(1st meeting) Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Excellencies, dear delegates, ladies and gentlemen, good morning to you all. It is a great honour for me to declare open the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Review Conference has been convened pursuant to Article 8, paragraph 3, of the Treaty and Resolution 77/66 of 14 December 2022 of the United Nations General Assembly. This is the sixth Review Conference to be held since May 1995. when States Parties adopted decisions on the indefinite extension of the Treaty, on the strengthening of its review process, and on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, together with a resolution on the Middle East. The Treaty, which entered into force 56 years ago, has played a crucial role in nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Throughout the past five and a half decades, the NPT has served as an essential pillar of international peace and security and a bulwark against the dangers of nuclear weapons. This Review Conference provides all parties to the treaty with an important opportunity to reaffirm their commitment to the Treaty and to the full implementation of all its provisions, as well as the consensus outcomes of previous review conferences. This is important in upholding the integrity of the Treaty and in ensuring that it remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. As decided by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the conference also provides an opportunity to address emerging challenges and to articulate a way forward to ensure that the treaty stays relevant and fit for purpose. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, Following the practice of previous review conferences, I now wish to introduce the final report of the Preparatory Committee, that is NPT/CONF.2026/1, adopted on 9 May 2025. The Committee held three sessions during the period of July 2023 to May 2025. 145 States Parties to the Treaty participated in the work of one or more of the sessions of the Preparatory Committee. States not party to the Treaty, specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations as well as representatives of academia and non-governmental organizations, were invited to attend meetings of the Preparatory Committee in accordance with the modalities of participation agreed by the Committee. At each session of the Preparatory Committee, a meeting was specifically allocated for representatives of non-governmental organizations to share their views and perspectives on relevant issues. The Preparatory Committee was able to agree and make recommendations on all main issues related to the organization of the Conference. In particular, during the third session of the Preparatory Committee on 9 May 2025, a decision on the date and the venue for the Conference was adopted. The Preparatory Committee was also able to agree and make recommendations on the draft Rules of Procedure, and the financial arrangements, the provisional agenda, the allocation of items to the main committees, as well as background documentation. The recommendations on these issues are reflected in the final report of the Committee, which is available on UNODA's website for the 2026 MPT review conference. the Preparatory Committee decided to defer consideration on the final document or documents to the Review Conference. Throughout the preparatory process, the Committee devoted most of its meetings to substantive discussions on all aspects of the Treaty, based on the allocation of items to each of the main committees of the 2015 Review Conference and three specific blocks of issues. One, nuclear disarmament and security assurances. Two, regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. And three, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and other provisions of the treaty and improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process. In this regard, States Parties will recall that the Tenth Review Conference, in its decision MPT/CONF.2020/DEC.2, established a Working Group on further strengthening the review process of the Treaty, open to all States Parties. The Working Group met from 24 to 28 July 2023 in Vienna. immediately prior to the first session of the Preparatory Committee and held discussions on measures to improve the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability, coordination and continuity of the Tenth Treaty Review process. Guided by the provisions of the final document of the 2000 Review Conference, including paragraph 7 of the section entitled improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty, the chairs of the first and second sessions of the Preparatory Committee prepared factual summaries of the consideration of issues by the Committee. In the course of these discussions, as well as those at the third session of the Preparatory Committee, many proposals were put forward, including those contained in the Annex 2 list of documents in the final report of the Committee. Despite the Committee's best efforts, it was unable to produce a consensus report containing substantive recommendations to the Review Conference. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, It is now my privilege to proceed to the recommendation for the office of the President of the 2026 MPT Review Conference. As agreed at the third session of the Preparatory Committee, the Committee expressed its full support for the intention of Vietnam, with endorsement of the Non-Aligned Movement, to nominate a candidate for the President of the Conference. I was subsequently informed that His Excellency Ambassador Doan Huu Viet, Permanent Representative of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to the United Nations, was nominated for the presidency of the 2026 MPT Review Conference. I now place the recommendation formally before the Conference for approval. May I take it that the Conference wishes to elect His Excellency Ambassador Doan Hong Viet by acclamation as President of the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons? It is so decided. I wish to express my heartiest congratulations to His Excellency Ambassador Doan Hong Viet and to assure him of my full support and cooperation, and I am sure of the entire delegations here throughout the conference. I would now like to invite the President to take his seat. Please join me welcoming Ambassador Do Hong Viet to the podium.

Your Excellency, Mr. Antonio Guterres, Secretary General of the United Nations, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, it is an immense honor for me to serve as President of the 11th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. At this moment, I'm profoundly grateful to my country, Vietnam, a nation shaped by resilience and independence, by the tireless pursuit of peace and an enduring belief in dialogue over confrontation, diplomacy over violence. Allow me to pay tribute to ASEAN and the non-aligned movement and express my sincere gratitude to all states parties for the confidence you have placed in me. I'm deeply mindful of the responsibility entrusted, and I will carry it out with much humility and a full sense of duty to all. Excellencies, for more than half a century, the NPT has played a vital role in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, advancing nuclear disarmament, and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As a crucial part of the NPT regime, review conferences have served as our points of reference on both where we stand and where we must go. They have guided our collective path toward the aspiration of a world free of nuclear weapons. Yet today, that path is less certain. We meet at a time of rising global tensions, disrupted dialogue, and eroding trust. Global military spending continues to set new records every year for the last decade. Nuclear arsenals are being modernized and expanded. The faltering of arms control arrangements present a disruption of trust and dialogue. The idea of using nuclear weapons are no longer confined to the most extreme scenarios in classified war plans. Likewise, the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons are openly discussed as if the legal norms against it do not exist. And it has now been 15 years, 16 to be exact, since we collectively as NPT states parties pronounced our commitment to and vision for the NPT regime in the form of a consensus substantive outcome of the review conference. This is a reality we must face with honesty. The NPT process remains unique. It brings together the vast majority of United Nations member and observer states, including all permanent members of the Security Council. Its legitimacy and central role in international peace and security is undisputed. But legitimacy cannot rest on existence alone. Without continuous and renewed efforts, the Treaty risks becoming a relic of the past, only respected at will and no longer guides the actions of States. Throughout my consultations with States Parties over the last seven months, I have heard in no uncertain terms that all of us remain committed to the objectives of the Treaty, and each of us, in our own way, is striving to avert a nuclear catastrophe. This is reason enough to find ways to move beyond entrenched divisions and resist the quiet acceptance of failures as the new normal, to rebuild trust and rediscover a shared sense of responsibility, however difficult that may be in the present moment. We must work to preserve and strengthen the relevance and authority of the NPT so that it not only continue to exist, but can guide us away from the catastrophe that nuclear war may bring. We should not expect this conference to resolve the underlying strategic tensions of our time or settle the disputes and conflicts that are plaguing many regions. But a balanced outcome that reaffirms core commitments and set out practical steps forward would strengthen the integrity of the NPT and convey the continued shared commitment to and relevance of this Treaty. I therefore urge all delegations to approach the coming weeks with constructiveness, flexibility and a genuine willingness to engage. Let us work together to advance substantive, forward-looking discussions, ones that respond to the realities of today and safeguard our future tomorrow. For my part, as President of this conference, and building on the work of the past months, I am committed to ensuring a transparent and inclusive process that can drive meaningful progress and deliver a clear and credible message. Excellencies, colleagues, this is not just another review conference. The success or failure of this conference will have implications way beyond these halls and way beyond these next five years. The prospects of a new nuclear arms race are looming over us, the scale of which we are yet to fathom. The prospects of a world without an effective, functioning NPT regime would, in all likelihood, be one where regional rivalries increasingly have nuclear dimensions, where the taboo against nuclear use erodes further, and where collective security is diminished by the potential spread of nuclear weapons. These are not prospects that we want for ourselves or for our children. So, ladies and gentlemen, let's get to work. Thank you. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, it gives me great pleasure to invite His Excellency, Mr. Antonio Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations, to address the Conference.

Mr. President of the Conference, Excellencies, Distinguished Delegates, Thank you for joining us. This Conference provides a timely opportunity to stand together and safeguard humanity from the great threat of nuclear annihilation. The global goal of eliminating nuclear weapons stretches back to the UN General Assembly's very first resolution in 1946. But sadly, people's memories are short. It was not so long ago that children learned to hide under their desks in case of a missile launch, that the nuclear arms race forced us to build fallout shelters, that nuclear testing destroyed pristine environments and vulnerable communities, and that humanity lived under the shadow of potential nuclear Armageddon. Today, a state of collective amnesia has taken hold. Nuclear sabres rattle once more. Mistrust rules the day. Hard-won norms are eroding, and arms control is dying. Global military spending soared to 2.7 trillion US dollars last year, 13 times more than all development aid globally, and equivalent to the entire gross domestic product of Africa. For the first time in decades, the number of nuclear warheads is on the rise. Nuclear testing is back on the table. and some governments are openly mulling the acquisition of these horrific weapons. Have we forgotten that a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought? Have we forgotten that nuclear weapons make no one safer? Have we forgotten that the only reason the world did not tumble into the abyss was because leaders stood together and said, "Enough"? Across the decades, We developed a web of instruments to prevent the use, proliferation, and testing of nuclear weapons, and achieve their total elimination. The Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the bedrock of those efforts, a meeting ground for countries to strengthen our common security, and an example of multilateralism in action. For too long, the Treaty has been eroding. Commitments remain unfulfilled. And trust and credibility are wearing thin. The drivers of proliferation are accelerating. So we need to breathe life into the Treaty once more. And, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, as you begin your deliberations today, I urge you to focus on two key points. First, countries must keep their promises under the Treaty, without caveats, without conditions, without delays, without excuses. It's time to recommit to disarmament and non-proliferation as the only true path to peace, by reinforcing the norm against nuclear testing, by strengthening the safeguards system and the IAEA's oversight, and by agreeing the measures needed to prevent nuclear war. Second, your discussions should lay the groundwork for the Treaty to evolve. Today, the nuclear threat is compounded by new dangers from rapidly evolving technologies, such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing. The Treaty is not a relic of a former age, frozen in amber. It must grapple with the nexus between nuclear weapons and new technologies. It must ensure that until nuclear weapons are eliminated, humanity never cedes control over their use. And it must help expand access to the benefits of nuclear science and technology for sustainable development. The treaty is only as strong as countries' commitment to it. With your support and engagement, the Treaty can remain an active and strong foundation for a world free of nuclear weapons in our fast-moving age.

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, today, just outside this hall, the hibakusha, these courageous survivors of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, have organized a deeply affecting exhibition to remind leaders of their responsibilities. But this exhibition does far more than just that. It sounds the alarm to remind us of the cost of nuclear warfare. In 2024, their organization, Nihon Hidankyo, the organization that represents the hibakusha, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of their tireless work and moral leadership. They survived the worst of what humanity had to offer to show us the very best of it. Every year, their numbers grow smaller, but their message to the world could not be more timely or urgent. Disarmament is not the reward for peace. Disarmament is the foundation of peace. And so, before it's too late, let us break our collective amnesia around nuclear weapons Let us renew our faith in what we can achieve when we stand as one. Let us act with urgency to clear this cloud, the cloud that hovers over humankind. I thank you.

