Terrorism and Maritime Insecurity: Collective Efforts to Counter Terrorism in the maritime domain (Counter-Terrorism Week Side Event)

Excellencies, distinguished delegates, partners, and guests, good afternoon. I warmly welcome you to this Sea Week side event entitled Terrorism and Maritime Insecurity: Collective Efforts to Counter Terrorism in the Maritime Domain. This side event examines evolving terrorist threats in the maritime domain, including the misuse of maritime routes, ports, and critical infrastructure, as well as challenges posed by emerging technologies and transnational risks. It seeks to reinforce international cooperation and information sharing, identify gaps and good practices, and explore measures to prevent and counter terrorist activities at seas while enhancing maritime security and the resilience. These side events will be livestreamed and recorded. In addition, a web story will be published featuring links to the livestream, photos from the event, and any remarks and presentations that can be shared. Please be sure to visit our website regularly for updates. We will also share highlights across our social media platforms, including X, LinkedIn, Facebook, and Instagram. If you are not already following us, we encourage you to do so to stay informed. May I kindly request all online participants to keep their microphones and cameras switched off unless they are speaking. Without further ado, I'm pleased to invite Her Excellency Natasha Mali, Permanent Representative of Malta to the United Nations, to deliver her statement. Excellencies, if you are ready, you have the floor.

Thank you very much, Madam Moderator, for the floor. Assistant Secretary General, Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, it is my pleasure to welcome you today on behalf of the Republic of Malta to this side event on terrorism and maritime insecurity, collective efforts to counter terrorism in the maritime domain. At the outset, I would like to thank our partners and co-organizers, Greece, the Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate, the United Nations Office of Counterterrorism, and the International Maritime Organization for their excellent cooperation in bringing this important discussion together. For Malta, a Mediterranean island state, For our state, the maritime domain is not simply an economic lifeline. It is central to our security, prosperity, and connectivity with the rest of the world. We therefore have a particular interest in ensuring that the seas remain safe, secure, and governed by international law. This commitment is deeply rooted in Malta's longstanding contribution to maritime governance, which dates to the vision of Ambassador Arvid Pardo. His concept of the oceans as the common heritage of mankind has helped shape the discussions that led to UNCLOS, but it also remains highly relevant today. It reminds us that the security of the maritime domain is a shared responsibility. Today, that responsibility extends beyond safeguarding freedom of navigation and maritime commerce, While maritime transport continues to facilitate the overwhelming majority of global trade, we must also recognize that the maritime domain remains vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists and organized criminal networks. Terrorists have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to adapt to changing circumstances, exploit gaps in governance, and take advantage of emerging technologies. As highlighted in the concept note, maritime routes, vessels, ports, and critical infrastructure may be used not only as targets but also as enablers of terrorist movement, logistics, and support activities. Addressing these challenges requires a truly comprehensive approach. Maritime security can no longer be viewed in isolation from border management, counterterrorism, organized crime, sanctions enforcement, critical infrastructure protection, and technological innovation. Effective responses depend on stronger cooperation between governments, international organizations, law enforcement authorities, border agencies, maritime actors, and the private sector. In this regard, Malta attaches particular importance to the Valletta Principles on Comprehensive and Integrated Counterterrorism Strategies, developed together with CITED and launched in Malta in 2025. These principles underline the importance of whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, stronger coordination between security, border management, and criminal justice actors, protection of critical infrastructure, and enhanced public-private partnerships in addressing evolving terrorist threats. These principles are equally relevant in the maritime domain, where no single authority can address the challenge alone. So, colleagues, today's discussion provides an important opportunity to identify vulnerabilities, exchange good practices, and explore how we can collectively reduce maritime domain blindness while strengthening our ability to prevent terrorist exploitation of maritime routes and infrastructure. I look forward to a rich and productive discussion and thank all participants for their engagement. Thank you.

Thank you, Ambassador Melly, for your valuable remarks. I now have the pleasure of inviting Ms. Natalia Gilman, Assistant Secretary General and Executive Director of CTIT, to deliver her statement. Madam Gelman, you have the floor.

Thank you very much, dear Madam Moderator, Your Excellency Ambassador Malley, Your Excellency Ambassador Caron, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen. It is indeed great pleasure to open this side event today on terrorism and maritime maritime insecurity. And I would like to thank our co-organizers, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Malta, United Nations Office of Counterterrorism, and International Maritime Organization, for advancing this timely and important agenda. The maritime domain is vital to global trade and stability, and yet increasingly exploited by terrorists and organized crime. They use shipping routes to move people and resources and target critical infrastructure such as ports, offshore installations, and undersea systems. And at the same time, technological advances including unmanned systems, cyber tools, and sophisticated logistics are expanding the reach and capabilities of terrorist actors into maritime and even subsurface domains. Maritime insecurity represents a critical and inseparable component of our collective security. However, significant gaps persist. CTAD's assessments indicate that maritime security is often insufficiently integrated into national counterterrorism frameworks. Information sharing remains uneven, and ports and maritime infrastructure are not consistently treated as critical assets. These weaknesses create vulnerabilities with serious implications for international peace and security. Addressing this challenge requires a shift in approach. No state, regardless of its capacity or geography, can secure the maritime domain alone. Maritime routes connect all regions, and vulnerabilities in one area can have global repercussions. Even landlocked states are affected when insecure maritime pathways facilitate the movement of terrorists and illicit goods. Cooperation is therefore indispensable. We must strengthen collaboration at national, regional, and international levels, including through whole-of-government approaches that bring together law enforcement, border management, maritime authorities, intelligence services, and the private sector. Partnerships with relevant international and regional organizations— as well as industry stakeholders are equally essential. At the core of effective cooperation is information sharing. Timely, accurate, and actionable information is critical to detect threats, prevent attacks, and disrupt terrorist activity. This includes sharing data on passengers and crew, enhancing maritime domain awareness, and integrating terrorism-related intelligence into maritime risk assessments. Without robust information flows, even the most advanced security systems will fall short. We must also continue strengthening the normative and operational frameworks underpinning maritime security. International instruments provide an essential foundation, but their effectiveness depends on consistent implementation. Supported by capacity building, technical assistance, and sustained political commitment. And in this context, CTAD remains committed to supporting member states through assessments, dialogue, and facilitation of technical assistance. We work to identify gaps, share good practices, and promote integrated approaches that embed maritime security within broader counterterrorism strategies. This event provides an important opportunity to advance practical solutions. Our shared goal is very clear: to ensure that maritime routes and infrastructure can no longer be exploited by terrorists, and that our collective responses are coordinated, proactive, and resilient. I thank you for your kind attention. And let me please, on behalf of all of us, welcome Her Excellency Ms. Aglaia Balta, Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations. And once again, Madam Ambassador, on behalf of all of us organizers of this event, I thank you very much for your cooperation and partnership in preparing and conducting this timely dialogue. Thank you very much.

