(Session 3) Decision-Making in the Council - Briefing for Delegates on the Work of the United Nations Security Council

Excellencies, distinguished delegates, colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, dear friends, Good morning and welcome back. It is a pleasure to see so many familiar faces returning for day two of our briefing on the work of the United Nations Security Council. And also I would like to thank Ambassador Alfaro d' Alba for joining us a bit earlier today. Thank you, Ambassador. I very much look forward to the fruitful exchange of ideas that today will bring on Wednesday. For those of you who joined us for the first day of the briefing, we built a solid understanding of the Council's structures, procedures, documentation and operational mechanics. Today we turn to some of the most dynamic and political significant dimensions of of the Council's work. How decisions are made, how informal processes function, and how all Member States, whether on the Council or not, can engage meaningfully with its work and identify opportunities for participation. Today's program is organized around two sessions. The first session of today is session three on decision making in the Council, which will cover the presidency of the Security Council, Council decisions and other outcomes, decision making and the use of the veto, and informal meetings and their conduct. Today we'll be hearing from our fellow delegates, ambassadors and political coordinators who are serving or who have served on the Security Council, sharing their personal experience and key takeaways from their time on the Council. After that, we'll move to session four, which will revolve around broader engagement and opportunity. During this session, we'll talk about improving the working methods of the Council, the preparation of the incoming 5 and negotiation dynamics of the elected 10, as well as the Council's relations with other organs and regional organization. The structure of today's briefing is similar to the sessions we had during day one. Each presentation would last approximately 30 minutes and it will follow by a 10 minute Q&A. The session three will conclude at 1pm so same schedule as day one. So we'll stop for lunch and we'll resume session four at 3pm and we'll conclude today's proceedings by 5:15pm so you can enjoy the long weekend after that. I again would like to strongly encourage you to take full advantage of these interventions. The insights that the presenters will bring from their personal experience on the Council are invaluable. These are the kinds of practical leave perspectives that no textbook can fully convey. With that, we will move directly into the substantive program. So let us begin. Now we move to the first session of today's briefing, Session three, which focuses on the decision making in the Council. We'll hear from senior delegates with direct experience serving on the Security Council. They will be sharing their Personal perspectives which are at the heart of this session. Our first presentation will examine the Presidency of the Security Council, its responsibilities, its working methods, and the practical realities of leading the Council's work for a month. We're fortunate to hear directly from two representatives who have held this responsibility in 2026. I am delighted to give the floor to His Excellency Ambassador Jamal Fares Alura Way, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Bahrain to the United nations and President of the Security Council in April 2026, and His Excellency Ambassador Mohammed Rabi Yusuf, Charge d' Affaires and Deputy Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Somalia to the United nations and President of the security council in January 2026. I will now give the floor to our first Speaker, His Excellency, Ambassador Jamal Fares Aroai. Excellency, the floor is yours.

Well, good morning everyone, and please accept my apology for being late. It was just on next door on the other event. So it's my pleasure to participate in this briefing on the work of the Security Council and in particular to the reflect on the important topic of decision making and the presidency of the Security Council. I would like to thank UNITAR DPPA and the Permanent Mission of Portugal for organizing this valuable discussion, which is contribute to strengthening understanding of the Council procedure and working methods among diplomats and professionals engaging with the multilateral system. The presidency of the Security Council is often described as procedural in nature and a practice. However, it is far more than that. So the monthly Presidency occupy unique position at the intersection of diplomacy, negotiation, coordination and political leadership. It plays a central role not only in organizing the Council daily work, but also in shaping the broader atmosphere in which decision making take place. As you know, the Presidency rotates monthly among the 15 members of the Council in alphabetical order. This rotation reflects one of the fundamental principles on the UN Sovereign equality among states. Every member of the Council, whether permanent or elected, assume responsibility for guiding the Council work. And every elected member assumed the Presidency at least once during its term on the Council. At the same time, the Presidency is exercised in a complex political environment. The Security Council is subjected to intense security, especially during moment of international crisis. The President must therefore balance procedural impartiality with political sensitivity, efficiency with inclusiveness and urgency with consensus building. The presidency also an opportunity to highlight national priorities and enhance understanding of how the Council functions. Today I will offer a few reflections on the practical dimension of the presidency, drawing both on institutional practice and Bahrain experience as a Council member and more recently as a President of the Council for the month of April before I get into that it is important to highlight the importance of preparing for the presidency of the Council. And I cannot, you know, highlight, you know, more on that topic because it's really important to have a time to prepare for the Presidency. It's an intense work. You have to be ready for unexpected issues that come up emergency situation. So it's part of it. So the slide is taken from the Security Council presidency guideline prepared by scad. It provide a useful overview of standard tasks before, during and the after presidency. And at this point I really cannot emphasize enough how valuable SCAD support and guidance is throughout this process. They provide practical advice on procedures, help prepare speaking notes and draft communications, advise on precedent and support the smooth organization of meeting and consultation. Their experience and institutional knowledge are essential in helping any delegation conduct a well prepared, effective and confident presidency. So we thank SCAD for all their work and support. It is also important for incoming presidencies to become familiar with the Security Council provision, rules of procedure as well as note 507 on working methods. The Eaton Handbook is also a useful tool. Bahrain began preparing for its April Presidency immediately after our election to the Council, including early discussions on our signature event which I will come back to it later. As you will see, the first day of the Presidency usually follows a fairly standard pattern which is the PR's breakfast, the coordinators meeting, the adoption of the program of work, followed by the press briefing and wrap up in session with the wider UN membership to present the program of work and other planned activities for the month. Then you know, I'm not going to go too deeply on the details of of procedural task. Instead, let me now elaborate further on the broader role and the responsibility of the Presidency. One of the first responsibility for the Presidency is preparing the monthly program of work. We reached out to SCAD six months before Bahrain presidency for the skeleton of the program of work and also to see what's the mandated issues and also the cycle of reports. The process requires close consultation with other Councils member, the Secretariat and the times at a times wider UN membership. While the program fork may appear to be significant simply an administrative planning tool, it carries important political weight. Decision on the timing of meeting, the sequencing of discussion, the scheduling of negotiation and the prioritizing of the agenda items can all influence diplomatic momentum and shape outcomes. At the same time, the program of work is largely driven by mandates and reporting cycle of file already in the Council's agenda. For that reason, the Presidency is generally not considered an executive presidency. To a large extent it is an exercise in coordination, an area where the Presidency has greater discretion is in organizing additional meeting on priority issues known a Signature Event Most Council members organize one or two signature events during their presidency. Bahrain organized four signature events during the April Presidency, all chaired by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. We know that it's not the norm on the Council, but April, you know, remained a unique month and also the situation around us wasn't, you know and you know, excellent situation. So the the first one was the briefing on cooperation between the UN and the League of the Arab States, which traditionally falls into the Arab member of the Council. The first ever Security Council briefing on cooperation between the UN and the Gulf Cooperation Council and the third one, an open debate on the maintenance of international peace and security focused on on the safety and protection of waterways in the maritime domain, which is all you know how important this issue become more and more. The fourth one was the quarterly open debate in the Middle east, which is Bahrain also made a signature event and was attended was and at the level of the Ministerial level. This event reflected Bahrain priority during its term on the Council. Early substantive and logistical preparation are essential, including work on concept note, high level participation and arrangement for civil briefers. In practice, the program of works evolved continuously throughout the month. Unexpected crisis required or require requests for urgent meetings, development on the ground or negotiation under draft resolution may require rapid adjustment. An effective President must therefore remain in close contact with the Council's member, coordinate carefully with the Secretariat, and stay responsive to emerging development. The Presidency also carries important responsibility regarding the scheduling and conduct of meeting. This include consultation on unscheduled meeting, determining meeting format, coordinating briefers including civil society, managing participation under Rule 37 and 39, and ensuring smooth procedural conduct. Although this responsibility may sound technical, they often require careful political judgment. Decisions concerning participation, speaking order, time limits or the handling of the procedural disagreement can quickly become politically sensitive. It is worth noting that other tasks of a presidency, including dealing with the correspondence, such as a letter, document and emails, much of the Security Council works to place not in a formal public meeting, but through intensive consultation and negotiation behind closed doors. In this context, the President may at times need to act as a consensus builder among members with differing views and position. This requires diplomacy and trust, as well as ability to identify areas of common ground, even when there are substantive divisions. During the Bahrain Presidency, for example, we were able to adopt two Presidential statements, one on the cooperation between the UN and the League of Arab States and the other one cooperation between the UN and the Gulf Cooperation Council. These were the first PRSD adopted by the Council this year. The Presidency also plays an important role in maintaining constructive dialogue during moment of heightening tension. A well managed presidency can help preserve channels of communication, reduce friction during negotiation and create space for diplomacy even when agreement is difficult. This role is especially important in today's international environment, marked by geopolitical tension, regional conflict and humanitarian crisis. In such circumstances, the ability of the presidency to guide discussion carefully and encourage consensus become particularly important. For example, when press elements are proposed during close consultation, the President can help steer discussion toward agreement, which is not always an easy task. Over the years, there has been increasing emphasis on improving the transparency, efficiency, effectiveness and inclusiveness of the Council working method, so successive presidencies have contributed to these efforts, including through regular briefing to the wider membership, engagement with regional organization and interaction with the civil society. Many presidencies also circulate working methods commitment at the beginning of their presidency. As mentioned in Note 507, this dimension in particularly important because the credibility of the Security Council depends not only on the authority under the Charter, but also on the confidence of the broader UN membership. This is even more so relevant for the elected members that are elected by the General Assembly. In this context, the Presidency can serve as an important bridge between the Councils and and the wider international community. The President often becomes the public face of the Security Council. This includes delivering press statements, conducting media stakeout, engaging with the journalists and representing agreed Council positions. The Presidency is expected to read Security Council press statement and elements to the press in the press stakeout areas. For example, I read the press statement agreed during our Presidency on condemning in the attack against unifil, following which our peacekeeper from France died and these and the three other were injured. So this is an example. I also attended as a President of the Security Council and delivered a speech at the event marking the 80th anniversary of the inaugural setting of the ICJ in the Hague on 17th of April. Before that of course, we had to work with the members to to agree on the speech, so representing the Security Council require careful formulation of the language and messaging. Especially when Council members hold divergent view, the President must preserve the institutional integrity of the Council while ensuring that communication accurately reflect agreed position. This can be challenging when consensus is fragile or negotiations remain ongoing. Presidencies must clearly distinguish between speaking on behalf of the Council, which is as a President of the Security Council, and speaking their national capacity. Although the Presidency can be demanding, especially on smaller delegations and elected members with limited resources, it is an important learning experience serving as a President. Place a delegation at the center of every aspect of the Council work. It provide insight into the Council procedure, dynamics and informal practices. And it is strengthening a delegation capacity for reminder of its item. On a broader level, the monthly rotation of the Presidency contribute to strengthening the overall presidency and institutional memory of the Council itself. Managing the Presidency requires procedural expertise, logistical organization and diplomatic coordination. This is precisely while briefing and work workshop such as this one organized by UNITAR are so valuable. Capacity building and knowledge sharing are essential to ensuring that all the Council member can participate effectively. And the confidence and work related is very important on that. And. The Presidency of the Security Council may rotate every month, but also important can extend beyond the 30 days of presidency. At the best, the Presidency can help the Council navigate complex crises, facilitate diplomatic compromise and uphold the collective responsibility in trust to the Security Council under the UN Charter. At the time when the international community faces multiple and interconnected challenges, the need for principal, inclusive and effective leadership within the Council has never been greater. So I thank UNITAR once again for, you know, convening this important discussion and also I look forward for your exchange of views and I'll stop here. Thank you.

