(7th plenary meeting) Third Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Good morning. The seventh plenary meeting is called to order. Dear colleagues, the meeting will now consider sub-item C entitled Towards the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Article IV. of agenda item 11 entitled consideration of the status and operation of the treaty and other matters important for achieving the objectives and purposes of the treaty. The meeting has before it the report of the co-chairs of the informal working group on the implementation of article four. It's contained in the document TPNW.MSP/2025/2. I am pleased to give the floor to the co-chairs of the informal working group on the implementation of Article 4, Malaysia and New Zealand, to introduce their report. Please take your seats, gentlemen.

Thank you very much, Mr. President. Mr. President, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, as co-chairs of the informal working group on Article 4 of the TPNW, Malaysia and New Zealand are honored to present our report on activities conducted during the intersessional period between the second meeting of States Parties and our present meeting. At the outset, we would like to recall that Article 4 of the Treaty entitled Towards the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons encompasses several elements relating to nuclear disarmament verification. Inter alia, first, verification of the irreversible elimination of a nuclear weapon program for a TPNW state party that after 7 July 2017 owned, possessed, or controlled nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and eliminated its nuclear weapon program prior to the entry into force of the treaty for the state party in question. This is in line with Article 4, or what is also referred to as the eliminate then join pathway for nuclear armed states. Such a state would be required to cooperate with the nominated international authority designated pursuant to Article 4.6 for the purpose of nuclear disarmament verification. The state party would also need to conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA. Second, verification of the irreversible elimination of a nuclear weapon program for a TPNW state party that owns, possesses, or controls nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, including immediate removal of such weapons or devices from operational status and their destruction within a deadline decided by the first meeting of states parties in accordance with a legally binding time-bound plan for verified and irreversible elimination. This is in line with Article 4 of the treaty, also known as the join then eliminate pathway for nuclear armed states. Third, conclusion of an IAEA safeguards agreement by a state party to which Article 4 applies. And fourth, prompt removal of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices by a state party that has such weapons in its territory or in any place under its jurisdiction or control that are owned, possessed, or controlled by another state. This is in line with Article 4 of the treaty. Fifth, designation by states parties of an international authority or authorities to negotiate and verify the irreversible elimination of nuclear weapon programs in accordance with Articles 4, 4, and 4 of the treaty. Under the working group on Article IV, the co-chairs have worked towards several key objectives. First, advancement of discussion among states parties and other relevant stakeholders on the topics of nuclear disarmament verification and the institutional arrangements for an international authority to negotiate, monitor and supervise the implementation of plans for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Second, pursuit of a range of technical consultations with experts to support States Parties' development of a common understanding of key concepts as they relate to nuclear disarmament verification, including through the study and elaboration of key questions arrived at by this informal working group in 2023. And third, engagement with stakeholders in the area of nuclear disarmament verification and the implementation of safeguards. As co-chairs, Malaysia and New Zealand consulted with relevant experts over the course of the intersessional period. Given the incremental nature of discussions under this working group, we hope that our report will provide a good basis for further deliberations among States Parties as regards Article 4 of the Treaty. At the same time, States Parties' engagement in the nuclear disarmament verification discourse reflects our seriousness in ensuring the full and effective implementation of the treaty, deepening our collective knowledge and understanding of key issues in this field. In this sense, we believe the working group plays an important capacity building function for states parties, leveraging on the expertise and insights of our partners from the scientific advisory group, academia and civil society. My colleague from New Zealand, Mr. Nicholas Clutterbuck, will now highlight salient elements from the co-chairs' report.

It has been a privilege to serve once again as co-chair for article 4 of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. This is a role that New Zealand has served in since the first meeting of states parties in 2022. Since then, we have been lucky to serve alongside such dedicated co-chairs, Malaysia and Mexico. Building off Malaysia's introduction, I will recall a few key facts about Article IV. Article IV is one of the treaty's fundamental articles. It establishes the treaty as a disarmament treaty. It requires the designation by states parties of an international authority to conduct negotiations, on behalf of States parties with a disarming State, on the terms of its time-bound disarmament plan. It also requires that an international authority be designated to verify the elimination of nuclear weapons by that State. The text of the treaty is not prescriptive in terms of which verification-related activities it requires, but rather the treaty leaves room for verification provisions to be developed that are tailored to a specific context. However, before such time as a former nuclear-armed state joins the Treaty, there are some important decisions that must be taken by States Parties. An informal working group that we co-chair has been tasked on advancing discussions around that. In presenting today's report, I have three points to emphasise which have driven our co-chairs' work on Article IV over the most recent intercessional period. The first point is the process to understand and develop verification protocols under the TPNW will take time and be an holistic endeavour. In our report, we described it as a multi-year mission, as scientific and technical expertise is advanced. Our job as co-chairs has been to approach this role incrementally and to break down the process into achievable steps. A lot of work has already been done internationally on the topic of nuclear disarmament verification, which we have been able to turn to and learn from. Any future disarmament process will be subject to negotiation about the degree of assurance required that the state in question has eliminated its nuclear weapons programme. This will be informed by the nature and complexity of its nuclear weapons programme and the willingness of that state to engage in the process on an ongoing basis. This working group shares the emerging preference among experts for a verification framework that is as simple and as flexible as possible. This does not mean the system won't be intrusive. To the contrary, it likely will be highly intrusive and require inspection regimes to be developed and agreed. My second key point is that verification of nuclear disarmament is indeed possible. in ways that successfully manage the safety, security and non-proliferation concerns. This is increasingly borne out by literature and was certainly the view of all the experts consulted by the co-chairs in this intersessional period. It has also been reiterated by other related expert groups, for example in the IPNDV, the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. Verification is a process common to international treaties. It is a process that allows parties to reassure and build confidence in one another that they are all meeting their obligations. An effective verification system will be one that establishes confidence in compliance of treaty obligations, and the level of verification required will depend on the degree of reassurance required around that state having eliminated its nuclear weapons programme. It is possible to develop a verification framework based on today's systems, tools, and expertise, and it would not require States parties to the Treaty and their representatives gaining access to sensitive nuclear weapons information and data. This issue is common to all NDV discussions. That is, how can States ensure the protection of classified information in order to protect against proliferation risks? To overcome this challenge, a model of disarmament nuclear disarmament verification focused on fissile material has been developed as a possible model for TPNW states parties. That would mean the sharing of sensitive information is not required. Under this model, which has been developed and promoted by experts at UNIDIR and Princeton University, all of a state's fissile material would be moved into a secure area and placed under strict safeguards to be monitored by the IAEA. The disarming state would then open the remainder of its nuclear weapons complex to international inspectors, who would verify the absence of nuclear warheads and fissile material in that, the open sector. At the same time, the disarming state would be responsible for its dismantling process according to a time-bound plan, agreed and verified by the TPNW authority. The TPNW's inspectorate would consistently measure the quantity of fissile material that is mixed down and disposed of over time. comparing that against the state's initial declaration of its quantities of fissile material, with a view to closing the state's material balance. Therefore, no sensitive information would ever need to change hands. This approach has been developed to get around the challenges of authenticity, of information and of secrecy, and is entirely possible when considering nuclear disarmament verification in a state that is totally eliminating its nuclear arsenal. compare that against a state that is engaged in nuclear arms reductions. My third and final point is that nuclear disarmament verification under the TPNW is likely to proceed on the basis of cooperation and not in an adversarial dynamic. This will make the process materially different from the processes outlined in other frameworks, for instance in New START or under the JCPOA. It will take place in a dynamic where nuclear weapons are understood as having no or as having negative value, and the disarming state wishes to demonstrate its commitment to its new identity of being or becoming nuclear-free. Our current understandings of nuclear disarmament verification have their origins in the Cold War arms control processes, characterised by the adversarial relationship between the US and the Soviet Union. This experience has produced several assumptions. namely that verification must be intrusive enough to detect any non-compliance. This has generated a requirement for very high levels of confidence and the ability to detect low levels of non-compliance. However, in that scenario, the States in question continue to see nuclear weapons as having a very high value, and they are engaged in a tense, adversarial relationship. The nuclear disarmament process through the TPNW will not be an extension of nuclear arms control. It will be about managing and regulating a system of nuclear deterrence in which nuclear weapons are highly valued. The underlying assumptions will be different, and the joining States will be looking for opportunities to demonstrate their adherence to the Treaty through a process of active reassurance. To conclude, We, the co-chairs, have been privileged to work over the last few years with excellent scientists, academics, and experts, and as co-chairs have identified six further lines of inquiry to be elaborated, including with those scientists, over future intersessional periods. I'd like to flag those for all delegations here. They are contained in the annex to our report. Over the last year, New Zealand has sponsored two research projects to further develop our understandings as a community of states parties. First, we have worked with Dr. Moritz Koot at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. Dr. Koot will be known to many of you as a Scientific Advisory Group member. And this project led to the investigation of elements of a nuclear weapons program to be eliminated in order to verify nuclear disarmament. Part of this project involved an expert workshop hosted over the summer and from which a report is being produced. The second project, we partnered with Dr. Nick Ritchie at the University of York to produce a series of reports on nuclear disarmament verification processes, defining the nature of cooperation in the verification of treaties and on irreversibility. These reports are at an advanced stage and will be published during the course of this year in preparation for the TPNW's review conference. And I wish to conclude by inviting Dr. Nick Ritchie to provide some further background about his research and possible future work in this working group. Nick, over to you.

Thank you. I thank Shivananda and Nicolas, the co-chairs of the informal working group on the implementation of Article 4, for your work, intersessional work, for your dedication to the process. Dear colleagues, before we proceed with the discussion on this agenda item, I want to give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Gambia to make statement on the general subject. Please, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. President, for giving us the floor to deliver our statement. Mr. President, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, the Republic of the Gambia is honored to address this esteemed assembly at the third meeting of States of Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. We stand to extend our heartfelt congratulations to Ambassador Akin Rahim Tulin of Kazakhstan on his election as President of this meeting and express our gratitude to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs for organizing this pivotal gathering. The Gambia reforms its unwavering commitment to global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Our nation has consistently demonstrated this commitment through our adherence international treaties aim at eliminating nuclear weapons. Notably, the Gambia is the first African nation to ratify the comprehensive nuclear treaty test ban. On the 24th of March, 2022 becoming the 71st state to do so. The ratification underscores our dedication to a world free from the threat of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the Gambia is proud, the Gambia is a proud party to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the Palindemah treaty which established the African nuclear weapons free zone. This treaty reflects our commitment, collective resolve to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Mr. President, the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons are well documented and deeply concerning. Recent studies have highlighted that women and children are disproportionately proportionally affected by ionizing radiation with significant gaps remaining in our understanding of its effects on productive health. We must continue to support and conduct research into the immediate and long term impact of nuclear weapon use and testing. Such research not only inform our humanitarian preparedness and response, but also reinforces the legal and moral imperative to nuclear disarmament. The Gambia is particularly alarmed by the resurgence of the nuclear threats in the global discourse. Such threats, irrespective of their cause, are unacceptable and pose significant risks to international peace and security. They undermine the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience. We echo the sentiments expressed in the TPNW preamble emphasizing that any use of nuclear weapon could be a horrent and that their total elimination is the only absolute guarantee against the use of the use or other threats used. Mister President, the Gambia calls upon all nations especially those that have not yet joined the TPNW to organize the treaty significance and take a concrete step towards its on universalization. We believe that the TPNW complements existing international legal instruments, including the NTP, the NPT, and strengthen the global disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The Gambia remains steadfast in its commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons. We continue to work collaboratively with all nations to achieve their objectives of the TPNW and to ensure a safer and a more secure future for humanity. Thank you, Mr. President.

