1st Meeting - 2nd Session Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems 2026

Excellencies, distinguished delegates, could I ask you to take your seats so we can start with the meeting? Excellencies, distinguished delegates, it's my honor to welcome you as chair of the Group of Governmental Experts related to emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems to the group's second session of 2026, the final session under our current mandate. Allow me to once again express my sincere appreciation for the confidence that you, the High Contracting Parties to the CCW, have placed in me to undertake this important responsibility. I remain deeply committed to facilitating our collective work in a transparent and inclusive manner and to bringing this mandate to a successful and meaningful conclusion. I am grateful for the constructive spirit and active engagement demonstrated by delegations during our previous sessions, as well as during the intersessional periods. As we begin our final session under the current mandate, I count on all of you to build on the progress achieved over the past three years and to approach our deliberations with flexibility, pragmatism, and a shared commitment to cooperation and compromise. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, I would also like to extend a warm welcome to the 10 delegates joining us through the CCW Sponsor Program, which is made possible by the generous support of Australia, China, Germany, the Philippines, and Slovenia, as well as by my own country, the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Your participation enriches the diversity and inclusivity of this group, and contributes meaningfully to our shared endeavor. Needless to say, I hope that our deliberations this week will stimulate you to consider acceding to the Convention in due course. As we will now turn to our agenda and provisional programme of work, I would like to remind you that these have been issued as official documents and have been circulated by the CCW Implementation Support Unit and also made available on the 2026 GGE on Laws webpage of the UNODA meetings place. It's my intention to proceed in accordance with the agenda, enabling us to move efficiently to our substantive discussions and make the best use of the limited time available to us during this final session. Let us turn now to agenda item one, opening of the meeting. You will recall that the 2023 meeting of the High Contracting Parties of the CCW decided that our group is to pursue the following mandate. I quote, "In the context of the objectives and purpose of the convention, the group is to further consider and formulate by consensus a set of elements of an instrument without prejudging its nature and other possible measures to address emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems, taking into account the example of existing protocols within the convention, proposals presented by contracting parties, and other options related to the normative and operational framework on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems. building upon the recommendations and conclusions of the group and bringing in expertise on legal, military and technological aspects, as contained in para 20 of the final report of that meeting, document CCW/MSP/2023/7. The 2025 meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW decided that the GDE would meet for a duration of 10 days in 2026, from 2 March to 6 March and from 31 August to 4 September, as reflected in paragraph 19 of its final report, document CCW/MSP/2025/8. In accordance with a decision by the 2025 meeting of the high contracting parties and by the powers conferred on me by the high contracting parties, I declare open the second 2026 session of the CCW Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, we have been entrusted with a task of considerable importance to further consider and formulate by consensus a set of elements of an instrument without prejudging its nature and other possible measures. Nothing less, but also nothing more. We found ourselves at a decisive moment. This is the final session of our mandate. The time available to us has effectively run its course, and the responsibility to deliver rests squarely on your shoulders here and now. It has been our common objective from the very beginning that by the end of this week, the group will have adopted a report for submission to the seventh review conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to be held from the 16th to the 20th of November, 2026, just as our mandate asks us to do. In this session, our focus must be to bridge remaining differences. consolidate what has been achieved and ensure that our report faithfully reflects both the progress made and the collective will of this body. This will require flexibility, pragmatism and a continued spirit of cooperation from all of you without exception. With this in mind, I strongly encourage all delegations to focus their interventions on what is on the table for today, that is, the draft final report and the additional suggestions by the Chair. Your positions are largely known or even well known, and this week we cannot afford lengthy and conceptual discussions. We have to be result-oriented. We have this room available for only 30 more hours, and apart from some limited additional time for informal consultation, that's all the time we will have to bring our work to a consensual conclusion. I thank you in advance for your cooperation. Before proceeding to the next agenda item, I would like to ask the Secretariat to play a video message addressed to the Group by the United Nations Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Madam Izumi Nakamitsu.

Excellencies, distinguished delegates, it is my pleasure to address the second 2026 session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, CCW. Let me begin by expressing my appreciation to the Chair of the Group, Ambassador Robert Indenbosch of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, for his dedicated and strong leadership in guiding the Group's work throughout its three-year mandate. Under his stewardship, the Group has engaged in substantive and focused deliberations, laying a strong basis for the successful conclusion of its work during this final session. Over the past three years, significant progress has been made towards a shared understanding of a range of key issues, including the characterization of lethal autonomous weapon systems, the application of international humanitarian law, potential prohibitions and restrictions, and other measures to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law, IHL, and accountability. Your task this week is clear. To consolidate areas of convergence, bridge the remaining divergences, and through cooperation, flexibility, and compromise, reach consensus on a set of elements of an instrument and other possible measures to address lethal autonomous weapon systems. The importance of fulfilling your mandate cannot be overstated. As weapon technology with increasing levels of autonomy continues to evolve, the window for effective international action is narrowing. The international community must act now to ensure that technological advances do not outpace the protections that international humanitarian law is intended to guarantee. Distinguished delegates, the report you are expected to submit to the seventh review conference of the CCW in November will mark an important milestone and help shape the way forward. The decisions taken in the coming days will resonate far beyond this session. They will help influence how the international community responds to a rapidly evolving area of military technology and whether we succeed in establishing effective guardrails before these systems become more widespread. I urge you to seize this opportunity and to translate the substantial work undertaken into a concrete and meaningful outcome. The dedication, expertise and effort invested over the past three years must culminate in a report that reflects both the depth of your deliberations and the urgency of the challenge before us. The stakes are high. But so too is the opportunity. By reaching consensus on a set of elements of an instrument on laws, this group can provide states with a solid foundation for future decisions, lay the groundwork for further action, and demonstrate the enduring value of multilateralism in addressing emerging disarmament challenges. My office and I stand ready to support you in this endeavour. I wish you productive deliberations and every success in bringing this mandate to a meaningful conclusion. I count on you to deliver the progress this issue demands. I thank you very much for your attention.

On behalf of the high contracting parties to the CCW and all participants in the work of this GGE, I thank the Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs for her message of encouragement to deliver on our mandate. I now invite you to consider item 2 of the provisional agenda, titled Adoption of the agenda. As you may recall, the provisional agenda was issued as document CCW/GGE.1/2026/1 and was circulated by the CCW Implementation Support Unit via e-mail on December 18, 2025. The document is also available on the 2026 GGE on Laws webpage of UNODA MeetingSpace. You may also recall that the agenda was adopted by the Group on the first day of the first session of 2026, the 2nd of March 2026. As you may further recall, the first four agenda items are dedicated to the usual procedural and organizational matters, as is the case with the item currently under discussion. Under item four, the organization of the work of the Group, I will explain in more detail how I plan to organize our discussions this week. Delegations will have the opportunity to share their views on the matter, should they wish to do so. Agenda item five, the principal substantive agenda item before us, reflects our current mandate and has been at the core of our deliberations for the past three years. Under agenda item six, on other matters, I will invite delegations to raise any issue that may not have been addressed under the preceding agenda items. Agenda item seven is dedicated to the adoption of the report. As you are all aware of, in accordance with its mandate, the group is expected to submit a report to the seventh review conference scheduled to take place from the 16th to the 20th of November 2026, paragraph 19g of the final report of the 2025 meeting of the contracting parties CCW/MSP/2025/8. It is therefore my plan to consider and adopt the report during this session under agenda item seven. Finally, under agenda item eight, closing of the meeting, I will close the second 2026 session of the group. We now move on to agenda item three, confirmation of the rules of procedure. Under this agenda item, I would like to remind the group that the Sixth Review Conference decided that the rules of procedure of the Review Conference shall apply mutatis mutandis to the group. See CCW/CONF.6/11 decision one para 40. The rules of procedure can be found in document CCW/CONF

Distinguished Chair, we are very pleased to see you chairing our meeting, and we are pleased to see other delegations participating in yet another session of this meeting of the GGE on laws of the CCW. The Russian Federation reconfirms its readiness to provide you with all the assistance that you require during the work of this group in order to ensure that we achieve meaningful results. In order to save valuable time, we would like to confirm that the position of the Russian Federation in terms of implementing chapter 10 of the rules of procedure related to the participation of non-governmental entities, including regional governmental and non-governmental organization has not changed. My delegation is ready to confirm the rules of procedure with the understanding that they will be implemented in line with the approach that was confirmed during the previous session of this group of governmental experts and that was successfully implemented under your clear guidance distinguished chair we also would like to recall that if this approach and this rule is ignored, in other words, if there is any politicisation of our work by non governmental entities or, what is even worse, any accusations against state parties, that decision related to how we work, related to the confirmation of the rules procedure will lose its force, will be null and void, and will require additional consideration by our group. We also would like to stress that this understanding does not create any precedence for the work of the GGE and the CCW on the whole, but relates to the specific nature of this group. The solution will only apply to this session and does not create any precedents for any future events related to the CCW. In all of this, we also count on the fact that finding an optimal solution related to the implementation of Chapter X and trying to find a long-standing solution to this problem will be something that States will continue to look at both here on the sidelines of the Group and also during the intersessional period of our work under the CCW. Thank you.

