Twelfth Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Thank you, Excellencies. Thank you, everyone. Can I welcome you all to the meeting of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at our 12th Ministerial Meeting, and welcome particularly the Under-Secretary-General Nakamitsu and Executive Director Robert Floyd. Dr. Floyd, thank you very much. Thank you to all of you all the countries, member states who are represented here for the meeting, for joining the meeting of this group of friends of the CTBT. We meet after a successful Article 14 conference last year, and I want to thank the co-presidents of that conference, the Philippines and Sweden, for their leadership in securing adoption of a final declaration that reaffirmed the vital importance and urgency of the entry into force of the CTBT. Well, we're all here because we have a shared commitment to this treaty, to banning all nuclear test explosions, whether for military or civil purposes, and I'm privileged to co-chair and moderate today's event. And I understand I'm co-chairing with Japan, but I understand Minister Motegi will be joining us later. And so we will hear from my co-chair at the conclusion or later in the event. What I propose to do now is to deliver Australia's national statement, and then I will hand over to Under Secretary-General Nakamitsu, followed by Dr. Floyd. Colleagues, 30 years ago, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, CTBT, was opened for signature, and Australia was proud to bring its text before the General Assembly. And today, the treaty is one of the strongest pillars of the global non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. By constraining the development and improvement of nuclear weapons, it brings us closer to our shared goal of a world without them. And in the three decades since, the treaty has achieved near universal support. 188 states have signed, 179 have ratified. And can I congratulate today the Kingdom of Tonga on its recent ratification, which completes universalisation of the treaty across the Pacific region. Congratulations. If you have had any opportunity to live in or travel through the Pacific Island region, you will know that that region, our region, knows the cost of nuclear testing first-hand, which is why we believe that it belongs to history. But, colleagues, the norm against nuclear testing is under serious strain. There are alarming claims that certain states have conducted explosive nuclear tests. The CTBT has underpinned a global norm against nuclear testing that benefits all states, and it is in every state's interest to maintain it. Any nuclear explosion of any yield could have irrevocable consequence. So we urge all relevant states to honour their respective moratoria and refrain from actions that would defeat the treaty's object and purpose. And we continue to push for new concrete measures to restore confidence in these moratoria. The devastating humanitarian and environmental toll of past tests demands restraint. So for states who are yet to ratify the CTBT, I urge you to do so without delay. And in this context, we make clear Australia's strong opposition to Russia's revocation of its ratification of the CTBT. That Russia would even countenance a return to nuclear tests is an affront to all who want a world without nuclear weapons. And we continue to call on Russia to reverse this course of action. Friends, the Treaty's entry into force will not only ensure a permanent and legally binding ban on nuclear testing, it would also activate the Treaty's verification regime, including on-site inspections to clarify events of concern. Next month's integrated field exercise, generously hosted by Namibia, will strengthen our collective readiness and technical capability. The International Monitoring System is nearing completion with over 90% of a planned 337 facilities operating. And of course, the IMS value goes beyond verification. It detects earthquakes and other events that could trigger tsunamis, helping to protect communities from disaster. Australia proudly hosts the world's third largest number of IMS installations. Colleagues, 30 years on, our task is clear. We must work to turn near universal support into entry into force. We owe that to so many. We owe that to the victims of past nuclear testing. We also owe it to future generations. And we owe it to all of our peoples for all of our shared security. So let us continue to push for action and let us work to ensure all states do the same. And Australia is pleased to join fellow members of the Group of Friends in supporting the joint statement, and we encourage others to join us. Thank you very much. I'm now honored to give the floor to UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Nakamitsu. The floor is yours.