I thank you very much for your statement. Dear colleagues, now I open floor for discussion on this agenda item, on the report of the co-chairs on the implementation of the Article IV. And I see on my list New Zealand. Please you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. President. To elaborate further, New Zealand has funded work at the University of York to develop our understanding of the requirements under Article IV for verified and irreversible elimination of a disarming state's nuclear weapon program. and the requirement for it to cooperate with a designated international authority. Specifically, we have produced a series of reports that have organised and summarised the large body of work on nuclear disarmament verification, the smaller body of work on irreversibility and nuclear disarmament, and the limited work that has explored the question of what is a nuclear weapons programme. In addition, we have commissioned work on options for a competent international authority, and what cooperation means in international law in relation to the requirement to cooperate with the competent international authority. As has been noted, this body of work will be published in the coming months to support discussions at the TPNW's first review conference. But there are two important takeaways from this work. First, a general consensus in the nuclear disarmament verification community that effective multilateral nuclear disarmament verification is possible in ways that successfully manage safety, security and non-proliferation concerns. And second, that a nuclear disarmament process can become irreversible in a practical sense in terms of maximising the time, cost and difficulty of reversal. The lion's share of the work in this area has been on nuclear disarmament verification, as an extension of an adversarial nuclear arms control process. It is important to reiterate that nuclear disarmament verification through the TPNW will almost certainly be a cooperative process in which the perceived value of nuclear weapons has necessarily diminished or evaporated altogether. This opens up a range of approaches to nuclear disarmament verification beyond those that have been developed in the International Partnership on Nuclear Disarmament Verification. The report summarises an extensive body of practical work on nuclear disarmament verification through the IPNDV, through UNIDIR, through research programmes at universities, including at Princeton, and many other collaborative exercises between states to develop and test technologies and methodologies for verification. The reports also bring together a recent set of case studies of real world examples of denuclearization and the extent to which they are irreversible in a practical sense, such as the decommissioning of France's fissile material production facilities for nuclear weapons, the denuclearization of the United Kingdom's Royal Air Force, and the South African experience. And we intend this body of work to be an educational resource for the TPNW community especially as new colleagues join delegations and civil society organisations through this and future review cycles. Thank you.

I thank you. Now I give the floor to the representative of Austria, to be followed by Thailand.

Thank you, Mr. President. At the outset, we would like to thank the co-chairs, Malaysia and New Zealand, for their efforts over the past year. We welcome the collaboration between the Working Group and members of the Scientific Advisory Group, experts, scientists, and civil society in discussing different technical aspects of disarmament verification. The result as presented in the working paper is a good basis to help us develop a common understanding of key concepts for nuclear disarmament verification. With a view towards our first review conference, our discussion on the designation of a competent international authority or authorities for verification should build on the specific expertise and knowledge of international organizations already working on matters relevant to our endeavor. In this context, we very much support the recommendations and further work as outlined in the report by the facilitators. and to make two points. First, the International Atomic Energy Agency has a mandate for and key technical expertise that is highly relevant for the implementation of Article IV, and we firmly endorse to deepen the engagement with the agency on this. One very pertinent example is the experience the IAEA gained when it undertook the verification of dismantling the nuclear weapons program in South Africa. This corresponds to the eliminate and join approach as contained in Article 4. This highly relevant expertise should be brought into our discussions in the coming year. Second, the CTBTO with its globally spanning international monitoring system established itself as a reliable source in ensuring that pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the moratorium on nuclear testing remains upheld. We therefore have consistently championed the idea that the CTBTO should be designated as the competent international authority to verify the provisions under Article 1 of the TPNW with regard to testing. This would underline the complementarity of the treaties and ensure synergies are maximized. From our point of view, this could be a key deliverable to be achieved at the review conference. Mr. President, the challenge with weapons of mass destruction is not simply the destruction of weapons themselves, but the dismantlement of whole weapons programs. Our endeavor is therefore an ambitious one, but it is not unrealistic. The TPNW is not the first disarmament regime to address verification as part of its implementation. Non-nuclear weapons states have their non-proliferation obligations fully verified under the IAEA safeguards obligations. Disarmament verification can build on such measures already undertaken in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation to define and ensure the implementation of a standard of irreversibility. Moreover, there are other relevant discussions and processes that address the challenges of disarmament verification, such as examining the concept of irreversibility and, as has been mentioned before, the International Partnership for Disarmament Verification. Austria is of the view that all processes can profit from cooperation, and we would encourage efforts in this regard. We will remain engaged in our continued discussions on this matter towards coming to a common understanding during the review conference. I thank you.

I thank you. Now I give the floor to Thailand, to be followed by Mexico.

Thank you, Mr. President. At the outset, Thailand commends Malaysia and New Zealand, the co-chair of the working group, for their leadership in furthering the discussion during the intercessional period towards developing or disconnecting competent international authority or authorities to execute negotiation and verification mandates. The multi-year task assigned to the working group has been instrumental in advancing our collective understanding on nuclear disarmament verification, in particular, the elaboration of what we need to eliminate or can be converted from nuclear program components. The complementarity role of our effort in TPNB with broader disarmament architecture, including the NPT, as well as reaffirm that the verification of irreversible nuclear disarmament is possible. We therefore welcome the report submitted to the MSP, which provides key findings derived from the working group's engagement with the different stakeholders, especially with the SAC and other experts, and encourages the dialogue on this critical issue under Article IV. In our part, Thailand is an unequivocal commitment to the total elimination of nuclear weapons based on the principle of irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency, and we also advance this effort in different forums. We recognize the critical role of the relevant international organizations, including the IAEA, CTBTO, in verifying and monitoring nuclear activities and maintaining nuclear safeguards. We strongly support the effort to explore possible contribution of these organizations to the work of the TPNB. Last but not least, Thailand also welcome the recently adopted UNGA resolution to explore the possible creation of the group of scientific and technical expert on new credits armament verification, we believe that the group can contribute to establishing an effective mechanism in the future. Looking ahead, we would be interested to hear about the Working Group's priorities and focus for the coming year, as well as its plan on engaging with a wider group of experts, including the new generation of scientists during the next intersessional period prior to the Liviu Conference. And I thank the co-chairs again for your dedication.

Thank you. Now I give the floor to the representative of Mexico. You have the floor.

Thank you very much, Chairman. I'd like to begin by thanking the two co-chairs of the working group for the report presented and for all of the work that they carried out throughout this intersessional period. We also thank them for positively mentioning Mexico when we co-chaired during the previous cycle. Precisely, Mexico had been involved in this process and it's also a pleasure for us to see the continuation of some of the questions that we'd identified in the previous cycle and precisely when it comes to the recommendations presented we believe that it is necessary and relevant to continue to deliberate on these issues there are some very technical issues and questions and I think that they need to be fine-tuned more it's not simple And this is the task that we set for ourselves jointly in the treaty. It's Mexico's opinion that future discussions that the states parties to the TPNW will have to have are specifically to do with destruction and accompanied with concrete steps on a domestic level to fulfill the provisions of Article 4. Also, having listened to the previous statements, we also wanted to make very clear the importance of relevant organisations getting involved and contributing both with technical and financial resources so that when the time comes they can be ready for the important work on compliance with Article 4. In particular, we believe that collaboration with the IAEA is essential. Thank you very much.

Thank you. Next, I give the floor, I think, to the representative of the Scientific Advisory Group. Yeah, please, you have the floor, to be followed by South Africa.

Thank you, Mr. President. I'm Moritz Kurt, a member of the Scientific Advisory Group, and I just wanted to take the floor briefly to speak about our work on the nuclear weapon programs and on the characterization of nuclear weapon programs, where we've worked over the last year to increase our understanding of what actually is a nuclear weapon program. In this vein, we were able to host a workshop in Geneva on the sidelines of the NPT review cycle where we had international experts explain to us what is their understanding of nuclear weapon programs, including independent experts from Russia and the United States, but also from South Africa, from our own member Andre Boes from the Scientific Advisory Group. And I will not go into the full detail of what we have learned and we're still working on this issue, but just to give you a very brief summary of our understanding, as far as we understand it now, we think nuclear weapon programs can be divided into six big categories. So there is the category of institutional support, which is all the agencies in weapons states that actually make the budgeting, make the human resources, make the laws for nuclear weapon programs. And there's the nuclear fuel cycle that all of us know because it's safeguarded in non-weapon states by the IAEA producing the fissile material for nuclear weapons. And there's the third element of component manufacturing, which is all the elements that you need to build a weapon, all the little bits and pieces including the pit, the explosives, the detonators. Then there's the fourth element, which is the process of weaponization, bringing these elements together, making a weapon out of these and doing the assembly and disassembly, also the research. It also includes the testing. And then there's a fifth element, which is the use infrastructure, which is basically the transport systems, the containers, the legal requirements that you have to actually bring these weapons to use. And this is not yet the sixth element, which is the delivery systems that we all know that would in the worst case bring these weapons to places of use. And so the only other thing I wanted to mention is also that we look into the transition of nuclear weapon programs because we think that will also be the work in the future because we think we can learn from how nuclear weapon programs have changed over the time. And so we hosted a side event this Tuesday where we looked at the transition of weapon programs in the Russian Federation after the end of the Cold War where the weapon program shrank significantly. We looked at the weapon program of South Africa, which was completely dismantled, and we looked at the weapon program of Sweden, which never actually came into being. And from these, we learned about a number of issues that we will study in the future, which is the redundancies in weapon programs, which is one of the issues that Article IV needs to look at in my view, which is that if there's multiple facilities, we really need to make sure that they're all get dismantled. The issue of conversion, how does it work, what were the successes and the misunderstandings. One issue we have identified also is the connection to safeguards. At what point is this handed over to the process that the treaty has specified? And also what to do with the personnel that has worked in nuclear weapon programs. These are the four issues I think will be important at least to us and probably also in the sessional period. for the Article 4 group to look at. Thank you.

Thank you. Now I give the floor to South Africa to be followed by El Salvador.

Thank you, Mr. President. We would like to thank the co-chairs Malaysia and New Zealand for the report capturing the discussions held during the intersessional sessions on Article 4. Article 4, Mr. President, is a fundamental provision of the treaty and makes provision for and creates a pathway for both nuclear-armed states and nuclear weapon-hosting countries to join the treaty. And it establishes the treaty as a disarmament treaty and as part of the broader disarmament regime. We have before us quite a wide-ranging report of this working group and in view of the high relevance of the issues, trust that we will build on the discussions held thus far to have a better understanding of the process for relevant states to join the treaty under conditions set out in articles 4.1 and 4.2. This understanding could also help with universalization efforts and outreach to states that would have these obligations. Mr. President, the consideration of the report on advancing and supporting progress on nuclear disarmament verification is appropriate while recognizing that verification is not an end in itself. We welcome the view of the experts consulted by the co-chairs that the verification of irreversible nuclear disarmament is possible. and that irreversible verification approaches could be implemented using today's systems, tools and expertise. The continued use of the expertise of the Scientific Advisory Group to consider elements of interest for the Working Group is demonstrating its benefits, grounding our work on scientific research and input. In this regard, we trust that the knowledge of the South African experts on the scientific advisory group can be tapped into, capitalizing on the South African experience on elements considered by this working group. Mr. President, the designation of a competent international authority with particular negotiation and verification mandates requires a coherent approach as any such structure might be developed will be subject to scrutiny and should stand up to the highest standard of inquiry. Though it must be said that some structures already exist and consideration should be maintained to rely on these structures as a first option with addition of aspects that might be needed in the TPNW context. In essence, we do not need to start from scratch. When considering the issue and welcoming the consideration of the co-chairs, the working group on how to best engage with other bodies in the work of this working group, including the International Atomic Energy Agency amongst others. We take note of the questions raised in the report to be considered during the next intersessional period, including on the IAEA taking on a central role in assisting States to implement and verify compliance with the Treaty through the monitoring of safeguards, particularly given the view of some experts that legally binding verification should focus on fissile material and its production facilities. As part of the efforts to advance and support further progress on nuclear disarmament verification during the next intercessional period, we are keen to further consider the various options or models, particularly on what we see as being the area of most risk, that is regulating the fissile material. Overall, Mr. President, we see loads of opportunity for the TPNW to build up knowledge on Article IV verification. Accordingly, South Africa welcomes the commitment to future intercessional work on these issues and consequently supports a new renewal of the Article 4 working groups mandate. I thank you.

I thank you. Now I give the floor to El Salvador to be followed by ICANN.

Muchas gracias.

Thank you very much. El Salvador wishes to recognize the leadership of the co-chairs, Malaysia and New Zealand, in all of their work on the implementation of Article 4 of the TPNW. We welcome the report, in particular, all of the collaboration that was engaged in with the technical experts to make headway with the provisions of the treaty on the elimination of nuclear weapons. We also recognize cooperation with the scientific advisory group, scientific experts, and civil society discussing technical aspects of nuclear disarmament verification. El Salvador continues to work decisively towards the irreversible, complete, transparent, and unconditioned elimination of nuclear weapons. Thank you very much for your work.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to ICAN, to be followed by the scientific advisory group representative.