Thank you, ASG Gelman, for your constructive remarks. I'm pleased to invite Her Excellency Aglaya Belka, Permanent Mission of Greece to the United Nations, to deliver her opening remarks. Excellencies, you have the floor.

Thank you, thank you so much. And first of all, I would like to apologize for my delay. Today, New York traffic reminds us of the High-Level Week traffic, and it's because of FIFA. Distinguished colleagues, I wish to thank the head of the Madrid Program Office of UNACT, Ignacio Ibáñez, Assistant Secretary-General and Executive Director of TED, Ms. German, Representatives of the International Maritime Organization, as well as my good colleague and friend, Permanent Representative of Malta, Ambassador Meli, for their leadership in advancing maritime security in the UN counter-terrorism efforts. Maritime security can no longer be viewed solely through a sectoral lens. It has become an essential component of the global security architecture. In an increasingly complex and asymmetrical threat landscape, safeguarding freedom of navigation and maritime security is indispensable to the maintenance of international peace and security. The maritime domain remains a cornerstone of international trade and economic development, facilitating the movement of energy, food, and essential goods across continents. Maritime activities continue to rapidly expand, and to do so— and so do the threats posed by the terrorist groups and transnational criminal networks exploiting vulnerabilities of maritime and counterterrorism frameworks. Terrorist attacks against commercial shipping, ports, and other critical maritime infrastructure jeopardize freedom of navigation, disrupt global supply chains, undermine confidence in international maritime routes, and cause severe humanitarian and environmental consequences for coastal communities. In addressing these challenges, strong cooperation among states, international and regional organizations, and the private sector remains indispensable. Close partnership, including with the International Shipping Industry, supported by a comprehensive and coordinated approach, are essential to strengthening resilience, and ensuring a secure maritime domain. In this context, new and emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, are playing an increasingly important role. Innovation should be an integral part of maritime security strategies based on international law, including respect for human rights. Reinforcing real-time information sharing mechanisms and communication networks, strengthening cybersecurity in port management systems, and advancing navigation technologies are essential steps to better prevent, deter, and respond, respond to complex threats and build resilience. As we recently celebrated the Day of the Seafarer, we must not forget that seafarers are among the first to bear the human cost of attacks against commercial shipping. Ensuring their safety and well-being should remain at the heart of our efforts. For Greece, home to the world's largest merchant fleet and a nation whose History and prosperity are inseparable from the sea. Maritime security is not an abstract policy objective. It is a strategic imperative. We remain firmly committed to safeguarding maritime security and contributing to collective efforts to assure safe, secure, and open seas for all. I thank you.

Thank you, Ambassador Belta, for your insightful opening remarks. Please note a change in the agenda. Acting Under-Secretary-General Zoueif regrets that he is unable to attend, and I now have the pleasure of inviting Mr. Ignacio Ibañez, Head of the UNOCT Office in Madrid, to deliver his statements. Mr. Ibanez, you have the floor.

Thank you very much. As it was said, I will deliver these remarks on behalf of Mr. Alexander Zouev, Acting Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Office of Counterterrorism. Your Excellency Ambassador Aglaia Balta, Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations. Your Excellency Ambassador Natasha Melly, Permanent Representative of Malta to the United Nations, Ms. Natalia Gerdemann, Assistant Secretary General and Executive Director, Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen. I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the governments of Greece and Malta for their partnership in convening this side event and acknowledge our close and valued collaboration with CTED and the IMO. The maritime domain has long been a cornerstone of global stability and prosperity, supporting the transport of over 80% of global trade and underpinning the economic lifelines of nations. Yet, as member states strengthen counterterrorism measures in the aviation sector, terrorists are increasingly threatening maritime critical infrastructure and exploiting maritime routes for the transit of terrorist operatives, weapons, and illicit goods and substances. Gaps in maritime security are being actively tested and exploited. Strengthening our collective ability to prevent and counter terrorist threats in the maritime domain is therefore a security imperative and a shared responsibility. The multilateral response must be adaptive, coordinated, and forward-looking. The United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism is committed to supporting Member States through comprehensive capacity-building programs aligned with the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. These efforts are highly relevant to the maritime domain. For instance, The multi-entity United Nations Counterterrorism— Terrorist Travel Programme, led by UNOCT, has enabled the processing of tens of millions of passenger data records and supporting early identification of threats. Expanding such approaches to maritime transport, enabling the collection and analysis of vital information on maritime passengers and crew, is an urgent priority. Similarly, the UN Global Programme on Countering Terrorist Threats against Vulnerable Targets supports Member States in protecting ports, maritime facilities, underwater cables, and energy infrastructure such as offshore platforms from terrorist attacks. These efforts are essential to ensure resilience across interconnected global supply chains and coastal economies. UNOCT's programming reflects a need for integrated, whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, bringing together security operators, policymakers, private sector operators and security companies, as well as international partners. Excellencies, this side event is intended to urge greater focus on countering terrorism in in the maritime domain, including enhanced cooperation, strengthened legal and policy frameworks, and the effective use of technology and data. As we look ahead, sustained political commitment and collective action is needed across regions, sectors, and institutions to ensure that maritime domain and maritime routes remain pathways for prosperity, not avenues for exploitation by terrorists. I thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Ibanez, for your informative remarks. This concludes the opening sessions. I thank the Excellencies for their opening remarks. We will now move to the panel discussion. May I kindly remind all participants that we must conclude the meeting at 2:45. I would therefore be grateful if speakers could keep their intervention within the allotted time. It's my pleasure to invite Mr. John Philip Moran, Senior Legal Office at CTIT, to moderate the discussion. I invite the panel to take the podium. Please allow us a moment to make the change.

