UN Transcripts — https://transcripts.un.org/en/asset/k16/k165cysa11
Preparatory Commission: Agreement on Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (Third Session, Informal Working Group) — General Assembly — 25 March 2026
Language: en
Automatically generated transcript — may contain errors. Not an official United Nations record.

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Co-Chair [0:02]:

Okay, I'm going to dispense with all of the formalities and in the Australian vernacular, let's get stuck in. So, rules of procedure. There were some clarifications requested yesterday in the session and I would like to make. We've done some looking into some of the questions and I'd like to make the following observations with regard to draft Rule 4, paragraphs 3 and 4 a clarification was sought on how Parties could express support for the holding of an extraordinary meeting of the Conference of the Parties upon a written request by a Party for such a meeting. The Co Chairs understand that in the context of the United Nations General assembly, concurrence with a request for a special session of the General assembly is typically expressed through a written communication by States addressed to the Secretariat.

With regard to participation as observers of States not party to the Agreement. I wish to recall that the text of Draft Rule 6, paragraph 2A provides that representatives of states falling under subparagraph A, I.e. States not party to the Agreement are entitled to participate as observers subject to prior written notification to the Head of the Secretariat. So we would welcome any comments in relation to that draft Rule, either now or in due course when we return for consideration of it.

I see no one wishing to take the floor, so let's move on to our consideration of. As you would remember, Delegates, we are grouping issues together. So I'm going to move on to consideration of Rules 9 to 13. Now there's a cross cutting issue with respect to those rules which is in regard to rule 9, 10, 12 and 13. You will see in brackets the text taking into account Article 6 of the agreement.

I propose to deal with these collectively as it's the same amendment for the same purposes in all four rules. Delegations may remember that that we had quite an extensive exchange on this at PrepCom2. So I don't intend to ask delegations for a comprehensive recital of the arguments in favour of the inclusion of the bracketed text or against the inclusion of the bracketed text. What I would be grateful for is an indication of delegation's preference for the inclusion or not, and for those supporting the inclusion, an indication of whether it is more important for them with respect to some rules than with respect to others. So I trust that is clear.

So we're looking at Rule 9, 10, 12 and 13, the bracketed text, taking into account Article 6 of the Agreement, grateful for indications of whether delegations are in favour of the retention of that text, or would like to see that text removed. The floor is open.

It's hand signal, by the way. And perhaps for the sake of completeness, if people could indicate which delegation they are representing. And if they are. If I don't get it correct, if they're representing a group. Okay, floor is open.

Saudi Arabia, you have the floor.


Saudi Arabia [4:41]:

Thank you, Co Chair and good morning. I just have a procedural question. Will we be going back? I know we are taking, as you said, the.

You are taking it in bulks, the parts and issues. So we would be coming back to the practice text that has not been resolved in seven and eight and so on at the later stage. Just to clarify.


Co-Chair [5:04]:

Thank you. That is correct.

Did you have a substantive comment? Saudi Arabia or No? Okay, thank you. Shock run. Next I see Japan to be followed by Vietnam.


Japan [5:24]:

Thank you, Court Chair. Japan is in favor of removal of all reference to Article 6 of the Agreement in this section. And Also on Rule 12, Japan supports the inclusion of no later than 30 days in the second bracket. And also on Rule 13, we would like to open the first bracket and include or extraordinary. That is all.


Co-Chair [5:46]:

Thank you. Thank you, Japan. And I give the floor to Vietnam, to be followed by Micronesia, I presume, on behalf of psids and the Philippines.


Viet Nam [6:04]:

Sorry.

Thank you. Co Chair, I would like to have a comment on Rule 9 and 10. So we consider the proposed insertion of specific reference to Article 6 in Rule 9 and 10 unnecessary and proposed deleting that reference. The Secretariat must prepare the provisional Agenda in accordance with agreement and other relevant rules. Furthermore, the Article 6 does not set out detailed rules for preparing the Provisional Agenda and does not restrict and the Conference of the Parties from considering or taking into account any agenda items.

Thank you.


Co-Chair [6:52]:

I thank Vietnam. And I give the floor to Micronesia speaking, I presume for peaceids.


Micronesia (Federated States of) · PSIDS [7:02]:

Thank you very much. And yes, that that is correct. On behalf of peace, it's very briefly, Article 6 is already in the agreement, so I think it is redundant here to restate it. It doesn't really change much. We're fine with pretty much the other brackets in the section that you have outlined.


Co-Chair [7:27]:

Thank you. Thank you, Micronesia. I give the floor to the Philippines.


Philippines [7:38]:

Hello. Okay. Hi. Okay. So we'd like to address the bracketed text throughout part four on the rules and agenda.

We note that what is crucial now is whether such language has likelihood to bring about convergence in the room and contribute the progress in our work. In this regard, we'd like to register anew our position that there's no need to reflect Article 6 and 18 in the Rules of Procedure as in this part of the Rules we we support, therefore, the removal of the reference to Article 6 in the bracketed text and we recall our previous statement on the language that these articles are delegate and that the consensus on the agreement rests on, among other things, that carefully crafted balance. This proposal to include Article 6 obsessive balance derails our progress and risk undermining the Agreement's objective and purpose thinking.


Co-Chair [8:31]:

Thank you, Philippines European Union, you have the floor.


EU [8:39]:

Thank you, Co Chair. I know we're trying to be brief and I really appreciate that, but I will try to make three points and I'll try to be short. Apologies for that in advance and I hope the room will accept be a bit patient with me. On Article 6, which is the main subject that you raised. The EU agrees with Japan, Vietnam Peace, SIDS, Philippines.

We don't see the necessity for that. I think the reasoning that was given by PCID was very relevant as well as the one given by Vietnam. Article 6 is a clause that defines the legal effect of the BBNJ on COP decision. It doesn't define the subject matter that the BBNJ may or not address. And anyway, the agenda is subject to the entire agreement.

We are not going to be discussing something that is not in the BBNJ agreement. I'd like to make two other points with regard to Rule 9 and 12. The EU and its member states consider that the provisional agenda setting power should be given to the President instead of the Secretariat. So the President, following consultation with the Bureau and with the support of the Secretariat. Such process would better ensure that the COPS works reflects the political mandate entrusted by the Parties to the President.

It would thus strengthen accountability in the process of setting the agenda. We do recognize that the agenda may have scientific or technical nature agenda items that will be of scientific or technical nature and will be shaped out by what comes out of the subsidiary bodies. But we do consider that the President can use their political skills to determine the order in which these items can be discussed in order to build supports and coalition for agenda items. The Secretariat's role in this system would then be to prepare the annotated agenda and gather the technical documents to support each agenda item. In any case, as it's already provided in the rule, the provisional agenda will be then submitted to the copy where parties will have the power to amend it before adopting it.

And I would like to make another point which goes a bit beyond the Article 6, but it's important for the EU. We know that in Rule 11 and 14 there is an expression which says made available to observer and this is not very clear in our view, like all other official documents mentioned in Rule 6 4c, the agenda should be distributed to observer and the EU and its member states. Also consider that to promote the transparency in decision making process that is mentioned in article 48, the agenda should be made available to the general public. And on Rule 13, as we are here, I'll just mention that we should refer to both Ordinary and Extraordinary meetings. Thank you.


Co-Chair [11:37]:

Thank you, European Union. And that's noted. Morocco floor is yours.


Morocco · Africa Group [11:47]:

Good morning, colleagues. Thank you very much. Mr. Co Chair. The African Group wishes to make observation on rules 9, 10, 12 and 13 and on the reference to article 6 of the agreement. The African Group underlines that given the Agreement's application to Areas B beyond national jurisdiction, retaining this reference ensures that agenda preparation remains consistent with the Agreement's object and purpose and also with the spirit and letter of Article 6 of the Agreement.

For interest of time, the African Group would also support the retention of these references. As I said in Rules 12 and 13, on the formulation in Article 9 of in consultation or after consulting, the African Group would prefer the formulation in consultation. That implies that an ongoing and substantive engagement with the Bureau throughout the process, whereas after consulting suggest a more limited sequential step. The four I mean in consulting would be the African Group.

