1st Meeting - 2nd Session Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems 2025

Excellencies, distinguished delegates, Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, LAWS, I would like to welcome you to the second session of the GGE in 2025. I would also like to take this opportunity to reiterate my sincere appreciation for the confidence all high contracting parties to the CD placed in me to carry out this task. I'm eager to continue our engagement on this important topic and look forward to collaborating with all of you throughout the week. I trust that you, like during our previous meetings, will participate in an open, transparent, inclusive, and constructive manner, and I count on your support as you have done since my designation. Let me also welcome the six delegates who are joining us this week through the CCW sponsorship program. Speaking about the CCW, the CCW is a key instrument of international humanitarian law. It continues to hold significant importance in protecting civilians, preventing unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering to combatants, affirming the importance of humanitarian disarmament, promoting international norms and a humanitarian law culture, facilitating discussions on the appropriate regulation of new weapons technologies, and encouraging international cooperation and assistance. We need it, now more than ever. Before I turn to the agenda and provisional programme of work, which have been issued as official documents and circulated by the CCW Implementation Support Unit, I would like to say a few words on the progression of our mandate and its implications on this and subsequent formal and informal sessions. Today, we are halfway through the mandate. On Friday afternoon, after closing the meeting, we will be two-thirds done. I'm very pleased with the substantive and focused progress we have made so far. However, much work remains to be done. This means that we will need to pick up the pace. Essentially, we will have two formal sessions remaining after this week, during which we will also have to reserve some time to finalize the report to be submitted to the Seventh Review Conference in 2026. And we have also been tasked with completing our work as soon as possible. For this reason, I call upon all delegates to continue to focus their efforts on reaching consensus on the subject of the matter under discussion, that is, the draft set of elements. I realize this demands from all of us in the room that we make sacrifices on the text, to the extent that I fear we will not win the Nobel Prize for Literature. However, I have full faith in your dedication to achieve this goal, and I'm looking forward to your creative proposals to bridge divergences and work towards compromises. Having said that, let us now turn to our agenda. Agenda item 1, opening of the meeting. You will recall that the 2023 meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW decided that our group is to pursue the following mandate. In the context of the objectives and purpose of the Convention, the group is to further consider and formulate by consensus a set of elements of an instrument without prejudging its nature and other possible measures to address emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems, taking into account the example of existing protocols within the Convention, proposals presented by High Contracting Parties and other options related to the normative and operational framework on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems, building upon the recommendations and conclusions of the Group and bringing in expertise on legal, military and technological aspects. as contained in para. 20 of the final report of that meeting, document CCW/MSP/2023/7. The 2024 meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW recalled this decision, as reflected in para. 23 of the final report of that meeting, document CCW/MSP/ 2024/7. That meeting also decided that the GGE would meet for a duration of 10 days in 2025, from the 3rd to the 7th of March and from the 1st to the 5th of September, as reflected in Power 28 Charlie of its final report. In accordance with the decision by the 2023 meeting of the High Contracting Parties, which was reconfirmed by the 2024 meeting of the High Contracting Parties, and by the powers conferred to me by the High Contracting Parties, I now declare open the second 2025 session of the CCW Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems. Agenda item 2, adoption of the agenda. As you may recall, the provisional agenda was issued as document CCW/GGE.1/2025/1 on the 17th of December 2024 and circulated by the CCW Implementation Support Unit via e-mail on Tuesday 28 January 2025. You may also recall that the agenda was adopted by the Group on the first day of the first session, the 3rd of March 2025. The document is available on the 2025 GGE on Laws webpage of UNODA Meeting Space. As you may further recall, the first four agenda items are dedicated to the usual procedural and organizational matters, as is the case with the item currently under discussion. Under item 4 on the organization of the work of the Group, I will explain more in detail how I plan to organize our discussions, and we will have the opportunity to exchange views on the matter, if delegations would wish to do so. Agenda item 5, the principal substantive agenda item before us, reflects our current mandate and will form the core of our deliberations this week. In order for us to make substantive progress during this week, I propose we try to complete a full reading of the text no later than Wednesday afternoon in order to have the opportunity to do some further work on selected issues on Thursday and Friday. Under agenda item 6, on other matters, I will invite delegations to raise any issue that may not have been addressed under the preceding agenda items. Agenda item 7 is dedicated to the adoption of the report. And as you recall, the 2023 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties decided that the Group should only submit a report to the Seventh Review Conference, see para 20 of the final report of the 2023 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties, CCW/MSP/2023/7. Therefore, we will not negotiate and adopt a report this year, and consequently, there is nothing to consider under this agenda item during this session. Looking ahead, I intend to provide an oral update to all CCW High Contracting Parties during the meeting of the High Contracting Parties in November. I will do this briefing under my sole authority as Chair, reflecting to the best of my abilities the progress we have made this year working towards the fulfillment of our mandate. The fact that we are not required to adopt a written report this year provides us with some flexibility and allows us to use the available time to focus on discussing the relevant substantive issues. However, that is not a carte blanche to avoid making progress, and I am also keenly aware that we cannot delay the task of reaching agreement on a report until the final day of our mandate. Therefore, towards the end of this week's session, I will share with the room my current thinking on how to proceed with the report in our remaining sessions. With the understanding that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, I urge all of you to approach this process with a constructive spirit, working step by step towards provisional consensus on these elements. Finally, under agenda item 8, closing of the meeting, I will close the second 2025 session of the Group. Agenda item 3, confirmation of the rules of procedure. We now move to agenda item 3. Given that the Group confirmed its rules of procedure during our first session in March, I would like to propose now to move on to agenda item 4 of our agenda, with the understanding that I intend to conduct the meeting as I conducted the meetings of the Group during our previous sessions. I recognize the distinguished delegate of the Russian Federation. Sir, you have the floor.

We're happy to greet you and other delegations during this session of the GGE on lethal autonomous weapons systems. Today in my country we are celebrating the Day of Knowledge, the beginning of the school year. And we believe that that holiday is very timely for our group of governmental experts, because our group is not just the repository of knowledge. But also, it gives the opportunity to all interested states parties to share with us the knowledge that they have, also obtain new knowledge from other delegations, and all of this for the purposes of achieving substantive results. And the Russian Federation reaffirms its readiness to extend to you, Distinguished Chair, all the necessary support as we work in our group in order to achieve these substantive results and to implement the objectives that we all face. On agenda item three, we would like to once again draw the attention of delegations to the questions of the implementation of Chapter 10 of the Rules of Procedure related to the participation of non-governmental actors, including interregional non-governmental organizations. This question was discussed in great detail during the meeting of States Parties of the CCW in 2023 and 2024. and also during the annual conferences on AP II and Protocol V. We discussed this question also here in this group of governmental experts. However, despite the fact that we had all those discussions and that efforts were made by participants and by the Bureau, States Parties, The decision that would be satisfactory to all countries and would help us resolve this problem has not been found and has not been adopted. This means that the problem is timely, it remains, and requires States Parties to take decisive steps to find a solution to this situation. We I'd like to reaffirm once again that the position of the Russian Federation on this question has not changed. We continue to believe that Chapter 10 of the Rules of Procedure does not provide by default to non-governmental actors, including regional, intergovernmental, and non-governmental organizations, the automatic possibility to take the floor during official plenary meetings as part of the events under the CCW. Moreover, any activities or steps by these organizations as observers, including through the submission of working documents, should be limited to their competencies and should be focused on making a constructive and positive contribution to the work of States Parties and not to politicize this work. And the Russian Federation is interested in the work of non-governmental actors and their participation in the GGE. We believe that their technical and legal expertise can contribute to the implementation by the group of its mandate and also help us find conclusions and recommendations that are substantive. Taking into account what I just said and also the nature of this group of governmental experts, we would like to once again suggest that we follow the compromise solution that was found during the session of the group in 2024 and also during the March meeting of the group this year. We are ready to confirm the rules of procedure only with the understanding that non-governmental actors, including regional, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, can be present during the meetings of the group. They can introduce working documents and can take the floor only referring to questions within their competence and in a non-politicized manner and not allow any accusations against member states. And this applies both to the working documents as well as to the statements that are made during plenary sessions. In cases when this approach is to be ignored, the decision related to the confirmation of Rules of Procedure will lose its force, and this question will require yet again consideration by this group. In all of that, we believe that this understanding does not create any precedent to the future work of the Group of Governmental Experts and the CCW as a whole, but it only relates to the specific nature of this group. And the solution will be in place only, and it will only be applied to this session, just like we did during previous sessions. In all of that, we do hope that finding the most optimal solution for the implementation of Chapter 10 of the Rules of Procedure, that work will be continued by States Parties here during this meeting of the GGE and also during the intersessional period. Thank you.