On behalf of all delegations, I wish to thank the United Nations Secretary-General for his important address and for his good wishes for the success of the conference. I would also like, on behalf of States Parties, to convey to him the sincere appreciation for the most valuable assistance that we have received throughout the preparatory process of the conference. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, It is my understanding that the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency will regrettably be unable to address the plenary this morning due to an unavoidable scheduling conflict. Therefore, the address by the International Atomic Energy Agency under item 5 of the provisional agenda will take place at the second plenary meeting this afternoon, around 4:00 p.m. The Conference will revert to this item at that time. As you will recall, at its third session, the Preparatory Committee considered the draft rules of procedure for the Conference and agreed to recommend them to the Conference. The draft rules of procedure are contained in annex 3 of the final report of the Preparatory Committee, document NPT/CONF.2010/CRP/13. 2026/1, which was submitted earlier to the conference. May I take it that the conference wishes to adopt the draft rules of procedure? It is so decided. Following the adoption of the rules of procedure, I would now like to refer to rule 44.3 regarding requests for observer status from specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations. Requests for observer status have been received from the African Commission on Nuclear Energy, AfConE, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, OPAW, the European Union, EU, the International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC, the League of Arab States, LAS, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, the Organization of American States, OAS, the Organization of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, OPCW, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, CTBTO, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, UNIDIR. I wish to recall that the preparatory committee agreed to recommend to the conference that notwithstanding rule 44, paragraph three of the rules of procedure, specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations be invited to make oral representations to the conference upon the decision of the conference on a case by case basis. May I take it that the conference wishes to proceed in accordance with the recommendation of its preparatory committee? It is so decided. With reference to rule 44.4 of the rules of procedure, requests to attend meetings of the plenary of the main committee or the main committee have been received from 154 non-governmental organizations. The list of these organizations have been made available to delegations in document NPT.CONF/2026/INF/5. As States Parties are aware, the Preparatory Committee, as reflected in paragraph 24 of document NPT

Thank you, Mr. President. We ask that the record of today's proceedings reflect that the United States objected to Iran's nomination to the General Committee and that the United States dissociates itself from the consensus on this decision. We are deeply shocked that this body has chosen to allow Iran to assume any position of leadership at this review conference. Indeed, it is an affront to the NPT itself that a country that has so blatantly disregarded its obligations under the treaty should take a place of honor and responsibility as a vice president on the General Committee that should help coordinate our work over the next four weeks. Our commission is to strengthen the treaty and affirm its commitments, but choosing to open this review conference by conferring leadership on a country that is notoriously violating the very treaty it has pledged to uphold is an affront to countries that treat the NPT commitments seriously. While this room may harbor differing views about Iran's ultimate intent, or the best way to address the threat of its nuclear ambitions, certain facts are indisputable. It is indisputable that Iran has long demonstrated its contempt for the nonproliferation commitments of the NPT. It is indisputable that Iran has refused to cooperate with the IAEA to resolve the glaring questions about its program. Iran has been given multiple opportunities to chart a new course. It is indisputable that rather than seize these opportunities, it has continued to lie and obfuscate about its past activities. Again, in the face of undeniable evidence, and in June 2025 was again found to be in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. It is indisputable that for years, Iran advanced its nuclear program in a manner inconsistent with any civilian purpose. eventually accumulating over 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, the only state enriching and stockpiling at this level that does not possess nuclear weapons. And rather than choosing to use this review conference to defend the integrity of the NPT and call Iran to account, we instead elect Iran a vice president. It is beyond shameful and an embarrassment to the credibility of this conference. I can only hope that this conference takes its work more seriously in the days to come than it has today. The action the United States has taken today to not call a vote and to proceed expeditiously to the conference work should not be construed as precedent in this body, in other treaty bodies, in international organizations, or other international fora. Let me be clear. The United States does not agree that Iran is a leader on issues of nonproliferation.

I thank the distinguished representative of the United States. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Australia.

President, Australia does not support.

Iran putting itself forward for a leadership role at this review conference. Iran's failure to cooperate with the IAEA, non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, and ongoing threat to the countries of its region make it clear that it is unfit for such a position. Holding such a position damages the credibility of this review conference. Australia agrees with those who have disassociated from any consensus on Iran's appointment to such a leadership role.

Thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the distinguished representative of Australia. I do not see any further requests for the floor. I understand that, well, I recognize the distinguished delegate of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Thank you very much, Mr. President. It is a matter of regret that at the beginning of the conference we witnessed some political statements rather than being ready to engage in a substantive discussion on issues very important to all humanities, especially nuclear disarmament. My delegation rejects categorically and in the strongest possible term the statement just delivered by the United States. The allegations put forward are baseless and politically motivated, devoid of any credibility. They constitute a deliberate attempt to mislead this Conference and to manipulate its procedure for narrow and self-serving purposes. If the qualification for serving as Vice-President of this Conference are to be assessed on the basis of compliance with the Treaty, then that standard must be applied uniformly and without double standard. Judged by such a standard, It is the United States, not Iran, that stand in serious deficit. It is indefensible that the United States, as the only state ever have used nuclear weapons, and the one that continues to expand and modernize its nuclear arsenal in blatant disregard of its Article VI obligation, seeks to position itself as an arbitrator of the compliance. Its record of withdrawing from international agreements, disregarding commitments undertaken at previous review conferences, and undermining multilateral disarmament process is well known. The same delegation that today question Iran's commitment is the one that unilaterally withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and failed to implement its obligation, despite Iran's continued adherence at the same time, as verified by the international mechanisms. Most recently, the United States demonstrated the same destructive approach by preventing the adoption of the agenda of the Disarmament Commission. thereby blocking the substantive work of that body and once again showing disregard for the collective will of the international community. Moreover, as one of the three co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, the U.S. bears a special responsibility for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in that region. Yet, instead of fulfilling this responsibility, it has persistently obstructed progress toward this objective. In this context, the continued and unequivocal support by US for the Israeli regime's military nuclear program, an unsafeguarded program outside the framework of the treaty, further exposes that profound inconsistency and selectivity of its position. This support directly undermines the integrity of the treaty and credibility of this conference. Equally alarming is the recent record of unlawful and unprovoked acts of aggression by the US in coordination with the Israeli regime against Iran and its peaceful nuclear facilities, facilities that are under the safeguard of the International Atomic Energy Agency. that such acts have occurred not once, but twice within less than a year, represent a grave violation of international law and a direct assault on the integrity of the global nonproliferation. Before concluding, I would like to put on the record that we also disassociate ourself with the election of the US as vice president as well as Australia. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom.

Thank you, Mr. President, and good morning, colleagues. I am speaking on behalf of the E3, France, Germany, and my own delegation, the United Kingdom. The E3 would like to put on record our concerns that Iran, a country that has been found to be in non-compliance with its obligations under its NPT safeguards agreement with the IAEA, is to be elected to the General Committee, a body that is tasked with ensuring the effective functioning of this Review Conference. Thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom. I understand that the Conference can elect the Vice-Presidents I have read out. The objections and reservations just expressed will be duly recorded in the records of the meeting. It is so decided. I wish to give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Arab Emirates.

Mr. President, I would like to congratulate you on your election as President and assure you of our full support as you guide the work of this Review Conference. The United Arab Emirates takes the floor to place on record our strongest objection to the election of the Islamic Republic of Iran as a vice president of this review conference. We deeply regret that Iran has been elected to a position of responsibility in a conference whose central purpose is to uphold, protect, and strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The vice presidency of this conference should be entrusted to states parties that respect their international obligations, uphold the integrity of the NPT, and contribute to regional and international peace and security. Iran's record demonstrates a blatant disregard for those obligations. Iran continues to violate its safeguards obligations. It continues to obstruct the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and it continues to reject the transparency required of every responsible state party. Iran's conduct raises serious and persistent concerns about the integrity of the nonproliferation regime, and its appointment to vice president harms the credibility of this review conference. A State Party that refuses to meet its safeguard obligations cannot credibly help lead a conference built on those very safeguards. A State Party that obstructs verification cannot credibly preside over discussions on transparency and trust. And a state party that undermines the authority of the IAEA should not be responsible for a process that depends on the vital work of that agency. Mr. President, Iran's destabilizing conduct is not limited to the nuclear file. Its unlawful and brutal actions since 28 February have been in direct contrast to the aims and spirit of this review conference. A country that attacks its neighbors, threatens freedom of navigation, and seeks to use the Strait of Hormuz as a tool of global economic coercion, cannot be entrusted with a leadership role in a conference dedicated to peace, security, and nonproliferation. If a state party can disregard its obligations, undermine verification, destabilize its region, threaten international waterways, and still be elevated to a leadership position in this process, then we must ask what message this conference is sending. This decision rewards irresponsible conduct. It weakens confidence in the review conference. And it risks damaging the credibility of the NPT review process at a time when that credibility must be strengthened, not compromised. The United Arab Emirates therefore formally and unequivocally disassociates itself from the election of Iran as Vice President of this Review Conference. Thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the Distinguished Representative of the United Arab Emirates. I now give the floor to the Distinguished Representative of the Russian Federation.

