(3rd meeting) 2026 ECOSOC Forum on Financing for Development Follow-Up (FfD Forum)

Good morning, everyone. May I kindly ask you to take your seats? I call to order the 3rd meeting of the 2026 session of the Economic and Social Council Forum on Financing for Development Follow-up. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, I invite the Forum to begin its consideration Of sub-item E of agenda item 2, entitled Update on Action Areas of the Sevilla Commitment Not Under In-Depth Review and Other Follow-Up Matters, to hold a panel discussion on key trends and updates across the Sevilla Commitment, with a special focus on debt and debt sustainability, international development cooperation, and development effectiveness and domestic public resources. We will begin the discussion with presentations on the topic of debt. I first give the floor to Mr. José Rubio Vela, Senior Advisor at the General Secretariat of the Treasury and International Financing of Spain. Mr. Rubio Vela, you have the floor.

Many thanks, Mr. President.

Muchas gracias.

Thank you very much. It's a pleasure for me and for us as a country, for Spain, to be here this morning. We are very grateful to you, President, for your invitation and for the forum. It's a privilege but also a responsibility. A responsibility because we share with the United Nations the need to do a diagnosis as to the current situation with regards to debt. And the diagnosis is that economic instability is not having the same impact on different countries. It's asymmetric, in fact. We listened to conclusions yesterday hearing that developing countries are the ones that are going to have the most significant negative impact of the current situation of instability and uncertainty. That's why we also share a vision with you, a vision that we need to be effective. We also need to be audacious, courageous, and innovative when we tackle the problem of debt for developing countries. And it's in this spirit that, as you all know, last year in June and July, we hosted the 4th Financing for Development Conference. We then adopted the Sevilla commitments and adopted a raft of different initiatives with coalitions of the willing within the framework of the Spain Platform for Action. However, Spain believes that this is just the beginning. This is the departure point, a springboard that we will use to begin to work and cooperate in order to bring in solutions that, like I said, are audacious, courageous, and are very necessary. One of the issues that was announced following the Seville Conference was the Seville Forum. This Seville Forum, what it seeks to do is to be a forum for dialogue, a platform for dialogue and cooperation, and decisive impulse for these initiatives that were agreed on in Seville. It's also important to explain that the Seville Forum Um, is not the civil forum. It's not really a forum. It's not for negotiating, structuring things. We have very, um, relevant ones for that, different ones that do that, like the G20. I mean, it's not to replace already existing initiatives or, um, to replace the civil initiatives, which of course, um, those documents are deposited here at the United Nations in this house. Now, um, this platform is fundamentally inclusive. It includes debtor countries. We welcome the Boris Platform that was announced last week. We applaud that. Finally, it's been created, and we're convinced that we will be able to work very closely with them. And then on the other hand, what we want to do is include creditors, academia, and philanthropic organizations. So all stakeholders will be involved in this initiative and in all of the endeavors there. What we want to do is to encourage this forum by setting up a select group of countries who would like to participate in the first phase. Of the forum. All of those countries and institutions that have an interest in this and that are incentivized to work on these solutions and these initiatives will certainly be more than welcome. So this speech is not just an explanation but also an invitation to all of you here to come and participate in this forum. And the goal of it, like I was saying, is to drive forward the commitments made in Seville on debt, the global hub, the alliance for debt swap, and also the working group on responsible lending and borrowing principles to work on this raft of principles on responsible debt and loans. And we will be facilitating this platform for ideas to be exchanged. We also will be hosting this first select meeting on the anniversary of the Seville Conference this summer. We're looking forward to it. And in the next few days and weeks, you'll have some information on the final dates. I'd like to wrap up by thanking you once again for inviting Spain to participate in this meeting this morning. It's been a real pleasure to come here, and I'd also just like to reiterate the extension of this invitation to all of you who participated in the Seville Conference to deal with all of these very relevant, important issues. Thank you very much.

Secretary of the Treasury and International Finance of Spain. I now give the floor to Ms. Sherri Spiegel, Director of the Financing and Sustainable Development Office in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs to present the Working Group on Principles on Responsible Sovereign Borrowing and Lending. Ms. Spiegel, you have the floor.

Thank you so much. As part of the Sevilla Commitment, one of the outcomes as part of the debt package was it mandated the UN Secretary-General, in collaboration with the IMF and the World Bank, to convene a working group to propose a set of voluntary guiding principles of responsible borrowing and lending and proposals for their implementation. And I'm pleased to update you on the progress made in taking the Working Group forward. The Working Group will be supported by a Secretariat composed of UNDESA, the Financing for Sustainable Development Office, UNCTAD, and the Executive Office of the UN Secretary-General, along with colleagues in the IMF and the World Bank. The Secretariat is now already operational and has jointly prepared a concept note for the Working Group and identified a list of potential participants of the Working Group. And also developed an initial road plan for— roadmap for its work. The Working Group, um, could focus on 3 specific tasks. First is developing a coherent and integrated framework for creditor and borrower responsibilities. The idea is not to reproduce, um, um, principles— there are many principles out there— but to build on and bring together existing principles and guidelines, to identify and address gaps, and to highlight priority aspects that have proven to be critical in past debt crises. The approach means that many of the different principles that are out there are for different types of creditor groups, for different types of borrower groups, and each of these can remain relevant to their respective constituencies, but also to help them gain prominence and wider adherence by creating sort of a core group of principles, if that exists, from the wider set of principles that are out there. So that's the first part. The second part is to propose options to strengthen adherence to the principles, including stronger monitoring and proposals to integrate these, possibly these soft law efforts, possibly international legislation, model contracts, and policy frameworks of international financial institutions. And third is to conduct outreach with all relevant constituencies, which we will be doing once the working group is up and running. We plan to organize it in a very transparent manner and to work with different groups to build ownership of the principles and enable broad buy-in with all of the different groups that— relevant groups that are out there. The working group members will be drawn from, again, all relevant constituencies, including experts and academics with legal and economic backgrounds, public sector representatives from both creditor and debtor countries, and private sector representatives, as well as representatives from think tanks and civil society. The list is also balanced from a gender and regional perspective. 2 co-chairs, one from the North and one from the South, will be selected from amongst the experts of the group to substantively lead the activities of the working group. Once the members have been formally invited by the Secretary-General, which should be very soon, we, the Secretariat, will convene our first meeting of the group to confirm priorities and develop the work plan going forward. And this will be followed by a series of working meetings and consultations throughout the year, including possibly on the sidelines of the Sevilla Forum on Debt. The aim of the group will be to publish the group's report in time for next year's— the 2027 FFD Forum, where debt will be highlighted under in-depth review. In closing, I want to emphasize that the Working Group is an integral part of the Sevilla Commitment debt package. Its work will both inform and benefit from other actions in the package, such as the Borrowers Platform or the UN Dialogue on Debt. Taken together, these debt actions represent a comprehensive— really the most comprehensive effort in years to build a development-oriented international debt architecture, and the Working Group's task is really central to that effort. So we look forward to working— to the Working Group reporting on its progress in the 2027 FFD Forum, and also, as I said, to reporting to you and talking to you and really outreach to member states and to other relevant stakeholders as the work progresses. So thank you so much.

I thank the Director of the Financing for Sustainable Development Office. On the topic of international development cooperation, I now give the floor to His Excellency Carsten Stauer, Chair of the OECD Development Assistance Committee.

Thank you very much, Mr. President, and thank you for having me here at this juncture. As made clear by preceding speakers both today and yesterday, we live in times of great volatility and uncertainty. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is in its 4th year. New and reemerging conflicts in the Middle East create widespread negative effects on fuel, food, and global economy. In the midst of this, the OECD has just a few days ago launched the preliminary ODA figures for 2025, showing a drop of 23%, almost a quarter, mainly caused by a sharp reduction in U.S. development funding, but also by declining ODA from some other major donors. Never before have we had such a dramatic decline in ODA from one year to the next. Inclinations are that the huge drop also hits where ODA is most needed, in life-saving humanitarian situations in sub-Saharan Africa and LDCs. The paradox of increasing needs and less concessional finance, at least in the short term, makes it even more important to clarify the future role of ODA in the new global economy, how to combine saving lives and help eradicating extreme poverty with supporting partners in the implementation of nationally owned strategies, including through institutional capacity development, and with efforts to mobilize more and much-needed private finance. All of this, of course, with an even closer eye to results and impact. With this in mind, the DAC has started to review and improve its role, its tools, and its partnership approaches. From the beginning, the DAC review has been focused on how the DAC could become a better partner, how we could ensure that our work data analysis, policy recommendations and guidances better respond to the needs of country partners; on how other providers, partners and stakeholders outside the DAC could be more involved in the work of the Committee without losing sight of DAC being a development providers' forum, not a mini-UN. We have deliberately chosen a pragmatic approach, focusing on what is within the power and ability of the 34 members of the Committee to change. The DAC Review is organized in 4 dedicated work streams. The first is around transparent and timely data on ODA and other official and private flows. How can these data become more predictable and more forward-looking? How can we strengthen cooperation with other data providers and ensure that data are interoperational, accessible, and user-friendly? The second is around ODA within the totality of development finance flows. Providing a better overview from a partner country perspective and also identifying how ODA can become more catalytic. The third is building on the strengthened ODA graduation process adopted by the DAC last year and work to identify a subset of indicators to supplement GNI per capita, which will still be the trigger for considering graduation from the list of ODA-eligible countries. And the fourth looks at ways to improve DAC's way of working to be more open and inclusive, engage more in dialogue with other providers, and in more systematic consultations, including through a sounding board structure. We have just launched a web-based public consultation on some of these ideas and the direction of travel of the review, and we would welcome comments from all stakeholders. I am hopeful that we will be able to present a first set of recommendations by the end of the year. As I stressed, the DAC Review focuses on issues within the purview of the Committee. There are larger discussions on how the fast-changing global environment will impact on the wider international development cooperation landscape, which goes beyond the remit of the DAC Review but will be captured elsewhere, including by the conference in Paris next month organized by the OECD. Many stakeholders are leaning into this wider discussion. It will take time as the tectonic plates and political balances keep shifting. The DAC will also lean into this discussion in a spirit of openness and collaboration and based on the values of transparency, accountability, and evidence, which is the hallmark of the Committee. Thank you.

I thank the Chair of the OECD Development Assistance Committee. I next give the floor to Ms. Prudence Kaoma, Permanent Secretary for Planning and Administration at the Ministry of Finance and National Planning of Zambia and co-chair of the Group of Friends of International Development Cooperation Effectiveness. Ms. Kauma, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to share progress on the work of the Group of Friends on Development Cooperation Effectiveness that Zambia is co-chairing with Ireland, Mexico, and the Republic of Korea. Why does this matter? At a time when development cooperation faces increasing fragmentation, financing constraints, and geopolitical pressures, strengthening its effectiveness is not just optional but essential. In today's context, the question is no longer only how much resources we mobilize, but how effectively we deliver. Despite the multiplicity of actors and platforms, for effective development cooperation, there remains a disconnect between global policy discussions and implementation realities on the ground. So this group responds to this gap by offering a dedicated space in New York to connect discussions across institutions, processes, and partnerships. This motivated— this context motivated the forming of this Group of Friends on International Development Cooperation Effectiveness and was conceived to provide member states a platform to strengthen coherence, dialogue, and effectiveness across international development cooperation system. So it's a space for strategic reflection, coordination, ensuring that our collective efforts translate into more effective, inclusive, and country-driven development outcomes. Through this group, we are helping shape the conversations that will define the future of international development cooperation architecture. What this group does is that it promotes coherence. It helps to bridge silos and across UN processes, including Financing for Development Forum, the High-Level Political Forum, and the Development Cooperation Forum. It contributes to more informed, connected, and mutually reinforcing discussions across the UN system. It also enhances dialogue and coordination by providing a neutral and inclusive space for member states to exchange perspectives, identify common priorities, and foster mutual understanding. It enables early coordinated ahead of key UN processes, strengthening the quality and impact of our collective engagement. It provides knowledge and evidence. The group promotes knowledge sharing on best practices, tools, lessons learned grounded in data and real-world evidence. It facilitates engagement with international financial institutions, multilateral development banks, and other partners, ensuring that discussions are informed by practical insights and global standards. It also bridges policy practice. A central value of this group is to connect global commitments with how development cooperation is actually designed. implemented. It helps to ensure that political commitments, including those from SEVIA, remain relevant, actionable, and responsive to country needs. How does this link to SEVIA? This group contributes to sustaining momentum from the SEVIA commitment, particularly its renewed emphasis on development effectiveness. It supports implementation and follow-up commitments on international development cooperation, including through the Sevilla Platform of Action. In this sense, the group is not creating new frameworks, but helping operationalize and reinforce what we have already agreed. The nature of this group is that it is informal, voluntary, and member-state-driven, with no negotiated outcomes or additional reporting burdens. Its Its strength lies in its flexibility, inclusivity, and ability to foster candid strategic exchanges. It is designed to complement existing processes and partnerships. The group brings together diverse perspectives across Global North and South, reflecting the evolving nature of development cooperation. It recognizes that countries engaged in development cooperation in different ways— as providers, recipients, both, and that all perspectives are essential. Looking forward, the success of this group will be measured by its ability to improve the quality of our collective discussions and strengthen the effectiveness of development cooperation practice. It aims to contribute to a system that is more coherent, more inclusive, and better aligned with national priorities. I thank you.