Let me thank the distinguished delegate of the Russian Federation and also for reminding us of that today is the day of knowledge, and I think we could all do with the best possible wisdom to bring forward the work of our group. I also take note of his remarks, and let me assure him that I intend to chair this meeting with a clear eye on having a substantial technical and legal debate with the aim of making concrete progress and exercising the powers conferred upon me under the Rules of Procedure, while upholding the rights of delegations. And as I see no other requests for the floor, we will now move on to agenda item 4. Agenda item 4, organization of the work of the Group of Governmental Experts. I would like to remind delegations that the meeting is being broadcasted live on UN Web TV, which allows viewers to follow the proceedings remotely in all six UN official languages. The link to the live broadcast has been made available on the webpage of the 2025 GDE on Laws and on UNODA Meetings Place. The video recording will also be available on the website of UN Web TV shortly after the meeting ends. All relevant information on the session and relevant documents, including working papers and conference room papers, will also be shared on the GGE on Law's UNODA Meetings Place webpage. Please note that statements will be posted on the meeting webpage only if they have been submitted to the CCW ISU. Therefore, if your delegation wishes to have its intervention made available online, kindly submit it to ccw@un.org. And I would also like to remind delegations to send all their statements to the speeches@un.org prior to their delivery, as this will be important for the crucial work of the interpretation services. May I also request that speakers maintain a measured pace to facilitate accurate interpretation. Additionally, a fully automated speech-to-text service will be provided so that text of the proceedings can be found on EDICO following the conclusion of the meeting each day. This is a machine-generated text and does not constitute an official record of the meeting, nor has it been checked for accuracy by the Secretariat. Regarding Rule 24 of the Rules of Procedure on the right of reply, I would also like to inform delegations at the outset that given the time constraints we are facing, I will limit the rights of reply to two minutes each and to a total of maximum three per delegation. To further facilitate our work, rights of reply will only be heard at the end of each morning and afternoon session. With that, I wish to now turn to the organization of the substantive part of this meeting. For this Group, to fulfill its mandate in the timeframe provided, it's absolutely imperative that we proceed with ambition and clear focus on further narrowing our differences. As you know, the 2023 meeting of the High Contracting Parties decided that the Group shall submit its report to the Seventh Review Conference scheduled to take place in 2026, and that the Group should complete its work as soon as possible, preferably before the end of 2025. See point 3 in para 20 of CCW/MSP/2023/7. As I mentioned earlier, I believe we have made significant progress, thanks to the active engagement with the rolling text. And while we may not be ready to complete our work at this stage, I believe that we can and should get to the end of 2025 with some preliminary but tangible outcomes. This is not only the bare minimum of what is expected of us, but also an absolute prerequisite with only two more sessions remaining next year. On the 7th of April, following our formal session in March, the CCWI ISU circulated the chairperson's summary of our discussions via e-mail. The document, issued as CCW/GGE.1/2025/ WP.1, is available on the webpage of the GGE. By submitting this summary, I wanted to capture my understanding of the work carried out during our first 2025 session and to maintain an informal record of proceedings to help inform the work of the Group in 2025 and ahead. On the 12th of May, the CCWI ISU, on my behalf, shared with you a revised version of the rolling text. As I explained in the corresponding letter, this new version is an honest attempt to take into account the sometimes diverging comments submitted by the High Contracting Parties and the exchanges between delegations during the first 2025 session of the group. I would like to emphasize that in the continuity of what was stated last year, I am putting forward this rolling text with the understanding that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. At the same time, as I said during my opening remarks, I count on the high contracting parties to work towards consensus in good faith, in the spirit of compromise and effective multilateralism. On the 28th of May, I invited High Contracting Parties and observers to a joint virtual informal consultation to facilitate effective preparation for the second session of the Group in 2025. During these informal consultations, we had a fruitful and detailed technical exchange on two important issues reflected in the rolling text. First, we discussed the terminology of the critical functions of laws and which of these functions should be reflected in the working characterization of laws. In the new version of the rolling text, I have chosen to keep two of these critical functions in the working characterization, select and engage, instead of also including identify as a separate third function. I based my decision on careful consideration of the input received in March and concluded that for many IHL contracting parties, "select and engage" implies that identification takes place. Therefore, this wording seems to me to accommodate the desire by some to have a broad characterization without risking that IHL-compliant systems will be prohibited from use. Second, we discussed how to reflect the need for and degree of what is now context-appropriate human judgment and control in the latest version of the rolling text. Based on the discussion in March, I decided to adjust the previous version containing human control and judgment to human judgment and control to more accurately reflect agreed language about human judgment. and control are deemed important for compliance with IHL. I look forward to continuing our discussion on this terminology and on how to best reflect the importance of human judgment and control, whether as part of the principles and rules of IHL or as context-dependent measures to ensure compliance with IHL. I also invited High Contracting Parties to two informal online consultations on the revised rolling text. These consultations were held on the 4th and 12th of June, with the aim to further homing in on key issues discussed during the first session and advancing our work in preparation for the second session. During the consultations on the 4th of June, we discussed boxes one, two, and three of the revised version of the rolling text. On the 12th of June, high contracting parties shared their comments on boxes four and five. As during the consultations on the 28th of May, delegations engaged in extensive exchanges on the key functions of laws as well as on the notion of context-appropriate human judgment and control. Besides these two informal consultations with high contracting parties, I also invited observers to a virtual informal consultation on the 17th of June. Here, I presented the latest version of the rolling text and invited them to share their views. We had an insightful exchange on several of the key points I outlined earlier, for which I would like to thank the organizations that joined us. On August 20, the CCWI-ISU circulated again the rolling text with a few technical corrections proposed by delegations during the informal consultations. This version is available on the webpage of the 2025 GGE on Laws on UNODA meetings place. To make the best use of our time, it's my intention to build on the rich body of work we have achieved through our formal and informal sessions, and to use this week to work on the latest version of the rolling text. Excellencies, dear colleagues, it's this group's responsibility to deliver on its mandate. That is, to use the time allocated wisely to ensure we indeed consider and formulate by consensus a set of elements of an instrument, without prejudging its nature, and other possible measures as laid down in our mandate, and to ultimately agree on a final report. I continue to believe that working on a concrete text is the best way to get to the core of the discussion, to narrow differences and capture concrete progress. As such, the text will continue to be amended and revised over the course of our work. I hope we will make progress on finding provisional agreement on some of the language in this session, and to use the coming intersessional period to make further advances of creating common understandings on where to find possible compromises. I suggest we heed my call to use the time wisely and efficiently and quickly move to the substantive portion of this session. I count on your cooperation and active engagement. Turning to agenda item five. to further consider and formulate by consensus a set of elements of an instrument without prejudging its nature and other possible measures to address emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems, taking into account the example of existing protocols within the convention, proposals presented by high contracting parties, and other options related to the normative and operational framework on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems, building upon the recommendations and conclusions of the group and bringing in expertise on legal, military, and technological aspects. As I see our work this year as an extension of the work done throughout 2024 and during the first 2025 session of the Group, and in order to optimally use the time, I intend to forgo general statements and turn straight to the first box of the rolling text. Should your delegation nonetheless wish to provide general remarks, I kindly request that this be indicated at the start of the intervention and ask that these be kept to a maximum of three minutes or five minutes if speaking on behalf of a group of states. I also kindly ask all delegations to focus their intervention on the matter at hand and refrain from making political statements that are unrelated to the substance matter or outside of this group's mandate. What we will now, with that, we will now turn to the first box of the rolling text. Let's see whether the technology is at our site. Yes, it is. Let me start by reemphasize that this is the 12 May version of the text, which we have already discussed briefly in the intersessional informal consultations and to which only two technical corrections have been made. To refresh your memory, I would like to point out what I see as the most significant changes to the text since the last session. As indicated before, I choose to include select and engage as essential characteristics of laws, with the assumption that identification is normally a precondition for these functions. In addition, I added new language in power two of box one to explain our understanding of lethal in the context of these elements of an instrument. The new language tries to reflect a middle ground between more narrow and broader definitions of lethal as presented during our discussion in March. For the rest of the text in this box, I want to point out that much remains the same. I feel this version reflects language that could lead to finding convergence in the room. Let me now then open the floor for comments and suggestions. Who would like to be the first to break the ice? I recognize the distinguished delegate from Germany to be followed by Ireland, but let me first pass the floor to the distinguished delegation of Germany. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor. And I would like to start thanking you for your excellent preparation and able stewardship of our meetings. Mr. Chair, before starting our discussions on the rolling text, my delegation feels that it might be useful to shortly make reference to a working paper presented by a group of states. To advance our discussions, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden have submitted a joint working paper on the human element. With this paper, we are highlighting areas of convergence we see within the GGE laws on the basis of the term context-appropriate human judgment and control and elaborate our understanding of it. In previous meetings, Germany and others have welcomed the term context appropriate human judgment and control. In our view, this word comprehensively circumscribes the construct that encompasses the technologically possible actions by setting clear boundaries within which the system's algorithm is allowed to operate. International law, and in particular international humanitarian law, is one of these boundaries. Germany attaches great importance to ensuring that a framework of human control is in place during the life cycle of a weapon system. In this joint working paper, the submitting states first describe the concrete elements of the term context-appropriate human judgment and control and explain why we hold the view that it is suitable to reflect the broader concept of human involvement. Second, we detail how this concept can take different forms at the respective stages of the life cycle of a weapon system. Third, we elaborate on the specific contextual factors that need to be taken into account. The submitting States hold the view that implementing context-appropriate human judgment and control is fundamental in order to ensure compliance with international law, in particular IHL, during the development and use of laws. We look forward continuing our constructive discussions to which we hope our paper can be a useful point of reference to further advance the GGE's work. Given that the GGE needs to fulfill its mandate by the end of 2026, it is essential to turn the existing convergence on substance into concrete language. Mr. Chair, thank you.

Let me thank the Ambassador of Germany for providing a joint statement, a working paper, I'm sorry. Next on my list is Ireland to be followed by France, but let me pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Ireland. You have the floor.

Thank you very much, Chair, and thank you to you and to your team for.

All the work that has gone into getting the text to this point.

The text as it stands achieves an important and welcome balance and reflects the broad convergence on the key issues.

The two-tier approach of prohibition and regulation, the centrality of the human element, maintaining human responsibility over the use of force and addressing the particular challenges posed by laws regarding compliance with international law, including IHL.

Ireland therefore expresses its broad support for the text as it stands.

On that basis, and in the face of the urgency of this issue, given rapid developments on the ground.

We believe the text has reached a level of maturity that represents a set of elements that should form the basis to move to negotiations of a legally binding instrument. Outstanding issues can and should be addressed through subsequent negotiations of such an instrument.

Our overarching view similarly applies to box 1.

This is in a good place and forms an adequate basis for characterisation of laws. It is clear and succinct, maintains the broad scope that is necessary to avoid creating loopholes further down the road.

And should be preserved as it stands.

In particular, I would like to support the two points that you have raised in relation to this box. In paragraph 1, we welcome the removal of the term "identify". As we and others have repeatedly argued, its inclusion would problematically narrow the definition, and we agree that "identify" is.

Included in the term "select".

And in paragraph 2, we strongly welcome the well thought through proposal on the concept.

Of lethality, which addresses issues raised in previous GGE sessions.

This proposal effectively addresses the issue.

It is important that we do not exclude systems that can cause injury and damage to.

Objects in line with IHL.

Thank you.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Ireland for sharing the views of his delegation. And next on my list is the delegation of France.

The Ambassador of France is recognized. Thank you very much, Chairperson, Chair. As it's my honor to take the floor for the first time in this body, allow me a few words to Thank you and your team for the efforts that you have garnered to move forwards with our work. I'd like to reassure you of my delegation's full trust and its full support. Obviously, I align myself as well with the statement that was just made by my German colleague. We are moving rigorously towards garnering a raft of elements which will move towards a concrete outcome. The draft that we have from 12 May is an excellent basis for that. We look forward to the discussion this week, which will allow us to resolve the last points of disagreement. I will directly comment on box 1 of the text for the time being. In the first section, in the first paragraph, we can accept only mentioning the select and engage roles and the deletion of identification because the identification role can be covered under selection. As you know, we have said on a number of occasions that we would prefer to have a clear mention of the command and control chain rather than having a single reference to a human user, which could be any human user. and is more vague. We would therefore prefer to replace human user by the human chain of command and control. Finally, we are of the opinion that the characterization here should include the concept of activating the autonomous system and the establishment of an operational framework for the system through the human command and control chain. We believe that the expression in the execution of these tasks may trigger a number of aspects of activation under the operational concept, and we would like to keep it. In the second paragraph, we can support the proposal to delete the first sentence.

"Death to a person".

In order to avoid a debate on the meaning of lethality, while ensuring that all of the actions under laws are covered by this action. Thank you, Chair.