Thank you very much. Distinguished delegates and colleagues, my name is Rebecca Eleanor Johnson and I give this statement on behalf of ICAN and also the acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, which serves on ICAN's steering group. And if I might say, having spent some fascinating weeks at Semipalatinsk test site as a guest of the CTBTO on on site inspections. It is a special pleasure to see Ambassador Ratmetulin here in the chair at this important 3MSP. and also to see such courageous members of civil society from nuclear impacted communities, including Kazakh civil society. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons warmly welcomes the report and active engagement by the Article IV Working Group co chairs Malaysia and New Zealand. The TPNW is not the first body to hold discussions on the verification of nuclear disarmament, but it is the first treaty to require the total elimination of all nuclear weapons and provide essential principles, objectives and practical pathways for nuclear arsenals to be verifiably dismantled and destroyed in a time-bound framework. ICAN believes that a strong, effective and irreversible disarmament verification system is a necessity for global security and will build confidence in the treaty as it develops. Effective verification is achieved at the interface of technical, institutional, political and practical considerations, including, of course, safety, environmental security and cost-effectiveness. ICAN supports the Article IV report's recognition that a political decision can be taken by TPNW States Parties about these considerations and what should be included as treaty-accountable items. We look forward to future intersessional work that will take forward deeper discussions on the essential principles, practical pathways and technical and institutional issues relating to disarmament verification in conjunction with research and input from the scientific advisory group and other relevant scientists and institutional experts. The TPNW's verification regime should be taken forward in the review conference on a simple and modest basis with principles of adaptability so that monitoring and other systems can grow increasingly effective as needed for the future. The principle of adaptability will enable the TPNW's institutional and verification system under Article 4 to respond to changing technical and technological innovations and political circumstances as necessary and appropriate. This should include wherever possible engagement with experts and nuclear armed and nuclear host governments, enabling the TPNW to address the various nuclear weapons programs and their different situations and requirements. There is a precedent for nuclear disarmament verification engagement and joint studies involving non-nuclear and nuclear armed states. And that dates back to the successful New Agenda Coalition initiatives from 1998 that led to the adoption of the 13 steps for disarmament and non-proliferation by consensus by the 2000 NPT Review Conference. And after that Review Conference, the UK government mandated its atomic weapons establishment based in Berkshire at Aldermaston and Burfield to research nuclear disarmament verification and include participation with non-nuclear governments which have important roles to play along with nuclear armed governments. To conclude, ICAN strongly encourages States Parties to renew the mandate of the Article IV Working Group so that it can continue further discussions and consider new and innovative forms of cooperation with other relevant organisations and agencies to achieve comprehensive and irreversible nuclear disarmament. If possible, these should include the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization to enhance international safeguards and strengthen the CTBTO's international monitoring system and provisions, which also serve vital roles for early warning and monitoring earthquakes, tsunamis and wider civilian humanitarian security purposes. This kind of complementarity and collaboration on nuclear disarmament verification should be encouraged as the treaty becomes further embedded in international law. To do this, will further our collective work for denuclearization, peace and security for the sake of our environmentally challenged world whose people desire to live sustainably and become nuclear free. Thank you.

I thank you for your statement. Next, I give the floor to Professor Zia Miyan from Scientific Advisory Group. to be followed by Indonesia.

Thank you, Mr. President. It has been very encouraging to the Scientific Advisory Group to have the support of the co-chairs of the intersessional working group on Article 4 and other States parties in the conversations about how to advance work on the implementation of Article 4. The Scientific Advisory Group can only be useful to States Parties through the cooperation of States Parties in engaging the Scientific Advisory Group on these questions. So we're very grateful to New Zealand and to other States that have been part of the conversations on Article 4. But one note that I would like to add to help States Parties think about the next phase of work on Article 4. So far, a lot of this discussion has been focused on the tech rightly so on the technical issues involved with the verification of the obligations for the elimination of nuclear weapon programs. And as my colleague, Dr. Kut mentioned, and as Professor Nick Ritchie mentioned, because we're talking about nuclear weapon programs and not just the dismantling of nuclear warheads, the task goes beyond just the technical requirements of what to do about complicated technological objects, which are nuclear weapons and the nuclear materials they contain. And the IAEA, of course, plays a central role in that particular aspect. But I do want to urge States Parties to think about Article IV in the specific context of our treaty. And with that regard, I'd like to ask colleagues to think about how to connect Article IV in particular to Article V. and the national implementation measures that a state is required to take when it joins the treaty, because some of the national implementation measures that a state would have to take would speak to the questions of the institutions and processes and personnel of the nuclear weapon program in the process of its elimination, because that will take an extended period of time. And so there needs to be a process that discusses Article 4, but includes not just the scientific input, but the input from States Parties and other professionals and experts who are able to help us understand what would be the appropriate legal, administrative and other measures that would have to accompany the scientific and technological elements of the elimination of programmes. And so Thinking about what one would like to see in a state's disarmament plan that includes these national implementation measures that go beyond the purely technical to address the other elements of nuclear weapon programs, and here I think we can learn from the examples of South Africa and other countries that have put in place specific national implementation measures. But we do need to have a broader conversation that deals with the other aspects of nuclear weapon programmes beyond just the narrow scientific and technical elements around the weapon, dismantling the weapon and eliminating and safely managing the fissile materials. So I would urge colleagues to think about, as we go forward in the discussions in the intersessional process on Article 4, how to include participants in this process from states, parties, and others who can help our conversation with regard to these other aspects that we need to fully understand as we take this work forward. Thank you.

Thank you. I now invite Indonesia to speak.

Thank you, President. Good morning, colleagues and delegates. Let me begin by expressing our appreciation to Malaysia and New Zealand, to co-chair, the co-chairs of the working group of the implementations of Article 4 for their insightful report. The key findings and concluding points assure us that irreversible nuclear disarmament verification is possible and achievable through existing expertise, tools and methodologies. Let me also welcome the constructive engagement within the working group as well as the contribution from the scientific advisory group, experts, scientists and civil society in advancing discussion on this important topic. The intercessional process has been and will continue to be instrumental in fostering technical consultation and refining key verification concepts, ensuring that our approaches are fit for the purpose. Mr. President, Effective and reliable verification mechanisms are essential to ensuring compliance with disarmament agreements, including the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The fundamental principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility must be applied to all nuclear disarmament measures. As highlighted in the report, variability and transparency are interrelated and must be structured in a way that ensures credibility and confidence among all stakeholders. It is therefore crucial for the future competent authority to hold credibility necessary to be widely accepted and to foster confidence among all parties. This credibility could only be attained through a feasible, efficient and non-discriminatory disarmament verification mechanism or regime. We support the involvement of existing institutions such as IAEA and the CTBTO. The IAEA, with its extensive operational experience in safeguard and nuclear security, could play a pivotal role in monitoring irreversibility of nuclear disarmament. Likewise, the CTBTO's verification regime and confidence-building measures could complement the treaty's objective by preventing any future nuclear weapons development and ensuring compliance with the prohibition on nuclear testing. Mr. President, the designation of an international competent authority in the implementation of Article IV is a crucial matter for this treaty. Indonesia believes that AIEA already has the mandate capability and the legal framework to carry out verification tasks for nuclear disarmament. Indonesia is open to discussions with other states parties regarding the designations of international competent authority within the framework of Article 4 of the treaty, including the possibility of further utilizations of the IAEA, taking into account the agency's expertise and experience in nuclear verification. As we move forward on verification matters, it will be crucial to ensure a non-discriminatory and comprehensive verification methodology under a future multilateral nuclear disarmament framework. Our discussion on verification measures requires sustained engagement with a broad range of stakeholders, including technical and legal experts. It is important to foster partnership and collaborative activities to ensure a pool of ready-to-use expertise that can be drawn upon when needed. Mr. President, Indonesia stands ready to actively engage in further discussions on Article 4 to develop credible, effective, and inclusive verification measure that will ensure the irreversible elimination of nuclear weapon. I thank you.

Thank you. Now I give the floor to the representative of civil society. Please introduce yourself and then proceed with the statement. And then followed by Chile. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. President. I am John Wester, Archbishop of Santa Fe, New Mexico, and I'm speaking on behalf of my archdiocese and the Archbishop of Seattle, the Bishop of Hiroshima, and the Archbishop of Nagasaki. We take guidance from our Holy Father, Pope Francis, who has declared the very possession of nuclear weapons to be immoral. We pray for his health. Two years ago in Nagasaki, on the 78th anniversary of its atomic bombing, we Catholic leaders formally created the Partnership for a World Without Nuclear Weapons. Our four dioceses include the birthplace of nuclear weapons, the most deployed weapons in the United States, and the only two cities that to date have suffered atomic bombings. We lend our voices in staunch support of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons at this third meeting of states parties. In July 2017, the Vatican was the first nation state to sign and ratify the treaty. We note that the nuclear weapons powers have never honored their long-held obligations under the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty to enter into serious negotiations leading to global nuclear disarmament. In contrast, the entry into force of the Ban Treaty was a great step toward the light of peace. The nuclear-armed states have a moral obligation to hear the voices of the majority of the world and to listen to those who are threatened by annihilation at the whim of any one of their nine leaders. Russia's nuclear saber-rattling over Ukraine has made this truly clear, while the ongoing crisis in the Middle East has further escalated the risks. Meanwhile, the nuclear weapons powers are engaged in massive modernization programs designed to keep nuclear weapons forever. The international legal force of the ban treaty is limited to those states that have formally ratified it. But its moral power does not recognize boundaries between nations, nor lines on a map. The moral power of this treaty is global and universal. We hope and pray that it will pressure the nuclear weapons states to finally honor their disarmament obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Moreover, we specifically call upon world leaders to demonstrate measurable progress toward nuclear disarmament by the 80th anniversaries of the atomic bombings. Eight decades of nuclear threats is far too long. as evidenced by the horrors documented by the atomic bombing museums in Japan. We demand concrete action toward nuclear disarmament. The 80th atomic bombing anniversaries just five months from now are the right time to make that demand. Our partnership for a world without nuclear weapons will be in Hiroshima and Nagasaki to bear witness and strongly advocate for just that this coming August. Please know of our continued prayers for peace and healing. May you all help lead this suffering world to the promised land of a world free of nuclear weapons. We deeply thank you for your efforts and pray for your every success. Thank you, Mr. President.

Thank you. And now I give the floor to Chile to be followed by Egypt.

Thank you very much, Chairman. My country is grateful for the report prepared by Malaysia and New Zealand in their capacity as facilitators of the informal working group on the implementation of Article 4 of the Treaty. on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. We appreciate the efforts to provide a detailed analysis and to engage in constructive debates on the mechanisms required for the effective implementation of this article. For Chile, accountability and international oversight are essential elements to ensure compliance with the commitments. assumed under the treaty, and in particular the mandate to eliminate nuclear weapons. In this regard, Chairman, Chile reaffirms its commitment, its unshakable commitment to total nuclear disarmament, and stands ready to provide the support required for more treaties to join and ratify the treaty.

The progressive.

Reduction of the amount of nuclear weapons globally is an essential step, and to continue to make headway to definitively eradicate these weapons of mass destruction in full compliance with international law and the international human rights system. Thank you very much.

Naguib El-Fotouhi, the representative of Egypt.

Thank you very much, Mr. President.

And through you, my great appreciation to the two dear friends and colleagues, Nicolas and Chivonnet, for and.

Their both respective countries, New Zealand and Malaysia, for the briefing on the intercessional work under Article 4.

On nuclear disarmament verification.

Just to have a question, I mean, from the seat of an observer.

About how did the relevant work at the UN could have factored in into the discussions of the informal working group?

We have a couple of -- less than two years ago, we had an adoption by consensus of the group of governmental experts report on nuclear disarmament verification. Later this year, the General Assembly might mandate a group of scientific and technical experts on NDV, pending the report of the Secretary-General. that should be out later this summer compiling the views of member states.

So did these discussions factor in any way at the discussions under the TPNW informal working group?

Are there any common or mutually reinforcing takeaways that you might want to highlight?

I mean, being on the floor already, it's.

Good also to say where does Egypt stand on the matter of nuclear disarmament verification. And it's pretty much similar to what numerous states parties already have indicated.

There is no lack of scientific and technical expertise on nuclear disarmament verification.

There is plenty of expertise, reservoir and resource that can be driven from. Secondly, we are not starting from scratch. There has been already rich previous experiences in the past that can be drawn from.

We have the very famous case of the South African experience, but also.

The verification measures that were applied in the context of the implementation of arms control agreements. And lastly, that the IAEA certainly has the competence and expertise to undertake this task and that nothing in its statute says otherwise.

Thank you, Mr. President.

I thank you. Dear colleagues, I do not have any more requests for the floor. I'd like to turn now to co-chairs, if you want to comment, to react on what you heard from the floor.