I take note of the remarks made by the distinguished delegate of the Russian Federation, and let me assure him that I intend to chair this meeting with a clear eye on having a substantial technical debate with the aim of making concrete progress and exercising the powers conferred upon me under the rules of procedure while upholding the rights of delegations. I do not see any other request for the floor, so we will now move on to agenda item four. Under agenda item four, allow me to briefly go over the main aspects of the organization of the work of the GGE for this week. I would like to remind delegations that the meeting is being broadcasted live on UN Web TV, which allows viewers to follow the proceedings remotely in all six UN official languages. The link to the live broadcast has been made available on the webpage of the 2026 GGE on Laws on UNODA Meetings Place. The video recording will also be available on the website of UN Web TV shortly after the meeting ends. All relevant information on the session and relevant documents, including working papers and conference room papers, will also be shared on the GGE on Laws UNODA Meetings Place webpage. Please note that statements will be posted on the meeting webpage only if they have been submitted to the CCW ISU. Therefore, if your delegation wishes to have its intervention made available online, kindly submit it to ccw@un.org. I would also like to remind delegations to send all their statements to speeches@un.org prior to their delivery, as this will be important for the crucial work of the interpretation services. I also request that speakers maintain a measured pace to facilitate accurate interpretation, and I too will try to do so. Additionally, A fully automated speech-to-text fast service will be provided so that text of the proceedings can be found on Indico following the conclusion of the meeting each day. This is a machine-generated text and does not constitute an official record of the meeting nor has it been checked for accuracy by the Secretariat. Regarding Rule 24 of the Rules of Procedure on the right of reply, I would also like to inform delegations at the outset that given the time constraints we are facing, I will limit the rights of reply to two minutes each and to a total of maximum three per delegation. To further facilitate our work, rights of reply will only be heard at the end of each morning and afternoon session. With that, I wish to now turn to the organisation of the substantive part of this meeting. I will do so by first briefly summarising what has been done during the intersessional period before going into the week before us. On the 7th of April, following our formal session in March, the CCW ISU circulated the Chairperson's summary of our discussions as CCW/GGE.1/2026/WP.2, which is also available on the webpage of the GGE. By submitting this summary, I have captured my understanding of the work carried out during that first 2026 session also to maintain an informal record of proceedings to help inform the work of the group in 2026 and ahead. On the 5th of June 2026, the CCWI is you shared with you on my behalf a revised version of the rolling text. As explained in the corresponding letter, This new version presented without boxes reflects the extensive and constructive deliberations and the proposals put forward during the first 2026 session of the group. On the 19th and 22nd of June 2026, I convened the High Contracting Parties for two rounds of informal consultations on the rolling text. On June 24th, I also held informal consultations with observers. All in all, a lot of valuable input was gathered and I would like to express my appreciation to you all for your active participation and your suggestions. On the 7th of July 2026, the CCW ISU circulated on my behalf the draft final report as document CCW/GGE.1/2026/CRP.1. containing both the standard procedural sections and the substantive part consisting of the rolling text of the 5th of June incorporated into subsection alpha of the conclusions section. Regarding the procedural part, I invite the delegations to provide written feedback to the CCW ISU with a view to ensuring an efficient use of our time during this session. Building on the informal consultations held in June, I developed additional textual suggestions intended to serve as a basis for further discussion during a new round of informal consultations in August. These suggestions do not constitute a revision of the set of elements and other possible measures contained in the draft final report. They are intended to stimulate discussion and explore possible avenues for convergence with a view of assisting in the finalization of our work. These suggestions were circulated by the CCW ISU on my behalf on August the 11th. The document has also been made available on the webpage of the 2026 sessions of the group on the UNODA meeting space. Subsequently, we had informal consultations on August 14th, 18th and 25th. On August 14th, the high contracting parties shared their views on the procedural sections of the draft final report and power 25 of my additional suggestions. On August 18, during a consultation in hybrid format, high contracting parties reacted to the powers 35 to 48 of my additional suggestions. And finally, on the 25th of August, delegations shared their views on all the remaining powers of the additional suggestions. I would like to take this opportunity to thank all delegations for their active participation and constructive engagement in these meetings. I particularly appreciate the time and effort invested in sharing views and reacting to each other's proposals, which have contributed to identifying areas of convergence as well as issues that require further consideration. Excellencies, dear colleagues, as I noted in my letter circulated on 27 August 2026, it will be particularly important that we focus our efforts on substantive exchanges aimed at identifying concrete compromises capable of achieving consensus. In this spirit and consistent with the approach taken during previous sessions, I do not intend to hold a general exchange of views. Instead, I propose that the group proceeds directly to substantive exchanges. Today and tomorrow, I intend to structure the work of the group around the additional suggestions by the chair. Based on our informal consultations over the last three weeks, I feel our work would benefit from continuing these discussions. I propose that we begin our exchanges with paragraph 25 of the additional suggestions before turning to paragraphs 35 to 38 and thereafter addressing the remaining paragraphs. On the basis of those substantive deliberations, I intend to circulate a revised version of the draft final report in the middle of the week, taking into account both the outcomes of our exchanges and the comments received from our contracting parties on the procedural sections of the report. My intention would then be for the group to begin the adoption of the text during the remaining days under agenda item seven. As necessary and beneficial, I may continue the practice followed during my previous sessions by convening informal consultations in various formats throughout the week, including, where appropriate, outside official meeting hours. At this moment, I expect to hold informal consultations on Tuesday and Thursday evening. More details will follow. It is the responsibility of this group to deliver on its mandate. That means using the time allocated to us wisely and efficiently, with a view to considering and formulating by consensus a set of elements of an instrument without prejudging its nature, as well as other possible measures, in accordance with our mandate, and ultimately agreeing on a final report. Rest assured, I will not ask you to overperform on the mandate, since delivering on the mandate is, I would say, already a huge undertaking, and I count on you to show the outside world that delegations in Geneva have over the years not lost the ability to negotiate and still can reach consensus on substantive issues. I continue to believe that working on concrete texts is the most effective way to get to the core of our discussions. narrow differences and capture concrete progress. I therefore encourage delegations to heed my call to use the time wisely and efficiently and to move swiftly to the substantive portion of our work. I count on your cooperation and active engagement throughout the week. Let me now turn to agenda item five, and that is Again, I will cite our mandate to further consider and formulate by consensus a set of elements of an instrument without prejudging its nature and other possible measures to address emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems, taking into account the example of existing protocols within the convention, proposals presented by High Contracting Parties and other options related to the normative and operational framework on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems, building upon the recommendations and conclusions of the Group and bringing in expertise on legal, military and technological aspects. I see our work this year as an extension of the work done throughout 2025-2025 and the first 2026 session of the group. In order to optimally use the time, I intend to forego general statements and turn straight to our substantive work on the set of elements and other possible measures by exchanging views on the additional suggestions by the Chair. Should your delegation nonetheless wish to provide general remarks, I suggest that these be delivered later on this week when we turn our attention to the draft final report. When doing so, please indicate it at the start of the intervention and I would ask that these remarks be kept to a maximum of three minutes or five minutes if speaking on behalf of a group of states. I also kindly ask all delegations to focus their interventions on the matter at hand and refrain from making political statements that are unrelated to substance matter or outside of this group's mandate. I would now like to turn to the additional suggestions. Let me stress once again that these suggestions do not constitute a revision of subsection A of the draft final report. They should also not be understood as implying that no further refinements may be warranted in other parts of the text. Rather, they are intended to stimulate discussion and explore possible avenues for convergence on some key issues, with a view to assisting in the finalisation of the draft final report. As mentioned earlier, I would suggest that we begin our exchanges with para 25 of the additional suggestions before turning to the paras 35 to 38 and thereafter addressing the remaining paras. Before opening the floor to hear your views on para 25, allow me to briefly walk you through the only suggestion I have made, a single change to clarify the existing language. I think we have come a long way on this discussion, and I believe we should not be too far away off from arriving at a text that is acceptable to all. At the same time, I'm aware that there are still a number of outstanding issues, including request to delete, move, rephrase the words functionally integrated, to add the notion of lethality, And in subpara alpha, to add the temporal element, change the language on determination, as well as to change or delete the current formulation on the characteristics. The suggested change for my side is intended to make it clear that specific applies not only to the target, but also to the group of targets to be engaged by the system. In my view, the suggested change is only stylistic in nature since the formulation in the draft final report is already intended to cover both. Since some delegations are uncertain about this, I propose adding it to avoid ambiguity. I would also like to note that it is a conscious decision to suggest, quote, specific group of targets, unquote, and not, quote, group of specific targets, unquote, as this would imply treating the components of that group as individual targets, which would make adding, quote, the group, unquote, before, quote, of specific targets, unquote, superfluous. Having said this, more than 12 pages of text, I think it's now time to turn to the room. and to open the floor to delegations requesting to address the meeting. I've been informed that we have so far two requests for the floor for a group statement, Algeria on behalf of the African group and Brazil on behalf of a group of states. Let me therefore first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Algeria.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the African States that are high contracting parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. As the GGE approaches the conclusion of its current mandate, the African Group acknowledges the considerable progress achieved under your leadership and through the sustained engagement of high contracting parties. In the group's view, the rolling text of the 5th June, as reflected in subsection A of the draft substantive report, has reached a level of maturity that provides a sufficient basis for the GGE to fulfill its present mandate and for our collective work to advance the next stage. We recognize that differences remain on certain aspects of the text and remain open to constructive efforts to address outstanding concerns during this final session. At the same time, any further adjustment should preserve the substantive progress already achieved and should not weaken the core elements that have emerged from the work of the group. In this regard, the African Group attached particular importance to maintaining the approach reflected in the text, combining prohibitions with restrictions and other measures governing lethal autonomous weapon systems. At the same time, such measures should be developed in a manner that does not constrain the lawful development, acquisition and use of technologies required to meet state legitimate security and defence need. Equally fundamental is the requirement to maintain human judgment and control in relation to lethal autonomous weapon systems. In this regard, the African group considers it is important that human judgment precedes and informs the exercise of control, ensuring that decisions concerning the use of force remain subject to meaningful human involvement. This principle must be supported by appropriate measures capable of giving its effect across the life cycle of such systems, including their design, development, and use. Such measures are essential to ensuring compliance with applicable international law, particularly international humanitarian law, and to maintaining human responsibility and accountability for decisions concerning the use of force. Responsibility cannot be transferred to machines. Mr. Chair, the African group considers that the set of elements contained in the draft substantive reports provide a sufficient foundation for negotiations on an instrument on lethal autonomous weapons systems. Remaining differences can and should continue to be addressed in the course of those negotiations and should not prevent high contracting parties from moving the process forward. The rapid evolution of these technologies and the humanitarian, legal and security implications associated with their development and use underscore the urgency of advancing our work. The African Group remains encouraged by the progress made thus far and looks forward to the adoption of a substantive outcome that reflects the work undertaken by this GGE and can provide a solid basis for negotiating mandate to be adopted by the Seventh Review Conference. We stand ready to engage constructively with all high contracting parties towards this objective and toward an outcome that preserve the progress achieved and enable the international community to move decisively to the next phase of this work. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

And let me thank the distinguished representative of Algeria speaking on behalf of the African group. Next on my list is Brazil speaking on behalf of a group of states to be followed by the Holy See. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Brazil. Sir, you have the floor.

Mr. President, thank you, Mr. President. At the outset, the Brazilian delegation would like to convey to the Norwegian people and the government our condolence of the passing of King Harald V. Mr. President, I have the honor of delivering the following statement on behalf of the following high contracting parties, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Guatemala, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montenegro, Mozambique, Nauru, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Pakistan, Palestine, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and my own country, Brazil. Observer States Nigeria and Thailand also associate themselves with this statement. Chair, as the current mandate of DGE draws to a close, and recalling the joint statement delivered in September 2025, We welcome the substantial and positive evolution of the rolling text under your leadership. We believe that the rolling text of June the fifth now included a subsection A of the draft substantive report of the GGE remains coherent and well structured. We therefore continue to consider it a sufficient basis to fulfill the mandate of this GGE and to serve as basis for negotiations within the CCW on an instrument on lethal autonomous weapons systems. The text reflects significant areas of convergence achieved by delegations, including the characterization of lethal autonomous weapons systems and the further development of operative elements in keeping with the two-tiered approach, prohibition of some types of systems and regulation of the design and use of others. We place special importance on the text's affirmation on the centrality of the human element through the key concepts of human judgment and control. Equally crucial are the specific measures that translate these concepts into concrete and operational measures for the use of laws. These measures aim at safeguarding human responsibility and accountability, thereby ensuring compliance with international law, including international humanitarian law. We are mindful that some issues remain under discussion, and we welcome continued efforts and proposals by the Chair to find solutions. We remain ready to engage constructively this week to address outstanding concerns and further strengthen the draft. We remain open to language alternatives that would help build consensus while preserving the core tenets of the draft report. In conclusion, Chair, we reaffirm our readiness to fulfill the mandate of the GGE. The progress achieved by this group demonstrates that a meaningful outcome is within reach. We are determined to work with all delegations towards a consensus outcome commensurate with the importance and urgency of this issue. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And let me thank the distinguished ambassador of Brazil speaking on behalf of a group of states, and I'll pass the floor to the distinguished representative of the Holy See. Sir, you have the floor.