Thank you very much. Your Excellencies, Foreign Minister Wong, and of course, Foreign Minister Motegi, soon arriving, Executive Secretary Floyd, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of the Secretary-General, it is a pleasure to join you for this 12th Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. I thank the governments of Australia and Japan for their sustained leadership in support of the Treaty and its entry into force. For many years, Friends of the CTBT have helped sustain political attention on the simple but unfulfilled objective, bringing into force one of the most widely supported instruments in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. 30 years after the CTBT opened for signature, much has been achieved. Today, 188 states have signed the treaty and 179 have ratified it. Tonga's ratification in July marked another important step towards universalization. The CTBTO has built an advanced global verification regime, providing states with objective and reliable information relevant to the detection of nuclear explosions. The norm against nuclear testing is strong. Verification capabilities are highly advanced. And political support is nearly universal. Yet one fact remains impossible to overlook. The treaty is still not in force. What remains is a political task. The remaining Annex 2 States must sign and/or ratify the CTBT without further delay and without conditions. That goal has become even more urgent. We meet amid heightened geopolitical tension, eroding trust and renewed concern about the possibility of nuclear explosive testing. Any such test would deepen mistrust, risk triggering reciprocal testing and further fuel a nuclear arms race. Until the treaty's entry into force, all states possessing nuclear weapons must maintain their existing moratoria on nuclear explosive testing. Those moratoria are indispensable, but they cannot be the final destination. Excellencies, this is where the Friends of the CTBT have an important role. Your collective voice carries political weight. I encourage you to use it to make clear that a return to nuclear explosive testing would be a step backwards for international peace and security. Those communities that live with the human and environmental consequences of past nuclear tests remind us what is at stake. Preventing such harm from ever recurring is a security imperative and a moral responsibility. The CTBT is often described as unfinished business. After three decades, it is time to finish the job. Let us ensure that the next milestone we mark is not another anniversary of waiting, but the entry into force of the CTBT. I thank you very much for your attention.

Thank you very much, Under-Secretary-General, and thank you for your work. And I call on the Executive Secretary of the CTBT, Dr. Floyd.

Thank you, Minister. Dear Ministers, Excellencies, Friends, On Thursday this week, we celebrate the Treaty's 30th birthday. In the year that I turned 30, which was a few years ago now, there were 47 nuclear weapon tests that year, almost one a week. In our previous century, over 2,000 tests. This century, just a handful. What a change for the better. Such dramatic and unqualified success. So what's new since the last meeting of the Friends in 2024? We've edged closer to universalisation. 188 states have signed the treaty, 179 have ratified it. And congratulations again to Tonga, joining the treaty's family just two months ago. We've improved the already amazing international monitoring system. 308 facilities are now certified, 92% complete. 36 gigabytes of data every day. And it's made available to every state signatory transparently, equally, and fairly. And above all, our detection capability keeps improving. Our monitoring system was designed to detect explosive nuclear weapon tests with a yield of 1,000 tons of TNT equivalent or more. Today, we can detect down to 500 tons equivalent. That's 1/30 of the power of the bomb that was devastating in Hiroshima. Yet, one major piece of work remains unfinished. the treaty is yet to enter into force. That would allow for additional verification activities, improving confidence below 500 tonnes, confidence building measures, consultation and clarification, and on-site inspection. Our on-site inspection integrated field exercise, as was mentioned, will be in Namibia this very next month, and thank you, Namibia. 200 experts from states and from the Secretariat will be trialing on-site inspection procedures and equipment in the deserts of Namibia. All this doesn't pay for itself. Assessed contributions, generous voluntary contributions, in-kind contributions, states here today, but also so many others have helped us make this great success. So thank you so much for your great support. But no one in this building needs telling the international scene is very concerning, dangerous, confusing. But in that confusion, one thing is as clear as a tolling bell. A return to nuclear weapon testing will make everything devastatingly worse. Our treaty is a force for good, for peace and security, for common sense. Let's keep it that way today and for yet another 30 years. Thank you.

Thank you, Dr. Floyd, and thank you and the organisation for all the work you do. We're now joined by my co-moderator, His Excellency Minister Motegi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, welcome, and I now give you the floor.