Thank you, Mr. President, and thank you, colleagues, for the support which we've felt throughout the course of this year, but also in the room this morning. I think we both really appreciate the thoughtful interventions that you have made. I know it's not easy delving into this. It's a heavy and dense topic on a Thursday morning, but I think there's been a really active and substantive set of engagements, so thank you for that. There are many good suggestions for how this work should be carried out from the period where we sit now until the review conference. in the next 18 months or so. So I think we've taken careful note of those and we will be including those in the future work of the working group and whoever the coordinators for that may be. I think this morning we've heard continued encouragement of work by the informal working group and that's pleasing to hear, as well as cooperation with scientists, the IAEA and other organisations, which I think as co-chairs we completely agree with the conclusions that have been reached in that regard. In particular, I wanted to thank Dr. Nick Ritchie and Dr. Moritz Koot for summarising their interesting research that you've been conducting and for sketching out the work that you think would be useful for this working group into the future, again, which we've taken careful note of and I think will help to guide the work of the TPNW over the next wee while. Couple of specific points that I thought were particularly interesting, I thought Dr. Zia Mian's suggestion that we consider the interrelationship with Article 5 on national implementation measures to be very interesting and something I hope that the co-chairs take into account in future inter-sessional periods. I thought Egypt, your remarks just now were very interesting and how we consider interrelationship with existing processes that have taken place in the UN system. I completely agree with the three points that you concluded on, and I think many of those have been borne out in the report that Shivani and I worked on and submitted to this meeting. In terms of existing processes and how they work together, I would certainly hope that TPW States Parties are preparing to fully engage in the GST process and recommending experts to participate in that. I think it's a useful opportunity for us to continue to work on that outside of this framework. I think in terms of the GGE's report that you referenced from two years ago, obviously GGE reports are subject to some limitations that we are not in this community of States Parties. They are consensus reports that are largely participated in by the nuclear weapon states also. So they do have some limitations, however we have looked very closely at them and we have looked very closely at, for instance, the IPNDV's work which has been US-led. So I think we're taking into account all of the products that we have before us and trying to chart a way forward that works for this treaty. And then finally, I thought it was a very valuable suggestion that Austria made this morning in terms of a particular concrete deliverable that we might have at the review conference around testing. So that's something that we'll need to continue to consider as we move forward. Thanks very much.

Thank you, Mr. President. May I join New Zealand in expressing Malaysia's Appreciation to all delegations for your continued support of this workstream and for the rich exchange of views we've had today. I fully agree with the concluding remarks just delivered by Nicholas and many of the points raised by speakers earlier today in terms of deepening our collective understandings in a holistic manner and the recognition that we are not starting from scratch. but are rather able to engage with the nuclear disarmament verification discourse within broader multilateral fora, and in this connection also to consider potential engagement with relevant international organizations. For the co-chairs, bearing in mind the structure of the intersessional process as a whole, We have tried to ensure, as far as possible, that the dialogue proceeds in an inclusive manner. The report serves to provide certain findings on the basis of our consultations with relevant experts, on the understanding that we, as States parties, will continue to interrogate the various elements relevant to nuclear disarmament verification. And to the question raised by the distinguished delegate of Thailand on the co-chairs plans for the next intersessional period, at the moment consultations are still ongoing on the co-chairmanship from the 3MSP up to the review conference. And it is our hope that regardless of who does take up this workstream, our report will provide some basis for next steps that could be considered. With that being said, we are also appreciative of the comments on the value of this working group and will remain engaged in the future dialogue. Thank you again.

I thank Shivanand and Nicholas, the co-chairs of the informal working group on the implementation of Article 4, for your work and dedication, and I look forward to working with you further on. Dear colleagues, may I take it that it is the wish of the meeting to conclude its consideration of sub-item C of agenda item 11? It is so decided. The meeting will now consider sub-item D, entitled Victim Assistance, Environmental Remediation and International Cooperation and Assistance, Articles 6 and 7, of agenda item 11 entitled Consideration of the Status and Operation of the Treaty and Other Matters Important for Achieving the Objectives and Purposes of the Treaty. The meeting has before it the report of the co-chairs of the informal working group on Victim Assistance, Environmental Remediation, International Cooperation and Assistance, document TPNW/MSP/2025/4. I'd like to invite now the co-chairs of the informal working group on victim assistance, environmental remediation, international cooperation assistance, representative of Kazakhstan, Kiribati, to introduce their reports.

Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, esteemed colleagues, distinguished delegates, it is both a privilege and solemn duty to address you today in this crucial discussion. During the period leading up to the third meeting of the State Parties, Kazakhstan and Kiribati, as co chairs of the informal working group on victim assistance, environmental remediation and international cooperation and assistance, convened substantive consultations with state parties in accordance with paragraph F of decision four of the first meeting of state parties. The co-chairs invited diverse stakeholders to the informal working group discussions, including representatives of the international campaign to abolish nuclear weapons, ICRC, academia, affected communities from the Asia Pacific and Central Asia region, both which have experienced the humanitarian and environmental effects of nuclear weapons. The co-chairs also convened a series of separate informal meetings with representatives of civil society and affected communities. The co-chairs circulated a survey in April 2024 to assess the views of States Parties civil society, academia and affected communities on elements of an international trust fund for victim assistance and environmental remediation from the consequences of the use or testing of nuclear weapons. The co-chairs also requested the Scientific Advisory Group to discuss the questions contained in the survey. Consequently, the Scientific Advisory Group established a sub-working group on Article 6 and 7. Numerous affected communities in States Parties and signatories to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, as well as in other countries, continue to suffer from the harm caused by use or testing of nuclear weapons. For example, in the case of Kazakhstan, from 1949 to 1989, about 456 nuclear tests were conducted at the Semipalatinsk test site, including 30 surface, 86 aerial, and 340 underground nuclear explosions. Those tests not only contaminate the test site and the surrounding environment, but also exposed the local population to radioactive fallout. Studies have found that even 40 to 48 years after exposure to radiation, the average annual prevalence of the levels of most categories and classes of diseases among the affected population and their descendants was significantly higher than in the control groups. The studies also found significantly high rates of lung and bronchial cancer among both men and women, breast cancer in women, eye cancer, cancer of brain and other parts of the central nervous system, as well as of the hematonic and lymphoid tissue than in the control groups. In the case of Kiribati from 1957 to 1962, Kiribati island was the site of 33 nuclear tests. The 500 citizens of Kiribati living in Kiribati at the time of the test received little protection and inadequate warning. Many members of this community experienced a multiple of illnesses and health complications that is cancer, congenital disabilities and the birth defects. Dear colleagues, In the informal consultations conducted by co-chairs with affected communities in both Asia Pacific and Central Asia regions, many affected community members discussed their medical ailments, including the severe chronic and inborn diseases, psychological trauma, and intergenerational genetic problems. They also expressed frustration that medical studies conducted by states responsible for nuclear tests have remained mostly classified, leading to further trauma and, in some cases, hindering proper medical care for both first, second, third, and fourth generation survivors. As a result, many affected communities stated that the trust fund should prioritize medical and psychological assistance to victims and assist in the restoration and development of infrastructure in affected areas. Co-chairs consider the establishment of an international trust fund to be an urgent matter. The proposed trust fund could serve the following key functions: provide humanitarian assistance to victims; resources from an international trust fund could be used to conduct studies on the needs of affected communities; The establishment of the trust fund need not to be dependent on the completion of a global needs assessment given the self-evident severity and pressing nature of the problem. The trust fund could provide support for assessing and addressing environmental contamination from the use or testing of nuclear weapons. For example, assessments of levels of background gamma radiation and mapping of the hotspots by scientists are crucial to informing the development of national policies. Even the environment can never be fully restored to its pre-contamination state, every step towards remediation would be beneficial for reducing the inherent risks posed by radioactive contamination. International Trust Fund could help state parties to advance the implementation of Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty. Article 7, paragraph 4 of the Treaty specifies that each State party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the victims of the use or testing of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. An international trust fund would help state parties to fulfill their responsibilities under Article 7 by equipping them with a suitable vehicle for providing international cooperation and assistance to affected states parties. In turn, the assistance would help affected states parties meet their obligation under Article 6. The establishment of the international trust fund can also help promote the universalization of the treaty. Specifically, the establishment of such a trust fund could encourage non-treaty states that have traditionally supported victim assistance provisions in their treaties to make contributions and engage directly with the states parties to the treaty. There is an ample ground for utilizing a trust fund as a means of providing an opportunity for non-treaty states to engage with and support the treaty on a broader basis. A decision to contribute to the International Trust Fund could be utilized to further encourage the contributing state to examine the potential of gradually increasing its involvement in the treaty in other aspects and activities. Now, dear colleagues, I would like to invite my colleague, the co-chair from Kiribati, to continue the discussion. Thank you.

Thank you so much, President Excellencies, fellow co-chair and colleagues. The co-chairs also considered the feasibility of an international trust fund in accordance with the portion of the mandate granted to the working group at the outcome of the second meeting of state parties. The interest in the prospect of a trust fund, present since early in the history of the treaty, indicates strong support for the idea of establishing such a mechanism. The Vienna Action Plan provides a mandate for state parties to engage in substantive discussions on the establishment of an international trust fund. Specifically under action 29, state parties are called upon to discuss the feasibility of and propose possible guidelines for establishing an international trust fund to provide financial support for victim assistance and environmental remediation. In 2023, at the second meeting of state parties, in its decision four took further steps and requested that a report be submitted to the third meeting of state parties with recommendations related to the feasibility of and possible guidelines for the establishment of an international trust fund for victim assistance and environmental remediation with the aim of examining the establishment of such a trust fund by the third meeting of state parties as a priority. During the intercessional period, as mentioned previously by my colleague. State parties and other stakeholders engaged in substantive discussions, responded to a survey on the establishment of an international trust fund, and delivered meaningful presentations to the co-chairs. Additionally, affected communities in particular have voiced strong support for an international trust fund, especially from the Asia Pacific and Central Asia regions. They stressed the need to prioritize funding projects that support medical and psychological assistance to victims, restoration and development of infrastructure, ecological rehabilitation of lands, research on the long-term effects of the testing of nuclear weapons, preservation of the historical and cultural heritage of affected communities and regions, and educational projects for women and young people. They also underscored that the success of an international trust fund depends on whether the interests of victims are taken into account. They emphasized the need to establish an advisory panel within the fund's governing body and the need for members of that governing body to convene regular consultations with both youth and civil society organizations from affected communities. They called for robust mechanisms on transparency, accountability, and oversight, and recommended that awareness-raising campaigns on the establishment of the fund be conducted to ensure, in particular, that the authorities of affected communities are adequately informed about ongoing efforts to establish such a fund. The co-chairs contend that existing trust funds within the context of international criminal, human rights, and disarmament law provide clear precedents for the establishment of an international trust fund under the treaty. In presentation from many experts, including a representative from Harvard Law School, they explained that while no trust fund provides a perfect model, state parties can learn from existing funds to establish one under the TPNW. These include the Victims Trust Fund of the International Criminal Court, the Voluntary Trust Fund of the International Support Network for Victims of Chemical Weapons, the UN Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture, the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Victims of Trafficking in Persons, especially women and children. We've also examined other trust funds that relate to conventional arms or the peaceful use of nuclear energy, including the Arms Trade Treaty Voluntary Trust Fund, the Peaceful Uses Initiative of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations Trust Fund Facility Supporting Cooperation in Arms Regulation, and the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action. Of those, the Peaceful Uses Initiative and the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action are particularly relevant to the environmental remediation objectives of the treaty. We've also examined and looked at the potential of how the trust fund can be an effective and impactful tool to support victim assistance and environmental remediation. This is evident from the fact that in the past, even limited support from the international community has enabled states to implement special programs and projects for the treatment and care of affected communities. For instance, Kazakhstan partnered with the IAEA to develop and implement projects for the rehabilitation of areas exposed to nuclear contamination, with the University of Haifa to study genetic changes in descendants whose parents were exposed to radiation, and with Hiroshima University to assess psychological consequences for the populations living in territories subjected to nuclear weapon tests. In addition, the co-chairs in August of 2024 shared with state parties an initial draft of the terms of reference document for a trust fund on victim assistance and environmental remediation from the consequences of the use or testing of nuclear weapons. The draft terms of reference document addresses the following: guiding principles, a board or committee to govern the trust fund, contributions to the fund, applications for assistance, applications application of the financial regulations and rules of the UN reporting the implementing office program support costs public disclosure closure of the fund and possible revisions the co-chairs conducted extensive informal consultations with state parties civil society groups and affected communities and solicit inputs with the view to refining the draft terms of reference over the international intercessional period While various and sometimes differing views regarding certain elements of the draft terms of reference were expressed, the overall level of interest and engagement by all stakeholders suggests that a trust fund remain a feasible and beneficial way to implement articles six and seven. A few areas in particular seem to require additional work. State parties express differing views on the involvement of affected communities non-governmental organizations and academia and different elements of the trust fund. They also had differing views on voluntary contributions from different actors to the trust fund, including particular whether state parties should allow states not parties and other actors to contribute. Many members of affected communities and civil society groups expressed the need for the fund to accept contributions from all actors. and underscored the importance of inclusivity in the decision-making process. The draft terms of reference represents the coaches' best efforts to produce a compromise text based on the discussions that occurred in the intersessional period. The document will remain a non-paper that will be used for internal reference only within the working group during the next intersessional period. Further, the co-chairs developed a set of guiding principles they recommend and form ongoing discussions and the intersessional period between the third meeting of state parties and the first review conference. These include the following. The trust fund and its design and operation should uphold and be guided by the following key principles. Demand-driven, the fund's grant making should be aimed at meeting the needs and priorities identified by affected states, communities, individuals, and their representative organizations. Voluntariness, contributions to the fund will be voluntary and may be solicited from eligible governments, intergovernmental organizations, national institutions, non-governmental organizations, private entities and individuals. Inclusivity and partnerships, affected communities and individuals are expected to be consulted as appropriate at all stages of the trust fund. Accountability and transparency, all entities and activity associated with the trust fund, including the fund's governing board, donors and grant recipients should be accountable to the state parties, to the meeting of state parties and the review conference. Integrity to safeguard the treaty, the activities of the fund, and its end goals should always advance and uphold the treaty's goals, credibility, and authority. Sustainability, state parties should take all appropriate measures to ensure that the fund remains sustainable. Additionally, the governing board of the trust fund, either a committee or executive body, the composition of which will be determined by the state parties, based on the principles of gender balance and equitable geographical distribution. And that entity will review grant applications, among other functions. The trust fund should support a wide range of projects, including those that assist affected state parties and victims, including survivors, promote measures towards environmental remediation, and build capacity for such activities. It could support projects at any stage of these activities, including projects related to national assessments of the humanitarian environmental impacts of the use or testing of nuclear weapons and development of national plans to address these impacts. Trust fund grants may be directly utilized by or in conjunction with a wider way of competent implementing partners whose scope of work is aligned with the object and purpose. of the trust fund and the treaty. In addition to these guiding principles, a few more, we've also identified possible draft decisions for the adoption by the third meeting of state parties. These include the idea of that we should have focus, further focus discussions under the informal working group on victim assistance, environmental remediation and assistance, taking into account the possible guidelines, technical provisions or terms of reference for the establishment of an international trust fund for victim assistance and environmental remediation from the consequences of the use or testing of nuclear weapons that is viable, effective and sustainable; a report that will be submitted to the first review conference that contains guidelines, technical provisions or terms of reference of an international trust fund for victim assistance and environmental remediation from the consequences of the use or testing of nuclear weapons with the aim of establishing, if possible, such a trust fund at the review conference. And then finally, to ensure flexibility and promote progress and implementation of the humanitarian provisions of the treaty, the establishment of the fund. may proceed in a phased manner informed by the set of guiding principles and with the involvement of stakeholders and development of guidelines and technical provisions or terms of reference. These possible draft decisions were submitted to the president of the third meeting of state parties as well as to all state parties of the TPNW and they have been under consideration and in the process of being negotiated. Thank you.