Thank you, Excellency for your remarks and for sharing your invaluable experience as well. President of the security council in April 2026 and for sharing your insights on regarding an effective Presidency. So thank you so much. It is now my pleasure to give the floor to our second Speaker, His Excellency Ambassador Mohammed Rabi Yusuf, Charge d' Affaires and Deputy Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Somalia to the United nations and President of the security council in January 2026. Excellency, the floor is yours.

Thank you very much, Excellencies, colleagues, dear friends, let me begin by first thanking Portugal, UNITAR and DPPA for organizing this important event a decade ago. As a new diplomat at the United Nations, I remember being in these training rooms, taking notes and learning the ropes toward my journey to the un. I also acknowledge the presence of Ambassador Jamel Eloy, Ambassador Eloy and Ambassador Sunita. Those sessions, as a young diplomat I remember, left a mark. And it's a pleasure to return today and to share reflections from the other side of the table as President of the United Nations Security Council of the month of January of 2026. As many of you know, the Security Council presidency rotates monthly following the English alphabetical order. Elected members during their two year term get this opportunity once, or if they are lucky, twice, like Bahrain or unlucky. While the Presidency may seem ceremonial from the outside, those who have experience know better. It's a chance to set the Council's agenda, steer attention toward urgent crises, chair meetings from routine briefings to emergency sessions, and represent the Council at the highest levels. In short, it's the best stage an elected member gets to showcase diplomatic leadership and leaves a positive legacy. Somalia took on this responsibility in January 2026 with a presidency anchored around three principles. Efficiency, transparency and consensus building. It was exactly one year into our Council term and for us it was a moment of return where we had the first presidency of Somalia in 1972. And by a strange twist of fate, that presidency also was in January and after one year of our time in the Council during that presidency in 1972. In January, Somalia organized the first council meeting in Africa in Addis Ababa at the Organization of African Unity. At that time, our agenda was heavily focused at that time on African liberation in Southern Rhodesia. Zimbabwe today was also a candidate for the Council membership. Independence for Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, to name a few, and addressing the policies of apartheid in South Africa. Today, that historic visit by the Council has been institutionalized and it's a regular annual consultation between the United Nations Security Council and the AU Peace and Security. And it's usually held in October every year and interchanges between Addis and New York. Last year the EU hosted the members of the United Nations Security Council in Addis and this year United nations. The Security Council will host the AU Peace and Security members this October. Since we had our only two presidency in January from we had half jokingly dubbed it the Somali Month. I will come back to that story in a bit. So. So keep that in mind. Of course the presidency is just one chapter in a country's two year council term, but it's the most vivid. It's where delegation's priorities, style and readiness are put all on full display. And let me tell you that one month can feel like the longest 31 days of your diplomatic career. The pressures are real, the stakes are high and the whole world is watching. So there are of course the powers and the pitfalls of the presidency. The presidency sets the monthly agenda, decides which issues get heard and when, chairing meetings, issuing council products and representing the Council at public events. But behind closed doors, the President also is a consensus builder working to find common ground among members whose interests often diverge. Every presidency is an exercise in crisis management, even when you think you have planned for everything. Let me share how we approach that task from preparation to execution and reflect on what worked the pre presidency. And we say preparation, preparation, preparation. Success as a presidency starts long before the gavel drops on day one. Unlike Bahrain for Somalia, we had the luxury of one year notice and we used every bit of it. Early team assembly is crucial. You need clear roles, robust communication plan both inside and outside the mission, and a sense of shared mission. So we have prepared and prepared and waited and prepared. And sometimes even though it's a luxury, it feels like you are waiting for Godot. We have spent months drafting our program of work, mapping out mandated meetings and stating items. We have also selected signature events that would define our month. Our high level theme or signature event was titled Promotion and Strengthen of the Rule of Law among nations was chosen to reflect our commitment to international law and the UN Charter. We also prioritized a high level debate on the Middle east and both to be chaired by our President. Drafting the program of work is an iterative process with rounds of negotiations among political coordinators, constant adjustments to accommodate new developments and last minute tweaks right up the final hours. And the program of work, of course, is a living document to adjust to accommodate emergency meetings on development crises. Customary bilateral meetings with the Secretary General and the President of the General assembly are essential to align priorities and expectations before the month begins. And then there are bilateral consultations, different ones at the level of. Different levels. Pr, DPR or Political Coordinating for the Presidency Month we say. Consultation, coordination and coping with surprises. January is always unique. It's the first month of the year when five new Council members join in after the program of work is adopted on the first business day of the month and of that new year. The Presidency has added responsibility of helping the new members and mark the first business day of the year with the flag raising ceremony. It's initiated by Kazakhstan in 2018 as an official welcome, symbolizing unity and cooperation for the incoming elected as they take on their responsibility of maintaining global peace and security. For January, our month of presidency is usually not the Council's busiest month, or so we thought. In reality, the agenda can fill up quickly. The President's role is to keep the process moving, make sure that the new members hit the ground running and maintain open lines of communication with all Council members. The Secretariat, of course, is CAD and colleagues across the UN system. Regular transparent consultation is the secret sauce. It reduces the risk of surprise, helps build trust and sustain the Council's authority. It also keeps you sane. We held mandatory meetings on Syria, Haiti and others, plus emergency sessions on Venezuela, Ukraine and Iran. Our high level signature events required extensive planning and months of coordination between New York and our capital Mogadishu. Now, remember when I said we called it the Somali Month in the Middle of our presidency, we realized that we have made a miscalculation. January in New York is in fact the least Somali of the month. It's the coldest time of the year. On the weekend before our high level signature event, the city was hit, as you know, by the snowstorm so severe that the New York shut down entirely just as our President as well as high level delegations were meant to arrive to our events. Despite our careful planning, Nature had other ideas. Our President was unable, unfortunately, to make to New York in time to preside over our signature events. Yet, in true UN spirit, the work went on. With the support of our team on the ground and the resilience of Council members, the events were resounding success. More than 80 delegations participated in each event, a testament to the commitment of the UN community and the importance of the topics at hand for Somalia and for the wider membership. The promotion of a strengthening the rule of law among nations and the high level debate on the Middle east were not just signature events, but priorities that reflected deepest values and the challenges of our region. Both debates were lively, substantive and inclusive, bringing together a diversity of perspectives and reaffirming the Security Council's role as a form for meaningful dialogue even when snow or circumstances keeps one from the podium. That experience reminded us in diplomacy you can plan for everything except for the weather, but you can always count on the commitment and the flexibility of your colleagues to carry the day. Lessons and Legacy at the end of the month, as encouraged by note 507, we hosted a wrap up session to review the Council's work and share lessons learned. Each Presidency also prepares monthly assessment of activities ensuring that experience adds to the Council's institutional memory. My Concluding Thoughts holding the Presidency is a high pressure, high visibility responsibility. It demands advanced planning, clear delegation and well structured program of work. But above all, it requires civilization, sincere continuous consultation with Council members and the YRU and family. Each team assembly, iterative drafting and proactive engagement at all levels by the ground to lay the ground for success and a thorough wrap up both in report and self reflection ensures that the lessons live on strengthen the Council's for the next Presidency. So to leave a legacy, a positive legacy, we believe that building consensus, leading on substance, managing crises, respond flexibly to events that no one can predict and speak credibly at national and regional level. I thank you for your kind attention. I'll be happy to answer questions and hear your comments. I thank you,

thank you Excellency for your reach and candid insights into the experience of presiding over the Security Council and how consensus building and preparation, even though you cannot control the weather all the times, is crucial for a successful presidency. So thank you so much. We will now open the floor for questions. Before we start, I would like to briefly welcome Ambassador Sanita Pavluta Des Landes. Thank you so much for joining us. We are running a bit over time, so if it's fine with you, we'll take three questions in the first round and then we'll move to the next session. So before you speak, please remember to state your name, the mission or organization you work for, and we'll be starting this right now. So thank you so much. And the floor is open? Yes, ma'. Am.

Good morning. My name is Mariela Fonrose. I'm from the Permanent Mission of Trinidad and Tobago. Thank you, Ambassador, so much for your very insightful presentation. I have two quick questions. One, Ambassador Raou, you mentioned in consultation on the program of work that you would reach out to the wider UN membership. And I'm not sure if Ambassador Youssef touched on it in mentioning the meetings with the Secretary General and the pga. So I wanted to know in what ways you'd reach out to the wider membership and what format. And you also mentioned, Ambassador Harari, that the month can extend beyond. Could you elaborate on that, please? Thank you.

Thank you so much. Perhaps we can take 12 additional questions. So if there's any questions, please raise your hand. Yes, please, go ahead.

Good morning. Thank you so much for your time today. My name is Sophie Grundin, and I'm with the Permanent Mission of Liberia. So we're on the council for the first time now in 65 years. So now you looking back at your presidency, is there anything that you would have done differently? Our presidency is coming up, as you know, of course, in December. So it would be good to know. Thank you so much.

Thank you so much for your question. We can take one last question. So if there's any last final question, don't hesitate. Yes, please go ahead.

Thank you so much. Excellencies, my name is Karla. I'm a fellow with the PGA's fellowship program. I know you cannot control the weather, but is there any handbook or rules that you can use to address crisis, conflict situations? Is there a common handbook or common rules or. It's up to your presidency how to conduct in this situation. Thank you.

Perfect. Thank you so much. So perhaps we can start with the first question. So it was regarding the what weighs? You can consult with the wider UN membership. So I don't know if Any of you would like to start first. Thank you.

Thank you very much for the questions. And it's an important question the relation between, you know, the Council's member and the wider membership that could, you know, go through regional group, your regional group. This is one topics or one channel. The other channel is also as a council member also you need to hear the others definitely, you know, to listen more and more from the wider membership, you know, because you are elected from that wider membership. So you need to also relay and come to them, you know, know to hear from them, you know, in some certain topics. So this is an angle and I have example for that. We, we put a resolution during our presidency and that resolution is presented by Bahrain on behalf of the GCC and Jordan. So that's our regional group was at that time. So it's, it's also reflect the regional group and also we have reach out with different also regional group. That's the engagement. What I mean, you know, in terms of the wider membership, our presidency was a unique presidency because we've been, you know, under attack by heinous attacks from Iran. So we have the presidency, our, our countries under attack and also the amounts of the, and also working on a resolution. So that three things, you know, without preparation in advance for the presidency, we cannot navigate, you know, through, through, through, through that. And also the consultation and having friends on the Council, you know, like, you know, Eloy, Sunita and Muhammad, you know, they will, when you talk to them, then they will give you advice, they will give you what they are seeing, you know, not not only your perspective only, but, you know, the other perspective too. So that's why, you know, our presidency was intense, a lot of meetings. I remember, you know, one of my best friends, he said, you know, welcome to the torture room. And that torture room, I understand it later, later, you know, what is it, you know, in terms of the torture room, which is, you know, a lot of work, a lot of pressure and a lot of stuff. The second question, Did I miss any questions or.