Okay, good afternoon, distinguished guests, colleagues, and participants joining us here at the United Nations. And online. Welcome to this panel discussion on terrorism and maritime insecurity, collective efforts to counter terrorism in the maritime domain. It's a privilege to moderate this timely and important conversation. As highlighted in the concept note, the maritime domain is central to global prosperity carrying over 80% of world trade and supporting the livelihoods of billions of people worldwide. At the same time, it remains vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists and organized criminal networks, whether for movement, logistics, or targeting critical infrastructures. Today's discussion brings together a distinguished group of experts to explore how we can better understand evolving threats, close critical gaps, and strengthen cooperation across legal, policy, and operational levels. We will also examine how innovation, data, and partnership can enhance our collective ability to safeguard this vital domain. I encourage a dynamic and interactive exchange guided by the key questions outlined for this session, and I invite all participants to actively engage during the discussion and Q&A. As we have a full agenda today, I kindly ask all participants to keep their intervention within the allocated time. In the event insufficient time is available during the Q&A session to hear from all participants wishing to take the floor, please submit your statement to the Master of Ceremony so that it can be posted on the event website. Thank you for your cooperation. With that, let me now turn to our panelists. And I now would like to give the floor to Mr. Georgios Christianos, Rear Admiral, Hellenic Coast Guard, Director of Operational Division in the Hellenic Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Insular Policy, who will participate via VTC. Admiral, how important is international intelligence sharing in detecting individuals who may attempt to conceal terrorist affiliation within mixed migration flows? Sir, you have the floor.

Good evening from Greece. Good evening from Piraeus, from Hellenic Coast Guard Headquarters. Yes, this is Rear Admiral Giorgos Christianos. I'm the head and the responsible admiral for all the operations in the operational division from Hellenic Coast Guard. And on behalf, of course, of Commandant of Hellenic Coast Guard, I would like to thank you very much for this invitation. And I will continue now with a short presentation according to maritime security in the Greek maritime domain, which is a very, very sensitive area. I would specific particularities. The Greek maritime domain, first of all, has a huge coastline which is almost 16,000 kilometers. We are very famous for the, for the big number of islands, more than 6,000 islands, and the incidents which they used to take place in our responsibility area. Uh, many, many, many, many incidents, of course. And as Greece, as Hellenic Coast Guard, we are obliged to take the proper action for all these incidents. Hellenic maritime domain is a crossroad of three continents, and we have heavy traffic with thousands of vessels sailing boats, fishing boats, and they are passing from our responsibility area annually. For this reason, we can find out that we have many incidents with illegal migration, first of all, for at least 15 years now. And especially the last 10 years, yes, increased numbers of migration flows. They used to depart from east or from south, and of course the destination for all these migration flows are the Greek islands. In any case, as Hellenic Coast Guard, we used to take the proper action in order to control all these migration flows, and at this moment I would like to thank our neighbors from east Turkey because with this very close cooperation which we have with the Turkish authorities, we have the opportunity for at least 6 years now to control all these migration flows. Let me say that behind from this phenomenon, we do not have only migrants, but of course we have many cases with the terrorists, and we ought of course to find solutions for this, for these cases. Except of the illegal migration, we have also human trafficking and many cases with the victims. And what else we have? Incidents with the ships, vessels, sailing boats, or merchant ships which they used to, let's say, carry drugs and arms. And for this case, of course, as Hellenic Coast Guard, we have the opportunity to detect these suspicious vessels, and whenever it is necessary, we used to take action against all of them. And last but not least, of course, we have the hybrid and cyber threats. We have critical maritime infrastructures in Greece, and the majority of them, of course, are the some specific ports. I will start from with the port of Piraeus, which is the Greece's largest port, and especially from this port of Piraeus, the majority of the vessels used to depart from the capital, from Athens, from Piraeus, and the destination are the all Greek islands. And another very important, let's say, critical maritime infrastructure is the port of Thessaloniki. Which has a strategic, let's say, position for the port serving for all the Balkan region. And we have the port of Alexandroupolis for energy supply. According to the energy infrastructures, we have the LNG terminals, the subsea cables, the natural gas pipelines, and oil installations. And as Helenikoskar, we do our best in order to success the proper monitoring and surveillance of all these infrastructures and of course for all our Hellenic maritime domain. How we manage to do something like that? By using first of all the national Integrated surveillance system which we have in Greece with many radars and thermal cameras, and they located established in specific islands in order of course to success the proper monitoring of all this huge area. What else we have? The AIS monitoring, and by using the AIS monitoring we have the tracking vessels identity, the course for all of them, the speeds in in real time, and we know exactly what's going on in our maritime domain. We have, of course, the satellite observations, the intelligence gathering, and risk analysis whenever it is necessary. According to the role of the Hellenic Coast Guard, we used to participate in counter-terrorism policy, and due to, let's say, this, to this search and rescue region which we have, which is more than 1,150,000 square kilometers, we have many search and rescue incidents. For this reason, we provide the proper search and rescue operations to provide the proper assistance to all people who are in danger at sea, and we collect an exploitation of intelligence. We have, of course, the port security and, as I mentioned before, the proper surveillance of all the maritime borders. And don't forget that our borders, of course, are the European borders. Last but not least, we have the countering of the illegal activities at sea. We need assistance. We need cooperation in order to have positive results for all this action. Except of the interagency cooperation which we have with all the Hellenic, the rest of Hellenic authorities, we have a very close cooperation, as I told you before, with Turkey, especially for the illegal migration. It is very important for us. And statistics and numbers always say the truth. And believe me, we would not— we didn't have— we will not have the opportunity, let's say, to decrease all these migration flows without this close cooperation with our neighbors. What else we have? Daily cooperation and communication with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, with Frontex, with Europol, of course, with joint action. Which we used to take a change to the organized maritime crime, of course with NATO and with the, with the International Maritime Organization. According to the challenges during the future, and especially for the next decade, yes, we ought to take the proper action. We are obliged to take the proper action to protect for all the subsea cables and the energy installations. For the port, say, cybersecurity resilience, we have the countering of the UAVs and the, uh, U-ships, vessels, uh, in order, let's say, to, to protect the cables, the sea cables, uh, the artificial intelligence in border surveillance and And we have, of course, the hybrid forms of terrorism. As conclusion, I would like to say that the Hellenic Coast Guard plays a key role in order to prevent and confront maritime threats for the security, not only, not only for Greece, but for all the European Union, and of course for the whole, eastern Mediterranean region. In the face of evolving maritime threats, our greatest strength is not found in our individual capabilities, but in our collective resolve to cooperate, innovate, and protect the seas that unite us all. For this case, we used to say in Greece, that if you want to go fast, go alone, but if you want to go far, we are obliged to go together. That's all from my side, and I would like to thank you very much for your attention. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Admiral, for your presentation and your comments. And I would like now to give the floor to Ms. Alessia Carbone, Director for Transnational Threats and Sanctions within the International Development Economic Affairs General Directorate, Global Issues, Maltese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Affairs. Ms. Carboni, given the increasing convergence between terrorism, organized crime, and maritime insecurity, And recognizing the growing importance of critical maritime infrastructures, what practical measures should states and international organizations prioritize to reduce maritime domain blindness and strengthen collective efforts to prevent terrorist exploitation of the maritime domain? Madame, you have the floor.

