenge the validity of the 1899 award. In fact, it positively endorsed the award and insisted on strict compliance with it. As much as Venezuela would like to discount the relevance of its conduct during the five-year demarcation period between 1900 and 1905 as merely a technical exercise, the 1905 agreement is a legally binding treaty that represents years of collaborative hard work between the representatives of British Guiana and Venezuela, which Venezuela willingly and freely signed. As detailed in Guyana's pleading, soon after the delivery of the 1899 award, Venezuela and Great Britain established a joint boundary commission. Now today, more than one century later, Venezuela would have us believe that it was coerced into participating in the boundary demarcation by Great Britain. The evidence offered is that Great Britain refused Venezuela's request to delay the start of the work, responding that it, Great Britain, would start demarcation without Venezuela. Venezuela's current argument in its rejoinder that it was "forced to endure against its will the line described in the 1899 award" simply does not hold up against the facts. Indeed, it was Venezuela that first insisted, in a letter from its foreign minister, Mr. Anduiza Palacio, to the British Foreign Office, dated 29 March 1900, less than six months after the arbitral award was issued, that the demarcation of the boundary was, quote, "a matter of such importance" and that, quote, "it is mutually beneficial to proceed in all that concerns the sentence of October 1899 by concerted and simultaneous action," end quote. How can Venezuela now argue with any credibility? that it was forced to engage in the boundary demarcation against its will. Between 1900 and 1905, the joint Venezuela-British Boundary Commission engaged in the demarcation of the 825-kilometre boundary. During this time, there was not a single utterance from Venezuela expressing any objection, reservation, or concern about the boundary being demarcated. To the contrary, the Venezuelan members of the Joint Boundary Commission, who reported directly to the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, worked with great commitment and meticulous care to comply with the 1899 award. When the work of the Joint Boundary Commission ended, Dr. Tirado, the Venezuelan chief commissioner, reported to the foreign ministry: "I am personally very proud of being able to present a plan of the outcome of our work which, considering the very unfavourable conditions under which our various journeys were made, is wonderfully accurate. On 10 January 1905, a formal and official international agreement was concluded on the location of the entire land boundary between British Guiana and Venezuela. Dr. Tirado, who signed the 1905 agreement, described the demarcation as an "honourable task". quote, the honorable task is ended and the delimitation between our Republic and the colony of British Guyana and accomplished fact. The evidence shows that Venezuela fully and willingly participated in the five year long demarcation process and freely and consensually signed the final 1905 boundary agreement. There is no evidence to the contrary. Indeed, just months after the signing of the boundary agreement, Venezuela's foreign minister, in his annual address to Congress on 23 May 1906, voiced his satisfaction that the territorial dispute with Great Britain had finally been resolved. "It gives me particular satisfaction to inform you that the commission charged with representing Venezuela in the boundary delimitation with British Guiana pursuant to the arbitral award rendered in Paris on October 3, 1899, has successfully completed its mandate. This effectively resolves a significant territorial dispute that Venezuela maintained with Great Britain for approximately three-quarters of a century." There is simply no evidence that the foreign minister felt coerced to make this very positive statement that the dispute with Great Britain had been resolved. Venezuela then went on to further affirm its acceptance of the boundary by duly recording the 1905 agreement in the official record of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Venezuela with no reservations. On the other hand, there is abundant evidence, Mr. President, that in the course of demarcating the boundary, Venezuela was very strict in ensuring that the boundary followed the 1899 award. It refused to accept any modifications to the boundary as described in the award, even in cases when Venezuela's own chief boundary commissioner, Dr. Tirado, advised it would be to Venezuela's advantage. For example, in October 1905, Venezuela rejected a British proposal for the replacement of the circuitous portion of the boundary line conforming to the watershed between the Orinoco and the Essequibo rivers, as provided for by the award, with the straighter Venamo River. Although the proposal was supported by Dr. Tirado, the government of Venezuela rejected the proposed deviation from the award. The fact that Venezuela felt free to reject Britain's request further counters its claim of so-called structural coercion. An incident that took place in 1911 further evidences Venezuela's insistence that the boundary strictly follow the 1899 award. When a boundary marker near the Atlantic coast was swept away by the sea, Venezuela insisted that the new marker, quote, "must be placed at the precise site in which the boundary line between the two countries out the new coast, which was fixed in the year 1900 in accordance with the award signed at Paris, the 3rd of October, 1899, by the Mixed Commission Anglo-Venezuela. As the Court can now see on its screens, that same year, 1911, Venezuela published a physical and political map of its territory. As shown in the enlarged map, the map follows the boundary established by the 1899 award and as drawn by the 1905 agreement. Also, the legend clarifies that this map was commissioned and signed by the then president of Venezuela, General Juan Vicente Gomez, on the occasion of the centennial of Venezuela's independence. This is but one of many official Venezuelan maps issued over decades that consistently gave effect to the 1899 award a record we will examine with you today. For decades on, Venezuela continued to respect the line fixed by the 1899 Award and implemented by the 1905 Agreement. For instance, on 22 February 1922, the Venezuelan Ministry of Home Affairs entered into an agreement with the Caroni Religious Mission which established the territory where the mission would be responsible for, quote, "the civilization and evangelization," end quote, of tribes. The limits of the mission's territory were established in accordance with the boundary as decided by the 1899 award and enshrined in the 1905 boundary agreement. Venezuela continued to freely affirm that boundary In 1926, Brazil and the United Kingdom agreed that their boundary lay, quote, "where Venezuelan territory commences on the said Roraima Mountains," end quote, which was as established by the 1899 award and the 1905 boundary agreement. There was no protest from Venezuela to this agreement between Brazil and Great Britain. As shown by subsequent events, it was quite the contrary. First, only two years later, in 1928, President of Venezuela, Juan Vicente Gomez, recommissioned the production of an official physical and political map of the country. As shown in the enlarged image on your screen, that map implemented, again, the line of the 1899 award and the 1905 boundary agreement. Second, and most importantly, the following year, in 1929, Venezuela implemented that same boundary in its frontier delimitation with Brazil, as shown by the text of that agreement projected on your screens. The frontier between the two countries should be clearly defined from the island of Sao Jose to a point on Mount Roraima where the frontiers of Brazil, Venezuela, and British Guiana meet. This was explicit recognition of the fact that the frontier between Venezuela and British Guiana had already been determined. Another compelling example is while fixing the tri-junction point. It became apparent that the boundary marker installed by the Venezuelan-British Guyana Boundary Commission in 1904 had been placed on the edges of Mount Roraima, not on its summit, as mandated by the 1899 award. The British suggestion to maintain this 1905 marker, 1904 marker, was rejected by Venezuelan Foreign Minister Pedro Itriago Sackin. In his reply on 31 October 1931, he demanded the reestablishment of the marker as mandated by the 1899 award. In his message, he described that boundary as a frontier de droit. And he explained that, quote, "the Venezuelan government regret that for constitutional reasons, they are unable to depart from the letter of the award," end quote. The British ultimately acceded to the Venezuelan position. Thus, that same year of 1931, the marker on your screen of the tri-junction point between Brazil, Venezuela, and British Guyana was established exactly where this point was placed by the 1899 award. The following year, on 3 November 1932, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister provided yet another statement, now expressing satisfaction with the placement. The Government of the Republic has noted with satisfaction that His Majesty's Government has decided to