Thank you, Mr. President. Distinguished colleagues. We have just confronted an unprecedented situation whereby political attacks were leveled at one state. We are categorically opposed to such an approach vis-a-vis any state that is a state party to the NPT. Everything that was said by distinguished colleagues from the US, the UK, Australia, and the United Arab Emirates is the object of discussions and requires an in-depth analysis. However, we cannot accept what they said as some sort of conclusion which does not require to be underpinned by any rationale. In light of the above, we'd like to express our deep regret about what is happening as regards the statements delivered by the aforementioned states. We would like to express a hope that the politicization of the conference, politicization that has become on day one, we hope that this politicization will not become a factor that will influence the outcome of the work that will be done by this important, and let me underscore, this historic forum. We call on all delegations who have criticism, who take issue with what's happening, we call on all delegations to express these during the general discussion and the discussions that will take place in the main committees. It is there that we will have an opportunity to have open, direct, frank dialogue and to engage in that dialogue on a constructive basis. And at the end of the day, hopefully, we will steer the work of this forum to a successful outcome. It is my hope that the wishes expressed by my delegation will be taken very seriously by all participants. of the conference, first and foremost those who sought to reflect their position today by taking the floor and delivering statements. Thank you for your kind attention.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation. I should now proceed to item 10 of the provisional agenda, the appointment of members of the Credentials Committee. Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure provides that in addition to the election of the Chairs and two Vice-Chairs, the Conference shall appoint six members of the Credentials Committee on the proposal of the President of the Conference. Accordingly, I propose the following members of the Credentials Committee: Brazil, Nigeria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Portugal, and the Holy See. If there is no objection, may I take it that the Conference agrees with this proposal? It is so decided. In accordance with the established practice, the report of the Credentials Committee will be submitted to the Conference after the Committee has met to examine the credentials of the representatives of the Conference. I would now like to proceed to item 11 of the provisional agenda, the confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary General of the conference. You will recall that at its second session, the preparatory committee decided to invite the Secretary General of the United Nations in consultation with the members of the preparatory committee to nominate an official to act as provisional Secretary-General of the Conference. At its third session, the Preparatory Committee was informed that in response to that request, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, following consultations with the members of the Preparatory Committee, had nominated Mr. Christopher King from the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs to serve in that capacity. the States Parties were duly informed of the nomination. May I take it that the Conference wishes to confirm Mr. Christopher King as Secretary-General of the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons? It is so decided. I wish to congratulate Mr. King on his confirmation as Secretary-General of the Conference. I would now like to take up item 12 of the provisional agenda, adoption of the agenda of the conference. May I take it that the conference concurs with the provisional agenda as contained in annex 4 of the final report of the preparatory committee, document NPT/CONF.2026/1. It is so decided. I would now like to proceed to the allocation of items to the main committees and the establishment of subsidiary bodies to the main committees. A decision on the allocation of items to the main committees of the conference was adopted at the third session of the preparatory committee. and is contained in Annex 5 of the final report of the Preparatory Committee. May I take it that the Conference wishes to proceed accordingly? It is so decided. Turning to subsidiary bodies, I have shared with States Parties the outcomes of my consultations with delegations regarding the establishment of subsidiary bodies. It will be recalled that in decision one of the 1995 review and extension conference, and I quote, "It was agreed that subsidiary bodies could be established within the respective main committees for specific issues relevant to the treaty, so as to provide for a focused consideration of such issues," unquote. This was also reaffirmed in the consensus outcome of the 2000 review conference with the agreement on improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process. I have already circulated a proposal based on the outcome of my consultations and to facilitate formal adoption. I have now requested the Secretariat to distribute document NPT.CONF/2026/CRP.1. This paper contains a draft decision on the establishment of subsidiary bodies to the main committees. Following its adoption, this document will be issued as an official document of the conference. Before proceeding to the adoption, I would like to confirm that the subsidiary bodies will be chaired by the chairs of the main committees. As part of its overall allocation of time, it is proposed that each main committee will hold two meetings of its subsidiary body. May I take it that the conference wishes to agree to the establishment of subsidiary bodies to the main committees as contained in NPT/CONF.2020/6/CRP.1? It is so decided. I would now like to turn to the draft programme of work, circulated as document NPT/CONF.2020/INF/4/Rev.1. This draft was submitted to assist delegations in planning. As States Parties are aware, following my consultations with delegations, The draft program of work will guide our work during the conference. We will need flexibility in adjusting the program in order to take into account any changed circumstances and to ensure that we are utilizing our time as effectively as possible. as possible. Further to the adoption of the decision on the subsidiary bodies, the programme of work will reflect the time and room allocated to their meetings. I will seek the Conference's consideration if issues arise that necessitate changes to how we structure our work. Taking this into account, may I take it that the Conference wishes to take note of the draft proposed programme of work as contained in document NPT/CONF.2020/6/INF/4/Rev.1? If it is the case, the work of the Conference will proceed accordingly. The conference will take a decision on item 14 of the agenda, namely adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the conference. In this connection, I will request the secretariat to submit a draft document that reflects the schedule of the division of costs based on the actual participation of states parties in the conference. This document is to be seen in conjunction with rule 12 and the appendix of the Rules of Procedure, with which the Conference adopted on the 27th April 2026. I recognize the Distinguished Representative of the United States. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. President. The current NPT financing formula is fundamentally outdated and increasingly unsustainable. Since 1995, the division of costs among the five nuclear weapons states has remained completely frozen, despite dramatic shifts in the global economic landscape. This stagnation has created severe misalignments. The United States currently pays 32.82% of NPT costs, nearly 11 percentage points above our UN assessment rate. Russia pays 8%. approximately six percentage points above its UN assessment. Meanwhile, China, despite experiencing extraordinary economic growth over the past three decades, contributes only 0.91%. This represents a staggering 19 percentage point gap below China's UN assessment of 20.004%. To put this in perspective, there are currently 11 non-nuclear weapon states that pay more than China under the current formula. The formula's origins compound the problem. While the 55/45 split between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states was established in 1980 to address legitimate concerns about disproportionate burden sharing, the internal distribution among the nuclear weapon states has failed to keep pace with the economic realities. The 1985 review conference specifically decided that costs should be, quote, "borne by the states parties to the treaty according to the scale of assessments adjusted in accordance with the membership of the treaty," end quote. And yet we have not honored this principle in practice. This misalignment undermines the fundamental principle that assessed contributions should reflect economic capacity to pay. It creates an inequitable burden on some nuclear weapons states while allowing others to contribute far below their means. The status quo is simply untenable. Without adjustment, we risk undermining confidence in the NPT review process itself and creating unnecessary friction among states parties that should be working together to strengthen the treaty. Mr. President, the United States proposes realigning the nuclear weapons states contributions based on the UN regular budget scale of assessments, prorated for NPT membership, while maintaining the overall 55/45 split between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states established in 1980. This reform would bring NPT financing into the 21st century while preserving the fundamental principle of nuclear weapons state responsibility established over four decades ago. Thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the distinguished representative of the United States. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of China.

Mr. President, China, as a state party to the NPT, we have always been consistent in making full and timely payments for the costs of the review conferences and the related costs. The U.S. and others have pushed for adjusting the allocation of the assessed cost sharing without full consultations with other states parties. This is not conducive to governizing consensus on this issue. China will need to seek instructions from our capital regarding the U.S.

Proposal.

At this stage, we cannot agree to make any substantive decision today on the apportionment of the costs of the conference. China believes that the related discussion on the calculation of the cost of the review should be based on the principles of consensus, fairness, and reasonableness. The calculation of the cost sharing involves many technical details. Therefore, it should respect the decision-making procedures of the financial and budgetary processes of the countries. This review conference, we have a packed work program. Therefore, China proposes to give States Parties more time to consult on this issue. At the same time, China urges the US to fulfill its due international obligations and quickly pay the arrears for the costs of this review conference. It is unacceptable to use arrears as a tactic of pressure to request adjustment of the cost contribution. I thank you, President.

I thank the distinguished representative of China. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation.

Thank you, Mr. President. We weren't intending to take the floor on the issue raised by the US delegation. We believe that this issue requires deep thought and consideration. over the course of the conference. What I will say now is that, indeed, in order to consider this issue, we will need additional time. So, on that note, I'd like to express our support for what was said by our Chinese colleague. We need serious consultations to be held on the issue of the apportionment of the costing for the review process and the conference itself. We stand ready to partake in such consultations. However, as I already mentioned, I stand in solidarity with my Chinese colleague. This is a very multifaceted issue. There are many specific characteristics therein, but we are prepared to work on this so as to resolve this issue. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation. I note that consensus on the decision under item 14 of the agenda is not possible at this moment. I would therefore seek the conference's permission to defer this agenda item while the President undertakes consultations with delegations. May I take it that the conference agrees with the proposed way forward? I hear no objection. It is so decided. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, it is my intention to immediately start with the general debate as we have many high-level dignitaries inscribed on the list of speakers. At this stage, 155 delegations have inscribed on the list of speakers for the general debate. which is planned to continue until the 30th of April 2026. I wish to inform delegates that the list of speakers will be closed at 6:00 PM this evening. I would therefore encourage all those delegations wishing to speak during the general debate and which have not yet inscribed their names on the list of speakers to do so before closing the list. I would also like to remind you, as indicated in the revised version of the information note 1 of 17 December 2025, that group statements should not exceed eight minutes and national statements should not exceed five minutes. Similarly, statements in the exercise of the right of reply should not exceed five minutes for the first intervention and three minutes for the second. A traffic light system will be put in place and include microphone cut-offs for rights of reply. I should like to encourage delegations to be present in the meeting rooms at the scheduled time in order to promote the punctuality and efficiency of the review conference's proceedings. It is now my great pleasure to welcome the first speaker I have on my list. Her Excellency Oppah Cham Svipange Muchingungiri, Minister of Defence of Zimbabwe. I now invite Her Excellency to address the conference.

Mr. President, My delegation congratulates you on your election as President of the Eleventh Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Zimbabwe is honored and indeed privileged to be part of your General Committee as Vice President, and we also congratulate all the other members of the General Committee on their election. We assure you of our full support as you steer this review conference towards consensus. Zimbabwe aligns itself with the statements to be delivered by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT, as well as the African Group. I have the honour now to deliver the following statement in our national capacity. Mr. President, the NPT is the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament regime and the first line of defense against a nuclear catastrophe. Only a balanced implementation of the NPT across its three pillars of disarmament, nonproliferation and the peaceful uses of the nuclear energy, will deliver the benefits of the grand bargain that underpinned the adoption of the treaty in 1968. Mr. President, Enhancing and modernizing nuclear arsenals may enhance offensive capabilities, but it does not in any way eliminate the certainty of mutually assured destruction. Moreover, in the event of a clear war, catastrophic humanitarian and environmental repercussions would visit every corner of the world. Zimbabwe therefore implores nuclear weapon states to move away from security competition and focus on pursuing collective security. As a state party to the Treaty of Pelindaba, which established the African continent as a nuclear-free zone, Zimbabwe calls on all regions that are yet to do so to conclude their nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. We also urge all nuclear-weapon states to ratify those treaties without reservations. We reiterate the global norm against nuclear testing and call upon all remaining Annex 2 States to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. As a signatory State to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which is complementary to the NPT, Zimbabwe reaffirms its commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons. Mr. President, Zimbabwe underscores the permanent sovereign right of all NPT States Parties to develop the full nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful purposes. We call upon all States with the relevant nuclear technology and capabilities to intensify the provision of assistance to the Global South. The Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe appreciates the support it has received so far under the International Atomic Energy Agency's flagship initiatives in areas that include cancer care, soil and water management, livestock disease monitoring and food security. Mr. President, in accordance with our Constitution and in line with the Charter of the United Nations, We have anchored our foreign policy on multilateralism. Zimbabwe is guided by the principles of sovereignty, respect for international law, peaceful coexistence among nations, and the settlement of the international disputes by peaceful means. We believe that no nation can prosper in isolation. Zimbabwe's participation in multilateral platforms is therefore aimed at advancing peace and security, human rights and sustainable development for integrity, dignity and prosperity for all. We believe that the full and balanced implementation of the NPT remains one such important multilateral imperative for world peace and prosperity. It is within this spirit that Zimbabwe is determined to serve on the United Nations Security Council for the 2020 27 20 to 2028 term so that we may contribute more actively to the promotion of international peace and security let me conclude by assuring you of Zimbabwe's commitment and constructive engagement towards a successful outcome during this 11th NPT review conference.

I thank you on behalf of the conference I wish to thank Her Excellency Oppah Charles Zvibange Muchinguri, Minister of Defense of Zimbabwe. The conference will now hear an address by His Excellency Jean-Noel Barrot, Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France.