Yes. So we have like traditional questions. The. But I don't know. Ambassador, would you like to contribute to first question? Question one, do you want to add any additional remarks? Perfect. So the second question, I think it was addressed to both of you. It was from your experience as president of the UN Security Council. Have you done something differently? So I think it's very good and difficult question to answer.

We did, but not, you know, intent to do it, which is, you know, before, before we joined the Council, you know, at the beginning they told us, some members, they told us, you know, not to surprise the Council. Always prepare them and don't send something, you know, during the weekend or late at night. And we did all the opposite. So this is something what we, you know, learn from our experience and that it came before because of, you know, what we are being through and what's the situation in our region and in the world.

Perfect, thank you.

So the question on something, what would I have done differently? I think I've told the story about, you know, planning and January is a tricky month in terms of. It's usually after the New Year's and after New Year's and people are, you know, you plan when to hold your events or signature events. Is it in the first half of the month or later at the month? So maybe look into more into how we plan our signature event where we'll put our signature event. But for, for New York, I think everybody knows that the weather is unpredictable. You can have sun, snow and rain at the same day. So it's impossible plan for that. Another thing maybe I would done differently is maybe enjoy the moment more. I think this is a once in a lifetime experience. So while you bug down into managing crises and all that, you forget that this is, you know, one of the once in a lifetime experience. So maybe enjoy more, take advantage of that time because once it ends the next time it comes, you never know when will be the next time. Thank you.

Thank you so much. And the last question asked from the room was is there any handbook or rules you can use to navigate different types of situations effectively for the sake of time? You can give us a very successful said answer like two, three minutes maximum. That will be appreciated. Thank you.

I wish that book was there. I've not seen it yet, so I don't think there's a book. But that's where you know your skills as the grammatical skills and leadership comes into play and you have to be creative with how you handle things.

I think listening, consultation after consult, consultation, reading, attending, you know, Security Council meetings, listen to the room, you know, intensive, you know, interactive, you know, with the, with the council's member, you know, in advance that that works, that help. I'm not, you know, against, you know, all, you know, AI platforms. It helps but at the same time it's. It's a cold, it's a cold information. But you need something that you need to deal with something alive. I think, you know, more into, in person, you know, attending and have, you know, meetings after meetings that the live book that you can learn from that you can take from.

Thank you so much Ambassadors. Was a pleasure having you this panel. So thank you. So give a big round of applause for our speakers. Perfect. Meanwhile we prepare for the next presentation. Let me briefly introduce the next session. Our next presentation will focus on Council decisions and other outcomes, the different types of formal decisions and outputs that the Council produces and the processes through which they are negotiated and adopted. This is another area where personal experience from the negotiation table speaks volumes. So meanwhile we wait for the next speakers. So we have the Let me briefly introduce themselves so that our next speakers will be His Excellency Ambassador Eloy Alfaro de Alba, Permanent Representative of Panama and Her Excellency Ambassador Sanita Paflutaba des Landes, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Latvia to the United Nations. Thank you. Welcome.

Thank you very much. I wish to thank in the first place UNITAR and the United Nations Department of Political and Peace Building affairs and the Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United nations for giving us this opportunity to share with all of you our experience, limited as it may be, regarding the function of the Security Council's working methods. So that I don't forget, I would also join Jamal's comment to thank Scott for all the assistance that they provide the members of the Council and particularly the Presidency when it's that turn, but because they have had a lot of experience and they can anticipate things that may be happening to you but that you may not see coming. It's not my opportunity to do that. But I also would like to congratulate both Bahrain and Somalia and their teams for the excellent work they did during their presidencies and during their term in the the Council and I think it was very interesting. Mohamed's comment about the first meeting of the Council outside of headquarters held in addis Abeva in 1971 reminds me that the same thing happened in Panama in 1973 when we were not presiding the Council but Panama was in the Council. And it turns out that it was my father in law that took that was able to maneuver. So the Council met for the second time out of headquarters in Panama and we were able to raise there the issue of the Panama Canal and Panama's expectations to be able to administer the Canal eventually, which did happen. Talking about what I shouldn't be doing, if you think January is a complicated month weather wise, let me assure you that August is even worse. And during August there is one thing you can count on is that no PRs are going to be with you at meetings. We had our presidency in August, and that's exactly what happens. So it's not a very high level month for meetings or for high level representatives of countries to come during your high level events. But we were very proud of what we were able to do. And the subject that we chose for our high level event was maritime security. I had a big struggle with my capital because. Because there was some preferred transnational crime, which I hated as a subject because I thought it would be a negative, you know, putting a mirror to your face and seeing the negative reflection. I hate to see. I hate to look at myself in the mirror. Anyway, so I decided, I convinced Capital to do it on maritime security and look what's happening now. Anyway, according to a gossip that circulates among Council members and others, elected members are only allowed to serve for two years so that they may not learn too much. And I think that is quite true. However, after a year and a half of experience as elected members of the Security Council, we hope to have developed some understanding of the dynamics behind the decisions and products emanating from the Council. And this is my topic, the topic that has been assigned to me. Those products are certainly the result of initiatives that foster dialogue and discussion on the conflicts and situations on unfolding on the ground. The Charter of the United nations refers simply to decisions adopted by the Security Council and does not expressly mention resolutions. However. Obviously resolutions are the most formal product of the Security Council and perhaps the most important one, and the most complicated to achieve. However, the Council produces a broader range of documents and outcomes in the course of the daily work. Most originate directly from the Council, while others do not and are referred to as other outcomes. In 2025, the Security Council adopted 44 resolutions and eight presidential statements, compared with 46 resolutions and seven presidential statements in 2024. The council also issued fewer notes and press statements than in the previous year. Panama has consistently engaged in Security Council negotiations, making an effort to promote balanced and consensus based outcomes across geographic and thematic files. And I think the colleagues at that spoke before me made a reference to that as well. We have been privileged as a country to participate in Security Council six times. But trust me, it is very difficult to gain experience because every Council has to deal with different issues and different crisis crisis. So there is not much experience to be had from being in the Council many years ago. We have emphasized the importance of negotiations and our colleagues have also mentioned that alongside the P5 and the E10. And that difference is important because the P5, as you know, are the P5 and the E10 are only there for two years, so they haven't at looked learned much. And in order to approve any resolution you need to have the number of votes, usually nine, but you also need to make sure that the efforts in that resolution will not be frustrated by a negative vote from any of the P5. So those negotiations are very important. We have as an elected member and co pen holder of on the Haiti file, and I'm going to use this as an example of a resolution that was very interesting and that refers to our region and it's one of the few and it's an interesting case in point because it's an ongoing situation and the effects of that resolution are not yet in. The curtain has not closed and so it will be interesting to see what comes out of that effort. But anyway, we played an interesting role in the negotiations leading to the adoption of resolution 2793 in 2025, one of the council's most significant recent decisions on Haiti, which established some something called the Gang Suppression Force and the United Nations Support Office in Haiti. UNSO Gang Suppression Force was not a name that was particularly popular among Council members, but for political reasons that I need not go into and prefer not to go into, that was the name that was chosen for this invention. As part of the continuous dialogue among Member States on the situation in Haiti, we consistently advocated for a comprehensive approach that addressed not only the security dimensions of the crisis, but also its humanitarian, human rights and broader social consequences. In that context, during the negotiations surrounded that Resolution 2793 that I mentioned, Panama promoted stronger language on child protection, violence against women, human rights safeguards and accountability mechanisms. In parallel with these border efforts surrounding Council decisions making, Panama has also worked actively trying to bridge positions among members of the P5 while engaging closely with regional and elected members of the Council to help build consensus around the resolution. And this is something my colleagues also refer to. In addition, and as another example of Security Council outcomes, we led a stakeout alongside 53 member states, calling for the approval of the resolution and underscoring the urgent need for the international community to provide concrete support to Haiti. The reason that I am saying that the curtness not yet closed is that it almost hasn't even opened because this resolution provided for a peculiar mechanism that is not completely under control of the United nations or the Security Council, but is meant to address the crisis in Haiti, which has been ongoing for over 30 years, some say 50. So that requires that this Gang Suppression Force be on the ground, which has not completely happened yet, and engages with the gangs to try to provide some level of security that may then serve as a basis to hold reasonably legitimate and transparent, transparent elections in Haiti to address the political issue. So we will see what happens. There is a complication and that's why I mentioned protection of children, that the gangs are significantly engaged in their miss youngsters. So the suppression will be suppressing youngsters. And it may be that the violence that ensues in that engagement between the gang and the. Between the gangs and the gang suppression force may prejudice young people that are participating as a gang member. So there's a delicate situation there. It is important to underscore that the decisions of the Council, in particular case of Haiti, through the sanctions regime, be new. The grand suppression force and unso, which is the newly created UN agency, must function in a coordinated and complementary manner, with each mechanism serving distinct but mutually reinforcing objectives. I already mentioned stakeouts and I can out of difficult experience, I can tell you that I came to the United Nations. I'm not a career diplomat, I think I'm not a diplomat at all, as a matter of fact. But I came to the United nations, to New York in September of 1924, and the first thing that I had to deal with was a stakeout. When I first heard the word, I thought it was something that you eat, but it turns out to be one of the products that is not necessarily a Security Council product because. But it's always. It always takes place in that space provided in front of the Security Council. So it's very confusing. The stakeouts are something sometimes Security Council promoted, but sometimes not necessarily because other countries can do stakeouts in the same place in the context of the Security Security Council. If for some reason the issue may be may cause may affect international peace and security, but they're two different things. Lately, depending on whether the stakeout takes place before Security Council meeting or after Security Council meeting. Some people refer to the ones that take place before before as take ins and the ones that they had before as takeouts. But anyway important to remember that it's not something that is edible. The purpose of the stakeouts is to communicate positions, provide updates on the conduct of meetings in the case of the Council, or react promptly to unfolding events. These interventions may take the form of press takeouts where brief statements are made, or press elements which consist of pre agreed messages among Council members. Now I'm talking back to about Council products and are generally read out by the Presidency. Those press elements are always negotiated among Council members and so the text is always adjusted to take into account political interest and positions. While they do not constitute formal decisions of the Security Council, as they require no vote and are not legally binding, stakeouts and pest elements have become an important tool within the Council's working methods as coordinators of the Security Council. Shared Commitments on Women, Peace and security in 2026, Panama also promoted coordinated messaging in support of WPS priorities. In February of 2026, the shared commitments Group conducted the first ever press takeout on Syria ahead of the Council meeting, highlighting the importance of women's participation and protection considerations in ongoing political and humanitarian efforts. So I'm just going to skip women. Within the framework of the Council's working methods, particular attention is also given to the so called monthly assessments prepared by each presidency. Note 507 of the Security Council underscores the value that members attach to this practice as it provides a comprehensive account of the Council's main activities during the month and contributes to the preparation of the annual report. This is sort of a memory exercise to leave something behind concerning what the Presidency had to deal with during its term. In this regard, presidencies are encouraged to complete and submit their assessment promptly after the conclusion of their term, ensuring a concise, yet complete overview of the Council's work. However, not all presidencies feel that this is important and therefore some decide not to comply. In practical terms, at the end of our Presidency, we were responsible for consolidating all relevant information considered throughout the month, and this included not only the formal meetings of the Council, but also informal consultations, as well as the decisions and outcomes adopted during the period. Throughout the process, we always try to incorporate the views and comments of all incidents interested delegations on the various files addressed during the month. Now, I will stop there because I think that I probably exceeded my opportunity.