Thank you, Chair, and thank you for the question posed. So in order to answer the question and to know the measures that you have to employ as a country, you would need to first analyze your risks. And therefore, Malta approaches maritime counterterrorism from a risk perspective. Firstly, as a member state situated on the European Union's external maritime border, and the state which is situated between two continents, our geographical position itself poses a risk. Secondly, Malta is also a significant transshipment hub. We also have a very significant large shipping registry, and we also are a very significant financial hub in that we provide a lot of services when it comes to the maritime services. Therefore, from our perspective, maritime security today extends far from the protection of ships or navigation, but the maritime domain has now evolved into a very complex security environment where counterterrorism needs to be met with counter-organized crime, sanctions evasion, the threats related to hybrid and cyber activities, and, but also the attacks which could be possibly put on critical infrastructure. It is therefore, in our opinion, not useful or difficult to examine maritime terrorism in isolation. So we must understand it in a broader ecosystem of maritime security threats. The United Nations Security Council has constantly emphasized the importance of preventing terrorism movement through effective effective border management. Resolutions such as 1373, 2178, and also 2369 provide a robust framework for preventing terrorist travel and strengthening border controls. However, unfortunately, much of the practical implementation of these resolutions is traditionally reserved for aviation rather than for the maritime sector. Maritime routes The small boats have always been given less importance despite their strategic significance. In our assessment, the principal maritime threat today is not necessarily a large-scale attack against a passenger vessel or a commercial ship, but rather it is of greater concern that these could be exploited and also there could be the exploitation of maritime routes or critical infrastructure to facilitate terrorist activities, such as the movement of foreign fighters, facilitators, the movement of weapons or dual-use materials, the financing of terrorism, and also shipping routes and shipping hubs being used for logistical support for terrorist fighters. Indeed, we are increasingly witnessing conversions between terrorism And organized crime terrorist actors frequently leverage existing criminal and smuggling networks rather than developing parallel infrastructures. This creates a complex and adaptive threat environment that cannot be addressed through traditional sectorial approaches alone. As the question referred to, the concept which differs— has to have significant importance today is the maritime maritime domain blindness, which refers to the inability of states and relevant authorities to maintain a complete, accurate, and timely understanding of the activities taking place around them. Unlike aviation, which benefits from highly structured screening, data collection, and passenger information systems, the maritime domain presents unique challenges. It encompasses vast geographic spaces, multiple jurisdictions, and extraordinary diversity of actors from commercial shipping to fisheries to recreational vessels and to offshore infrastructure. As a result, authorities often struggle to answer some of the basic but very essential questions such as who is moving, what is being transported, who owns the vessel, and does this seemingly legitimate activity conceal illicit or security-related conduct. Maritime domain blindness may arise from numerous factors, including the manipulation of vessel tracking systems, opaque infrastructures, false flags, ship-to-ship transfers, fragmentation of information across agencies, and other challenges. From a counterterrorism perspective, these blind spots create opportunities for terrorists and their facilitators to move personnel, equipment, funding, and logistical support while avoiding detection. Importantly, the challenge is not the absence of information, but in many cases, authorities already have a large volume of data. The challenge is to ensure that the information is accurate, interoperable, analyzed effectively, and shared in a timely manner. Reducing maritime domain awareness Therefore requires a comprehensive approach centered in stronger maritime awareness, enhancing information sharing, improved interoperability, advanced analytical tools, and closer cooperation with all relevant stakeholders. And when we say all relevant stakeholders here, we are also including our foreign counterparts. In fact, Malta is a strong believer of helping our foreign counterparts. We also provide capacity building. Through such support, it is— which is being offered to several member states, we are ensuring that the highest shipping standards are being offered, particularly in terms of ship flagging. Malta also proudly holds the Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law, who is also working on this sphere. Another issue which in our opinion requires particular attention is the issue of critical infrastructure, whereby recent incidents affecting undersea communication cables and energy infrastructure have demonstrated both the vulnerabilities of these systems, but also they are potentially causing severe disruptions. For Malta, we have critical infrastructures that include the ports, the maritime logistic hub, energy installations, the LNG facilities, undersea, uh, telecommunication cables, and also the electricity interconnectors with mainland Europe. These assets are deeply interconnected. A terrorist attack on one of these components can trigger a cascading effect across multiple sectors, affecting communications, energy supplies, and transport transportation networks. This makes such infrastructure an attractive target not only for terrorists but also actors engaging in sabotage, hybrid activities, and other forms of malicious conduct. Moreover, the threat is no longer exclusively physical. We must be increasingly at the outlook for cyber threats, insider risk, unmanned systems, and also also the emerging technologies. As recognized both in the revised European Union Maritime Security Strategy and the Security Council Resolution 2341, protecting critical infrastructure must not form only— must not only be an integral component of national resilience, but also of counterterrorism strategies. Our objective should not thus be only to prevent attacks, but also to ensure that our critical systems are resilient. And now let me turn to the final point that I have on my notes, whereby one message that we would like to send here today is the importance of information sharing, but not only with the national stakeholders or the foreign counterparts, but also with the private sector. So, in the maritime sector, private sectors frequently hold critical data that may provide the earliest indicators of suspicious activities. In Malta, we have a very structured dialogue with our shipping industry, including with the lawyers that represent the industry, and we have seen that shipping companies, port operators, insurers, maritime service providers all can identify patterns even if these are not detected already by the public sector. Reducing maritime domain awareness blind zones therefore does not only require strong coordination between us the public sector, but also that there needs to be a meaningful and structured engagement with the industry. This can be done through trusted reporting mechanisms, regular dialogues, and also having clear frameworks relating to the exchange of information. Ultimately, maritime, as Madame Garman also said, requires a whole of government and the whole of society approach.