Understand that in consultation would be better when I stop here. Thank you.


Co-Chair [13:08]:

Thank you, Morocco. On behalf of the Africa Group, I now give the floor to Argentina on behalf of clam.


Argentina · CLAM [13:19]:

Thank you, Co Chair. Yes, on behalf of CLAM. With respect to Chapter 4, we have no substantial comments to make. This chapter has reached, we understand, a sufficiently advanced stage allowing discussions to continue without the need for significant modifications. We also have no concerns regarding the inclusion of the bracketed text in the provisions.

We consider the proposed rules acceptable as they are based on the regulations of similar forums. Thank you.


Co-Chair [13:53]:

I thank Argentina on behalf of CLAM and give the floor to Saudi Arabia.


Saudi Arabia [14:02]:

Thank you Kosher for giving me the floor. I'm coming back to give some substantive comments regarding some of the issues raised regarding Article 6. We are in support of retaining the reference to Article 6 and the rules. So, just to make it short, and regarding Rule 12, we had made previous comment in previous prepcom regarding our feeling regarding this rule and we stressed that the inclusion of supplementary agenda item must remain under the authority of Parties and in line with established multilateral practice. Such items should also be subject to confirmation by Conference of the Parties.

So we did suggest a textual proposal in the previous. So we will propose it here again to follow by any such supplementary Agenda items shall be subjected to confirmation by the conference of the party. So we submit this change to make sure that any addition to the agenda should be after consensus and the spirit of consensus by parties of its inclusion. Thank you.


Co-Chair [15:15]:

Thank you very much. Saudi Arabia. And I give the floor to Switzerland.


Switzerland [15:23]:

Thank you very much, Co Chair. We would like to join others, Japan, Vietnam, PCs, Philippines, the EU, in supporting the deletion of Article 6 in Rules 9, 10, 12 and 13 for the reasons explained by others and with respect to Rule 11 and 14. We also think that we need to ensure transparency and that the agenda should be distributed to observers as well and are also supporting that comment that was made by others. Thank you.


Co-Chair [15:58]:

Thank you, Switzerland. And I give the floor to Jamaica, if you can confirm on behalf of caricom. Jamaica, the floor is yours.


Jamaica · CARICOM [16:07]:

Thank you, Co facilitator. Yes, this is Jamaica on behalf of caricom.

And we do join other delegations, including PCs, Japan, the EU and the African group in supporting the deletion of the reference to Article 6 in Rules 9, 10, 12 and 13 for the reasons so clearly articulated.


Co-Chair [16:36]:

I thank you, Jamaica, on behalf of caricom and I give the floor to New Zealand.


New Zealand [16:45]:

Thank you, Co Chair. I speak on behalf of Canada, Australia,. Norway, Iceland and New Zealand. We add our voice to those supporting. The removal of the language in square.

Brackets, the references to Article 6 for. The same reasons that have been expressed by others. The references aren't necessary. It's not an issue of procedure and. In any event the rules procedure are.

Subordinate to the agreement. Thank you.


Co-Chair [17:12]:

Thank you, New Zealand. And I give the floor to Fiji.


Fiji [17:20]:

Thank you, Co Chair. Fiji joins others in lending its voice in terms of removal of references to Article 6. We also would like to just seek clarification on the point made by EU in terms of the agenda to be prepared by the President. I believe that this is a point that kind of signals whether the Secretariat is likely to be politicized or not. Are they leaning towards that angle on why and if there is any justification for this change, on why the President would be responsible for the preparation of the agenda.

Thank you.


Co-Chair [18:11]:

Thank you very much, Fiji. We will respond to that question at the end of the item. I'll just continue to take State's views for now and we will respond. I give the floor to Turkier.


Türkiye [18:25]:

With regard to reference to Article 6 of the Agreement in Rules 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13. We consider that provisions already contained in the agreement and do not necessarily need to be replicated in the Rousseau procedure as this may lead to deprecation and could potentially give rise to interpretative inconsistencies. Furthermore, as reflected in Article 61 of the one of the Rules of Procedure, the primacy of the agreement over the Rules of Procedure is already ensured. In this regard, we recall that Article 6 constitutes a general provision of the Agreement which applies across the implementation of the instrument as a whole. We believe that its application is already ensured irrespective of whether it's explicitly referenced in specific procedure rules.

We would like to also note that selective references to Article 6 in certain rules, but not others, may unintentionally create ambiguity regarding its scope or suggest differentiated application. But we remain flexible and open to engaging constructively with other delegation in a spirit of compromise. Thank you, Co Chair.


Co-Chair [19:51]:

I thank you, Turkey. And I give the floor to Morocco, to be followed by the United Kingdom.


Morocco · Africa Group [20:00]:

Thank you, sir. And I would like to would like to come back on Article 6 just to clarify that the African Group's position is the retention of the bracketed text that relates to Article 6. Thank you.


Co-Chair [20:24]:

I thank Morocco for that clarification on behalf of the Africa Group. And I give the floor to the United Kingdom.


United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [20:32]:

Thank you very much. Good Morning, everyone. The UK joins Philippines, Japan, Vietnam, the EU PeaceIDS and others in opposing the references to Article 6 in these rules.

We recall our previous interventions on this. These issues are already sufficiently addressed in the Treaty and we do not need to reproduce those references in the Rules of Procedure. As well, in Rule 12, we are content with removing the square brackets around no later than 30 days. And we also can accept the we can accept removal of the square brackets of or extraordinary in the first line of Rule 13, though we do note that that is duplicative of what we have in line 2 of Rule 14. Currently, we're generally flexible on where that reference goes.

Thank you.


Co-Chair [21:30]:

I thank the United Kingdom. Is there anyone else looking to take the floor on this issue?

China floor is yours.


China [21:43]:

Thank you. Co chair for rules nine to 13. China prefers to lift all the square. Sorry, to lift all the square brackets concerning reference to Article 6. That is to say, to retain the contents of reference to Article 6.

We deem it a necessary element to be considered when preparing the agenda of the Conference of the Parties to ensure that the agreement focuses on its right area of application. I also heard the argument that has, that has expressed by several delegations that this is simply a duplication of the text of the language of Article 6. But what we are talking here today, it is not only the rules in text, we are also talking about the rules in fact that the application area of the BB&J Agreement is. Is clearly the area beyond national jurisdiction. But in practice, in fact, in the real world, the boundaries of this area is not always clearly defined.

So in our view that to retain the reference to Article 6 would secure that the agendas of the COP would not infringe on any area within national jurisdiction or disputed area. Thank you, Co Chair.


Co-Chair [23:25]:

I thank China and I give the floor to Cuba.


Cuba [23:33]:

Yes, thank you, President and good morning. Almost good afternoon to all colleagues here. I will be very quick with Article 9. When we are addressing issues regarding UN, we have to say some formalities. One of them is that the Secretariat is always supporting, but it's up to the Member States to lead or to have the leading role during the processes.

So that's why I support what was said by some delegations, including eu, that we would like to see that for saving the formalities that the President, in close consultations with the Bureau and with the assistance of the Secretariat will prepare the provisional agenda for. For the meeting. Thank you.


Co-Chair [24:41]:

I thank Cuba. Is there anyone else seeking to take the floor on this item? I. Switzerland. Switzerland, the floor is yours.


Switzerland [24:56]:

And apologies for coming back to this. I just wanted to also comment on the fact that indeed it should be a Member State led process and the Secretariat is in a role of support. So we heard the comments by Cuba and the EU and we would like to know if there is some drafting proposal with respect to that that we could examine in order to see whether this could be in something we would be favorable to. Thank you.


Co-Chair [25:38]:

Thank you, Switzerland. I'm aware that there has been a sidebar or there are sidebar discussions going on on this point. Does the delegations involved wish to take the floor or if not. Yep. Okay.

European Union, you have the floor.


EU [25:57]:

Thank you, Mr. Co Chair. I think the main point is a bit as highlighted by Switzerland is to ensure that this is a party driven process and ensure accountability in the setting of the agenda. We are happy to submit the proposal in writing. Thank you.


Co-Chair [26:15]:

I thank the European Union, especially as you were put on the spot.