My delegation also wishes to join Brazil and other states in conveying its condolences to Norway for the passing away of King Harald. Moreover, we wish We want to thank you for the important work you have done in steering the group of governmental experts, including the consultations you conducted over the summer. In this regard, we appreciate your continued efforts and proposals to find commonly acceptable solutions while addressing the concerns that gave rise to this GGE. We believe that the joint statements delivered by Brazil on behalf of a number of delegations and by Algeria on behalf of the African group reflect significant areas of convergence, including an appropriate characterization of the systems under consideration. In particular, we attach special importance to the text affirmation of Brazil and of other countries of the centrality of the human element. Mr. Chair, the Holy See continues to view the work of this GGE not solely through the lens of compliance with international humanitarian law. As fundamental as it is, the concerns raised by lethal autonomous weapon systems are much broader. These wider moral and ethical stakes Were recalled by His Holiness Pope Leo XIV, who recently affirmed that moral judgment cannot be reduced to calculation, for it involves conscience, personal responsibility, and the recognition of the other as a person. No algorithm can make war morally acceptable. AI does not remove the intrinsic inhumanity of conflict. Therefore, it is imperative to establish a shared framework. Furthermore, in order to address these ethical concerns, my delegation considers it important that the rolling text includes a clear and specific prohibition on autonomous weapons systems that target human beings or whose use can be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life. Mindful of more than a decade of discussions, my delegation stands ready over the next few days to engage constructively and with a renewed sense of urgency so as to fulfill the GGE's mandates. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Let me thank His Eminence for stating the positions of the Holy See and the Holy Father. So far, no further requests to the floor. We have, we are, please keep up your plates a little bit longer. We forgot to take the binoculars with us and it's a bit of a challenge here. Yes, we have now a number already, we have one more even there. For the time being, I have Sri Lanka to be followed by the United States and South Africa, but let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. First, allow me to express deepest condolences to the delegation of Norway for the passing of His Majesty, the King Harald. Sri Lanka wishes to express its sincere gratitude to you Mr chair for your outstanding leadership dedication and guidance throughout the process of formulating this set of elements navigating these complex deliberations is not an easy task and we deeply commend your poise patience integrity and diplomatic skills as well as the tireless efforts in bringing us to this pivotal stage today Sri Lanka believes that the Chair's rolling text or the set of elements contained in subsection A of the current version of the draft final report provides a foundation to fulfill the mandate of the GGE on laws and thus serves as the basis to launch formal negotiations on a legally binding instrument on lethal autonomous weapon systems within the CCW framework. Mr. Chair, allow me to move to paragraph 25 of your additional suggestions. Sri Lanka wishes to place on record its support for paragraph 25, which establishes an essential foundation for the entire set of elements and workable definition for lethal autonomous weapon systems, which could be used as a baseline for future negotiations. We oppose any revisions or modification to para 25 that risk weakening its substance or reducing its operational scope. Maintaining a robust characterization is essential to ensure effective prohibitions and restrictions to govern emerging autonomous weapons technologies. Mr. Chair, while paragraph 25 establishes a workable characterization, Characterization alone is not sufficient. We must ensure that this characterization directly links to clear prohibitions in subsequent elements. We note that the characterization in paragraph 25 serves as an overarching neutral characterization for all lethal autonomous weapon systems regardless of what they target. Therefore, the systems that operate autonomously against human targets, such as anti-personnel autonomous weapons, which are designed to directly target humans, must be subject to an explicit unconditional ban in a subsequent paragraph of the text to prevent digital dehumanization. My delegation believes that the text needs to be further strengthened through our deliberation at this session by addressing such kind of remaining gaps in several critical elements. Mr. Chair, my delegation has carefully listened to the proposals made by other delegations regarding the text. We view the current draft as a result of compromise. we should determine not to water down the report in a way that would undermine years of effort, contributions and constructive convergence. Sri Lanka also wishes to recall to this forum and welcome the renewed call by the UN Secretary General and the President of the ICRC to commence negotiations on a legally binding instruments establishing clear prohibitions and restrictions before it is too late. For this purpose, the set of elements before us constitutes an indispensable foundation and the single most viable pathway to initiate negotiations before technological developments outface our deliberations. It is my delegation's earnest hope that all delegations will strive towards our shared objective by further strengthening the set of elements during this session. Sri Lanka supports the full inclusion of the set of elements in the final report of the GGE on laws. Thank you.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka for stating the positions of her delegation and making proposals, and also for jumping to the substance. And for that reason, we have now put the text on the screen to facilitate the discussion in the room. Let me now pass the floor to distinguished representative of the United States to be followed by South Africa, France, United Kingdom, and from the signatories, I have Nigeria. But let me first pass the floor to distinguished representative of the United States. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair, for recognizing us. We actually didn't request the floor. I think it may have been the United Kingdom placard that went up and was mistaken for us, not the first time. But thank you for recognizing us anyway.

I'm not going to comment on the past. Let me now pass the floor to the United Kingdom. You have the floor, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. We have reached a decisive point in our deliberations, and the United Kingdom is wholly committed and remains ready to work constructively and proactively with all states in order to fulfil the mandate entrusted to this group. Over the past three years, we have built greater understanding, narrowed differences, and made substantive progress through goodwill, hard work, and sincere effort. Therefore, it would be profoundly regrettable if we were to lose all of that progress because of inflexibility and an inability to put our common objective ahead of competing priorities. One principle unites us all, the importance and primacy of international humanitarian law. The CCW is the right forum for this work. It anchors our discussions in the law applicable to armed conflicts and brings together the diplomatic, military, legal and technical expertise required to address the challenges posed by lethal autonomous weapon systems. A successful outcome here would show that the CCW is not only capable of responding to technological change, but remains a living and effective instrument to which states can turn shared humanitarian concern into practical international action. Mr. Chair, the United Kingdom would particularly like to thank you and your team once again for your stewardship of this process. and for the development of the rolling text and ensuing report. You have listened carefully to the varied and at times contrasting voices in this room and have sought to build bridges between them. We also welcome the clarity with which delegations have articulated their positions throughout both the formal and informal processes. As we enter the final days of our negotiations, our work and approach to it should be guided by the principles of sincerity, transparency and collective will. Consensus does not require any delegation to set aside its core concerns. It will require all of us to distinguish what is essential from what is preferable and to recognise the value of an outcome that advances our collective work. The United Kingdom will listen carefully, engage seriously and contribute its knowledge and expertise in that spirit. We urge every delegation to do the same. With that in mind, The UK would like to emphasize that the role of the human as the accountable agent under international humanitarian law is critical. It is not the system that exercises legal agency, it is the human. It is not the system that exercises judgment, it is the human. States put in place measures of control over their systems which affect the requirement that IHL is respected. The United Kingdom is therefore in favor of the formulation in the rolling text of control and human judgment as better reflecting the manner in which the law interacts with these systems. We also recognise that there is further work to do this week to address how and to what ends control is to be exercised. The opportunity before us is significant, but it will not remain open indefinitely. Let us use this week to translate years of dialogue into a credible and meaningful outcome that strengthens the CCW and demonstrates that multilateralism can deliver. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom for stating the positions of his delegation and also for calling on the group to do what we have to do, I would say. Next on my list is South Africa, to be followed by France and the distinguished representative of Turkey. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of South Africa. You have the floor.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor. South Africa wishes to thank you and the friends of the chair for the considerable efforts undertaken advancing the work of the group. We followed the informal consultations closely and have given careful note of the various proposals and perspectives put forward by the delegations. While we could not intervene during those discussions, we would like to offer the following comments for consideration and also aligning with the statement delivered by Algeria on behalf of the African group. Regarding paragraph 25, South Africa proposes an inclusion of the word positively before the term identify so that the relevant paragraph could read within the scope of the application of the CCW, a lethal autonomous weapon system can be characterized as a combination of one or more weapons and functionally integrated technological components that can positively identify, select and engage a target without intervention by a human operating the system. In our view, the inclusion of the term positively identify would strengthen the characterization by introducing an important element of certainty and reliability in relation to the identification of targets prior to the selection and engagement. South Africa further considers that this formulation may assist in addressing issues that arise elsewhere in the text, including those reflected in paragraph 44, where questions relating to accountability may become relevant. A requirement for positive identification could provide additional clarity when considering whether a system can meet applicable standards and safeguards. In addition to this discussion and during the informal consultations, we highlighted concerns relating to accountability. My delegation believes that incorporating the concept of positive identification at this stage may help address some of these concerns in a practical manner, particularly where there are differing views regarding differences to individual accountability. By strengthening the characterization of the system itself, the text may better support subsequent considerations relating to responsibility, accountability and compliance. For this reason, Mr. Chair, South Africa would support the inclusion of the word positively in paragraph 25 and encourages delegations to consider this proposal. Thank you very much.

I thank the distinguished representative of South Africa for commenting on the text and making a text proposal. Next on my list is France, to be followed by Turkey and Ukraine. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of France. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. I'd like to thank you, Chair, and your delegation for the tremendous efforts made. Rest assured that my delegation supports you in this group. On paragraph 25, we support the characterization as proposed in the text. Allow me to explain our understanding of it and why we can support it. the way it is described, we can see the parameters of application for a future instrument to clarify the systems that it covers. It does not make a judgment on measures or prohibition or restrictions which will be applied to these systems that will be explained later on in the text. It's therefore relevant that this characterisation and definition be broad, neutral technologically speaking, and able to evolve with the future. The way it is described and defined, we believe, is particularly relevant because it meets, or answers rather, a number of questions that have been discussed at length within our group. First of all, on lethality. Here we have the weapons systems that are conceived or created to injure or kill people as well as to damage or destroy objects. We reaffirm that it is not desirable to include a definition of lethality because it doesn't exist in international humanitarian law. The second question, the Inclusion of components. The systems covered by this explanation or characterization can take the form of one single unit or a range of components that have critical functions that are located in one particular physical space or not. Thirdly, the critical function. The characteristics include systems which once triggered or activated can select a target by identifying it in advance and then engage fire or target without human intervention. Now, although some of the characteristics can be activated by a human in advance, by engaging targets, the systems will be covered by this characterization so far as they can then identify targets with this system with a certain degree of autonomy. Exclusions include systems which include autonomy only on one part of the targeting or the engagement of fire. If a human targets instead of the system, then the system is not covered by this particular text and it will be covered by international law, in particular international humanitarian law. There's no question therefore about the autonomy of decision. This means that we can agree to the characteristics that are set out in paragraph 25. I thank you.