Thank you.

I thank Ms. Carbonnet for her remarks. I now give the floor to Ms. Amaya Sesma, Legal Officer in the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, and I invite her to highlight where are the most critical gaps and vulnerabilities today. And Maya, you have the floor, please.

Thank you very much, Mr. Moderator, Excellencies, colleagues, and dear participants. Also, I wish to welcome you to this very important side event on behalf of CTAD. Indeed, we have already heard Excellencies and colleagues highlight the importance of not only the maritime security, but also that it is still under-addressed dimension of global counter-terrorism architecture. Now, as we know already, that maritime security underpins not only the global trade, as colleagues has highlighted, but also economic stability. But however, it has not received so far the equivalent— attention in counterterrorism efforts. There are solid foundation already in the Security Council resolutions from 1373 of 2001, which already obliges member states to ensure effective border management measures, whether it is air, land, or maritime. While we also recognize that we have not seen, or major recent terrorist attacks taking place in the maritime domain. This is thanks mainly to the ISPS Code and sustained international efforts. However, this should not lead us to become complacent. The proactivity was already mentioned by colleagues, that this should be the leading foundation, proactive measures to strengthen counter-terrorism measures at sea rather than waiting that there is a major crisis, attack, or hostage-taking situation. CETA's work focuses on identifying these vulnerabilities through our country assessments that we conduct on behalf of the counter-terrorism Terrorism Committee. Also, we have recent years increased the focused or dedicated port visits and direct engagement with port authorities. This has allowed CTED to identify gaps, promote international standards such as the ISPS Code, and identify also good practices such as the countries indeed Sponsoring this event, Greece and Malta, and this is certainly something that we look for in our assessments. Importantly, our assessments and the recommendations deriving from those assessments act as a bridge linking the assessments to delivery of tailored technical assistance in cooperation with our partners such as UNOCT and IMO. CTED has also been instrumental in highlighting some of the emerging trends. A key trend is displacement. As we have already heard, that it is always the weak link that the terrorists and criminal organizations will exploit. They will shift to routes that are that have lower security. And we have increasingly seen the so-called broken travel where individuals use multiple transport modes to avoid detection. The maritime domain is not only a target, it is also a facilitator for terrorist activity and enabling movement of foreign terrorist fighters, finances, weapons, and other illegal commodities. Another, uh, concern is the convergence between terrorism and organized crime. The actors share roots, logistics, and infrastructure. The threat landscape is indeed also evolving fast with technological advancements. Unmanned aircraft systems, unmanned maritime systems are becoming more accessible. Finally, the insider threat. Such as compromised port workers, remain an under-addressed but serious vulnerability. The main gaps highlighted here derive from our over 200 visits we have conducted in member states. Border security is among the top 3 recommendations that include gaps in implementation of member states' measures to protect maritime security. There has been progress, but despite this progress, we have several systematic gaps that persist. The first one is the strategic and policy disconnect. Maritime security is often insufficiently integrated into national counterterrorism strategies or border management frameworks, which limits coherence and effectiveness. Information and data gaps are profound. While systems such as Advanced Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record systems have transformed aviation security, there has been no equivalent global standard for maritime passenger data. This has created major vulnerability in tracking terrorist travel and identifying high-risk individuals. For this reason, the Advanced Development of Booking and Reservation Information, or BRI, systems for maritime as a counterpart to PNR is developing in a— and are developing to strengthen passenger screening and risk analysis. Capacity and resource constraints continue to hinder many states monitoring base coastlines, ports, and maritime zones. This requires significant technical capabilities, equipment, trained personnel, resources that remain unevenly distributed globally. Fourth area is the evolving and hybrid nature of threats that all member states are raising their concerns. This presents also new challenges. Terrorism in the maritime domain increasingly overlaps with organized crime, trafficking, smuggling, but this also creates a complex and interconnected risk environment. Fifth is the critical infrastructure vulnerability. Ports, offshore installations, and undersea cables are rarely identified as critical assets. They— that means also that they will remain insufficiently addressed in national frameworks despite the central importance to global stability. And finally, the emerging threats that were already highlighted from cybersecurity to unmanned systems requires risk-based responses. And specifically in the maritime domain, we see this disconnect that the threat assessment guiding proper risk assessment in the maritime sector is not conducted systematically. Addressing these gaps will require now renewed international attention and cooperation. Priorities should include maritime security, international global counter-terrorism strategies, advancing the development of passenger data standards for maritime travel, legal frameworks and implementation, scaling up coordinated capacity building efforts. Equally important is the partnerships. As I mentioned, CDET assessments and recommendations are a bridge to technical assistance. SeaDat mandate to facilitate technical assistance supports these efforts in ensuring that identified gaps are addressed through targeted and more focused capacity building. Strengthening maritime security is not only about protecting sea lanes, it's reinforcing the integrity of the entire global counter-terrorism system before it becomes the weak link. We work with our partners and member states to continue supporting member states in this vital effort. Thank you very much.