accept the Venezuelan proposal that the boundary in question should be a straight line drawn from the source of the Winamo River to the point of trijunction on Mount Roraima of the frontiers of Venezuela and British Guiana. Five years later, in 1937, the official map of Venezuela was once again updated. As shown on your screens, that update continued to depict the border with neighboring British Guyana in accordance with the 1899 award and the 1905 boundary agreement. The following year, in November 1939, the Venezuelan Ministry of Promotion published a map of the Venezuelan state of Bolivar, which borders Guyana. This map also implements the frontier of the 1899 award and the 1905 boundary agreement. Moving on, as you can see on your screens, in 1940, Venezuela's Ministry of Public Works and its National Cartography Directorate prepared the Atlas of Venezuela, which likewise reflected the boundary as determined by the 1899 arbitral award and implemented through the 1905 boundary agreement. In the post-World War II period, as Great Britain began to prepare British Guiana for independence, There was no suggestion from Venezuela that the 1899 award or the 1905 boundary agreement were legally invalid or null and void. To the contrary, Venezuela continued to accept and recognize the binding authority of the award and the agreement. Indeed, in 1945, Venezuela adhered to the map presented by the United Nations upon its creation. The map clearly follows the border of the 1899 award and the 1905 boundary agreement, as shown on your screens. Two years later, in 1947, Venezuela produced two different official maps, again implementing the same frontier, first the physical and political map shown on your screens. Second, the index map of Venezuela's landing sites, now on your screens. Shortly thereafter, and of great relevance, in 1948, Venezuela's Congress promulgated the Organic Law of the Federal Territories. Article 5 provided that The Delta Amacuro Federal Territory of Venezuela, quote, "is formed by the region found within the following boundaries, the Gulf of Paria and the Atlantic Ocean to the north, the Atlantic Ocean and British Guyana to the east, as defined by the border treaty between Venezuela and Great Britain." In the following year, 1949, the infamous Mele Prevost memo was published by the American Journal of International Law. Professor Sands will address that memo in some detail. The point I want to make is that nothing in that memo altered the Venezuelan government's consistent position on the legality of the 1899 arbitral award or the 1905 boundary agreement. Indeed, Venezuela continued throughout the following decade to regard them as legally valid and binding. This is clearly reflected in the official maps it published during this period. I will take you through them. First, In 1950, right after the publication of the Maley-Prevost memorandum article, it published not one, not two, not three, but four different official maps, all incorporating the 1899 award to the letter. The first one on your screens is yet another official physical and political map of Venezuela. The second, now on your screens, is a geological map published by Venezuela's Ministry of Promotion. The third map depicts the eastern natural resources of Venezuela and was published by its Ministry of Mining and Hydrocarbons. The fourth and final one is a mining and geological map of the Venezuelan state of Bolivar, published again by its Ministry of Mining and Hydrocarbons. Again, all of these maps faithfully implemented the 1899 award. Venezuela continued to implement this award throughout the 1950s. In 1955, Venezuela published an updated version of its physical and political map, the one commissioned in 1911, and updated in 1928, 1937, and in 1950. As in its previous four iterations, this map implemented again the frontier of the 1899 award. The following year, in 1956, the Ministry of Public Works published a map of the Republic of Venezuela, again depicting the boundary of the 1899 award. Four years later, the same Ministry maintained that same boundary in another map of the Republic of Venezuela published in 1960. Mr. President, Members of the Court, as you are all well aware, two years later, in 1962, Venezuela voiced for the first time its legal challenge to the validity of the arbitral award. Yet, that same year of 1962, Venezuela published another map of the Republic of Venezuela, which respects the 1899 award. Mr. President, we have shown to the court through a period of decades multiple official statements of Venezuela recognizing and expressing satisfaction with the 1899 award as well as clear and consistent conduct demarcating and defending the boundary drawn in accordance with the award. We have presented to you at least 16 official Venezuelan maps spanning the period from 1911 to 1962, all showing the boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana exactly following the line described in the 1899 arbitral award and as demarcated in the 1905 boundary agreement. We have looked for official maps showing a different boundary. We have found none, not a single one. Certainly, there are none in Venezuela's pleadings in this case. If they have found one since the filing of their rejoinder late August, and if it is admissible in evidence as a readily available publication, we look forward to seeing it on Wednesday. In Guyana's view, the consistent depiction of the international boundary on Venezuela's official maps is conforming strictly to the 1899 arbitral award and the 1905 boundary agreement over a period of at least 61 years should be given considerable weight by the court. In its jurisprudence, the court has paid particular regard to such maps. In the case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, Cambodia versus Thailand, The dispute centered on a particular map which depicted a boundary line produced by a mixed boundary commission established between France and Siam in 1904, which placed the temple of Preah Vihear in Cambodian territory. Thailand's failure to challenge the validity of the map until 1958, some 54 years later, despite opportunities to do so, was a determining factor for the Court. The Court found it significant that Siamese and Thai officials continued to produce the map showing the temple Preah Vihear on Cambodian territory all during this time, without placing any reservations or notations on these maps challenging the boundary. The same could be said for Venezuela between 1911 and 1962, which could have included a reservation or notation on its official maps, but never did so. Based on the consistent conduct of Siamese and Thai officials for more than five decades, in the Temple of Preah Vihear case, the Court explained as follows: looked at as a whole, Thailand's subsequent conduct confirms and bears out her original acceptance, and that Thailand's acts on the ground do not suffice to negate this. Both parties, by their conduct, recognized the line and thereby, in effect, agreed to regard it as being the frontier line. I come now to part two of my presentation on the legal consequences of Venezuela's consistent, open, clear, and freely given recognition and acceptance of the validity of the 1899 arbitral award and the 1905 boundary agreement for more than 60 years between 1899 and 1962. The consistent conduct of a state, including by its highest officials over a period of years, can produce legal consequences. One of the leading cases is the arbitral award made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906. That case is factually and legally similar to the current case and thus of particular relevance here. As in the present case, In 1906, Honduras and Nicaragua had by treaty submitted a disputed part of their boundary to arbitration. The outcome of the 1906 arbitration award favored Honduras. However, it was not until 1912 when for the first time, Nicaragua challenged the validity of the award. And it was only after decades of failed negotiations the case reached the court in 1960 through agreement by the parties. Briefly, Nicaragua challenged the validity of that arbitral award for reasons similar to those invoked by Venezuela. In particular, Nicaragua claimed that the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction, that he committed essential error, and that he provided inadequate reasons to support his conclusions. Honduras defended the arbitral award based on the conduct of Nicaragua, which until 1912 had accepted the award as valid. Nicaragua responded, much like Venezuela, claiming that it was unable to challenge the award early because it had been unaware of the award's defects at the time it was issued and for six years thereafter. This argument failed. Nicaragua, by express declaration and by conduct, recognized the award as valid, and it is no longer open to Nicaragua to challenge the validity of the award. Nicaragua's failure to raise any question with regard to the validity of the award for several years after the full terms of the award had become known to it further confirms the conclusion at which the Court has arrived. While no case will be identical on all points, the King of Spain case is nearly identical in the relevant aspects, with one notable difference. In the King of Spain case, the time between the arbitral award