Let me thank the distinguished Ambassador of France for sharing the views of her delegation and making proposals. The list is open. Who would like to follow? I recognize the distinguished representative of Austria. Sir, you have the floor.

Thank you very much. Mr. Chair, we want to start with thanking you and your team for all the work that went into the rolling text and the intersessional consultations that were held. And also, thank you to the friends of the Chair, who I think are still working hard for our common purpose in the shadows. The current text is very advanced and the result of developed positions and shared understandings among the states which have participated in the discussion. We therefore want to thank all delegations of the present who have actively contributed to the work in the GGGI laws in the past sessions and also during the intercessional period. In this regard, we also want to mention the informal consultations that have taken place earlier this year in New York. They provided the chair with an opportunity to exchange with a wider audience and hence expanded the range of views contributing to our work here. The rolling text as it stands is a solid basis for coming soon for coming closer to completing the mandate of the GGE and taking the next step of starting negotiations in this framework. In this way, we expect that further changes to the text are well elaborated with the objective of improving the text and the delegations in a productive mode will refrain from simple deletions without providing alternative, alternate text. We particularly value the reflection of the Tuti approach in the text, which foresees the prohibition of certain weapons while regulating all other systems that fall under the definition set out under box 1. The regulations part, however, requires a stronger standing as this should form part of a legal regulation and cannot be misunderstood or be presented as voluntary measures. It is also important to underline that the section on definitions is not the right place to limit the scope of a possible instrument. As we have stressed many times, a range of weapon systems, in particular existing ones, would fulfill the requirements set out in box three. In addition, any future negotiations of a legally binding instrument could also touch upon possible exclusion as far as they are required. While being a relatively new concept, we are also very pleased about the wide and cross-regional support the concept context appropriate human control and judgment has received in our last discussions. We took note of the reversal of the control and judgment in the new version and hope we can make sure that we have a common understanding of its meaning in the course of our discussions this week. Related to this, we took positive note of a working paper presented by a group of states which we consider a valuable contribution to these efforts. In addition, let me underline that we see the need to address ethical considerations and human rights aspects that have a clear role in considerations about prohibitions and regulations. While partly reflected in the later part of the text, we also still see more potential when it comes to technology-related aspects. Finally, we would also like to share some remarks on the general nature of our work. Through the introduction of autonomy into weapon systems and to use of force, humanity will pass a major threshold. Currently, only a few states are in a position to shape in which way this technology is used. Their immediate decisions do have an enormous impact on how international humanitarian law will be interpreted in the process of developing and deploying them. The effects of these developments, however, will concern and affect us all. In consequence, we do have a strong preference for a multilateral approach to this issue, as well as an international solution for a legally binding instrument. Multilateral regulation of autonomous weapon systems can also be seen as an opportunity to educate the various stakeholders in this field and to give states and all those involved in their development guidance for any future technological developments. To be future-proof, this guidance needs to set limitations, guardrails, and requires a strong normative aspect. This normative aspect needs to contain a clear explanation on how human control is achieved and reaffirm the ethical principles that underpin IHL and international law. We are doing no less in this room than defining the role of humans in future warfare, a responsibility that should weigh heavy on everyone. The CCW is a framework designed to be expanded and enhanced by new legal protocols in face of new technological or methodological developments in warfare. It is exactly this role it has now to fulfill. Coming to box one, we align with other states who have said that we are already in a very good place when it comes to the text. What we would be interested is to have more discussions in para one on what exactly we understand under integrated combination of one or more weapon and technological components. While we are not per se against this formulation, I think we should be on the same page on what it actually means to us. We very much welcome the new way how the third line is formulated. We support the select and engage and we are, as others have already laid out, this is a right way to grasp this while other formulations that we had previously used might lead to misunderstandings. On para 2, in our view, This kind of definition is not necessarily needed. In general, we would prefer to not have a leaflet in the text at all. We understand how we ended up with this and we can go along with it. For us, it's extremely important that it's clear that this is for the purpose of these elements of an instrument. This is a formulation that we would like to maintain. Otherwise, we believe that the current text has undergone an improvement from previous versions, and it's definitely something we can accept in this way. When it comes to para 3, also here, if this is a formulation that is useful for a delegation to accept the current text, we can go along with it as well. Any kind of future limitations of a possible instrument will be part of the negotiations of a legally binding instrument, and we will come back to that later. This is a common practice that we see in negotiations. And it very much depends on how the further parts of the text develop. And only once, especially box three, is completed, only then we can actually go back and discuss what kind of limitations and where we have, where the instrument goes beyond the scope that was originally intended and where we can set up limitations to safeguard this or that aspect of existing weapon systems, for example. That's all for the beginning, but we are eager to engage in interactive discussions. And thank you again for all the hard work.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Austria for the kind words addressed to the Chair, for his proposals, and also for his question. And, of course, I invite others to further reflect on that also. But first, next on my list is the distinguished representative of Mexico. Madam, you have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. Since it is the first time my delegation is taking the floor, I'd like to congratulate you and your team on the work that you carried out in preparing this compilation, the rolling text. For me, this is the best possible way to move forward, and also thank you for the consultations you held. especially the regional consultations, and I believe that this is very important to understand better the positions of delegations. In a general manner, I would like to reiterate some of the comments that we made on the text. Principally, as previous speakers said, this is a very good foundation to move forward towards achieving the objectives of the GGE and to find language that enjoys consensus. Now, in box 1, the three paragraphs, we understand this as a compromise formula. For example, my delegation said on numerous occasions during the work of the group that we'll prefer to exclude the word lethal, but we do understand that this concept, as you presented in the document, is a consensus-based proposal. So we believe that this language perhaps will not change, but we need more discussions on the notions that we find in the three paragraphs. For example, paragraph one, the notion of the integrated combination. of components. We need to discuss that. And then in paragraph 2, we have to better align this paragraph with norms of IHL, including with the scope of the existing protocols under the convention that may cause indiscriminate effects or damage. I would like to also draw your attention, as we did earlier, that we have to be consistent throughout the text. And finally, we have to also have a word of caution. The more detailed a definition, we're through that limiting the scope of a possible instrument. And this is work that will need to be done when we will negotiate the instrument. So we have to be very clear how we define the concept for those purposes, or we will actually be using definitions that already exist in other documents for the purposes of this new instrument. And finally, this text is a very good foundation to move forward in our discussions. Thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for sharing the views of her delegation and pointing out issues for further discussion. About further discussion, next on my list is Australia. Madam, you have the floor.

Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor. I am delivering this statement on behalf of Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Poland, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Singapore, Sweden, and my own country, Australia. Before addressing box 1, we wanted to briefly reflect on the progress of this GGE and express our support for the valuable work you have facilitated here. The rolling text which you and your team have presented for discussion has been immensely helpful. We thank you for your tireless efforts. We also take this opportunity to thank civil society for its constructive engagement throughout this GGE. The GGE has come a long way, and we would like to keep the momentum going. We should bear in mind that the final year comprises just two formal sessions, each of five days in length. We must make the best use of the time that remains. Let us work towards meaningful inroads in this session so that we may deliver a substantive consensus outcome next year. To do so, we need to focus on settling characterisation issues regarding laws, and we need to finish elaborating what would be involved in the exercise of context-appropriate human control and judgement in a way in which we can all agree. Further, we think early consideration is needed regarding how this rolling text will be presented in its final form. This may require adjusting the locations of concepts within the rolling text with a view to finalising its structure. Finally, while remaining focused on delivering a consensus outcome, the High Contracting Parties should begin to contemplate next steps that will build on the progress made by this GGE. We look forward to working with delegations to achieve a consensus outcome on remaining issues and drive forward the mandate of this GGE. I'd like to now turn to Box 1 in Australia's national capacity, starting with paragraph 1. On paragraph one, Australia is comfortable with the removal of the phrase "identify" in favour of the simplified "select and engage". We support taking the simplified approach, noting the significant number of alternatives suggested for this paragraph in March. We have heard your explanation during the intercessional period, as well as the explanation of the ICRC and others, and agree that to select presupposes identification. We think that the law's critical function being to select and engage is reasonable. We do not think identification is a central characteristic of a lethal autonomous weapons system. Turning now to the definition of lethality proposed at paragraph two, we still believe that it could benefit from some refinement. First, Australia can accept the first sentence beginning, "For the purposes of these elements of an instrument." as this remains true to the ordinary meaning of the term lethal. Second, it is our strong preference to delete the second sentence to avoid inadvertently introducing ambiguity into this paragraph. While we recognise the work which has gone into coming up with a text suitable to many states, it has been Australia's view that IHL applies to all weapons, autonomous or not, and that defining lethal is not helpful or essential. If the second sentence is to be retained, We therefore propose to amend it by deleting "such as to damage or destroy objects or to cause injury". In this way, the second sentence would more simply read: "The fact that the laws can be used in circumstances that do not result in death does not exclude it from this characterisation." Third, Australia continues to believe that there is merit in simplifying paragraph 1 by adding "with lethal force" after "engage a target". In our view, this would strike the right balance between retaining lethality, noting Australia's views, and recognising IHL governs a broad spectrum of effects. Thank you.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Australia, also for delivering a statement on behalf of a group of states. and for sharing the views of our national delegation. Next on my list is Switzerland to be followed by Japan, but let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Switzerland. Sir, you have the floor.

Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving us the floor and thanks also from the Swiss delegation for all the work that you have undertaken The revised rolling text, uh, continues to go, uh, in a positive direction since the last. session, we are very happy to see and to participate actively in valuable discussions before and during summer. And we're also very happy to see new contributions in the form of food for thought or working papers. And we thank in particular to a group of states for submitting a very good paper, working paper number four, on the human element and on context appropriate human judgment and control. This week, we see the opportunity for more progress, finding solutions for refining the rolling text. We can say that we already see what we have as a very solid foundation for concluding the work of our group as outlined in our mandate. All high contracting parties are to be congratulated for that significant progress. And we would also like to thank civil society and in particular the ICRC for their constructive engagement. Our view is that we have made significant progress, mainly also because we've been working in these boxes. These boxes are meant to facilitate the discussions. They have served as well. There will be of course at some point the need to be flexible with regard to jumping from one box to the next. There is also at some point perhaps a need for structural work and find the perfect arrangement of the boxes and the paragraphs in it to ensure the flow. In our view, that could be done at a later stage. At this stage, we should still put the emphasis of our work on finding substantial progress, rather than starting to move things around. Generally, on box one, we support it as it stands. A number of concepts, of course, still need to be better understood. Other delegates before me have just referred to some. We are also eager to engage this week on better understanding them. A number of things can still be sorted this week. For instance, we think on box one, select and engage, we've made very good progress. We need to better understand the fact that select and engage does actually cover what the critical functions are. We support the focus on select and engage as the two key critical functions. Like others, we do not see the need to also have identify. And in that regard, I think the discussions in the informals really helped us a lot. We understand identify as being part of selecting. Technically, that's for us how we understand the word "select." It is a catch-all in that sense. And politically, we fear that with the three components, we would begin our text with a cumulative definition that results in a narrow scope and would exclude important systems. Another area I think where more understanding is needed, and again, there we're happy to engage, is lethal. For principled reasons, we have long proposed the deletion of "lethal", but of course we understand the attachment by many delegations. It's also in the title of our GGE. Assuming that "lethal" is retained, it's important to clarify what we mean. We have a very good paragraph 2 as it stands. We really like it. It's a good compromise in our view. We've also listened with interest to the proposal made by France a moment ago to remove the words "Lethal" refers to the capacity to cause death to a person. I think that would be very interesting to look at in more detail. At this stage, and as a general point, and listening to other contributions this morning, we would caution against introducing more text or more words referring to lethality. We would propose not adding "with lethal force". We're interested in looking at how we can fix this, how we can ensure that we are kind of talking about the components whose effects can cause death or injury in paragraph one. That might be a way forward rather than introducing lethal effects for us, lethal force. For us, it's important that it's effects-based. A couple of other points were flexible with regard to human user, human operator. We've listened carefully to France's contribution this morning, as well as on activation and in the execution of the task where we are quite flexible there as well and hope we can make good progress on that. Thank you so much. That's all for this at this stage.