So thank you. I now give the floor to Morocco.


Morocco [26:25]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. And our understanding was to reflect Only on Article 6 of the agreement. But now I understand that we should reflect on Article 9 to 14 on any bracket language. Right.


Co-Chair [26:42]:

Well, my initial request was that we concentrate on Rules 9 to 10, 12 and 13 in relation to Article 6 and the references to Article 6 that are square bracketed. The conversation has the interventions have also strayed into wider issues in respect of those rules. So certainly, I think it would be fair to say that the floor is open if you've got any further comments on the other square brackets in those rules.


Morocco · Africa Group [27:18]:

Yes, thank you so much for the clarification on Rule 12. The African group supports 30 days as the deadline for supplementary agenda items and opposes any reduction. This threshold reflects the time required for national and regional coordination, which is particularly important for African delegation. On Rule 13, BIS, the African Group notes that adoption of the agenda is already the first act of any formal meeting in practice and therefore questions the added value.

Questions the added value of this provision. The Group does not oppose its retention if colleagues see value in codifying this practice. And on Rule 14, the African Group understands the need for a degree of flexibility in extraordinary meetings. However, the Group underlines that extraordinary meetings are convened for a specific purpose on the basis of items either proposed by the Conference of the Parties at an ordinary meeting or including in the written request that triggered that meeting. That purpose should remain the boundary of the extraordinary session's work.

The current formulation, which allows items to be added to to the agenda at the very moment of its adoption, risks placing delegation in a position where they must engage on items for which they had no time to prepare or consult with their capital. This is of particular concern for delegation with limited capacity. The African Group therefore proposes two safeguards. First, any item added to the agenda of an extraordinary meeting should be directly related to, to and necessary for the purpose for which the meeting was convened. Second, any such item would not be considered until at least 48 hours after its inclusion in the agenda to allow delegations a minimum period of preparation.

The Group considered that these two safeguards strike a reasonable balance between operational flexibility and the fundamental principle of adequate advanced. Notice that. Thank you very much.


Co-Chair [29:31]:

Thank you very much. And I can see now there is room for some level of confusion between Article 6 and Rule 6. So just to say again, we have these modalities from the Chair to try and focus in on particular questions. But having said that, it's difficult and also, most states in the room are not working in their native language. So whenever comments are made in respect of other rules or items, they are recorded and will be very much taken into account.

But I admit that is particularly confusing with Rule 6 and Article 6 appearing in the same part of the text. So thank you very much for that. Morocco. Cuba's asked for the floor. Cuba, the floor is yours.


Cuba [30:26]:

Thank you, sir. Very quick. Just to say that in Article 12, we are going to apply the same logic that we are talking in Article 6. So. In Article 6.

Sorry, in Article 9. So the idea is that is the Chair in consultation with the Bureau and with the assistance of the Secretariat, they want to prepare supplementary topics in Article 12. So it's the same thinking or reasoning behind Article 9. Thank you.


Co-Chair [31:10]:

Are we talking, if I can just ask Cuba, Are we talking about the rules or the articles in about Article 9.


Cuba [31:18]:

In Article 9, we explained that the leading roles should be states through vistral states. And that logic is also applied to Article 12. Rule. Sorry, Rule 12.

Rule 12, where the chair, in consultation with the Bureau and with the Assistant of the Secretariat should be presenting supplementary topics. Sorry, with my translation, I have a. Version here in Spanish that's completely understood.


Co-Chair [31:55]:

As I said, I'm conscious that most delegations in the room are not operating in their native language, so. Entirely understood.

Thank you. Muchas gracias. Okay, delegates, I think it would be fair to say there's not a consensus on this particular question. Obviously, unfortunately, it falls into that category of issues that are relatively binary in the sense that the references. Oh, Fiji has asked to take the floor.

Fiji, the floor is yours.


Fiji [32:38]:

Sorry, Sorry, Kochia, for coming back in. I think we've just gone back and reviewed the current formulation of Rule 9. And I think one of the things that we would like to make as known as a delegation is that largely the structure reflects a established practice across other measures. I mean, I'm looking at unfccc, cbd, even Minamata, where the provisional agenda is actually prepared by the Secretariat in agreement with the President. And in this regard we see merit in maintaining this approach because this is what ensures the balanced party driven process.

And I think at this stage in its current formulation, we also seek clarification on the role of the Bureau in this provision because it's not mentioned explicitly in any other ME rules. And we do not wish to ensure that this does not unintentionally constrain the ability of parties to propose and advance agenda items. And I think in the spirit of compromise as well, I mean, while we are acceptable to removing Article 6 references, it would be good that established MEA practices followed in this process. Thank you.


Co-Chair [33:55]:

I thank Fiji very much for those comments which we've heard. Can I suggest that if delegates do wish to submit text to address these issues, that would be very gratefully received. This can be a difficult process in the sense that of course, as the Chairs, we are not here to necessarily explain everything. We are here to compile the text that has been put to us or to distil the various proposals that are on the table and I acknowledge the issue flagged. And yes, if delegations could consider a textual solution to that, that would be very much appreciated and we would look forward to receiving that.

I was starting to sum up the item overall. So to state the obvious, there's not a consensus either for the retention or the deletion of the bracketed text across the four articles in four rules. Now I'm doing it the four rules in which it's included. As I said, unfortunately this is binary. There's either inclusion or deletion.

We will go away and look at this again. I would ask all delegations, those who've expressed support for the retention of the text and those who've expressed support for the deletion of the text, to consider whether there is any ranking of priorities as between which rules it is more important for than others. I. I appreciate that probably everyone in this room would look at these rules, these the bracketed text, as if you like a package. Nevertheless, we need to think very seriously and collectively about where the room for a possible compromise on this particular question might lie. With that, I thank everyone and I propose to move on to Rule 22, which is the composition of the Bureau.

I'll just give everyone a minute to be able to flick through to that.

So that is Rule 22, page 10 for those who are looking.

With paragraphs 1, 2, 5, including 2 bis. So I think for ease of reference, we will refer to the sub rules as being paragraphs with the number. So the first sub rule there is rule 22, paragraph 1. So the bracket of text is limited to the number of seats on the Bureau as well as whether to have a Rapporteur. The bracketed number of vice presidents, 11 or 16 reflected the options for two or three bureau members per UN regional group.

Both numbers include one one additional bureau member representing small island developing states and one representing least developed countries with the President. The Bureau would have a total membership of respectively 12 or 17 members. The floor is open and we are welcoming views specifically on this and on the proposal to include a Rapporteur. Floor is open. I see that Singapore has asked to take the floor.

Singapore, the floor is yours.


Singapore · AOSIS · Amanda [38:07]:

EEOC is glad to see that Rule 22 provides that one Bureau member shall represent the small island developing States. And we continue to emphasize that the sit seat on the Bureau should be a dedicated sit seat, which is to say the sit seat should be in addition to the seats allocated to each regional group. And this is in line with the practice and the precedent from the UNFCCC COP Bureau and the subsequent Bureau of the cop, CMP and CMA under the Paris Agreement. And we have no objections to the LDC seat being also in addition to the seats allocated to each regional group. So with this we support either 11 vice presidents or 16 vice presidents.

And we are flexible with either two or three bureau members per regional group. So either option would work for us.

And on a note of Principle, Article 7 of the BBNG Agreement on Principles and Approaches provides that the Party shall be guided by the full recognition of the special circumstances of small island developing States. And so we submit that it's consistent with that principle for the institutional architecture. We are now building to offer SIDS the same as what was secured in the climate regime three decades ago. And we hope that delegations can support this dedicated SIDS seat on the BB&J Corp Bureau. On the basis of this principle and the clear precedent of the Bureaus under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.

And in relation to subparagraph para 2 bis, AOC can be flexible as long as this does not apply to SIDS. We note that the financial rules contain language excluding SIDS, LDCs and parties that have agreed on and are respecting a schedule of payments in accordance with the financial rules and on the role of the Rapporteur. AOC can also be flexible on this in subparagraph five. Thank you.


Co-Chair [40:16]:

Thank you, Singapore. And apologies, Amanda, for not introducing you as speaking on behalf of aosis. I would encourage all of those representing regional groups, please. If we miss it from up here, it's not easy operating in this room. Please do clarify that.