and Nicaragua's challenge to its validity was just six years, whereas in our case, the time gap is more than 60 years, ten times longer. Venezuela's failure to challenge the 1899 award thus produces legal consequences. By 1962, it was too late for Venezuela to make a viable legal challenge on grounds known to it for more than six decades. In its more candid moments, Venezuela itself recognized the weakness of its argument. The same foreign minister who asserted the first formal challenge to the 1899 award, in February 1962, Dr. Falcon Brizeno wrote that existing jurisprudence would, quote, "oppose a situation of this kind," end quote, namely, a challenge to an award whose validity had already been long accepted. He therefore suggested proceeding ex aequo et bono. In other words, Venezuela itself recognized that under applicable international law, its claim could not succeed. In these proceedings, Venezuela has conjured up a new argument to avoid the legal reality that for over 60 years, it has accepted, applied, and acquiesced in the 1899 award. Venezuela now contends that the 1966 Geneva Agreement gave it a new right to challenge the 1899 award it had clearly supported during those six decades. This is not a persuasive argument. By the 1966 agreement, Great Britain and Guyana only recognized that Venezuela claimed, since 1962, that the 1899 award was a nullity. It did no more than that. It certainly did not address the substance of Venezuela's claim or the grounds on which Great Britain and Guyana could oppose it or Venezuela's right to raise it 60 years later. It is now for the Court to determine whether Venezuela is precluded from challenging the validity of the award on the same basis it could have asserted in 1899 or at any time shortly thereafter or 60 years later. The Geneva Agreement did not revive a right that had long been lost. It did not create a new right. Mr. President, It is Guyana's submission that both the 1899 award and the 1905 agreement are fully valid and that no grounds exist for challenging the legal validity of either. However, we should underscore that the 1899 award and the 1905 boundary agreement are two legally distinct juridical acts. And any possible defect affecting the validity of one of them has no bearing on the validity of the other. As stated by the arbitral tribunal in the Laguna del Desierto case between Argentina and Chile, a decision on a frontier dispute and its demarcation are two distinct acts, each of which has its own legal force. Venezuela has not disputed, and could not dispute, the validity of the 1905 agreement, which has stood as a valid treaty for more than 115 years. In any event, by 1962, and pursuant to the principle reflected in Article 45 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Venezuela had lost the right to invoke any grounds for invalidating the 1905 Agreement because of its prolonged acceptance not only of the award, but also and particularly of the 1905 Agreement itself. Moreover, as a boundary agreement, the agreed boundary has a life independent of the treaty. As the Court explained in its 2007 ruling on preliminary objections in the territorial and maritime dispute Nicaragua v. Colombia, a principle of international law that a territorial regime established by treaty achieves a permanence which the treaty itself does not necessarily enjoy, and the continued existence of that regime is not dependent upon the continuing life of the treaty under which the regime is agreed. Venezuela's failure to challenge the boundary agreement and the boundary it established for 57 years between 1905 and 1962 constitutes its acquiescence and results in its forfeiture under Article 45 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of any right to challenge their validity. Venezuela cannot avoid these consequences by arguing that it is not a party to the Convention. In Somalia v. Kenya, the Court held quite that, under customary law, Reflected in Article 45 of the Vienna Convention, a state may not invoke a ground for invalidating a treaty if, after having become aware of the facts, it must by reason of its conduct be considered as having acquiesced in the validity of that treaty. Mr. President, in conclusion. The evidence is resoundingly clear that from the very instant when the 1899 award was delivered some 127 years ago until 1962, Venezuela constantly accepted, recognized, complied with, and insisted on strictly following the award. It was well aware of any possible grounds for challenging the award. As much as Venezuela now denies this, its officials repeatedly expressed their satisfaction and depicted the outcome as a victory, having gained the most valuable part of the disputed territory, the mouth of the Orinoco River. Mr. President, Members of the Court, this is the end of my presentation. I thank you for your courtesy, and I ask that you invite Guyana's next speaker, Professor Philippe Sands, KC, to the podium, but perhaps after a coffee break.

I thank Professor Orale. Before I give the floor to the next speaker, the Court will indeed observe a break of 15 minutes. The hearing is suspended.

La.

Please be seated. The sitting is resumed. I now invite Professor Philippe Sanz to address the Court. You have the floor, sir.

Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is truly an honour for me to appear in this case on behalf of Guyana, a case that is of such importance for this country. I'm going to address the document that has come to be known as the Mallet-Prevost Memorandum. The story of this document is so fantastical that it could rather feature in a novel by Gabriel Garcia Marquez, or an opera by Verdi. And the document is, of course, to a very great extent, the basis for Venezuela's contention of the nullity of the 1899 award, first evoked only in 1962. Yet the memorandum's origin and its purpose are shrouded in uncertainty and mystery. Indeed, even its very existence is open to question. Two things are clear. First, the memorandum is not an accurate or reliable account of events relating to the 1899 arbitration. And second, it provides no support whatsoever for Venezuela's claim the 1899 award is a nullity. As I will show, far from being a true and authoritative account, the memorandum is simply a mishmash of unreliable anecdotes, a farrago of entirely groundless speculation and outlandish allegations about a so-called illicit Anglo-Russian deal one that is said to have been secretly conceived and then consummated during the arbitration. The memorandum purports to describe events that occurred in 1899 during the conduct of the proceedings, yet it was apparently written almost half a century later, and it took even longer to see the light of day and be made vaguely public. It was said to have been created in the mid-1940s by a partisan author, a lawyer who purported to recount events and conversations which had allegedly taken place more than four decades earlier, and who, for reasons known only to himself, insisted that the memorandum and its contents must remain secret until after his death. It is a most curious document, replete with demonstrable inaccuracies and devoid of any credible or corroborated new information about the arbitration. In short, it is about as far from an independent and reliable account of events as it is possible to get. Before addressing its content, let me say something about its origins. The story begins, or maybe it is more accurate to say ends, in July 1949, when an article appeared in the American Journal of International Law by an American lawyer named Otto Schoenrich, who happened to be a retired partner of the Curtis, Mallet, Prevost law firm. Mr. Schoenrich's article purported to recite the contents of a document supposedly produced five years earlier, in 1945, by one Mr. Severo Mallet-Prevor. Some 45 years earlier, Mr. Mallet-Prevor had been a member of Venezuela's legal team at the 1899 arbitration in Paris. Prior to that arbitration, he had spent several years as the secretary to the US President Grover Cleveland's commission on the boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana. As a young lawyer, Mr. Mallet-Prevost had spent years studying, developing and advocating Venezuela's territorial claims in respect of the Essequibo River. In later life, Mr. Malo-Prevost became a partner in the same American law firm as Mr. Schoenrich. And according to Mr. Schoenrich's article, in February 1944, Mr. Malo-Prevost produced a memorandum which purported to recount certain experiences and impressions of the 1899 award. Now, that document was allegedly, and I quote, "found among his papers" following his death in December 1948. And it was supposedly accompanied by an instruction that it not be made public while Mr. Mallet-Prevost was still alive. After his death, Mr. Schoenrich, by unexplained means, somehow obtained the memorandum from Mr. Mallet-Prevost's archives and then submitted an article to the American Journal of International Law, which purported to posthumously publish the text of the memorandum. It's a sort of Groundhog Day here. Last year, I appeared before you in a case concerning a treaty that no one could find or had seen. This year, it is a document that no one could find or had seen. One of the many curious features of the supposed memorandum is that the