Mr. President, ministers, ambassadors, In 1968, almost 60 years ago, and at the cost of tremendous diplomatic efforts, the international community managed to come to an agreement so as to ward off the greatest of risks, that of a generalized arms race, nuclear arms race. The risk of devastation which could have resulted from a nuclear war which then entire humanity could have been engulfed by. By signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the nations of the world managed to circumscribe force through law, to place force under the tutelage of the law to safeguard peace and security. Today, the treaty is quasi-universal. It still holds at a time when all of the other arms control treaties have expired. And all of this is because the NPT's drafters did not seek to deny power dynamics, but to organize them in our mutual interest. Also, because they clearly established the rights and obligations of all, advancing nuclear disarmament until we reach general and complete disarmament, preventing any weapons dissemination any nuclear weapons dissemination, and sharing access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These are the three pillars which underpin our world's security. Three pillars in which cracks are forming at a time when the world is becoming increasingly violent. These are three pillars which France seeks to defend, rooted in our conviction that there is no alternative, neither desirable nor possible, no alternative to full respect for the Treaty. If I may, I'd like to speak to the three pillars, one by one. First, disarmament. After a lengthy period of progress, the possessors of the world's largest arsenals are backing out of the commitments they signed up to. Russia is pursuing a revisionist, imperial, colonial policy. Russia's nuclear rhetoric is weighing heavily on Ukraine, showing that Russia is deviating from its exclusively defensive commitment within the framework of nuclear weapons. By this, I mean that Russia is dishonouring itself, discrediting itself. It is high time for Russia to radically change its stance. China committed to playing accelerated catch-up with the US. It is our collective responsibility to reduce strategic risks and to seek the transparency which is so sorely lacking. As for France, we have achieved unparalleled achievements as regards disarmament. The complete dismantlement of our ground-based deterrence capabilities, reduction by a third of our submarine and airborne components, the irreversible dismantlement of our fissile material production facilities, the definitive end of nuclear tests, followed by the irreversible dismantlement of our nuclear testing sites in the Pacific, as well as the ratification of the CTBT. Yes, France reaffirms our commitment to nuclear deterrence. And faced with the degradation of the strategic environment, the President of France announced on the 2nd of March 2026 Two important developments for both France and Europe. First, the upward adjustment of the French nuclear arsenal, following a strict defensive logic and with thresholds that are consistent with the operational effectiveness of our deterrent. Also, the materialization of the European dimension of our vital interests. This is expressed through the announcement of forward deterrence, which is fully in keeping with the NPT. Now these developments, these changes were necessary for the French deterrent to be able to buttress, as it has been doing for decades, to buttress peace and security on the European continent. Nonetheless, we maintain our ambition to make progress towards complete nuclear disarmament. This is why. When we take up the presidency of the P5 process this summer, we will be seeking to take measures to reduce strategic risks, as well as a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for weapons, the entry into force of the CNTBT, the launch of discussions on strategic stability with the aim of crafting a new security framework, including nuclear capabilities, but on the condition that the discussions take place on an equitable footing, given that countries such as France and the UK find themselves in a situation that is radically different from other states with outsized arsenals, as well as the strengthening of transparency of national reporting submitted by NPT States Parties. This brings me to the second pillar, non-proliferation. Never has the risk of nuclear proliferation been so high. and the threat posed by Iran's and North Korea's programs is intolerable for each and every state party to this treaty. France has crossed all of the red lines drawn a decade ago. Iran must definitively renounce the possession of a nuclear weapon, bring itself into compliance with its comprehensive safeguards agreement and to demonstrate the exclusively peaceful nature of its program. No military solution offers any lasting guarantees. Hence, we need strict oversight and an intrusive and complete verification regime. This is what Iran must imperatively submit itself to. As for North Korea, it continues to pursue its illegal programs, which pose a threat to international security. North Korea must cease its nuclear and ballistic program in a manner that is complete, verifiable, and irreversible pursuant to relevant Security Council resolutions. France supports and will continue to support the IAEA, which plays a crucial role in preventing proliferation and helping us to address this. We call on all States Parties to the treaty to bolster their capacities, to renew their political, technical, and financial supportment to the IAEA, and to endow the organization with the necessary resources for it to undertake its indispensable verification activities. third pillar, peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Without a doubt, these uses have been developing for the benefit of the greatest number of people to fight cancer, to provide access to abundant and low carbon energy for the common good. And yet, before our very eyes, we're seeing civilian nuclear safety and security being instrumentalized in the battlefield. As we mark the tragic anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, which occurred 40 years ago, let's recall that just last year, a drone loaded with explosives was launched by Russia, perforating Chernobyl's confinement arch. In a world where civilian nuclear infrastructure are being targeted, well, this shows contempt for international law and the spirit of the treaty, contempt for human and radiological consequences. This is deplorable. No states party can tolerate this. We stand convinced that civilian nuclear energy remains a formidable tool for resilience and sovereignty. Hence, France, together with the IAEA, brought together 60 countries in Paris on the 10th of March of this year for the Nuclear Energy Summit. This is a demonstration of our unshakable ambition to ensure that this technology serves the common good. Since it entered into force 56 years ago, the NPT has withstood all of the world's crises and upheavals. It remains the keystone of our security infrastructure. Bound by our overarching responsibility as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, as a nuclear weapons state under the treaty, France will not let this edifice crumble. France will not let the legacy of visionary generations who entrusted us with this task will not allow this legacy to be called into question. My presence in the room today is proof of this. It attests to the force of our commitment to global peace and security, a commitment which will not waver.

On behalf of the Conference, I wish to thank His Excellency Jean-Noel Barrot, Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France. The Conference will now hear an address by His Excellency Pablo Quirino McGranin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship of Argentina. You have the floor, sir.

Mr. President, allow me to begin this address by congratulating you on your election to preside over this 11th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As the Foreign Minister of a country that presided over the last review conference, I am entirely cognizant of the magnitude of this responsibility. I wish to convey to you Argentina's full support. Mr. President, we are acutely aware of the fact that the NPT is facing countless challenges which adversely affect the integrity of the global nonproliferation architecture more than ever before. Argentina is of the view that the NPT must be buttressed by a clear, concrete message. Achieving a consensus final document demands responsibility and a genuine desire to find common ground on the part of us all. For this reason, Argentina has arrived at this conference with a keen interest in preserving the validity and full force of the Treaty and in actively contributing to facilitating consensus. President, Argentina reiterates its ironclad commitment to the objectives and purposes of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We perceive that treaty to be a central instrument for international peace and security, and we see it as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. For my country, the central role of the NPT rests entirely on the balanced implementation of its three pillars: nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Argentina is staunchly in favour of nuclear non-proliferation and of the safeguards regime administered by the IAEA. The IAEA's role is vital for the implementation of the NPT. With that in mind, I wish to underscore the importance of the leadership of Rafael Grossi, who is today a candidate to the Secretary-General of the United Under his leadership, the IAEA has acquired renewed gravitas on the international stage and has emerged as a central actor with technical authority and effective presence on the ground. Another key demonstration of our commitment to nonproliferation is the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, the ABACC. It was created 35 years ago, and since that time, it has emerged as an international example of country-to-country verification in a highly sensitive environment. It provides renewed strength and guarantees regarding the peaceful nature of our nuclear activities. This experience now stands as a model that can be rolled out in other regions. President, Argentina attaches strategic importance to nuclear technology and its peaceful applications. It is the As a result of that perspective, our country has an extensive trajectory in this field and scientific and industrial development in this field, which is pioneering in Latin America and the Caribbean. This experience is rooted in our belief that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are an inalienable right. Argentina has come to stand as a responsible and reliable producer and exporter of nuclear technology, as well as components and services for many countries. In this same context, I wish to underscore that Argentina is now chairing for the fifth time the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Moreover, we hail the growing interest shown by the international community in nuclear energy. Aware of the challenges that that poses, our country is renewing its commitment to training highly qualified professionals and is expanding its range of services, components, industrial capacities, and specialised knowledge in response to growing global demand. Based on its wealth of experience and expertise, Argentina now holds a singular position in various links of the nuclear value chain and is well placed to contribute by way of human capital, engineering services, services and industrial capacities to ensuring the growth of such activity on a global level. Argentina promotes international investment and the expansion of business activity in the sector, including uranium mining and infrastructure, the convergence between resource availability, cutting-edge experience in innovation, and a new pro-investment architecture paves the way towards an exceptional opportunity to revitalise our value chain through public-private partnerships and an enhanced role for the private sector. All of this can only take place under the NPT umbrella and its provisions. President, this review conference is being held against the backdrop of a context that we cannot ignore. Among the factors which have most affected the stability and credibility of the non-proliferation regime is the nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the existence of undeclared sites and activities. The NPT establishes clear obligations that must be upheld and fulfilled. However, for more than two decades now, Iran has not fully cooperated. Nor has it managed to successfully demonstrate the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. It has persisted in obstructive behavior and failed to provide full information. The Argentina has continually appealed to Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and resolve outstanding issues. In spite of repeated diplomatic efforts on the part of the international community, Iran continued its sensitive uranium enrichment activities, enriching uranium to levels whose civilian use was neither credible nor justified. And Iran continues to support non-state armed actors with a destabilizing impact. This conference must serve to send out a clear message: Iran must never have nuclear weapon. President, to preserve the effectiveness of the NPT, it is vital that we make progress with the implementation of its provisions in the field of nuclear disarmament. Argentina sounds the alarm regarding risks associated with nuclear rhetoric and the expansion and modernization of arsenals. We champion concrete measures to ensure nuclear risk reduction. In this vein, we support initiatives that support dialogue around arms control, and we urge nuclear weapons states to begin negotiations. President, to conclude, I wish to once again express Argentina's support for your presidency and state that we are ready and willing to actively contribute to strengthening the NPT. Thank you.

On behalf of the Conference, I wish to thank His Excellency Pablo Guerno Magrani, Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship of Argentina. The Conference will now hear an address by Her Excellency Dubravka Bosniak, Minister of Civil Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina. You have the floor, ma'am.

Thank you, Mr. President, Excellencies, distinguished delegates. Bosnia and Herzegovina reaffirms its full and unwavering commitment to all objectives and obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. For us, this commitment reflects a clear responsibility to contribute to international peace and security. We attach particular importance to the effective implementation of safeguards as a cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. In this regard, Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to fully implement its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, ensuring credibility and confidence in our compliance with international obligations. Furthermore, Bosnia and Herzegovina implements the Additional Protocol recognizing it as an essential instrument for ensuring the peaceful nature of nuclear activities and strengthening the safeguards system. We also support the fundamental right of all States Parties to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in full compliance with their obligations under the Treaty. However, This right must always be exercised with the highest standards of safety, security and responsibility. Additionally, we emphasize the importance of Bosnia and Herzegovina's involvement in international CBRN initiatives. In this regard, intersectoral cooperation and projects strengthen capacities for prevention, preparedness and response to potential incidents, including radiological and nuclear threats, which is directly linked to the obligations and objectives of the Treaty. Also, we highlight the importance of inclusivity in global security discussions, including the participation of women and engagement of young professionals in nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation. Despite the absence of nuclear power generation and the limited presence of nuclear material, we remain fully committed to fulfilling all reporting obligations and facilitating verification activities conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Even with limited capacities, we are committed to meeting the highest international standards. However, we express deep concern over the continued existence of nuclear weapons and the insufficient progress towards their elimination. Any use of nuclear weapons would have catastrophic consequences for people, the environment and future generations. In this context, we also emphasize the importance of strengthening education and raising public awareness empowering people to understand the risks and support a safer, nuclear-free world. Bosnia and Herzegovina is prepared to contribute to regional and international efforts in this area, including through cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and relevant United Nations agencies to strengthen capacities in Southeastern Europe. Mr. President, At a time of increasing global challenges, it is essential to preserve and strengthen the credibility of the safeguards system. This requires not only full compliance with existing obligations, but also continued political commitment and enhanced technical cooperation among all States Parties. International cooperation and support remain particularly important for countries with limited institutional and technical capacities. In conclusion, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a reliable and constructive partner in advancing global nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation, and in strengthening the implementation of the treaty. Thank you.