I thank the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and National Planning of Zambia. On the topic of domestic public resources, I now give the floor to Mr. Rami Youssef, Chair of the United Nations Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on the UN Framework Convention on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, via virtual connection. Mr. Youssef, you have the floor. Held on 27 March. The President's summaries of both meetings reflect the discussions in full, while I will provide a concise overview. While domestic resources mobilization is not an action area under in-depth review at the Forum this year, it is among the highest priorities for member states seeking fiscal resilience, and it will be a dedicated theme at the 2027 Forum. The outcomes of the Council's 2 special meetings are therefore related directly to the work ahead. The ECOSOC Special Meeting on Financial Integrity held on 4 February constituted an important cross-silo engagement on financial integrity, bringing together member states, intergovernmental bodies, and stakeholders working across tax cooperation, anti-money laundering, and anti-corruption frameworks for the first time. The meeting underscores that strengthening financial integrity is essential to advancing sustainable development. Illicit financial flows continue to undermine domestic resource mobilization, weaken public trust, and disproportionately affect developing countries. 2 broad areas of discussions emerged. First, on global coordination and transparency, Participants highlighted the need to strengthen inclusive norm-setting and improve the effectiveness of information exchange systems. Discussions highlighted both significant progress over the past 2 decades and persistent challenges in combating illicit financial flows, addressing structural asymmetries in access to information, and ensuring that developing countries can fully participate in and benefit from international cooperation mechanisms. Second, on enforcement and capacity, discussions pointed to persistent gaps in institutional, technical, and digital capabilities. Participants stressed the importance of integrated whole-of-government approaches, stronger coordination among national authorities, and enhanced cooperation among enforcement bodies and standard-setting institutions. The role of innovation, including digital tools and artificial intelligence, was also emphasized. Moving forward, efforts should prioritize enhancing interoperability of data systems, promoting whole-of-government approaches, and supporting integrated capacity building. This includes identifying potential opportunities to better align global tax. Anti-money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism, anti-corruption, and customs systems to reduce fragmentation and strengthen effectiveness. On the ECOSOC Special Meeting on International Cooperation in Tax Matters held on 27 March, 3 areas of discussion stand out. First, the state of tax systems. Member States underscored the strong, fair tax tax systems are essential to financing sustainable development, especially as debt vulnerabilities rise and fiscal space tightens. Countries cannot rely on external resources alone, and the quality and fairness of domestic tax systems have direct implications for the social contract between governments and citizens. Second, on international tax reforms, The meeting showed broad agreement that existing rules largely anchored in physical presence no longer reflect the realities of a digitalized, globalized economy. Member states called for taxing rights to better align with where economic activities and value creation occurred, with particular attention to the position of developing countries. Discussions also show broader openness than often assumed on updating nexus rules, plus a call for a more evidence-based dialogue going forward. Third, on capacity and implementation, discussions recognize that reforms depend not only on rules and policies being fit for purpose, but on the ability to administer them. Artificial intelligence is already delivering real gains in tax administration, in audit selection, fraud detection, and compliance. But those gains depend on digital foundations, data quality, and human oversight being in place. Without targeted support, AI risks deepening existing inequalities rather than narrowing them. The special meeting also reflected on a call to strengthen taxation of high net worth individuals as both an equity measure and a means for reinforcing the legitimacy of the tax systems. Across these areas, member states reaffirmed the United Nations as a central platform for inclusive and effective international tax cooperation through the technical and norm-setting work of the United Nations Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters as well as the ongoing intergovernmental process toward a UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation. Excellencies, a common message emerged across both meetings: advancing financing for development requires not only mobilizing resources but also safeguarding them through fair tax systems, strong institutions, and effective international cooperation. These discussions should continue to inform our collective effort in implementing the Sevilla Commitment. The President's summaries of both meetings will also be available on the webpage of the respective events. In my role as presiding officer— I think we're ready for— on the topic of domestic public resources, I will now give the floor back to Mr. Rami Youssef, Chair of the United Nations Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on the UN Framework Convention on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, who is going to join us virtually. Mr. Youssef, you have the floor.

Hello, and thank you. I hope you can hear me well.

Yes, we can.

Go ahead.

Yeah, thank you.

Thank you.

First of all, sorry for not being able to join in person in this meeting. And let me go directly to the topic, which is domestic revenue mobilization, in which actually the taxation is considered one of the main pillars for domestic revenue mobilization. Although Many countries still are able to mobilize resources from tax through the domestic policies. However, it has been seen that the current international tax rules that have been developed during the last century are still considered as a main barrier and setting cap for the countries' policies to be able to generate enough resources to finance their Sustainable Development Goals. So there is a decision that has been taken back in 2023 to establish a framework convention in which we can develop and enhance and introduce new international tax rules, which is fair for all the member states and enable more domestic revenue mobilization for all member states, whether developed or developing countries. Given that, it was back in 2024 when a decision has been taken by the GA to establish a committee to set a term of reference for the Framework Convention, in which it defined what the objectives this convention should be aiming for and what exactly the scope that it should be looking at. One of these main objectives is to set a new international tax system under this convention. In February 2025, the INC was established in its organizational session, and we start the work since that time. We set a roadmap with a timetable to be able to finish the work for the Framework Convention with 2 urgent protocols that have been seen by most of the member states as this is the topic that we need to go through and solve as a priority. Since May 2025, the substantive work has started with gap analysis and scoping and approaches, setting approaches for the Framework Convention and for the protocols. And in November, it was the first— November 25th, it was the first text for the convention to be discussed in the committee. In February, we continued the discussions of the substantive articles in the convention, and we continued also the scoping and approaching approaches for the protocols in February 2026. And now, as we are moving to the next session, will be in August, and followed by another session in November within the current year, We are aiming to have a full text for the Convention and full text for the Protocols in August and November. Although it is a very tight timeline, but the good news is that the Committee is exerting all the efforts to keep on the time and within the roadmap and the timetable with the aim to get the Convention text completed and adopted by the Committee and the 2 Protocols by July 27th. We are on the time till now and doing all the efforts to do this. The spirit in the room has changed a lot, and now we see a very high level of cooperation from different member states, whether developing or developed countries, and new innovative ideas and solutions, and the common understanding for the issues that we used to face in different countries and different levels. So what I would like to deliver here is that we are working in one of the main pillars of the domestic revenue mobilization with achieving very good progress and on time to deliver to the GA one of the biggest milestones in the DRM, which is the Framework Convention by setting a new international tax system and its 2 early protocols in the field of international tax. Thank you.

I thank the Chair of the United Nations Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on the UN Framework Convention on International Cooperation in Tax Matters. I now give the floor to the lead discussant, Mahmoud Mohi Aldeen, Co-Chair of the UN Expert Group on Debt. Mr. Mohi Aldeen, you have the floor.

Thank you so much, Chair. I'll focus on my discussion now on areas related to debt and debt sustainability, based on the progress so far since we met in Seville. We meet at a time when sovereign debt has moved from being a development enabler to becoming a development constraint and major hurdle. For too many developing countries, scarce public resources, including the domestically mobilized resources, including taxes of course, are diverted away from health, education, infrastructure, and climate resilience toward rising debt costs and debt service obligations. This is not only a financial challenge; it is a development emergency, if not a crisis, for many developing countries. I have 4 quick messages to share with you, given the time constraints. The current debt mechanisms are too slow, too fragmented, and too costly. It is good to see some meaningful progress in terms of the architecture, as we got the update from Spain on the formation of the Sevilla Debt Forum. Last week, as mentioned yesterday by the Secretary-General of the UN, a borrowers' platform had been formed with an interim chair, responsible for operationalization and getting the next steps, including areas related to governance, in shape, in collaboration with the group that formed the Club and the support of the Secretariat. We heard as well positive development on the growing work on the principles of responsible lending and borrowing. And that could really be helping us to see some progress in particular areas if these institutions are in shape. That could include faster debt workouts, temporary debt service standstills, improved creditor coordination, and more transparent and inclusive restructuring processes. These and other recommendations that came out from the group, the expert group on debt that I co-chaired with 3 other colleagues, could really be part of the mandate of the Debt Forum and the Borrowers Platform. The second area of concern is basically that we are suffering from a persistent overestimation of investment and default risks in developing countries, particularly in Africa. And we have here an astonishing fact. For more than 3 years now, we have been getting updates from the multilateral development banks and top financial institutions on database of actual default risks, what's called the GEM. And we know now that defaults are actually much less than being perceived. But the astonishing and sad outcome of all of that, while we could really celebrate that facts are better than perception, but nothing had happened in terms of reduction of cost of borrowing. This kind of evidence and updates were not reflected in the terms and conditions of lending. As the UN Expert Group on Debt recommendation covering expansion of the use of guarantees, credit enhancement tools, and better country risk analysis to unlock affordable finance at affordable cost, that could be of relevance here. My next point, that we need to deal with the origination of debt. In many cases, we see that countries at the sovereign level shouldn't really be even borrowing for areas that the private sector should be more able to invest. We need to have stronger pipelines of investable national projects. Global liquidity is available, but too often it doesn't reach countries that need it the most. And my very final point. Here is basically about collaboration, especially with the multilateral development banks and the national development banks, that they definitely can do more and do it faster. The UN expert group on debt called for optimizing balance sheets, increasing concessional resources, expanding local currency lending, and leveraging special drawing rights more effectively to lower financing costs and crowd in private investment. We welcome the developments of a hub for debt swaps and we welcome the emphasis on transparency and providing more in the capacity building, but nothing will be more helpful in the short term than focusing on our work in 2 particular areas. First, to reform the debt sustainability analysis of the World Bank and the IMF, and there are very specific recommendations in these regards and the recommendations coming either from the Jubilee Report or the group— the expert group on debt. And finally, there are specific recommendations as well to improve the G20 Common Framework, including the inclusion of middle-income countries in the coverage of the Common Framework. Thank you so much.

I thank the co-chair of the UN Expert Group on Debt. I now give the floor to Ms. Penelope Hawkins, Officer-in-Charge of the Debt and Development Branch, United Nations Trade and Development, to make a presentation on the Borrowers' Platform.

Thank you very much, Chair, and thank you very much to all of you Excellencies and delegates for allowing the opportunity to talk on this. The Barros Platform has been established under the authority of the Sevilla Commitment, and so allow me to congratulate each one of the member states here and all of those who supported this language in the Sevilla Commitment. This start of the implementation is as much ours as it is yours. The Borrowers Platform, as we know, fills a critical gap in the infrastructure of the international financial architecture. It is a space where borrowers can talk and share and learn from each other. The Paris Club, which is one of the earlier credit groups, has existed for 70 years. They were established in 1956, so the Borrowers Platform has a lot of catch-up to do. The aim of this platform is to allow for technical peer learning conversations to take place that will allow countries really not to lose knowledge in between acquisition of large amounts debt. We know that debt sustainability is as much about the acquisition and the terms under which that debt was contracted as it is around the management of it and the process of ultimately refinancing or completing the debt contracts. These conversations, we think, should take place place in 2 tiers. There will be a political level that includes the ministries of finance of different sovereign member states, and of course there will be the technical level at which the heads of debt management offices or the heads of treasury operations will partake. The launch on the 15th of April was a launch of the beginning of the process. There is a draft modalities document worked on by 7 member states, 2 from each of the developing regions and 1 small island developing state, and this is now— the process is now that under the interim phase for 6 months that draft modalities document needs to be completed. We need to have a work plan going forward and we need to install the first annual chair of the process in October this year. So there is work to be done. At the launch, there were 31 countries in presence. They were represented by 2 prime ministers and 16 finance ministers and The rest were either deputy finance ministers or central bank governors. We had statements of support from one-third of those finance ministers, and so the process is just beginning, but it is a process that continues to need the support of all the member states. If debt is better acquired, better managed, and better resolved, then it will benefit debtors and creditors alike, and hopefully 70 years from now people will say this made a difference to reducing the risks of the system. I thank you.