I thank Miss Maya Sesma for this very comprehensive review and for this assessment. That rely mainly on the work of CITED. So thanks, Amaya. I now give the floor to Mr. Ignacio Ibanez, Head of the Madrid Program Office and Coordinator of the Vulnerable Target Program Special Project and Innovation Branch, UNOCT. He will be followed by Mr. Simon Dagnent, Program Manager Chief Development Officer, Countering Terrorist Travel Program in also UNOCT. So, dear colleagues, you will have the floor and Ignacio, you can start maybe. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Moderator, dear Jean-Philippe. Actually, most of what has already been said is what I was going to say, so I'm going to be extremely short because I think I think the good news is that most of us are in agreement of what the challenges are, what the possible solutions are, but I do think that UNOCT, as my colleagues from CETAID were saying, we help build technical assistance and support member states in developing their capacities, can bring some options on the table to support your efforts. Presentation can be shown, that will be great. In addition to being the head of the Madrid Programme Office, I am also the coordinator of the global programme of the UNOCT on the protection of vulnerable targets. Next slide, please. So when we talk about vulnerable targets, what are we really talking about? So most of you know, because you have been deeply engaged in the negotiations of the Global Counterterrorism Strategy Review, and you know perfectly well the language of the General Assembly resolution, but for many following us online, just to clarify, when we're talking about vulnerable targets, we're referring to both critical infrastructure and public places protection, and actually the resolution, the previous review resolution, mentions specifically transportation and transport hubs as one of these key areas. Next slide, please. So that said, I wanted to basically go over the— what we consider key targets, terrorist targets in the area of the— in the maritime domain area. So basically, what critical infrastructure could a regulators be looking at could be threatening. So you can see there on the screen different colors. Really, that's depending on the level of criticality. What we have says could be more important in terms of the cascading effects that we also heard our colleagues, our experts from Greece and Malta mentioning. So as you can see up there, up the list, We have ports and terminals. We already mentioned the, the level of volume of global trade that they entail. Then shipping lanes. Of course, we normally think about shipping lanes of cargo, but we also should bear in mind ferries, cruise ships, which are also very interesting targets for terrorists. And choke points, international maritime chokepoints. Submarine cables, telecommunications and data, which, you know, they carry more than 95% of global internet traffic. Then in a second, let's say in a second level, we have pipelines, floating storage units and LNG terminals, and undersea power cables and interconnectors.

Connectors.

And a third, let's say, step, we would have the offshore oil and gas platforms, offshore wind farms and energy installations more and more being developed around the world, harbor infrastructure of different, of different kinds, navigation systems and aids. Remember that we are and have been talking about not only physical protection but also cyber protection of systems. And then in a less, let's say, in lesser level of criticality, but still part of these critical infrastructure, shipyards and repair facilities, and maritime surveillance systems. Of course, we could have a debate about the criticalities and we will have different assessments, but as we have heard from our experts already, risk, the risk management cycle will help us determine in each country, depending on the local context, which of these are more critical. Next slide, please. So what are the consequences of— could be the consequences of terrorist attacks on maritime critical infrastructure? So I put there a little image. It's perhaps too small to see from here, but basically of an accident that happened with undersea cables on on the western coast of Africa, which left 3 countries without internet services, intermittently, but for days. And that was an accident. It's believed that it was some kind of rocks that interrupted the service in the— in the— in the Dead Sea that interrupted the service of those cables. But it could happen— it could happen being caused by a terrorist organization. We have seen scenarios and simulations about hooks, especially with undersea cables that are at a low depth. So this is just an example. So you can imagine if for an accident we have 3 days of— or 4 days of interrupted internet provision services. And you imagine the economic impact of that for these countries. What could happen if a bigger attack could take place against this critical infrastructure or others that we have seen? Of course, the consequences are difficult to imagine, but you can already see the human impact that that would cause—casualties, hostage taken, humanitarian crisis. Many of you would remember, for example, the hijacking of the Achille Lauro in the '80s, of the cruise ship. The economic impact in terms of trade routing, higher freight insurance costs—these we are seeing also because of the geostrategic context that we're living in. —so that you can already fathom—as well as energy security risks. This we are also experiencing. Environmental damage, oil spills, infrastructure destruction, especially with certain explosives. And the strategic effects, how that would change our—the way in which trade, international trade is conducted, how sea Lanes could be militarized, the deployments of different navies, etc. So what are we doing in the UN to try to support member states? And next slide, please. In this regard, so you have heard already, uh, that we are working with a number of member states, and we're also working, working in partnership between different programs of the UN. Not only within UNOCT, but also between UNOCT and other UN entities and other UN member states. Of course, I would underscore the very good cooperation with the IMO in this regard in the context of our global program on vulnerable targets protection. And I know my colleague Simon will now give you an overview also of the CT Travel program. So as you can see, joint efforts from the UN based on very firm mandates both from the Security Council and the General Assembly to protect critical infrastructure and public places, but actually to address the whole chain of threats throughout the prevention, protection, mitigation, investigation, response, and recovery. Resilience is one of the key points from terrorist attacks against vulnerable targets at different levels and in accordance with human rights and gender cross-cutting themes. Next slide. So I'll pass on these, but just so you can see the volume of what we do in our global program. Next one, please. Two technical guides that we that we have already launched that refers specifically to international good practices, many of them from member states here around the table, both on the public transportation side and on the critical infrastructure side. Next slide. And some of the key points that will come out from these technical knowledge guides and some of the work that we have been conducting under the Vulnerable Targets Program. Some of these recommendations are actually already and have already been said in this roundtable. On governance and strategy, basically, we really saw that countries that have integrated national strategies on critical infrastructure protection, well connected to other strategies on the, of course, counterterrorism side, but also on the security and broader defense side work better, having clear roles across transport security, cyber, and emergency actors, and indeed alignment with international frameworks. In the area of risk management, something we have been paying very close attention in the Vulnerable Targets Program, we really need regular reviews and adaptation to evolving threats. And as our dear colleagues from CTED always emphasize, we need to interdependency. We need to look at the risk management cycle as a whole, including the threat, the vulnerability, the risks, the exchange of information, how you factor in intelligence, public-private cooperation and partnerships, and identifying interdependency and cascading effects throughout the whole risk management cycle. In terms of coordination and preparedness, our Our technical guides emphasize, as we have heard already, public-private partnerships with operators and industry, and fully agree with our Maltese colleagues in this regard. Information sharing, training, and joint exercises and drills together. I think that cooperation between the public sector and the private sector cannot be limited only to the exchange of information. Information or requests for information from the public sector, but also about developing emergency plans together, about having the inputs of the private sector and private operators in trainings and exercises. They are fully part of the security chain. In terms of prevention and security, security by design in ports, something that we are seeing more and more.— and I'm sure the IMO colleagues will mention— platforms and the infrastructure that is within the ports, layered measures both within the ports and outside in the whole maritime domain in terms of control, surveillance on the cyber side, on the physical side, and as my colleague Annmaria mentioned, also the insider threat mitigation, a key component of these efforts. Finally, on response, recovery, and resilience, our technical guides emphasize very much crisis plans, ensuring continuity—business continuity—of essential services, interoperability of communication and command structures, and recovery focus on rebuilding and long-term resilience, of course, very much connected with the whole strength of infrastructure. And with that, I will leave it to my colleague Simon to brief on the CT, on the counter-terrorist travel programme. So, Simon, I hope you can hear us.