Let me thank the distinguished ambassador of France for stating the position of her delegation. Next on my list is Turkey, to be followed by Ukraine, and then I have Nigeria. Let me now pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Turkey. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. Good morning, colleagues. My delegation has studied the additional drafting suggestions you have put forward, as well as the alternative formulations subsequently shared among delegations. We want to put on record some of our general observations about the entire text before we move to paragraph by paragraph discussion. We appreciate the effort to move our discussions forward with a view to reaching consensus and are ready to engage constructively in this exercise as our mandate draws to a close. We welcome in particular your recognition, Chair, that human control over laws may be exercised directly or indirectly, and the more descriptive framing given to the measures in paragraph 38, elements of balance that we would be concerned to see disturbed as we move toward adoption. At the same time, we see a number of formulations across the text that, taken together, shift the character of this document from a framework capturing convergence among states toward one that reads in places as creating new and prescriptive obligations. Before turning to specific paragraphs, we would like to set out the framework within which we approach this exercise. First, on the nature of this exercise. We continue to view this set of elements as a technical, non-binding reference reflecting the current state of discussion among high contracting parties, not a treaty text and not a step that should be read as prejudging whether or in what form a future instrument may be negotiated. We attach particular importance to the qualifiers already found in paragraph 47A of the report, namely without judging namely without prejudging its nature and without prejudice to the result of the future discussions, and we will insist that both be carried forward unchanged into whatever text the Seventh Review Conference is asked to endorse. Second, the applicable law anchor. Where the text uses mandatory language, we can only support it to the extent it reflects each state's own obligations under applicable international humanitarian law. Formulations that go beyond that, whether by broadening applicable IHL into undifferentiated international law or by importing treaty-specific language from instruments to which not all high contracting parties are party, raise difficulties for delegations, including my own, that are not party to Additional Protocol I. For the same reason, we would urge caution before treating must formulations in this text as declaratory of settled customary international law. A customary rule requires both consistent state practice and the corresponding sense of legal obligation, opinio juris, and we do not believe that threshold has been met for most of the obligations under discussion. With that framework in mind, we note a recurring shift from recommendatory language should toward mandatory language must and in one instance shall, including in paragraphs 34, 35, 39, 44, 46 and 47. We believe the group should exercise caution here. This is meant to be a set of elements capturing common understanding, not a treaty text creating binding obligations. Third, in paragraph 35, we are concerned that the addition of international law in particular extends the scope of this paragraph beyond international humanitarian law, which is the body of law that actually governs the conduct of hostilities. Fourth, we note that certain textual safeguards providing important flexibility have been removed in the latest drafting. Notably, the clarifying sentence in 36 that human control does not imply constant direct human control and the qualifier adequately in paragraph 40C on predictability and reliability. We believe both should be restored. Fifth, we're concerned that the deletion of while active in an operational context in paragraph 38C risks extending a requirement intended for the operational phrase to the operational phase to the full cycle of the system with practical consequences for systems that must retain limited autonomy to complete their mission or defend themselves under degraded communications, electronic warfare or cyber attack conditions. Sixth, paragraph 39 now incorporates language directly drawn from Article 36 of Additional Protocol I. As my delegation is not party to that instrument, we cannot accept language that imports treaty-specific obligations into a document intended to reflect common understanding among all states, including non-parties. Seventh, we note the addition of open-ended language such as and other possible measures in paragraph 48, which risks leaving the scope of expected measures undefined and unbounded. Finally, and most fundamentally, we continue to believe that this set of elements would benefit from an explicit clause clarifying that it is without prejudice to the nature of any possible future instrument and does not in and of itself create, alter, or expand the rights and obligations of states under international law, language that tracks closely the qualifiers already present in paragraph 47A of the report. We understand from informal exchanges that the Chair's own explanation of this text, that is, it restates existing obligations and creates nothing new, is not controversial among delegations. If that is so, we see no obstacle to saying so expressly, which would also reduce the need for individual delegations, including our own, to append lengthy national statements. We will return to this proposal later. We will elaborate on each of these points as we proceed paragraph paragraph and we stand ready to work with other delegations to find language that all of us can support. On paragraph 25, we continue to view this paragraph, including its exclusion clause in 25A, as a carefully negotiated package. We would caution against reopening individual elements of the characterization in isolation. We can engage on drafting refinements, but only on the understanding that the exclusion of systems where the specific target or group of targets is determined by personnel planning deciding upon or carrying out the attack is preserved in full. I thank you, Chair.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Turkey for stating not only the not only giving the Commons on paragraph 25 but all the wider views of her delegation with regard to the text. You have made my life easy by already stating what I have stated numerous times that what we are doing and what we are not doing here and I think I have also read out the mandate three times or even four times. That is what we are doing. We are not making a legally binding instrument. We are working on a set of elements Certain cases references are made to existing law. In a number of cases, there is a clause to it applicable. So I would like to refer to that. Next on my list is Ukraine to be followed by Nigeria and then I have Italy. Let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Ukraine. You have the floor.

Thank you. As this is the first time that the delegation of Ukraine takes the floor, we would like to thank you, Mr. Chair, and your team for your leadership in steering the work of this working group. We also express gratitude to states as well as non-governmental organizations and representatives of the academic community who have provided constructive contributions. It is the position of Ukraine that the rolling text offers a solid basis for the outcome that we are going to finalize in the upcoming days. The basis for such an outcome must be the principles of international humanitarian law, including the principles of humanity and military necessity, both of which must be considered to find a proper balance. Ukraine strongly supports the presumption that responsibility for IHL compliance cannot be passed to machines. It is in the light of this presumption that we should consider the notions of judgment and control. They are not absolute. Rather, they serve the overall purpose of IHL compliance, including the protection of civilians and civilian objects. Whatever the wording deemed appropriate, this wording must be effective for the protection of victims of armed conflicts. It must, however, take into account the realities of armed conflict, including realistic scenarios of the use of the lethal autonomous weapon systems. We therefore urge the respectable delegates to keep in mind that eventually the effectiveness of the instrument will depend on the readiness of states to accept it. I thank you, Chair, and wish us all a successful work.

I thank the distinguished representative of Ukraine for sharing the positions of his delegation and the words of support to the Chair. Next on my list is the distinguished representative of Nigeria, to be followed by Italy. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. Chair, Nigeria congratulates you on convening this important final session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems. We appreciate your sustained leadership and the considerable efforts invested by you, the Secretariat, and all delegations throughout the 2024-2026 cycle. Nigeria participates in this group as an observer state. as we are not yet a high contracting party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, CCW. Nevertheless, we attach great importance to the work of the GGE and remain fully committed to contributing constructively to efforts aimed at establishing an effective normative and operational framework for lethal autonomous weapons systems. Nigeria associates itself with the joint statement delivered by Brazil and also Algeria on behalf of the African group. In our national capacity, we wish to emphasize the importance of preserving the rolling text of 5 June 2026, now reflected in subsection A of the draft final report. Mr. Chair, the rolling text represents the product of several years of careful deliberation. technical engagement and significant compromises by delegations holding different legal, military, technological and policy perspectives. No delegation obtained everything in its initial start. That is precisely why the present text constitutes a credible and carefully balanced basis for consensus. Nigeria support the rolling text in its present form. We consider it coherent, substantive and sufficiently mature to fulfil the mandate entrusted to this group. Any further consideration of the text during this final session should therefore be guided by the need to consolidate the convergence already achieved, not to reopen settled compromises or weaken the substantive balance painstakingly constructed over the course of the mandate. Nigeria particularly welcomes the text's clear affirmation that international humanitarian law applies fully to the development and the use of laws, that legal obligations rest upon states, state parties to armed conflict and individuals, and cannot be transferred to machines, and that human judgment and control are indispensable to ensuring compliance with international law. We also support the two-tiered structure embodied in the text. prohibiting systems that are inherently indiscriminate, whose effects cannot be sufficiently anticipated and limited, or which cannot otherwise be used in compliance with international humanitarian law, while establishing concrete requirements and safeguards governing the design, development and use of the system. The provision concerning responsible chains of human command and control, limitations on targets and operational parameters, timely deactivation or neutralization, legal reviews, testing and evaluation, predictability, reliability, traceability, explainability, and the mitigation of unintended and automation bias are essential. Equally important are the provisions safeguarding human responsibility, individual accountability, and effective investigation of incidents that may involve violation of international humanitarian law. Mr. Chair, Nigeria has carefully considered the additional suggestions presented under the Chair's authority. We remain prepared to engage constructively with these and other proposals. However, any refinement must command broad support, preserve the architecture and the substantive protection of the 5th June ruling text, and avoid disturbing the delicate compromises already achieved. These advanced changes should clearly and strengthen consensus, clarify and strengthen consensus, not reopen fundamental questions or diminish established safeguards. Mr. Chair, this final section presents the group with both an opportunity and responsibility. The rapid evolution and increasing military application of artificial intelligence make further delay increasingly difficult to justify. The international community must ensure that technological advancement does not outpace the development of effective legal and humanitarian safeguards. Nigeria therefore encourages all higher contracting parties to demonstrate maximum feasibility and the political will necessary to adopt a substantive final report by consensus and transmit a meaningful outcome to the Seventh Review Conference. The progress achieved by this group must be preserved and carried forward as the basis for negotiation on an effective instrument on lethal autonomous weapons systems without prejudging its eventual nature. Finally, let this final session consolidate our collective work rather than unravel it. Nigeria stands ready to engage constructively with all delegations towards that objective. I thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria for commenting on the text and making proposals. Please, ambassadors, distinguished delegates, allow me just a few remarks. I know it's tempting during the first day of our final session to be a little bit reflective, and I had a few remarks also in my opening words to that end, but could I please ask you to focus on the text, especially now on paragraph 25, because otherwise your remarks could become closing remarks in a way. And we need a lot of work to be done and moments for reflection. There will be enough time for that after the meeting, I would say. But here we have a difficult job, but on the other hand also a straightforward job to do is now discuss the text that is on the screen. So please, um, with all due respect to, um, to of course the views from your capitals, uh, that are certainly, uh, worthwhile listening to, but we also have to be a little bit concerned about the time we have today, um, with regard to, um, diving into the substance. So having said that, let me now move to the list. I have Italy, United States, Canada, Russian Federation, ICRC and Sweden. But let me first pass the floor to distinguished representative of Italy. You have the floor, madam.

Thank you, Chair, for providing us with this additional suggestions and for allowing me to comment on this paragraph. The mandate of our group to further consider and formulate by consensus a set of elements of an instrument is arriving at the end. And we are pleased to have witnessed growing convergence over these three years, which will hopefully allow us to narrow final gaps and adopt a final report by consensus on Friday. As we have underlined on previous occasions, we consider that a lethal autonomous weapon system is one which, once activated, can identify, select, and engage targets without further human intervention, thus implying the use of autonomy across all the three critical functions. We believe that maintaining this formulation brings us closer to a consensus definition. With regard to sub-paragraph a, we can endorse the addition of the clause, a system is not included in this characterization when the personnel planning, deciding upon or carrying out the attack determines the specific target or specific group of targets to be engaged by the system. This wording appropriately limits the scope of the new instrument to cases in which human operators do not intervene in defining the object. Regarding subparagraph b, we continue to support a text which specifies that a system which is lethal by nature cannot be excluded from characterization, even when used to damage objects or inflict injury, or when it requires initial parameter input from an operator. We viewed this as a balanced and pragmatic compromise consistent with the discussions held over the past year, which offers a constructive way forward by deferring detailed characterisation to the future negotiation of the instrument among the contracting parties. We would encourage applying the same approach to the final paragraph. by postponing a potential exclusion of specific weapon systems to subsequent negotiation phases. And I thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Italian Republic. Next on my list is the United States. You have the floor, sir.

Thank you, Chair. Good morning, colleagues. And just to start, Chair, by thanking you and your team in the ISU for the work that's been done to prepare us for these meetings. Chair, this is the final week under the GGE's mandate. We have a lot to do with limited time. So following your guidance, we will dispense this morning with an opening statement setting out our expectations for the week. I think our general views are well known and of course, we'll provide explanations of our positions throughout the discussions over the course of the week. For now, I think the main thing we want to say is that we are confident that all delegations in the room this morning are like us committed to working together to find consensus on a report this week that meets our mandate. And we've come ready to roll up our sleeves to engage constructively with the text and with others and with the language on the screen. So turning chair to paragraph 25 of the additional suggestions text. We do think the group is very close on characterization and this would be a tremendous advance in the group's work to arrive on this characterization of laws. For our delegation, I think there are four issues that we did want to identify in the current language. First, as we have previously mentioned, the term functionally integrated really doesn't work for us. we can support deleting functionally integrated and after technological components add a phrase whose integrated functions enable the system to identify, select, and engage a target. The important point for us is not that the integration is functional as opposed to formal, but that the functions are integrated. So this revision would clarify that the system rather than individual technological components perform these functions of target identification. The second issue is the lethality element, which has been much discussed. We continue to believe that lethality needs to be included within the definition of laws, and we have made a number of suggestions in the past to this end. The third issue, Chair, is we think that we should use the term human beings rather than humans in the Chapeau paragraph. Human is generally used as an adjective and using it as a noun is awkward and colloquial. Human being is consistent with subparagraph A. Sorry, I'm not sure when you lost.

We got your explanation on human as an adjective and then the microphone dropped.