Thank you, Penny. Thank you for joining the 12th Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of the CTBT. I would also like to reiterate my respect for the strong leadership demonstrated by CTBTO Executive Secretary Floyd. 30 years ago, in this very forum of the UN General Assembly, the CTBT was adopted and open for signature. The path towards nuclear disarmament since then has not always been smooth. In particular, looking at the Indo-Pacific region, North Korea's advancing nuclear and missile programs continue to pose a grave concern and a serious challenge to the global non-proliferation regime. We also cannot overlook the rapid and non-transparent buildup of nuclear capability by some country. Yet, we must not halt our journey toward a world without nuclear weapons. we believe that the CTBT, a vital pillar of the NPT regime, can play an even more important role. As we mark the 30th anniversary, I'd like to reflect on the proven value of this framework and reaffirm our determination for the next 30 years. First, universality. Over the past two decades, the CTBT has achieved nearly universal support among UN member states. This year, with Tonga's ratification, the number of ratifying states has reached 179. We sincerely welcome the completion of the ratification of all member states in the Pacific region. Japan will continue its effort to advance the universality of the treaty step by step through active engagement with non-state parties. Second, despite the fact that the treaty has not yet entered into force, it has demonstrated its clear effect in practice on the ground. The International Monitoring System, IMS, is absolutely vital. Over the past 30 years, the IMS has been expanded to more than 300 facilities covering almost the entire world. We would like to further strengthen the system to ensure the non-conduct of nuclear tests and adherence to nuclear test moratoria. Last but not least, capacity building. To sustain the CTBT's effectiveness, developing experts who operate this the IMS is indispensable. Japan conducts annual training programs on nuclear test detections. To date, more than 300 participants from over 80 countries have participated. We will continue to advance such efforts. These accomplishments of the past 30 years are not merely historical. They are a solid foundation for the future. As the international security environment becomes more severe than ever, the NPT regime and the CTBT as its essential pillar are being tested. Today, as we come together at the UN, the very starting point of the CTBT, let us reaffirm our determination to work together with all our strengths towards early entry into force of the treaty and tangible progress in nuclear disarmament. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much, Minister Motegi. And can I also acknowledge the ongoing work of the government of Japan, both in relation to this treaty, but also in relation to disarmament. We thank you for it. I will now proceed to speakers from the floor, and I will invite first my colleague from the Pacific, the Minister Paloka of Tonga.

Thank you, Minister. Co-Chairs, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, the Kingdom of Tonga is honored to join this ministerial meeting as we mark 30 years since the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty opened for signature. Three decades of determined international effort to secure a world free from nuclear test explosions. For Tonga, this milestone carries profound significance. On 7 July 2026, Tonga deposited its instrument of ratifications of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, reaffirming the Kingdom's steadfast commitment to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, international peace and security, and the rule of international law. Our commitment speaks from the consignes of Blue Pacific. For our region, nuclear testing is not a distant chapter of history. Its human, environmental, and intergenerational consequences endure. We therefore regard the prohibitions of nuclear testing as both a moral imperative and a sovereign responsibility owed to generations yet unborn. Tonga commends the Preparatory Commissions for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the international community for 30 years of progress in strengthening the global norms against nuclear testing and building a sophisticated international verification system capable of ensuring that no nuclear test goes undetected. Yet, this anniversary must also summon us to complete the unfinished work before us. Tonga humbly calls upon all states that have not yet signed or ratified the treaty, particularly those who ratification is required for its entry into force, to do so without further delay. As we reflect on progress and shape the future, let us renew our collective resolve to consign nuclear test explosions permanently to history and secure a nuclear weapon test-free world for all humanity. Malo e uito, I thank you.

Thank you to His Excellency from the Kingdom of Tonga. I will now go to my colleague and friend from the Republic of Palau, Minister Aitaro.