Singapore has just done that. You're speaking on behalf of a group. With that I will give the floor to Indonesia. The floor is yours.


Indonesia [40:43]:

Thank you, Mr. Co Chair. On the Rule 22 Indonesia Support Bureau structure that ensure that highest level of inclusivity and recognition, Indonesia can be flexible on the number of vice president, either 11 or 16 and the number of the Bureau member for each regional group as long as it ensures that the Bureau reflect the diverse membership of the agreement and provide adequate space for all regional group. In this regard, Indonesia maintain that unique perspective or archblick state must also be considered as well. This position is informed by the legal President of the CBD COP 11 decision 31 which underscores the necessity of gender balance and equitable geographical representation as functional requirement for the effectiveness of the B Rule. And on the next, on the matter of paragraph 2b concerning the eligibility in relation to financial contributions, Indonesia agrees that the bracket tax that this rule must be read in conjunction with Rule 5.3 of the Financial Rule.

And while we recognize the importance of financial responsibility, we must ensure that the institutional leadership of this agreement remain accessible to all developing states. And we also add some highlight regarding these two pieces which is a protection of LDCs and seats which say that eligibility penalties do not apply to least developed countries or small island developing state. This essential to prevent the marginalization of the Swiss special requirement under Article 52 of the agreement. And then we also responsive force measures consistent with the position of the group G77 and China. We maintain that the payment extension and resulting eligibility for office must account for global economic shocks and external crisis.

This is also relevant with 5th Rule 5 3d of Neutral Financial rules. And the last our highlight about these two BIS is about transparency in payment schedule. Any determination of ineligibility under Rule 22 must be preceded by a transparent consultation process where the Secretary facilitates a realistic payment schedule of up to four years. Thank you Mr. Chair T. Makassi, Indonesia.


Co-Chair [43:21]:

And I now give the floor to Mike Ra on behalf of pseuds.


Micronesia (Federated States of) · PSIDS [43:29]:

Thank you very much Co chairs. So of course I line myself with the osis. So from our perspective you could pretty much lift all the brackets. The the only one that's a binary is should it be 2 or 3 which then informs whether it's 11 or 16. We're ultimately flexible but from the level of interest that we have seen, it might seem more sensible to go with the higher number on this one.

I did have another question, but I'm actually gonna save you that so that we can make some progress. Thank you.


Co-Chair [44:11]:

Thank you Micronesia. I give the floor to Jamaica on behalf of caricom,.


Jamaica · CARICOM [44:19]:

The co facilitator. Caricom aligns itself with the statement given by Singapore on behalf of aoc. And therefore in paragraph one we would prefer the lifting of the brackets around the reference to the allocation of a seat for small island developing States. We also would want the brackets around the second brackets in relation to gender balance and those provisions and adequate representation. We would highlight again 2 bis that the issues there which we understand are cross referencing the financial rules would be addressed appropriately at the relevant time.

Thank you.


Co-Chair [45:11]:

Thank you. Jamaica. And I give the floor to Japan.


Japan [45:20]:

So Japan supports the the number the composition of the officers to be three from each regional members and with the one member from each seats and LDC. So the total should be 17. And on the question of Rapporteur which applies to paragraph 3 and 5, Japan is of the View that to ensure the neutrality of records, reporting tasks should be entrusted to the Secretariat. So there's no need to designate a Rapporteur. So we would like to delete the reference to Rapporteur and also delete entire paragraph five.

And also we would like to propose an addition of a sentence at the end of the paragraph 3 for the reason that we would like to ensure the better representation. So the proposed text would go. No parties may have their representative to be elected as a member of the Bureau for more than two consecutive terms. That should be added at the end of the paragraph three. Thank you.

Co Chair.


Co-Chair [46:42]:

Domore Gato Gozaimas. Just a point of clarification, we didn't quite catch what you said. In respect of seats for additional groups. Would you mind just repeating that for our benefit and the benefit of the room? So you mean it for the composition of the officers.


Japan [46:59]:

So we would like for the first two sets of bracket we want a 16, and for the regional groups we would like three. So the total should be 17, including the present. Thank you. Thank you very much for that. The European Union.


Co-Chair [47:17]:

The floor is yours.


EU [47:22]:

Thank you very much, Mr. Co Chair.

Let me start with rule to BIS. We've heard the comments that were said in the room and will consider them. We do consider that there should be something that happens if there is an error in payments. So in favor of the ruling itself, we're fine with the drafting as it is. We just suggest that we keep the brackets around Rule 5, 3, paragraph F of the Financial Rules, just because it's still under negotiation.

So we would. We're fine with the cross reference, but just that the reference to the rules of Financial Rules are finalized on the question of the Rapporteur in paragraph five, what we would support the text as presented in paragraph 5. We note for Commissad Maurid earlier that the report would be drafted with the assistance and support of the Secretariat. So it does see a role of the Secretariat in that process.

So similarly then, in paragraph three, the role the Rapporteur should be included and the brackets lifted. And then coming to paragraph four one, we have a preference to keep the representation at the usual practice to have just the five regional groups. Thank you.


Co-Chair [48:48]:

Thank you, European Union. And I give the floor to Argentina on behalf of CLAM.


Argentina · CLAM [48:56]:

Thank you, Mr. CO Chair. On behalf of CLAM, I must say that CLAM is still analyzing this issue and at this stage does not yet have a position regarding the number of borough members. At the same time, CLAM remains open to considering mechanisms that would Facilitate inclusion of states with special circumstances. Thank you.


New Zealand · CANZ [49:25]:

Thank you. Argentina for clam. And I give the floor to New Zealand on behalf of Kansi.

Thank you, Co Chair. Yes, on behalf of Kansi, we support. The Bureau having seats for SIDS and LDCs. We are generally flexible on the size of the Bureau, but we do have a preference for the higher number there. So three Bureau members per regional group.

Thank you.


Co-Chair [50:05]:

Thank you, New Zealand, on behalf of Kanzi. And I now give the floor to Morocco for the Africa group.


Morocco · Africa Group [50:13]:

Thank you, Mr. Court Chair, for giving me the floor. The African Group emphasized that the Bureau must be sufficiently sized to ensure equitable and inclusive representation. We can show flexibility on the number it 11 16. We heard in the room 17. But we stress that any formula should not advantage regions or weaken the voice of developing countries.

We can support dedicated representation for LDCs and sits while ensuring inclusivity across all developing regions. On the Rule 22bis, the bracketed provision linking service in the Bureau to arrears, the African Group should reserve its final position pending agreement on the financial rules so that the two dispositions remain correlated. Thank you.


Co-Chair [51:00]:

I thank Morocco for the Africa Group. And I give the floor to Switzerland.


Switzerland [51:06]:

Thank you very much. With respect to 2bis, we are in favor of the inclusion of 2base, conscious that these rules are also under negotiations. So we can keep the brackets as long as this is still being negotiated. But on principle, we are in favor. With respect to the Rapporteur, we also would welcome the paragraph 5.

With respect to the composition of the Bureau, we would support a compensation composition. Sorry, made of the five regional UN groups as per usual practice in other MEAs. And with respect to the size, we don't have a strong view. We are flexible. Thank you.


Co-Chair [52:03]:

Thank you, Switzerland. And I give the floor to the Philippines.


Philippines [52:12]:

Hello. All right. The Philippines would like to submit the following Comments on Rule 22. First, as to the number of Vice Presidents, we favor a large enough number to guarantee equitable geographic and group representation and adequate representation of developing countries, including SIDS and LDCs, but not too large to risk the slowing of the bureau's work. Sixteen vice presidents or 17 bureau members could be a reasonable number and in line with the suggestion.

We further suggest that each of the five UN regional groups be represented by three Bureau members. So three. We note the increased interest of States in most ocean governance processes and the importance that the Bureau membership should reflect this. We also support the assignment of the role of Rapporteur and we are open to unbracketing the text on Rule 22:5, as well as subjecting the role to a rotation similar to that of the precedents provided in the bracketed text in 22 3. Thank you.