I thank the distinguished representative of Switzerland for sharing the views of his delegation and providing us with comments. Next on my list is Japan, to be followed by the Republic of Korea. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Japan. So you have the floor.

Well, thank you, Mr. Chairperson. And first of all, my delegation would like to express our appreciation to the Chairperson and the Chair's friends and the Secretary as well. for your tireless efforts and preparation of this rolling text, which is definitely an excellent basis for our discussion and proceeding this working group as well. Let me point out just two points. Number one, essential characteristics of loads. My delegation would like to draw your attention that the consensus was reached at the GGE in 2019 regarding this importance of the functions of identification, selection and engagement. As mentioned in the various occasions by my delegation, including the informal consultations, Identification is a function directly linked to the judgment of whether or not it is for military purposes and is important in fulfilling the principle of distinction and the international humanitarian law. From Japan's perspective, when discussing the autonomous functions of ROADS, identification should remain an important element. In the targeting cycle, Mr. Chair, of those discussions, identification includes establishing situational awareness of what is where on the field and is the process of searching and identifying much from a memory database of what has been captured using a visual sensor and radio wave information. and is a function of distinguishing between civilian objects and military objectives. So, comply with the principles of distinction under international humanitarian law. It is necessary for commanders, for example, to take all feasible precautions to verify military objectives, as well as to ensure that civilians are not mistakenly targeted through the weapons own identification capabilities. Since it is important for all weapons systems, not just the LoRs, Mr. Chair, to determine whether the weapons system can sufficiently identify the target in order to judge whether it complies with the principles of international humanitarian law, it is appropriate to retain identification as a characteristic. as a premise for discussing the application of international humanitarian law to the laws. Regarding the argument that including identification makes the scope of the laws excessively limited, my delegation would like to understand specifically which weapon systems would be excluded and what other problems are in that. Number two, lethality. referring to injuries to persons and damage or destruction of objectives as a result of the laws is supportable in light of the CCW and IHL. But on the other hand, to clarify the focus of this discussion, lethality included in the GGE mandate should be retained. And from this perspective, my delegation proposes adding "with lethal force" to paragraph 1 of this box 1. The integration of paragraph 2 into paragraph 1, as proposed in the some formal consultations, can be considered favorably. And lastly, there is generally no problem with the paragraph 2. But if only the term "lethal" is expressed as a capacity to cause death, it could apply to everything, including non-weapons. Therefore, to relate lethality to weapon systems rather than capability, my delegation prefers a lethal weapon system refers to a weapon system that causes death to a person. I thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

I thank the distinguished representative of Japan for sharing the views of his delegation and making comments on the text. Next on my list is the Republic of Korea, to be followed by Pakistan. I will now pass the floor to the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea. Sir, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. At the outset, my delegation wishes to express our sincere appreciation to you and your team for your dedicated efforts in guiding our work. We have made a significant progress on the basis of your rolling text in previous sessions, and we hope to achieve a substantive outcome next year and fulfill our mandate. And I also would like to welcome everyone back to school, as the Russian delegation mentioned. Moving directly to box 1, we consider the text is moving in the right direction. My delegation has only a few remaining issues to be addressed. First, on the issue of critical functions, my delegation has consistently underscored the importance of including identification among the core functions of the laws. This reflects the operational reality of such systems, which are typically designed to first identify and then select the targets for engagements. During the identification phase, the system distinguishes between types of objects, friend or foe, combatants or non-combatants, cars or tanks. In our view, it would be impractical to characterize laws without taking into account how they actually function in practice. For the characterization to be meaningful, it must be technically sound. While we acknowledge the concerns raised by a number of delegations the including identification could narrow the scope, we do not share this assessment. We do not consider that human involvement with pre-setting for parameters would automatically exclude such weapons systems from being considered LOS. We see the identification function as being primarily performed by LOS once they are activated. In this regard, we support the suggestion put forward by the French delegation that we include after activation in the characterization to clarify this point. Furthermore, we view identification as a distinctive function even though it precedes selection. Just as selection is a precondition for engagement, yet it remains explicitly recognized and mentioned as one of the critical functions, we believe identification should likewise not be omitted. We therefore once again stress the need to include identification in the list of critical functions for laws. Second, we suggest replacing a human user with the operator that would provide greater precision, as the U.S. and other delegations suggested during the previous sessions. This is again to ensure that our characterization accurately reflects how militaries employ laws in practice. The term "user" is ambiguous and imprecise, as the French delegation has just pointed out. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea. Next on my list is Pakistan, to be followed by Italy and Spain. But let me now pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Pakistan. Sir, you have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. We would like to join others in appreciating the work that you and your entire team has been carrying out and the work and the support given by the ISU. We think that the rolling text has developed and to a very positive threshold and where we are, I think there are some very useful elements that are contained in the rolling text, which we would like to preserve. And I would just like to highlight before getting into box one that we are at this stage of our discussions where it's important to consider that we are not yet negotiating a legal instrument, but we are engaged in the process of developing a set of elements of a future instrument. Therefore, it is critical that while we are doing that, we should capture the full range of essential elements that will inform and shape our future work. We do not believe that important or critical elements or aspects should be lost that are contained in the rolling text. Nothing should be permanently discarded. Instead, we must take a broad, inclusive, and forward-thinking approach and aim to develop comprehensive menu, a set of elements from which a future instrument can take form. Now some general comments on box 1. Mr. Chair, we are one of those states which have often highlighted that the question of how we characterize laws is an important one, but we must ensure that our definition serves the broader purpose of work rather than restricting it. We have already spent considerable amount of time over the years discussing definitions. We understand that the ruling text that you have circulated appeared on May 12, but we have been discussing all these elements much before that. We think that the real challenge is not how to define laws, but how to find a way to regulate and to address their negative impacts. A definition from our perspective that is too narrow, one that captures only theoretical systems, for instance, that may never be developed, will not serve us well. So if we define laws in such a way that, for instance, only systems with full autonomy in each stage of their life cycle and all stages of operation is required, then we risk regulating something that may never exist. So that aspect is important. So we need an approach that is broad, practical, and technology proof, because we understand that our understanding, future understanding of these systems will evolve also. So that aspect is also important. Now, coming to the specifics of POC 1, Mr. Chair, our delegation supports the formulation as you have proposed. especially when we talk about critical functions, we support how you have used the terms select and engage. We understand the views that some states have expressed to call to insert, identify. From our aspect, the challenge that we face is, I mean, the question we ask ourselves is, do we have a common understanding of what that identify, which stage of the process would it cover? Is it going to be in the design phase when programmers encode a radar profile, for instance? Or is it at the operational level when a commander is making a judgment or positively identifying a lawful target under IHL? Or is it simply a sensor-based classification function that we are trying to cover using this identify verb at the moment of use? And we think that we cannot agree on where identify actually lies. And we risk importing ambiguity by including identify. We risk creating loopholes into our definition, which can then in future be exploited by states. Target identification can often happen at the ISR or, for instance, at command level that is outside the weapon system itself. So if it required identify as part of that definition, states can argue that their weapon states do not do that. It merely acts on preloaded data. Engineers may preload target profiles, for example, emitter signatures, heat shapes, image libraries, which are a design process, but they can be interpreted as encoding of identification criteria, not an autonomous decision made during use. For example, if we look at the specific case of loitering munitions, which roam in a box, use seeker logic, including anti-radiation sensing to select an attack matches to a target profile, often without a human picking the specific radar or vehicle or a time of strike. So in those cases, a state can argue that it's not doing the identification function of the process, and that would, again, take the system outside the scope of the instrument that we are trying to regulate. Chair, we also do understand that some states have given examples of perhaps what they mean by identification is some tasks that are performed at the level of the system during its operation. Now, when we look at those tasks, the autonomous weapon systems can execute certain of those tasks autonomously, such as detecting, classifying, or confirming a match against those profiles. But in our doctrinal language, we think that those are generally sub-steps of selecting. They are already covered in the formulation that you have proposed here. Some have also said that identify helps in distinction under IHL. Mr. Chair, we think that the positive identification in IHL, the obligation that confirming a military object is a lawful target, that's a commander or operator-related obligation, not a system function. This is what we need to address in the future boxes, in the other boxes, in boxes three, where we're talking about prohibitions and regulations. So in a nutshell, we strongly support the formulation that you have proposed to retain, select and engage on this. Regarding some other proposals that have been raised in this box one, we will come back at a later stage. Thank you.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan for sharing the views of his delegation and indeed for reminding us that we are not yet developing a legal instrument. but a set of elements. Next on my list is Italy, to be followed by Spain, Singapore, Canada, and Brazil. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Italy. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. At the outset, allow me to thank you and your team for the tireless work you have done over these months. Many sensitives are present in this conference room and through Your efforts and our differences have been narrowed down to the current rolling text where we see many areas of possible convergence. The task of our group is to further consider and formulate by consensus a set of elements of an instrument. And for us, this instrument should try to adopt a functional approach focused more on the scope of application rather than physical characteristics. Looking at section 1, We would like to make the following comments. We support the introduction of the language within the scope of the application of the CCW, as it clearly defines, in fact, the scope of application of any future instrument. We intend to support regulation of laws that, in general terms, maintain a higher level of autonomy across all critical functions. In our view, A lethal autonomous weapons system is a system that, once activated, can identify, select, and engage targets without further human intervention, implying, therefore, the use of artificial intelligence for all the three phases of the process. For this reason, we have expressed a preference for mentioning all the three phases, identify, select, and engage. with the addition of without further intervention by human user in the execution of these tasks. Having said that, we appreciate the detailed expert work contained in your background paper on context appropriate human judgment and control and the critical functions of laws. During the last session of the GEG laws, it appeared that delegations may give different meanings to the critical functions, especially to the selection phase. And we are ready to work towards a common understanding that brings us closer to a consensus definition for the future instrument. Now, looking at paragraph two, the definition of lethality formulated in this paragraph, clearly focusing on the capacity to cause death in the first part, and maintaining a more generic formulation in the second part may be used in circumstances that do not result in death. This formulation seems to us a good compromise, following the discussion we had in March. The suitability of laws to cause death appears to be the necessary requirement for the characterization, if then the system is used to cause damage or injury, this does not preclude it from still being considered a lethal autonomous weapons system for the purpose of the CCW. We think the current text is a very good basis for further discussion, and we are open to consider other possible language alternatives that could accommodate different sensitivities of this matter. In our view, though, in order to resolve any interpretative doubts regarding the possible inclusion in the category of laws of automatic defensive systems that function on missiles and drones, it would add more clarity to remove from the sentence "to damage or destroy objects", so to remove this part of the sentence. I thank you, Chair.