only evidence that exists about it is in the article written by Mr. Mallet-Prevor's former colleague in 1949. The original memorandum has never been located or produced or seen by any other human being. Indeed, apart from Mr. Schoenrich, No one has seen this memorandum. It has disappeared without a trace, assuming it ever existed at all. There is no evidence before this Court to show that the supposed document might have been anything other than a figment of Mr. Schoenrich's fertile imagination. Nor is there any explanation whatsoever as to why Venezuela waited 13 years before the outing of the supposed memorandum in 1949 before it did anything at all. As Professor Oral has said, throughout those 13 years, between 1949 and 1962, Venezuela continued faithfully to accept, respect and apply the award and the 1905 agreement that drew the boundary. It did not act on the memorandum. Nothing. Notwithstanding this behaviour, Venezuela now places great weight on a supposed memorandum that no living person has ever seen, that is said to have been written 82 years ago and which claims to describe alleged events that occurred 127 years ago. Nevertheless, and we would say improbably, Venezuela asserts in its rejoinder, without any caveat, that the memorandum is, and I quote, "the first eyewitness testimony of the unlawful process leading to the 1899 award", end of quote. It asserts that it was only because of the publication of the memorandum that what it calls the inner history of the 1899 award came to light. Those are its words. The memorandum, in Venezuela's words, reveals what until then was only assumed. the 1899 award had nothing to do with an award based on the application of international law. According to Venezuela's counter-memorial, the Mallet-Prevo memorandum of July 1949, in disclosing a fait nouveau, changed everything. In other words, they seem to be saying: but for this memorandum, we would not be here gathered today. Since Venezuela places so much reliance on the memorandum, my speech will proceed on the assumption, but it is only that, that the memorandum somehow existed and its contents were as described in the 1949 article. But since the original has never been located or produced, that is only an assumption. It is not an admission. In the 77 years since the publication of the 1949 article, the existence and authenticity of the supposed memorandum has never been corroborated, and it is highly doubtful that it ever will be. Let us assume hypothetically that the memorandum did exist. What do we know about its origins and purpose? The answer is very little. The text of the so-called memorandum itself says nothing whatsoever about why or in what circumstances it was created. In the 1949 article, Mr. Schoenrich claims that, following a conversation about the 1899 arbitration with Mr. Mallet-Prevost in early 1944, Mr. Schoenrich had urged Mr. Malley-Prevo to produce a written account of the matters they had discussed, and that his colleague had subsequently done this. Note, there's no indication of any verbatim record, any contemporaneous notes, or anything like that. Beyond Mr. Schoenrich's brief words, however, there is no evidence whatsoever about why Mr. Malley-Prevo suddenly decided in February 1944, at the age of 84 and just four years before his death, to supposedly put pen to paper. Nor does the memorandum offer any insight as to why Mr. Mallet-Prevor was apparently unwilling for the matters described in the memorandum to be made public during the remaining four years of his life. His reluctance to publicly stand by the claims in the memorandum is striking, unexplained and inferences can be drawn. One thing we do know, however, is that just one month before he purportedly wrote the memorandum, in February 1944, Venezuela had conferred its highest national award on him, the Order of the Liberator. That decoration, personally presented to Mr. Mallet-Prevor by Venezuela's President in January 1944, was bestowed in recognition of his services as a long-standing friend and adviser to Venezuela. In the words of Venezuela's ambassador to the United States, the honour recognised the high estimation in which the Venezuelan people hold and will always hold Mr. Mallet-Prevost, to whom Venezuela owes a long-standing debt. According to Mr. Schoenrich's 1949 article, the decoration was specifically conferred on the gentleman in recognition of his services in connection with the boundary dispute. In the absence of any explanation from Mr. Mallet-Prevor about what prompted him in February 1944 to produce the memorandum, it is difficult to escape the reasonable inference that it might somehow have been connected to his receipt of that prestigious Venezuelan accolade just a few weeks earlier. What is certain is that Mr. Mallet-Prevor was throughout his life a loyal servant of Venezuela. whose commitment to Venezuela's territorial claims was celebrated and recognised with Venezuela's highest civilian honour. As a senior official in the British government noted shortly after Venezuela first raised its contention of nullity in the early 1960s, the Male Prevost memorandum represents an aged lawyer's flight of fancy, produced while he was suffering the immediate after-effect of the receipt of a high Venezuelan decoration. This is a colourful description, but we would say it is apt. As a dedicated servant of and advocate for Venezuela, Mr. Maley-Prevo was no doubt disappointed that Venezuela had not been awarded even more territory by the 1899 award. Indeed, in a December 1899 letter from Mr. Olney to US President Grover Cleveland, the writer described Mr. Maley-Prevo as being consumed by, and I quote, intense wrath and bitterness of soul at the course and decision of the arbitral tribunal." There is no indication that Mr. Malley-Prevor's wrath and bitterness about the award subsequently diminished. On any view, it cannot seriously be disputed supposed memorandum was not written by a man who can be said to have been independent of Venezuela or impartial, if indeed it was ever written at all. On the contrary, he was an impassioned, devoted, lifelong friend, servant and advocate for Venezuela. Whatever its true provenance, one thing about the supposed Maley-Prevor memorandum is crystal clear. On its own terms, it is not and cannot be treated as an accurate and reliable account of events. Indeed, the memorandum contains numerous factual inaccuracies. I will limit myself to one glaring example. The supposed memorandum describes how Mr. Mallet-Prevor attended a dinner in London in January 1899. during which he spoke with Lord Russell about international arbitration. According to the memorandum, Lord Russell told Mr. Mallet-Prevost, and I quote, that international arbitration should take into consideration questions of international policy, end of quote, rather than being determined exclusively on legal grounds. The memorandum goes on to state you will be able to see it on the screen, "From that moment, I knew that we could not count upon Lord Russell to decide the boundary question on the basis of strict rights." There is a little problem with the timing of this memorandum. At the date of the alleged dinner and the conversation between Mr. Malo-Prevost and Lord Russell, in January 1899, Lord Russell had no connection with the arbitration concerning the boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana. The two British arbitrators appointed to the arbitral tribunal under the Treaty of Washington were Lords Herschell and Lord Justice Collins. If Lord Russell had been an arbitrator, perhaps, but not even necessarily, there may have been some interest in some words he may have said. But he was not an arbitrator. He was not a participant in the arbitration at that time. It was only after Lord Herschels unexpected and untimely death following an accident in March 1899, two months after the supposed dinner conversation recounted in the memorandum, that Lord Russell was appointed to the tribunal in place of the late Lord Herschels. At the date of Mallet-Prevost's conversation with Lord Russell in January 1899, Lord Russell had no role in the arbitration, and no one, including Mr. Mallet-Prevost, could have had any reason to imagine that he might become involved. It follows that the claim in the memorandum that, from that moment, Mr. Mallet-Prevost knew that Venezuela could not rely upon Lord Russell to determine the boundary question based on strict rights is a claim which cannot be true. Shortly after the publication in 1949 of Mr. Schoenrich's article, a British researcher and official, Clifton Child, undertook a detailed analysis of the claims contained in the memorandum. Child's critique was published in the American Journal in 1950. It is blunt and it is scathing. on the accuracy of the memorandum's supposed claims. As Child notes, it was sheer nonsense for Mallet-Prevor to suggest that from the moment when he dined with the Lord Chief Justice in January 1899, he knew that he could not count upon the latter to be fair. Child's 1950 article identified this as but one of several major errors in the memorandum. Chalde identified various misstatements of fact in Mr. Mallet-Prevor's narrative, which also show how badly his memory must have served him, pause, he was 84 years old at the time he supposedly wrote the