So thank you, thank you, Ambassador, for, for your insights on Council decisions and other outcomes, as well as for highlighting the importance of negotiations within the UN Security Council, especially given the Panama's extensive experience in the Security Council. So, thank you so much. I am pleased to introduce your second Speaker, Her Excellency Ambassador Sanita Pavluta Deslandes, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Latvia to the United Nations. Excellency, the floor is yours.

Well, thank you. Thank you very much. And thank you for this opportunity to speak to those colleagues from different missions who who are interested in the work of the Security Council. I do not know all of you, but I have a suspicion that there are many of you who are aspiring members, probably so I'll try to be rather clear but at the same time, without being very exhaustive, because I'll say why afterwards. But I'll start by thanking, as my colleagues did, thanking UNITAR for organizing this, but obviously also the DPPA and the Mission of Portugal and scab, as well as Hila rightly mentioned. And I'll start by some kind of advertisement. If you are aspiring members or preparing for serving on the Council, you will have many opportunities to train and to train your teams in very much detail. And UNITAR has helped us a lot when we were preparing and providing some very, very wise and knowledgeable speakers who actually spoke during this seminar as well. So I'm jumping to the answering the question that was asked to the previous panel about the handbooks. There are paper handbooks on the procedures and all kinds of things that you need to know. And there are also living handbooks, and there is one name, which is Lawrence Zeivers, who is both the paper and living handbook that you can always rely on. But then certainly there are things that are written, but there are so many things in our work that rely on practice, and practice probably is the most difficult part. And this is the main difference between the P5 and the elected members, because they have this institutional memory, and we have to learn and we have to learn fast. So my first advice is use the time before you enter the Council to learn as much as you can and train your teams. Because many of the outcomes that I'll briefly cover because I think we're really behind the schedule, are done not by the PRs sitting here and talking, but by the experts, negotiated by the experts. And it is very important that the experts also know how things work, and they're very much prepared. To serve the country, to serve the wider membership, and actually to be able to negotiate and make the Council as efficient as any elected member can actually do. For my country, this is the first time that we are on the Council. We entered on the 1st of January. We haven't had a presidency yet, so I cannot share firsthand experience. I can share experience of watching. But then there are decisions that are not always put forward or negotiated by the presidencies. They can be initiated either because some country is a pen holder on a file, or because some country is in charge of some informal group, and I'll mention a few examples while I speak, or because there is a new issue you want to raise. So that means that not only the presidency can be in the lead, but also any member of the Council in specific situations. Now, ELO covered several topics, so I'll probably start by trying to put things in a frame. When we talk about the decisions and the outcomes of the Council, typically people would notice resolutions and ELO explains practically how that happens. Resolutions are obviously decisions of the Council, but they seem more visible because there is a vote. There is attention drawn to that. And somehow it seems as the more noble product of the. Of the Security Council and it seems as the most probably difficult in many cases. It is probably difficult when you have to draft it because it is very. Usually tends to be longer and more precise and sets further steps. But in fact, since it can be adopted with nine votes in favor and no vetoes by the P5, it is actually sometimes easier to achieve a result with a resolution. It sounds counterintuitive, but it can be easier because you do not need a consensus necessarily. So I'll. I'll touch upon the other products and those other products actually require consensus, which means that this is unanimity. And although they seem like silent outcomes of the Council, they can be much more difficult to agree upon. So there is a difference in terms of the content, but also in terms of the way you can actually adopt them. So also Ila mentioned the trends. I'll now cover a little bit other kinds of decisions besides the resolutions. So first about the presidential statements. And they're actually, as I said, since this requires consensus, you would see also the trend that, for example, for the presidency statements called PRSTs, which is the word we use. So I'll keep with the PRS. PRS. Although PRSTs might be confusing because press statements also would sort of combine the same letters. But PRSTs are presidential statements. So last year there were only eight PRs for the same reason that if there are divisions in the Council and the issues are complicated and when you need the consensus, it's very difficult to agree. So you would only be sometimes able to agree on something which is the lowest common denominator. And that number was lower than the years before this year in 2026, in the now almost five months of 2026, we only have had two presidential statements. Similarly, for the press statements, there is a very similar trend. Now about the what is the statement by the President? It is always a Council decision, regardless of the content. Why do you opt for a presidential statement? So politically it would be seen as a step below a resolution, but legally it is not. When does that happen? It can happen in cases when the Council addresses an issue for the first time. So there is a member states, not necessarily the presidency, but it could be the presidency that wishes to Explore a new issue on the Council. It would be typically you wouldn't start with a resolution necessarily. Presidential statement might be one of the first steps. And then you might want to build upon that. If there is a, let's say you feel the willingness of the membership to proceed with that, then you might elaborate that later. It can also be a situation, an ad hoc situation, an existing file where something happens and you want to put that forward. It can also be on a thematic issue, so it is shorter, but at the same time also needs to be negotiated very thoroughly. So I said we have had two presidential statements this year. So those were initiated under the presidency of Bahrain. And Cemal told in detail about his experience. So these were in this case about the cooperation between the UN and the Arab League and between the UN and the gcc. On the gcc, that was the first time ever. So that was an introduction of a new element. Now you adopt the PRSDS through a non objection procedure, which means that is practically in writing. You negotiate that at the expert level. There can be different revs. You can negotiate in prisons. It is done by the experts. So I don't have actually a firsthand experience of negotiating a PRC because it's done by the experts. So you would typically the author would put forward the text, they would be negotiated with experts in presence, in writing several reps. And then once there is an agreement, typically it would be adopted at the Council meeting in the chamber. And there are two ways. You can either read it out and adopt it afterwards, or like it was the case this year, the PRSDs were coinciding or presented for the meeting in question. So we had a Council meeting on birth to topics. So you had a debate on the topic. And then at the end, as the silence procedure passed and there was an agreement, the Presidency said and we adopt this and that presidential statement on this and that topic. So that's one way of doing those. Now going forward. Another type of outcomes is letters by the President President. So they can also be decisions of the Council and they also require a consensus, which means that the presidency of the Council cannot unilaterally speak on behalf of the Council. They can only do so with the authorization of the members of the Council. So you can have, as I said, the same decisions. One example of decisions that are originating from the Council themselves is like when the Council goes on a mission to the field and then they adopt the terms of reference. There can be decisions that are response to a letter by the Secretary General. And when they need that requires response of the Council, that decision would come also in a form of a letter. And they also go on the silence procedure, what they typically cover. They can in specific situations, amend a resolution in a specific case, and to an extent a mandate. If such a necessity is instead of a resolution. There can be reasons for that, or there can be establishment of regional offices or modifying their mandates. But most frequently, the exchanges of letters with the Secretary General happen in cases of appointments. Although legally the Secretary General does not need to have the Council's approval, it is good practice to consult the Council before those appointments. So it's not legally required. But this is good practice. And most of the time Secretary General does that. But since the Council reply requires consensus, a country can either allow the decision to pass and dissociate itself, or it can in cases of appointments, also halt the appointment, which means delaying it. For the letters. I have an example that could be also interesting. All our eyes are now on the selection of the next Secretary General. So one example of such letters where discussions among the Council members take place, very detailed discussions and sometimes complicated discussions, is the. When you start the procedure of the selection of the Secretary General, it is launched by joint letter by the PGA and the Security Council, the President of the Security Council. So it is a joint letter, but for the President of the Security Council to be able to sign that joint letter with the pga, it had to be negotiated by the Council members. So that is a typical case where a letter can be very sensitive and complex negotiation. And now, for instance, there is another process, a next step from the Council point of view. In this selection process, when the current Presidency, China is preparing a letter regarding the next steps in the Council, about how the process will take place in the Council. These things are very much based also on practice, whether such a letter is issued or not issued. So this is a typical case where practice also plays a role. Now we have another type which is notes by the President. And Eloy mentioned notes five or seven. That is one very important part of the notes by the President. So while resolutions are about policy, notes are typically about procedure. So depending on the content, it can be a decision. And they also require the consensus of all 15 members. So one of the examples would be adoption of the Council's annual report. That was also mentioned, that is actually happening today. The Council adopted, formally adopted without a vote, the annual report. It had passed a non objection procedure, which is nlp, which is like silence, and then it will be distributed to the ga. Further, with a note by the President of the Security council. Typically Note 507 is a very important type of note. It is these decisions are about the working methods. So you have the working methods that are covered by the provisional rules of procedure of the Council. But there are many things that are not covered. So they rely a lot on practice. When the practice has been going on for some time, there is the informal working group and working methods which discusses and if there is a consensus among the members that this or that kind of practice needs to be codified or can be codified, and there can be a lot of resistance against codification of practice. If there is an agreement that is codified, then it is then a note by the President would be issued and so on. The working message, typically this is always note 5 or 7, which is another very important handbook in writing that you can always refer to. Notes can also be used when you need to change the formulation of an agenda item. I think that was probably covered how the agenda is shaped in the Council. There can be no. That are not decisions that would typically transmit reports from entities of the wider UN system which are not directly answering to the Secretary General. Press statements were covered a lot, I would say, just probably also for the. To put that in a bigger picture. Press statements are often the fastest way for the Council to signal or to react to a specific situation, but it can be very difficult to agree on that. So these are not decisions, but they require unanimity. So presidents also have to always be very, very careful about the language used when presenting them. So press statements are published, they can be read to the. To the media. Not necessarily, but they are always published. You can have a situation where there is initiative to have a press statement. And this actually works for all consul products that could be put forward either by the Presidency or by the penhold or by someone who is. Who is. Who has taken the lead on a specific topic. And then there is a negotiation. But if there is a disagreement, the Council never. The product never sees the daylight. So sometimes, basically these would be also negotiated at the expat level. But if there are difficulties, there would be brought to the Council for the consultations. Typically there might be that the pen of that particular product initiates a conversation among the members at the Council level, typically PR level or whoever represents the PR at that particular meeting in closed consultations, typically under any other business, business or any other matter to try to block a situation. So there have been cases this year when it worked, and there have been cases where actually it's clear that there will be no result. And I had examples I mean, I'm talking too much myself, but for example, in Sudan we had both situations this year, one that saw daylight and the other one that did not. And finally, on the press elements, yes, press elements are agreed messages. The issue with the press elements is that usually they are initiated in close consultations on that point. And the idea is that you see in the room whether there is an agreement to have one or not. There might be an agreement to have one, but members can cannot agree on the messages, in which case nothing happens. The press elements, if the press statements could sometimes take a few weeks to negotiate and to come out. The press elements, the idea of the press elements is to have them quickly reacting to a specific situation. So if you cannot agree on that on that day, or let's say very, very quickly, then usually those pretzels are just dropped. And also Ilya mentioned the stakeouts. I think one aspect about the stakeouts is that when you see that the council cannot unanimously agree on public messaging in either statements or press elements. This is why we see a multiplication of stakeouts. So stakeouts are not council outcomes. They are not. I mean, if the Council can agree, the council will not do a stakeout. The council will do a press statement or press elements. So stakeouts typically would be a way for the council members who are agree on a specific matter, but not the whole Council. So a group of member states who agree that there is a need to communicate on this matter, they would do a stakeout. It can also be done by non council members, but related to the council agenda. But typically it would be by someone from the council, sometimes open to wider membership. Sometimes only a group of council members would do that. But generally, let's say this is the mapping of possibilities. So whatever is your political objective, you choose either way of trying to get an outcome. But then, although sometimes they may see technical issues, but blocking something, disagreeing with something, it's very, very political, always very political. So that's, that's somehow, that's, that's a very, very, very wide, wide array of possibilities that the Council has. And yes, I'll probably stop here. I've spoken a lot, I had an, I wanted to share maybe more specific cases, case studies, but yeah, then we need another half hour, so I'll stop here and very happy to try to answer if there's anything. Well, this was a bit technical, but it will, you'll have the opportunity to see that much more in detail when you prepare for your, for your terms. And I wish you good luck for those who are Preparing.