Let me thank the Ambassador of Italy for sharing the views of his delegation and making proposals on the present text. Next on my list is Spain, to be followed by Singapore. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Spain. You have the floor.

Thank you very much, Chairperson. Allow me to begin this brief statement by thanking you and indeed thanking your entire team for the work that's been done throughout this process, both in formal and informal meetings, and to thank you for your very valuable leadership given to this group. This work that you've been carrying out has borne fruit in this rolling text, which we believe to be an excellent cornerstone for our work, and it contains many areas and elements of agreement which we believe will be able to bring us eventually to consensus. I'd like to take this opportunity to recall the work done by the group of countries, including Spain, who were members of the two tiers group on the human element. This is a document that was presented this morning by the German Ambassador, and we believe this is a very valuable document, and we'd like to urge all delegations to take it into account in our work this week. In my national capacity, I'd like to share three very specific comments as regards box one of this rolling text. Concerning paragraph one, We're well aware that the possible inclusion of the term "identify" would favour positive identification of the target as a military target, and it would in turn be in line with compliance of the principle of distinction contained in Protocol I of the 8th of June 1977, in addition to the 12th of August 1949 Geneva Conventions. But this delegation believes that the term identify is a characteristic connected to the critical operation of selection. And so we would agree with retaining in paragraph 1, select and engage without requiring the addition of the term "identify". As regards the term "intervention by human user", this term might give rise to just considering operators of those systems. Well, if we broaden out our understanding of the term "human intervention", we would understand that it is that the scope of that phraseology would be wider. And this would better envelope non-direct forms of control, which we are currently wanting to bear in mind. Also, the use of the term human intervention would better encapsulate the fact that these systems should operate within a responsible command and control chain, human command and control chain. As regards to paragraph two, we support the characteristic of lethality being clearly incorporated here, and we understand this as ability to cause harm. We also think that it would be good for the term "lethal" to include the ability to cause harm to both people and possessions. In that sense, the second sentence of paragraph 2 is, we believe, extremely appropriate and relevant. Chairperson, you can count on this delegation in working towards a consensus in this rolling text and to facilitate the compliance of this group's mandate. Thank you.

Let me thank the Ambassador of Spain for her comments, suggestions and explanations. Next on my list is Singapore, to be followed by Canada. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Singapore. You have the floor.

Distinguished Chair, Singapore would like to first thank Your Excellency, Mr. Chair, and your team for the intersessional informal consultations in May and June and making amendments to the rolling text. We assure you of our continuous support in working with you and our fellow delegations to make substantive progress in this GGE. We would first like to refer to the Chair's background paper, which provides useful definitions for the terms "identify", "select" and "engage". These definitions reflect clearly that "identify" and "select" have distinct functions. We note that some delegations have suggested using "select" as a catch-all term that would cover the "identify" function. We thus would like to further understand how such an approach would differentiate laws from existing conventional weapon systems that select targets by themselves based on radar returns without performing an identify function. An example could be guided missiles in their terminal phase. My delegation is therefore of the view that if the intent is for the function of identify to be included as a precondition for select, then this term should be explicitly reflected in the rolling text. Without including the term identify in the definition of loss, We are concerned that the generic quality and ambiguity of such a characterization could risk undermining the rolling text. It will eventually form the elements of a special and authoritative status on laws. So without identify, we are concerned it would blur the distinction between the type of emerging technologies we are actually concerned about, as well as mixing it up with the many types of conventional weapons from the 20th century. Some delegations have also argued that the concern could be mitigated through the exclusion clause, where relevant existing conventional weapons could be excluded from this characterisation. We would like to highlight a few issues that this may raise. First, relying on the exclusion clause could introduce further contention during subsequent implementation, specifically as to whether specific weapon systems should or should not be excluded. Second, we were concerned as to whether enacting an exclusion clause could create a loophole by serving to green lane existing non-contentious conventional weapon systems. To be more precise, we're concerned bad faith actors could claim that their laws do not reinvent the wheel, but are merely technologically advanced versions of existing conventional weapons, and should be logically covered under the exclusion clause. This approach could complicate or potentially undermine the implementation of measures from this GGE. In light of the above issues, my delegation is open to hearing from other delegations regarding possible examples of specific weapon systems that should be considered laws, but which the identify, select and engage characterization would exclude. If delegations could provide such examples, it would then illustrate the concrete risk of overly narrowing the characterisation and help my delegation to understand the concerns. With that, Chair, I thank you again for the work done in amending the rolling text, and we hope that through our continued discussions, we are able to achieve a clear focus outcome on characterisation. I thank you, Chair.

I would like to thank the distinguished representative of Singapore for his statement and for diving deep into the proposals made and raising also some questions, and I invite other delegations to respond to that. Next on my list is Canada, to be followed by Brazil and Colombia. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Canada. Sir, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. As this is the first time my delegation has taken the floor, we'd like to congratulate you in the manner of which you've organized this meeting, and you can count on my delegation's full support. We would also like to take the opportunity to thank you for representing this group at the May informal session on AWS in New York. Mr. Chair, my delegation aligns itself with the statement delivered by Australia, and we wish to offer a few additional comments on the rolling text in our national capacity. We believe that substantial progress has been made in refining the rolling text, getting us closer to achieving our goal of establishing a set of elements towards an instrument. Specifically on box one, like others, we welcome the removal of the term "identify" as we agree that this is indeed presupposed within the concepts of select and engage. On the question of lethality, my delegation believes that the agreed definition as it is currently set out in para. 2 could be better suited as part of para. 1 or as a subparagraph to para. 1, where it is first introduced. Additionally, the second sentence of paragraph 2 could be removed since we believe it is not necessary as the definition is based on the capacity to cause death, which ergo would render injury and damage to also be possible. And finally, we also would just like to echo and welcome the important contributions made by civil society on our ongoing deliberations. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Canada for sharing the views of his delegation and coming up with proposals. Next on my list is Brazil, to be followed by Colombia, China, and the Russian Federation. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Brazil. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and good morning. My delegation would like to express its appreciation to you and to your team for guiding our work thus far since the beginning of the current mandate, and in particular for presenting the latest revision of the rolling text, the 12th of May version, which, in the understanding of our delegation, has reached a level of maturity and detail that convinces us that we will be able to fulfill our mandate. While my delegation is ready to continue working on this text to further refine and perfect it, we expect that the substance of the text as a whole is maintained. All the elements contained therein are a reflection of more than 10 years of discussions in the context of this GGE. Therefore, any text proposals to change or substantively alter the breadth of this draft rolling text should be fully justified and be informed by our previous discussions. Specifically as regards box one, Brazil believes that it is very well crafted and very close to a point in which it will be ready for adoption. Like other delegations, we believe that the autonomy in the selection and engagement of targets are the functions that should be the litmus test to characterize a weapon system's weapon system as loss. The formal consultations you have organized and the background paper that you have prepared on this issue of critical functions have shed light on the technical aspects of these concepts. And it confirms the perception of my delegation that the identification is subsumed under the context-- concept of target selection. On the other hand, the inclusion of a reference to identification as a critical element for the characterization of loss, especially given the lack of clarity about the term itself, might lead to loopholes that can be explored to artificially exclude autonomous systems from this definition, as was thoroughly explained by the Pakistani delegation earlier. Like other litigations, we also prefer the exclusion of references to lethality. We believe that this notion is unnecessary and might also lead to artificial exclusions. But we believe that if the word is to be retained, this concept is to be retained, it should be made clear that it does not exclude systems that are capable of causing damage to objects or injury to persons. In this regard, the language that in para 2, in our view, is a good step towards that objective even if it can still be further refined. By the same token, we do not support the inclusion of reference to "with lethal force" in paragraph 1, as it would potentially lead to an understanding that this characterization applies only to anti-personnel systems, and this is something that my delegation would not favor. I thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil for his intervention. Next on my list is Colombia, to be followed by China, Russian Federation, and then I have campaign to stop killer robots. But first, let me pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Colombia. So you have the floor.