Sorry, I didn't hear him. So the third issue for us, Chair, is the terminology humans in the paragraph. Human is generally used as an adjective and using it as a noun is for us awkward. We think reference to human beings is consistent with subparagraph A and is also terminology used in Article 6 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. So if these three changes were made, the paragraph would read, within the scope of the application of the CCW, a lethal autonomous weapon system can be characterized as a combination of one or more weapons and technological components whose integrated functions enable the system to identify select and engage a target with lethal force without intervention by human being chair turning to subparagraph a first just a minor grammatical point we do think that the word determines in the second to last line should be determined because it's referring to the personnel so it would be the personnel who determine And then a more substantive point. We do not support including the phrase or characteristics thereof in subparagraph A. For us, this language is unclear and redundant with the existing language in subparagraph A, which we think is covered in the phrase or otherwise determines a set of potential targets. the best approach would be to omit the language and just simply interpret the phrase or otherwise determines a set of potential targets to include setting the criteria for something to be deemed a target. But we could be more flexible and another option would be to we could be open to including a phrase after otherwise determines a set of potential targets by adding the phrase, including by setting criteria for the system to engage a target. For us, it's important to explain that this language is already included in the prior clause. We also think it's important not to confuse the characteristics of the target, which are set by the individuals who design the target, and the criteria applied by the system to determine whether to engage a target, which are set by those persons programming the weapon system. Finally chair in our previous interventions during the informal period we had raised a concern with adding the term specific before group of targets. We did see this as redundant but we're prepared to support including the that additional reference to the word specific if that will help us read consensus. Thank you chair.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of the United States for sharing the views of the delegation, making proposals, and indeed showing flexibility, very helpful. Next on my list is Canada to be followed by the Russian Federation and the ICRC. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Canada. You have the floor.

Chair, my delegation at the outset would like to present its condolences to Norway related to the passing of King Harald. I would like to thank the Chair and his team for the way they prepared us to this very important final session related to our mandate. As others have said, my delegation believes that the CCW is the appropriate forum to discuss the questions related to laws and we're ready to cooperate with all delegations in a spirit of consensus in order to have, at the end of this week, a positive document. On paragraph 25 of the final report, my delegation can support the version that has been presented by the Chair on 5 June and also the suggestions made by the Chair related to a specific group of targets. We believe that human beings have the power to determine and verify that a target or a group of targets is legitimate in terms of law of armed conflict and IHL. When targets are grouped, it is important that special measures are taken to guarantee their identification as legitimate targets. Thank you.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Canada for commenting on the text proposed by the Chair. Next on my list is the Russian Federation, to be followed by the ICRC, Sweden and Chile. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation. Sir, you have the floor.

Thank you very much, distinguished Chair. At the outset, we would like to reaffirm as we said in our first statement today, reaffirmed that the Russian Federation is ready to make a constructive and positive substantive contribution to the work of the Group in order to help the Group achieve the objectives that are set before the Group in implementing the objective and the mandate and to the adoption by consensus of a substantive report. The group indeed has carried out significant work over the last three years. This is something that confirms that this platform and this format is the best possible way to discuss this set of issues. And also what confirms that is the fact that even in the current draft final report of the group that we're discussing right now, most of the paragraphs and understanding that you propose, distinguished Chair, have been already been cleared from brackets and are agreed to. We consider the text that you proposed as a very good foundation, a solid, robust foundation for our work. We just have to make one more small step in order to reach agreement on outstanding paragraphs in this draft. For that, we need political will. We also need the readiness to find compromise and to find solutions. In essence, this is indeed the substance of multilateral diplomacy. and if during the remaining days we will be able to do just that and be able to find solutions then that will mean that we'll be able to achieve the best and maximum possible result that is possible and this is what we are counting on as far as paragraph 25 is concerned we still have some concerns in terms of the separate elements of this paragraph. Most of these elements have been presented by you, Chair, in your introductory statement. But before turning to the discussion of our concerns, as a general comment, we would like to say that we do not find it advisable to present as a separate subparagraph a the set of elements that we are referring to in the title of the document that you circulated that was proposed as additional proposals on behalf of the chairperson for consideration by the group we believe that subparagraph subsection A does not correspond to the mandate that the group has and we believe the introduction of a subsection with a title is counterproductive in the context of reflecting and implementing the mandate of the group so we find it preferable to not have any subsections and simply limit ourselves in the text to have a section related to conclusions and recommendations or simply conclusions as we find in section three right now on paragraph 25 first concern that we still have is the language functionally integrated we believe that this language that was proposed by you, Chair, at an earlier stage in order to find a compromise, is a very elegant way of finding a compromise in terms of specific types, categories of systems that this definition could apply to. For my delegation, it is very important to ensure that this definition covers not simply cover systems that in one single device contain attack elements but also auxiliary elements. We believe that the definition should cover systems that when the attack elements and auxiliary elements, for example, elements related to selection and election of targets, command and control, are not within one single unit, but are distributed and are presented as separate units that together represent a system. In this case, we believe that such an objective could be resolved if we place the words functionally integrated before the word combination. Otherwise, if some delegations have some problems with the language functionally integrated, our delegation will be ready to work on specific language in order to find acceptable language that would in the end be able to solve the main concern that we have, namely to ensure that this definition covers both categories of weapon systems that we have mentioned earlier. The second concern that we have relates to lethality. We believe that it is absolutely necessary to introduce this factor in the definition in the chapeau of paragraph 25, because the lethality factor is an integral part of the mandate of this GGE and it must be taken into account in this working definition. Currently, we only have language and a reference to the fact that such systems can identify, select, and engage a target without having a clear definition of what targets we are talking about. So this not only covers human beings, but also inanimate infrastructure. We do not find this to be fully correct. We believe that it is necessary in the Chapeau to have language that states that the carrying out of the functions of identification, selection and engagement of targets can be carried out with the mandatory causing of death to human beings. Because if we do not include this qualifier, then the definition will also cover cases when infliction of death did not happen or deaths did not happen and only infrastructure was damaged. And this goes beyond the mandate of this group and must be taken into consideration. This is why we suggest to include after the words engage a target, after the comma, after that language, to add language causing death to a person. On subparagraph A, We find this subparagraph as a very elegant balance that takes into account the concerns of all delegations and we would be ready to accept the language as it is presented here as a whole because as you said it's a very balanced text with a minor stylistic amendment In other words, the deletion at the end of this paragraph of the words 'by the system'. As far as the rest of the text is concerned, we are ready to accept subparagraph and in all of that, any attempts to introduce any changes or make amendments to this subparagraph will disrupt this delicate balance and will throw us back and we would really like to avoid that. On subparagraph we would be ready to accept this paragraph in the way that it is presented here to us with the understanding that the function of lethality, the criteria of lethality would be introduced in the chapeau of paragraph 25. and together these paragraphs would mutually complement each other and would present a very correct picture related to the characteristics of such weapon systems. Subparagraph c is something that we can also accept in the way you presented it to us right now. Now, in terms of the new proposal in subparagraph a, in terms of the introduction of the word specific before the words group of targets, we as a compromise would be ready to accept this addition if this will help us reach a consensus on paragraph 25. However, we would not be ready to include in the word specific before the words targets the group of specific targets because in that case we would once again create a problem and not solve a problem when as a target a whole set of group of targets could be considered as a target and in that case it would not be required to ensure the acquisition of each element of that group, but the very group could become a target against which the systems could carry out their functions without any intervention of a human operator. Thank you.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation for making explicit the position of his delegation. Thank you also for making proposals and indeed for underlining the importance of maintaining the balance within the text. I think, and also what you stated with regard to what I would still then call functionally integrated, I think we all more or less aim for the same purpose, including also what you meant, we now have the the challenge in reflecting it in words in the text. And I'm hopeful that we will be able to set the small steps that in the end will be the big step for humanity as you put forward. Next on my list is the ICRC to be followed by Sweden, Chile, Pakistan, Stop Killer Robots, the United Arab Emirates, China, and Brazil. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of the ICRC. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair, for giving us the floor. And the ICRC would first like to express appreciation to you, Chair, to your team, and the friends of the Chair as well for the hard work and the consultations on the draft report. We echo the comments that have already been made this morning by many distinguished representatives. We consider that the text reflects many constructive contributions that have been made by States parties and observers to date. In the context of this paragraph on characterization, 25, We consider it necessary that the group retains a broad characterization of autonomous weapon systems to capture all systems of concern. As it is currently formulated, paragraph 25 with subparagraphs A to C should therefore be understood as a package deal, and in our view, it cannot be diluted any further. We recall that international humanitarian law requires attacks may only be directed at specific military objectives. We therefore welcome your additional suggestions, Chair, in this regard, which make clear that the qualifier of specific is intended, as you have stated this morning, to apply to both target and group of targets. However, we would move the inserted specific to be after group rather than before it to make it clearer that it is the individual military objective that must be specific, even if it is grouped together physically with others. So the formulation could then read, determines the specific target or group of specific targets. Without this change, we do see a risk that group of targets could still be read as referring to a category or a class, such as tanks in general. And this interpretation would exclude weapons where a human selects a category or a class of targets such as tanks as part of the generalized target profile, even if the weapon system itself then selects the specific tank or object within that general category. This system in our view should definitely be included as an autonomous weapon system. I thank you, Chair.

I may thank the distinguished representative of the ICSC and now move to the distinguished representative of Sweden to be followed by Chile, but first Sweden, you have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. Sweden wishes to join others in appreciation of your continuous efforts in guiding our group to achieve our mandate on formulating a set of elements for an instrument. Sweden supports the draft report, which contains essential elements for laws and many of the additional suggestions. The draft report demonstrates that this group is capable of meeting its mandate and that the CCW remains the appropriate forum for laws. As to the characterization, Sweden recognizes the discussions and compromises made to arrive at the technology-neutral characterization that focuses on autonomy in critical combat functions. In our view, the characterization is fit for purpose, in particular with regard to the text in C that mentions future understandings and potential modifications, as well as exclusions or inclusions. Chair, Sweden supports para 25 and we find it logical to add specific before group in 25A as it appears in the Chair's additional suggestions.

I thank the distinguished

representative of Sweden and let me now pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Chile to be followed by the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom. by Pakistan and stop killer robots but first the distinguished representative of Chile.

Thank you chair. I'm grateful to Norway and to you for the work conducted up to now in leading this working group and we wish you very much success. As We said in the letter we're not giving general remarks, so we'll move straight to paragraph 25, which is on the screen, to say that Chile can support the wording here and the general approach of this paragraph that looks at the neutral basis. and the system for identifying, selecting and engaging a target without intervention by a human operating the system. For us, it is important to underscore that this characterisation is not restricted to systems that include artificial intelligence, and the fact that a system is included in this does not determine its application, nor should it be prohibited. This characterisation is separate to the post The subsequent discernment, we need to be careful that this aligns with international humanitarian law. In terms of paragraph A, we look at the second sentence that excludes the characterization of systems where we have a person planning or designing potential targets or specific targets. This distinction for us is crucial to differentiate or distinguish them from other automated systems, artificial intelligence, where engaging the target or identifying the target remains in human hands. We also support the first sentence that appropriately clarifies that human involvement in previous phases and prior early the early phases is not sufficient on its own to exclude the system from this characterization. As to, we support the clarification that it does not depend on the loss of life, such as damage to or destroy objects or cause injury. As to, we support the opportunity to continue in the future to evolve or include changes in our understanding that might exclude or include certain systems, depending on how relevant they are to our discussions.

I thank the distinguished representative from Chile for stating the position of the delegation. I will now move to the distinguished representative of Pakistan, to be followed by Ms Stokkerla Roberts. I will first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Pakistan.