Co-Chair [53:21]:

Thank you, Philippines. I give the floor to the UK, to be followed by Bangladesh and then Japan. UK, the floor is yours.


United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [53:31]:

In our view, we prefer 11 bureau members. To ensure efficiency, we can support SIDS and LDC seats on the Bureau. And we agree with the formulation set out. That would be in addition to two representatives from each of the UN regional groups. We were actually the proponents of removing the references to the Rapporteur in this role.

And the reasoning for that was that we considered it more appropriate for the Secretariat to assume the function of preparing a record of the meetings, and we'd noted precedent for that in various rules. But in the interest of pragmatism and flexibility, we are flexible and we can go along with the Rapporteur references being retained. And we do note the role of the Secretariat in assisting and supporting the Rapporteur as provided for in paragraph five. So, yeah, we can be flexible on that. Thank you.

Thank you.


Co-Chair [54:23]:

Thank you, United Kingdom. That offer of flexibility is very much appreciated. I will give the floor to Bangladesh, to be followed by Japan.


Bangladesh [54:37]:

Thank you, Mr. Co Chair. On Rule 22, we support broader participation. 16 For Vice President and three for borough members. However, Bangladesh is flexible on the number. Given that it is resolved in a manner that ensures equitable geographical representation, gender balance, and adequate representation of developing countries, including Due consideration for LDCs and seats, any final criteria for the election of officers should be clear, transparent, practical and broadly acceptable.


Co-Chair [55:13]:

I thank you.

Thank you, Bangladesh. And I give the floor to Japan.


Japan [55:22]:

Thank you, Co Chair, for giving the floor. Again, as regards to paragraph 2bis, Japan prefers to retain this paragraph. Thank you.


Co-Chair [55:35]:

Thank you, Japan. And I give the floor to Indonesia. Yep. Thank you, Mr. With regard to para. Wait a minute.


Indonesia [55:49]:

Para three, we'd like to leave the bracket of office. And for paragraph five, we like to remove all the brick on the bracket. Yeah. And within paragraph five. Thank you, Mr. President.


Co-Chair [56:09]:

Okay, appreciated. That concludes interventions on this item. Oh, China, you have the floor. Thank you, Co Chair. In terms of.


China [56:25]:

My intervention will be very short in terms of the number of Bureau members except the President. China in intends to support option of 16 and 3. And China welcomes allocating special seats for Cs and LDCs. We are flexible on other bracketed contents. That's it.


Co-Chair [56:48]:

Okay, Delegates, this has been a useful run through. I don't think there's anything in Rule 22 that is not bridgeable. I heard a distinct preference in the room that bigger is better in terms of the Bureau. So my apologies to the United Kingdom, but I might be asking you to be flexible more than once with respect to Rule 22. But I think this has given us some material.

I think delegations should expect to see the larger number of 16 vice presidents in the next version that you see. And then we will go and look at the various other comments and review the discussion and come back with what I hope will be a close to consensus version of this rule before we move on. Can you just give us 30 seconds, if that's okay?

Thank you for your patience.

Delegates. We will now move to part seven, chapter seven, that is subsidiary bodies. That goes through from rule 26 to rule 30bis. So from page 11 to 13, that is the bad news. But the good news is there's very little in the way of brackets in there.

I mean, the main set of brackets is in relation to Rule 26, 1sub Rule B, and there's a couple of other brackets in there. One thing that I would ask all delegations to be aware of is, of course, there is a related discussion taking place on subsidiary bodies that will resume again on Thursday. I would just ask delegations to bear in mind that obviously, when we have the final product of that discussion and the final version of this rule, we will of course put them up side by side and ensure that any duplication is eliminated and also ensure that they are consistent. So there's no need to take the floor on those issues yet. We will seek to ensure, once we have final products on both, that they are scrubbed appropriately to ensure that they sit well alongside each other.

That is the contents of this rule, Chapter seven on subsidiary bodies, and the outcome of the subsidiary bodies discussions that are taking place in parallel. So with that qualifier, the floor is open for any comments on Chapter 7 subsidiary bodies. That's Rule 26 through to Rule 30bis, but obviously with a particular focus on the bracketed text. Floor is open.

Singapore, the floor is yours. On behalf of aasis,.


Singapore · AOSIS · Amanda [1:01:37]:

Thank you, Chair. I just confirmed that we're confining comments right now. Is just for rule 26.


Co-Chair [1:01:46]:

No, sorry, Amanda. My. My fault. We're on chapter seven, which is subsidiary bodies. That is rule 26 through to rule 30 bis, pages 11 through to 13.

But I'm obviously asking for a particular focus on the bracketed text. And most of the bracketed text or the most significant bracketed text is in Rule 26. But the floor is now open for Chapter 7 subsidiary bodies, that is Rule 26 through to Rule 30bis. I hope that clarifies it. Thank you very much.


Singapore · AOSIS · Amanda [1:02:25]:

In that case, I will go through the entire Chapter 7 with your indulgence.


Co-Chair [1:02:33]:

Absolutely.


Singapore · AOSIS · Amanda [1:02:36]:

So, starting out with Rule 26 and AOC's comments here are without prejudice as to whether these rules and subsidiary bodies are better placed in the COP rop or the TORs of the subsidiary bodies. AUSA supports Rule 26, which allows the chair of a subsidiary body to exercise the right to vote. We understand that this is in keeping with the standard practice at the UN where bodies are comprised of people elected in their individual capacities who are entitled to exercise the right to vote. So an example of this would be The ACABQ and AOC's understanding of the effect of Rule 26 is that any subsidiary body's terms of reference adopted by the COP will prevail over the COP Rules of Procedure as the more specialized rules, with the COP ROP representing the residual rules. Finally, I note that EOSIS is still considering the Advisory Mechanism on Indigenous Peoples, Local Communities and Traditional Knowledge, and so on the issues throughout this part, we note that there will be textual proposals made by the P SITS on this matter, and as EOCs, we do not wish to foreclose the possibility that such a body may be created and this paragraph may need to be reconsidered pending the outcome of those discussions.

So this caveat will just apply throughout. And moving on to Rule 28, AOC favors giving the Chair of the Subsidiary Bodies the autonomy to decide on the dates of the meetings of the respective Subsidiary Bodies. However, we note that the budgetary implications of these meetings will ultimately have to be approved by the copy.

Moving on now to Rule 28bis, AOC continues to strongly support ensuring SIDS representation in the bureaus of all subsidiary Bodies. If Subsidiary Bodies are to have officers, one seat should be a dedicated SID seat. We therefore support the language in the square brackets, UN Regional Group or by the relevant category of States. And we suggest a small textual tweak as follows. A replacement shall be nominated by parties from that's the insertion two words, the UN Regional Groups, or from the relevant category of states concerned for the remainder of that member's term.

And we understand that the addition of these two words, parties from, more accurately reflects the process that actually happens. And on the second set of square brackets. Again, this is 28 bis para 1. We consider that all members, including replacement members, should be elected by the Conference of Parties and would therefore like to see the brackets around that Text dropped as for paragraph subparagraph 2. We are flexible on this.

Again, this goes back to the Financial rules and we understand there's text there which allows it not to apply to SIDS. Moving on now to Rule 29, AOSIS continues to strongly support ensuring SIDS representation in the Bureaus of all subsidiary bodies and therefore the wording here should also be aligned and the rotation should apply to the UN Regional Groups and relevant categories of States. So we would like to see insertion of language there to reflect the SIT seat in the sbs. So this is a comment that would just carry through in relation to Rule 30 as previously highlighted by EOCIS, the subsidiary bodies should develop their own program of work in a bottom up approach rather than a top down. AOSA sees the development of the work program as separate to its approval by the COP and we can go along with Rule 30 as it does not prescribe more than approval from the COP and gives power to the President to adjust the allocation of work should the chairs of the subsidiary bodies request it.

And moving on finally to the Last square bracketed Rule 30, Biscuit Eosis is flexible on the inclusion of this draft rule and if it is retained, the square bracketed language on the role of the chairs of the subsidiary bodies should be retained as it ensures a degree of independence for the subsidiary bodies and ensures that technical level cooperation is not overly centralised under the COP alone. And with that that concludes EOC Comments on Chapter 7 thank you Chair.