I thank Azamat and Christian, co-chairs of the informal working group on victim assistance, environmental remediation, international cooperation assistance. Now I open floor for discussion, for your questions, for your comments to the co-chairs. So I give the floor to South Africa to be followed by Holy See.

Thank you very much, Mr. President, and we'd like to thank the co-chairs, Kiribati and Kazakhstan, for the report and for the sheer amount of work undertaken on this important issue during the intersessional period. The positive obligations of the treaty are essential to achieving its humanitarian goals. From our regional perspective, we are cognizant of the legacy of testing of nuclear weapons, knowing all too well the devastation associated with nuclear tests conducted in and around the African continent. This is a longstanding and complex challenge which deserves our utmost attention. Correspondingly, discussions on Articles 6 and 7 require the involvement in discussions by a broad range of stakeholders, including affected communities. Mr. President, while noting the report of the co chairs, we have a few observations. I will touch upon three for now. Uh, first, uh, taking into consideration the Vienna action plan, we were hoping to have a reflection on the work undertaken on, uh, on, um, actions 19 to 32. South Africa has seen some positive developments during the intercessional period, which we believe is very pertinent. For example, the first committee resolution on addressing the legacy of nuclear weapons, providing victim assistance and environmental remediation to member states affected by the use and/or testing of nuclear weapons. And in this regard, for the Secretary General to convene a one-day international meeting on victim assistance and environmental remediation in 2026. This resolution has been championed by both Kazakhstan and Kiribati and supported by a majority of member states. And reflection on this aspect vis-a-vis the implementation of the Vienna Action Plan should have been considered. Secondly, the international cooperation and assistance is key for states parties to cooperate with states parties to facilitate the implementation of this treaty. It is our hope that the decisions taken at the second meeting of states parties on voluntary reporting on Article 6 and 7 would have provided affected states the opportunity to inform the international community of their national plans and where they require external support, thus encouraging international cooperation with states in a position to do so to provide the required assistance. A reflection on this aspect during the next intercessional period might be useful. Third, we note the co-chairs report focused on the establishment of an international trust fund. We do believe that it is opportune for us to consider the establishment of an institutionalized mechanism or structure to ensure that we address the needs of effective communities, thus furthering the humanitarian goals of the treaty. What is fundamental is that we need to get it right. We take note of the guiding principles that the co-chairs recommended, inform ongoing discussions in the upcoming intersessional period. Consequently, we are committed to working with the co-chairs to ensure the mechanism or structures we create establishes assistance programs that optimally, efficiently, and sustainably assist affected communities and populations. Generally, Mr. President, we welcome the work of the co-chairs both directly within the TPNW intersessional period and indirectly within the broader UN context. South Africa believes that a broad focus on the working group would achieve the desired expectation of states parties as articulated in the Vienna Action Plan. We continue to stand ready to engage with the co-chairs as we move forward on a comprehensive implementation of Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty. Thank you.

Thank you. I will give the floor to the representative of Hungary, to be followed by Fiji.

Thank you, Mr. President, Excellencies, distinguished colleagues.

My delegation would like to commend Kazakhstan and Kiribati for their dedicated efforts as co-chairs of the informal working group on victim.

Assistance, environmental remediation, international cooperation and assistance, and welcomes the submission of their report, recognizing its valuable contribution to advancing these important issues. Eighty years after the first nuclear test and the subsequent use of nuclear weapons.

Their devastating humanitarian and environmental consequences are still being felt.

In addition to the immediate destruction.

Caused by these weapons, their use has had a long lasting effect on victims, communities and ecosystems.

Too many people continue to suffer from radiation exposure and contamination of essential resources. There is an urgent need for international cooperation to address these enduring harms.

particularly by states in a position to assist, as many affected nations face significant challenges in responding alone. The international community bears a moral obligation to stand in solidarity with those still suffering the effects of radiation. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons provides a crucial framework for victim assistance and environmental remediation.

Recognising the profound and lasting damage caused by nuclear weapons.

In the context of escalating nuclear threats and military expenditure, the TPNW assumes a pivotal role in upholding.

Human dignity and safeguarding our planet.

Mr. President, my delegation continues to support the ongoing discussions on the establishment of an international trust fund to address.

The long term consequences of nuclear weapon activities.

In order to optimize the fund's effectiveness, it should be open to voluntary.

Contributions from the widest possible range of contributors, including states that are not yet parties to the TPNW.

At the same.

Time, it is imperative that decisions on the allocation of funds remain at the sole discretion of the states parties.

Furthermore, my delegation recognizes that victim assistance and environmental remediation offer potential areas of common ground for dialogue and cooperation between States.

Parties and those that have not yet acceded to the Treaty.

Many States already have national legal frameworks in place that require them to provide assistance to victims of nuclear weapons.

And to address environmental damage.

While these frameworks may have their limitations, They provide an important basis for promoting cooperation on these pressing humanitarian and environmental issues. Finally, my delegation encourages the participation of indigenous communities in the discussions on Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty. The TPNW acknowledges that indigenous communities have historically and continue to bear a disproportionate.

Share of the negative impacts of nuclear weapon activities.

Therefore, it is important that their perspectives be considered in the development of a comprehensive framework for assistance and remediation in response to these enduring effects.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Thank you. Next, Fiji, to be followed by Costa Rica.

Thank you very much, Mr. President, and thank you for your leadership and guidance. If you'd like to first and foremost, I'd like to thank the coaches, Kazakhstan and Kiribati, for their report, including their tireless dedication and effort throughout the intersessionals that we have carried out not only this year and the years before. And just before I move to this particular agenda item, I just want to also thank our two colleagues from Malaysia and New Zealand. for their comprehensive report and likewise their tireless commitment. Let me now return to this item. First of all, we would like to register that this item is of great importance amongst others, which makes this TPNW treaty unique when you compare it to other nuclear disarmament instruments. And with this, we want to reflect on a few points as raised by our co-chairs, including a few additional remarks. And our comment is basically drawn from our national statement as we have raised the day before. And that is that the urgency to advance this work is now more than ever before, in particular the establishment of the trust fund, international trust fund for victims assistance. which is in our view as deliberated quite clearly by the co-chairs, is in line with the Vienna action plan as well. So the urgency is that the longer we wait to advance research, education, awareness and other countermeasures in relation to the devastation of this, is that the more devastation as well that we would have to endure in relation to the effects on our land, our oceans, and our environment in general, which is going to be compounded further in our case, uh, with the effects of climate change, the sea level rise, the natural hazards, and more. Last year, what happened was that we have a massive earthquake in, in Vanuatu, and even one or two years before, we also had a massive volcanic eruption followed by, uh, a tsunami in Tonga. So the issue is that fortunately, this was close to the former nuclear sites. So we are more concerned in case those eruptions or those earthquake happen to be in those nuclear sites, the results would be more terrible. So this is why we are saying there are further research needs to be done and there are things that we really need to advance. but we are more or less stumble with the resources of the constraints that we are facing at this time. And this is basically an important initiative that will guide us in that direction. And what we also wanted to say is that merely compensating the victims, though critical, is not only the priority. We need to roll out scientific efforts to counter radiation. We are not looking at now, we are also looking at the future. We need to be sustainable in our approach, such as our wasteland at the moment, both terrestrial and marine environment, and to complement some of the work that's already been undertaken by some of our partners, including the civil societies. Additionally, though, um, the report is very much comprehensive, um, in our view, it still hasn't gained the mileage that we would want, um, uh, following on from MSP one and MSP two, I know it's the result of negotiation, uh, in our view, we would want, um, uh, we would go by the maximalist, um, approach. And the minimum that we should agree is to have at least to have a common will that we need International Trust Fund as a key outcome derived from Article 6 and Article 7. In this regard, we need not feel that we need to have the most perfect Trust Fund in the world, as some of us seem to think. You know, what we need to understand is that any Trust Fund is of course subject to review and is subject to amendments after operational. to suit the new circumstance that may arise, the dynamics upon which is operational, amongst others. I think the list of trust funders provided by the co-chair from Kiribati is basically, possibly they are being established, but it doesn't mean that almost all of them are perfect. What we need to have is that we need to have it established, and that is why we have the MSP. That is why we have the review conference. All of these are actually models upon which meetings upon which state parties can review the effectiveness of such trust fund and we can delay it in such a way to address some of the common challenges that we may face now or in the future once those fund are actually established. So, you know, Mr. President, as state parties, the effects of testing has implications on member states disproportionately. This is also something that we need to understand. even though we have some common state parties. But when you're looking at the effects, some of us seems to be more affected than others, which is something that we do not see as something that we need to be devices, but something that we need to promote and unite our efforts towards our common goal to provide the level of support that needed. We have the case of Kiribati, we have the case of Marshall Islands, even Kazakhstan, Japan and more. Even in our case in Fiji, we are more fortunate that no testing was done. But we just want to, you know, for the common goal, common purpose that we are here, that we would want to ensure that those who are affected, they needs to be provided the level of support that they need. So in that regard, we do recommend that we should be guided by the members most affected as the benchmark. So if members who are actually affected, wanted, then why should we, as those of us who are not really in the worst situation as them, be the stumbling block? So, so, so, so that's basically the question, uh, which we would want, um, uh, to, to also pose, uh, to, to, to the room, uh, in view of, um, what we have, uh, heard, um, given that the coaches, again, they have reiterated the severe diseases, which are still ongoing, and they also, um, expressed the frustrations that some of our communities, some of our members have faced, Then the question is how long do we need to wait? That's basically the question that we also need to ask at this time in as far as advancing Article 6 and Article 7. And I think for those of us who have some historical knowledge of Article 6 and Article 7, in 2017 it was one of the most difficult article to have it reflected in the treaty itself, given the oppositions that we received in the room. Most of the members, they don't want Article 6 victims of assistance and environment remediation at all. Some of us have to push really hard to ensure that we have something. And here we have something, but again, we are seeing to recall what happened in 2017 again. It becomes that cycle again. So it's unfortunate if that's the case. So this is something that, again, just saying it loud. that we as state parties, we are here as member states agreeing to this and we are also going to commit together in case, but in particular with the member states who are affected, let's unite in our effort to be guided by them in terms of the benchmark that they will need in as far as victims of assistance and environment remediation is concerned. So, Mr. President, let me conclude above all we should take the issue of trust fund. as an issue that should unite members and partners together. And this is, as we know, is purely voluntary. And we have an opportunity to approach partners even beyond this room to be able to provide the channel that they could potentially. Some of them are more willing, they are ready, but we are not providing them the platform. And this is an opportunity that will unite our effort together on this. So finally, Fiji would like to appeal that at least the Voluntary Trust Fund should be established and operational anytime soon, or at least by the MSP or even during the next review conference or whichever the forum that comes earlier. That's all I have at this time. Thank you so much.