I thank the Officer-in-Charge of Debt and Development Branch, United Nations Trade Development. That concludes the updates. I now open the floor for the interactive discussion. Delegations wishing to intervene are invited to request the floor by pressing the microphone button. I would like to remind speakers that in order to give as many speakers as possible the opportunity to take the floor, time limits of 2 minutes for individual interventions and 3 minutes for statements on behalf of groups will apply. To ensure proper interpretations, Delegations are asked to speak at a normal pace and to provide a written copy of their statement by an email to statements@un.org. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Nepal on behalf of the least developed countries, followed by Mr.

President, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, I have the honor to deliver this statement on behalf of the Least Developed Countries. The group would like to highlight 5 priorities. First, debt vulnerabilities in LDCs have reached critical levels, severely constraining development efforts and undermining investment in sustainable development. The Group calls for a more effective, timely, and inclusive sovereign debt architecture, with faster restructuring, better creditor coordination, and fair burden sharing. Expanding access to concessional finance and scaling up innovative instruments such as debt-for-climate and debt-for-development swaps are essential to restoring sustainability. Second, official development assistance remains indispensable for LDCs. At its volume, predictability, and concessionality are under increasing pressure. We therefore reiterate the importance of meeting the 0.15% to 0.2% of ODA GNI target for LDCs. Development cooperation must be country-led, aligned with the national priorities, and delivered through simplified and accessible modalities, including for climate finance. Third, despite progress, many developing countries remain below the 15% tax-to-GDP threshold, reflecting enduring structural challenges. These constraints are compounded by illicit financial flows and limited administrative capacity. We emphasize the need for strengthened international tax cooperation, more inclusive global tax governance, and scaled-up support for capacity building in tax administration and public financial management. Domestic efforts must be supported by a fair and enabling international environment. Fourth, mobilizing private investment at scale is essential. Yet, LDCs continue to receive only a marginal share of global capital flows. We call for enhanced use of blended finance, guarantees, and de-risking instruments to unlock investment in productive sectors, infrastructure, and climate resilience. Private finance must align with national development strategies and contribute to structural transformation. Fifth, the Cebu commitment underscores the need for a more inclusive, equitable, and responsive global financial system. We call for reforms that improve access to affordable financing, strengthen global financial safety nets, address structural biases in credit ratings, and enhance the voice and representation of developing countries in global economic governance. Excellencies, closing over $4 trillion USD SDG financing gap will not be possible without prioritizing LDCs and addressing these structural constraints. The SABIA commitment sets out a comprehensive framework, but its impact now depends on urgent, large-scale implementation driven by sustained political will, concrete delivery, and effective accountability. In this regard, we underscore the Doha Programme for Action for LDCs as the guiding framework for enabling sustainable and irreversible graduation from the LDC category.

Thank you.

I thank the representative of Nepal I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Colombia, followed by France and Brazil.

Mr. President, Excellencies, a very good morning, everybody. First of all, Colombia wishes to welcome the initiative to make progress in the Working Group. This is one of the most significant commitments made in Seville. Now, on debt and The sustainability of debt, it's very important to underscore that we believe that the more than 23% drop in ODA for 2025 was extremely significant, compromising the achievement of our goals. So there's the commitment of 0.7% for developed countries and 0.2% for the least developed countries. Now, for us, in order to deliver the Compromisos de Sevilla, international financial institutions must ensure that there is access to sustainable That requires other production models focused on sustainability and the protection of life. A policy on access to credit that enables the different criteria to be discussed for the payment of debt through climate action or actions to increase development and increasing the productive capacity of different regions.

Representative of Colombia. It is important to highlight that given the limited time available, the microphone will be automatically cut off when the time allotted time has elapsed. This is in the interest, of course, of hearing all inscribed speakers. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of France, followed by Brazil and Poland.

President, It has 3 pillars. Firstly, inclusivity. BRICS are involved in the work of the Paris Club, and emerging economies also fully participate in negotiations. This is important progress in line with the financial landscape. Then clear principles, solidarity and consensus between lenders on case-by-case approaches, which allow borrowing countries to have tools in negotiations. Finally, professionalism. The common framework uses independent analysis of the IMF and the World Bank, as well as expertise from the Secretariat of the Paris Club. However, we should go further and improve the common framework, and this is something the G20 is working on, particularly to work on greater transparency and to also work to accelerate negotiation processes. On discussions of debt debt architecture, it's important to ensure that all initiatives are tied together to avoid fragmentation. So let's build bridges between these and support dialogue. This is what we're doing with the Paris Forum that brings together every year all debt communities— lenders, borrowers, international organizations, academia, and the private sector. This is the main platform to bring together all partners and to continue discussion on debt architecture. We, of course, would like to see close coordination with the Borrowers Platform launched last week and the Seville Forum that our Spanish colleague mentioned this morning. Cooperation is essential and it is indeed a condition for successful debt architecture management. Thank you very much.

Thank you, the representative of France. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Brazil, followed by Poland and the Philippines.

Thank you.

Mr. President, the Sevilla Commitment marked a significant step forward in the financing for development agenda by placing global attention on the urgent challenge of mobilizing resources to achieve the 2030 Agenda. Today, that challenge remains immense, with the annual financing gap for the SDGs estimated at nearly $4 trillion. Yet the global context is deeply concerning. First, the macroeconomic outlook remains fragile. Ongoing wars, trade tensions, and unsustainable debt burdens continue to weigh heavily on the global economy. Second, increasing political fragmentation and uncertainty are compounding existing crises from climate change and inequality especially of gender and race, to the disruptive impacts of technological transformation. Third, the poorest, poorest, and most vulnerable countries are facing a severe financial squeeze. Over the long term, domestic resource mobilization and private investment will be essential. National governments and the private sector already provide most SDG financing. That's why Brazil strongly supports negotiation of the UN Framework Convention on international tax cooperation, which could significantly strengthen domestic revenues in developing countries. However, these solutions take time. In short term, international financial flows remain indispensable. At this critical moment, it is deeply troubling that ODA is declining. This makes it urgent to increase the capital of multilateral development banks to advance innovative solutions. such as the rechanneling of special drawing rights through MDBs. Brazil stands ready to work with all partners to advance both multilateral responses and—

I thank the representative of Brazil. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Poland, followed by Philippines and Peru.

Mr. President, the successful adoption of the Sevilla Commitment provided a boost for the Financing for Development agenda and multilateralism. We should use this momentum to translate commitment from Sevilla into concrete action on financing for development. The international community needs to reflect deeply on how to use limited financial resources to bring about systemic change. This aid should primarily be a catalyst for engaging private capital inspiring the development of civil society, and strengthening public institutions, including national fiscal systems. Poland supports a cooperation architecture that distinguishes between classic official development assistance and new instruments, while maintaining transparency, coherence, and common goals. I would like to emphasize the importance of 3 areas of actions. First, we need to build resilience. Investing in preventive measures and in addressing the causes of crises is of key importance. We know that prevention is less costly than dealing with the consequences of conflicts and disasters. Second, we need to build innovative partnerships and involve the private sector in the development cooperation. Thirdly, there is a need to reform the development cooperation system by simplifying it and making it more effective. This will also help rebuild trust in the multilateral system. Let me conclude by underlining that financing development is a strategic investment in peace and security in all its dimensions. Thank you very much.

I thank the representative of Poland. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Philippines. Followed by Peru and Burkina Faso.

Thank you, Mr. President. The Philippines welcomes the review of progress under the Sevilla Commitment. This discussion is particularly timely as persistent global challenges, including ongoing political tensions, rising debt vulnerabilities, and climate-related shocks, continue to constrain fiscal space and limit much-needed investments. As we have consistently emphasized, the global financing framework must remain firmly anchored in the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. Domestic efforts alone are not sufficient. They must be complemented by a supportive, equitable, enabling international environment. On domestic public resources, the Philippines underscores that strengthening domestic resource mobilization is central to sustainable development. However, this requires scaled-up, predictable, and demand-driven international support. In this regard, we welcome the commitment under the Compromisos de Sevilla to double support for domestic resource mobilization by 2030. We stress the urgency of translating this commitment into concrete and effective actions. International tax cooperation must also be inclusive and effective, with stronger action to combat illicit financial flows, tax evasion, and corruption, fully consistent with domestic policies and national circumstances. On debt and debt sustainability, we emphasize that current challenges are not driven solely by domestic borrowing practices. They're also the result of external factors, including volatile capital flows, rising global interest rates, and the growing frequency and severity of climate-related disasters. In this context, we underscore the need to integrate climate and disaster risk into debt sustainability analysis to expand access for middle-income countries to liquidity support and debt resolution mechanisms. The Philippines reiterates the critical role of ODA as an essential pillar of the global development architecture. Let us move forward together implementing the Compromiso de Sevilla. Thank you.

I thank the representative of the Philippines. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Peru, followed by Burkina Faso and Armenia.

Muchas gracias, Presidente.

Thank you very much, President. And thank you to the moderator and the panelists and everyone who has participated before Peru's turn. Distinguished participants, public debt in emerging countries is at very high levels as a result of many adverse shocks that required policies for fiscal— and fiscal measures. Events like COVID, have led to an increase in public debt to historically high levels, close to 80% of GDP in many cases, increasing risks to do with fiscal sustainability. In this context, we have a challenging program ahead of us. Perspectives for economic growth are low while interest rates are increasing. There are Structural factors also, like climate change, that require more expenditure on mitigation and adaptation, and also the aging of our populations, also increases, um, in health expenditure and pensions due to aging populations. According to bodies like the IMF, the World Bank, and the OECD, it's urgent to adopt measures in order to safeguard the sustainability of public finances, which includes strengthening fiscal receipts, improving the resilience of public expenditure, and reaching controllable levels of deficits and controlling fiscal rules. In Peru's case, we still have a commitment to align our debt conditions with the strategic financial strategies of the government to provide debt sustainability and macroeconomic stability. Thank you very much.

I thank the representative of Peru.

To the distinguished representative of Burkina Faso, followed by Armenia and Azerbaijan.

President, the question of debt and international cooperation and the mobilization of domestic resources are at the heart of sustainable financing. Burkina Faso is particularly concerned by the evolution of public debt in developing countries, which reduces budgetary space and limits the capacity for investment in priority development sectors. In a context marked by multiple crises and a need to rethink debt management mechanisms to make it more just, more transparent, and better adapted to the realities of countries experiencing fragility, my country then calls for the creation of effective restructuring mechanisms and the strengthening of prevention provisions for overindebtedness. President, in terms of international cooperation, Burkina Faso would like to underscore the importance of aligning external support with national priorities. Cooperation should be based on mutual respect, transparency, and accountability. It should also move towards more balanced forms of partnerships, giving latitude to beneficiary countries to sovereignly define their development priorities and lead policies related to that. We're also convinced that mobilization of domestic resources is a fundamental pillar for homegrown development, and therefore we are pursuing our efforts to strengthen our tax system, improve financial governance, and optimize public resource management. Satisfying results have been seen in terms of domestic resource mobilization, and this shows how relevant these focus is. International cooperation should be adapted to our priorities, particularly to address insufficiencies of our own resources and support development ambitions and counter illicit financial flows. To conclude, Burkina Faso considers that financing for development should ensure a balance between mobilizing domestic resources and external support.

The speaker's microphone has been cut off.

Thank you, the representative of Burkina Faso. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Armenia, followed by Azerbaijan and Pakistan.