Thank you, Ambassador, for your insightful presentation and for your experience with us. And we now open the floor for questions. We are 10 minutes behind schedule, so we'll try to catch up with time during the next session. However, we can open the floor and if you have any one pressing question you like to ask the speakers, please don't hesitate to go ahead. The floor is open.

Good morning. Again. Just one question on the monthly assessment. You had mentioned that it was a concise document and I guess it's open to Member states of the Council whether they wish to have one at the end of their present. But is there, is it a factual document or is there room for interpretation or to give perhaps your views on the way forward on like a particular issues or issues during your presidency. Thank you.

Perfect. Thank you so much for your question. So

actually it has to be as factual as possible because otherwise it. It gets objections from members of the Council depending on the issue that is being addressed or the event that the assessment is describing. So it has to an attempt has to be made for the wording to be as factual as possible. This happened. This meeting was held on such and such a topic. But it's very difficult to go beyond that. There is always room for interpretation depending on some wording. But you're right, it has to be straightforward on a factual basis rather than on a valuation or interpretation basis.

Thank you, Ambassador. Ambassador Pavluta Des Landes, would you like to say some final remarks before we close the session?

No, not necessarily. Unless there are questions. Yeah, but I think there was something. I saw someone moving or not.

Is there any final questions from. From the room? No. Okay.

Exceeding my the time. I think I want to congratulate Sunita because you made a very good overview of a number of products and I think that we didn't step on each other's toes, which was good, even though we didn't prepare that. She made several references to experts. And if some of you are about to or expecting to be in the Council or some are already in the Council, as the case of Liberia, I always kit our team because it was a team that was put together and it included some members that already had some experience at the UN and some that did not. And so I told them at the start that in my view they were ignorant, not experts. But I'm not sure whether they like the comment at the beginning, but they cut my drift eventually and actually they do become experts because they're assigned to a specific thematic issue or to a specific geographic regional situation and they are the ones that do all the research, et cetera. And they also have to speak English well. And they have, because of the negotiations, and they have to draft well in English and in Spanish. So that's one thing. And the other thing, if you do expect to be in the Council or you're already there as an expert or as a. Or as a political coordinator, expect to gain weight because the. The meetings are generally held during lunchtime or breakfast, and PCs and experts love to have lunch. That's the personal observation. And then when I tell my team that, they always come back and say so do the PRs, which is true. Just one thing that is important that I was thinking about when Sunita was speaking is that there are some resolutions that are vetoed in the Council, so they're not approved in the Council, but then the issue goes to the General Assembly. And it's a peculiar thing because there have been cases in which the General assembly approves a resolution that was not approved at the Council because it was vetoed. Of course, those are not binding even though they're approved to the General assembly, but they provide an opportunity to the larger membership to express the sense of the membership concerning certain issues. Thank you.

Thank you. ILU triggered me, so I'll say a few words. I would say vprs before entering the Council are certainly as ignorant as other ignorants. But I would stress a few things. One thing is that I think it will be covered by following speakers today. But that's why I said if you prepare for the Council, use the six months before, very, very wisely and use the observation period which is the three months proceeding, because this is something. It is a luxury that we have now. It is not a very old, old practice. It is a very important time because then when you enter the Council, you have seen things evolving, you've seen how that's what we were covering, how those negotiations are happening, which means that you can jump in and be efficient from the very start. There were a lot of advice that we also received from the either outgoing or recent members of the Council. And one of those was expect the unexpected, which proved to be very true for our start as well. I know it was the same case last year, but for us in January, it started on the 3rd of January morning with one particular case that was not even before on the agenda. So you had to be very, very agile and flexible and fast. And I don't know, I haven't seen anyone gaining weight. I think it's actually losing weight, but. But that's fine. And the most important thing probably is teamwork. Do invest a lot in teamwork, because the PRS cannot do much without the rest of the team. The PCs are key, but it is also very important when negotiating those products we just covered. You will remember that you are not only negotiating, I don't know, situation in South Sudan, you are also negotiating on topics that are your priorities. So it is very important that those experts are all the time in touch with the whole team, actually. So that's an advice, if I may, in the framework of today's topic. And the last thing is that we profited a lot from the other, as I said, recent members experience. So for those of you who are preparing, do not hesitate to come to us and talk to us either to your counterparts, experts, PCs, PRs, team to teams. We did that a lot and that was absolutely useful. So I encourage you not to be shy and talk to any of us who are on the Council currently. So best of luck and thanks.

Thank you. Ambassador Alfaro de Alva and Ambassador Parlucta de Las. Thanks once again for being here with us and for the interesting discussion. So please join me to give a round of applause to our speakers. Perfect. Thank you so much. So now, meanwhile, we prepare for the next presenter. Let me move to the next session. So we now turn to one of the most consequential and frequently debated dimensions of Security Council decision making, the use of the veto. This presentation will examine how decisions are made, how the veto operates in practice, and the evolving norms and reform discussions surrounding it. I am pleased to introduce To His Excellency Mr. Oliver Juan, Deputy Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations.

Good morning. Thank you so much to colleagues at Unitar, DPPA and Portugal and others for inviting us. So it dates a little bit for the Swiss side. We've been at the Security Council 2324 and we still have a few colleagues at our mission from that time. So I join what the Ambassador said before, if we can be of any help, do reach out to us. So we were asked to speak about decision making and the use of the veto, and on decision making, some of the instruments products of the Council have been very aptly described by the previous speakers. So let me maybe take it from this angle, from the outside. The general audience, I think, perceives the Council primarily through its formal meetings and its votes. This is what captures the attention also maybe in our parliaments, in our systems back at home. In our experience at the Council, we realized just how much decision making is a continuous diplomatic process that takes place at Multiple levels and throughout the different hierarchies. So, speaking before about the experts, the PRs, all the levels in between, one important takeaway for us in terms of decision making was to really involve actively all those different levels. So the experts and advisors are the ones that have the best in depth knowledge of the topics at hand. The PCs, the political coordinators, play that clearing house role, reaching out to their counterparts with a really strong network that is decisive. The DPRs frequently intervene when negotiations become politically sensitive or require strategic guidance. And then the permanent representatives, of course, are the ones needed when a final compromise, a final political decision is required, both within the other, within the Council, with the other members of the Council, but also with capital as relevant, particularly in crisis and high profile files. Having mentioned capitals, they remain, of course, closely involved throughout the process. We were thinking hard before entering the Council, how to articulate that, what moments to build in with the system as such, like the Ministry, our ministry, what about the other ministries, when they have a stake in that? What about also Parliament and the general general public? So there's a number of things that we had to think through to make sure that we are always on track. For us, of course, it was also the first time to be at the Security Council, 20 years after having joined the UN, as such. So the decision making processes, how long is your line to get an approval for something who is reachable at whatever time of day and night in capital was relevant for us as well. So this is to say that the effective Security Council decision making in our experience requires not only the formal procedures, the votes, the stuff you see, but also a lot of political judgment, patience, trust building and a constant investment in diplomacy. And then there are of course, all these subgroups at the Council that you're aware of. So the A3 and the A3 plus is one, the European members, E5, of course, the P5 and also the E10. And those experiences, I think they vary quite a lot. Today's dynamic is already very different from when we were there. And that is, I think, not just a reflection of political priorities in different capitals that evolve and different countries that come in, but it's also about the dynamics between the people. Do you build those networks? How can you build trust? How can you have an understanding, even if you disagree, to build a strong connection with different members of the Council. That for us was essential. Now, on the use of the vita, which is maybe the most interesting discussion, and it's interesting that Switzerland was invited to speak about that. We come from a political political culture that, of course, is extremely inclusive. We have referendums on everything. And so we have a, I think, peculiar way of taking decisions that has developed over decades and centuries, actually. So at the Security Council, first comment I want to make on this is the veto is a reality. It is there. And so the. There's lots of opinions on how that should go forward. There's lots of reasons why it is the way it is for us. What we saw at the Council is that the veto is not only used formally through the negative votes. Again, I'm trying to make the distinction between what you really see and what gets captured by the media, by the public. But it is of course, something that can linger as a mere threat and that then shapes negotiations from the outset and can determine which initiatives are pursued, modified or abandoned. The possibility of a veto frequently leads to extensive pre negotiations and informal consultations aimed at identifying language that is acceptable to the permanent members before a text is formally tabled. In some cases, we've seen that the threat of a veto can encourage compromise and force delegations to seek a broader consensus. In others, it can weaken Council products or prevent the Council from acting altogether. That's what you then would read about in the press. The veto has of course been used most visibly in situations involving major geopolitical divisions, often leading to a blockage on urgent crisis and limiting the Council's ability to respond effectively. DeVito therefore affects not only the final outcomes, but the entire diplomatic dynamic at the Council, including timing, drafting strategies, coalition building, including the different groups I mentioned previously, and engagement with capitals. In our view, the veto is not likely to be abolished anytime soon. So what can we do? Swiss pragmatic approach to that is that we believe the veto should be exercised, criticized with utmost restraint, especially in situations involving mass atrocities, serious violations of international humanitarian law or large scale humanitarian crisis. We do believe there are ways to restrain the veto, to live with that. And that's also the title of a report, that Security Council report recently published. I hope you're familiar with that. It's entitled Living with the Veto. The Accountability Coherence and Transparency Group act that we coordinate has also developed a code of conduct that deals with the Security Council action in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. So we believe these are very specific circumstances that merit a different way of acting for the council. Then there's GA Resolution 76, 262, the so called veto initiative that has strengthened transparency and accountability. I think it was referenced just before. By ensuring that the GA meets whenever a veto is cast, we see this as an important contribution to institutional dialogue within the UN system. That's a whole different topic, maybe less for today, but the relationship, of course, between the Council and, and the ga, which then implies the entire membership. So from our point of view, decision making in the Security Council ultimately depends on the willingness of members to place collective security above their narrow national interests. The Council functions best when members engage early, transparently and in good faith, with a genuine readiness to seek compromise. That, again, is a bit our Swiss approach. We see how consensus decisions at the GA are getting more difficult. And I would just emphasize the importance of building good relationships at all these levels. And then the mission can really thrive on that by comparing notes between your different levels of what you have been able to discuss and establish with different counterparts. The veto remains one of the defining and most controversial features of the Council's architecture. It was essential to the creation of the UN and remains a political reality, as I said, of the multilateral system. But it does carry, in our view, a particular responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security by those that have it. When the Council is unable to act in the face of major crisis, the credibility of the entire multilateral system is affected. And of course, that plays into also the times we're in now looking for a new Secretary General and the importance to transmit to the broader audience, including back at home, that the Council is able to work and that the Council is not just blocked. And in our view, it's not blocked. It actually manages to do a lot of things, but not enough. And so that is where all of us come into play to try and make a difference. And let me conclude by saying that as coordinator of the ACT Group, Switzerland works together with a broad cross regional coalition of member states to promote more transparent, more inclusive and accountable working methods in the Security Council. While we were at the Council, a number of vetoes have been cast on a number of issues that were blocked. And you can look those up. You familiar with those instances? But we did leave the Council after two years thinking that there were results, there was agreement, take an example, 2730 and the Protection of humanitarian workers. That's something that we brought to the Council and that we work on very regularly, including this week and POC Week. So we were able to combine the services, sort of almost flash flood of daily events that just almost throw you off balance if you're not prepared well enough for the Council with priorities that we had been working on throughout. And these priorities correspond to what we had always wanted to do and continue to be doing now. So it's not just legacy of the Council, but it's something we were able to look into and work on with a particular focus during those two years and that were not blocked by the veto and that continue to carry us as we continue working on these issues that matter. Thank you.