Thank you very much. Co-Chairs, Executive Secretary, Dr. Robert Floyd, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, it is a great honor to address the 12th Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on behalf of the government and the people of the Republic of Palau. We thank the Co-Chairs and the Provisional Technical Secretariat for their continued leadership in advancing the CTBT. For Palau and the Pacific, The prohibition of nuclear testing is deeply rooted in our history. More than 300 nuclear tests were conducted across the Pacific, leaving lasting environmental and health consequences. This experience has strengthened our region's commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. Palau's nuclear-free constitution reflects this commitment. And in 2018, Palau became the first Pacific Island country to ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. We also warmly commend Tonga on its recent ratification of the CTBT, completing signature and ratification by all Pacific Island Forum members. At the 55th Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting, leaders reaffirmed our shared commitment to a peaceful and nuclear-free blue Pacific. We remain concerned, however, by growing geopolitical tensions, expanding nuclear arsenals, and ballistic missile activities over the Pacific. Transparency and advanced notification of such activities are essential to regional confidence and safety. Palau also reiterates its concern regarding the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile programs and calls for compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions and for the DPRK to sign and ratify the CTBT. Voluntary testing moratoria are very important, but they cannot replace a universal and legally binding prohibition. Palau therefore calls on all remaining States, particularly the Annex II States, to sign and ratify the treaty without delay. Palau is proud of its partnership with the CTBTO and of hosting international monitoring system infrastructure that contributes to global verification and supports tsunami monitoring and early warning in our region. The Pacific knows that the consequences of nuclear testing can endure across generations and oceans. Palau remains committed to working with all partners to strengthen the global nonproliferation and disarmament framework and bring the CTBT into force. Let us ensure that no people, no ocean, and no future generation ever again bears the consequences of nuclear testing. Thank you and.

Thank you very much, Your Excellency, Minister Aitara. I now go to the Minister of International Relations and Trade of Namibia, the Honourable Minister Ashiphala Mousavi. The floor is yours.

Thank you very much. Excellencies, Distinguished colleagues, let me thank the Co-Chairs for convening this 12th Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of the CBT. And of course, to Dr. Floyd, Executive Secretary of CBT/O Preparatory Commission, for his continued leadership in our common endeavour to bring the comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty into force. Namibia assures you of its full support. Namibia reiterates its unwavering commitment to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and to its universalisation. 30 years after the Treaty was opened for signature, its entry into force remained elusive. Although the International Monitoring System continues to operate provisionally, it was designed as a permanent verification instrument for a world free of nuclear test explosions. And if there is any apt international political inducement needed for the long overdue entry into force of the CTBT, it is the current geopolitical situation. As a State that has signed and ratified the CTBT, Namibia again urges all remaining Annex 2 States to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay. Namibia demonstrates its commitment to nuclear disarmament through practical action. Hosting the integrated field exercise in October and November this year is a direct contribution to strengthening the on-site inspection regime, the least developed pillar of the treaty's verification architecture, and to showing that the CTBT verification regime can be ready when the treaty enters into force. Through our inter-ministerial structures and with the contribution of Namibia's trained OSI inspectors, we have worked closely with the provisional technical secretariat to prepare for an exercise of this scale and importance. In this connection, Namibia will welcome close to 250 inspectors, experts diplomats and representatives of civil society. We are proud to open our doors to this community and to offer a practical demonstration of what a real on-site inspection entails. It is a privilege for Namibia and one we carry on behalf of Africa to host the largest and most complex exercise ever undertaken in the field of nuclear disarmament and arms control. And we approach this responsibility with the dedication and seriousness it deserves. We express our deep appreciation to the Group of 77 and China, the European Union, the African Group, and all state signatories that have consistently supported Namibia hosting of IH 26. and we look forward to welcome you to Namibia for the exercise. Once again, and in conclusion, Namibia remains steadfast in its pursuit of CTBT universalization and calls on all States, particularly Annex II States, to sign and ratify the treaty without further delay. Doing so would give full effect to one of the international community's most important instruments for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and bring us closer to a world free of nuclear test explosions and, ultimately, nuclear weapons. I thank you.

Thank you very much, Your Excellency, and thank you again also, as I said, for Namibia's generous hosting of the field exercise. I will now turn to the United Kingdom and call Mr. Chris Elmore, MP.