memorandum. These included, for instance, inaccuracies regarding the timing and duration of the tribunal's hearings and its recesses. Through a careful examination of the facts, Mr. Charles's article, which is well worth reading, you can find it at tab 8.1 of your folders, lays bare the complete unreliability of the memorandum on its own grounds and provides a comprehensive rebuttal of the claims set out in it. The most serious allegation in the supposed memorandum is that during the arbitration proceedings, Great Britain and Russia somehow struck a secret deal concerning the outcome of the arbitration, which the President of the Tribunal, Mr. Martins, and the two British arbitrators then conspired to foist upon the two hapless Americans. The memorandum claims that during a recess in August 1899, the two British arbitrators returned to England and took Mr. Martins with them, and that it was during that visit that Russia and Great Britain concluded a secret deal regarding the outcome of the arbitration. So a reasonable person asks themselves the question, what is the evidence in the memorandum in support of a pretty serious charge? The answer is nothing. There is nothing. Well, not quite nothing. What is there? What there is, is Mr. Malo-Prevor's belief that following the break in the arbitration, there was what he called a noticeable change in the demeanour of one of the two British arbitrators, Lord Justice Collins. Writing in 1944, Mr. Malley-Prevost claimed to recall that, prior to that recess, Lord Justice Collins had asked numerous questions that were critical of the British contentions and gave the impression that he was leaning towards the side of Venezuela. After the recess, however, Lord Justice Collins asked very few questions, and his whole attitude was entirely different from what it had been. This alone is what led Mr. Mallet-Prevo to believe that something must have happened in London to bring about the change. And he surmised that the change in Lord Justice Collins' demeanour could only be explained on the basis that, and I quote from the memorandum, During Martin's visit to England, a deal had been concluded between Russia and Great Britain to decide the case along the lines suggested by Martin's, and that pressure to that end had in some way been exerted on Collins to follow the course." It's a bit like me watching you very closely over the course of a hearing and noticing that one of you is sitting slightly differently, and that's all I've got. It's hopeless. There is no evidence. before the court to support the contention. Not a shred, nothing at all. Mr. Mele Pravos claim of a secret Anglo-Russian deal is a concocted fantasy. The suggestion that two of Great Britain's most senior judges and one of the world's foremost international jurists secretly colluded to force a political deal on two of the most senior judges from the United States is completely unsupported by evidence and, to put it mildly, inherently improbable. Indeed, Venezuela only belatedly invokes in the rejoinder a passing line in one biographical entry claiming that Lord Collins, I quote, successfully defended the interests of the Foreign Office in the boundary dispute with Venezuela. But even taken at its highest, this line says nothing about a sudden change in Lord Collins's demeanour or his conduct during the arbitration or a supposed deal with Russia. There is no documentary or other evidence to support this extraordinary allegation. The absence of any documentary corroboration is confirmed by a painstakingly researched biography of Professor Martins produced by the eminent Russian international lawyer Vladimir Pustogarov. Pustogarov explains that, and I quote, "In working with the archival materials of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs connected with Martins' activity, not the slightest trace was discovered of a deal between England and Russia, or that Martins, the president of the tribunal, received instructions regarding the case from his own government. On the contrary. The diary entries of Martins testify that he acted in the arbitral tribunal autonomously and independently. They contain no indications at all of the deal ascribed to him." It's a similar conclusion as that reached by Mr. Child back in 1950 in his meticulously researched critique of the claims made in the Mallet-Prevost memorandum. Mr. Child explained that his research had established that in the 15 bound volumes of British Foreign Office papers relating to the arbitration and in the almost equally voluminous despatches and telegrams which passed between London and St. Petersburg during this period, there is not one single document which, by the widest stretch of the imagination, could be considered to indicate a deal between Great Britain and Russia of the sort suspected by Mr. Mallet-Prevor. Beyond that, the allegation is totally inconsistent with the contemporaneous records produced by some of the arbitrators during the proceedings. For instance, Professor Martens himself described in his private diary how the two British arbitrators were apparently angry that, one, under my influence, they had to waive something that they considered already belonged to them, and, two, that due to the unanimity which I persistently demanded, they had to make concessions to the Americans. Professor Martin's contemporaneous diary entries describe the extent to which he successfully persuaded the British arbitrators to make concessions, which would result in Great Britain receiving substantially less territory than the British arbitrators considered it should receive. For example, Professor Martin described how, during the tribunal's intensive deliberations, Lord Russell waved his line ceding a significant area to the Venezuelans. Further to the south, after my question, he again waived what he demanded. These are not the words of a man intent on colluding with the British arbitrators to impose a preordained outcome on Venezuela, one that overwhelmingly favoured Great Britain at the expense of Venezuela. The memorandums claim that Professor Martins and the British arbitrators travelled to England during the August 1899 recess is also unsupported by any evidence. As Guyana explained in its memorial, throughout the arbitration proceedings, the press reported on the movements of members of the tribunal. Yet, although there were reports that Lord Russell had travelled to England during the recess when the deal was said to have been made, There's no report or record of either Lord Justice Collins or Professor Martin's having made a trip to England during that recess. It's therefore unlikely that they did so. In fact, none of the five August 1899 entries in Professor Martin's diaries mention any trip to London. The entry for 15th of August 1899 confirms that he was in France. and the 27 August 1899 entry records him as heading to The Hague to sign the acts of the first peace conference. Nor is there any evidence to support a sudden change in the attitude of Lord Justice Collins after that recess. Venezuela acknowledges in its rejoinder that the memorandum's claim about a change in the attitude of Lord Justice Collins is based exclusively on Mr. Malo-Prevost's recollection in 1944, that it is nothing more than impressions, supposedly formed 45 years earlier and never forgotten. Those impressions are not supported by any facts. As Mr. Child explained, a detailed analysis of the record of the oral proceedings shows no appreciable change in either the frequency or the nature of Lord Justice Collins's interventions before and after the recess. Mr. Malau Prevost's impressions about a change in Lord Justice Collins's demeanour are, we submit, a figment of a partisan imagination. Apart from these points, the claim of a secret Anglo-Russian deal is very hard to square with the state of diplomatic relations between Russia and Great Britain in 1899. As a result of the Transvaal crisis in southern Africa, which culminated in the outbreak of the Second Boer War in October 1899, tensions were running high, and the relationship between Great Britain and Russia was under intense strain throughout that year. Against this backdrop, the suggestion that these two countries might have entered a secret deal regarding the outcome of the 1899 arbitration is, we say, fanciful. As Mr. Child explained, had Mr. Mallet-Prevost reflected for a moment upon the state of relations between Great Britain and Russia in the summer of 1899, he must inevitably have realized how difficult, if not impossible, from a political point of view, a deal between the two countries would have been. And finally, the claim of a secret Anglo-Russian deal can't be reconciled with the outcome of the arbitration. As you know, the award determined that the mouth of the Orinoco River belonged to Venezuela. This was an outcome which, in the words of the Mallet-Prevo memorandum itself, gave to Venezuela the most important strategic point at issue. The day after the award was delivered, Mr. Mallet-Prevost and former US President Benjamin Harrison publicly emphasized that no portion of the entire territory possessed more strategic value, both from a commercial and a military standpoint, as the mouth of the Orinoco River. Professor Orrell has already taken you to this text. A similar sentiment was