I thank you. Now I invite Ambassador Maritza Chan of Costa Rica to take the floor.

Thank you very much, Mr. President. Before the TPNW, treaties on nuclear weapons largely concerned themselves only with preventing further harm, ending nuclear tests, stemming the expansion of existing arsenals and inhibiting the creation of new nuclear arsenals. However, the TPNW goes further than this. As a treaty motivated by humanitarian principles, it not only seeks to eventually free the world from nuclear weapons, but also seeks to redress the damage they've already done. Through the TPNW, States Parties have the duty to work to reclaim environments devastated by nuclear blasts or radiation and, just as crucially, to assist the victims who have suffered and still suffer from exposure to radioactive fallout. States Parties should not be left alone to deal with the nuclear injustices inflicted on communities under their jurisdiction. Therefore, we need to look for effective ways to implement Article 7 and ensure that states receive the assistance that they need. We must also strengthen an appeal to partnerships that span borders, faiths, cultures, ages, abilities and genders, and we must work together. In legal terms, Our task is to find every untapped complementarity between the TPNW and other treaties in force and invest in them with an emphasis on the restorative justice contained in Article 6 of the TPNW. These complementarities must extend beyond nuclear disarmament treaties to also consider ways the TPNW can be implemented to mutually reinforce human rights instruments like the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, as well as climate action and environmental protection. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons recommends the use of complementarities to achieve the objectives of the TPNW, as does the Vienna Action Plan and the many different working documents and working papers submitted to this forum. As each new legal complementarity is identified, it is the duty of State parties to lead our policy into harmony with them. in the secretariat, in intergovernmental organizations, in a strengthened civil society, and in our own governments, just as lessons from Kazakhstan's victim assistance and remediation efforts show. Mr. President, we're grateful to Kazakhstan and Kiribati the co-chairs of the informal working group on victim assistance, environmental remediation and international cooperation and assistance, for the intercessional work that they have carried out and for the draft terms of reference document for the trust funds that they prepared and circulated last year. We look forward to further consultations to reach an agreement on the remaining outstanding issues and to allow for the establishment of an effective mechanism in support of the implementation of Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty. Together, we should use this Treaty, along with every instrument at our disposal, to bind up the wounds of a world scarred by nuclear weapons. Thank you.

Thank you, Ambassador, for your statement. Next, I give the floor to ICRC, followed by Ireland.

Mr. President, the ICRC and indeed the entire Red Cross and Red Crescent movement place great importance on the TPNW's positive obligations on victim assistance and environmental remediation. The TPNW's positive obligations are a testament to the importance of human security which encompasses not only individual and the collective health and well-being, but also the environment, food security, the climate, and ultimately the very future of humanity. And international cooperation and assistance to reduce the harm caused by past nuclear weapon use and testing to people and environment is an important element of achieving and maintaining a nuclear weapon-free world. Needs around victim assistance and environmental remediation are multifaceted and there are many ways for states to discharge their positive obligations. Within the working group and with the input of civil society, considerable work has been done on possible terms of reference for such a trust fund. We commend states for their serious engagement and careful consideration of this important issue. Further progress is now needed if the treaty is to deliver on its promise to victims of nuclear weapons, affected communities and future generations who will be impacted by long lasting environmental contamination. We encourage States Parties to use the opportunity provided by this meeting to continue and advance work towards the establishment of an international trust fund within parameters that are both realistic and appropriate in light of the Treaty's object and purpose. At the same time, we highlight the importance of implementing as soon as possible all the measures contained in the Vienna Action Plan that are necessary for States Parties. both those affected by nuclear weapons use and testing and others, to properly discharge their victim assistance and environmental remediation obligations. Mr. President, as a young activist advocating for nuclear disarmament and having two great-grandfathers who provided medical care, respectively in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to hibakusha, allow me to share some reflections from my home country, Japan. the first and only country to have experienced the horrific effects of nuclear weapons use. I hope they will be relevant to your work on this topic. Hiroshima has a dialectal expression, madote kure, which means destroy it to its original state or make amends. This phrase embodies the desperate plea of the hibakusha to have their lost families, friends, physical and mental health, livelihoods, and social relationships restored. However, throughout history, not only in Hiroshima, but in all instances of nuclear weapon use and testing, there has never been a case where victim assistance and environmental remediation were fully achieved. In every affected region, the situation remains incomplete. Even now, many decades later, people continue to suffer without full recognition of their health damages and communities remain unable to return to their homelands. When a nuclear explosion occurs, whether due to the use or testing of nuclear weapons or an unintended accident, its impact is vast. extending across both space and time, creating a nuclear legacy that transcends generations. The international community must urgently prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons, which cause such long-term and far-reaching consequences for the sake of future generations. Furthermore, the entire international community must collaborate to compensate those who continue to suffer, especially those who have so far been overlooked, and to restore the contaminated natural environment. In Japan, exposure to the initial radiation from a nuclear explosion has traditionally been considered one of the key criteria for compensation. However, radiation exposure resulting from a nuclear explosion also includes residual radiation and fallout, such as the radioactive black rain. For example, fishermen exposed to nuclear tests in the Pacific encountered radiation not only through direct exposure, but also by consuming contaminated fish they unknowingly caught and by being subjected to sudden showers containing radioactive substances. Despite these realities, residual radiation, fallout and radiation exposure in daily life are often overlooked. Therefore, when addressing victim assistance, including the establishment of an international trust fund, it's essential to carefully examine who the victims are or could be to ensure all those who those exposed to radiation are indeed included based on discussions in affected regions, among them Japan. Understanding the many ways in which exposure can occur is crucial. This requires additional scientific research, close collaboration with local communities, and conducting thorough investigations in a respectful and culturally sensitive manner, including interviews with those affected. Thank you for the opportunity to share my experience and contribute to your important work.

Thank you. Now, I give the floor to Ireland to be followed by Mexico.

Mr. President, thank you for giving me the floor. As our thematic discussions earlier this week outlined, any testing or use of nuclear weapons by accident, miscalculation or design would cause immense human suffering and environmental degradation. The testimonies of many, including often marginalized or vulnerable groups, as well as indigenous people and the Baka Shab, must be heard. The work of groups such as Nihon Edankyo are a powerful reminder of the unimaginable suffering caused by nuclear weapons, and we welcome the deserved recognition by the Norwegian Nobel Committee of this incredibly important work in their awarding of the Peace Prize in 2024. Victims and survivors are at the heart of the TPNW. These individuals know directly that our goal is not purely aspirational, but grounded in the lived experience of the enduring consequences of previous nuclear weapons testing and use. The TPNW carefully incorporates this exemplary human security approach with a focus on individuals at its core. The benefit of this approach and the need for it to be advanced across the disarmament and non-proliferation architecture are undeniable. Mr. President, Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty recognise the terrible effects of nuclear weapons on people and our environment and seek to rectify these harms. We thank the co chairs, Kazakhstan and Kiribati, for their continued dedication and work on this important issue. Ireland broadly welcomes the recommendations of the co chairs' report and looks forward to further discussions over the next inter sessional period on the implementation of these articles, including on the establishment of a viable, effective and sustainable international trust fund. The ongoing work on the implementation of these articles has the potential to benefit many lives. It is a key test of the treaty and provides an important opportunity for the disarmament and non-proliferation framework to learn and to reassess through direct engagement with victims and affected communities. Ireland strongly supports the objective of the TPNW and its efforts to address the impact of nuclear weapons with victims and affected communities at its core. We welcome further opportunities to strengthen the implementation of these provisions and ensure the object and the spirit of the treaty is realised. Thank you.

Thank you. Dear colleagues, I have a number of requests for the floor. Let me enumerate them all. After that, I will close the list and just in order to allow time for our co-chairs to respond. So Mexico, ICAN, Kiribati, Switzerland, Austria, Thailand, New Zealand and Indonesia. And after that, I close the list because no more is described and pass the floor back to the co-chairs. So Mexico to be followed by ICANN.

Thank you, President. We thank the co-chairs of the working group for their report. Mexico is pleased to see that progress continues to be made in discussions on the positive obligations under the TPNW particular when it comes to victim assistance and environmental remediation following the use of and tests of nuclear weapons under the leadership of the two co-chairs. Mexico has been a staunch advocate of recognizing the systemic and long-term impacts of nuclear weapons on health, the environment, food security, climate, and development. The consequences of a nuclear explosion, be it intentional or accidental, would be catastrophic and irreversible for the whole of humanity. My country participated constructively in the discussions geared towards defining the guiding principles. that would enable the establishment of a victim assistance fund and environmental remediation. In this regard, we believe that it is essential that in the intersessional period before the TPNW review conference, we go into further depth into discussions on these principles, ensuring clarity and flexibility in their design. We have taken note of the report of the co-chairs of the working group, and we I believe that the different recommendations that they have made to this third meeting of States Parties are a basis on which to continue our deliberations before the review conference. From our perspective, the parameters must be clear enough to ensure that the fund is effective, but also flexible enough to enable its implementation in practice. Contributions from stakeholders will be very important in this process, in particular as regards the intergovernmental negotiation process that we're engaged in. Mexico will continue to participate actively in these discussions to ensure that the TPNW can effectively respond to the devastating humanitarian environmental consequences that nuclear weapons have left in their wake, drawing on the provisions of Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty and the Vienna plan of action. Thank you very much.

Thank you. Now I give the floor to ICANN to be followed by KIRIBATI. Could you turn off your mic just for a second, just to allow. So can't you use the other mic or?

I think it's working now. Okay, good. Thank you, Mr. President, and thank you to the co-chairs for the presentation of the reports and for your work on these articles. Distinguished delegates, I'm pleased to deliver this statement on behalf of the Fiji Nuclear Veterans and Families Association, whose members couldn't be here in person, and I can. The nuclear detonations at Malden and Christmas Island were acts of inhumanity, poisoning the land, the ocean, and the people. Hundreds of Fijian soldiers and sailors were exposed to the radiation of nine nuclear bombs, their lives forever altered by the invisible poison that seeped into their bloodlines. A hydrogen bomb with a destructive force of one megaton when detonated releases energy equivalent to one million tons of TNT, creating a fireball hotter than the sun, instantly vaporizing everything. Those caught in the immediate blast are reduced to shadows, while survivors suffer from radiation burns, blindness, and acute radiation sickness. Now imagine such explosions occurring repeatedly within months. The horror did not end with the explosions. The true enemy was the radiation that permeated the bodies of the Fijian soldiers and sailors. Radiation exposure has resulted in aggressive cancers, rare blood disorders, birth defects, and chronic illnesses that continue to manifest generations later. The children and grandchildren of these veterans have inherited the suffering, living proof that nuclear radiation does not recognize the boundaries of time. The Fijian Nuclear Veterans and Families Association has undertaken a comprehensive data collection in Viti Levu, the capital of Fiji, identifying 40 veterans and over 2,000 family members who remain in desperate need of radiation specialists and dedicated hospitals that can properly diagnose and treat radiation-related conditions. For decades, misdiagnoses have plagued these communities. It is time to act, not just with words, but with tangible measures that heal, repair, and uplift those who have suffered for generations. The Fiji Nuclear Veterans and Families Association urges the TPNW States Parties to fulfill the obligations outlined in Articles 6 and 7 and has the following specific recommendations. First, to provide medical assistance and specialized care, including establishing dedicated medical facilities and radiation treatment centers in Fiji and helping veterans and families residing outside of Fiji receive such care. Secondly, establishing an international trust fund for victim assistance and environmental remediation, which can support programs for nuclear veterans and their families, including medical care and rehabilitative services. Thirdly, pursuing international collaboration, such as developing partnerships with nations possessing advanced medical expertise in radiation-related illnesses to facilitate medical training. States parties to the TPNW should urge nuclear-armed states to release medical records of Fiji veterans and sailors to provide a baseline for the type of unique medical support that nuclear victims need. We urge States parties to provide technical, material, and financial assistance to states parties affected by nuclear weapons to further the implementation of this treaty. Fourth, data collection and transparency. Establish a comprehensive database documenting affected individuals and families and continuing research on the intergenerational impacts of radiation. And finally, public awareness and education. Increase global awareness about the consequences of nuclear detonations and advocate for complete nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, ICAN recommends that all TPNW States Parties implement Vienna Action Plan actions 19 through 32 and 49 through 50 on victim assistance, environmental remediation, and international cooperation and assistance and inclusion. These actions include continuing initial assessments of needs, concluding initial assessments of need, developing national implementation plans, and discussing and developing guidelines to establish an international trust fund. Governments should intensify efforts to include nuclear weapon-affected communities and disseminate information to them at all stages of implementation. Let us move forward towards a future free from the horrors of nuclear devastation. We owe it to our people, our ocean, our environment, and our future generations who depend on a secure future. Thank you.