Thank you, Chair. As this is the first time my delegation takes the floor this week, allow me to appreciate you and your stewardship and to assure you of Pakistan's full cooperation in the days ahead. Chair, let me set out briefly the approach Pakistan will bring to this week. This group has been at work for more than a decade, and the text on the table is the product of three years of concentrated effort. It reflects compromises made by every delegation in this room, including my own. Pakistan has accepted formulations we did not propose and would not have chosen because we understood that a text acceptable to all must contain something of everyone. We proceeded on the understanding that others did the same. Our first commitment this week, therefore, is to preserve that accumulated work. We will not seek to reopen settled questions, and we would ask that others exercise the same restraint. Our second commitment is to engage constructively on what genuinely remains open. Pakistan has done so in the informal format you convened, and we will continue to do so. where we can move toward another delegation without giving up substance, we will move. Pakistan seeks a consensus outcome and will work for one. A report that preserves the framework we have built. Prohibitions and regulations, human judgment and control, responsibility and accountability is what this group is asked to deliver. Chair, turning to para 25, Pakistan would begin by recalling what this paragraph is and is not. It is a characterization, not a definition. Its function is to describe the systems with which this instrument is concerned, to set the scope of our work. It does not by itself prohibit anything, permit anything or impose any obligation. The prohibitions and the regulations are elsewhere and it is there that the legal consequences attach. That distinction matters for how much weight the paragraph can bear. We have sometimes proceeded in this group as through every word of the characterization must be watertight before anything else can be agreed. Chair, it need not be, and in our respectful view, it cannot be. No arms control instrument in this convention began with a perfect description of its subject matter. Characterizations are refined through negotiation and through practice. Subpara says exactly this. The description is without prejudice to future understanding, to modification, and to the inclusion or exclusion of certain types of systems. Pakistan attaches importance to that subpara. It is what allows this group to adopt a working characterization now and to improve it in the negotiations that follow. What we would guard against is the opposite tendency, narrowing the characterization now in a search for precision to the point where systems of genuine concern are placed permanently beyond the reach of the instrument. With that framing, Chair, my delegation has one substantive observation on your clarifying suggestion. We understand intention and we do not oppose it in principle. but we would ask the group to consider how a specific group of targets will operate in practice. The first sentence of the paragraph A provides that determining a set of potential targets or characteristic therefore does not exclude a system from this characterization. That sentence is the heart of the paragraph. The second sentence excludes some systems where personnel determine the specific target or group of targets. In operational practice, groups of targets are determined by reference to characteristics. If a group so determined qualifies as a specific group of targets, then the second sentence undoes the first, and the characterization captures very little. Pakistan's preference would be to return to the formulation in your own March suggestion that the personal planning deciding upon or carrying out the attack chooses the specific target or targets to be engaged by the system. that achieves the intended purpose without opening the question of groups. Should the group prefer to refrain, retain the reference to the group of targets, Pakistan could accept the addition of specific to both limbs on the shared understanding, which we would ask to be reflected in this record, that a group determined solely by reference to target characteristics does not constitute a specific group of targets for the purpose of this sentence. Chair, permit me to concentrate about what is at stake. The systems this group has been most concerned with are precisely those given a broad target profile and released into an area where the machine, not the person, determines what within the profile is actually struck and when. Ammunition dispatched against a category of objects over a wide area and an extended period, selecting its own engagements, is the paradigm case. If a group defined by characteristics counts as a specific group of targets, that system fails outside this characterization altogether and with it the systems that give rise to our mandate. I thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan for elaborating on his position. Next on my list is Stop Killer Robots, to be followed by the United Arab Emirates and China. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Stop Killer Robots. You have the floor.

Over the past few years, we have seen significant progress in this forum. States have developed their common understanding of what autonomous weapon systems are. They have built common ground on the core measures that are needed to ensure meaningful human control over these systems and uphold international law. We would like to commend the continued efforts of you and your team to retain and reflect this progress while seeking consensus. The set of elements we have now as a result is a highly significant text. It gives a basis for effectively prohibiting and regulating autonomous weapons systems through a legally binding instrument. welcome the recognition in the joint statement delivered by Brazil that the current set of elements is a sufficient basis for negotiations on an instrument on lethal autonomous weapon systems. Over 70 states have since the September 2025 GGE expressed support for moving towards negotiations on the basis of the text the group has been discussing. We strongly urge states to preserve a text this week that fully reflects their work over the past three years and to resolve final issues in the context of the negotiations of a legal instrument. States must not accept the weakening of the core concepts of the removal of broad sections of the Elements in the name of consensus. It would be unacceptable to waste their work in this way. The Elements, if turned into rules, would still only be a bare minimum we need to see towards protecting civilians during armed conflict and defending existing legal principles in the context of increasing autonomy in weapon systems. They do not address the crucial issue of anti-personnel autonomous weapon systems. To make legal rules that truly represent a step forward to protect humanity, states will need to go further when negotiations commence. In the meantime, this final session of the GGE comes at a critical moment. Reports of the use and testing on the battlefield of systems that fall within the scope of autonomous weapons are rising, including of systems that could detect and kill people autonomously. There have also been reports of civilian casualties. We are not in a theoretical debate. Decisions made in this room will have a real impact on people living through war. We urge States to keep this at the top of their minds during this week's discussions and focus on finishing this mandate so that they can move forward to the next step at the review conference. Regarding paragraph 25, we believe this provides a workable characterization of autonomous weapon systems, despite the risk that paragraph 1 could be read unnecessarily restrictively. In this regard, we welcome the Chair's suggestion to insert in specific regarding the group of targets as well as the ICRC suggestions to clarify this insertion further to avoid potentially excluding systems that should fall under the scope of an instrument. Thank you, Chair.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Stop Killer Robots and now pass the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Arab Emirates to be followed by China, Brazil, India. But let me first pass the floor to the United Arab Emirates. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The United Arab Emirates would like to thank you for your continuous leadership and your excellent efforts, including in the intersessional period. With regards to paragraph 25, the UAE can support the general characterization, and we appreciate the efforts to make more clarity with regards to the lethal autonomous weapon systems in the context of CCW. With regards to the beginning of the paragraph, we can accept keeping the components that identify, select, and engage a target. It is part of the consensual wording. However, things need to be clear and coherent so that the characterization is functional and does not lead to a wider context or a lesser context. For paragraph A, it's important to distinguish between the design and program and with the actual attack or decision making that determines the target or a group of targets to be engaged by the system. In our opinion, this distinction is important and clarifies the degree of human intervention. It also means that prior human intervention in the programming or the design could by itself exclude the system from the characterization. At the same time, the situation could be different when the human being did determine the target or group of targets to be engaged. As for 25, we can support the current text, and we agree that the system cannot be excluded simply because it does not lead to loss of life. The damage or destruction of objects could also be a matter of concern for our group. As for paragraph We support keeping this approach. This is important, especially with the continuous technological developments. This version allows to reach more understanding or modify the characterization in the future, including the possibility of excluding or including certain types without prejudgment. We also have two comments on the text. First, we support the USA with regards to paragraph A to change determine to determines in order to have it grammatically linked to the personnel. Here we mean the persons who plan, decide upon, or carry out the attack, and not the system as a whole. Our second comment on C, and to make sure we are coherent, instead of the above description, we prefer to say the above characterization. because the whole paragraph uses the term characterisation'. In general, we believe that paragraph 25 provides a balanced basis to continue and to achieve convergence, and we prefer to keep the objective balance of this paragraph and we can look into any suggestion that would enhance this paragraph and not dilute it.