On behalf of the conference, I wish to thank Her Excellency Dubravka Bosniak, Minister of Civil Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The conference will now hear an address by His Excellency Yashan Ashibayev, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, on behalf of the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. You have the floor, sir.

Mr. President, distinguished participants, I have the honor to speak on behalf of the state parties to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, namely the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan, and my own country, the Republic of Kazakhstan, which currently serves as chair of the treaty. This year, the treaty marks the 20th anniversary since its signing by the five Central Asian states in 2006 in the city of Semipalatinsk, and continues to resolutely fulfill its mandate in reinforcing the global disarmament and nonproliferation regime. Four review cycles have passed since our zone was established. The global situation has since dramatically changed. also unavoidably affecting the NPT as one of its core components. Today's key challenges comprise of the lack of meaningful progress in nuclear disarmament under Article VI, the unraveling of key arms control agreements combined with a disturbing trend for modernization of nuclear arsenals, the growing pressure on nonproliferation norms, as well as regional conflicts involving civilian nuclear infrastructure. Despite all of the above challenges, non-nuclear weapon states continue to faithfully uphold their commitment to the objectives of the Treaty. A prevailing majority of these states are also parties to nuclear-weapon-free zones treaties, which are widely recognized as an essential part of the bedrock of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. Mr. President, the declaration of the Central Asian region affirming to be a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the heart of the vast Eurasian continent significantly enhances the security and stability in this expanse of geopolitical space. The establishment of such a zone is the visionary outcome of the collective effort of all five Central Asian states in their desire to provide security, stability, and peace in the region pursuant to the idea put forward by Uzbekistan in September 1993 at the 48th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Very symbolically, our region made an astonishing leap from a region where nuclear weapons were actively tested and deployed to a champion of global nuclear disarmament. The Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone still remains the first and only such zone located entirely in the Northern Hemisphere and directly bordering two nuclear weapons states. Remarkably, our region also hosted the world's largest nuclear test site, the Semipalatinsk Polygon, which was closed in 1991 by the will of the people of Kazakhstan and where more than 450 nuclear tests were conducted for over four decades. Since the treaty's signing 20 years ago, the Kyrgyz Republic has been officially performing the functions of depository of the treaty. In accordance with the established practice, an updated memorandum on activities of the zone was submitted by Kyrgyzstan on behalf of the five states as an official document of this review conference. Through the core provisions of the treaty, its state parties have committed themselves voluntarily and unequivocally to ban the production, acquisition, and deployment of nuclear weapons and their components or other nuclear explosive devices on their territories. Another distinctive feature of the treaty is that its parties are required to conclude comprehensive safeguard agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Additional Protocol. And finally, provisions to assist any efforts towards the environmental rehabilitation of territories contaminated as a result of past activities is another innovative element of this zone. Noting the importance of the environmental rehabilitation issues for our region, we urge all governments and international organizations to consider providing appropriate assistance to Central Asian states for radiological assessment and remediation of former nuclear test sites, as well as uranium extraction sites. Mr. President, we stay committed to enhancing partnership with the other existing nuclear-weapon-free zones with the aim of strengthening the NPT regime and coordinating international efforts to ensure broader peace and security. In December 2023, under Tajikistan's chairmanship, our zone formally signed a memorandum of cooperation with the African Commission on Nuclear Energy. A similar memorandum was concluded with OPANAL in December 2024 during Turkmenistan's chairmanship. Currently, we are actively exploring avenues for broadening our cooperation with the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, the Bangkok Treaty, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, the Rarotonga Treaty, and Mongolia. Moreover, on 28 November 2024, representatives of Chiring Sait also took part in the special session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean on behalf of members of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. On August 28, 2024, on the occasion of the International Day Against Nuclear Tests, a second of its kind seminar on fostering cooperation and enhancing consultation mechanisms among the existing nuclear weapon-free zones was co-organized in Astana with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs. The event gathered the representative of all nuclear weapon-free zones and Mongolia, relevant international and non-governmental organizations, as well as the five nuclear weapon states. Distinguished delegates, more than a decade has passed since May 2014 when the high-ranking representatives of the Nuclear Five signed the protocol on negative security assurances to treaty on a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Asia. The protocol is an integral part of the treaty and provides security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to the Central Asian states. The protocol to the treaty has been so far ratified by the four nuclear weapons states, and we express our hope to secure the earliest ratification of the protocol by the United States so as to finalize the institutionalization of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. With reference to this protocol, we recall Resolution 79/24, Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on December 2, 2024, that calls on the nuclear weapons states to take measures for early ratification of the protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. In this context, on behalf of Central Asian states, I invite all state parties to support the next iteration of the resolution, which will be tabled during the upcoming 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly this October. I would like to reiterate that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone is one of the strongest universal instruments preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and bolstering the global disarmament process. Therefore, the integrity and well-functioning of the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones remains in the interest of all States Parties to the NPT, particularly so the nuclear-weapon States. Regrettably, no new zones have emerged over the past two decades, especially in the Middle East, which many deemed a realistic and achievable goal. On the contrary, we see a dire deterioration of the security situation in the region, putting additional stress on the fragile global non-proliferation architecture. In this context, the 1995 resolution on the Middle East retains its full validity and relevancy, pending its full implementation. Mr. President, to conclude, allow me to reiterate the five Central Asian States' strong commitment to upholding the NPT and its unique and indispensable role as the cornerstone of the global disarmament and nonproliferation regime and a pillar of international stability and security, which is all the more necessary in current critical times. We express our hope for this review conference to yield practical and consensus-based outcomes that will enhance global security, promote further cooperation, and sustain peace and prosperity in the world. I thank you.

I wish to thank His Excellency Yerzhan Aishibayev First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, speaking on behalf of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. I would now like to invite Her Excellency Alvin Vat Pettersen, State Secretary for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, speaking on behalf of the Nordic States, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark.

Yes, thank you, Mr. President. I address this conference on behalf of the five Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, and my own country, Norway. And allow me to congratulate you on assuming the office of President of this review conference. Rest assured of our full support. Mr. President, the Nordic countries underline our unwavering support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. For nearly 60 years, the NPT has enabled a significant reduction in nuclear weapons stockpiles and curtailed nuclear proliferation, while serving as the framework for international cooperation on nuclear energy, on science and technology. We strongly support all three pillars and the full implementation of the Treaty. We call for its universalization and encourage all States that have not yet joined the Treaty to do so as non-nuclear weapons States. We pledge our full support for the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which plays a vital role in promoting, sustaining and strengthening the global nuclear architecture. We also underscore the value of export control regimes, among them the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zanger Committee. We emphasize that nuclear science and technology can support the Sustainable Development Goals. And we express our appreciation to Finland for taking on the chairmanship of the Main Committee III. Mr. President, the NPT remains the only credible path to nuclear disarmament. It is of immense importance that we collectively send a crystal clear message of support for the Treaty as such. And in today's deteriorating security environment, the Treaty does indeed face notable challenges. The Nordic countries condemn in the strongest possible terms Russia's nuclear rhetoric and its threats to use nuclear force in its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. Russia's nuclear threats, coupled with the pursuit of new nuclear capabilities, possibly also in outer space, severely undermines global security and stability. We also remain profoundly concerned about China's nuclear buildup, already undertaken over several years. China continues to rapidly and significantly expand its nuclear arsenal, and does so in a non-transparent manner. We call on China to explain how this fits with China's NPT Article VI obligations to pursue disarmament in good faith, and we encourage China to adopt meaningful measures of transparency, risk reduction, and verifiable arms control. We also urge all States to adhere to the Hague Code of Conduct. Furthermore, the expiration of the New START Treaty means that the world is without any restrictions on the number of nuclear weapons. This is an unfortunate and dangerous development. but could potentially open the door for a new and stronger framework. In any such possible framework, it is of great importance to include measures to handle tactical nuclear weapons. Against this backdrop, we urge Russia and China to engage in dialogue, confidence-building, and transparency measures, including accepting the U.S. offer to engage in nuclear arms control discussions without preconditions. In addition, the world faces several serious nuclear proliferation challenges. The DPRK continues to develop its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs in violation of multiple Security Council resolutions and should return to compliance with the NPT. Iran has not shown willingness to limit its capability to enrich uranium and reduce its stockpiles, while refusing to cooperate fully with the IAEA, including to implement all of its safeguard obligations. It is imperative that Iran never acquires nuclear weapons in line with its NPT obligations, and we encourage efforts to ensure progress on the creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. We strongly call for the pursuit of diplomatic efforts to achieve lasting and sustainable solutions. Mr. President, in challenging times, it is more important than ever to safeguard a nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and arms control architecture. We stress the need to implement all obligations under the NPT, including commitments made during previous review conferences. In this regard, the Nordic countries are committed to advance nuclear disarmament based on the three interrelated principles of transparency, verification, and irreversibility. In line with this, the Nordic countries underscore that the fundamental purpose of NATO, to which all five Nordic countries belong, is to preserve peace, to prevent coercion and deter aggression. NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements are fully consistent with the NPT and have been key in preventing proliferation, one of the NPT's core goals. Mr. President, the Nordic countries firmly support a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. We strongly urge all states, in particular the remaining Annex 2 states, to sign and ratify the CTBT, securing a legally binding moratorium on nuclear testing. And we also reaffirm our support for the immediate negotiations and conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty. The Nordic countries fully share the goal of a more secure world without nuclear weapons. Let us remind ourselves that a nuclear war would visit devastation upon all humankind. We must make every effort to avert the danger of such a war, bearing in mind that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Mr. President, the Nordic countries are strongly committed to a successful outcome of this 11th Review Conference. Thank you for your attention.

I wish to thank His Excellency Eivind Vard-Petersen, State Secretary for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, speaking on behalf of the Nordic States. The Conference will now hear an address by His Excellency Oleksandr Myshchenko, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, speaking on behalf of a group of states. You have the floor, sir.