expressed by none other than Venezuela's foreign minister on the 7th of October 1999 when he declared, "Greatly indeed did justice shine forth when in the determination of the frontier we were given the exclusive dominion over the Orinoco, which was the principal aim we sought to achieve throughout the arbitration." The suggestion that Russia and Great Britain hatched a secret deal to illicitly benefit Great Britain, but which awarded the most prized strategic asset of all to Venezuela, is hardly persuasive. While the allegation of a secret Anglo-Russian deal is outlandish, it is also instructive, for it starkly demonstrates the unreliability of the claims made in the memorandum, which contains much by way of speculation and nothing by way of substance. It's long on fantasy and short on facts. It lay dormant for 13 years after its publication. In the years since 1962, Venezuela has used it repeatedly to generate heat and smoke, but no light and no illumination. And that brings me to the claims in the memorandum regarding the meeting which is said to have taken place between Mr. Male Prevost and the two American arbitrators while the tribunal was deliberating. According to the memorandum, Mr. Mallet-Prevost was called to meet with the two American arbitrators, who told him that the British arbitrators were inclined to rule that the boundary followed the Schomberg line, but that Professor Martins was anxious to have a unanimous decision. And if we agree to accept the line which he proposes, he will secure the acquiescence of Lord Russell and Lord Justice Collins, and so make the decision unanimous. The memorandum alleges that the American arbitrators asked for Mr. Mallet-Prevost's advice on whether they should agree to Martin's proposal. According to Mr. Schoenrich's account, Mr. Mallet-Prevost then consulted with Venezuela's lead counsel, former President Harrison, before advising the American arbitrators that Venezuela's position was that they should concur in the proposal. The account of these alleged discussions between Mr. Mallet-Prevost, a counsel, and the two American arbitrators is uncorroborated. It finds no support in the accounts of the tribunal's deliberations given by either of the American arbitrators or in any other documents. The notion that someone of that age could recall verbatim sequences said to have been spoken half a century earlier is, to say the least, improbable. It's also instructive to note that in the aftermath of the arbitration, Mr. Mallet-Prevost apparently made statements on the arbitration with which the American arbitrators did not agree. A letter from Secretary of State Olney, dated the 6th of March, 1901, for example, records that, "I see that Mr. Mallet-Prevost has been talking with you and giving you his account of the way in which the Venezuelan boundary award was made. He told me, I suppose, practically the same tale. I found, however, in talking with Chief Justice Fuller last fall, that he did not fully concur in Mr. Mallet-Prevost's views. But there's even more. Even if the claim about the discussions between Mr. Mallet-Prevost and the American arbitrators was true, and even if the words were accurate, it would provide no support for Venezuela's contention of nullity. Allow me to highlight two points. First, there is nothing irregular about the description of the tribunal's discussions and deliberations. The fact that the tribunal's deliberations involved a series of mutual concessions and compromises facilitated by the President will hardly come as a surprise to anyone involved in international judicial or arbitral work, still less an irregularity. As any international judge or international arbitrator knows, discussion, negotiation, compromise, give and take are the hallmarks of judicial adjudication. That is especially so where the matter to be determined is not one that involves a binary yes or no outcome, but rather a matter such as the drawing of an international boundary line, with innumerable possible permutations. There is nothing unusual about a panel of arbitrators initially holding diverging views on the correct outcome of a case before ultimately coalescing around one outcome, following a process of discussion, negotiation and compromise, usually brokered by the tribunal's chair or president. That is we would say, the very essence of a collegial approach. Second, even if the alleged exchanges between Mr. Mallot-Prvost and the American arbitrators did happen in the way described in the memorandum, and there is no evidence before you that they did, it does not lie in Venezuela's mouth to complain about them. The alleged exchanges took place between arbitrators appointed on behalf of Venezuela and counsel instructed by Venezuela to represent and argue Venezuela's case at the arbitration. According to the memorandum, those two arbitrators wanted to know Venezuela's preferred outcome. Having obtained that information from Venezuela's lawyer, the arbitrators appointed on behalf of Venezuela then allegedly proceeded to act in accordance with Venezuela's stated preference. There is nothing in the memorandum, no suggestion, that the arbitrators appointed by Great Britain or the British lawyers representing Great Britain were party to any of these discussions. In these circumstances, we submit that it is simply not open to Venezuela to argue that the alleged but uncorroborated communications between Mr. Malo-Prevot, one of its own counsel, and the two American arbitrators who they appointed vitiate the validity of the 1899 award. There is no suggestion by Venezuela that Mr. Melet-Prevost acted contrary to Venezuela's interest or without its authority. Nor is there any suggestion the American arbitrators acted against Venezuela's interests. On the contrary, The memorandum claims that they acted consistently with Venezuela's wishes and endorsed an award which gave Venezuela the most prized asset of all. It follows that even if the alleged conversations between those arbitrators and Mr. Mallet-Prevost happened as described in the memorandum, and there is no evidence, no evidence before you that they did, this could not affect the validity of the award. I turn to my conclusions. Ever since Venezuela first claimed nullity in 1962, it has placed great weight on the Malle-Prevo memorandum. But even a cursory analysis of its claims makes clear that the document simply cannot bear the weight which Venezuela seeks to place upon it as a source of credible evidence about what happened at the 1899 arbitration, the value of the supposed document is zero. If you were to conclude otherwise, you would be opening the door to more mischief in the future. I won't be around in 44 years, but hopefully my colleague, Mr. Craven, who you'll hear from shortly, will still be around. Imagine him writing an analogous memorandum in 2070, alleging a conversation with one of you in this case, which is later found in his papers after his death, and then causes one of his colleagues to write a law review article, a more junior colleague from his chambers, And more than a decade later, at some point in the 2080s, that memorandum is relied upon by Guyana to come back to this court to seek to reopen whatever judgment you will give in this case. I'm sorry, but that is an absurd scenario, but that is what they are arguing. That is what Venezuela relies on today. So what will Venezuela say on Wednesday about a memorandum said to have been produced almost half a century after the conversation, meetings and impressions which it purports to describe? What on earth is Venezuela going to say about a supposed document that may or may not have been authored by an individual with a deep allegiance to Venezuela? who spent years advocating for Venezuela's claims to the territory dispute and whose loyal commitment to Venezuela had just been recognised through a prestigious national decoration. What on earth is Venezuela going to say about the identity and motives of the supposed memorandum's supposed author and the circumstances and timing of its supposed creation? And what is Venezuela going to say about 13 years of silence after the supposed memorandum was revealed in the American Journal. Mr. President, Venezuela has opened before us a world of theatre and fiction, not law, not fact. The claim of a secret Anglo-Russian deal is wholly unsupported by any evidence. Claims about Mr. Malley-Prevost's conversations are demonstrably untrue or wholly uncorroborated. Even if they ever took place, and there is no reliable evidence that they did, they provide no support whatsoever for any contention of nullity. In a nutshell, this document, this supposed document, is a giant red herring. It does not support Venezuela's attack on the validity of the 1899 award. Its only real value, we say, is to confirm that that attack is entirely devoid of any substance whatsoever. Mr. President, distinguished members of the court, Guyana trusts that you will deliver the final word on Venezuela's embrace of a regional principle of magical realism. This is the stuff of a novel. It is not the stuff of a pleading before this court. I thank you for your patient attention and now ask you to call the very youthful Mr. Craven to the podium.

I thank Professor Sands. I now give the floor to Mr. Edward Craven. You have the floor, sir.