Thank you.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of the United Arab Emirates and now pass the floor to the distinguished representative of China to be followed by Brazil, India, Switzerland. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of China.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chinese delegation appreciates your excellent leadership over the past three years. China will continue to lend its support to your work. We do hope that under our mandate and at the last session, that all parties will demonstrate flexibility with regard to humanitarian concerns. and the necessary national defence. We need to strike a balance. Just as the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs has mentioned, we look forward to meaningful results at the end of this session. Let's turn to paragraph 25. On numerous occasions China has mentioned or pointed out that with regard to the scope of the discussion of laws, we must remember that the CCW is the framework that's within which we should discuss laws. The emerging technologies should not include those that have existed for long and those conventional weapons that are already regulated by international laws. Considering that technologies evolve, we must prevent from a too narrowed scope, which will lead to loopholes. In the meantime, we should prevent also from a too large scope, which will prevent the development of future technologies. Therefore, China believes that the current text in general, its structure, and including the exclusive clause of 25 is meaningful. In the meantime, regarding the following points, we have some views. On 25, The first sentence, the fact that a human being designs programs or otherwise determines a set of potential targets or characteristics thereof does not exclude the system from this characterization. This sentence is vague. It might include weapon systems with intervention of human beings, for example, missiles, they might be included in law's definition. To avoid ambiguity, China would like to suggest to delete this sentence. With regard to 25b, lethal China agrees with the Russian Federation the discussion at hand must follow our mandate to clarify that lethal that nature of being lethal is a characteristic which means it's related to the intention of design. The current text and its description might lead to misunderstanding on laws, i.e. it might lead to inclusion of weapons that do not belong to laws category. which means our discussion will be diluted. China wishes to suggest that at the beginning of this paragraph, we add that laws are designed to be used to kill people. and it has the capability of doing so, and this is the system of weapons system of laws. I thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of China for stating the positions of his delegation and commenting on the text. Let me recall here that In this text, we have more or less two packages. We have 25 and 25 Bravo, and we have in 25 Alpha, we have a first and then second sentence. I would strongly caution against removing elements of that because that would really tear apart the text. And I think words to that structure in that way have already also be spoken by others. We have to be extremely careful. And I'm also hesitant in talking about designed too. That would, it is in another protocol, but that is not the protocol that is above my bed at home as the most glamorous we have been drafting within the CCW. I have to be honest on that. Having said that, let us move forward. And next on my list is Brazil to be followed by India, Switzerland, and I have the INHR, yes, Denmark, Norway, Austria, Cuba, Israel, well, at that time probably lunchtime, but we will see. Let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Brazil. You have the floor, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Regarding the paragraph at hand on characterization, my delegation would like to say that we are comfortable in general with the formulation that you have proposed. We, however, still have a few concerns with regard to the second sentence of subparagraph 25a. Firstly, like other delegations before us, namely Russia, Pakistan and the ICRC, we also believe that the word specific should come after targets in that second sentence in order to avoid the potential conflict with what is said in paragraph and the first sentence of that subparagraph. Additionally, we understand that the language of the second sentence of 25A was designed to avoid capturing fire-and-forget weapons, which have existed for a long time. However, we believe that the current text entails the risk of excluding weapons that are able to be directed at specific targets but that might remain actively searching for such targets for long periods of time. during which the circumstances prevalent at the time of deployment might have substantively changed. This, in our view, is materially different from fire and forget weapons as they exist today, which operate for a relatively short time, thus allowing operators to have better awareness of the circumstances in which the actual engagement will occur. If loitering munition that is able to be directed at the specific target is able to loiter for hours or even days, the challenges associated with this type of systems will be effectively indistinguishable from those of autonomy. This is particularly concerning in the case of systems that are designed for anti-personnel use. For this reason, during the informal consultations, we have proposed a possible language fix for the second sentence of paragraph 25, subparagraph 25a, that would address this issue by highlighting the need for operators to also choose the circumstances of the engagement. This would be by adding at the end of the second sentence of paragraph 25A the following words, and the time and circumstances of the engagement. So the whole sentence would read, a system is not included in this characterization when the personnel planning deciding upon or carrying out the attack determines the specific target or group of specific targets to be engaged by the system and the time and circumstances of the engagement. I thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil for commenting on the text and making a concrete proposal. Next on my list is India, to be followed by Switzerland. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of India. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson, and good afternoon to all colleagues. Mr. Chair, first of all, on behalf of my delegation, I want to appreciate you for your hard and sincere work and also the manner, which is transparent and inclusive, which has helped steer our discussions at this stage. Let me also underlining that my delegation will engage constructively and we will offer you our full support for a meaningful and successful outcome of this group. And let me also briefly acknowledge the contributions of the ISU and the ODA in supporting our work. Mr. Chair, generally this work that we've achieved is a reflection of the hard work of all delegations built through years of discussion and innumerable compromises. And this has also benefited from the vast array of expertise that the group gets from diplomatic, legal, and technical side. Our view is that this work should not be lost and that we should demonstrate that CCW has the ability to build frameworks, normative regulatory frameworks, to address emerging technologies and the new weapon systems that are being produced. And I also want to underline that the IHL remains of primordial importance to my delegation, and the upholding of IHL is something that we take very seriously. And in that context, we appreciate your articulation of human element in the text in general, and the benchmark that you have suggested on human judgment and control, according to which we will implement the international humanitarian law in the context of lethal autonomous weapon systems. Now on the question of characterization, Mr. Chairperson, we believe that we are already on a very solid and robust foundation. We want to just say generally that our characterization should be not narrow because it might have loopholes, but at the same time it should not be too expansive that we lose focus on the primary systems that we seek to regulate. We have some technical edits to suggest. I will not enter into conceptual discussions. We've had those discussions in the past. First of all, on the aspect of lethality, we have known that there are different views on the term lethal and we have had prolonged discussions on that matter. However, thus far we have not been able to overcome these differences entirely. The best solution for us and I suppose for other delegations at this stage, given the paucity of time, is that we avoid expanding and elaborating the term lethal in the text. This problem is of course further compounded by the absence of an internationally agreed definition on the term, in particular in the context of armed conflict. Therefore, we suggest on and we insist on adding the words with lethal force after the word target in para 25 and with that insertion we are also flexible in deleting para 25b with para 25 having captured the element of lethality. Now on Para 25. My delegation principally supports the differentiation that you've done from nominal input to laws from an input that would effectively remove autonomy from lethal autonomous systems. The distinction between human inputs that identify potential targets on one side and specific targets or group of targets is a fundamentally sound differentiation. However, textually speaking, the first sentence is introduces several verbs and nouns. For instance, it uses the word designs, then it uses programs, and of course another word otherwise determines, and the noun is a set of potential targets. So our delegation is not clear about how design and program applies to set of potential targets. There is a lack of common interpretation around these terms. Our view is that this text can be simplified. For instance, with the use of a more general word, such as enable, which would cover all these terms. And the point is that it focuses on the task rather than how it is performed. Likewise, we also think that the first sentence on what is included can be made more uniform with the sentence two, which refers to what is excluded. And I'm making a reference to how the element of human and human being is referred, because in the first sentence we have a reference to human being. But in the second sentence we have a reference to personal planning deciding upon and carrying out the attack. So I think there's a room for more uniformity in these two sentences. My delegation has noted the differences on the term technological components. We heard the delegation of the US and they proposed a certain formulation which my delegation could consider supporting. On The reference to the word "designed to", we would just highlight, well this is not a red line for us, but we feel that the word "designed to" would be more appropriate. I also want to underline that the protocol three does not have a reference to "designed to" but a reference to "primarily designed to", which led to different views and litigation on that concern. So "designed to" is different from "primarily designed to", that would be submission from our delegation. And lastly, This is a point we have made, we have brought out in several discussions previously, and we have an important concern on preventing any possible impact of this effort that we are engaged in, in the GGE laws, on the peaceful use of emerging technologies. We have raised this point repeatedly. This is not only a concern for India, but a concern for many countries in the global south. This point becomes even more important because the characterization that we have makes reference to technological components of laws. So we are not talking only in the context of weapons but also on the integrated functioning of technological components. And these technological components are not weapon in and of themselves. Further, these are essentially dual use and they may have a variety of applications, in fact more applications for peaceful purposes than for military purposes. Therefore, the characterization and the measures outlined in this text should not hamper progress in civilian research and development in the use of these technologies. We have, of course, I want to further emphasize, in the GGE Laws reports already accomplished a number of understandings on the subject, for instance, the para 23 of the 2019 report as well as the para 16 of the 2017 report. Further, the Guiding Principle J also states very clearly that discussions and any potential policy measures taken within the context of CCW should not hamper progress in or access to peaceful uses of intelligent autonomous technologies. Mr. Chair, one of the reasons I have highlighted this again is because we feel that we could have another paragraph like CBIS, which captures the guiding principle J and of course we're willing to work with all delegations in finding a possible formulation that can address our concern as also the concern of many other delegations who have issues with regard to any impact on peaceful use of emerging technologies. With this, Mr. Chairperson, I will stop and we will continue to remain constructively engaged in these discussions. Thank you.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of India for stating the positions of his delegation and for formulating proposals. In a short reaction, I would say also what you said with regard to lethality, I already commented on that. earlier, we have to see the characterization really as a big package with two individual packages in it. So let's be careful what we take out of it because that could really harm the, I would say, growing consensus we have in the room. I'm listening very carefully to your proposals and I'm I attempted to look, um, at a few words in a way, but that's about what I probably can do, because if I would do more to the text, I would really harm the text. With regard to references to guiding principles, yes, we have a set of guiding principles and that remains always valid, I would say. Here we are, of course, drafting a set of elements of an instrument and that is a little bit of a different approach under the convention, I would say, but certainly it's good to have a discussion on that. Next on my ever getting longer list, I'm not going to read it out because otherwise we lose too much time. I now first have INHR to be followed by Denmark and Norway. But let me first pass the floor now to INHR. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. As a group enters its final session under its current mandate, INHR welcomes the progress reflected in the rolling text, particularly its efforts to translate the principle of human responsibility into practical measures for the development and use of lethal autonomous weapon systems. As an organization which has long conducted expert dialogues among leading AI weapon states, INHR has convened specialists over the past two years to analyze what meaningful human judgment and control requires as AI systems become increasingly capable and autonomous. The current text recognizes that the appropriate level of human judgment and control depends on the operational context and on the characteristics and capabilities of the weapons system as a whole. It identifies practical measures, including limits on autonomous operations, human authorization for substantial changes to mission parameters, and the ability to deactivate systems in a timely manner. These are essential safeguards to ensure human control. But increasingly capable AI systems raise a further challenge. Human control is not only about whether a person can intervene, it is also about whether that person can understand, supervise, and meaningfully direct a system whose behaviors may evolve over time. This challenge is becoming particularly important with agentic AI systems, which are systems capable of autonomous perception, memory, decision making, interaction, and execution. Based on our expert dialogue titled AIX Military, INHR has developed a risk reduction framework for agentic AI in the military comprising 25 guiding principles with recommendations to decision makers, practitioners, and system developers. Our framework begins with principles meant for maintaining human control. It calls for bounded authority, graduated mechanisms for human adjustment and override, meaningful oversight, safeguards for human judgment, and ensuring that operational intent remains with human commanders rather than migrating to machines. This last principle is particularly important. A system may remain nominally under human control, though pursuing objectives in ways that the commander did not intend, anticipate, or authorize. for agentic systems therefore meaningful human control requires safeguards against goal drift clearly defined mission boundaries and mechanisms that allow humans to slow pause modify or terminate autonomous activity when circumstances change the current rolling text also rightly emphasizes testing and evaluation our framework similarly treats testing not simply as a technical exercise but as a core governance mechanism agentic systems should be tested as complete interacting systems under realistic and variable operational conditions with particular attention to emergent behavior, system degradation, and the awareness that systems may possibly behave differently when they recognize that they are being evaluated. These considerations reinforce an important point for this group. Principles of human judgment and control will only be meaningful if they can be operationalized throughout the life cycle of a system. in design, procurement, testing, training, deployment, monitoring, and post incident learning. INHR's framework is intended as a practical contribution to that effort. We encourage states to review it on our website, INHR.org/AI. We hope it can support the GGE's work on how emerging principles can be translated into concrete risk reduction measures. Thank you.

And I thank the distinguished representative of INHR. And let me now pass the floor to Switzerland. I do apologize because you were higher on the list. I overlooked it on the list. So first Switzerland and then Denmark, Norway, Austria. But let me first pass now the floor to distinguished representative of Switzerland. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. No problem at all. I understand the dynamics of the speakers list and it's good. We thank you, Ambassador Indenbosch, your team and the ISU for the focused work after three years. Overall, the rolling text is a meaningful basis for moving forward. While Switzerland is ready to show flexibility as part of an overall package, we hope others will do the same and we are encouraged that we heard the words flexibility and compromise many times this morning. On paragraph 25, the present text is a carefully constructed balance and for us, a sound basis for moving towards negotiations next year. For Switzerland, the chapeau and subparagraphs A to C must be read as a package or as multiple packages. Having said this, we can be flexible on limited adjustments, namely on technical or scope neutral improvements. while being cautious of their cumulative effect, because taken together, small changes could upset the balance that we have achieved and remove significant systems from the scope of our considerations. On the specific points, on functionally integrated, we thought you had introduced an elegant solution, but here we can be flexible if certain tweaks bring us closer to consensus. on lethality and introducing lethality in the CHAPO, adding with lethal force causing death would create new interpretive boundaries. Switzerland strongly favours retaining the existing package CHAPO and 25B. On 25A, like others, we note that A specific group of targets could be rather broad, for example, all tanks in a populated area over an extended period of time. And we therefore, like the ICRC and others, have a preference for a group of specific targets. We also support the concrete proposal by Brazil a moment ago, which would add, quote, time and circumstances of engagement at the end of 25A. On designed to, just briefly, as a previous speaker had brought it up, we would caution against replacing the present functional formulation with designed to, which could unnecessarily narrow the scope by shifting attention from what the system can actually do to its stated design purpose. Finally, and back to a more general point, we want to end by stressing that paragraph 25 is a working characterisation, not the final scope provision of a future instrument. Let us move to negotiations to do that. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Switzerland for stating the positions of his delegation and commenting, and indeed this is a working characterisation and we have to be careful not to make better the enemy of good, but on the other hand there are legitimate concerns about certain texts, so we have to look into that also. I have Denmark, Norway, Austria and perhaps we can also have Cuba before the lunch break, but let's have a look. Let me first pass the floor to distinguished representative of Denmark. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. As it is the first time our delegation is taking the floor, we would initially like to thank you for your chairmanship and for your efforts in preparing this meeting. We would also like to join others in expressing our sincere condolences to the delegation of Norway for the recent passing of King Harald. Our intervention will be brief. My delegation would like to voice our support for the Chair's additional suggestions on subsection A, including the formulation in para 25. We recognize the careful compromises that have been made in drafting this text and consider the text to provide a sound and sufficient basis for a characterization on laws in line with our mandate, that is to consider and formulate by consensus instead of elements of an instrument without prejudging its nature. My delegation will continue to engage constructively and we reiterate our support for you and your work. Thank you, Chair.

And I thank the distinguished representative of Denmark. Let me now pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Norway to be followed by Austria. But first, the distinguished representative of Norway, you have the floor.