Honorable Chair, Excellencies, dear colleagues, the global financing environment remains challenging, with persistent gaps and growing pressures continuing to constrain progress towards sustainable development. From Armenia's perspective, these trends highlight the need for a more coherent and balanced response across the financing for development Rising borrowing costs and increased exposure to external shocks continue to narrow fiscal space, even in countries where debt vulnerabilities remain manageable. This underscores the importance of not only strengthening debt management capacities but also advancing systematic efforts to reduce the cost of capital and improve access to affordable long-term financing. In this regard, enhancing transparency, promoting responsible borrowing and lending, and advancing more forward-looking approaches to creditworthiness remain critical. At the same time, declining concessional flows and increasing fragmentation underscore the need to strengthen effectiveness and coherence of international development cooperation. Support must be better aligned with national priorities, scaled up through targeted technical assistance, and responsive to the specific needs of countries in special situations, including landlocked and middle-income countries facing structural vulnerabilities. We also reform— domestic resource mobilization remains central to sustainable development financing. Armenia continues to advance reforms aimed at strengthening tax administration, improve expenditure efficiency, and enhancing fiscal transparency. These efforts are essential for building resilience and supporting long-term development objectives. At the same time, scale-up of well-designed public-private partnerships can play an important role in crowding in private investment, particularly when aligned with national priorities and supported in appropriate de-risking instruments. Thank you.

I thank the representative of Armenia. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Azerbaijan, followed by Pakistan and Sudan.

Excellencies, distinguished delegates, aligned with the spirit of the CVAO commitment on financing for development, I would like to highlight Azerbaijan's experience and contribution in this field. Azerbaijan has successfully transformed itself from a recipient country in the early 1990s into an emerging donor since the the early 2000s, despite the significant challenges faced during the early years of its independence. Today, international development assistance is an integral part of our foreign policy, contributing to global prosperity, supporting international peace and cooperation, and mobilizing resources for commitment to global efforts in financing sustainable development. To better respond to growing global needs, Azerbaijan established the Azerbaijan International Development Agency under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2011. Through AIDA, Azerbaijan has provided humanitarian and development assistance to more than 140 countries, totaling nearly $350 million. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Azerbaijan supported over 80 countries, allocated $25 million to address urgent needs. We have also prioritized human capital development, providing scholarships to students and training programs for public officials from developing countries. Following the successful presidency of COP29, we have expanded our support to small island developing states. Azerbaijan's experience underscores the value of South-South cooperation and reflects our growing role as a reliable development development partner. By sharing best practices, we can also collectively advance sustainable development. Our ASAKHEDMAT model, now implemented in more than 30 countries, stands as a strong example of how innovative and cost-efficient public service delivery can support effective governance and—

I thank the representative of Azerbaijan. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative

Thank you, Mr.

Chair. We thank the presenters for their valuable insights. The discussions today reaffirm that debt remains one of the most pressing development challenges of our time. We welcome the various initiatives emerging from CIVIA, including the CIVIA Forum on Debt, and thank Spain for its leadership. We also appreciate the progress towards the United Nations Framework Convention on International Cooperation in Tax Matters. Mr. President, at this crucial stage, our collective focus should be on the full, timely, and effective implementation of all commitments agreed in Sevilla. Pakistan had the privilege to serve as the Vice Chair of the Working Group in the establishment of the Borrowers Platform alongside Egypt and with secretariat support from UNCTAD. The platform was launched last week. We were pleased to see broad participation at the launch and strong support from the Secretary-General. The platform fills a long-standing gap by creating a structured space for borrowers, enabling peer learning, exchange of national experiences, stronger technical capacities, and a more informed collective borrower voice. We hope the platform will move swiftly into an effective operational phase With support from all partners. At the same time, we must move swiftly on the intergovernmental process on debt agreed in Sevilla. This was an important collective commitment. As a first practical step, the dialogue under the process should be convened without delay to chart the way forward. We believe that at this stage our collective focus should be on avoiding any backtracking from the commitments made in Sevilla and advancing their full and timely implementation. Thank you.

I thank the representative of Pakistan, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Sudan, followed by Mexico and AFRODAT.

Thank you, Mr. President, Excellency, distinguished delegates. Sudan aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the LDCs Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and appreciate the fruitful, useful insights by the panelists. In the context of international development, Sudan underscores the importance of its effectiveness, not as a technical objective, but as a dispensable prerequisite for the success of the financing for development agenda. At a time of acute global and national pressure, it is essential that all available resources are utilized strategically. To deliver tangible and inclusive outcomes. This requires strengthening national ownership, aligning external support with state priorities, enhancing coordination among partners, and reducing fragmentation. Transparency, accountability, and a strong focus on results must guide our collective efforts to ensure that financing translates into real progress on sustainable development. In the context of Sudan, where war has severely impacted institutions, livelihood, and basic services delivery, the need for development efficiency is even more critical. Limited resources must be directed toward life-saving interventions while also preserving core state functions and building resilience. Sudan calls for a flexible, predictable, and context-sensitive model that bridges humanitarian, development, and peace efforts reinforce national systems, and prioritize the needs of the most vulnerable. By enhancing development effectiveness in fragile and conflict-affected settings, we can help restore stability, support recovery, and lay the foundation for lasting peace and sustainable development.

I thank you.

I thank the representative of Sudan. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico. Followed by the African Forum and Network on Debt and Development and Reality of Aid Network.

Mexico would like to thank you for these very interesting presentations from the panel. We'd like to share our views on the implementation of the Seville Commitment. The topics covered clearly show that challenges are not conceptual but more operational. So how can we ensure that these 3 pillars really allow states to properly finance sustainable development? Debt viability should not be looked at in isolation. We should also look at its impact on budgetary room for maneuver for public policy so that we can have— there is enough budget for health, education, climate, because otherwise there's much less room for maneuver. International cooperation will only be effective truly if it can strengthen national capacity. Therefore, systems that are more flex— need to be more flexible, and they need to have participation of countries and better long-term coordination and long-term Of course, we need to understand it's not simply a budgetary or fiscal aim. It's the root, the foundation of our economy and our development strategies. In this context, Mexico believes that we should strengthen the link between these 3 aspects, and it's fundamental to have a better capacity for planning and investment, public investment.

concrete impacts on the development of people. Thank you.

The Chair thanks Mexico.

Thank you very much, Mr. President. I speak on behalf of the Civil Society Financing for Development Mechanism. I begin by giving an analogy of a boa constrictor, which is a large nonvenomous snake known for killing its prey through coiling itself around the prey and constricting it to death. This is exactly the situation developing countries find themselves in, with global debt levels reaching a record $102 trillion as of 2024, decreasing ODA, increasing debt servicing costs exceeding expenditure to sectors such as health and education, and the current shocks countries face as a result of the war. In addition to constricting social spending, domestic borrowing is constricting financing for domestic businesses and creating a domestic debt balloon that will pop. Accessing finance requires fiscal space to repay and having a development pathway. This cannot happen if countries face risks of credit rating downgrades amidst the prevailing global wars. To prevent a deepening debt crisis in Africa, stop the war, stop expansionist military funding, top up ODA commitments, and deliver another package of debt relief, which includes debt service suspension and halt in credit rating. The debt burden is as a result of a financial architecture that continues to prioritize the interests of creditors over the people. It is not fit for purpose and needs urgent reform. We need to see an urgent commitment from countries to find ways to deliver unconditional debt cancellation. Further, solutions that have been provided, like the G20 Common Framework, fall short as they dominate— are dominated by creditors, unlikely to reform a system that serves its interests. We therefore welcome the launch of the borrowers' platform that will strengthen coordination by gaining power and technical capacity in sovereign debt negotiations. We support the adoption of the Common Africa Position on Debt by the Africa Union member states as a negotiation strategy and united front before creditors and other—

I thank the representative of AFRODAT. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of

Thank you.

Current global finance mechanisms, principles, and institutions do not guarantee reliable, sustainable, and sufficient access to international liquidity, much less a stable and equitable financial environment that fosters growth driven by development investment. External debt pressures have constrained public investment, limiting countries' ability to finance growth, strengthen resilience, and achieve sustainable development. In the area of sovereign debt, its treatment has been characterized by the absence of universally agreed common principles or forums for its negotiations. It is essential to establish a multilateral mechanism based on the universally agreed principles and rules designed to facilitate negotiations and renegotiations on sovereign debt. The United Nations General Assembly in this case is the appropriate body to have this kind of debates, as it's the only inclusive multilateral and democratic forum with the legitimate— the legitimacy and competence to discuss and agree on a multilateral legal framework to address sovereign debt crises. In this regard as well, we welcome the launch of the Borrowers Platform on on April 15th, which allowed developing countries to have a space to improve coordination and amplify their collective voice in debates on global debt. Thank you so much, Mr. President.

I thank the representative of Cuba. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Reality of Aid Network.

Thank you, Chair. I am delivering this statement on behalf of the CSO FFD mechanism. Much has been said about the latest OECD data that shows that in 2025, only $14.3 billion or 0.26% of the total GNI of donor countries have been committed. Let that simmer. Notwithstanding the efforts of IDC actors and institutions following Compromiso, how we respond starting today should be revisited given the current context. First, the push for private capital, blended finance, and other financing mechanisms through IFIs to close the financing gap shifts the narrative of aid from an obligation to an investment scheme, which risks aid being utilized to generate profits and advance private sector interests instead. Second, donor countries' own interests are becoming clearer by day. Slashing aid budgets to ramp up military budgets, for instance, is increasing. Moreover, the post-war reconstruction, while must be supported, should not be the reason for eating up life-saving budgets for LDCs, particularly for Sub-Saharan Africa. This huge financing imbalance should be addressed. Aid is still a necessary and relevant form of financing to help nations and communities toward their own sustainable development, especially in the middle of today's global crisis that show the importance of having national industries. In this regard, we put forward some specific recommendations. First, for donor countries to uphold the 0.7% GNI ODA commitment as stated in paragraph 36 of the compromiso, as well as development effectiveness principles. Second, redirect military and defense budgets and increase public financing to basic and life-saving social services such as education, health, and agriculture, and gender transformative

I thank the representative of Reality of Aid Network.

Unfortunately, we come to the end of our allotted time. I thank our distinguished presenters for their substantive contributions and delegations for participating in a productive exchange of views. I now briefly pause the meeting and invite the panelists in the next discussion to take their seats on the podium. Please remain seated.

Thanks.

Again, good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The Forum will now resume its consideration of Sub-item D of Agenda Item 2 to hold a panel discussion on international financial architecture and systemic issues, with the focus on fostering financial system integrity innovation, and stability across credit ratings and cross-border payments. I'm pleased— I'm pleased to welcome our distinguished presenter for these discussions. I also welcome the moderators, Mr. Frank Van Gansbeek, Executive Scholar in Residence at Middlebury College in Vermont, who will conduct the discussion. I look forward— I look forward to an open, constructive, and productive exchange of views. Mr. Ban, you have the floor.

Thank you so much.

Thank you, thank you so much, Chair. Good morning to you all, good afternoon or good evening wherever you're taking us from, online or in person. It is an absolute pleasure to host this panel. And first of all, I would like to give the chair— sorry, the floor to the person who's going to be introducing the summary of the rating agency proceedings. Thank you, Mr.

Chair.