Mr. President, members of the Court, it is an honor to be here before you and a privilege to address you on behalf of Guyana. In this final speech of Guyana's first round, I will address three issues. First, Venezuela's repeated violations of the Court's provisional measures orders. second, the remedies required for those violations; and third, Guyana's submissions in relation to the validity of the 1899 award and the related question of the location of the parties' land boundary. Mr. President, one theme which emerges very clearly from both the written pleadings and the speeches you have heard today is Venezuela's willful disregard for the court's judgments. Venezuela makes no secret of the fact that it rejects the court's judgment on jurisdiction, and I need not repeat what Professor D'Argent said on this earlier today. You will recall that, in addition to continuing to dispute the court's jurisdiction in its counter-memorial and rejoinder, Venezuela's government held a nationwide referendum in December 2023 to seek and obtain support for Venezuela's historic position of not recognising the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to resolve the territorial dispute over Guiana Essequiba. In the two and a half years since that referendum, Venezuela has repeatedly declared that it does not recognise the Court's jurisdiction in this case. Indeed, less than 48 hours before the start of this hearing, the Venezuelan Government issued a press release, which you will find behind tab 9.1 of your judges' folder. That press release states, as you see on the screen: "Faithful to its historical position and the popular mandate expressed in the consultative referendum of 3 December 2023, Venezuela ratifies that it does not recognise the jurisdiction of the Court in the territorial dispute over Guiana-Essequiba, nor the decision it may adopt on this matter. Therefore, its attendance at these oral hearings does not imply in any way its consent or recognition of said jurisdiction. Regrettably, as well as repudiating the court's jurisdiction and declaring publicly that it will not accept the court's final judgment, Venezuela has also overtly and repeatedly rejected and violated the court's provisional measures orders. The court has made two such orders in these proceedings, following requests by Guyana, which were prompted by Venezuela's explicit threats to Guyana's sovereignty and its territorial integrity. Venezuela has wilfully and flagrantly breached both orders. In October 2023, Venezuela announced plans to conduct the national referendum to which I have just referred. In addition to the question inviting support for Venezuela's repudiation of the court's jurisdiction, the proposed referendum also included a question concerning Venezuela's plans for the creation of the Guayana Esequiba state and the development of an accelerated and comprehensive plan for the present and future population of that territory. including, inter alia, the granting of Venezuelan citizenship and identity cards, consequently incorporating that state into the map of Venezuelan territory. Faced with that unambiguous threat to its sovereign territory, Guyana filed an urgent request for provisional measures. On 1 December 2023, the court unanimously ordered provisional measures. The court observed that Venezuela had made official statements that suggest that Venezuela is taking steps with a view to acquiring control over and administering the territory in dispute, and that there was a real and immediate risk of irreparable prejudice to Guyana's plausible right to sovereignty over that territory. Accordingly, the court unanimously ordered that, pending a final decision in the case, Venezuela shall refrain from taking any action which would modify the situation that currently prevails in the territory in dispute, whereby Guyana administers and exercises control over that area. The court also unanimously ordered that both parties shall refrain from any action which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the court or make it more difficult to resolve. How did Venezuela respond to that unanimous and unambiguous provisional measures order? With immediate defiance and instant disobedience. Just two days after the order was made, on 3 December 2023, Venezuela held the referendum that had prompted Guyana's request for provisional measures and the resulting order. Just two days after that, on 5 December 2023, the Venezuelan Government announced that it would create a Venezuelan state of Guiana Essequiba. On 8 December 2023, just one week after the court made its provisional measures order, the Venezuelan president signed a series of presidential decrees that, in the words of the court's subsequent second provisional measures order, were "aimed at acquiring and exercising control and administration over the territory in dispute. In other words, they were aimed at doing exactly what the first provisional measures order prohibited. As the court noted, the Venezuelan decrees created a new comprehensive defence zone in the territory. They designated a Venezuelan official as the sole authority in that territory. They authorised Venezuelan state-owned companies to grant concessions for the exploitation of oil and minerals in the territory. They ordered the territory to be incorporated in Venezuela's official maps. They declared the creation of Venezuelan national parks and environmental protection zones in the territory. And they established the so-called High Commission for the Defense and Recovery of the Guiana Essequiba. A few weeks after those presidential decrees were promulgated, Venezuela unlawfully violated Guyanese territorial sovereignty. Its military entered Guyana's airspace. It deployed naval forces in waters adjacent to the territory claimed by Venezuela, and it expanded military infrastructure on Ankoko island. As shown on your screens, Ankoko island is an insular feature in the Kaiuni river, which the 1899 award divides between the parties. The eastern portion of the island falls within Guyana's territory, yet Venezuela has occupied it since 1966 and, following the court's first provisional measures order, it has further intensified its military presence there. That intensification was carried out in clear defiance of the court's order and it constitutes an unlawful incursion of Guyana's sovereignty. But Venezuela didn't stop at that. On the 21st of March 2024, the Venezuelan National Assembly enacted a far-reaching law which purported to convert the territory claimed by Venezuela into a new state of Venezuela, the so-called Guiana Essequiba State. You can find a copy of that law the organic law for the defence of the Guayana Esequiba, behind tab 9.2 of your judges' folders. Among other things, the law purported to create executive and legislative branches for that new Venezuelan state. It purported to confer the Venezuelan courts with jurisdiction over the territory claimed by Venezuela. It required that every map of Venezuela depict the territory as an integral part of Venezuela. It also imposed a legal duty on all Venezuelans to, quote, safeguard, protect and vindicate Venezuela's sovereignty over the territory of the Guiana Essequiba. Mr. President, short of a military intrusion into the territory, it's difficult to conceive of a more flagrant violation of the court's first provisional measures order. Venezuela's enactment of this law was, in substance and in intent, an attempted de jure annexation of the territory. By purporting to subject the territory to Venezuela's legislative, executive and judicial jurisdiction, Venezuela was quite plainly seeking, in the words of the court's first provisional measures order, to modify the situation that currently prevails in the territory in dispute, whereby Guyana administers and exercises control over that area. And Venezuela was self-evidently acting in a manner that might aggravate or extend the dispute before the court or make it more difficult to resolve. Venezuela's actions prompted widespread condemnation by the international community, including a statement by the Security Council on the obligation to comply with the court's provisional measures order. Venezuela ignored all of this and it doubled down. In August 2022, Venezuela publicly declared that it was proceeding with a process of affirmation of sovereignty over the disputed territory. In January 2025, the Venezuelan president announced that Venezuela would hold elections in Guiana Essequiba, in which the people of Guiana Essequiba would elect a governor of Guiana Essequiba state. To be clear, Venezuela was planning to hold elections in Guyana's territory, elections in which Guyanese citizens would be called upon to elect a Venezuelan governor to rule over them. Venezuela's announcements and its declarations of intent were yet further violations of the court's first provisional measures order. In the face of Venezuela's defiance of that order and its escalating threats to Guyana's sovereignty and territorial integrity, Guyana made a second request for provisional measures in March 2025. On 1 May 2025, the court granted that request and made a second provisional measures order. The court explained, as you see on the screen, that by adopting legislative measures, and decrees concerning the territory in dispute and by announcing the holding of elections therein, the respondent has confirmed its intention of acquiring and exercising control and administration over the territory in dispute. The acts taken by Venezuela since 1 December 2023 further confirm that the respondent intends to incorporate the territory in dispute into its own territory. The court described Venezuela's actions as grave developments. Accordingly, the court unanimously reaffirmed the provisional measures, indicating its order of 1 December 2023, which should be immediately and effectively implemented. The court also went on to indicate a further specific provisional measure, namely that, pending a final decision in the case, Venezuela shall refrain from conducting elections or preparing to conduct elections in the territory in dispute, which Guyana currently administers and over which it exercises control. Venezuela, once again, flagrantly defied the court's order. The day after that order was issued, Venezuela put out a communique that categorically rejected the order. Venezuela pronounced that, quote, "True to its historical position, it does not and will never recognise the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice or abide by any decision emanating from it to settle the territorial dispute around Guiana Essequiba in a process that has been rigged from the beginning. On 19 May 2025, the president