Co-Chair [1:07:40]:

Thank you Singapore on behalf of AOSIS and I now give the floor to Jamaica on behalf of caricom.


Jamaica · CARICOM [1:07:50]:

Thank you Co Chair. As always, CARICOM aligns itself with the comments of OASIS which were delivered by the delegation of Singapore. With respect to paragraph 261 a Caricom agrees that a majority of the members of this Subsidiary consider a body which is the first set of brackets would constitute a quorum for paragraph 261 bis, we have no difficulty with the removal of the brackets in that paragraph. On paragraph 26. While we support the removal of the brackets for the paragraph, we also have a question which is that whether the increased threshold of 2/3 majority for decision making with respect to the reconsideration of a proposal or an amendment is necessary for a technical body.

While the requirement for an enhanced majority for decision making may be appropriate in a conference of parties as a political body when reconsidering decisions on or amendments, it is not clear to us that the same is required for technical body. Also concerning paragraph 26 CBIS we favor the opening of the brackets for that paragraph, Turning to Rule 29, Caricom agrees that the chair of any subsidiary body should be elected in accordance with the procedures and terms of reference for that subsidiary body. As technical bodies made up of independent experts, each subsidiary body is best placed to elect a chair to guide the work of the body to be done. Therefore, we favor the removal of the square brackets in that paragraph. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Co Chair.


Co-Chair [1:09:53]:

Thank you, Jamaica. On behalf of caricom, that point is noted. And that will also be one that is obviously will be considered in the subsidiary bodies discussions. And as I said, we will round back to ensure that the two sets of texts are consistent with one another. With that, I will give the floor to Mike Ranesia, speaking on behalf of pids.

Floor is yours.


Micronesia (Federated States of) · PSIDS [1:10:21]:

Thank you very much, Co Chair. And of course I also align myself with the points just made biosis and just want to add a few additional ones.

One is, you made the point that we're dealing in two place, that there is a bit of an overlap, that we have one work stream here, the dealing with the subsidiary bodies, and then we have one that specializes in that and that there is a little bit of overlap in those provisions right here. I do want to note that P sits have made a proposal in the other room. Whether those paragraphs end up here or there, our proposal of course still stands, but I will not repeat it. I'm going to save you the time because you have already heard it. Whether we end up here or there, the main point for us here is what applies where when first you have the rules of procedure, they're kind of like the base structure.

And that's why we put the mutatis mutandis, because it's a fallback now. They're adopted by the Conference of Parties. Now, if the Conference of Parties sets discrete rules for one of the subsidiary bodies, then those discrete rules would be the ones governing or altering what is written in the COP rules. We just wanted to make that clear because we have heard a couple of times if there is a conflict, then it's the COP that prevails. And we're like, not necessarily if it was something that was made specifically for a subsidiary body.

And in that respect, Rule 27 2, we're still trying to figure out if that phrases it rightly in. In exactly that context.

And I leave it at that because eosis has already pronounced on things like the voting rights of the chair, etc. Thank you very much.


Co-Chair [1:12:47]:

I thank Micronesia, speaking on behalf of psids. And yes, you're Absolutely correct.

We do have, of course, as I flagged at the beginning, these two places where this rule and of course the process on subsidiary bodies where these issues are to be resolved substantially or discussed substantially. I would prefer that to take place in the subsidiary bodies modality for two reasons. One, I think it's just the better place, but also as the chair of both, to be purely pragmatic. Time is of the essence here in a way that it's not with respect to subsidiary bodies. So you are right.

We will pick that back up in the subsidiary bodies discussion and I thank you with that. Oh, you're right in front of me, sorry. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Iran. Sorry, I was looking one side and the other.


Iran (Islamic Republic of) [1:13:47]:

Thank you so much, Mr. Chair. Well, actually I was in the other discussion on the Secretariat and was able to come here just now. Thank you for giving me the floor. Just on the question related to the whether the chair of subsidiary body should have a right to vote or not, our position has been consistent and we believe it's fair that a chair of subsidiary body remain neutral not to take participate, not to participate in the voting processes.

Looking into Rule 45 on the voting threshold, you might remember, Mr. Chair, that yesterday we raised a question in relation to the to the voting threshold where the chair of the conference of party might have to say that well, there is no consensus, all efforts have been made and we need to go for voting. And as the rules of procedure is going to be applied metatis mutandis on the subsidiary bodies, this situation might lead to it. I mean it might be rare, but you might see a situation of conflict of interest where the chair of the subsidiary body is the same person who is going to say that there is no consensus, we need to go for a vote and that chair would have a right to vote. I think it's appropriate not to follow that path.

On the AC abq, I would like to mention that from our understanding within the United nations and the Fifth Committee, that kind of practice I could say is an informal procedure where there is no agreement, the Chair tries to guide the process. Quite contrary, the established practice was that usually the chairs of body or a meeting or a commission, they do not have right to vote. Of course, if there is any member from that delegation among the members of the subsidiary bodies, they do have the right to vote. And in relation, very quickly, in relation to Article 28 on the dates of the meetings, it's maybe it's better that the COP adopts this to make sure that there is no conflict in the schedule. And one last comment, Mr.

Chair. Unfortunately, as I mentioned, we have to cover both parallel meetings. I'm sure that there were a couple of rules that have been covered. I'm not going to touch upon them only one and that is rule 8 bis, if I may would like to briefly touch upon that. Thank you so much.

On Rule 8bis, which refers to cooperation with relevant IFBs. In our view this is a matter of substance, not of procedure. This needs to be addressed in its own context and framework. Modalities for this matter could be considered, but this place is not in the Rules of Procedure. Therefore, our preference is to delete this provision should there be a discussion in this regard in the Rules of procedure.

Article 5 subparagraph 3 of the agreement, a non prejudiced clause for non parties to the unclass must be fully taken into account. Thank you so much.


Co-Chair [1:16:48]:

Thank you. Iran and I now give the floor to Saudi Arabia, to be followed by Japan, the European Union and Bahrain.


IAHWG · Co-Chair [1:16:59]:

Saudi Arabia, the floor is yours.


Saudi Arabia [1:17:02]:

Thank you. Mr. Co Chair. We will come in on several rules regarding this chapter of the Rules of procedure. On Rule 26 1A BIS, we underline that subsidiary bodies should operate primarily on the basis of consensus consistent with established material practice and to ensure all positions are captured and is essential to us.

So to preserve transparency, inclusivity and confidence in the process. So we propose the additional text that if consensus cannot be reached, divergent views should be fully reflected in the report. Regarding Rule 26 1B, we have reservation regarding granting the share an additional voting rule. As has been mentioned before in subsidiary bodies where members are act as representative of their States following the Chair to Allowing the Chair to exercise a vote may lead to double representation and I could affect the balance among parties. So we think the share should remain felicitated and impartial role.

So we propose the deletion of paragraph B On Rule 28 PES, we note that the reference to relevant categories of States lack clarity and it's not defined in the agreement. So we would seek that this is be clarified or removed. Thank you.


Co-Chair [1:18:27]:

I thank you Japan and I give the floor to the European Union.

Oh, My apologies. We're operating with no technology up here. So needless to say, I would never intentionally ignore Japan and Sumi Masen.


Japan [1:18:50]:

Japan, the floor is yours. Co chair. So first on the 26 believes it is important to make sure that the Chair maintains the neutrality so Japan does not support the inclusion of this paragraph. And next on 21C we have two points to raise and first given that the decision making at the COP is based on the principle of consensus and that in case where substantial extensive issues are to be decided by voting, a 2/3 majority is required. So Japan prefers to apply the same standard to subsidiary bodies, at least for the scientific and technical body, where its scientific and technical recommendations should be based solely on objective facts and logic.