Distinguished guests, Executive Secretary, ladies and gentlemen, it is a privilege to join you today, and I am grateful to the friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty for their invitation. My presence here reflects the United Kingdom's enduring commitment to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the organisation that underpins it. In the 30th year of the treaty, we are invited to reflect on what we have achieved through multilateral cooperation. When the treaty opened for signature in 1996, it was little more than a vision on paper. Thirty years later, state signatories have built a near-complete global verification regime with more than 300 international monitoring system stations operating across the globe, ready to detect nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion. This is a remarkable achievement. Day and night, the international monitoring system provides trusted, independent data that helps deter nuclear testing and enhances our collective security. And that is not all. The system delivers benefits far beyond its core verification mission. Its data has supported tsunami warning systems, earthquake and volcanic eruption monitoring, atmospheric and oceanographic research and a wide range of scientific and civil applications that enhance global resilience and international co-operation. That is why, in its 30th year, it is right that we celebrate what we have accomplished through decades of patience, persistence and international co-operation. A treaty that, although not yet in force, enjoys near universal support and a verification regime that is now close to completion. As underlined at this year's review conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty remains an essential component of the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. The United Kingdom is proud to have played a pivotal role in the negotiation of the treaty and the British expertise helped shape what has become one of the most unique and technically sophisticated international verification systems ever developed. Looking ahead, we recognise that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation is facing many challenges. The international monitoring system is ageing and in urgent need of repair, maintenance and modernisation. We also share concerns about non-compliance under the regime. Yet those challenges are not insurmountable. What seemed impossible in 1996 became reality because countries chose co-operation over confrontation and action over inaction. By working together, we can meet today's challenges in that same spirit. We share responsibility to ensure the continued strength and effectiveness of the international monitoring system, providing it with the resources it needs to carry out its vital mission for the next 30 years and beyond. The United Kingdom stands ready to work with partners to secure the long-term sustainability of the international monitoring system, the treaty and the organisation. If the last three decades have shown us anything, it is that, when we act together, we can achieve what once seemed impossible. Let us show that same determination again.

We will now turn to contributions from the In addition to Australia and Japan, the other members of the Group of Friends of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and I go first to Dr. Andreas von Gaier, the State Secretary of Germany.

Thank you very much, ministers, Executive Secretary. First, a big thank you to Namibia for the invitation to the exercise. And thank you to Tonga for joining and for, if I may say, for having mentioned the moral character of this treaty. The treaty is still not entered into force, but it is one of the most successful and consequential achievements on the global arms control architecture. This is because it did not only establish a near global consensus, a norm against nuclear testing, but more crucially, it enabled us and has means, the actual hardware to verify that norm. That is why this strong verification capability gives the norm against nuclear testing real weight. Any state contemplating to break away from the norm must reckon with the CTBTO's international monitoring system. The system can reliably detect tests. It operates around the clock, and the risk of detection creates a barrier. That is important, creates a barrier against clandestine testing. And where there is doubt, we talk about it. Now, because the global norm against nuclear testing and the ability to detect a violation are so intrinsically linked. For us, looking forward, three things are important. First, we need to help sustain the international monitoring system, improve it where we can. My country, Germany, is proud to pledge significant voluntary contributions to the CTBTO this year. Second, we need to continue working on the universalization of the CTBT. And third, until the treaty will be enforced by on-site inspections, we believe voluntary transparency measures can help fill the gap. Voluntary exchanges can make an important contribution to strengthening confidence in the treaty. So overall, the CTBT remains a success story, an effective barrier against the return to nuclear testing. It remains a key element of our international order and, together with the NPT, on the global nonproliferation and arms control architecture as a whole. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much. So I'll now go to Finland, also a CTBT friend, the Deputy Foreign Minister, Raijula.