Thank you, Chair, and thank you to your team and ISU for your continued hard work to bring this GGE to successful In the interests of time, I will go straight to the matter at hand, but I would like to start by expressing our appreciation to delegations for their words of condolence on the passing of King Harald V this past Friday. On paragraph 25 of the draft final report, we believe that the characterisation is pretty close. At the same time, we would like to note that the characterisation in the rolling text of 5 June and now in this draft report is, in our view, a marked step back from the previous version. We believe that the working definition of LULs should remain as broad as possible. The characterisation itself does not create any obligations; it merely draws the boundaries for what we are looking at, as we have commented on in the past as well. For us, it was a big concession to move from identification being an alternative characteristic of laws to being part of a cumulative list with selection and engagement. We could live with this in light of the inclusion inside paragraph A, which made clear that the fact that a human operator sets parameters of the target does not exclude the weapon system from the category of laws. With the addition of the second sentence in subparagraph a, the scope is narrowed down again and we believe that systems which can automatically identify, select and engage targets merit consideration in this instrument even if an operator should have determined the specific target or group of targets for the system. Even such systems, if they for instance have a very long run time and/or a wide geographical area of operation, they raise concerns relating to the role of the human or human judgment and control, if you will. We believe that how we deal with such systems is better addressed in the operational parts of the future instrument. We understand, however, that it is important to some delegations to avoid, as much as possible, the characterisation covering existing systems that have largely not been controversial, for instance, close-in weapon systems and certain kinds of fire-and-forget munitions. We do not think that including such systems in the characterisation would be problematic, because they simply do not raise particular concerns with respect to human judgement and control. However, we accept the need to strike a balance in order to finally land a working characterisation that can provide much-needed focus for future endeavours to establish an instrument on laws. Striking that balance means that we will not cover all systems that are of concern, but in return we cover many of the most concerning ones. We take comfort in sub-paragraph, which reminds us that we may revisit the characterisation in future discussions, being mindful that, once a ceiling has been set, it is hard to change. We think that it is better to err on the side of broadness at this stage than to be too narrow. As the regulations take shape in the future, it will be easier to caveat and narrow down the definition at that stage than it is to broaden it up. All this is to say that we can more or less live with paragraph 25, as the expression of a hard-fought compromise. We believe that the way the two sentences in paragraph 25 operate in relation to each other is not entirely clear, yet we think that this falls into the category of constructive ambiguity that we can address in our future work. As we understand it, the second sentence implies that systems with a concrete highly individualised targets or groups of such individual targets have been preselected by the operator in advance, they fall outside the scope. We agree with your proposal, chair, to render this clearer by adding the word specific in relation to groups of targets in the second sentence, but like others, we would prefer that the order be as follows, group of specific targets. And we noted also with interest the Brazilian suggestion to add time and circumstances of the engagement at the end of sentence number two in 25A. We'll chew a bit on that over lunch, but it sounds like a promising clarification to us. On the South African proposal a bit earlier today to write positive identification in the shape of paragraph 25. I think we agree with the sentiment, but our concern with that is that it risks narrowing the definition down to only those systems which are able to positively identify a target, and this is certainly something that should be required of laws. But if a system is not able to operate with that degree of fidelity, then we think there is all the more reason to be concerned, and for that reason we believe that such systems should be covered by the characterisation. Lastly, on the various proposals regarding lethality, to include wording such as causing death to a person in paragraph 25A or that laws are designed to kill or to be able to kill humans, this is not something that we support and I'll explain why. In the explanation of those proposals, it was stated that if we did not include this language, then also cases where deaths did not ensue would be covered by the definition and we think that that should be the case. First of all, we think that the term lethal in laws at the most describes a capacity and not an effect. Second, we do not think it would be a practical approach with the definition pursuant to which the question of whether a weapon is a laws or not is only possible to determine after the weapon has been fired and its effects are known. As regards the proposal to include language on design intent, If we were to include such language, we would effectively narrow down the definition of laws to cover only anti-personnel systems. The question of how we deal with such systems has been a topic that the GGE has discussed a lot in previous times, with many advocating an outright ban, but that is by no means the only one. Moreover, design intent is a very fickle thing to prove. Most weapon systems are not designed specifically to kill human beings. They are designed to cause some kind of kinetic effect, which may be used for different purposes. So as we see it, lethality is well covered in our characterization already through the word lethal in lethal autonomous weapon systems, which provides, as we see it, a lot of intuitive guidance and doesn't need much by way of explanation. And then we have paragraph 25b, which indirectly underscores the point by clarifying that even if death is not the outcome, the weapon is instead used to destroy or injure, it does not lose its status as laws. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Norway to reflect on the text in making proposals. Next on my list is Austria, to be followed by Cuba. Let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Austria. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. We are grateful to you, Ambassador, for your leadership and to the ISU for their support. We consider the additional suggestions put forward by you, Chair, on para 25 a careful, balanced approach. It means making concessions for us, as for many, and we are ready to do so and consider this as a package or packages, as you elaborated, Chair. We agree with those who suggest replacement of specific and to refer to a group of specific targets rather than a specific group of targets. We see this as a means of clarification of the underlining understanding that group of targets would not be understood to be referring to a broad class of targets among which the systems could be able to select from. We see this as a point of clarification rather than a new proposal. We continue to be of the view that lethal is not a category of IHL. Therefore, in our view, it's not feasible and also not necessary to add lethal to autonomous weapon systems, but we've always been flexible on this point and can support the Chair's proposal. But we do not support any further narrowing the scope of the current characterization. We see a need for the characterization to remain broad and to reflect the broad scope of IHL. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Austria and let me now pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Cuba. You have the floor.

Thank you very much, Chair. At the outset, I would like to express our condolences to the delegation of Norway related to the passing of King Harald. Now, Paragraph 25 is a good foundation for our discussions. We'd like to make some specific proposals. At the outset, my delegation agrees with a general focus to characterize laws on the basis of the combination of technological components that are functionally integrated that make it possible to identify, select, engage a target without intervention by human operator. But the current text is not. enough to ensure meaningful human control, especially for systems that integrate AI. This text establishes that information about characteristics does not exclude certain systems, and the most determining element is the human operator that identifies and determines a target or a group of specific targets, and we believe that this criteria is sufficient but not sufficient. The determination of a specific target or a group of specific target during the phase of planning does not guarantee meaningful human control during the selection and target engagement, especially when the system operates in dynamic environment or with broad parameters for the definition of a target. We hope that the paragraph can include explicitly the concept of meaningful human control and judgment throughout the life cycle of the system, including design, activation, selection, and attack. As additional criteria to have any exclusions of systems. Now, in the subparagraph that characterizes laws should not depend on whether the use leads to the loss of human life, damage to objects, as well as we have to also include harm in line with the principles of IHL. Thirdly, in subparagraph c, Cuba, supports that this characterization is understand with prejudgment of any future understandings we may achieve. We insist that in this exercise of characterizations, we should not turn it to end in itself or avoid the negotiation of a legally binding instrument that prohibits legally lethal autonomous weapon systems. Finally, Chair, I would like to reiterate that no technical characteristics should legitimize the development and use of systems that will replace human control or judgment related to decisions related to life or death. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba for sharing the positions of his delegation commenting on the text. got a little bit extra time from the interpreters, so I'm grateful for that. And of course, we then have to make the best use of it. So let me now pass the floor to the representative of Israel to be followed by Peru. But first, Israel.

Thank you so much, Chair, and good morning, almost noon, colleagues. Mr. Chair, as this is the first time my delegation is taking the floor, please allow me to thank you, your team and the Secretariat for all the hard work and the efforts to reach common ground and achieve a consensus of a substantial final report this week. Regarding paragraph 25th, in our view, this paragraph has moved in a positive direction and we appreciate some of the changes that have been made to the text. welcome the effort to refine the formulation and to clarify the characterisation of loss. However, we still have some concerns with the text. Regarding the first paragraph, we remain concerned with the following issues. Firstly, as we have previously mentioned, we do not fully understand the practical meaning of functionally integrated and are concerned that it broadens the definition beyond a clarity Sorry, very clearly identifiable weapon system to external components that are not actually part of the system. The current text does not sufficiently reflect the fact that weapon system often rely on a large amount of information and external inputs that are not inherently part of the system. This concern becomes even more pronounced with the addition of the term functionally before integrated at the risk broadening the definition loosely capture connected elements based on functionality alone, and this is problematic. That is why we suggest replacing the term functionally integrated with their integral before technological components. This will help create a definition that is clear, practical, and does not unintentionally include elements that are not actually part of the weapon system. Therefore, the sentence could read, A lethal autonomous weapon system can be characterized as a combination of one or more weapons and their integral technological components. Alternatively, Chair, we call positively consider the proposal by the US delegation this morning in this regard. Furthermore, as eloquently expressed by the representative of India and previously stated by my delegation, we suggest replacing the word can with its design too, in light with common terminology and international law applicable to weapons, including in the context of the CCW. There is a reason why definitions of weapons are based on design, as it better reflects what the intended use of weapons systems is, which is a crucial element in defining and reviewing weapons. Furthermore, we believe it is helpful to maintain language that has been already agreed upon by states in the context of the CCW protocols, and this ensures clarity and facilitates implementation. We believe these modifications will be helpful in progressing towards a more accurate characterization of laws. We also agree with statements made by other delegations such as the US and others regarding the need to reflect the notion of lethality in the characterization paragraph. In our view, the clearest way to do so will be to add "with lethal force" after "identify, select and engage a target", thereby ensuring that the characterization remains focused on lethal autonomous weapon systems. Regarding 25a, we see great value in this paragraph and we think the inclusion of both sentences in the paragraph is very important as they form a coherent package, as you said, Chair. The first clarifies what falls in the characterisation, while the second provides the necessary safeguard by excluding the situation in which humans select the specific targets. However, there is one element that is problematic in our view and is particularly important for the clarity of the characterization. In the first sentence in paragraph 25a, we would prefer to revert to the previous language suggested by the Chair, which stated, "The fact that a human being designs programs or otherwise determines a set of characteristics of potential targets does not exclude the system from this characterization." In our view, the new text, which refers to a set of potential targets or characteristics thereof, creates confusion as it is unclear what the setting of potential targets actually means and seems too similar to the reference of determining the specific targets or group of specific targets that is found in the second sentence of this paragraph. It is clear that there is consensus that when a human exercises judgment and selects the target for a weapon system, this is not a lethal autonomous weapon system. However, the phrase determining a set of potential targets could be interpreted to refer to this exact situation. Therefore, we will suggest framing the issue in terms of a set of characteristics of potential targets. This should help to clarify that we are not including systems that merely execute an attack based on human selected targets, but rather situations where human selected the characteristics of the potential targets and then the system identifies, selected and engage the target autonomously. Finally, regarding the chair's proposed placement for specific before group, we had previously been unclear as to the added value of this formulation and had therefore preferred to revert to the previous text. Having said that, and having heard the chair's explanation, we are prepared to show flexibility on this point in the interest of reaching consensus. Thank you, chair.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Israel for commenting on the proposals made and making suggestions. I would now like to pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Peru, and that's then the last on the list.

You have the floor.

Peru recognises your role as chair of this group of experts over the past three years and we welcome the plan set forth in your letter of the 27th of August with a view to focusing our work in this last decisive week. We believe that paragraph 25 relating to the characterisation of lethal autonomous weapons systems provides sufficient definition and appropriate characteristics, the scope of this paragraph should not be reduced further. As such, we believe that it should be preserved. In connection with the suggestion in the chapeau made by a delegation regarding the functions We remain flexible and open to reviewing this as long as it does not alter the balance that has been struck in the two packages that you referred to a few moments ago. Generally speaking, we urge all delegations to be very mindful of this balance in trying to draft more text at these final moments of our work. Regarding sub-paragraph, my delegation supports the addition that you made, but is also flexible as to the alternative proposal expressed by a number of delegations, as well as by the ICRC. And we also are interested in Brazil's proposal, which suggests including at the end of this sub-paragraph, language relating to the moment and the circumstances.

I thank the distinguished representative of Peru for sharing the views of his delegation. I will now look at the list for the afternoon. We have Germany, Panama, Nigeria, Ireland, Colombia, Bangladesh, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand. That is for the time being for this afternoon. We keep carefully listening to delegations and, at the same time, doing some work. Of course, we have to gather your views, so we still have a number outstanding. In the meantime, we will start informal consultations with around the room and work is being done to do some tweaks in the text. I say tweaks because I'm afraid that if we do more, we will make progress in the opposite direction. I think we have to reduce divergences, narrow down divergences and not create new ones. So I'm afraid for those of you who have high expectations with regard to changes, moderate your expectations with regard to that. But you can draw your own conclusions also if you have listened carefully to the statements of other delegations. Then, before we break for lunch, let me kindly inform you of the side event today organized by Stop Killer Robots on humanitarian and rights concerns, humanitarian and rights concerns, unaddressed key issues for future multilateral negotiations. This side event will focus on the impact of autonomous weapons systems on people, their rights and dignity. This side event is open to all and will be held today from 1.15 to 2.30 in room Concordia 1 in building A of the Palais des Nations. So today, 1.15 to 2.30, room Concordia 1 in building A. I thank you for your attention and we will resume at 3.00. Minister Ntaryi.