Mr. President, dear moderator, Distinguished colleagues, I'm pleased to have this opportunity to present a summary of the ECOSOC Special Meeting on Credit Ratings, which, which I chaired as Vice President of ECOSOC. On 30th of March 2026, the Economic and Social Council convened its first-ever Special Meeting on Credit Ratings here at United Nations Headquarters in New York. This meeting was mandated in the Sevilla Commitment to continue and strengthen dialogue on and with credit rating agencies and marks one of the key actions in the Sevilla Commitment to build a more development-oriented international financial architecture. The discussion focused on 3 closely linked themes: the relationship between credit ratings and the cost of capital, the methodologies and the time horizons underspinning ratings, and the capacity of developing countries to engage effectively with ratings and assessment. These themes respond directly to the Sevilla Commitment mandate and lay the foundation for a sustained multi-year ECOSOC dialogue. For the first time, ECOSOC brought together the 3 major credit rating agencies alongside member states, international institutions, African Union staff working on the Africa Credit Rating Agency, private sector actors, academia, and civil society for a direct and open exchange. This diversity of perspectives enriched the discussion but also highlighted the complexity of the issues at stake. Participants stressed that developing countries increasingly rely on private markets for financing while facing rising borrowing costs and growing debt vulnerabilities. This has raised the silence of concerns around credit ratings, which play an important role in the development finance landscape. Ratings shape investor perceptions and influence access to finance. Sovereign credit ratings have an impact on the broader cost of capital across economies due to the sovereign ceiling. During the meeting, concerns were were expressed that current methodologies may not fully capture country contexts and that short-term horizons may undermine long-term investments, with implications for borrowing costs, financial stability, and sustainable development progress. Let me briefly highlight the key messages that emerged. First, it was widely recognized that Credit ratings are only one component of a broader architecture. Participants emphasized the need for a more inclusive and responsive international system. Addressing high costs of capital will require reforms to the international financial architecture, debt contracts and restructuring mechanisms, and stronger global financial safety nets. Second, there was broad agreement on the need to strengthen data and transparency. Better data, greater transparency, and especially clearer communication from borrowing countries can help reduce information asymmetries, support more accurate risk assessment, and improve the economic and risk narratives of developing countries. Several participants underlined the need for stronger debt transparency and improved debt management practices. At the same time, participants also stressed that engagement with credit rating agencies should be understood as a two-way process. While countries need to strengthen their data systems and communication, rating agencies also need to deepen their understanding of country contexts and broaden their engagement with stakeholders, including calls for greater transparency, especially of the qualitative component of ratings. Third, many participants, particularly from developing countries, emphasized that current methodologies may not adequately reflect economic fundamentals, growth potential, or resilience. Overreliance on conventional indicators, such as growth of gross domestic product, can lead to mispricing of risk. Rating agencies noted that the time horizon follows that of many investors who have a short-term outlook, and that the demand for short-term assessment will persist. Nonetheless, participants, including long-term investors, issued a strong call for more long-term and forward-looking approaches which could complement short-term ratings. The meeting heard from the credit rating agencies about the progress that has been made on revising methodologies including through the integration of climate-related risks and default data from NDB datasets into rating agency reports. In addition, rating agencies noted that they are beginning to use scenario analysis to complement the short-term analysis. The IMF presented on its efforts to incorporate a longer-term perspective, including investment in resilience, into the debt sustainability framework. Fourth, let me also note the importance of diversity and inclusiveness in the rating ecosystem. Initiatives such as regional and national rating agencies, including the Africa Credit Rating Agency, were highlighted as complementary efforts that can provide more granular and context-specific insights. A 5th key message relates to capacity. Many developing countries continue to face significant constraints in producing timely and comprehensive data and in engaging effectively with the rating process. Strengthening institutional capacity, improving coordination across national authorities, and developing clear and credible communication strategies were identified as essential steps. Emerging initiatives such as the BORIS Platform were highlighted as promising avenues to support dialogue, peer learning, and collective engagement among countries. Excellencies, the discussions made clear that improving the functioning of credit rating systems is not only a technical issue; it is a component of a broader effort to build a more effective and development-oriented international financial architecture. Structured dialogue between borrowers and financial market actors, including rating agencies, supported by robust data and strengthened capacity, can contribute to market actors better understanding country realities and long-term plans. There was strong support for sustaining this dialogue and building on the momentum generated. ECOSOC has decided to convene this special meeting on a biennial basis. As the first meeting under the mandate of the Sevilla Commitment, the March 2026 discussion provided an important foundation for continued engagement and for advancing practical reforms. I thank you.

His Excellency, thank you so much. His Excellency, Mr. Panayotis Hofanisian, Vice President of also had the word. Thank you so much for those concluding remarks. Excellencies, distinguished guests, I think it's my pleasure right now to lead this moderation. In order to set the landscape of what this is— pretty rather complex material, so I'm trying to combine the elements of rating agency considerations with the global payments infrastructure— I would like to share some introductory slides. And if everything is working well right here, so we'll kick off with what the Sevilla Commitment has actually recommended, is to focus on paragraph 55 on credit rating agency practices and then paragraph 57 on cross-border payment infrastructure. Here we have at the moment, also from the lens of of the global systemic risk, courtesy of the Network for Greening Financial System, a diagram deflecting and depicting on the left-hand side the variables at bay, where we have medium-term climate and nature risk related, and on the short-term, AI shadow and geopolitical kind of concerns, which are pretty blatant. We have a transmission mechanism And ultimately, this is impacting the financial risk, specifically liquidity risk and operational risk impacting the global payment infrastructure, and then credit risk where credit rating agencies operate as a proxy, as a gauge for that counterparty risk. If these risks are not mitigated, we have an exposure to global systemic risk. And by the way, I'm more than happy to provide those slides desk, you know, for the public for your perusal. Next, we have as one of the recommendations also in paragraph 55, the recommendations to foster the findings and recommendations from the G20 roadmap for enhancing the cross-border payments. They are looking into cross-border payments, but CBDCs, so central bank digital currencies in all shapes and formats, as you know, in China, digital euro and in naira in Nigeria. But we also have this emerging systemic risk in what is called the re-time gross settlement risk, so these are the intraday exposures that exist in settling these payments within the respective currencies. Part of it is also the insurance industry, a tipping point. What happens if one of these insurance companies would collapse or some of the players would collapse? That trigger in terms of systemic risk. Now, another setting the landscape. What are we talking about in global payment infrastructure in terms of ecosystem? We have clearing systems on the left-hand side as is. We have emerging global payment infrastructures with the BRICS Pay, with CBDC. And on the right-hand side, we have the counterparty risk. So these are the roles the rating agencies play in order to capture the counterparty risk. We have S&P and Moody's, the China Shenzhen Credit Ratings, GCR, but also as part of our panel member here, African Peer Review Mechanism. In the crypto, there is no such counterparty risk, just for reference. But we do see that central banks and the infrastructure are becoming more important in terms of resiliency. In context, in numbers, what are we talking about? What is at stake? What are some of the numbers? This is courtesy of the BIS, Bank for International Settlements Innovation Hub. There's an Agora project that's going on. So we have payments in the cards and then the remittances, about $1 trillion each. We have the correspondent banking, which are the clearing settlements of banks that are undertaking that in their respective currencies, to about $125 trillion. So for reference sake, global GDP is about $110 trillion. And then forex, so the buying and selling, which is taking place here a couple of miles away in Wall Street or in London or in Singapore for that matter, we're talking about $1,500 trillion on an annual basis, right? So this is about 15 times global GDP in numbers. Next, we go into the infrastructure. So again, we have on the left-hand side fiat currencies, we have emergence of the CBDC, and the CBDC is hinging on the cybersecurity, big data, semiconductor chips, but also in the individuals, as we're talking in the developing worlds, but also the concerns of the individual. How are these developments impacting the impact of the privacy or the surveillance for the individual? How can those concerns be mitigated? The recommendations are underneath by the G20 roadmap, safer, faster, and cheaper and more inclusive payments execution. Next, we're moving into rating agencies. So the question has already been recommended by His Excellency in the recommendations, you know, to what extent are these rating agencies' gauges— are they not only short-term but also long-term? To what extent do they include choke points, and are they supply chain-proof with respect to food, energy, fertilizer? To what extent have we a fuller picture and are we integrating those dimensions? Next, and this is more emerging, to what extent do we have natural capital and also nature of value at risk? And here I would like to underscore the work that has been undertaken by Professor Nicola Ranger at Oxford University. How can we make rating agencies more holistic, and to what extent is ensuing cost of debt reflecting true potential? Next, what are some of the challenges? We have here the global emerging markets database that's been run and managed by the globe, by the World Bank. To what extent could those be integrated into the rating agencies' methodologies? Secondly, already referenced, how can we integrate nature to sovereign debt markets? We have increased satellite imagery. We have emerging natural carbon sink capacity software that could capture all those elements. To what extent could we integrate them into the overall rating agency practices? But last but not least, we have actually experienced in 2007-2008 a major collapse into the global financial markets as a result of synthetic leverage around subprime mortgages. To what extent also do we have the guardrails in place to avoid a repetition of this occurrence with synthetic leverage this time around private credit. This is a major, major concern also there. I would like to leave you to conclude my remarks with this slide. This is courtesy of Bodo Elmers, but here you see reflecting the cost of capital or the cost of debt of sovereign risks for the years 2020 to 2025. You see the evolution here from the US, 2.8, all the way up to Africa, 9.8. paid, right? So this is almost like 3.5 times a multiple of those cost of debt for going into the market. Question, rhetorical in nature, are rating agencies causal to this trend, and is this reflective of all available facts? All right, this concludes my introductory remarks to set the landscape. With this, I would like to now invite my After the introduction of my panel members. And so now I introduce the panel members in the sequence by which they will speak. So first of all, it's Ms. Laura Moisa.

Where is she?

On the right-hand side. Yes. So, member of the Board of Directors of the Bank of the Republic of Colombia. Then we have online Dr. Mishek Moutissé, Researcher, African Peer Review Mechanism. Then we have, on my right, Bill Foster, Senior Vice President, Sovereign Risk Group of Moody's Ratings. Then we have William Roos, on my extreme right, Managing Director, Corporate Strategy at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Then we have also online From Abu Dhabi, Andreas Jobst, who is Chief Monetary Policy of the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates and research affiliate with the University of Cambridge. And then we have, to my extreme left, Mr. Jesse McWaters, Executive Vice President and Head of Global Policy at MasterCard, the credit card company. And last but not least, the distinguished Mr. José Antonio Ocampo, Professor of Professional Practice in International Public Affairs at Columbia University and member of the Committee of— sorry, of Development Policy. So what we're going to do next is I'll offer the floor to each of the panel members to address some introductory remarks. In order to guide their introductory remarks, I have shared with them some questions, so I'll share off and I'll kick off with the first one. For Dr. Laura Moyser. There is widespread agreement by UN member states on the urgency for multilateral oversight of the oligopoly of the 3 rating agencies: S&P, Moody's, and Fitch. So how could this be addressed as it relates to the developing world? Which global regulatory body should assume this oversight here? Second question: to promote more widespread competition among these 3 global rating agencies and to promote competition? You know, what are some of the initiatives at play? And thirdly, regarding systemic thinking, could supply chain chokepoints and natural capital, the full array of tropical rainforests, mangroves acting as natural carbon sink of Earth system buffers, be included in the sovereign risk assessment, and if so, how? Dr. Moisa, the floor is yours.

A very good morning. First of all, thank you very much for the invitation extended to me to attend this very key and important space. I'd also like to just underscore the presence of Colombians here, especially Our colleague here, who we've Professor Campo Ocampo, who we've learned a lot from in the past. Now, this is my personal position, not the position of the central bank or its board. Now, in terms of the international financial system and the high concentration, I think the compromiso de Sevilla. Touches on the most important points. This is a general situation in terms of risk assessment. We have a highly concentrated international financial system with just one way of assessing growth and development. Now, this structure defines measures that The fact is that many of our nations in our region have huge resources that are extremely important for the future of nations and humanity. Now, this situation creates huge inequalities in macroeconomic evaluations, and it's necessary to look at the resources that states have. and fund them. So a lot of developing countries have to ask for loans for— to fulfill their basic needs, not even for development or to engage in productive transformations or systemic transformations. And this creates inequalities between countries. Now, in this regard, the concentration of the financial system in general and Credit rating in general are not in line with the concrete reality of countries, but these are unified models that don't take account of the important efforts being made by our nations. Now, it's necessary for important voices to be listened to. Countries with peripheral economic systems like ours have issues with the fundamentals of macroeconomics. Now, for example, we can have 2 options on how to use these resources, and one could be growing in the way that we define growth today in terms of the markets and production. This, for countries like Colombia, means that we have to produce using biological systems that are important for humanity like the Amazon and use that to produce food to sell on the international markets. However, this has future impacts not only in terms of climate change. It also generates conflicts and also leads to a vicious circle. We can also go another way and we hope this is the one that we will be able to take and this is to protect these natural resources and to protect the development um, of our country, our— in line with our traditions and our ancestral knowledge, our collective communities. And this would mean stopping production. We'd then have to ask for loans or resort to fiscal income— that's also very complicated— in order to engage in new development. So a productive transformation that thinks more about ecological development and on social development is extremely expensive for countries that don't have resources. So therefore, this would require fiscal pressure, pressure on the fiscal system, and, um, we'd be penalized in our credit ratings. And this has happened to a lot of our countries, and of course that incurs higher costs. So we need to break the vicious circle, and we have 2 options. Right now, and we're seeing that the international financial system creates vicious circles and imbalances. And so therefore, breaking these circles requires us to change the metrics on measuring risks and understanding that these are— can be turned into important opportunities for assessing the future. Now, this brings me to the second question, and that's the importance of creating regional mechanisms and agreements to assess these things from a regional perspective, so proposing coordination between different regions and generating more horizontal financial systems rather than vertical ones. And the UN has an important example. That's the creation of the economic councils for different regions, in particular CEPAL. That has a proposal for Latin America on a new path for development, and the same goes for the African agency that is looking at how different regions can engage in processes that really assess our realities and qualify our risks from the point of view of our realities. Now, in terms of policy, we need to make sure that the work that countries do in order to safeguard the future of all nations is valued. And I think that we are not underdeveloped countries. What we are is countries with huge capacities for development. However, just not in terms of the current metrics for development. We need to measure assets that are not part of the market. Colombia is like— Colombia has developed alternatives to GDP like environmental GDP or care, for example. 20% of our GDP accounts for— care accounts for 20% of our GDP, and this causes an imbalance too. And just one more quick point. I'll round off now. I think in these spaces we need to take a look at these satellite accounts and include them in our risk assessments and credit ratings, and this is important to create a more collective and horizontal system. Thank you.