Thank you, Madam Co-Chair. Ministers, Madam Under-Secretary, Mr. Secretary-General, Executive Secretary, it's a true honor to be among this very committed group of friends. This year indeed marks the 30th anniversary of opening the CTBT for signatures and Finland is proud to be among the first signatories and ratifiers. This reflects our long-standing commitment to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the early entry into force of the treaty. It is high time for this process to be completed and we call for all the remaining Annex 2 States to sign and ratify the Treaty without further delay. As has been said, despite the lack of entry into force, the Treaty has significantly and positively contributed to international security. It is an essential part of global non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The Treaty forms a strong norm against nuclear testing. Beyond its essential contribution to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, the CTBT continues to demonstrate its broader value to the international community. The treaty's verification regime represents a remarkable example of how multilateral cooperation, science, and technology can actually work together to advance both international security and the common good. Through its international monitoring system, the CTBTO provides data and expertise that support a wide range of peaceful and scientific applications. These applications have proven their relevance in areas such as disaster reduction, tsunami warning, scientific research, and nuclear emergency preparedness. By facilitating access to reliable and timely monitoring data, the CTBTO contributes to a better understanding of our planet and strengthens the capacity of states to respond to natural and technological hazards. An important step further on this path would be reaching an agreement on the release of filter material from the radionuclide filter archive for scientific research. These wider benefits further reinforce the importance of sustaining the treaty's monitoring system for the benefit of all. Finland is hosting one of the primary seismic stations and one of the certified radionuclide laboratories of the CTBT. Strength of the international monitoring system is demonstrated by the fact that six nuclear tests by North Korea in 2006 through 2017 were detected by the primary seismic station in Finland. over 6,000 miles or kilometers away from the actual test site. And we continue to provide high quality data registered in Finland to the use of CTBT and we are committed to supporting the global network. Finland remains a strong advocate of the CTBT and we are a proud member of this group of friends. And we will continue our work towards a common goal, a world free of nuclear weapons. The entry into force of the CTBT would be a valuable step towards this goal. I thank you.

Thank you very much. Continuing the contributions from the CTBT group of friends, I now call on the representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Tom Berendsen.

Thank you very much. Thank you for all friends surrounding this important topic for being here, and specifically our honourable co-chairs for facilitating this important meeting. 30 years ago, the international community made a historic choice. It adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, committing to a comprehensive end to nuclear testing. And the Netherlands is proud to be among the countries that championed this treaty from the very beginning. Together, we have worked to bridge regions, advance verification, and invest in the science that would make a global ban on nuclear testing credible. At the heart of this achievement lies the International Monitoring System, the IMS. Few other multilateral endeavors combine science and security so effectively. With its worldwide network of seismic, hydroacoustic, and infrasound stations, the IMS can detect nuclear explosions almost anywhere, in the atmosphere, on the water, and on the ground. Apart from this, the IMS is extremely valuable for several other reasons. First, it deters nuclear testing. Any potential tester knows that an explosion is likely to be detected and analyzed. That knowledge helps to uphold the global norm against nuclear tests. Second, it builds trust. Shared independently verified data reduces uncertainty and miscalculations between states. And in a time of increasing geopolitical tension, this common factual baseline provides an essential contribution to international cooperation. And third, it serves humanity beyond geopolitical peace and security. IMS data supports tsunami warnings, earthquake and volcano monitoring, and deepen our understanding of the planet. It is a global public good available to all. For the Netherlands, the IMS embodies our vision of multilateral security arrangements, rules-based, science-driven, and delivering concrete benefits for people. As we mark the 30th anniversary of CTBT, we should be proud of the system we have built together. Yet, we must also recognize that our work is, unfortunately, not finished. The treaty still awaits entry into force. To safeguard the achievements of the last three decades for generations to come, we must maintain our commitment to the CTBT. We must protect and strengthen the IMS and keep working towards making the CTBT fully operational. Thank you.

Thank you very much. Can I turn now to another of the friends of the CTBT, the representative of Canada, Mr. Richard Arbiter.