Voting thresholds should be 2/3 majority for SD. And also the second point is that it is not clear what reconsideration of proposal or reconsideration of amendment of proposal is referring to in this paragraph and if it is referring to reconsideration of proposal of abmt, Japan would like to add after the reconsideration of recommendation the following language the consideration of a recommendation on the area based management tool and the part three of the agreement and also if it is referring to other recommendation by subsidiary bodies for approval or adoption, by copying instead of adding the language I just read, proposals should be replaced by recommendation. Japan already submitted this proposal in writing, so if you could look it up. And Also for paragraph 28, Japan considers that decision on the dates of the meeting of subsidiary bodies should should not require a COP decision and the Chair of each subsidiary body should be authorized to make such decision in consultation with the Secretariat and President of the cop. And at the same time it is necessary to give due consideration to budgetary implication when deciding on dates and duration of the meetings.

So we would like to delay the conference of Parties and add at the end of this paragraph with due regard to budgetary implication, we already submitted this also in writing. So that is all. Thank you Arigatougozaimasu.


Co-Chair [1:21:50]:

And watashi wa sumimasen for having that mistake. Domo regato gozaimasu and I now give the floor to to the European Union. Floor is yours.


EU [1:22:04]:

Thank you Co Chair. So the European Union, its Member States would like to insist that decisions in the subsidiary body should be made by consensus. And we agree with the comments that have been made before that where there is a disagreement it should be reflected in the report and would like to just highlight that this is already in paragraph C BIS on the whether the Chair of the J Body may exercise a right to vote. The Unit's Member States do consider they should have a vote for reasons that were outlined, I think by EOSIS and others. One of the other arguments in favor of that is that if they do not have a right to vote, then it might also dissentivize.

Members to try to become the Chair of that body. So we do see a value in having them have A vote on paragraph C. We know that what is provided for is a majority of for decision making. And we do believe that if the aim is to keep consensus and try to seek to have a consensus, such such threshold is much too low. We do consider that we should have a higher threshold, maybe something like 4/5 to ensure that most of the members are aligned. And if there are one or two divergent views, then they're in the report as provided by cbis.

We are open though to have a different voting threshold for procedural and substantive matter.

Moving on to Rule 27, we do think that the second paragraph in that rule, which is bracketed, can be included for clarity on Rule 28 on the dates of meeting. We agree with Japan, I think also made that point. There might have been other delegations. Apologies if I do not mention you, but I do agree with you that the chair of a subsidiary bodies should be the ones to make the decision. Going through the COP would make it overly burdensome.

We do also agree with the suggestion of Japan to add wording such as due regard to budgetary limitation. Moving on to Rule 28 biscuits. So on that we are not sure about the need to have a replacement elected by a conference of party. I mean conference of party will happen, will not happen every month. There will be conference of party every so often.

And we do not want to have the subsidiary bodies limited because for a bit of time there is. There is no COP meeting. So we're not really sure about having an election, the need for an election directly. There would be an election at the next copy for the replacement, but in between they should be able to participate in the body. So in our view, the end of paragraph one should read, if a member of a subsidiary body is resigned or is otherwise unable to complete their assigned term, the replacement shall be nominated by the UN regional group concerned for the remainder of that member's term.

On paragraph two, we just want to the comments we've made for the Bureau in terms of nominating Bureau members on that rule and then moving on in the rest of the bracketed text. We agree with eosis that the second sentence of Rule 30bis is rather burdensome and with limited added value. So we would suggest to delete it. On the first sentence we may have some textual suggestion that we'll submit.


Co-Chair [1:26:09]:

I thank the European Union delegates. I've now got Turkey, Indonesia, Philippines, the uk, the High Seas Alliance. I would really like to finish this item before we break for lunch. And even though we don't have interpretation, we lose the sound pretty much quickly after 1 o'. Clock.


Türkiye [1:26:29]:

So let's try and trot through. Let's try and trot through if we can. Turkey A the floor is yours. Thank you Co Chair. Regarding Rule 26 para 1A, we note that the quorum requirement of 1/4 for open ended summary subsidiary bodies may be relatively low.

Therefore, we would be open to considering a quorum based on a majority of parties as a more balanced approach to ensure adequate participation. Rule 26 para 1B. We consider that the Chair should maintain a neutral and facilitative role and therefore shouldn't exercise the right to vote. In this regard, we would support either the deletion of this para or its revision to reflect this approach. Rule 30B is we support to delete last sentence in the bracketed text and we believe that subsidiary bodies should adopt recommendation to the COP by consensus and we are in favor of the if it is a vote, we are in favor of the the higher threshold.

Thank you Co Chair. Thank you Turia. We'll go to Indonesia next.


Indonesia [1:27:54]:

On roll 26.

We can agree they with general principle of the Mutatis mutanis. However, Indonesia also would like to emphasize that the architecture of Article 48, 49, 52 and 53 of the Agreement collectively ensure that all subsidiary bodies function as technical or consultative organ that report to advise and provide recommendation for the final consideration of the cop. In this regard, we seek further clarification whether provision regarding Rule 26P are in the native exercise right to foot and move to Rule 27.

We like to reiterate the fundamental principle of that form must follow function. In this context, Indonesia emphasize a tailor made approach for any such body. For any new subsidiary body to be truly effective, it must be accompanied by specific tor and we also like to suggestion we can agree with the the bracket and for for textual proposal, we'd like to suggest that Rule 26 of the present Rule of Procedure applies to any additional subsidiary body established in accordance with the present rule subject to the mandate of its Subsidiary Body Formula sentence and for Rule 28 Indonesia maintains that final authority to adopt resolution concerning the agenda and scheduling scheduling of Subsidiary Body meetings must remain with the cop and we believe that COP should exercise this authority in close consultation with the Chair. So furthermore, in the interest of administrative efficiency and cost effective, where appropriate, meeting of subsidiary bodies should be held in conjunction with the Ordinary meeting of the cop. In this regard, we'd like to leave some bracket of Rule 28 and read as follows the Chair of Subsidiary Body in consultation with the Secretariat and the President of the Conference of the Parties shall decide on the dates of the meetings of the Subsidiary Body and where appropriate, meetings of the Subsidiary Body shall be held in conjunction with the meeting of this Conference of the Parties and Moving on the 28th piece paragraph two, we support to leave all the brackets.

Indonesia reaffirms its support for linking the eligibility to self Subsidiary Body to the fulfillment of the financial obligation under the Financial Rules. And lastly on Rule 30B we agree with previous delegation from EU to delete all the last bracket tax. It's kind of unsure with on the wording jointly decided. Thank you Kochi.


Co-Chair [1:31:13]:

Thank you very much Indonesia. I now give the floor to the Philippines to be followed by the UK and China. Philippines floor is yours.


Philippines [1:31:24]:

Regarding the part on Subsidiary Bodies, the Philippines stresses the importance of clarity in their mandates, composition and decision making procedures, including voting rights where applicable. Clear delineation of these elements will be essential to avoid procedural uncertainty and ensure coherence within the Institutional framework. We remain open to further discussions on whether detailed provision should be retained in the COP Rules of Procedure or elaborate in separate instruments whenever the less would like to submit comments on the section as follows. Number one, we can already unbracket Rule 26B with the President being allowed to vote in line with his capacity as representative. In Rule 28 we prefer the language that the Chair of a Subsidiary Body in consultation with the Secretariat and the President of the Conference of the Parties representing the first set of bracketed text in line with the technical expertise of the Subsidiary bodies.

On Rule 28bis, we support suggested language that a replacement shall be nominated by the Parties from the UN regional groups or from the relevant category of States concerned for the remainder of that Member's term as conveyed by AOCs. Finally, we welcome the inclusion of Rule 30bis as this may work to increase coordination between COP and the Subsidiary Bodies and improve delineation of responsibility, avoid procedural certainty and ensure coherence within the Institutional framework. Thank you. I thank the Philippines and I give the floor to the United Kingdom.


United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [1:33:00]:

Rule 26 we support the right for the Chair of a Subsidiary Body to vote for the reasons outlined already by others, including ACEs in the EU. We agree on 26 that decisions recommendations should be made by consensus with voting only as a last resort. We've listened with interest to others proposals on requiring higher threshold for voting should it take place, and we think some form of provision to this end sounds sensible, so we will consider those proposals. Carefully. On 21.1 C biz there's some crossover to the Subsidiary Body discussion yesterday of provision all 56 in the terms of reference and like there we think the drafting should be strengthened here.

I think it should say shall ensure rather than should make reasonable efforts.