Thank you.

Thank you very much.

Thank you, Dr. Moisa. So, I would like to invite our other panel members to respect the 5 minutes allotted time, so in the benefit for all the participants, but also for the other— for the upcoming interactive dialogue. So, with that, we'll move online to South Africa, to Dr. Mishek Muthisi. And so, again, in a similar vein, the question is, promote more widespread competition. Can you please also comment on the forays that African peer review mechanism is undertaking in order to establish that broader competition? And what is the differentiating business model that is embraced by the African peer review mechanism? Secondly, currently we are agnostic, so we are in the rating methodology, we are not assigning value to the natural capital assets, as was already alluded to by Dr. Moyes' contribution. So how could integrating those broader assets entail enhanced rating outcomes for the emerging markets, and how could this be done? And thirdly, a more technical question but also relevant here: how could rating agencies assess adherence to the negative pledge with loans provided to the World Bank and to the IMF? So the negative pledge is a condition by which, you know, the countries The debtor countries are prohibited of securing assets prior to honoring the loans under the preferred— preferential creditor status of the World Bank and the IMF. The floor is yours, Dr. Mishek.

Thank you.

Thank you very much for inviting me to participate in this very important discussion. It's quite a loaded question, and I will try and address every bit of it in the 5 minutes. So the African Peer Review Mechanism is a specialized entity of the African Union, and part of our mandate is supporting good governance. And within that, there is a specialized program where I sit, where we support African countries to improve their ratings. So that's the context where the idea of establishing an Africa credit rating agency emerged, but it did emerge as a necessity to provide alternative views to the Big Three, which I think has been well articulated in the openings and the prior interventions. So I'll just point out a few practical instances that has necessitated this idea to be legitimate needs to have an alternative view, part of which are very recent occurrences which we cover under our support to member states program. Perhaps I will start with that. 3 weeks ago, We had a report by the SNP in which they reported several errors or instances of failure to pay attention, and one of the most material observations that anyone could observe is that they could not locate the— or they could not identify the difference between Uganda and Burundi. on the map, and the map they used had several, uh, uh, missings which, uh, anyone could be outraged if they have interest in that. And this, as much as it looks like a negligible error, but you look at Uganda being rated by S&P since 2008, and if researchers sitting in an institution like S&P are not able to identify the location of the country they have been rating for so long, then it's a cause for concern. Then I'll move to another instance that we have been engaging quite extensively, which involves Ghana, Zambia, and one of the multilateral development banks in Africa called the Africa Export-Import Bank. And we have been raising quite substantial concerns on the rating action by Fitch, which we had substantial contestation on the basis of that rating. You did mention, I think, several observations on— from the recommendations of the Sevilla Forum that we need to put more work to make sure that engagements with the rating agencies is a two-way engagement. That's a very fair recommendation. But we have found challenges from the Big 3 rating agencies that inasmuch as there is effort to keep the two-way engagements with the Big 3 going, in many instances they just ignore some of the submissions or the engagements that African countries try to do with them. I will refer specifically to this engagement by Ghana and Fitch, as well as Zambia. Because Fitch downgraded Afreximbank on the basis of an IMF report on the observation which involves the component that you have just mentioned on the preferred creditor status. And our objection on this rating action was not about the preferred creditor status itself, but it was on the basis of an assumption that was contained in the report of the IMF. And our biggest concern was that Fitch made such a rating action without consulting the country's that were involved and made conclusive rating action, which led to also withdrawal of that rating action. And such ratings, in, in as much as they don't have a substantial basis which is verifiable, they do move the market, and investors are always on a cautious mode, and that has a serious impact on the cost of capital in the stakeholders that are concerned. I can go as much as I can on several instances, one of which I think, example that I'll mention, is involving Kenya. Kenya last year was— it had a program of a bond buyback which was completely derailed by a Moody's analyst that made a commentary on Bloomberg that if such a bond buyback would happen, they would interpret it as a depressed bond buyback. And that commentary, inasmuch as it was in a newspaper, but it sent signals to the market and the bond went out of rail and Kenya could not implement such a bond buyback. So these are some of the instances that raise the concern that we need to have institutions that also perform ratings to provide investors with alternative ratings. And in Africa, in the African Peer Review Mechanism, inasmuch as we have a mandate to support the establishment of an African rating agency, and holding all things constant, we hope that By June this year, the institution will be issuing its first ratings. We also support other smaller African rating agencies. At the moment, we have a total of 9 of them that are quite active on the domestic capital market as part of our broader mandate to develop or to support the growth of the domestic ratings industry. It was quite concerning that a few—

Mr. Muthisi, could I ask for your concluding remarks, please, in the interest of time?

Thank you.

Let me finish with this point that Moody's acquired one of Africa's largest rating agencies, which is GCR. As well, as much as this is a welcome development, but we did think that it constrained the drive of having a widened opinion space and also to support the development of domestic financial markets. Let me pause here.

Thank you so much, Dr. Motise. With that, we'll move to Bill Foster, on my right-hand side. Mr. Foster, the Global Emerging Markets Risk Database, known colloquially as the GEM database, is often referred to as the most eminent and holistic database regarding emerging markets. What is holding credit rating agencies back to tap into that database? Secondly, to rate a country's debt position, how do you ensure you have the full creditor position? How do you view the intent to consolidate existing debt databases into a global central debt data registry under the umbrella of the World Bank? And the third question, developing countries' external debt burden reached about $12 trillion, $12,000 billion as of 2024. Last week at the Spring Meetings, the Borrowers Platform under the leadership of Pakistan and Vietnam and with the endorsement of Prime Minister Mia Mottley was launched. As a rating agency, what would be your preliminary recommendations to this new platform. Could I kindly ask you also to stay within the 5 minutes, please, contributed? Thank you so much. The floor is yours.

Thank you very much.

Can you—

yeah, wonderful. I will be efficient with my remarks. Thank you very much. First of all, it's an honor to be here. Thank you very much for having us as part of this important discussion. To answer your first question regarding the GEMS database, it's very important upfront to state what the difference between the GEMS database is, which reflects the track record of performance of loans and guarantees from MDBs, multilateral development banks, to sovereign nations and private sector debt. GEMS is used for MDB loan performance as a measurement, but not for private sector debt, which is a different metric altogether, and there's more risk for private creditors. So we don't use it for, obviously, for private debt. But I have good news to share with regards to the GEMS. Historically, we have not had access to the database. More recently, we did secure access to it, and we have greater transparency from MDBs themselves individually on their track record of performance with sovereigns. And what we've been able to do this year And later this year, we're going to roll out officially a new methodology for MDB ratings. We've been able to use that information to better assess the preferred creditor status of MDBs, looking specifically at the performance, default track record, and recovery rates for sovereigns in the portfolios of MDBs. And we've basically been able to track that to much better uplift and preferred creditor status for lowly rated sovereigns when the loans are coming from MDBs. The result of this ultimately will be higher capital adequacy scores for MDBs across the spectrum that benefit from PCS. So this is going to be an important change to our methodology, and ultimately it's leveraging the GEMS database. On your second question regarding how do we track various obligations across different creditors. Obviously, we're all familiar with the challenges related to that. That's something that, you know, really came to the fore with the G20 Common Framework. But ultimately, our first starting point obviously is the official data from governments. We have a very open and transparent relationship with all of the governments that we cover in the sovereign rating spectrum. We cover over 140 countries. We visit each country each year, once a year, and then we also have virtual meetings throughout whenever there's a need to do so with those countries. So whenever we have questions or they have questions, we always communicate. But we use the official sources for the debt and data. We also use the multilateral sources from the World Bank and the IMF, as well as private sector sources through things like the BIS and financial system obligations that can be tracked that way. In addition, we need to look at other potential contingent liabilities. So we look at state-owned enterprise debt, for example. We try to track collateralized obligations that are resource-backed, et cetera. And of course, the challenge sometimes is when you have arrears that are not disclosed or if you have other hidden debt. That becomes more problematic. But that's really based on our— the issuer and the various— you know, hopefully the transparency is there for those discussions. But if there is an issue we reflect related to transparency, we want to reflect that in how we assess sovereign ratings, either through assessments of fiscal policy effectiveness, the government liquidity risk, or institutional strength, particularly for fiscal policy. What do we think about the potential for a global centralized database? I think it's obviously a very good idea if it addresses the issue of the opacity of debt obligations and can bring together a more comprehensive, transparent picture of those obligations. That would be obviously welcome for all creditors, but there are challenges related to privacy, governance, and other issues that are very real, but this is certainly a public good that the global community is working toward to try to address. Finally, your question about the recently announced borrowers' platform. Again, this is a wonderful— has wonderful potential. I would say the things we'll be watching with regards to its effectiveness will really relate to 3 things. First, transparency. To what extent will it improve transparency? Transparency for debt obligations and, you know, achieve similar outcomes as we were just talking about with regards to centralized database, greater transparency across, you know, what other obligations there may be outstanding outside of just the direct obligations of the government, but other obligations that might be less obvious for state-owned enterprise contingent liabilities, et cetera. Very good for creditors and for the countries to focus on. Coordination across borrowers and across creditors, that would be very helpful to ensure that there's more active conversations early on in a potential restructuring process that would allow for better, swifter outcomes and alignment among borrowers and creditors. That would be very helpful. And finally, the credibility that it could potentially bring to debt sustainability frameworks would be meaningful. Thank you very much.

Thank you so much, also for honoring the time commitment. Now we're moving into the more global payments infrastructure space, so we're moving to Mr. Jessel Waters from Mastercard. So the following question is for you. Could you please How do these, in succinct format, impact the key recommendations from the Group of 20 roadmap for enhancing cross-border payments? How can the retail and cross-border remittances be rendered more efficient and at lower cost? So we all know Western Union charging 8% to 10% of a remittance payment. What is MasterCard specifically undertaking here, and does MasterCard have any intent to issue digital currencies. Thirdly, what is the notion that a— we know that there is a notion of a currency that never leaves a country's clearing system, so therefore one is using correspondent banking relationships. The Bank for International Settlements Innovation Hubs Project Agora is attempting to bring innovation in this process. How will it benefit the retail payments in the developing world. The floor is yours.