Thank you very much, Chairperson, and greetings to all. We'd like to thank you and your team for the rigorous work you've carried out in this last review of the text. We appreciate the effort. to guide sustained discussions over the last session and the inclusive focus adopted to incorporate many of the constructive contributions made by the High Contracting Parties and observers in the group's work. We lend our support to your work and we look forward to finding consensus. As the text stands, it contains the structure and substance of a raft of elements that we believe to be an excellent basis for negotiations. Into the substance, we believe that the concept of lethality introduced by the Presidency represents a constructive compromise between the proposals in the previous session. This particular wording reflects a spirit to seek consensus demonstrated by many participants in conserving reference to the ability to cause death, something highlighted by a number of delegations. At the same time, by including systems capable of causing harm to people or material possessions, we avoid the use of lethal weapons being conceived to be exclusively connected to those just causing death. This characterisation is essential to ensure that the group's discussions and the various elements that are drafted tackle all systems of concern. We greet the reference to selection and engagement as one of the key terms in the text, and we believe that those terms contain items related to identification as well. We believe that the text that the chair has presented contributes to resolving disagreements. Finally, we would like to reiterate our commitment to finding consensus and support your work. Thank you.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Colombia for sharing the views of his delegation and for the support expressed to the Chair. Next on my list is China, to be followed by the Russian Federation, Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, and Cherale Onum, and then I have the ICRC. But first, let me pass the floor to the distinguished representative of China. Madam, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, for some time under your guidance, we have conducted in-depth discussions on key issues such as the defining characteristics of laws and application of IHL, which have laid a good foundation for our further work. China will continue to support your work and make efforts with all parties to further promote consensus in the process. In the current rolling text, concerning the text, we believe that the key functions of economy, interpretation of lethality, and the exclusion clauses constitute a good basis. And we expect all parties to reach consensus as soon as possible. Concerning specific issues, in the first paragraph, concerning the discussion on identification, This discussion mainly is reflected in the ability of the weapon system to make autonomous decisions based on different mission environments. The autonomous functions in the chain of destruction may lead to a situation in which the laws have intent or outcome of key aspects of judgment, decision-making, control, and actions in the performance of destruction task that are inconsistent or contrary to the intent of a human operator. Therefore, we support focusing on the issue of autonomy in a chain of death and injury. Identifying, selecting and engaging are all core functions of laws. This point has been already reflected in the 2019 GDE report. Therefore, we suggest we add the word identification. concerning lethality in the second para. Following our mandate, lethality is an essential element of laws. That is the design intent of the weapon. The discussions around laws should not be extended to autonomous weapon systems or autonomous systems. We suggest in the second para concerning the expression of lethality, we can use the wording "designed to kill and injure persons and capable of doing so." Some delegations have suggested This formulation can be merged in the first paragraph. We do not oppose this idea. Concerning the third para, the scope of discussion, we should remember the original intention of discussing emerging technologies in the field of laws within the framework of CCW. The regulation of laws is essentially a preventive limitation and should not attempt to include conventional weapons that have long existed and that are already subject to relevant national laws. Taking into account technological elements, we should avoid the definition being too narrow and leaving loopholes in this way and also avoid the definition being too wide and thus hindering the future development of legitimate technologies. Therefore, we believe that the exclusion clause is useful. Furthermore, We would like to hear more views concerning without intention -- intervention by a human user on this formulation. We would like to understand more views on the understanding of the word intervention so as to further study this issue because In the rolling text, the word intervention appears only once. We would like to understand this word includes what actions and what measures. Thank you, sir.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of China for sharing the views for, for my delegation and for making proposals with regard to the text, uh, and asking for clarifications. Next on my list is the Russian Federation, to be followed by Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation. Sir, you have the floor.

Thank you very much, distinguished Chair. First, I would like to join Those speakers expressed their gratitude and recognition, something that was mentioned by several delegations, thanking you and your team for the preparation of this text and for the organization of the work on this document during the intercessional period. Our delegation also believes that such efforts contribute to the progress by Member States towards a compromise and consensus in connection with the different understandings that could eventually make it possible to implement the objectives that this group faces and prepare the foundation for discussions and agreement on the draft final report of this group. Just like many other delegations, we share the point of view that this text is a very good foundation for our continuation, the continuation of our work in order to find perhaps consensus-based understandings on key aspects that relate to lethal autonomous weapons systems and technologies that are related to such systems. For our part, we are ready to continue our work to find such consensus-based understandings, conclusions, and recommendations as part of the work of this group on box 1 and paragraph 1. First, distinguished chair, we believe that as part of a working definition or understanding of the working characteristics of such weapon systems, we have to have and we have to define the three fundamental elements of the mandate of this GGE and such weapon systems. What I mean is the understanding or the notions of lethality, autonomy, and what the weapon system actually represents or means. If we start with the last, the term "weapon system", then in paragraph 1, we see that the first part of paragraph 1 serves exactly that purpose. This is, we believe, why we have in the text the language integrated combination. Because the term itself, a weapon system, is not limited to one specific means that makes the system. We have numerous examples when a weapon system, including weapon systems that already exist, that already have high levels of automation, include several elements. And all of that together, these elements represent one single weapon system. We have heard quite a few statements about the fact that we should not have a narrow definition. We fully understand and support such an approach, and this is why the inclusion of the notion of an integrated combination is fully justified in this case. It is aimed at ensuring that we do not have a narrow definition that focuses on specific means of attack or elements of attack that may represent an integral component of a weapon system as a whole. Moreover, we also believe that as far as other technological components are concerned, the components that may be included in such a weapon system, together with attack elements, we have to have a clear reference to the fact that these technological components are playing an auxiliary role. This is why we believe that we should include the word auxiliary before the words technological components. We believe that that is indeed the compromise that we may have when we work on understanding of such weapon systems, when our main attention will be devoted to means or elements of attack as part of such a system, but at the same time we would not exclude any secondary or auxiliary technological components. On the notion of autonomy. We believe that the essence of this notion in the version that you're proposing to us, Mr. Chairman, we believe that it correctly represents what we need to have. Now, on the term "identification" as a critical function that could be included here together with the functions of selection and engagement of a target, my delegation approaches this question with flexibility in order to be able to achieve compromise here. And this is why we are quite ready to accept the point of view of only including just selection and engagement of a target. These two functions, because we are. We believe that the notion of identification of targets would be an integral part of the process of selection. selecting the target, because in line with international humanitarian law, one cannot select a target without identifying the target. But understanding also the interests and views of other delegations and taking into account the 2019 report, and also due to the fact that the notion of identification is indeed a critical element for those delegations, we would be also ready to accept the inclusion of this notion together with the notions of selection and engagement of a target. More importantly for our delegation is the last part of paragraph 1. And boiling down the notion of autonomy only to the stage of selecting and engaging a target. We believe that the notion of autonomy or elements of autonomy. This is what a weapon system has throughout its life cycle. We do not really understand a situation when such a weapon systems would have a function of autonomy only as it executes the task of selecting and engaging a target. And prior to that, for example, it would not have such a function. Once again, I will say that we believe that the function of autonomy that is inherent in a weapon system is present throughout the entire life cycle of such a system. Otherwise, if we are talking about something else and we are limiting the function of autonomy just to the phase of carrying out the two objectives that are mentioned, then we could start questioning the other notions that exist in the text that relate to the stages of the development, testing, production, and further on, including the notion that refers to carrying out legal reviews. Because during the stage of development, If we take into account the definition that we currently have, we can have systems that will not have the function of autonomy and may be excluded from carrying out such legal reviews, for example. This is why we suggest the deletion of the language in the execution of these tasks. and not to limit the definition only to the stage of using such systems, and leaving aside all the other stages that can be applied to the notion of autonomy. On the notion of lethality now. We share the point of view expressed by several delegations that took the floor before us when they said that lethality is an integral part of the notion of lethal autonomous weapons systems. And this notion should be included as part of the working definition of such weapon systems. as one of the key elements of such weapon systems. We are categorically against any attempts to change the mandate and subject of these discussions and limiting it simply to autonomous weapon systems. Now on the notion of lethality itself. Overall, we agree with the way this notion is presented in a fundamental way in paragraph 2, but we would prefer to introduce this characteristic in the working definition that we have in paragraph 1, and to add some language to paragraph 1 with a latent sense and cause death to a person. As a result, we will have language that will define a weapon system that has the capability not just simply to select and engage a target without the intervention of a human user, but also it is a weapon system that can cause death to a person. So This means that we will include the notion of lethality in paragraph 1 and as part of a working characteristic or a working definition of such weapon systems. Now with that, in paragraph 2, then the first sentence becomes superfluous and should be deleted. And as far as the second sentence is concerned, again, in order to be able to reach a consensus and understanding that this is very important to some delegations, we would be ready to agree to keep the sentence as paragraph 2 as some form of an understanding that provides further clarifications. about what the notion of lethality may actually mean. But with that, this would be done without interfering with the working definition of lethal autonomous weapon systems. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation for sharing the views of his delegation, for making proposals to the text and giving further clarifications with regards to his positions. Next on my list is the distinguished representative of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. Stop Killer Robots wishes to thank the Chair and friends of the Chair for their continued efforts to build convergence on the elements of an instrument on autonomous weapon systems through work on the rolling text. On box 1, we urge States to maintain a broad characterisation of autonomous weapon systems as the scope for their work on an instrument. To make sure that the problems and dangers of increasing autonomy in weapon systems are addressed effectively, Prohibitions and positive obligations to reject the automation of killing and keep meaningful human control in the use of force must be formulated within the discussion of a wide scope of systems. The characterisation in the current rolling text is sufficient to do this work, and we recommend that it is not restricted further. States should save any further discussion towards a definition of autonomous weapons systems for their negotiations on a legal instrument. Stop Killer Robots has stated before that we believe the word "lethal" should be removed from "lethal autonomous weapons systems". We welcome paragraph 2 in the revised text for its clarification that this qualifier does not restrict the scope of weapon systems under discussion in states' current work. When states move to negotiations on a legal instrument, we continue to recommend that the word "lethal" is removed. Lethality is an effect rather than a characteristic of a weapon system, as paragraph 2 makes clear. We believe the progress States have made in their discussions means that the international community can now move to negotiating a legally binding instrument on autonomous weapons systems, taking the work they have done so far as a starting point. States must commit to doing so urgently, and we call on all States to take the opportunity of this week's discussions to make this commitment. We also continue to stress that when States move to negotiations on a legal instrument, they must address issues that are not fully considered in the current rolling text, including the need to prohibit anti-personnel weapons systems, autonomous weapons systems, and the wide range of ethical and human rights concerns raised by autonomy in weapons systems. We will comment on these issues further during discussions this week. Thank you, Chair.

Let me thank the representative of killer robots. Next on my list is Sierra Leone, to be followed by the representative of the ICRC, Venezuela, Sri Lanka, United States, El Salvador, and Luxembourg. But first, the distinguished representative of Sierra Leone. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. Sierra Leone, thanks to you and your team and the group of friends who have been working behind in the background diligently for producing the revised rolling text and for the inclusive and transparent consultation if guided throughout the intercessional period. We commend the considerable efforts invested in drawing together the diverse contribution of delegations, experts, and observers into a text that reflects genuine areas of convergence. Sierra Leone welcomes the revised rolling text as a significant achievement. We reiterate, however, that we must preserve now What we must preserve now will determine the starting point for negotiations on a legally binding instrument. The revised text now before us reflects, in our opinion, further progress in reaching a common understanding. This is a welcome evolution. The text is not perfect, but we believe it represents a set of elements that could serve as a foundation for negotiations. We see in this text beginnings of a coherent framework. including affirmation of IHL and recognizing human judgment and control as indispensable, and providing both prohibitions and restrictions reflecting the widely supported to the approach. It also outlines, in our opinion, measures across the lifecycle of these systems, legal review safeguards, accountability mechanism that give substance to the principle of human responsibility. This convergence that Sierra Leone believes we must now preserve and build upon rather than dilute. The time has come now to shift our focus from identifying principles to negotiating binding rules. The urgency of this task is underscored by real-world developments. Technologies with growing autonomy are no longer theoretical, and the risks to civilians are more immediate than ever. Therefore, we believe, Chair, at this moment, we must recognize the revised text provides a sufficient basis for negotiation. While refinements will certainly be needed, remaining differences can and should be resolved in the course of negotiations. What matters now, we believe, is that we have a converging document that reflects our common ground and can take us forward. With this, Chair, I would like to also share Sierra Leone's comments on box one. Sierra Leone regards characterizational laws as foundational to our work. We note that the revised text takes important step forward by clarifying lethality as the capacity to cause death to a person, while also making clear that systems capable of causing injury to persons and damage to objects are not excluded. In March, Sierra Leone expressed concern that focusing on lethal alone risked narrowing the scope of our work as IHL protects against injury and damage as well as death. While we continue to see merit in a broader formulation, we recognize that the present language represents a constructive compromise. We are prepared to support it in the interest of convergence, provided it remains clear that all systems of humanitarian concern, whether causing death, injury, or damage, fall within the scope. It's vital that these humanitarian considerations remain at the center of our work, ensuring that the perspectives of all states are reflected in the outcome. We also wish to emphasize the importance of retaining reference to the critical functioning of selection and engagement. This reflects the practical reality of how such systems operate and ensure that weapons which autonomously select then engage targets are appropriately characterized. Linked to this, Sierra Leone recalls its earlier position that characterization must capture systems where a human may identify a target, but the machine autonomously selects and engages it. This distinction between identification by humans and autonomous selection and engagement by machines remains essential. It ensures that systems designed to match environmental data against target profiles and trigger force accordingly are not excluded from the definition. This alignment with existing technical realities will help prevent loopholes and provide the clarity necessary for effective regulation. Mr. Chair, Sierra Leone therefore welcomes the progress reflected in the revised formulation of Box 1 as it strikes a balance that can allow this group to move forward together. I thank you, Chair.