Thank you, Ambassador Hoen, for that thought provoking and timely discussion on the different elements that are required for effective decision making on the Security Council and for sharing, as you said, the Swiss pragmatic approach to the use of veto. We will now take questions from the floor, so please remember to briefly introduce yourself before speaking. We have 15 minutes for this, for this part, so we'll start with the first set of three questions. So the floor is open. Thank you.

Yes, please go ahead with the PGA's fellowship program. I would like to know if usually the P5 inform in advance to the presidency if they are going to use the veto. I don't know if there's a rule. I guess there's no rule about that, that they have to do it. But what do they usually do? I think that would be very important for decision making and that's what I wonder. Thank you.

Thank you so much for your question. We can take one traditional question. In case anyone has any questions, don't hesitate to raise your hand. I don't see any questions by timing. Perhaps we can take this question.

Sure, sir. I cannot speak from personal experience because I was not here. I was supporting what we did from outside during the two years. But what I gather from my colleagues is that the answer probably depends on, and the point I made on the networking at various levels, I think addresses this. So you would get a sense at different levels of where a particular file is going to. And I can even sense that now from when we are just outside observers to what's happening at the Council, when at a certain level, say the PC level, for example, you sense, ooh, there is a likelihood that this is not going to pass by X and Y country. So there's a moment where you, I guess, sense that more strongly, but it wouldn't yet reach the top level of that respective mission. That's my understanding so far. I haven't been here during that time. And the other thing, I guess, is the continuity of those conversations. And that is, I think, the beauty of diplomacy, that we keep on talking to each other because the veto, of course, also means something for that country. Are they really willing to do that? What are the repercussions? And so positively speaking, optimistically speaking, that is an opportunity to find, you know, a potential sweet spot. What exactly is it and how far can we push that envelope through good diplomacy to get an outcome that is not watering down what you really wanted, but that still goes in the direction of somebody who feels uncomfortable with that. We would carve out of that wherever possible the exemptions that I mentioned, because there are instances where we feel it shouldn't be used. But the Charter is clear. Perfect.

Thank you. Is there any. Yes, please go ahead.

Thank you so much for your time being with us here today. My name is Sophie Grandin. I'm with the Permanent Mission of Liberia. I have a question with regards to the UN Charter and the Rule 27 3. I was wondering if you could speak a little bit more your experience then dealing with the veto because. But also in light of the charges saying that if you are a party to a disagreement that you should abstain from voting, how did Switzerland then make sense and use of both those two things? If you could share any insights with regards to that, that would be very interesting. Thank you so much.

Perfect. Thank you so much. Perhaps we can take this question.

Sure. Thank you for the question. So 27 3, as the name says, is an article of the Charter. It is there and it says that there shouldn't be participation by members of the Council to a dispute that they are themselves a part of. And the way we engage in that reflection is really the basis of our approach to the big question of Security Council reform, meaning that there are states that try to change the Charter that want changes to happen. And in the past that has happened. The Council didn't always have 15 members, etc. So there are historic precedents for that. Our focus is on looking at what is in the Charter and how we can increase the respect for those provisions and the transparency and accountability that I mentioned. And so 2073 has always been there. It's not new. It's been there from the very beginning. And there were historic times when those provisions, particularly during the Cold War, were respected by certain parties of the country to say we will not be pardoned. It's not even a state. It's really not being part of the. Of the voting process. And that has somewhat slipped in the last decades. And so the thought by a number of countries in the group that we are a part of is that this is something that needs to be looked into again in the sense of reaffirming something that is. That is there and something that was considered by those that drafted the Charter in a way that is immediately intelligible. That you would not play a role at the Council when the Council discusses an issue that concerns a dispute you're involved in. So that is our mindset and it applies to the so called veto initiative in the same way, saying we will not put our political energy at the moment into changing the Charter. Others try that and we try to just say the Charter is our common document. It's very precious and it's actually probably more useful and relevant in many of its dispositions than people would sometimes assume, even though. So it's been eight years.

Thank you so much for the interesting debate. Thank you for the question. I don't see there any additional questions from the room. So we will now conclude this block. I would like to seize the opportunity to thank once again Ambassador Hoen for sharing your insights and your experience, and also thank you for your Swiss punctuality. Now finished just on time. So thank you so much everyone and please join me once again to bigger round of applause to our speakers. Perfect. So we're five minutes ahead of schedule, so we catch up with time. So meanwhile, our next presenters join the podium. Let me briefly introduce now sessions. So our final presentation before the lunch break will address informal meetings and their conduct, a crucial dimension of the Council's work that often takes place outside the formal chamber, but it's central to its actual functioning and decision making. I am pleased to introduce to Mr. Konstantinos Tanopoulos, political Coordinator at the Permanent Mission of Greece to the United nations, and Mr. Serge Bansa, political Coordinator at the Permanent Mission of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations. Please allow us one, two more minutes until presenters are set and we will start.

One second.

Please allow us one more minute and we'll start very soon. Thank you. I am pleased to give the floor to our first speaker, Mr. Konstantinos Stanopoulos, political Coordinator at the Permanent Mission of Greece to the United Nations. Konstantino, the floor is yours.