Thank you very much. It's a great pleasure to be here today. Perhaps first, a little bit of context. Frank said that we're a credit card company. MasterCard is best known for its cards, but within the context of today's discussion, I think it's important to know as well that we operate or provide the software for 13 real-time payment systems around the world. We operate a cross-border Services Group that is able to reach through remittances over 90% of the world's population. And while we have no plans to issue a digital currency, we are actively exploring with its use on our network, trying to find ways that it can make processes, particularly for cross-border payments, remittances, and B2B transfers, more efficient. Cross-border payments sits at the very heart of what Mastercard does. We are at our core a global payments network. And so when in 2020, under the Saudi presidency of the G20, the G20 roadmap for cross-border payments was launched, we were very excited to participate in it and have done so actively. I think that the most important central core to understand about the G20 roadmap is the 3 pillars that underpin its work. Firstly, that is about interoperability and extension, finding ways to align the operating hours of RTGS systems as well as to explore the interlinking of real-time payment systems. Secondly is the legal and regulatory, identifying where non-homogeneous legal and regulatory systems are creating frictions that introduce cost and delays into global payment systems. And then finally, data and messaging standards— identifying opportunities to complete the rollout of the ISO 20022 expanded messaging format, as well as opportunities to align things like API, Application Programming Interface, standards across the global payment system in order to achieve higher rates of straight-through processing for those payments. If you are not spending time day to day in the payments space, that may all have sounded like a lot of nonsense jargon. But what I can tell you is that at the core of that is an appetite to find ways to bring cross-border payments, which often feel like they're stuck in the past, in a world where domestic payments operate in real time, where your card-based payment for an in-person purchase might be accepted anywhere around the world? Why is it that a payment takes so much time, can cost so much, and the progress of that payment can be so uncertain? This is at its core what the G20 roadmap seeks to address. Unfortunately, 6 years into its delivery, the G20 roadmap has an expectation that it will not meet its 2027 targets for cost, transparency, speed, or accessibility. And I think that the reason fundamentally behind that is twofold. On one hand, the G20 roadmap was a little bit too broad in its initial construction. It sought to take all retail payments, everything from a $100 remittance transfer to a grandmother to a $100 million transfer to secure the leasing of a fleet of aircraft as one type of payment. And it was also too narrow. By focusing exclusively on speed and cost, it failed to recognize the importance of safety and security of those payments. And so today, the G20 roadmap finds itself in many ways at a bit of a turning point, seeking to identify how it can continue to pursue its goals by being, in the words of one policymaker at the Spring Meetings last year, more focused, more realistic, and more actionable, looking at the specific challenges facing individual corridors and exploring the importance of coordinated action to defend against fraud and emerging risks to the cybersecurity of payment systems. To Frank's question about where are we seeing progress, I'll point to a couple of items, and I think this is an exciting area where there's opportunities for both the public and the private sector. We've seen the private sector drive the digitization of domestic payments, which counterintuitively is essential for the efficiency of cross-border payments because an enormous portion of the cost and delays in cross-border payments comes in the last-mile delivery. We've seen important work on public-private collaboration, such as Project Agora out of the BIS Innovation Hub, which brings together 7 of the world's most important central banks or largest central banks, as well as over 40 private sector entities. And critically, there's still important work for the public sector to do, particularly around the alignment of regulation. And I would call out in particular the need to deliver harmonization of money laundering and privacy and data protection regulation where we continue to have problematic clashes and challenges. I'll stop here, but happy to dig in more deeply as we move on with the discussion.

Thank you.

Thank you so much, Jesse, and also again for honoring the time allotment. So now it's my pleasure to move to Abu Dhabi online, where we have— and hosting— where we're hosting Andy Jobst. So, Andy, the 3 questions for you. So, how can a developing country benefit from a central bank digital currency? Why would a citizen in the Global South be better off than with a crypto stablecoin, a Bitcoin, or an enhanced domestic real-time payment system? Second question, how can retail central bank digital currencies be offered to the private public at large without triggering surveillance anxiety and privacy infringement? And last but not least, given your location in the United Arab Emirates, and also, thank you, given the considerations there geopolitically, thank you for taking time out here and to be with us. Can you talk about how the current crisis has shaped the assessment of sovereign risk and how changes in the credit rating assessments can influence the evolving payment system. The floor is yours.

Thank you very much, Frank. Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, it's my privilege to be with you. Before I make my remarks, the usual disclaimer applies. I express my personal views and not those of the Central Bank of the UAE. Thank you very much for the questions because they really speak to some core issues around also how the public sector plugs into what Jesse just mentioned regarding the increasing pace of innovation in the private sector regarding digital finance and digital money. But first of all, let's get to the bottom of similarities and differences between CBDCs and other digital currencies like virtual assets, which can be backed by either real value such as stablecoins or nothing such as Bitcoin. What they have in common is that they all serve as digital alternatives to physical money and can be used for various transactions online, in-store, commercially, Peer-to-peer. This offers numerous advantages, including promoting financial innovation, enhancing payment system efficiency— what we just heard about— and increasing financial service accessibility for the marginalized strata of populations. However, the key distinction lies in the fact that CBDCs are direct liabilities of central bank, ensuring a secure and trusted form of public debt. Digital money. In contrast, stablecoins are private digital money. They are privately issued cryptocurrencies designed to maintain a stable value by pegging them to reserve assets such as fiat currencies, the currencies we know, or commodities for that matter. So now that distinction— the distinctions are clear, let's address the challenge before us. As you mentioned earlier, exploring payment systems must consider the vulnerabilities faced by many developing countries. This raises a critical and crucial dilemma: balancing the efficiency and the scale from new digital technologies like CBDCs and stablecoins with building resilience, which may require redundancies that could counter the very efficiency goals we set out to achieve. The interplay between public and private digital money exemplifies how these tensions can be managed effectively. What I would like to propose is a potential framework that would involve public digital money in the form of wholesale CBDC as the trusted settlement backbone, ensuring money singularity, fair value guarantee, and settlement finality to anchor macrofinancial stability. Then we have private digital money such as stablecoins. They can operate downstream, are customer-facing, and utilize programmability for conditional payments and automatic compliance. And lastly, we have retail CBDCs that can occupy the non-monetizable space, offering a common good with minimal transaction costs while user wallets connect directly to the evolving cross-border settlement system for wholesale CBDC. The UAE's central bank digital currency, the digital dirham, for which I had the honor of co-leading the policy work stream, will function exactly like that. This layered approach of combining public digital money and private digital money allows for innovation and efficiency at the periphery while maintaining stability at the core, potentially resolving the efficiency-resilience dilemma I've just illustrated. Importantly, CBDCs can address some challenges such as costly correspondent banking in the Global South, but they cannot eliminate some negative incentives, especially if they are fueled by unregulated private money like Bitcoin. Persistent structural issues we know exist in the payment system exist for the same reasons we also see hoarding of US dollars, for instance, offshore, which have the negative consequence of also undermining monetary policy sovereignty, evading capital controls, concealing transactions, or simply escaping domestic inflation volatility. because the central bank cannot fulfill its financial— its mandate of price stability. Now, to your second question about the anxiety when it comes to retail CBDC. What I'd like to do is acknowledge the common concerns about privacy in relation to retail CBDC. However, advancements in the design of CBDCs have led to a system known as Transaction identifiable, privacy protected. This approach is already in place for the UAE's CBDC, utilizing so-called pseudo-anonymity to safeguard privacy without enabling illicit activities. Additionally, we have a 2-tier distribution model for user wallets, which ensures that the central bank remains separate from the day-to-day transactions involving CBDCs. Now, to wrap up, your last question about— obviously, we're going through a difficult phase in the region. And that has brought home, obviously, a lot of resilience considerations. What the crisis has highlighted is that resilience to physical risks is important, a key component of the payment system infrastructure. In the UAE, for example, we saw damages to data warehouses supporting cloud-based software applications for commercial banks. That was very effective, very swiftly addressed, but similar disruptions could occur related to climate-related natural disasters. You mentioned this wonderful chart by the NGFS, and those can happen anywhere in the world, especially in those places where vulnerabilities are most profound. Therefore, I would suggest revisiting the credit assessment framework to recognize that investment in digital payment infrastructure is really macro-stabilizing and is not just a general financial expense. For many developing countries, there is a fiscal issue because upgrading the payment system—

Adi, can I ask you for your concluding remarks, please?

Yeah.

So we need the international financial institutions and the credit rating agencies to differentiate investment in standards-aligned payment infrastructure that is separate from general fiscal spending. And so in this context, I would appeal to the process of the IMF Article IV consultation, for instance, that could provide a structured transparency benefit for a more effective credit risk assessment if the resilience of the payment system, the expenditure related to improving the resilience thereof, is explicitly recognized. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Andy. So now we're moving to William Roose on the extreme right-hand side. So, William, I think the 2 questions for you: when EBRD, so the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, is advising countries and clients to establish well-functioning local financial markets and global capital markets, could you please talk about the mitigation practices of systemic risk? Secondly, can you talk more about the multilateral development banks' efforts to improve the availability, quality, and accessibility of risk and impact data as contained within the Global Emerging Market Risk Database. William, the floor is yours.

Thank you very much. It's a great pleasure, a great honour to be with all of you. First question, it's about what we do as a multilateral development bank to support countries and clients, strengthening their local financial markets and also the way they interact with the global capital markets. We are trying to address both elements. It's very important, just as an introduction, for domestic savings, to mobilize domestic savings to support long-term investment and to enhance resilience, notably through diversification and a more stable investor base. The way we do that is to have a holistic approach. First, to participate in the local market, to enable benchmark issuance, to strengthen local currency pricing, to broaden the investor participation. What we also do, it's an EBRD specificity, is to develop local currency liquidity pools. So we issue, borrow, and transact within the local markets. We take risk position, maturity transformation, It's a way to understand the bottlenecks and also the fragility and to engage in a policy dialogue and technical assistance. Going to your questions about mitigation and how to mitigate systemic risks, the first thing is we need a strong and clear international framework for the financial sector, because most of our countries where we operate, they are rule-takers, not rule-setters. rulemakers, so the quality of the global architecture is very important. And then the second element is, of course, at local level, is the good regulation, good supervision, good governance, and risk management. Our bankers told us, and colleagues in charge of policy dialogue, it is the best way to mitigate systematic risk. Cybersecurity risks have emerged these last years, and for that, we, as many other institutions, we have developed a cybersecurity team and cybersecurity technical assistance to help identify digital infrastructure risks and vulnerabilities. This is something we do in different countries and which is very important in terms of cybersecurity systemic risk. Regarding your totally different questions about the GEMS database, it comes from 29 major development banks and financial institutions. It integrates more than 3 decades of data. I think you have the sovereign loans, Indeed, it can be used by credit rating agencies to fine-tune the way they rate MDBs. But we provide, and I think it's very important in the context of this discussion, we have also all the default rates, loss-given default, for private sector projects where we don't have the preferred creditor status. It's something where we are, in a way, aligned with the private investors. We are convinced that developing this database could help to reduce the perception regarding the risk. You have some real issues investors are facing, but you have also some perception issues. We think that this database, which is now more granular, with also some statistics associated with that, could really help. Of course, we need to continue to improve this database, to have new categories, etc., but it is, I think, a very useful tool to provide a concrete assessment of the risk when you invest in private sector projects in developing economies, and notably infrastructure projects. It shows that the actual risk is lower than the perceived risk most of the time.

Thank you. Thank you so much. So last but not least, and I think in the interest of time, I'm also inviting to keep within the 5-minute allotments because we want to open up the floor to the distinguished guests here. So, Mr. Ocampo, when MDBs typically maintain AAA ratings from agencies and Moody's and S&P, in what way does that hinder their broader development finance ambitions? Can you also comment on the national development banks' ratings in relation to the MDBs? And then secondly, are rating agencies too conservative in evaluating the MDB balance sheets? The floor is yours.

Thank you very much, but actually let me start by the question that you asked to the other Colombian at the table. Which is on the— to underscore one point that was in the report of the group of international experts that supported the Financing for Development process, which I had the opportunity to chair. And let me say that the basic problem is that the basic problem faced by emerging and developing countries in private capital markets is that they are procyclical. That is, we get lots of money and cheaper money during booms and less money and more expensive during crisis. And let me say that the evidence is that the procyclical pattern of ratings by the credit rating agencies actually worsens the problem. Therefore, we actually recommended that there should be a regulation of the credit rating agencies. Or oversight, as you said in your question, which actually we— and that regulation should emphasize the long-term capacity of countries and agencies to maintain their financing position rather than the short-term situation. And actually, we recommended that the IMF should be in charge of the regulation of the credit rating agencies.