Mr. President, I have the honour to speak on behalf of 43 NPT state parties. Full list of alliance countries will be reflected in the written statement. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine is a blatant violation of international law, including the United Nations Charter, and poses a threat not only to Ukraine, but also to international peace and security, the rule-based international order, and the global nonproliferation and disarmament architecture. We condemn in the strongest possible terms Russia's actions, including its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, in the context of its war of aggression against Ukraine, which further demonstrates how Russia's repeated conduct undermines international commitments, peace, and security. Russia continues to contravene the principles of the Helsinki Decalogue and the security commitments it undertook in the Budapest Memorandum. We reaffirm our unwavering support for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, including territorial sea, as well as for Ukrainians' inherent right to self-defend in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter against Russia's ongoing illegal war of aggression. We strongly condemn indiscriminate attacks that have resulted in civilian deaths and destruction of critical infrastructure. Such attacks, occurring in parallel with international efforts aimed at a restoration of comprehensive, just, and lasting peace for Ukraine, reveal the real Russian goals and intentions, demonstrating no genuine interest in ending its war of aggression. We reiterate our demand that Russia cease its war of aggression against Ukraine and ensure a full, immediate, and unconditional withdrawal of all its forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders. We strongly condemn the continued military support provided by Belarus, Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which enables Russia to sustain its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. Mr. President, we meet at a solemn moment, marking the 40th anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, a tragedy that remains a powerful reminder of the critical importance of nuclear safety as an underlining part of the NPT. Today, these lessons are once again being tested as Russia's aggression continues to put Ukraine's nuclear facilities at risk. We recall that on 10 December 2025, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 80/111, Strengthening of International Cooperation and Coordination of Efforts to Study, Mitigate and Minimize the Consequences of the Chernobyl Disaster, stressing that the 40th anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster in 2026 presents a critical opportunity for all stakeholders to actively commemorate the event and renew their commitment to long-term recovery, resilience, and sustainable development. We reiterate our great concern over the demand caused by the drone strike on 14 February 2025 against the new safe confinement at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant of Ukraine. We stress the importance of continued international support in repairing the new safe confinement, which is essential for maintaining global nuclear safety standards and mitigating environmental risk in Ukraine and beyond. Moreover, Russia's seizure and militarization of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, combined with its repeated, deliberate, and targeted large-scale strikes on Ukraine's energy infrastructure, have significantly increased risks to nuclear safety and security in that plant. In this regard, we would like to recall the UN General Assembly resolution, Safety and Security of Nuclear Facilities of Ukraine, including the Zaporizhzhia, nuclear power plant, as well as relevant resolution of the International Atomic Energy Agency's General Conference and Board of Governance, which demand that the Russian Federation urgently withdraw its military personnel from the ZNPP and immediately return the plant to the full control of the sovereign and competent authorities of Ukraine to ensure its safety and security in order for the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct safe, efficient effective safeguard implementation. We stress that the release of the detained Ukrainian ZNPP personnel by the occupying Russian authorities remains a paramount precondition for restoring both basic trust and operational safety at the site. We support the Continuation of the IAEA monitoring mission to all Ukrainian nuclear sites, including the NPP, and to substantial identified by the agency is critical for the safety of nuclear power plants. We express our appreciation for the atomic energy commitment for the professionalism as well as courage of its staff in continuing their mission despite the risk. We call on all states to strengthen joint efforts to condemn and stop Russia's irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, as well as to hold Russia accountable for its reckless violation of international law. Coordinated diplomatic political, and economic actions against the aggressor are essential to protect international peace and security, to end Russia's war of aggression, and to secure a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace for Ukraine. Thank you.

I thank His Excellency Oleksandr Myshenko, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, speaking on behalf of a group of states. I now give the floor to His Excellency Enrique Ochoa, Vice Minister for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights of Mexico, on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition.

You have the floor, sir.

Thank you very much, Mr. President. I'm taking the floor on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa, and my own country, Mexico. President, we're grateful to you for the transparent and inclusive process used to prepare this review conference. Rest assured that you have the full cooperation and support of the New Agenda Coalition to achieve an outcome which can strengthen our crucial treaty and bolster our common goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. We will soon be at two decades without a agreement in force which fosters progress with our treaty. We are meeting at a fragile juncture marked by a highly polarized geopolitical environment where confrontation is ripe with conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, and the Northeast and South of Asia. All of these conflicts have a nuclear dimension, including dangerous nuclear threats. During this review cycle, alarming developments have taken us further away from our common goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. The concerning trends that the New Agenda Coalition raised the alarm about previously during this review cycle have continued or worsened. We are now seeing the acceleration of both the qualitative and quantitative expansion of nuclear arsenals. We're seeing increasing dependency on nuclear weapons within security paradigms, as well as the consideration of new such arrangements and indications of possible interest in horizontal proliferation. There is greater dependency now on nuclear deterrence in security doctrines, together with renewed nuclear rhetoric or actions on the part of States Parties that stoke or legitimize proliferation. This concerning situation, together with the continued failure of nuclear weapons States to forge ahead with disarmament in line with their Article VI obligations and commitments is undermining trust between the States Parties around the integrity and sustainability of the grand bargain which underpins the NPT. It is at this very moment when our treaty requires its members to show bravery and courage to eliminate the existential threat that is nuclear weapons. This responsibility demands our full commitment. not indecision or the undoing of progress. This conference can and must send out a clear, unequivocal message to the world that nuclear disarmament is necessary, urgent, legally binding, and that it will be sought meaningfully by nuclear weapons states now. We cannot wait to arrive at some vague point in the future at the so-called strategic stability. We must take action now. President, deeply rooted norms, which appeared to be universally accepted, are also now under threat. It also appears possible that there is possible undoing of long-standing commitments to a moratorium on nuclear tests. That imperils yet further still the necessary entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Our conference is meeting just shortly after the New START treaty expired without a successor agreement in its place. That is a source of grave concern. For the first time in more than 50 years, the two states with the largest nuclear arsenals do not have numerical restrictions on their nuclear stockpiles, nor do they have mutual systems for inspection and verification. The formal initiation of negotiations on a successor agreement must be secured without delay. We wish to see all nuclear weapons states consider arrangements of this variety, arrangements which would build the necessary trust both within the treaty and beyond it, as building blocks towards more ambitious disarmament measures.

In 2010, States Parties affirmed their concern about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. Since then, Updated scientific research has added to such understanding. In this regard, we welcome the ongoing work of the independent UN Scientific Panel on the Effects of Nuclear War. Yet, as with other areas of our treaty, this affirmation and its scientific underpinnings have been subject to efforts to undermine them. This conference must send a clear message reaffirming the catastrophic humanitarian impacts and consequences of nuclear weapons. President, enhanced transparency and accountability with regards to nuclear weapons states' implementation of Article VI and related commitments will not solve all the challenges facing this Treaty. However, it would be a modest improvement to build confidence and trust at a time when both are short in supply. Standardized and substantive reporting, including agreed baseline information and mutual understanding on criteria and benchmarks in line with related decisions and commitments adopted in 1995, 2000, and 2010 by nuclear weapons states would allow for comparability on direction of travel. Like many others, We call for the formal institution of enhanced reporting and an interactive dialogue with each nuclear weapons State in furtherance of actions 5, 20 and 21 of the 2010 Action Plan to which all States Parties committed. We call for measures taken to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in military and security doctrines be included in national reporting. Existing decisions and commitments made at previous review conferences in 1995, 2000 and 2010 remained valid until their full implementation. This should go without saying. While the NAC expects a reaffirmation of existing obligations and commitments as part of a conference outcome, this would not constitute substantial progress. This reformation constitutes the floor and not the ceiling of our ambition. We need to see arms control and reduction efforts by all nuclear weapons states in fulfillment of their Article VI commitments and obligations, in line with their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Throughout each NPT review cycle, the New Agenda Coalition has consistently called for and proposed measures to accelerate the implementation of States Parties' nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments, especially on the part of nuclear weapons States. These measures include de-alerting, entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and the creation of new nuclear-weapon-free zones, including the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. The new agenda Coalition invites States Parties to consider the recommendations put forward in its working paper, which will be outlined in greater depth in our upcoming statements in Main Committee I. President, now is the time for ambition and bold leadership to foster confidence and build trust. Obligations are not meaningless. They are real and legally binding. and commitments must be faithfully pursued. Let us restore our treaty and get it back on track. The moment demands it. Thank you very much.

I thank His Excellency Enrique Ochoa, Vice Minister for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights of Mexico, speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition. I now have the honor to invite His Excellency Yoon Do-jung, Vice Minister for Strategy and Intelligence of the Republic of Korea. You have the floor, sir.

Mr. President, distinguished delegates, as Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, the second Secretary-General of the United Nations, once noted, if the situation we build are defective, It is our responsibility to repair them. We gather today at a critical juncture when the NPT must respond to unprecedented and complex challenges. Instability in today's international security environment, including the ongoing situation in the Middle East, together with diverging views between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states on nuclear disarmament are eroding confidence in the credibility and effectiveness of the NPT regime. At a time of deepening divisions, all State Parties must return to the original spirit of the Treaty, the so-called grand bargain, and reaffirm the commitment to the three mutually reinforcing pillars of the NPT: nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. At this point, I need to remind the special responsibility of the nuclear weapons states to pursue good faith negotiations on nuclear disarmament and the cessation of the nuclear arms race in line with Article VI of the Treaty. We must remind all nuclear weapons states to reaffirm the 2022 P5 commitment that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. In the context of the continued dialogue among nuclear weapons states, we welcome efforts to explore new frameworks, including the United States proposal to pursue multilateral strategic instability dialogue. The Republic of Korea also supports the entry into force of the CTBT and the early commencement of the FMCT negotiations and will continue to support initiatives such as Stockholm Initiative and International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification to advance conditions conducive to nuclear disarmament. Mr. President, recalling the obligations to comply with non-proliferation commitments as reaffirmed in the 2010 Action Plan, the Republic of Korea underscores that all compliance-related issues must be addressed in order to uphold the integrity of the NPT and the credibility of the safeguards system. I must draw renewed attention to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The DPRK is the only case that benefited from the NPT regime, announced its withdrawal, and openly continued the development of nuclear weapons, thereby remaining the most pressing challenge to the non-proliferation regime. Any state that seeks to uphold the NPT regime should duly align itself with this unified position of the international community to send a clear message that only a return to the treaty can ensure security and prosperity. We also call upon Russian Federation to cease its illegal military cooperation with the DPRK, which violates United Nations Security Council resolutions, and to fulfill its responsibilities in safeguarding the global nonproliferation regime. The Republic of Korea will continue to work closely with the international community towards the complete denuclearization and lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. While upholding this goal, we recognize that it will take time given the realities on the ground. We are therefore pursuing a phased approach that starts with stopping DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile programs through dialogue and negotiation, moves to reduction in the medium term, and ultimately proceed to dismantlement in the long term. We call upon DPRK to respond to our sincere efforts to return to full compliance with the NPT and relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. Mr. President, we are now witnessing a renewed momentum that can be described as a nuclear renaissance. Recognizing the mutually reinforcing nature of nonproliferation obligations and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, we reaffirm the inalienable rights of the State Parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in full compliance with nonproliferation and safeguards obligations. IAEA safeguards are indispensable in this regard, and we strongly support efforts to universalize comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol. Further strengthening the NPT review process remains a key priority. particularly to improve transparency and accountability in the implementation of the treaty. In this regard, we support the adoption of a standardized format for national reports and the allocation of dedicated session during the review conference to examine them. Mr. President, for the Republic of Korea, the NPT is directly linked to the peace, stability, and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. Our commitment to nonproliferation is not just a legal constraint, but a strategic imperative. We remain firmly committed to working with all state parties to safeguard the global nonproliferation regime, and will work constructively to ensure that this review conference marks the beginning of meaningful progress. Thank you for your attention.