Dear Ministers, Co-Chairs, Executive Secretary, High Representative, distinguished colleagues, as we've heard, we meet today at a critical juncture for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the global norm against nuclear explosive testing. The prospect of resumed testing, once considered distant, is becoming increasingly real. Any return to nuclear testing would undermine international peace and security, weaken confidence in the multilateral system, and risk fuelling a new nuclear arms race. This should not be considered inevitable. Indeed, since the early 1990s, remarkable progress has been achieved. We have built a verification regime unprecedented in scope and have established a powerful norm against nuclear explosive testing. but we cannot mistake progress for permanence. Questions surrounding compliance, intensifying strategic competition, and renewed discussion of nuclear testing all demand vigilance. The task before us is not only to respond to present concerns, but to prevent a broader erosion of a norm that has served us so well for three decades. To meet that challenge, Canada sees three practical avenues for action. First, We should encourage relevant Annex 2 states to consider voluntary transparency measures. Scientific exchanges, technical dialogue, and the sharing of relevant national data can strengthen confidence, reduce misunderstanding, and reinforce testing moratoria. Second, we encourage consideration of innovative pathways to entry into force, including coordinated efforts among states whose security concerns are closely intertwined. Where concerns regarding strategic disadvantage have contributed to deadlock, mutually reinforcing ratification steps could help to pave the way for progress. And third, we must continue investing in the treaty's verification regime. This means not only sustaining the international monitoring system, but also reinforcing the international data center's capacity to analyze data and better characterize events, and enhancing the on-site inspection mechanism so that it is ready for the treaty's entry into force. None of this is possible unless all state signatories pay their assessed contributions in full and on time. In closing, our predecessors acted to build the institution, the norm, the verification regime needed to put an end to nuclear explosive testing. Today, our responsibility is different, but no less important. We must preserve and strengthen that legacy before it comes under greater strain. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Canada. And to close, before I move to adoption, I call on my friend and colleague from the ASEAN region, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Teresa Lazaro from the Philippines.

I thank Australia, Canada, Germany, Finland, Japan, and the Netherlands for successfully convening the 12th Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. This is a particularly significant year for all of us gathered here. 30 years ago, the international community came together to make a clear choice to put an end to nuclear testing. When the CTBT was open for signature in 1996, it carried with it the hope that nuclear testing would no longer serve as a means of military development or strategic competition. Today, that vision remains unfulfilled, but we have come a long way. We have seen remarkable progress in the past three decades. Before the CTBT opened for signature, thousands of nuclear tests were conducted. Since 1996, there have been only 10. The difference is stark. The CTBT has established a powerful global norm against nuclear testing, even in the absence of its entry into force. This is an achievement that we must recognize and protect. This year has also been marked by important milestones. We warmly congratulate Tonga on its recent ratification of the CTBT, which completes the treaty's universalization across the Pacific. For a region that has experienced first-hand the devastating consequences of nuclear testing, this carries profound significance. We also look forward to the integrated field exercise in Namibia later this year, which will provide an important opportunity to test and further strengthen the Treaty's on-site inspection capabilities. The progress we have made over the past three decades is real, but much remains to be done. The Organization is facing serious financial pressures, and renewed rhetoric around nuclear testing is increasingly concerning. These challenges make it all the more important to protect the gains we have made and to keep moving forward. At a time when the prospect of renewed nuclear testing is once again being discussed, the norm established by the CTBT is more important than ever. We must not allow the world to return to an era when nuclear testing was considered an acceptable option. That is why the work of the Friends of the CTBT remains valuable. We must continue to keep the treaty on the international agenda, sustain political momentum, and remind the world of what is at stake. The progress of the past three decades was built through sustained political commitment. That same commitment will be needed to carry us through the final steps towards the treaty's entry into force. As co-president of the Article 14 conference with Sweden, the Philippines remains fully committed to advancing this work. We will continue to engage all state signatories and partners in advancing the treaty's universalization and entry into force. 30 years on, the choice that gave birth to the CTBT remains as relevant as ever, to choose restraint over escalation, and to work towards a world where nuclear testing is no longer an option. The Philippines remains committed to that choice and to bringing the CTBT into force. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Tess, Minister Lizardo. Can I proceed now to both adopt the statement, joint ministerial statement, and to close, but if I may, on behalf of the co-chair, Minister Montague, and I make three points. The first is that the treaty we are discussing has underpinned a global norm against nuclear testing that benefits all states, and all states have an interest in maintaining it. The second observation I make is that that fact is demonstrated by the contributions today, whether it's from Tonga and Palau or Namibia or Germany or the Netherlands or Canada or Australia or Japan. And the third point I make is this. A number of speakers have commented on the fact that this norm is under serious strain today, and there is only one way to respond to that, and that is to work together to strengthen that norm. So in that vein, I thank you all for your attendance. I thank those who have signed the Joint Ministerial Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and invite those who have not yet signed to indicate their support for it. With that, I declare the adoption of the statement and close this meeting. Thank you very much.