Thank you.

Now, on the first question of the MDBs, I think the— of course, the AAA rating is absolutely essential, but again, it should not be confused with the public sector objectives of multilateral development banks. That should not be an element that should be against the AAA rating, let's say. But in the case of national development banks, we actually, in our report, recommended that there should be standards of regulation which are different from the commercial banks. Today, the commercial— the national development banks are rated or are regulated the same ways as national development banks. They don't take into account actually the fact that they have the public sector support that they actually, you know, reduces the risk and therefore that the capital and liquidity requirements should not be the same as in the national— in the commercial banks. Now, on cross-border payments, let me say that the that one of the big issues is the capacity of countries to maintain regulation of capital flows, or as in the jargon of the IMF, capital flow management, which is a very important point because the short-term flows and the derivatives can actually be very procyclical and therefore should be subject to some regulation by the countries. In that regard, of course, the big question mark is whether the system actually allows in the regulation that task. And let me say that the digital payments, in that regard, given the unregulated character of many regional digital payments, actually worsens the problem and therefore that all the digital transactions should be subject to a stronger regulation generally, like other financial activities. Now, the problem— the one point that should be underscored is the use of the payment agreements among developing countries as one of the targets that should be promoted as part of the stronger South-South cooperation, let's say, in the monetary area. And I think while there are some in place, they could be extended, it could be amplified, and I think that should be part of the stronger South-South cooperation in the monetary area. And actually, finally, the use of the lending in domestic currencies of the countries should be an objective of the multilateral development banks, and I hope that doesn't affect the regulation of the multilateral development banks, because actually that reduces the risk from the point of view of countries, rather than borrowing in foreign currencies. Thank you.

Well, thank you so much. I think, as I said, as the Extensive panel here, so with many contributions. Thank you for those. I would like now to invite the floor for the civil society— no, no, sorry, back to the Vice President, back to you.

Thank you. I wish to thank you, Mr. Van Gansbeke, for skillfully moderating this panel discussion. As usual, the time taken by the panelists— and then I want to thank them— will be more than the time allocated to member states. I now open the floor for the interactive discussion. Delegations wishing to intervene are requested— are invited to request the floor by pressing the button. But, but I would like to remind speakers that unfortunately We will have a time limit of two minutes for individual intervention, and three minutes for delegation making statement on behalf of groups. I now give the floor to the.

Intervention.

Member state first. I want to remind you that it is an intergovernmental conference.

Tuvalu first.

Excellencies, distinguished delegates, the Financing for Sustainable Development Report 2026 highlights some progress since Seville. However, overall progress remains too slow and in some areas is stalling. Macroeconomic headwinds, conflicts, and growing fragmentations are eroding development gains. And weakening resilience, while climate-induced disasters are generating significant economic losses in most vulnerable economies. Meanwhile, financing gaps for the SDGs and climate action continue to widen, pushing SIDS and LDCs further behind. I will make 2 points. First, the international financial architecture designed for a different era continues to fall short in responding to today's realities. Reforms to the IFA must include fundamental realignments of the mandates of the IFIs and MDBs toward development and climate resilience. Credit rating agencies' methodologies must be calibrated to capture the nuances of climate vulnerabilities and investment in resilience building, drawing on national experiences. Second, we caution against the size phase of approaches to enhancing global transparency and data exchange framework and unintentionally penalize SIDS and LDCs. In particular, the implementation of AML/CFT requirements has continued to widespread debanking, placing some SIDS and LDCs, including Tuvalu, at risk of exclusion from the international payment system.

Excellency, solutions are within reach, but we continue to fall short on urgency and political will.

We must move decisively from commitments to implementation.

I thank you.

Thank you, Tovalu. Mexico.

Gracias.

Thank you. The integrity and stability of the financial system are not ends unto themselves, but rather essential tools in order to drive forward the development projects that today we are meeting to discuss in this forum. When it comes to credit ratings, it's essential to address the methodological deficiencies that often lead to pro-cyclical evaluations. These qualifications based on different methodologies that are not exempt from judgment show short-term indicators that can entrench financial shocks and make the cost of capital more expensive precisely at times of heightened vulnerability. This approach is not sufficient vis-à-vis the resilience required in the current context. Mexico believes that it's necessary to move towards more prospective metrics that systematically include long-term factors linked to sustainable development, such as resilience to shocks to sustainable development growth and structural changes. What's more, it's essential to include more clearly variables related to transparency, accountability, and the quality of the institutions of a country. The Sevilla— the Compromiso de Sevilla is clear on this. We need more transparent practices, more prospective ones that are better aligned with development. This same logic must also be extended to other key components of the international financial architecture, such as cross-border payments. Mexico has driven forward digital payment systems, sovereign ones, efficient ones, through the Financing for Wellbeing project that provides the ability to send back remittances well below an average cost in line with the 2030 Agenda, there is a fragmented and costly international payment system. So for Mexico, reducing costs for remittances is not just a technical policy, but it is an act of social justice for millions of families. In this regard, stability cannot be achieved on the basis that have perpetuated asymmetries. They must be built through a more transparent and more inclusive system that's better aligned with development objectives. Thank you.

I thank the representative of Mexico. Colombia.

Muchas gracias. Thank you very much. It's an honor for us to contribute to this debate. The speaker's microphone seems to have been shut off. Ah, they're back. Water, energy, roads, education, health. We have a young population in Colombia. We have natural resources and public institutions that are designed to mobilize state and private capital into our most vulnerable regions. We have so much to offer and so much to do. When it comes to the severe agenda and the different conversations we've had on it, We've obtained a renewed framework and concrete commitments to mobilize private capital, to reform the credit rating methodologies, to strengthen guarantee mechanisms, and to be more predictable in restructuring debt. Colombia has made commitments. However, agreements reached in Seville must now lead to instruments that countries like ours can really use with lower costs for capital and proportional compliance rules with mutual benefit. Finally, the expectations of the world are all going in the same direction, and that is that SDG 17 is a very important goal. And so Colombia is calling upon this assembly to set forth the commitments made in Seville through mixed financing mechanisms, reducing risk and strategic alliances with development banks, with the United Nations system, with the private sector, and with the world. We stand ready to act and we invite our partners to do the same. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Colombia. Now turning to the civil society, Ms. Emma. Börgeser, Christian Aid. You have the floor, madam. You have the floor. I will give the floor to the next speaker. Could you change your place? Now I give the floor to the Center for Economic and Social Rights. You will have the floor later, madam.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Thank you. Do I have the floor again?

Did you succeed? You have the floor, madam.

Thank you, Chair. I speak on behalf of Christian Aid and the civil society FFD mechanism. I thank the panels for their contributions and have followed this discussion as well as the CRA dialogue in March with great interest. However, it strikes me that the focus of the discussion is somewhat mismatched to the moment we find ourselves in. I'm going to skip a bit because I won't get the 3 minutes I was told I would have in the beginning. But as ever, as civil society, we find ourselves asking whose interests are really being represented in discussions on credit rating agencies, as well as on financial regulation more broadly, SDRs, and global economic governance. Who gets to decide what adequate progress towards development is, which is the language in the debt sustainability analysis of the Fund and Bank? For that reason, we ask delegates to think outside the confines of what the panelists have raised here today and to consider 3 initiatives. One, provide an immediate multilateral response to the impact on developing countries of the current crisis by strengthening intergovernmental dialogue on global macroeconomic coordination and policy coherence, particularly with reference to identifying and tackling adverse macrocritical spillovers of international monetary tightening, recurrent volatility of capital flows and resulting currency and economic crises. Second, advance intergovernmental dialogue to strengthen the global financial safety net for developing countries, including identifying immediate reforms that can facilitate a more efficient global reserve system and strengthen international standards of financial and prudential regulation and provision— adequate provisions to limit speculative behavior by non-bank financial institutions. Third, we ask you to relaunch the intergovernmental dialogue on the establishment of an international public credit rating agency at the UN. Thank you so much.

Thank you. Center for Economic and Social Rights.

Not on.

There we go.

Thank you, Chair. I speak on behalf of CSR and the civil society FFD mechanism. Today, we meet at a critical moment in history with ongoing genocides, massive loss of lives, and systemic destruction of infrastructure and health systems. There can be no development under war. The war economy devastates the rights of the people and the planet everywhere, with the heaviest cost borne in the Global South, especially by women, girls, and gender-diverse people. This is not just a crisis of conflict. This is a crisis of an international financial architecture that remains historically unjust and structurally undemocratic. The most vulnerable are paying the price of inflation, debt crisis, capital flight, austerity, and shrinking fiscal space. If people were to survive the bombing, Can they afford the cost of living? Private capital is not a silver bullet. States cannot offload their duties onto an unregulated private sector that prioritizes shareholders' profit over the people and the planet. ODA and reparations remain critical now more than ever. We do not need to reinvent the wheel. International human rights law already provides principles that should guide global economic governance. We demand a UN path forward for democratic economic global governance. As we face a crisis of trust and legitimacy, member states face a choice: allow the system to fracture further or reclaim and strengthen multilateralism based on equal rights and shared duties. The choice is yours. The power is yours. And so Lives are at stake. I thank you.

Thank you. Now, Asia-Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. I speak on behalf of the Feminist Workstream. We cannot discuss the transformation of the international financial architecture without confronting the systemic inequalities continues to produce. Today's global financial system is not neutral. It reflects power imbalances, and its failures disproportionately impact women, particularly in the Global South. In this regard, we recommend the following. First, we need a UN-led intergovernmental mechanism to regulate credit rating agencies and ensure fair development-oriented assessments. Credit rating agencies wield significant influence over countries' access to finance, yet operate with limited transparency and accountability. Their assessments often reinforce pro-cyclical dynamics, raising borrowing costs and deepening crisis. Second, address systemic financial instability through global rules. Adopt global agreements on capital account management, regulate speculative practices and and international financial oversight under the UN. Developing countries face greater exposure to volatility, currency crisis, and capital flight, leading to job losses, lower incomes, and increased care burden. Third, democratize global financial governance. The expansion of unregulated financial actors has increased risk for developing countries. Without stronger regulation, crisis will continue to heavily impact Global South, reinforcing cycles of austerity and inequality. Lastly, if we are serious about sustainable development, then financial systems must serve the public good. That means prioritizing stability over speculation and accountability, rights, and justice over profit. Thank you.

The last speaker, Cuba.

Muchas gracias, señor presidente.

Thank you very much, President. The billions of dollars that developing developed countries are investing in the armed race. And into their being stashed in their banks and real estate are hampering efforts to achieve development globally. The radical drop in ODA in 2025 has, um, led us back to levels, um, before the 2030 Agenda. There are grave impacts on the living conditions of millions of people the world over. Countries of the Global South need additional and predictable resources that must be backed with concrete actions for market access, capacity building, and technology transfer. In this regard, South-South and triangular cooperation are positive experiences to complement and not replace North-South cooperation. operation, and that's why it's necessary to increase ODA and to carry out more comprehensive measurements such as the Multidimensional Vulnerability Index. In this case, we must reject unilateral coercive measures that are against the UN Charter and international law and the rules of multilateralism. All commitments on financing for development must be complied with. And the only thing that is required is real political will. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Kuba. You were the last speaker on the list. I now invite the moderator— only the moderator, I'm sorry— to make A closing remark for 1 minute.

Thank you, Mr.

Chair.

So I do appreciate having listened here to this complex, as I mentioned at the introduction, complex subject material. And as you can see, we have, after a full day that has been spent on the credit rating agencies' methodologies, of which the recommendations have been made, I would make a kind or submit a kind request to actually dedicate a similar one-day, full day onto global payment infrastructure and how progress can be made to benefit the Global South, to benefit the individual and the global citizen at large. With that, I would like to conclude my remark and thank you, Mr.

Chair. I thank Mr. Van Ginsbeke for expertly guiding the discussion. May I thank on your behalf our distinguished panelists for their substantive contribution and delegations for participating in this productive but short exchange of views.

Yes.

Colleagues, that concludes this morning's meeting. The Forum will reconvene at 3:00 PM this afternoon in this conference room to hold a special meeting with the IMF and World Bank. I would like to conclude by thanking the interpreter and the representative of the Secretariat. Thank you again. The meeting is adjourned.