I thank His Excellency Yeon Do-jung, Vice Minister for Strategy and Intelligence of the Republic of Korea. I now have the honor to invite Her Excellency Le Thi Thu-Hanh, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam. You have the floor, Madam.

Mr. President, at the outset, allow me to extend my warmest congratulations on your election as the President of the 11th NPT Review Conference. my delegation is align itself with the statement to be delivered later on by representatives from Uganda and the Philippines on behalf of the Non-Alignment Movement and Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Our discussion is more timely than ever, as the international community confronts heightened uncertainty and fragmentation. Escalating geopolitical tensions, coupled with the resurgence of nuclear rhetoric, cast a profound shadow over global security. Our particular concerns are the continued modernization of nuclear arsenals, the emergence of arms races, and the rapid advancement of emerging technology, all of which risk undermining decades of progress in nuclear disarmament. Historical experience has consistently underscored the indispensability of the NPT. It remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, as well as the fundamental pillar supporting the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In this context, we would like to emphasize the following points. First, States parties must reaffirm their collective commitment to the NPT. Nuclear-weapon States bear a special responsibility to fully implement their disarmament obligations and to refrain from the threat or use of force. It is both urgent and imperative to advance confidence-building measures. and to deepen engagement on strategic issues, particularly those related to strategic stability, with a view to restoring trust and sustaining the credibility of the global disarmament regime. Second, we underscore the need to advance the implementation of the NPT through complementary international instruments, including the early entry into force of CTBT and the further ratification and accession to the TPNW. We support the establishment and consolidation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and in particular, remain committed to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. We call upon nuclear weapons states to ratify the protocol to the treaty at the earliest possible opportunity. Third, peaceful uses of nuclear energy are essential to maintaining the balance and credibility of the NPT. Expanding access to developing countries in both a right under the treaty and a driver for progress. We call for strengthened international cooperation, improved access to technology and expertise, and sustainable financing to ensure that all countries can fully benefit from the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. In this spirit, we invite all delegation to attend our upcoming side event on atoms for the global south, technology, capacity, and financing for peaceful use of nuclear energy at 1:15 PM this Wednesday. Vietnam remains steadfast in our commitment to nonproliferation and the complete verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons. while upholding the inalienable right of all states to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We continue to advance scientific research and technological application of nuclear energy, focusing on healthcare, agriculture, environmental protection, and energy security. The recent adoption of strategy for the development and application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes until 2035 with the vision to 2050 reaffirms our commitment to harnessing nuclear technology in a safe, secure, and sustainable manner for social economic development. In light of the complex challenges we face, it is imperative that this review conference turned reaffirmation to meaningful action. This will only be possible by achieving consensus on a balanced and substantive outcome document. In so doing, we must strengthen our collective efforts, guided by a spirit of flexibility and shared responsibility. We stand ready to work. with all partners to ensure a successful outcome that strengthens the NPT and contributes to a safer and more secure world for all. I thank you.

I thank Her Excellency Le Thi Thu Hang, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, for her statement. I now give the floor to His Excellency Jukka Salovaara, Permanent State Secretary of Finland. You have the floor, sir.

Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on your election as a President of the Review Conference. You can count on Finland's full support in this demanding task. Finland is honored to be serving as a chair of the Main Committee III and support you from this role as well. Finland fully aligns with the statements of the European Union, the Nordic countries, and the Stockholm Initiative. I would like to make a few additional remarks in my national capacity. Mr. President, For more than five decades, the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has curbed nuclear proliferation, advanced nuclear disarmament, and enabled peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We must ensure the success of the Treaty in the future as well. For Finland, the three pillars of the Treaty are equally important and mutually reinforcing. The international security environment remains extremely difficult. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine continues in its fifth year. Russia's irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and unlawful actions around nuclear facilities, as well as its disregard for international law, undermine the global nonproliferation and disarmament regime. We condemn Russia's war of aggression in the strongest terms. The security situation in the Middle East and the Gulf is very serious. Finland calls all parties to work towards a diplomatic solution and refrain from escalatory measures to end the war. The challenges to the NPT extend beyond the ongoing conflicts. Serious nonproliferation crises continue. The nuclear and missile programs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea threaten international peace and security. Iran's nuclear program cannot be verified to be exclusively peaceful. China continues to expand its nuclear arsenal at an unprecedented pace. The New START Treaty between the United States and Russia has expired, and strategic dialogue between major nuclear powers remains limited. In a situation like this, we cannot afford to be indifferent. What is required now is a renewed commitment to the international rules-based order and to the full implementation of the NPT. Mr. President, as a NATO ally, Finland continues its constructive and active disarmament and non-proliferation policy. NATO's nuclear deterrence arrangements have been a key tool in preventing proliferation. NATO's policy predates the NPT and fully respects the treaty. Ultimately, NATO shares a goal of a world without nuclear weapons. We actively support nuclear risk reduction work. All States have an interest in and can contribute to reducing the risk of nuclear conflict, while nuclear-weapon States bear a special responsibility in this area. Risk reduction can contribute meaningfully to the implementation of Article VI obligations and nuclear disarmament-related commitments. For decades, Finland has been a steadfast supporter of the global safeguard system and the International Atomic Energy Agency, contributing technical expertise to strengthen the verification regime worldwide. Nuclear energy is a crucial part of Finland's energy mix. According to current estimates, an operating license for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel facility could be granted by the end of 2026. with operations at the encapsulation plant expected to start in 2027. As the first country to begin the final geological disposal of spent nuclear fuel, Finland remains committed to sharing its expertise with other countries. Finland is an active participant in many international initiatives aimed at advancing disarmament and non-proliferation. We contribute constructively to the Stockholm Initiative, the Global Forum to Prevent Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism, the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, the Vienna Group of Ten, and to the nuclear risk reduction work. These initiatives contribute to the implementation of the NPT and strengthen cooperation between countries and regions. As a member of the Group of Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, we promote the entry into force of the CTBT, which is an important element of the implementation of the NPT. Mr. President, as we begin our work at the Conference, we have a clear understanding of the challenges before us, but also the confidence in the Treaty. With a shared goal accompanied by a sense of realistic expectations, we can strengthen the Treaty. Finland stands ready to work with all delegations towards a balanced, forward-looking outcome that reinforces the NPT for the years ahead. Thank you, Mr. President.

I thank His Excellency Jukka Salovaara, Permanent State Secretary of Finland. I now invite His Excellency Oleksandr Myshchenko, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. You have the floor, sir.

Mr. President, distinguished participants, as we gather here in New York, Russia continue unselective attack on Ukraine cities. killing civilians, and damaging energy infrastructure, including power grids linked to nuclear facilities. This escalation amid efforts towards a just and lasting peace shows Russia's true intent: no interest in ending the war. In 1994, Ukraine made the historic decision to give up its nuclear arsenal and join the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state. We placed all of our nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. In return, we received security assurances through the Budapest Memorandum, which, as we can see today, were fundamentally destroyed. Russia's invasion has exposed the region's nuclear safety to unprecedented risk, as the aggressor deliberately targets Ukrainian nuclear sites and conducts combat activities around them. The Russian leadership exploits this escalation to divide our partners, weaken support for Ukraine, and use our nuclear facilities as a leverage against the international community. Russia not only violated international law by attacking Ukraine, but also systematically undermined the global nonproliferation and disarmament regime. Moscow noncompliance caused the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and in 2023 led to withdrawal of Russia's ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. This is all about the same country, the Russian Federation, which is a State Party to the NPT, a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and a participant in all nuclear non-proliferation regimes, constantly disregards the core missions of this Organization. Mr. President. Yesterday, we commemorate the 40th anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, a tragedy that reminds a powerful reminder of the far reaching consequences of nuclear accidents. We recall the damage caused by a Russian drone strike on the new safe confinement at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in February 25, which caused a serious damage of its structure and the risk of the nuclear leak. Ukraine expresses its sincere gratitude to all states and international organization for their support for the projects, including the repair of the new safe confinement, announced at the International Donor Conference in Chernobyl Recovery and Nuclear Safety held in Kiev yesterday. The situation in another threatened Ukrainian nuclear facility, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, remains extremely alarming. We firmly reject Russia's attempts to restart the reactors at the Zaporizhzhia NPP and call on the international community to pressure Russia to release the lawfully detained Ukraine plant personnel. Ukraine also calls on all States to support its re-election to the Agency Board of Governors, to ensure continued focus on nuclear safety and security in conditions of the war. Mr. President, Ukraine highly values the Agency's central role in upholding the global non-proliferation regime. Russia's aggression against Ukraine clearly demonstrated that attacks on non-nuclear state occupation of nuclear facilities, interference with safeguard, and nuclear cohesion directly undermines the NPT foundation. But Russia's aggression undermines all three pillars of the NPT. First, Russia's actions undermine non-proliferation. Second, Russia undermines the principle of peaceful use of nuclear energy by occupying Zaporizhzhia NPP, militarizing the area, threatening off-site power and reactor cooling, and attacking Chernobyl's new safe confinement, it turns protected civilian infrastructure in a tool of military and political pressure, directly violating the NPT's purposes and principles of peaceful nuclear use. Third, Russia undermines nuclear disarmament. Ukraine gave up the world's largest nuclear arsenal in good faith. by joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state. Today, Russia, despite its security assurance, wages war, occupying Ukrainian territory, threatening nuclear disaster, and normalizing nuclear intimidation, signaling that disarmament does not guarantee security, while nuclear weapons protect the aggressor, thereby eroding the NPT and global disarmament architecture. Ukraine calls for strong, principled support for the Agency's work in Ukraine, including its presence at our nuclear sites. In this context, Ukraine underscore the need for full cooperation with the Agency on safeguards worldwide. Verification must remain objective, technically sound, and free from political manipulation, a principle that must apply equally in all cases involving sensitive nuclear issues. Mr. President, Ukraine remains firmly committed to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, urging all Annex 2 States to ratify it without delay. We also support the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty as a key step to curb the nuclear arms race and advance efforts to secure nuclear materials as essential pillars for non-proliferation and disarmament. Farther more, the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, building on existing delivery system and Minsk's new military doctrine enable their potential use poses a serious threat to the international nonproliferation regime and undermine multilateral disarmament efforts. Mr. President, four years into Russia's war against Ukraine, the human cost keeps rising, and the rule-based international order is being systematically undermined. Decisive international action is essential to deter further aggression and ensure the UN Charter and the NPT are enforced, not ignored. Ukraine will remain at the forefront of these efforts and call on the NPT States Parties to stand united. Thank you very much.