And first of all, welcome from my side also to all of you, thank you very much for taking part in this training, both in person and also via webcast. Being part of the Security Council life for two years is a joy, an honor and a privilege. It is also a strenuous exercise, quite demanding. I will be happy to take you through today on the main types of informal meetings in the Council and their contact and along with my fellow colleague and friend Serge. So I will first make an introduction laying out the main types of informal meetings and Serge will also continue and then we will break for a questions and comments. So first of all, to Say that informal formats are, so to speak, as the word implies, more spontaneous formations of the Council. Some we can find some in presidential notes on PRSTs about their type of. There is not a lot of codification, however, as contrast to formal meetings, which are more, if you like, better recorded in terms of procedure, I will limit my presentation to four or five main types of informal formats, which are the main, if you like, vehicle of informal formats are consultations. Another frequent type of meeting is IITs, which are informal interactive dialogues. Then we also have SG lunches with the Security Council. We also have ARIA formula meetings. That's a fourth type of meeting. And we also have yet more types of conflicts consultations like wrap ups, informal presidency wrap ups, especially the Toledo style wrap ups. But as well we have informal dialogues and consultative meetings between the African Union and the Security Council. It happens once a year. But lately we also have this type of format meetings also with the Arab League, also with the European Union and regional organizations, so to speak. So I will go into a bit more detail in a while about the type of those formats. But first to say a word on why do we choose those formats? Why do we want an informal setting? I think the reason is because these are potentially more interactive. They are off the record, they don't have media apart from consultations. They don't appear in the program of work, so you don't have a record. So they, so to speak, they are supposed to encourage discussion and a more frank interaction. You can also test the waters with an informal meeting. You can explore a theme as a soft introduction to subject that you don't want to call a formal meeting. You may also want an informal format meeting because very often these are restricted. So you may want to restrict the people coming from outside the Council in terms of briefers or even member states. You can apply a more restricted format on some of them, especially consultations. So this is, I think that is the main reason why we ask for informals. Another point to note is that the provisional rules of procedure do not apply in informal meetings as they do in informal ones. And therefore another. Another thing that I would like to pinpoint is that very often in the program of work there is now a hybrid format that was not used to be used in the past, but now it has become so commonplace that we barely notice it nowadays. So very often you will have a briefing and then consultations about the given subject, say Yemen. Now the briefing is the formal part. Yeah. And that answers to the demand of the wider membership and to the need to communicate the Main positions first of all of the UN briefers, then the member states. So that is, if you like, the formal part of the show. But then that was originally the idea. At least the Member States wanted a more intimate discussion. So Hans Grunenberg briefed the member states in public. All the member states, you know, said the things that they wanted to say in public. So the show has been played. Now let's get back to business. Let's go to the consultations room and let's have a more intimate and frank discussion. That was the original idea anyway. But whether that is the case or not, the jury is still out. But nevertheless, when we see briefing, that's the formal part, and then consultations, that's actually the informal part where the real discussion in the Council is supposed to be taking place. But we will go into that in a minute. So in terms of consultations, therefore, which is the first and the main, I think the majority of informal meetings, I think are consultations. Nowadays these are also called consultations of the whole or close consultations. They have always been Council members only. So I have not seen, and I don't think I have heard of non Council members to attend those consultations. And also the briefers are limited to UN officials which are answered to the Secretary General. So things are a little bit stricter in terms of the briefers that are chosen. Hence my previous point that you may want to. You may want a more restricted format in informal meetings and therefore opt, for example, consultations in order to restrict the briefers and the Member States who are attending. There are two main types of consultations. These are the consultations themselves and the other matters, which is the aob, the consultations themselves, they are generally by consensus. So a Council member calls them, asks them, and there is a sort of an unwritten unspoken understanding that we all agree that those consultations will take place. But in general terms, because formal Council rules do not apply, the provisional rules here, as we said, a Member State in theory may pose an objection. They may, and it has happened during our lifetime in the Council that a Member State has objected to the holding of the meeting. In this case, in theory, you should have consensus. How? However, there are quite often, because overall the majority of the Member States believe that the matter must be discussed. And in fact, when the President has this opinion, he may choose and the other states may back him to continue with the discussion. There are no records and no recordings, as we said, in consultations proper. And the topics will appear in the Journal and the pow, the Presidency work plan. Now however, this is still a serious business of the Council. This is still a serious meeting of the Council, although informal. So the element of interactivity, the element of surprise, the element of spontaneity and frankness does not usually, usually apply to be honest in consultations, because Member States still are aware of leaks. So leaks may limit their the willingness and the ability of Member States to really speak their minds out. Also very often the PRs by now, that is my experience, that is our experience anyway, they tend to be speaking from notes and from pre existing positions. And for certain matters which are still contentious, even behind closed doors, members may still want to stick to their formal positions. That is not to say that the discussion is entirely the same that you have into an open meeting, but that is to say that very often even close consultations can appear static and the conversation has to really move and advance to a point where the real discussion begins very often and sometimes we don't have the time for that. So there have been cases, there are cases where the discussion really becomes thorough and honest and. And there is a dialogue. But quite often close consultations are more spontaneous, but nevertheless not entirely free discussion from what you have in a briefing. In terms of other matters, which is the other segment in close consultations. This is basically a way to describe the naob, the aob. It's something that is, if you like consultations light, we can use an AOB to bring to the Council's attention new developments, something that has happened. This may be something that is already on the Council agenda, or it can be something new. It is a low way, a low profile way to raise a matter of. That is not in the eyes of the Council, not in the radar of the Council immediately. But it can be also a practical point if we want to discuss, e.g. drafting or problems that we face on a particular subject. We had for example an AOB recently to discuss logistic details for a particular meeting. More practical issues that do not want, do not merit a full blown discussion among the Council members, whereby a Council member may brief, you may have an exchange, you may have an understanding arising, but without having like a tour de table and a full blown discussion about an issue. So that concludes the parts, the part of the consultations format and then I move to the iids. This is something informal. This is a short word for informal interactive dialogue. These can include briefers who are not part of the UN system. They can include a small number of non Council member states. These are usually held in rooms like this, in a conference room, not the chamber so they emphasize the informal part. It can be a matter that is part of a formal agenda item of the Council. So it can be, for example, a discussion on Operation Irini in Libya. It can be a discussion with the League of Arab States and the Council, but it can also be a matter that is not yet taken up by the Council. Again, if you want to introduce a new matter in the Council, there is an iid, for example, with the Peace Building Commission Chair and the Council for the PBC Annual Report. So these are again, IID may look like a formal meeting of the Council, but they're not entirely the same. They are supposed to facilitate again, an easier discussion about some issues. And also very often they are used for interaction between the Council and regional organizations like the Arab League, the European Union, or indeed the African Union. Then a third type of informal consultations of informal meetings rather, is the Toledo Wrap Ups. These are basically when the Presidency wraps up its program of work at the end of the month, it may choose to involve also other Council members that may be from a different geographical group, or they may, in order to bring a more geographical balance, or they may agree on a particular thematic area. They. They may want to emphasize a particular theme in the Council or a particular policy that two or three member states agree. So it can take the form of a troika, if you like, of the member State who is concluding its term in the Council this month, being flanked by one or more member states, who will usually speak also about a part of the month's work that concerns also themselves. It's a collaborative effort, essentially, and it adds a bit more interest and a bit more variety in terms of the Member States explaining their account, giving an account of the months of the program of work during the month that has elapsed. Then another format for informal, as far as informals go, is the monthly lunch that the Council has with the Secretary General. The Presidency usually agrees with the office of the Secretary General, the date in advance. The Secretary General picks the topics. These are usually two topics for discussion, and a few days prior to the meeting informs the Presidency. The Presidency relays back the topics to the Council members for their approval. Basically, once this is confirmed, the lunch takes place, and this is usually again fairly choreographed discussion. By now, the Secretary General will introduce the first topic, they will have a full discussion. They may break and have a sorry. After the Secretary General concludes the first topic, he may break, they may have a discussion, or he may choose in the interest of time to go to the second item and then stop and have A discussion with the Member states. This can be more frank exchanges of use, more frank conversations between the Secretary General and the Member States. Not that the Member States will depart massively from their known positions, but nevertheless, a more interactive way of discussion may ensue, especially when it comes to current developments. So the Secretary General may brief the Member States about something that he wants them to be aware of, or vice versa. Now going over, just to have a look. There are also other types, like the Finnish workshop, which also is an informal type of council activity. This is meant in preparation for the incoming members of the Council, and also to give the opportunity to the Council to have a more relaxed and informal discussion of the Council agenda at the time, and indeed the whole year. And I think I'm going to finish my statement, my intervention with the ARIA formula meetings. This is. This is not a Council discussion, so to speak, in the way that an IID is, because you don't have a president. So it is not, if you like, a standard format of discussion, because the Member State that convenes the area, the topic of the area is basically the one who is in charge, irrespective of the presidency of the month. They organize. The Member State organizes, invites and very often chairs, along with briefers and the Member States who may be also organizing this discussion, irrespectively of the monthly presidency. Again, this is a meeting in a conference room and it's not in the Chamber. The Council members may want to attend or they may not want to attend. This is not part the of. This does not go in the journal or the calendar of the Presidency. They are usually open format meetings, thereby allowing the participation of the wider membership. But they can be also closed meetings or limited to representatives of geographical groups in the Council, in order to limit the time and the scope of the meeting as well, especially when it comes to the security of the briefers, because these are again informal meetings and you want to, in theory, introduce new elements for the awareness of the Council. So you may want to invite briefers who will be freer to speak than a formal meeting in many ways. But again, you may want to restrict the format of the meeting to protect the briefer and have a more open discussion. So I think I'm going to. I think I'm going to pause here. I think I'm going to stop here. Yes, I will hand over the floor to my colleague Serge, and then I will be happy to take your questions. Thank you.

Okay, thank you. Thank you, Patricia and Junita, for inviting us here to share our little experience. I still have like how many months?

5.

Five months in security Council. But I've been following closely the Security Council for almost nine years, so I can have some insight. So now it's good for me because I can witness from inside. I was witnessing from outside, as you do now and then now I have the advantage of following closely if I'm inside. So he made my life easier because he went all over, he said it almost, he said it all. So I will just have to pick this and this and then add some spice and then we can, we can have more time for the Q and A, as he said. We need to understand why our predecessor decided to have all of this format. It's happened because as member of the Security Council, you have to work on to maintain the peace and the safety in the world. So you need to think twice. Sometimes the formal environment cannot allow you to go and to solve crises and solve issues. So we need to think out of the box. So this is what our predecessor did. But maybe when it will be our generation also we may also come with some other stuff. He was talking about Toledo. So there is a lot, a lot of stuff we have just to continue thinking after the box with one goal. How can we achieve peace? How can we solve crisis in the world? And then because of that, they went all over trying to found solutions. Because this kind of informal form give room for clarity. They also give room for people to open up to explain exactly what they are feeling, to explain exactly what is the issue really. Because a diplomat, when I will be like talking officially, I know that in the formal meeting everybody is following. So you are not sure that what I'm saying there, it's exactly what I should support. Suppose I'm supposed to say. So that way, it's good to have this kind of format meeting when people will open up and then you will understand what is the issue exactly. And then you will push, as he said, in this kind of interactive dialogue, push people to explain exactly, even briefer. Sometimes in the open, open area, it's sometimes very difficult for them to. To explain exactly some sensitive issues, because those issues are related to some time for the confidentiality of a country. So they cannot just open up like this. So that's why this kind of format are very, very good. Because the briefer, even the Security Council member will be in a relaxed, relaxed environment. They can open up, they can talk, and then it's made help all of us to solve even very difficult and sensitive issue. In terms of types, I will just add one. I didn't hear it from him. We call it informal informals. You are used to it. But in the Security Council we also use it most of the time those are highly restricted. Restricted meeting often convened by the lead country of or the pen holder. Because if you are the pen holder in any issue like in Sudan in Africa, you may convene that kind of meeting with specific topic. It can take place usually in a member missions venue or facility rather than the UN headquarter. So this is some of the the kind of the meeting we also use to discuss like resolutions. You know all of these topics. I can talk about some key characteristics of those informal meetings. First characteristic of the informal meetings are confidentiality. Those meetings, most of the time they have no official VERBA team record are kept and no official media coverage is provided in the room. This confidentiality is made to encourage open debate and direct negotiation. The second characteristic of those informal meetings are location. Informal consultations are typically held in the consultation room. That is not the one you see on tv. I've never seen it. The private room. I've never seen it on tv. So we have the formal meeting room, the chamber that you all know. But those informal consultations most of the time are held in a private room out of the official chamber that all of us, we know. Other formats like area formula meeting may be held in standard UN conference rooms, conference room 1 ECOSOC, anywhere it can be there. Another characteristic of those informal meetings are the access. It's all about the access. Some of those informal meetings are only council member are permitted to attend informal consultations. Like in the informal consultations, it's restricted for only council members. Even though they are talking about your country. If it's like. I can say if it's like Trinidad, they are talking about Trinidad. You are not as Trinidad. If you are not a member of the Security Council, you are not allowed to get there. But of course member of SCAD Security Council they may attend because they are in the room. Like facilitating the work of the Security Council members. Another characteristic of informal meeting most of the time there is no voting. Sometimes there is no formal resolution or decision adopted during informal meetings or sessions. Formal sessions are convenient next door to formally adopt agreement reached during some discussions. As he was trying to explain. I can talk a little bit more, a little bit about the informal. Informal interactive dialogue. It began as a pragmatic hard hook solution to a procedural dilemma in 2009. I think it was the issue of Sudan back then with the previous president of Sudan. That's why they came with that because there was a lot, lot of situation, it was very sensitive. So it was no way that it could have been dealt in the format, formal format of the Security Council Chamber. So they went all over finding a way to deal with the issue. But as it is now, we can see it has evolved into a core flexible working method for the Security Council to engage with other actors in ways that respect both protocol and political sensitivities. We are always making sure that we respect some protocols and then we also respect political sensitivities because sometimes the matters that are in place in the Skate Council are so sensitive. And then we need to be a little bit careful the way to approach all of those issues. I think I will mostly give room for discussion. As he said. You can found some of them in our working method notes, especially the 507 notes. You need to go over that 507 notes to Master it because it will really, really help you in what is waiting you in the future days. And I remember having an experience on the area formula experience, because my country was most of the time having a lot of issue in the Script Council. So we explored all those. Sometimes there was an issue on the minerals and then they decided to say, okay, see, if you go in the script Council, there will be no one way out, but we need to bring that matter through an area formula meetings. And then sometime we decided, I remember once it was about a very sensitive situation in my country. And then the Secret Council decided to do an informal interactive dialogue. And then as representative of my country, we just came. They give us like a window of 5 minutes and 10 minutes. They say, come in 10 minutes, explain your issue and then go. So the two countries that was in that situation, involving that situation, we came in different time. My country came 10 minutes. We explained what we want from the Scott Council, what is pissing us off. And then the other country also came. And then they say, okay, we just heard you, get away from here. So. And then the Security Council members stayed in the room. They continue to have the discussion to see what is the ways they can explore, to make sure that they can, you know, sometimes give kind of solution in very difficult issue or situations. So I think we just stop there and then give more room for discussion.