Thank you very much, Ignacio. Just making sure everybody can hear me in New York. Hello from a very hot and sweaty Budapest. In the next 5 minutes, I'd like to answer 3 questions. Firstly, what is the problem regarding the collection of maritime data? Secondly, what have we in the UN been doing about it? And thirdly, what more can we do? Before I start, I should tell you very briefly what the UN Countering Terrorist Travel Programme is. In short, we help member states to set up passenger information units to collect, analyze, and share traveler information. Why is this beneficial? Well, if a state collects information about travelers before they arrive, they can do watch listing on known suspects, they can check against Interpol databases, they can see suspicious patterns or questionable bookings, they can do rules-based targeting, to unveil hidden connections between people and also between people and objects like credit cards or email addresses or phone numbers. This allows countries to identify not only known persons and known risks but also unknown persons and unknown risks. So we support states by first assessing their capacities through a CTED-led consultation. And then delivering support across these four pillars that you see on screen. Legal, where UNODC Terrorist Prevention Branch help draft our legal frameworks. Operationally, where UNODC Passenger and Cargo Control Programme help to set up and train their PIU. On the industry guidance side, where ICAO help to engage and connect with the industry. And on the technology front, where we can deploy an analytical system called Go Travel. It's a one UN initiative bringing together all of the logos that you can see on screen: CTEDD, IKEO, Interpol, UNODC, OICT, and IOM. Turning now to those three questions. Firstly, what's the problem? Well, as Annemarie said, at the international level there is not yet a mandatory standard obliging member states to collect passenger data from maritime vessels. Without an international legal framework, it is challenging to draft a national legal framework. Operationally then, maritime presents different risks and challenges than to aviation, and the agencies dealing with it often don't include police and intelligence agencies. In terms of the industry, there isn't one international industry body like we have in aviation with IATA because we have cruise lines but also ferries, fishing boats, freight, pleasure craft, and others. And then from the technology perspective, these vessels may not have the technical means for collecting and transferring this data electronically. Second question: what have we been doing about it? Well, in terms of the international framework, I said we do not yet have one. The good news is that at the last IMO FAL meeting, there was agreement on the language to make the collection of maritime data a mandatory standard. We expect it to be fully adopted at the next FAL in 2027. In terms of our support, we have model legal provisions on maritime data. We've already started providing it to particular member states. Operationally, we have terms of reference on how to add a maritime component to a passenger information unit and the training material for how to analyze maritime traveler data. In terms of industry support, we have a guide on how member states can engage with the maritime industry and also how to deal with non-compliance. And on the technology side, we have detailed business requirements for a maritime module in GoTravel. In summary, we have the expertise and the guidance material. We're currently lacking the finance to deliver it. Third question: what more can we do? Well, from a member state perspective, I would encourage you to support the adoption of maritime data as a standard in the next FAO. If you are looking to support the UN, In order for us to be able to deliver the various areas of support that I reference, we need the resources to do so. So for the member states who have a strong interest in this area, perhaps even the, the wonderful co-sponsors of this event, we would greatly appreciate your support. And of course, maritime security, it involves a lot more than just maritime passenger data, so we also need to align with other UN maritime programs. As Ignacio said, maritime ports are critical infrastructure, so we've joined forces as well with the Vulnerable Targets Program to propose tailored support to specific regions on maritime security and countering terrorism. In conclusion, the collection of passenger data for aviation has been a standard for 10 years. We have seen measurable results and impact in the countries we have been supporting since the launch of this program 7 years ago, thanks to the donors that you see on screen. Collecting passenger data is hugely beneficial in countering terrorism and serious crime and in improving law enforcement and border management. You can see our contact address on screen, cttravel@un.org, and indeed there's 2 of our team present in the room, Natalia and Motaz. Maybe you could stand up and wave so people know who you are. Just to finish by saying, now is the time to close the gap that exists when it comes to maritime data. We have the tools and the guidance, but we need your support to deliver them. Thank you very much.

I thank Mr. Ibanez and Mr. Degnan for their remarks. We are running a little bit short of time, but I'm sure it's going to be okay. We have to finish, uh, in about 15 minutes. So I now give the floor to Mr. Jeremy Greenwood, Head of Maritime Security Section, Maritime Safety Division, International Maritime Organization. Uh, Mr. Greenwood will participate via VTC, and I have a question for you, Mr. Greenwood. The ice The ICAO's IAPS code provides an all-risk framework but lacks detailed standards and recommended practices like Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention in the aviation sector. So is it time to adopt a similar approach at IMO? Sir, you have the floor.

Well, greetings everybody.