of Venezuela declared that Venezuela is going to elect governance of the state of Guiana Essequiba, a sovereign state of Venezuela, and it is going to elect deputies from Guiana Essequiba. Six days later, on 25 May 2025, the Venezuelan foreign minister announced that: "We are electing, for the first time, the authorities who are going to represent the state of Guayana Esequibo." The following day, the Venezuelan president proclaimed that the Venezuelan people had elected a governor of the Esequibo. Despite those statements, Venezuela did not, in fact, conduct elections in Guyana's territory. Instead, it confined actual voting to parts of its own territory bordering Guyana. Nevertheless, by declaring that a new governor would be and had been elected for the "state of Guayana Esequiba, a sovereign state of Venezuela", Venezuela had undoubtedly prepared to conduct elections in the territory in dispute, and it had clearly engaged in further conduct that might aggravate or extend the dispute before the court or make it more difficult to resolve. Indeed, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that that is precisely what Venezuela was seeking to achieve by making those statements. Less than three months later, On 8 August 2025, three resolutions that were passed by Venezuela's Superior Tribunal of Justice were published in Venezuela's official gazette. Those resolutions purported to extend the jurisdiction of three different Venezuelan courts to Guyana's Essequibo region. The resolutions were yet another example of Venezuela deliberately engaging in actions that sought to modify the situation that currently prevails in the territory in dispute and that undoubtedly might aggravate or extend the dispute or make it more difficult to resolve. In short, the factual record demonstrates that, from the moment that the court made its first provisional measures order, on 1 December 2023, Venezuela deliberately, repeatedly and flagrantly violated the provisional measures indicated by the court. Venezuela has not sought to deny those violations or to pretend that its actions were not likely to aggravate or extend the dispute between the parties. On the contrary, it has publicly proclaimed that it does not and will never abide by any decision emanating from the court. Through its words and its deeds, Venezuela has demonstrated its disregard, disobedience and contempt for the court's provisional measures orders. Those orders are binding and create international legal obligations for Venezuela. The orders plainly have been violated, and that calls for appropriate remedial measures. Mr. President, I now turn to that issue. Guyana requests two remedial measures. First, the court should declare that Venezuela has violated the two provisional measures orders which the court has made in these proceedings. Second, the court should order Venezuela to revoke, by means of its own choosing, each and every law, decree, and other domestic act that has been enacted or taken in violation of those provisional measures orders, including the legislation that purports to incorporate Guyana's sovereign territory within Venezuela and the legislation that purports to extend Venezuela's legislative, executive and judicial jurisdiction to that territory. The court should also order that Venezuela must withdraw and destroy the official maps that purport to depict Guayana Esequiba as part of Venezuela. Those measures are requested because Venezuela is under the obligation, by way of reparation for its breaches of the provisional measures, to re-establish the situation that would, in all probability, have existed if those breaches had not been committed. In the arrest warrant case, the court held that the situation that would in all probability have existed if the illegal act had not been committed could not be re-established merely by a finding by the court that the impugned arrest warrant was unlawful under international law. That was because the arrest warrant was still extant and it remained unlawful. Accordingly, the court held that the state that had issued the unlawful warrant was required, by means of its own choosing, to revoke the warrant and to inform the authorities to whom it had been circulated of that revocation. Similarly, in relation to jurisdictional immunities of the state, the court ruled that the decisions and measures infringing Germany's jurisdictional immunities, which are still in force, must cease to have effect and the effects which have already been produced by those decisions and measures must be reversed in such a way that the situation which existed before the wrongful acts were committed is re-established. Accordingly, the court ordered that Italy must, by enacting appropriate legislation or by resorting to other methods of its choosing, ensure that the decisions of its courts and those of other judicial authorities infringing the immunity which Germany enjoys under international law shall cease to have effect. Mr. President, an analogous order should be made in the present case in respect of Venezuela's violations of the Court's provisional measures orders. Having enacted a series of laws and other domestic acts which flagrantly and deliberately violate those orders, Venezuela should be required to comprehensively revoke all of those measures by effective means of its choosing. And having violated the provisional measures orders by producing and circulating official maps which depict vast swathes of Guyana's territory as belonging to Venezuela, the court should require Venezuela to revoke and destroy all of those unlawful maps. An order in those terms is a logical, reasonable and legally inescapable consequence of Venezuela's breaches. There can be no possible suggestion that such an order would be impossible or disproportionately burdensome for Venezuela. On the contrary, it would be simple and entirely straightforward to comply with. Guyana is entitled to an order in those terms, and it is what the preservation of the court requires in the face of Venezuela's extensive and persistent breaches. Mr. President, members of the court, I turn now to the final part of my presentation, which concerns Guyana's submissions regarding the subject matter of the dispute over which the court upheld its jurisdiction. Guyana will, in the conventional way, formally present its submissions at the end of the second round. However, Guyana wishes to conclude its first round by briefly addressing the declarations that it will invite the court to make in its judgment on the merits. As the court will appreciate, in view of the sheer extent of Venezuela's claims, over Guyana's sovereign territory and the existential threat which they pose to Guyana, the court's declarations in this case are of absolutely crucial importance to Guyana. As Guyana has demonstrated in its written pleadings, and as the speeches you have heard today make clear, Venezuela's contention that the 1899 award is void and Venezuela's repudiation of the boundary established by that award and by the 1905 boundary agreement are entirely without merit. Venezuela's attack on the validity of the award and the boundary which it established is devoid of factual or legal support. It is, to be clear, nothing less and nothing more than an attempt to provide a fig leaf for the annexation of Guyana's sovereign territory, territory which has formed an integral part of Guyana since long before its emergence as a sovereign state some 60 years ago. The court's role is of singular importance in this case in affirming the legal reality clearly authoritatively and unambiguously. Therefore, Guyana will respectfully ask the Court to make the declarations set out in the submissions in Guyana's reply. These include a judging and declaring that the 1899 award is valid and binding upon Guyana and Venezuela, and that the boundary established by the award and the 1905 boundary agreement is the boundary between the parties. They include adjudging and declaring that Guyana enjoys full sovereignty over all the territory between that boundary and the Essequibo River, and that Venezuela is required to fully respect Guyana's sovereignty and territorial integrity in accordance with that boundary. And they include declarations which logically and necessarily follow from this which will be spelled out in our final submissions. Mr. President, we submit that those elements are required in order to vindicate the rule of law, the authority of the court, and the sovereign rights of Guyana, as well as to fulfill the mandate of the Secretary General of the United Nations when he selected the court as the means for resolving the dispute back in 2018. They are the logical and inescapable consequences of upholding Guyana's application. They reflect and they give effect to the validity of the 1899 award, which it must be recalled, was explicitly intended by the 1897 Washington Treaty to constitute a full, perfect and final settlement of the parties' land boundary. A judgment in the terms sought by Guyana will provide the key which finally unlocks the resolution of this decades-long dispute. The court can, with its judgment in this case, provide the foundation for enduring peace and security in the region on the basis of the rule of international law. and it can definitively and finally settle a long-standing source of tension and conflict between the parties. Above all else, the court's judgment can and should affirm Guyana's territorial integrity in the clearest possible terms and place its sovereignty over the Essequibo beyond any possible question. The declarations that Guyana seeks will allow a line to finally be drawn under a dispute that has endured for far too long. They will bring complete clarity and certainty to the legal status of the parties' boundary, which will benefit not only the parties themselves but all states in the region and beyond. Above all, it will allow the parties to turn a page and to begin a new chapter in their relationship, a relationship which it is sincerely to be hoped will be characterised by amity, stability, respect for the rule of international law and respect for the inviolability of Guyana's sovereign territory and of Venezuela's sovereign territory based on the boundary established more than 126 years ago. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I thank you very much indeed for your kind attention. This concludes Guyana's first round of oral arguments.

I thank Mr. Craven for the statement that brings the first round of oral argument of Guyana to a close. The oral proceedings in the case will resume Wednesday, the 6th of May 2026 at 10 a.m. when Venezuela will begin its first round of oral argument. The sitting is closed.