I thank His Excellency Oleksandr Myshenko, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. I now give the floor to his Excellency Enrique Ochoa, Vice Minister for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights of Mexico.

Mr. President, allow me to begin by congratulating you on having assumed the presidency of this review conference. Mexico is attending this review conference with the conviction that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament regime. 56 years after the entry into force of the NPT, a large number of its non-proliferation goals have been achieved. However, progress towards nuclear disarmament is practically inexistent. and we can even say that serious backsliding has been seen. It is a source of concern to note how geopolitical tensions have led to warmongering rhetoric growing ever harsher and to an increase in military expenditure. The above has led to several developed nations reducing their ODA. This state of affairs means that we are moving ever further away from what humankind requires, that is resources for peace and development, and not for war and not for destruction, as was very clearly proposed by a woman with a humanist vision and a firm sense of leadership, that is Claudia Sheinbaum. our president only a few weeks ago, allocating 10% of global expenditure on arms, a sum that would stand at thousands of billions of dollars, to fund a global program that would allow millions of people to reforest millions of hectares every year. That was her proposal. The International Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons, ICAN, reported that In 2024, military expenditure on nuclear weapons exceeded $100 billion. This means that $3,169 were spent per second on such weapons. And allow me to put that in perspective, if I may. Only one second, if you like, of this expenditure could have financed 18,570 vaccines against measles, mumps, and rubella. We cannot allow this immoral wastage of resources to continue. Our goal must be to significantly and meaningfully reduce these weapons. We must reduce them in such a way that we ultimately arrive at the complete elimination of the most destructive and most costly weapons that humankind has ever seen. President, Frustration remains regarding the lack of nuclear disarmament, that is true, but now in addition, we find ourselves in a position where it is necessary to defend a norm that we thought was already firmly established. We cannot be complacent in the face of those that promote the idea that non-nuclear weapons states should host these weapons or attempt to develop their own. We need to see a stringent review of the implementation of Article 2 of the Treaty. Equally alarming are the veiled or explicit threats of the use of nuclear weapons and those that speak out in an attempt to normalize such threats. We are alarmed too by the possibility of seeing the resumption of nuclear tests, as well as about the radiological risks that could arise as a result of armed attacks on nuclear facilities. We here wish to express our outrage and our dismay at the lack of agreements in force related to control of these weapons. This year, the Tlatelolco Treaty will mark its 60th anniversary. Over these six decades, States Parties have worked to establish nuclear weapons-free zones. These have now extended to other regions. Today, 116 countries, the vast majority of which are located in the Global South, are part of these nuclear weapons-free zones. And with that step, we have with actions and not merely words contributed to and strengthened the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Moreover, 74 States have acceded to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. We have done so because we are staunchly convinced of the need to explicitly ban these horrific weapons under international law. present, 16 years have elapsed since the last time that the parties to the NPT reached an agreement. We cannot waste the opportunity offered to us by this Review Conference. Allow me to share, in this regard, four priorities that Mexico holds dear. Firstly, the need to recognize the catastrophic consequences and the humanitarian and environmental impact of any use of nuclear weapons and or and or an intentional accidental detonation secondly allow us to recognize that nuclear weapons must not be used ever again by any actor under any circumstances and we must promote nuclear risk reduction particularly through crises Communications and we must avoid misperceptions and prevent miscalculation. We must also urgently address the risks of the intersection between nuclear weapons and new technologies. Our work here must guarantee that for as long as these weapons exist, human beings retain control over them. Thirdly, nuclear weapons states must commit to transparent and irreversible actions to comply with the disarmament commitments enshrined in Article VI of the Treaty. In turn, non-nuclear weapon States, however ironic it may sound, must make explicit their commitment to complying with Article II. the need to continue to promote the universality of the NPT. President, finally, Mexico reiterates its readiness to work towards an agreement which ultimately leads us to a world free of nuclear weapons. This agreement must be buttressed by law, peace, humanism and international solidarity. Thank you.

I thank His Excellency Enrique Ochoa, Vice Minister for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights of Mexico. I now invite His Excellency Matt Thistlethwaite, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia. You have the floor, sir.

Thank you, President. The most important international instrument in existence to control nuclear proliferation. That's how the then Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam characterised the NPT more than 50 years ago. It's a judgment that has stood the test of time. 50 years on, the NPT remains as the practical expression of humanity's determination to avoid catastrophe. At this conference, it's worth asking ourselves a sobering question. What would the world look like without the NPT? Well, we would see more states with nuclear weapons. And with more nuclear weapons comes the risk of nuclear accidents or miscalculation or more potential for conflation and impact across the world. Confidence in peaceful nuclear cooperation would erode, depriving states of the benefits of nuclear science and technology. Simply put, without the NPT, the world would be a more dangerous, unpredictable and unfriendly place. That is what is at stake. And so our responsibility at this review conference is clear. We must protect the treaty. We must strengthen it. And we must ensure it continues to deliver in a very different world from the one in which it was negotiated. At the same time, we must be clear-eyed. The current security environment is deeply challenging. Strategic rivalry has intensified, and the arms control architecture is under strain. We see serious compliance concerns, nuclear threats and coercion, and in our own region, the Asia-Pacific, a nuclear buildup lacking the transparency the region expects. These realities make consensus harder, but they also make the NPT more necessary than ever. In difficult times, we do not strengthen security by abandoning what works. We strengthen it by holding firm to it and making it work better. This conference is not about lowering ambition, but about turning ambition into practical action. President, there's so much that we agree on, and many success stories that we shouldn't overlook. The International Atomic Energy Agency continues to play a critical and irreplaceable role at the heart of the treaty, supporting safeguards, enabling peaceful uses, and promoting confidence to the international community. Australia is proud to support the IAEA's vital work. Australia is committed to nuclear disarmament. The NPA provides an indispensable framework for these efforts. The nuclear weapons states are in the room, and their engagement is critical. We also see in our region the tangible benefits of the NPT's third pillar, nuclear science, improving cancer treatment, strengthening biosecurity, supporting agriculture and food resilience. These are successes worth protecting and expanding. Of course, we must also confront the hard issues. We want to see more progress on disarmament, but there are no easy solutions. Many of the steps are clear. Ending explosive nuclear testing permanently through the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Developing robust disarmament verification measures. The NPT is central to advancing each of those goals. At the same time, compliance and accountability matter. The treaty works if obligations are met and concerns are addressed. Australia is deeply concerned about continued proliferation challenges, including those posed by Iran and the DPRK. We must discuss these issues frankly, constructively, and with a focus on implementing the treaty. Enhanced transparency, accountability, and risk reduction can and should be areas of real progress at this meeting. In a difficult security environment, these are practical, achievable, stabilising measures that strengthen implementation of the NPT and serve the shared interests of all States Parties. Australia knows that credibility in non-proliferation is built through transparency. That principle guides our approach in acquiring a naval nuclear propulsion capability under AUKUS. We are committed to setting the highest non-proliferation standard and working closely with the IAEA to ensure our approach strengthens the non-proliferation and disarmament regime. President, the treaty is too important to allow disappointment, division, or geopolitics to hollow it out. The NPT has endured for 50 years because states have chosen, again and again, to put it first. The NPT has endured because it is implemented every day through inspections, through reporting and verification, through dialogue, technical cooperation and peaceful uses. Quietly, but with impact. Australia will work constructively with states parties to support you in your role as President and to focus this conference on what matters most, safeguarding this indispensable treaty, strengthening its implementation and ensuring that it continues to protect future generations from the gravest of dangers. Thank you.

I thank His Excellency Matt Thistlethwaite, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia. I now invite His Excellency Yashan Ashibayev, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, to take the floor.

Mr. President, I'd also like to congratulate you on assuming the presidency of this conference. You may count on the full support and constructive cooperation of my delegation. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, we meet at a moment of profound consequence for international peace and security, characterized by the erosion of the arms control frameworks, lack of trust among major powers, as well as risks brought by rapid advances in AI and other emerging technologies. The expiration of the New START Treaty has removed an important layer of predictability and transparency between the two largest nuclear arsenal holders. Kazakhstan's firm decision to close Polygon 35 years ago and renounce the world's fourth largest nuclear arsenal demonstrates that security does not necessarily need to rely on nuclear weapons. Mr. President, the credibility of the NPT depends on the balanced and full implementation of its three pillars. The continued lack of tangible progress under Article VI is deeply concerning. We call for the restoration of strategic dialogue among all nuclear-weapon States and development of modern arms control frameworks, including practical nuclear risk reduction measures. At the same time, risk reduction must complement and facilitate nuclear disarmament, not substitute it. In this context, we recall the initiative of President Kasym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan to relaunch high-level dialogue among nuclear weapons states. And Kazakhstan stands ready to offer its good offices where appropriate. The entry into force of the CTBT remains one of the most urgent unfinished tasks on the international agenda. In this year, when the Treaty marks 30 years, we call for the Annex 2 States to sign and ratify the Treaty. The global norm and taboo against nuclear testing must be preserved under all circumstances. And any rhetoric on nuclear weapon use or testing is destabilizing and undermines the very normative foundation of the Treaty. Kazakhstan also recognizes the complementary role of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, TPNW, in reinforcing the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament. As a nation that has firsthand knowledge of the human and environmental cost of nuclear weapon testing, we remain engaged in efforts to promote victim assistance and environmental remediation. Distinguished delegates, the non-proliferation framework is under growing strain. While the IAEA safeguards must be strengthened, we should remember that a sustainable and viable non-proliferation regime depends on balanced implementation across all pillars. Kazakhstan continues to champion nuclear-weapon-free zones, including the Semipalatinsk Treaty, which celebrates its 20th anniversary this year, as one of the most effective tools for advancing global nuclear disarmament and strengthening global and regional security. We continue to promote enhanced cooperation among all zones, including by having hosted in Astana two such interzonal meetings. Mr. President, in line with Article 4 of the Treaty, we support strong international cooperation, technology transfer, and capacity building. Last year, Kazakhstan achieved a historic milestone in restoring its sovereign equality within the IAEA. As a host to the IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Bank, Kazakhstan also supports practical, multilateral solutions that ensure reliable access to nuclear fuel while reducing proliferation risks. We are in the process of building our own first nuclear power plant. Distinguished delegates, Kazakhstan believes that this review conference can become a starting point for agreeing on tangible, achievable, and balanced outcomes across all three pillars. Kazakhstan's active engagement in the review process, including its role as a chair of the second PREPCOM and the chair of Main Committee II, reflects our continued commitment to facilitating inclusive dialogue and advancing practical consensus-based outcomes. Kazakhstan stands ready to work with all partners in the spirit of responsibility, realism, and constructive engagement to ensure that our common treaty remains fit for purpose in these turbulent times. Thank you.

I thank His Excellency Yashan Ashikbayev, First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan for his statement. This concludes the opening meeting of the conference. We will continue with the list of speakers for the general debate this afternoon. It is my intention to begin our meetings strictly on time. Accordingly, the afternoon plenary meeting will start at 3:00 p.m. sharp. The first speaker in the afternoon will be His Excellency Dag Hattielius, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden. The meeting is adjourned.