Thank you. Now I give the floor to Kiribati to be followed by Switzerland.

Thank you, Mr. President. Your Excellencies, distinguished delegates, Esteemed colleagues and ladies and gentlemen, I extend warm greetings to all from the beautiful island of Kiribati in the Republic of Kiribati. My name is Oema Johnson, and I am honored to stand before you today as a youth representative from Kiribati, presenting the concerns and experiences of my people from Kiribati Island. I stand here not only as a representative, but as a fourth generation nuclear survivor. a living embodiment of the long-lasting consequences of nuclear testing. My presence underscores the urgent need for acknowledgement and action regarding the ongoing implications of these tests on our health, our environment, and our very existence. Nuclear testing is often characterized as a tragic chapter in history. a subject that receives scant attention in educational curricula and public discourse. For my family and community, however, it is not merely an academic issue. It is an immediate and painful reality. Between 1957 and 1962, the United Kingdom and the United States conducted thermonuclear weapons tests on Christmas Island as part of Operation Grebe. leaving behind a devastating legacy. These were not inconsequential tests. They involved some of the most powerful nuclear weapons ever tested. And the people of Kiribati were neither consulted nor informed. As a British colony at that time, we were treated as subjects rather than individuals deserving dignity and protection. My family's history carries profound stories of survival during this catastrophic period. My grandfather, who arrived on Christmas Island at the tender age of 14, lived through bombing without any protective measures. The radiation exposure he endured has had severe consequences for his health and that of our family. In his later years, he was afflicted with serious health issues, including hearing impairment, memory loss, and cognitive decline, conditions that were previously absent in our family. The intergenerational effects of these nuclear tests are evident in our familial history. Two of my father's older siblings were born prematurely and tragically passed shortly after birth. My father's sister succumbed to an undiagnosed neurological condition at the age of 18, a condition believed to be linked to radiation exposure. My father continues to endure chronic migraines, and I too have experienced unexplained health issues. The suffering inflicted by these actions did not cease with the conclusion of the tests. It continues to have profound effects today. passed down through generations. In light of this painful legacy, I wish to highlight the critical relevance of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in advancing the cause of nuclear justice. The government of Kiribati has been actively engaged in efforts to realize this treaty, particularly emphasizing the obligations set forth in Article 6 and 7. Under Article 6, states parties bear a legal responsibility to provide assistance to victims and remediate environments affected by nuclear testing. This obligation is not a mere symbolic gesture. It is a moral imperative to ensure the health and well-being of those affected and to restore the ecosystems that have suffered. Moreover, Article 7 underscores the importance of international cooperation in addressing the ongoing ramifications of nuclear testing. The Kiribati government advocates for collaborative efforts through the United Nations system and various international organizations to support affected communities. We believe that all nations have a collective responsibility to aid in the healing of those still grappling with the long-term effects of nuclear warfare. In particular, we call for the establishment of an international trust fund dedicated to assisting nuclear-affected communities, including our own. This fund must provide, first, comprehensive medical care for survivors and their descendants, with a focus on radiation-related illnesses. Second, financial support for families facing intergenerational health challenges and economic hardships caused by these displacements and loss of livelihoods. Third and last is environmental remediation, initiative to restore and rehabilitate contaminated lands and waters. This is a clarion call for justice. The United Kingdom and the United States, as primary actors in these nuclear tests, must acknowledge their historical responsibilities and take concrete immediate action to aid the communities irreparably impacted by their nuclear programs. Excellencies, the people of Kiribati exemplify resilience, yet such resilience should not imply acceptance of injustice. We did not choose the devastating wrath by nuclear weapons. and we continue to bear the consequences the commitments outlined in article six and seven of the tpnw must be translated into actionable measures that provide relief remediation and Justice as representative of the youth we are often regarded as the future however we are also a part of the present we are not passively awaiting Justice we are actively demanding it I implore this assembly to take decisive action to ensure the fulfillment of the commitments made under the TPNW, not as distant promises but as urgent and concrete step towards justice for nuclear affected communities. Nuclear injustice is not solely my burden, it is a global responsibility. Justice delayed is justice denied. We cannot afford to wait any longer. Thank you, Mr. President.

Thank you. Next, Switzerland to be followed by Austria.

Thank you, Mr. President, for giving me the floor under this agenda item.

We also thank the co-chairs for their extensive work and their report on the topic.

The catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons and the devastating nuclear legacies.

Were underlined in the survivors' testimonies as well as in the scientific evidence presented during this week. The global concerns at the humanitarian and environmental impacts of nuclear weapons.

Were also highlighted at last year's first committee of the UN General Assembly, including through a resolution spearheaded by Kazakhstan and Kiribati receiving broad support.

Switzerland has recognized the importance of victim assistance and environmental remediation and the significance of the positive obligations contained in Article 6 and 7.

Since its participation in the TPNW negotiations in 2017.

As an observer state.

To the TPNW, Switzerland continues to consider the humanitarian consequences as an area of work that could unite all stakeholders. We underline that we see potential for complementarities with other treaties and processes.

We take note of the report by the co-chairs proposing the establishment of an international trust fund for victim.

Assistance and environmental remediation from the consequences of the use or testing of nuclear weapons.

Switzerland continues to see value in a trust fund if it could.

Ensure sufficient and sustainable resources over the long term.

This would require structuring it in a way that allowed for broad support, including from states beyond the treaty's membership.

We therefore reiterate our hope that the trust fund will be structured in a way that allows for inclusivity, both.

In terms of contributors and the views solicited in its work. What we have heard so far by the co-chairs and the States Parties seems to be positive in that regard.

Thank you very much for your attention.

I thank you. Now I give the floor to Austria to be followed by Thailand.

Thank you. Let me join others in thanking the co-chairs of the Article 6 and 7 Working Group, Kazakhstan and Kiribati, for their reports and the regular convening of meetings in the inter-sessional period on the implementation of these two important articles. Victim assistance and environmental remediation have always been a truly cooperative endeavor. and the TPNW has broken new ground in the area of weapons of mass destruction. Eight years after the first use and tests of nuclear weapons, concrete assistance to affected communities and the environment is still woefully lacking in many cases. This is unacceptable, and even more so in light of the additional scientific evidence available to us now on the depth and breadth of the harms of the use, testing, mining and waste dumping, as well as fuel cycle accidents have caused. There are no boxes to tick off here, but what is needed are long-term commitments to the socio-economic, cultural development and physical and psychological well-being of a community with the aim of leaving no one behind. We commend affected States and all stakeholders that have undertaken or supported measures for victim assistance to effectively harness their expertise, resources and the ensuring of a wider impact, we must find ways to better cooperate and assist those most in need. We therefore look forward to making progress towards new and groundbreaking modalities under the Treaty. Survivors and affected communities, including indigenous peoples, know best what their needs are and therefore must be part of any discussion in this regard. For Austria, a human-centered approach with the effective and non-discriminatory participation of survivors therefore remains at the heart of our treaty. Incorporating gender and diversity considerations is essential to ensure that all those in need can effectively benefit from victim assistance. Chair, As a humanitarian disarmament treaty, the TPNW can make use of synergies with and best practices from existing instruments, including the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative, the Mine Action Fund, and where applicable, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. These instruments can provide valuable ideas on how to deal with radioactive materials and remnants of war, or how to ensure full and equal meaningful inclusion of survivors and affected communities in our work. What points to a unique challenge for our work, however, is the transgenerational nature of impacts on affected communities exposed to radiation. Only with better understanding the long-term effects of radiation, we can better target victim assistance and environmental remediation programs and fully grasp the humanitarian impact any nuclear explosion really has on humanity as a whole. Chair, with the first review conference ahead of us, it is time to define milestones based on common understandings of good practices in the implementation of Articles 6 and 7. Progressing work on national action plans, as established in the Vienna Action Plan, Action 31, as well as conducting needs assessment with survivors and affected communities can be significant steps, not only for better understanding needs, but also for ensuring ownership and sustainability of national strategies. Another measure to show progress on is the designation of national contact points for Articles 6 and 7. Austria is active in the implementation of victim assistance provisions of the CCW and the AP MDC, as well as the CCM previously, and we remain committed to sharing best practices and learning from these processes. We therefore look forward to engaging with others in the upcoming sessional process to ensure that we can implement Article 6 and 7 in the most effective way, including by working on the establishment of an effective and impactful trust fund. Through our collective commitment, and action, we can turn the obligation of the treaty into effective, meaningful, and lasting change for those affected by nuclear weapons. Thank you.

I thank you. I give the floor to Thailand to be followed by New Zealand.

Thank you, Chair. Thailand commends Kazakhstan and Kiribati for their leadership and efforts to conduct extensive consultations with state parties, civil society groups, and affected communities. Meaningful engagement of all stakeholders is essential to the success of our work. Thailand reaffirms the importance of Article 6 and 7 as core obligations to address humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use and testing. In this regard, Thailand has co-sponsored a UNGA resolution on addressing the legacy of nuclear weapons, providing the victim assistance and environmental remediation to member states affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons tabled by Kazakhstan and Kiribati. I would also like to echo previous speakers that we should continue to advance Article 6 and 7 within the TPNW as well as in the wider context to complement other treaties and processes. Over the past days, we have heard testimonies of nuclear survivors and recognize the urgent need to provide necessary support to the victims and remediate the environmental damage caused by nuclear explosions. Thailand therefore welcomes the guiding principles and initial draft terms of reference and views it as an important basis of our work toward establishing an international trust fund that is inclusive, transparent, and sustainable. We encourage the informal working group to continue substantive discussion during the upcoming intercessional period based on existing findings, the survey conducted and with the support of the scientific advisory group, as well as to promote public awareness raising and education and engagement with various stakeholders to appeal for their valuable support and resources. Thailand remains firmly committed to strengthening the international cooperation and assistance in these areas, We believe that international community must unite in these efforts to address the long lasting legacy of nuclear weapons. I thank you.

I thank you. Now I give the floor to New Zealand to be followed by Indonesia.

Thank you, Mr. President.

First, I wish to thank the co-chairs, Kiribati and Kazakhstan, for their dedicated efforts in support of this critical work stream. As we are all aware, some communities impacted by nuclear weapons testing have been waiting far too long for assistance. While New Zealand is particularly conscious of the harmful legacy of nuclear testing in the Pacific, the enduring effects and damage of the detonation of over 2,000 nuclear weapons continue to be felt in many parts of the world, from Central Asia to North Africa and North America. I acknowledge all of those who have joined us here today from affected communities. We thank you for your perseverance and for continuing to tell your stories and share your experiences.

We are listening.

I thank all of those who have contributed to the work led by Kazakhstan and Kiribati over the last intersessional period. This includes the significant contributions of international non-government organisations and civil society groups. New Zealand remains determined to support this workstream where we can, as we have done since the establishment of the Treaty. In the Pacific, the consequences of nuclear testing last century persist today. Some communities are unable to return to their ancestral lands and fishing grounds due to the environmental destruction and contamination.

Caused.