Thank you so much, Sturgeon Konstantino, for those invaluable insights from the insight and how this interactive informal dialogues help solve difficult and time sensitive issues while keeping the focus on achieving peace. Now we will open the floor for questions and answers. We have have 10 minutes. So the floor is now open thank you. Yes, please go ahead.

Thank you very much for those insightful submissions you made. My name is Ali. With the Ganesh mission. I have a concern. I noticed that there is the need to think outside the box to have some problems solved very quickly. How about the question about legitimacy, transparency, accountability that normally comes with the use of open process. In other words, when you adopt this informal process, all these ingredients are lost in transmission decision, even though the intended aim is a very positive one. How do you balance this use of the informal process with the UN's principles of accountability and transparency?

Perfect. Thank you so much for, for your question. Is there any question from the room so we can take. Okay, I don't see any questions. Perhaps we can take this question first in case there's only additional questions later on. So I'll hand it to any of you.

I think that's an excellent question and I don't have a good answer for that, to be honest. I think there are certain technical elements of transparency and accountability. It in the sense that especially when it comes to consultations, but also other meetings, they appear in the program of work. So iids consultations appear in the program of work. And you know that this matter is being discussed. So there is a kind of public communication. It's not entirely secret behind closed doors. In terms of legitimacy, I don't think this is contentious. The Council is free to discuss any issue that they think is pertinent to international peace and security. So I don't think there's a question mark there when it comes to transparency and accountability. I think that there is a better point to be made there. And Greece is part of a group of act, for example, and we have tried to, you know, be as transparent as possible when it comes to our workings in the Council and the working methods of the Council, for example. And we're always pushing in that direction, including, for example, lately on the SG selection process. But again, one has to remember that we are also diplomats, we're not activists. So if you want to have a better conversation, if you want to do a deal, as President Trump also says, if you want to focus on the more diplomatic, the more business part of our work, I think you need certain flexibility in order for not everything to be in public. You need, in other words, a minimum level of confidentiality so that if there is any kind of agreement within reach, the parties will be able to exchange honestly what is going on, protecting the possibility of an agreement, so to speak, before you are able to go public with it, if you know what I mean. Because this is very much a game that's played with our public audiences also, and international audience as well. So it's actually quite hard to keep that balance. I think leaks also do not help because as I think I said in my intervention, you may have a consultation that actually is not so different to a public discussion. And therefore, you know, it's not that we're hiding anything. And the reason for that is because of leaks on a given subject. For example, you know, PRs may want to stick to their formal positions because they know that there is wide attention to that. So there is no good answer to this question at this stage. I think the elected members have a responsibility to push for more transparency and accountability. On the other hand, if you are completely open to what is going on behind closed doors, you are basically talking, you know, with domestic agendas in public, which may not be helpful to the process. I think that's my 20 cents to this question. But if Serge wants to.

It's a difficult question, but I can just build on what he said. I It's sometime all about what we want to achieve, when we want to achieve peace, to solve crisis. Sometimes we have to go not totally out of the norms, but at the border, at the course of the border, to make sure that we can at least achieve something when the situation is very difficult. That's why they decided to have this kind of. Remember when Mr. Arya decided to have bring up this idea, it was because it was very difficult to have any kind of solution. It was difficult to make some further advances on the issue in a formal chamber or meetings. So it was good to have it like open and out there. Yes, of course it brings out some procedural issue. But we can also see that those informal meetings are very useful because some of them are primarily used to build consensus, used for sharing information. They are used also to negotiate text without strict procedural rules. So there are ways that help us to go to achieve and to solve an issue. Sometimes it may be a country that is in a deep crisis, people are dying, there is a chaotic humanitarian situation, and then we need somehow to engage and talk. But the good news is that even when we are doing area formula, it's sometimes like a brainstorm. But those new ideas that we are developed in this area formula, they will end up in the chamber, in the formal chamber and help an issue in the formal chamber. So this is like we have like a format where we are thinking, we are trying to think to put some rationale there. And then at the end of the day, at the end of the process, all those outcome discussions. The outcome of those discussions will in a way or another reflect later in the formal chamber. So I think they still. They are useful. Yes, we may have some issue with transparency, but those meetings are very useful and from inside I can tell you that they are useful.

Perfect. Thank you so much for your question and for the interesting debate. We still have a few minutes left, so there's. We can take one or two questions. So if there's any additional questions from the room, don't hesitate to raise your hand. Yes, please go ahead.

Mariela Fonros from Trinidad and Tobago, you had raised different types of informal meetings and is there any. I don't want to say ranking or factors that would influence the particular one that you would choose to advance discussions on a matter and any. Are there any practical examples of council members choosing these particular types?

Perfect. Thank you so much for your question. So up to you.

Thank you.

You want to take it first? Sorry, just to be sure that I understood the question, which are the factors that influence the choice of meeting the type of informal that country may choose? Is that the question?

Yeah, not necessarily the factors per se, but if there's something that you may use, I don't want to pigeonhole it as a standard, but so to speak a criteria that you would use that probably as you as a country or a council member, it doesn't have to be the council as a whole or something that probably like an observation amongst member states in terms of their choice of a particular format of an informal meeting to advance an issue.

Thank you for this question. I think again it. It depends on what you want to achieve. So. I mean very broadly speaking as a rule of thumb and you know, I think if you want to discuss a matter in a bit more detail, you will choose consultations. And I would even argue that very often you may want to do this through an AOB if you don't want to. If you just want to discuss an issue thoroughly, consultations is a good way of doing that. Again, there are limitations to this exercise. If you want to have a more informal type of exchange of use, especially with non standard council formations like in like international organizations, if you want to have a more informal. Yes. Exchange of views and communicate a little bit positions, then an IID is a good idea. So when the UNC and the UN more broadly is more wants to be apprised of what is going on in a different part of the globe or with a particular subject, an IID is a good idea for that. We had a Great. IID a few months ago, by the way, on Sudan, in which the council, basically the conveners actually brought in all the different regional organizations and vehicles and formations that are of international actors in the international community who are dealing with Sudan. So they try to bring everybody in the room in order to have at least a common ground on where we are on Sudan right now and what each is doing, who is doing what. So that was a good way of doing it with an iid. And then if you want to highlight a particular issue in a certain way, then you do an aria. So an ARIA is like a trial balloon, if you want. So you may want to have an ARIA even on a product that you're thinking to launch, but you want to try it informally first and see test the waters a bit. Let's say it's a matter that is not in the council attention every day. Like, I don't know, space and science, which is something that, you know, it's not immediately apparent how is it linked to pension security. Then you may have an area to sort of test the waters a little bit, especially if you're thinking to launch a product. So it really depends what you're trying to achieve. Yes, I think I'll leave it there.

If I may add something. He said it a little bit and then I can just say this. It's a very difficult questions because sometime we sit as experts to see what is the best way to address the issue. What do we do? But I can give you few things that may help you to define this time around. What do I need to do? Do I go with an area formula? Do I go with aid? Do I go with this one? The first one is the initiative who is in charge of the to initiate that meeting. You can see if like it's an area formula that may be you yourself a country can initiate or more council members. And when like it's an informal interactive dialogue. Any member or group can also initiate. So in terms of who to initiate, it can also give you an idea. Another one. You can see the scope. The scope. When you have very specific targeted dialogue with invited party that you want to be with. It may be likely ARIA formula. And when you are you want to have like a broader flexible. More broader, more flexible interactive discussion discussions where people they will freely talk. You may have also interactive informal dialogue. Also he was talking about transparency. You should also consider that if it's an ARIA formula, it may not be published in the UN Journal. It will not be published even sometimes. ID also may not be also so you also have to consider that one do you want that is to be well known also what do you want if you want it to be well known? So you will have to choose something else than that one. In terms of structure, when we are in an area formula, we mostly highly structure around a specific invitee. Remember what I think it was France or we did an area formula last time it was in Conference Room 11. So they invited academics, it was about legal issue. They invited look very, very, very shaped academics because they wanted the member of the skilled council to listen to those people. So yes, we have been, all of us, we gather in that room, but it was with a specific panelist. We wanted to hear what is the experts take on that issue. And when you want something that will be more flexible had to offer format, likely aid. So I'm just giving some some idea and also the purpose, as you say, what do you want to achieve the purpose? If it's like direct confident exchange with high level or non state actors, maybe ARIA formula when it's open interactive dialogue on issue of concern, maybe. So you have some tools that you can use to to make your choice to balance. In ARIA formula interactive dialogue consultation in the room like the matter we wanted to achieve yesterday we decided all of us to say no. We need it to be in the consultation room because we wanted something. But I cannot talk about that here. That's why we wanted it to be private consultation, but in the other room not as area formula. Because ARIA formula some country will not be. If ARIA formula I'm free. Even though I'm a member of the skilled council. If I want to attend to area formula meeting, I need to register. If not, it will not be automatic as it used to be in the formal chamber. In the formal chamber, all 15, whether you like it or not, you have to be there and then talk. If you don't, you don't have anything to say, just be there. But in Aria formula you are the one to decide. You may not attend, you may attend, you may not attend. So you have also to consider that one if you want all the 15 member to attend. So sometime ARIA formula will not be good because there is some countries say okay, Aria formula I'm free, I cannot attend, I don't want to attend, I don't want to be there. So it's all of those criteria I just put in the table to make you to help you to choose which way you're going to follow when murder arise. I submit.

Thank you for this interesting and practical exchange and for the thought provoking questions. That brings us to the end of session three. I want to sincerely thank Konstantinos and Serge, as well as all our speakers who join us this morning for sharing so generously from their personal experience and expertise. These are precisely the kinds of firsthand perspectives that make everything like this truly invaluable. We will now break for lunch. We will reconvene at 3pm for session four on broader engagements and opportunities which look at how all Member states, whether on the Council or not, can engage with its work, influence its methods and prepare for potential membership. We look forward to seeing you back here probably at 3pm Enjoy your lunch. Thank you.