I would like to thank the distinguished representative of Sierra Leone for sharing the views of her delegation. Next on my list is the ICSC, to be followed by Venezuela. But now the ICSC. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. The ICSC would like to express appreciation to you, Chair, and to your team and the friends of the Chair for the hard work and consultations on the rolling text. We echo the comments made by distinguished representatives from Ireland, Austria, Mexico, Switzerland, Pakistan, Brazil, Italy, and Sierra Leone just now, in considering that the text reflects many constructive contributions made by high contracting parties and observers to date. It contains the structure and substance of a set of elements that we see as a very good basis for negotiation of a legally binding instrument to regulate autonomous weapon systems. In the context then of the working characterization, we see it as imperative that the group retains a broad characterization of autonomous weapon systems that captures all systems of concern, such as the one reflected in the current version of the rolling text. In this regard, we reiterate our recommendation to delete the qualifier of lethal throughout the text, as IHL protects civilians against death and injury, and it also protects objects. That said, similar to comments made by Ireland, France, Mexico, Switzerland, Spain, and Brazil, we consider the qualifier on lethality introduced by you, Chair, in paragraph 2 to represent a constructive compromise between the proposals made during the last session. It reflects the spirit of consensus building demonstrated by many high contracting parties, as it retains the reference to the capacity to cause death, which is an aspect of lethality emphasized by a few delegations. At the same time, by also referencing systems capable of causing injury to persons or damage to objects, the formulation ensures that the characterization of laws is not unduly narrowed to autonomous weapons that would be certain to cause death. This characterization of laws is important to ensure that the group's discussion and the set of elements it formulates captures all systems of concern. Moreover, echoing the comments made by a number of delegations, including Ireland, France, Australia, Switzerland, Pakistan, Spain, Canada, Brazil, among others, we welcome the reference to selection and engagement as the critical functions of autonomous weapon systems in box one. We see these terms as having a more common understanding, including, for example, as stages in the joint targeting cycles of many militaries. For the ICRC, the term identify refers to the process of determining a general target profile or list of potential targets to be input into the system. We consider this process would be often carried out by humans well ahead of time that the system is activated or launched. In contrast, select involves matching a specific person or object against a pre-programmed target profile that is selecting them for a strike. For the ICRC, a weapon system would fall within the scope of an instrument, even if the identification of a type of target is carried out by humans. The key point here is to capture all systems in which a human does not select the specific target and does not engage that target with force. On this basis, we continue to support the current phrasing, which omits the function of identify. I thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of the ICSC. Let me now pass the floor to Venezuela, to be followed by Sri Lanka. But first, the distinguished representative of Venezuela. You have.

The floor.

Thank you very much, Chair. Just like other delegations, we'd like to thank you and your team. and also thank the Secretariat. We trust that the discussions that we'll be having this week will be fruitful. Following the discussion in the plenary on the definition of lethal autonomous weapons systems, my delegation believes that the terms Identification and selection without human intervention are key elements that can have a complete definition. These notions reflect the technological autonomy in the execution of critical tasks, something that is a fundamental aspect that should be dealt with conceptually. On lethality. Our delegation believes that this term refers to the capacity of weapon systems to cause death or serious injury to a person, and also to destroy or damage objects. This element is essential in order to define the nature of laws, even if not designed specifically to kill, the high levels of autonomy to inflict damage may have indiscriminate harmful effects affecting not just persons but also ecosystems and critical infrastructure. Finally, my delegation values the focus on the role of humans and human change, and we need to guarantee complete and direct human control over such systems, a principle that should be clearly defined in whatever normative framework. We believe that this focus is fundamental to invert to avoid ambiguous interpretations that may be related to the use of these technologies. Technological autonomy should not replace human decision-making, especially in contexts where such decisions may become irreversible. My delegation will be making additional comments on the different paragraphs and boxes of this ruling text. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Venezuela. Next on my list is Sri Lanka, to be followed by the United States. First, the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. At the outset, my delegation would like to extend our gratitude to you for presenting the updated version of the rolling text. Sri Lanka commends your efforts in discussing the rolling text in a comprehensive and inclusive way during the first session in March this year, as well as during the inter-sessional period. Sri Lanka perceives the rolling text as a comprehensive and balanced proposal which reflects convergences of views expressed by the High Contracting Parties in a constructive way. According to my delegation's view, the elements which contained in the rolling text could be used as the basis of a future legally binding instrument with necessary improvements through the future negotiations while considering the recommendations and conclusions of the GGE. Mr. Chair, moving to the box 1, para 1. While noting your rationale to exclude the term "identify" from the rolling text, my delegation would like to mention that, given the complex nature of critical functions of the different types of autonomous weapon systems and their operations in reality, especially with a view to address the issues of any future developments of such weapons, it is very important that the rolling text clearly captures all the critical elements of the entire weapon cycle. Therefore, my delegation shares the similar notions of the other delegations who pointed out the need of covering the identification phase in the rolling text. We believe that the identification phase could take place at different levels based on different preconditions in different weapon systems, and therefore it is difficult to come into common understanding on dropping the term "identify" in para 1. This requires further elaboration of clear language without leaving room for any ambiguity in the future discussions on laws. The term "identification stage" is a critical function of laws and a central point of concern in their prohibition and regulation. Identification refers to the ability to search for, detect, and primary stage of distinguishing between targets, such as military objectives, and non-targets, such as civilians or civilian infrastructure, in most of the cases without human intervention. The importance of this function stems from its direct connection to key principles of international humanitarian law, particularly the principles of distinction and proportionality. Therefore, without clear indication on the term "identify" would also create accountability gaps in application of IHL. My delegation also believes that the elements of the rolling text should be broader enough to serve as the basis for negotiating a future legally binding instrument without leaving room to any misleading interpretation on select and engage by omitting the important element of identification, which is particularly important in view of the possible future developments and advancements of technologies. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka for intervention and proposed changes. Next on my list is the United States, to be followed by El Salvador and Luxembourg. But let me first pass now the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States. Sir, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and good morning, colleagues. At the outset, Chair, we would like to congratulate You and thank you and your team, the secretariat, the friends of the chair for all of the work that's gone into the rolling text, for all of the work that has gone into the intercessional period. And we wanted to assure you of our delegation's continued support in this effort. Like many others, we think the current text is in good shape. It represents real progress. We also agree with the comment made by our colleague colleagues from Pakistan and Brazil that our approach to characterization should be broad to ensure that the measures we identify create a practical, implementable framework that address both the current realities of autonomy as well as future weapons systems. Chair, we've tried very hard this morning to keep up with the comments, and we've heard a number of interventions that raise a number of really important questions and So we had prepared an intervention this morning that we've now had to substantially rewrite just to try to take into account many of the questions that have come up. And in the spirit of interactive discussion, we're going to hope to try to address some of them. And we also just wanted to note at the outset that we plan to circulate a working paper to address many of the issues that have been raised this morning, and we hope that that working paper, which I'm hoping we can circulate tomorrow, if not earlier, will contribute to our consideration of these issues. For example, our colleagues from Austria and Mexico suggested that it would be useful to have further discussion of the reference to the integration of one or more weapons and technological components, and the working paper that we plan to circulate will hopefully help address that issue. Our colleague from Singapore indicated that it would be helpful to have a deeper understanding of examples of weapons that would or would not be covered by the provision on characterization, and which we note could address the concern about loopholes raised by delegations like the delegation of Brazil. So hopefully the working paper that we will circulate will help deepen our understanding on some of these issues. Before turning to the text before us this morning, we did want to offer a couple of thoughts on the chapeau paragraph. I think that the main thing that we would want to just confirm with the Chair and with others in the group is the understanding that this is very much a working document reflecting a Chair's proposal at this point. I think one of the concerns that we have is just as a matter of drafting, with terminology like status up at the top in the header and with language that already appears to indicate that the group has provisionally found consensus. We just think it's important to confirm that understanding. I think that's the shared understanding in the room. Potentially, we could clarify that by dropping a footnote at the bottom of the page. But we did want to just note that one concern with the framing. Turning now to box to box one. I think our first observation is that the phrases within the scope of application of the CCW and the phrase and for the purposes of this set of elements of an instrument are both phrases that we think should relate to the entirety of box one. And because we have within the scope of application of the CCW in box one, paragraph one, and for the purposes of this set of elements, et cetera, in box one, paragraph two, it creates a little bit of an ambiguity. So we would suggest adding and for the purposes of this set of elements of an instrument to the first clause in the opening paragraph. Another drafting approach, which I think would be more complicated, would be to have a chapeau that begins before the numbered paragraphs that clarifies that the following understandings are within the scope of the application of the CCW and for the purposes of this set of elements of an instrument. We just don't want to have any ambiguity that both of those phrases apply throughout the paragraphs in that box. We've heard concerns from our colleagues from Japan and the Republic of Korea with the deletion of the term "identify." And while we, as a delegation, can be flexible on that point, we do think that further work may be needed to bring delegations closer together on these questions. And again, we are going to present some ideas in our working paper that we hope could help bridge those gaps. Chair, we suggest replacing the term user with operator. I think you've heard us make this point before. We think it's important to be more precise than human user because we're trying to describe autonomy in terms of a capability without any human intervention. User is an ambiguous term. And we have a concern, for example, that a commander could be understood to use a weapon even though the commander does not operate it, but rather subordinate personnel operate it. So for example, a human user, such as a commander, may have no intervention in the execution of the task, but the system is actually not autonomous. because the operator is performing the target selection and engagement function. So we think this is an area where additional precision could be helpful. We continue to suggest deleting the term human before the reference to user or operator. And in this connection, and again, we've made this point before, no IHL instrument refers to human user. as opposed to simply referring to the user or the operator. Uh, and in every IHL instrument, it's understood that the persons being referred to are, are human beings. By adding the term "human," we would imply that there is a category of non-human users or operators of, of a laws, which doesn't make sense because machines are not persons. Uh, and it's important for our delegation not to imply that such a category exists. Chair, we've heard China and I think others suggest replacing the term "can" in the first paragraph with "is designed to." And it is, I think, important to note that CCW protocols do typically incorporate references to design as an element to be considered. So I do think that it's appropriate to raise this question in connection with our characterization paragraph. Having said that, we don't want to lose the connection to the use of the weapon. So if We're going to refer to design. We think it's important to continue to refer to use. I think in March when we discussed this, we had suggested is designed or used. We think here you could add, before can, you could add the phrase through its design or intended use. And that would address both the questions or concerns that have been raised about the need to address the element of intended of design, but also could continue to capture the use connection. Chair, we would like to recommend adding initiation together with execution, so it would read initiation and execution. For example, if an operator directs the system to select and engage a target and the system then executes that task without operator intervention, then the engagement has not been performed autonomously, even though aspects of the task have been. As another example, a landmine, which is designed to be exploited by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person, can be regarded as a rudimentary autonomous weapon. because it can initiate and complete an engagement after activation. So we think this would be a helpful clarification. And finally, with respect to this paragraph, we would suggest deleting the comma after target and changing these tasks, plural, to this task. to make it more clear that the tasks are related and form a coherent activity, selecting and engaging a target without operator intervention after activation. We want to avoid misimpressions, for example, that selection is not related to engagement and that other steps needed to engage the target are not included. Chair, turning to the second paragraph and the question of lethality, and just to note, as I mentioned before, we would suggest deleting for the purposes of these elements of an instrument here and moving it up to the first, um, paragraph. Uh, we, uh, like many delegations, do believe we need to add an element on lethality. Uh, lethality has been omitted from the characteration- characterization paragraph above. But we're still, of course, retaining the term lethal autonomous weapons systems. And without the clarification of the lethality element, it would suggest that a lethal autonomous weapons system could be a non-lethal system. We had previously proposed adding with lethal force, which is a proposal we've heard again this morning. And Although there are differences among delegations on whether lethality should be a characteristic, I do think the GGE needs to work with the guidance given by the CCW high contracting parties, which includes this element. Therefore, unless there is consensus at the GGE to recommend that CCW high contracting parties omit the term lethal, the element really does need to be included. I think, Chair, your proposal in paragraph two is getting us very close to where we need to be. We have still heard some concerns about the reference to causing death being potentially overly broad. And one textual suggestion that occurs to us to make it a maybe more precise formulation that would avoid some of the concerns with over breadth would be to delete "cause death to" and replace it with kill a person. So it would read lethal refers to the capacity to kill a person. That would be a much more refined formulation that hopefully would address some of the concerns that we've heard from other delegations this morning. Finally, Chair, with respect to the third paragraph, we think it's in very good shape as drafted. One question that we have continued to hear, and again, a couple of concerns. One, we've heard concerns about the characterization approach that we're taking here being overly narrow. In previous meetings, I think this has been articulated by some delegations as wanting to ensure that we're capturing cases of what they characterized as nominal human input. That's not a term that we supported or favored, but we understood that as being another way of getting at this concern of an overly narrow definition. So one idea that we had that we're happy to throw out as food for thought at this point would be to include a phrase at the end that could read, or the possible application of these elements as appropriate to systems other than laws in which the operator relies on the system to identify, select, or engage a target as part of an attack. And that, Chair, we think might be a way to show that the measures and the good practices that we're developing in the context of this instrument actually have utility and importance to the types of weapons systems that may not, strictly speaking, be covered by the characterization paragraph. Thank you, Chair.