And lastly on Rule 28 we agree with others that we we don't think a COP decision would should be required to set the date so we'd be in favour of retaining the first sentence there and we listened to Japan's additional suggestion which on initial consideration sounds sensible. So we will consider that drafting proposal carefully. Thank you. Thank you United Kingdom and I give the floor to China to be followed by Iceland, Switzerland and Morocco. China, the floor is yours.


China [1:34:30]:

Thank you Co Chair the first comment from China is concerning Rule 28B paragraph 1 the how to deal with the replacement of a vacant of a living member during the elections. We don't see the option that the replacing member could be nominated by the original nominating state. We deem it is proper option here for the continuity and consistence of work of the living member in case the original nominating state waives its right to nominate the replacement could be nominated by the relevant UN regional group or relevant category of states to complete the remainder of the term of the living member. So our suggestion is to add an option of the nominating the replacement to be nominated by the original nominee state and the second is about Rule 26 paragraph 1 subparagraph abs. China wants to seek clarification whether this language of the recommendations to be submitted to the COP shall be adopted by a vote.

There is no threshold here so China just wonders whether the vote shall the voting rules in Rule 45 would apply here because this whole subparagraph AB lies an exception to the application of the present rule. So China just want to seek clarification on this point. I hope I made my my clear my point clear.


Co-Chair [1:36:29]:

We will provide clarification on that at the start of the next session of this of the rules of procedure. I'm just conscious of time but we will come back to you on that Iceland floor is yours.


Iceland · CANZ [1:36:44]:

Thank you. Thank you Chair. Co Chair I'm I'm speaking on behalf of Cany here. Now on Rule 26 as a general comment, Kansi sees consensus based work of the SPS as something to emphasize due to the nature of the work as scientific and expert work. Although we would not want to exclude the possibility altogether and we know that this all relates to the work on sps elsewhere.

But just to re emphasize this consensus based work of the SPs now specifically on Rule 27 para 2 we see this as legally unnecessary.

So we would prefer to have it removed, although we do not feel strongly about it. But less is more in those rules. Now on 28 we prefer flexibility to ensure SPS can work and therefore prefer the first brackets. On Rule 30B we are all for cooperation always of course with IFPs, but we have not fully understood the notion of cooperation with in the title. Is this referring to the cop, which would seem obvious.

So. So something. Something to consider between SPS, of course makes sense to us.

Now lastly on 30 bis we do think this raises the issue of autonomy of subsidiary bodies. So we wonder whether the bracketed text requiring joint decision of the CAP and chairs of SPS strikes the right balance. And we don't think this text is needed. Therefore we prefer to to strike it out. Thank you very much.


Co-Chair [1:38:41]:

I thank you Iceland on behalf of Kansian. Give the floor to Switzerland.


Switzerland [1:38:48]:

And sorry, it's 1pm so I would make it short. On Rule 26 we on the right to vote of the Chair we still reserve our position for now we want to check common practice. On Rule 26C we are fine with the threshold that there are. We think that if there is a change we might come back to it. On Rule 28 on the date of meetings we agree that the chair of the subsidiary body is best placed to organize the work so they should make the decision.

And we support the suggestion by Japan to take due consideration of budgetary implications. On Rule 28bis we request the deletion of the wording or by the relevant category of states on par 1 and on par 2 bis we support this insertion and on rule 30 bis we will consider the comments with respect to the autonomy of subsidiary body. But at least we don't think that the last bracketed sentence is actually necessary. Thank you. Thank you very much Switzerland for the brevity in particular.


Morocco · Africa Group [1:40:10]:

And I give the floor to Morocco on behalf of the Africa group.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. The African Group recalls its general position that the rules of procedure should apply to the SPs while allowing differentiated rules aligned with their specific mandates. The Group also underlines the need to streamline overlaps between the provisions under the rules of procedure here and the terms of reference under negotiation under the sbs. And so as to avoid inconsistencies and duplicity.

And we are between your hand on these matters. On Rule 26 subsidiary are by nature advisory and technical circumstances should remain the rule and any fallback voting mechanism must be subject to strict condition and query frame on the election and role of the Chairs. The African Group underlines that Chairs should be elected by members and the members of the SBS and in the interest of neutrality and impartiality, should not exercise the right of vote.

On Rule 26, paragraph C, BIS, the obligation to fairly reflect the views of all members in reports to the Conference of the Parties should be strengthened. This is a fundamental safeguard for minority position and also the integrity of the reporting process. On the Rule 27, the African Group can support the application of Rule 26 to any additional subsidiary body established by the Conference of the parties under Rule 27 and on the dates of the meetings and Rule 28. The African Group favors that the Conference of the Parties as the main deciding body, decide on the dates of the SB's meetings, with the Bureau and the Secretariat playing consultative roles. The Group underlines that predictability of meeting dates is particularly important for developing countries and also their delegation who are expected to defray their own participation costs.

On Rule 28, BIS paragraph 2 on the eligibility to nominate members of SBIs to Subject to areas. Here again, the African Group preserves its position until discussions on the financial wars are finalized. But the African Group would like to emphasize that however, these provisions should not be unduly punitive or restrictive. It must take into account the financial situation of concerned parties, their good faith efforts to normalize their situation through payment plans and give adequate consideration to developing States, including least developing countries and small 29. And consistent with Rule 26, the African Group confirms that Chairs of Society bodies should not exercise the right to vote and all Rule 30bis.

The African group views Rule 30bis positively and supports its retention. And we believe that cooperation and coordination between subsidiary bodies is key to the current and effective implementation of the Agreement and that this provision offers valuable institutional foundation on such coordination. Thank you very much. I have been running on time not to be interrupted by the. I mean my microphone.

Not interrupted. Thank you very much. Morocco, we have five minutes maximum. I will give the floor to Argentina. China has an announcement.


Co-Chair [1:43:47]:

I will then allow China to make its announcement. If we lose sound, I can still still sum up because I've got a very loud voice. Argentina, the floor is used and apologies to the High Seas Alliance. I wanted to give you the floor, but we've just run out of time. Argentina, the floor is yours.


Argentina · CLAM [1:44:04]:

Thank you, Co Chair and I will try to make it fast on behalf of CLAM regarding Chapter 7 on subsidiary bodies. CLAM's general position is that the rules of procedure of the COPS should apply Mutadis Mutandis to those bodies. And in this regard we support in principle, Rule 26 Subject to the arrangements agreements reached on the composition of the subsidiary bodies, CLAM also understands that it will be necessary to have additional and specific rules of procedure for subsidiary Bodies, particularly regarding the mandate of each body, its composition and its working methods. With regard to Rule 26c, subparagraph c, the text is based on Article 81 of the Rules of Procedure of the General assembly and we agree with its content. However, the wording of Rule 26 subparagraph C is not as clear as that of Article 18.

In this regard, we believe it should be reformulated and we will send an alternative text a proposal not to read it here. And with regard to Rule 26, we suggest replacing should make reasonable efforts to ensure with shall ensure. This change is based on the understanding that the subsidiary bodies must ensure, and not merely make reasonable efforts, that the positions of its members on any matter subject to a vote are accurately reflected in the report submitted to the cop in Rule 28 on the dates of meetings of subsidiary bodies, we believe that the COP should decide such dates as the COP as the superior body will have an overall view of the meeting's schedule. In Rule 28B on the election of members of subsidiary bodies in the event that a member cannot compete their term, we do not agree that the concerned regional group should propose a replacement. In our view, it should be the state of nationality of the member who resigned that proposes the new member.

With regard to Rule 28B, subparagraph 2, clam does not agree that errors in the payment of contributions should prevent a state party from presenting candidates for subsidiary bodies. Therefore, we request its delusion in Rule 30, we believe that the adjustment of the work program of subsidiary bodies should not be an exclusive prerogative of the COP President, but rather of the Bureau as a whole. Therefore, we suggest adding after the word President the expression in consultation with the Bureau. We support inclusion of Rule 30 BS. We believe that regular consultation between the COP and subsidiary bodies is essential for the effective implementation of the agreement.

We welcome that this new version replaced the verb may with child. Thank you. I thank Argentina.