That climate change now presents an existential risk to the integrity of a number of testing related structures requires urgent attention and action. Mr. President, New Zealand supports efforts to seek to establish a mechanism to sustainably provide assistance to victims and for environmental remediation, and we are committed to working with all TPNW state parties to reach agreement and progress this work.

Thank you.

I thank you, Ambassador, I give the floor to Indonesia to be followed by Chile.

Thank you, Mr. President, Excellencies, distinguished delegates and colleagues, we join all our colleagues in thanking Kazakhstan and Kiribati for their leadership as co-chairs of the informal working group. of Article 6 and 7 and taking notes on their reports. We commend their dedications to facilitating discussions among States party and relevant stakeholders, as well as collecting input from affected communities, civil society and experts which have advanced the discussion on the working group. We also acknowledge the testimonies of those who have suffered of the devastating effects of nuclear testing and their voices serve as a stark reminder of our collective responsibility to act. Mr. Chair, Mr. President, first, Indonesia underscores the need to place the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons at the forefront of our deliberation. The tragic case of Semipalatinsk and Kiritimati Island that included in the report, as well as many cases from nuclear tests all over the world, illustrate the enduring health, environmental and socioeconomic toll on affected populations. The intergenerational effects of nuclear contamination demand urgent and sustained international attention. This human story must remain at the heart of our work, reinforcing the moral and legal imperative of victim assistance and environmental remediation. In this regard, we stress the importance of transparency, scientific research, and continued engagement with affected communities to ensure that assistance is tailored to real and pressing needs. Second, Indonesia recognize the need for continued discussion on international trust fund establishment. We believe that this initiative must be approached with a careful deliberation. The establishment of such a fund requires clear guidelines on source of funding, governance structure, and long-term sustainability to ensure its effectiveness and credibility. Furthermore, Insha emphasized the importance of upholding the integrity of the treaty, particularly in the discussion regarding the source of contribution for the trust fund that comes from nuclear armed states or entities linked to the nuclear weapons industry. In our view, any mechanism, including funding mechanism, must reinforce rather than undermine the treaty course disarmament objective. Mr. President, Indonesia remains committed to constructive engagement on this critical matters. We look forward to working with all delegation and relevant stakeholders to ensure that the humanitarian provisions of the treaty are implemented with the highest ethical and legal standards. We reaffirm our commitment to a future free from nuclear weapons, one where justice is delivered to affected communities and the environment is safeguarded for generations to come. Thank you.

I thank you. I give the floor to Chile.

Thank you very much, President. Chile values and expresses our profound gratitude to the work carried out by Kazakhstan and Kiribati in the informal working group on victim assistance, environmental remediation, and international cooperation and assistance in the framework of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The environmental and humanitarian consequences of the use of and testing of nuclear weapons is a task that the international community must absolutely take up and is a fundamental pillar for the establishment of a disarmament regime that is fully legitimate. From this perspective, Chile reaffirms its commitment to the humanitarian principles of the TPNW, as well as the need to make headway with concrete measures that enable us to effectively address the impact of nuclear weapons on the affected populations and on the environment. In this regard, our country stands ready to continue to work on discussions to establish mechanisms for assistance and reparations with the possible creation of a trust fund. We believe that the report presented is an important basis to continue to work during the intercessional period with a view to establishing a fund that is sustainable in time. Thank you very much, President.

Thank you. Dear colleagues, we have the number of civil society representatives, to be accurate, five. So let us start from the first one.

Introduce yourself and proceed with your statement, please.

I'd like to express my gratitude to everyone working towards a world without nuclear weapons.

Korean A-bomb victims find themselves in a unique.

Historical and political situation that requires careful consideration when it comes to victim assistance issues.

The United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 100,000 명 넘는 한국인이 피폭되었습니다 그러나 아직까지도 제대로 된 실태조사 한번.

이루어지지 않아 도대체 얼마나 많은 한국인이 피해를 당했는지 알 수 없습니다 한국 원폭 피해자 중 상당수는 일제강제동원 피해자였습니다.

About 100,000 Koreans were exposed to the atomic bomb dropped by United States on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, even to this day, no proper investigation has been conducted to determine the true extent of the damage, and we still do not know how many Koreans were affected. Many of the Korean A-bomb victims were also victims of forced labor during the Japanese colonial rule.

Survivors who returned to their hometowns also suffered a lifetime of pain due to the government's indifference, society's indifference, terrible poverty, and the aftereffects of the atomic bomb. Even now, the Korean government Even those who survived and returned.

To their hometowns live the rest of their lives in pain, suffering from the neglect of the government, social ostracism, crushing poverty, and the after effects of the atomic bomb. Even now, the South Korean government continues to exclude the descendants of A-bomb victims from special support law and has completely ignored the voices of the victims.

I am the branch president of the Korean Atomic Bomb Survivors Association, and I have witnessed the pain that our victims are experiencing, which cannot be expressed in words.

As the head of the Hapcheon branch of the Korean A-bomb Victims Association, I have witnessed the indescribable pain endured by Korean victims for.

Over 20 years.

I ask, why must we suffer and die in this way?

원폭이 태된 지 80 년이 지났지만 미국과 일본 정부는 피해자들에게 단 한 번의 사죄나 배상을 하지 않았습니다. 피해자는 있는데 책임지는 가해자가 없다는 것은 도저히 있을 수 없는 일입니다.

It has been 80 years since the atomic bomb was dropped, yet neither the U.S. nor the Japanese government has offered an apology or provided compensation to the victims. It is unimaginable that there are victims yet no responsible perpetrators.

I demand with a bleeding heart that the governments of Korea, the United States, and Japan provide international trust fund to participate in the international trust fund for victim assistance, but also sign the TPNW without delay.

I demand this with all my heart. The governments of Korea, the United States, and Japan must not only participate in an international trust fund for victim assistance, but also sign the TPNW, without delay.

I demand this with all my heart. The governments of use, and victims like us can be created again. That is why Korean atomic bomb victims and their descendants will oppose nuclear weapons until they become a high-temperature lump on the earth.

The existence of nuclear weapons means they can be used at any time, creating more victims like us. Therefore, we, the Korean A-bomb victims and their descendants, will continue to oppose nuclear weapons until every single nuclear weapon on this planet is reduced to a pile of scrap metal.

In 2026, to hold the United States accountable for its illegal atomic bombings, I also appeal for.

Your support and participation in the 2026 International People's Tribunal, which will hold the U.S. accountable for its illegal atomic bombing of 1945.

Together, let's create a world without nuclear weapons. Thank you.

Together, let us create a world of peace without nuclear weapons. Thank you.

Thank you. I give the floor to the next civil society representative.

Thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to speak on the topic of victim assistance and environmental remediation. My name is Alan Owen, and I am the son of James Ronald Owen. who served in Her Majesty's Royal Navy at Operation Dominic, a joint UK-US operation on Christmas Island in 1962. The first British test was carried out in 1952 at the Montebello Islands in Australia. The UK tested a total of 45 atmospheric weapons in Australia and the Pacific. They performed 600 minor or subcritical trials in Australia, and 24 underground tests in the Nevada desert until 1991. A small delegation of UK servicemen also took part in Operation Dominic on Christmas Island, and one of them was my father. Over 22,000 servicemen took part in the British nuclear testing program. Scientists, indigenous people, and innocent victims were affected by this program. At the second meeting of states parties, we heard testimony from Corrina Lester, in reference to her father Yami and how after the totem test at Emu Field in 1953 a black mist moved across his territory forever affecting those innocent people. Yet you may be amazed to know that the topic of British testing is not taught in schools in the UK. The participants and the victims have been airbrushed from history. This must change. There are generations of people who don't even know that the UK tested nuclear weapons, let alone the effects and the legacy. Speaking of that legacy, my father unfortunately died in 1994, aged just 52 from a heart attack. During his time on Christmas Island, he witnessed 24 detonations in 78 days, the largest being 7.7 megatons. because Operation Dominic was fast tracked because of the Test Ban Treaty coming into force. My brother died in 1996, aged just 31, from the same heart condition, 18 months after my father. My sister also suffered a heart attack but luckily survived. As the youngest of three siblings, I thought I had escaped the curse of the nuclear tests. But in April 2022, I suffered a cardiac arrest and was without a heartbeat for eight minutes, clinically dead. Luckily for me, I had immediate CPR and three shocks from a defibrillator to bring me back to life. This is the legacy of nuclear testing. Congenital defects, neurological problems passed down through the generations. Mine is one story of hundreds of thousands of families worldwide who live with the effects every day. Yet the UK government refuses to study the descendants and voted against a new study into the effects of nuclear war. The TPNW with the victim assistance and environmental remediation is extremely important because of this legacy. The impacted communities need help. the indigenous people have had their sacred lands forever contaminated. Burial pits in Australia containing plutonium with a half-life of 24,000 years. No-go areas with signs such as those at the Montebello Islands which state to restrict your visit to one hour per day, avoid causing dust as any particle might be radioactive, not to handle or remove objects as they may be radioactive, and no camping is allowed. This is 73 years later. We must continue to monitor these toxic environments and as new technologies emerge, help the indigenous people who live close to these areas. We have an opportunity to help the victims through the trust fund, but the fund must be administered with meticulous scrutiny. the actual victims receiving the help that they require. We must include the NGOs at the highest level of any board or grant making committee. We are the experts in our own community. We have the lived experience of being part of the nuclear community. Whilst we might not be scientists, we understand our unique communities, their heritage, the suffering and the pain. We live with that legacy every day. We now have fourth generation descendants who are experiencing health issues, miscarriages, stillbirths, birth defects. The bloodline has been forever altered. It is critical that this fund is administered so that essential studies are completed, that programs that help the victims are created because they've been ignored for decades. Studies such as the DNA study from iglow.world, which seeks to capture the DNA of the first and second generation survivors before they pass away, so their whole genome can be sequenced for future studies. The average age of a UK nuclear test veteran is now 85, and many of them believe that the UK government is waiting for them all to die before acknowledging the harm. We estimate that there are between 1,500 and 2,000 of them left worldwide of the 22,000. So many have now passed away who campaigned for decades. Throughout my life, I have campaigned for recognition, for an apology, for compensation, and the abolishment of these weapons. This is why I founded LabRats to help impacted communities, not just in the UK, but across the world. I've met some amazing people doing amazing things like the people here today. Through the TPNW we can make a difference. We can evoke change and help those affected. We can educate, raise awareness, tell our stories and ensure that the victims receive the help that they deserve. But we must be included from the very beginning in the set up of the trust fund and the administration of the grants. We stand as one nuclear community, showing the world that these weapons are deadly, not just at the point of detonation, but for decades afterwards. The effects last for generations. We must never forget these participants, the innocent victims and those who gave the ultimate sacrifice, many unknowingly. It is time the world woke up and started a new chapter in history. And that chapter is one without nuclear weapons and one where the victims are assisted and where the world knows their story. As a representative for the British nuclear test veterans and their families, I encourage you to ensure that the role of the NGOs is not forgotten and that it is enhanced and an impacted communities group created similar to the scientific advisory group. To the observers at this meeting, please double your efforts to sign this treaty. And to the States Parties, thank you for your commitment to the Treaty, and in doing so, you are protecting future generations from these terrible weapons of destruction. These should be abolished so that no one ever witnesses their destruction again, as my father did. Thank you.

I thank you. So, dear participants, we've heard the final speaker for the morning session. And since there are three delegations remaining who have requested for the floor under this agenda item, I would suggest that we will move the further deliberations on this agenda item for the afternoon session, and we will therefore continue our discussions on this agenda this afternoon at 3:00 sharp. But before coming to an end, I would like to invite the Secretary-General to make the announcement.

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Thank you very much, Mr. President. I'd just like to make the following announcements. At the request of Kiribati, the Secretariat wishes to inform delegates that a side event entitled Nuclear Weapons and Gender will take place today from 1:15 p.m. to 2:30 p.m. in Conference Room 12. A light lunch in connection with the event will be served near the Vienna Cafe. I would also like to remind delegations that the draft credentials report will be circulated this evening. In order for delegations to be represented in that credentials report, they need to have their delegation submitted by 3 o'clock this afternoon. And I would also like to remind delegations that additionally, at the request of Ireland and Thailand, the Secretariat wishes to inform delegates of a side event on the impact of nuclear weapons on children, which will take place during the lunch break in conference room six. The event will hear from the UN Office, the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, the ICRC, and others.

Thank you, Mr. President.

I thank you, Secretary-General. Dear colleagues, before adjourning the meeting, please allow me to remind all delegations of the state parties who may be interested in taking a position in the coordination committee to please approach my delegation as soon as possible. So as I said, our next meeting will take place this afternoon, this room at 3 p.m. sharp. The meeting is adjourned.