Good afternoon from London, and thank you very much to our distinguished excellencies and colleagues. Particularly our sponsors Greece and Malta, and the kind colleagues of CTED for hosting this wonderful event. As the United Nations specialized agency with responsibility for the safety and security of international shipping, this topic couldn't be more important to us. And as the head of maritime security, I'm very pleased for the opportunity to discuss a little bit about what we're working on here at IMO. What worries us and what some of the priorities looking forward in the maritime security sphere with respect to counterterrorism. Obviously, one of the large events with the headlines today, which includes a lot of work by the IMO, is focused on the Strait of Hormuz. And certainly it has been a very tragic event for international shipping, with nearly 50 vessels, commercial vessels conducting international trade being struck by unmanned aerial vehicles and surface unmanned craft. And so one of the great concerns that we look towards here is the possibility of that, what I'll call terror contagion, the demonstration by actors that it is very easy to disrupt international shipping with low-cost, easy-to-fire, easy-to-direct vehicles. And so it's not just in the Strait of Hormuz, as most of us know. It is present in the Red Sea, the Black Sea, and even the Mediterranean. And so this is a growing concern for maritime security. And while state actors tend to be primary for this act and action, we know that non-state actors have this capability and they have shown the ability to disrupt global shipping and the world economy with relative ease. Turning to more of the technology side that's been discussed already, obviously great concern over cybersecurity. We have just passed a Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships Code, MAS Code for short, here at the IMO. It is a non-binding document which will lead into an experience phase that will turn into hopefully a binding document. But as we think about the complexities of autonomous vessels, The fact that they can be controlled from remote operation centers located far from the coast and far from traditional jurisdictions that regulate maritime security. It is a growing concern that we will have to find unique and creative ways to regulate this particular field. That goes in addition for smart ports. We have seen the growing connectivity of ports, the ship-port interface, and the concerns of vulnerabilities have been spoken about already today. So in the interest of time, I won't go further into them. But ports have shown a particular vulnerability from unmanned aerial vehicles and surface vehicles during this conflict in the Middle East region. And so we have numerous ports that have also been struck, showing the ability to impact global shipping very easily, both on land and at sea. And then, of course, we have traditional targeting, which would be, of course, cruise ships, other infrastructure, oil platforms that we need not forget about. 5,000 passengers on a cruise ship is a very unfortunate reality that we must consider as we think about the future. And quickly, in the interest of time, I want to touch on a little bit of the legal and policy framework that embeds maritime counterterrorism work here at the IMO. As your leading question teed us off to think about, is the International Ship and Port Facility security code ready for the future threats that we face. And so our member states here at the IMO have challenged to submit new proposals thinking about new and emerging risks in maritime security to include those presented by transnational organized crime. And so we welcome member states to continue in this conversation, submit proposals for new work outputs in ways that we could take what has been a very successful instrument, the ISPS code designed post-9/11 and the counterterrorism threat that existed then, and how can we modernize it, ensure it's ready for future threats, and perhaps make it more prescriptive where necessary if that's what member states decide. We are working currently on a non-mandatory cybersecurity code for the maritime environment, and work is expected to be completed next year., and then it'll be entered into a non-mandatory guidance document, which will lead to an experience building phase and hopefully into a mandatory cybersecurity code. And I've already spoken about our Maritime Autonomous Ship Systems Code that is currently out and published and available online. And one thing that we do know is that currently within the ISPS framework and within IMO instruments, we do not have a mandatory maritime security audit scheme. We work very closely with our CTED colleagues to try to provide that gap where necessary, but one challenge as we look forward is, is it time to implement some type of mandatory security audit scheme? And I put that challenge to the group, and I look forward to your questions. And in the interest of time, I'll go ahead and stop my remarks and turn it back over. Thank you very much.

Thanks to you, Jeremy, and thanks for taking into consideration the problem of time we have. That's why I'm going to ask the three last speakers to really sum up to the main points they want to share with us, which is about one minute per speaker. I apologize for that, but I'm happy now to give the floor to Mr. Sarang Hassani from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Mr. Minister, you have the floor.

Thank you very much, Mr. Moderator, and in respect of the time, I will keep it as short as possible. First of all, expressing our appreciation, and we're very pleased to join this event and partners, as well as the Hellenic Republic and the Republic of Malta, to discuss this topic today. Just adding to what already has been said, we can also see from our experience and analysis, our own ones, that existing links between terrorism and other forms of transnational organized crime at sea is predominant, which highlights the need for coordinated, comprehensive, and multi-agency responses. Now, UNODC supports member states state through a rule-of-law-based criminal justice approach that strengthens maritime domain awareness, information sharing, operational capacity, legal framework, uh, aligned with international standards and international cooperation. So as emerging technologies reshape the maritime security landscape, we also see The need for continued international cooperation, capacity building, including to strengthen detection capabilities through the collection and analysis of maritime travel data, and solid legal framework with appropriate data privacy and protection safeguards— these remain essential to preventing and countering terrorist exploitation of the maritime domain. Thank you.

Thank you very much, and sorry again for this problem. I now give the floor briefly to Mr. Ewin Princi, Senior Project Manager, Interpol, who will participate via VTC. Mr. Princi, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope everybody hears me well. Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, conscious of the time, I will try to be quite brief. I would like to only stress— I'll bypass the part of the threats. I would like only to provide one small message about Interpol's role in maritime crime. It's a proactive approach in critical maritime infrastructure structure that we provide through support that we provide to member countries with specialized training and operational activities alongside with a partnership. Our role includes providing operational support, analysts to assist member countries in investigating on complex maritime crimes at sea, and coordinating efforts among various stakeholders, jurisdictional— thank you— and technical experts. Enhancing international, international cooperation. To enhance international cooperation, Interpol facilitates information exchange through our databases, through our systems. We provide mentorship to member countries to advance cases, investigations, to share data nationally, regionally, internationally in order to fight any type of maritime crime. An important part is the capacity building that we provide to, and to raise capacity, to increase capacities, and the interagency exercises that we do at sea. In this, we have recently produced, and we will about to launch, a maritime investigations guide, which is like a short task book for first responders and operators. And the last but not least is to mention the Interpol Global Maritime Security Database, established in 2011 and backed up by UN resolutions which serves as a global repository for sharing information on criminals and crimes in the maritime domain, and it's a hub for information to support member countries again in the first response and investigation of the maritime crimes. With that, I conclude and I give the floor to you. I would like to thank you for this opportunity. Thank you very much, Mr.

Prentzi. And our last Speaker Duncan Porter, Project Coordinator, World Customs Organization. Sir, in about a minute, please. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Jeff, and thank you everyone. In the interest of time, I will do this and I've got the clock on. So the WCO represents 187 customs administrations, and I think it's important to highlight that customs plays a key role when it comes to the detection of goods and people across the borders, and ultimately in protecting society, like security, economics, and public safety threats, and of course in counter-terrorism. Obviously, with global trade volumes continue to grow, customs administrations must increasingly rely on intelligence-led and data-driven risk management to identify high-risk cargo before before it reaches the borders. So with that, the WCO has developed the WCO SAFE framework of standards, which has become a global foundation for the secure and facilitated trade, and that promotes the use of advanced cargo information and integrated risk management to strengthen supply chain security while supporting legitimate trade. Ultimately, counter-terrorism in the maritime domain It requires an end-to-end approach that connects maritime security, border management, customs, law enforcement, and the private sector. By strengthening risk management, information sharing, and trusted partnerships, customs can identify and disrupt high-risk movements early in the supply chain, making a direct contribution to global counter-terrorism efforts. WTO looks forward to continue to work closely with the United Nations and international partners to strengthen cooperation. Thank you very much for the time. I think I'll go within a minute.

Thank you, Chair. Thank you very much, Mr. Porter. I again thank WCO, Interpol, UNODC, key partners in our work to counter terrorism in the maritime domain. For any other panelists or intervention, if you have questions, please send questions to our email, cted@un.org. We will, of course, take that. And I think in the interest of time, I will close that meeting. Thanks again, everybody, for joining us today, and good luck for the rest of the City Week. Thank you.