I would like to thank the distinguished representative of the United States for sharing with us the views of his delegation and also already something, some preview of a working paper that is under construction. Let me I think on behalf of the room, I ask indeed that it, it, it will be great if we would have that as soon as possible, uh, because the later, the more difficult is to, to digest it, um, um, what you have shared with us is, is very detailed, is very thorough, and I think we would all profit from it if it would be, uh, circulated, uh, as soon as possible to the full, um, uh, uh, presence of the room. Um, and with regard to the chapeau, I'm a little bit hesitant on starting their discussion because this is, is a kind of a, a two, and I would say by the time we, we have finished our discussion, hopefully reach consensus on the set of elements, we will, then we have the discussion on how to move it into, um, uh, a report to the, uh, uh, review conference of the CCW, and, and this chapeau is in a way for that moment, um. So that is only a kind of a temporary tax, a kind of a placeholder. And I take your points, but let's be careful on spending much time on that. I'm looking at the clock. We have a little bit less than 15 minutes left, and I still have one, two, three, four, five requests for the floor. So we might continue with this list after lunch. First, we have El Salvador to be followed by Luxembourg. Let me pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Luxembourg. You have the floor. Sorry, El Salvador to be followed by Luxembourg.

Thank you very much, Chairperson. Firstly, I would like to express my delegation's praise for the work that you have carried out and indeed the work your team and the Group of Friends has carried out in compiling this ruling text on the basis of prior deliberations. My delegation believes that this forms an excellent cornerstone and it properly represents the constructive contributions of various delegations to progress with our mandate. We are also grateful to civil society for its contributions. Additionally, my country is delighted to be a member of an interregional group of 16 countries that have provided fundamental elements for the construction of an instrument in this sphere. In particular, my delegation is in favour of the establishment of a legally binding instrument within the CCW with a possible sixth protocol. On this basis, I align myself with what has been said by other delegations, saying that we are increasingly closer to an integral text on the elements to be considered for negotiating an instrument. That said, we believe that some details still require clarification, and I offer the constructive support of my delegation for that purpose. In relation to the specificities of box 1, With regards the first paragraph, my delegation could be in favour of this proposal. In particular, we support retaining the terms "select" and "engage", agreeing with the statements made by a number of delegations. As we said in previous sessions, my delegation would prefer that the term "lethal" isn't used. because it eliminates the scope or some of the scope and the serious ramifications these weapons can have for humanity. Nonetheless, bearing in mind that this is a sensitive issue for some delegations and with a view to being flexible and constructive, my delegation could support the proposal presented under paragraph 2, in particular as regards the second section of this paragraph. Finally, Chair, we wish you all the very best during this session, and I'm grateful to you for giving me the floor.

I thank the distinguished representative of Panama. Next on my list is then El Salvador, Luxembourg, and the full list is Luxembourg, India, APILS, Bulgaria, Sweden, Article 36, and then Panama. But first, we have Luxembourg. You have the floor, sir.

Thank you, Chair. As this is the first time Luxembourg is taking the floor in this session of the GGE, I would like to express Luxembourg's full support for you, Chair, and your team, as well as for the well-crafted rolling text before us. I would also like to express our appreciation for the informal consultations you organized beforehand, which we found very helpful. Our delegation considers the rolling text to be in a very good shape as it is at this stage. That said, in an effort to be as time effective as possible, I will now dive into directly into the comments for the first box. Regarding the first paragraph, we appreciate the change you made in omitting the mention of identify so that it now reads select and engage. as we understand identification to be intrinsically and inherently linked to the selection process. Regarding the second paragraph, while Luxembourg's national position on autonomous weapon systems does not include the notion of lethal, we recognize the importance on delegation attached to it and understand that this is an integral part of the current mandate of this group. Therefore, we are open to keep lethal in the working definition, but support an extensive interpretation of lethality to avoid narrowing the scope of the characterization. We believe the wording you have put forward in paragraph two fulfills this purpose. Thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Luxembourg. Next on my list is India to be followed by IPILS, but first the Distinguished Representative of India. So you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson, for giving my delegation the floor. And I'd like to begin by also thanking you and your team for the work you've done previously and your effort in steering our discussions very well in the previous sessions, as also today. I can confirm that you can count on our delegation support and that my delegation will engage constructively in our discussions moving forward. I also want to take the opportunity to acknowledge the contributions of the ISU. Mr. Chairperson, we have taken note of the valuable contributions by various delegations today morning. We would like to place our preliminary views on the characterization debate and also on the revised characterization that you provided for this session. When we talk about a characterization of laws, in our view, precision in language is essential. A definition that is too broad risks capturing technologies that were never intended to fall under the instrument. Conversely, a definition that is too narrow risks leaving genuine concerns unaddressed. Therefore, we must aim to strike a delicate balance. In this connection, my delegation acknowledges the work on characterization done thus far and that it serves as a constructive foundation for future work. We do not think that we are too far from a formulation that can get consensus support. However, I would like to highlight areas where we have concerns and suggest possible edits. Mr. Chair, I have broadly three points to speak on. First, we believe that the reference to technological components as is in para one is broad. We are all aware that modern weapons rely on software, sensors, processors, and other technologies. These technologies, however, exist in countless civilian applications, such as cars, phones, medical equipment. To include all technological components without reference to their connection to the weapon would be too expansive and broad, such that it might be counterproductive. Therefore, we would like to add the word "there" integral before the technological components. Our concern is weapons and not the general-purpose technologies that are used in everyday life. By speaking of their integral technological components, we ensure that what is covered are weapon-related integral technologies as they function within a weapon system and not in isolation. Second, we would like an explicit inclusion of the term "identify" alongside "select" and "engage," as was also suggested by the delegation of Singapore. Targeting, in our view, is not a single act. It is a sequence. First, a target must be identified, then it can be selected and finally engaged. If we omit to identify the definition risks covering systems that are not truly autonomous in the sense that concerns us. Take the example of a fire and a forget missile. A soldier points it at a tank, pulls the trigger, and the missile will home it until the impact. Such a missile can select and engage the designated object, but it does not identify what that object is. The human has already done that work of relating to the identification of the target. The system has no capacity to distinguish between, for example, a tank, a bus, or a civilian car. It simply follows what it has been told. A system that continues chasing what a human has already marked is not exercising independent judgment. It cannot, therefore, be called a lethal autonomous weapon system. For this reason, all three functions, in our view, identify, select, and engage are indispensable. They are not interchangeable words. Together, in our view, they form the true test of autonomy. In addition, the 2019 report, the para 19A, also recognizes that identification, selection, and engagement are essential characteristics, as was also stated by the delegation of China. Our view is that if the general opinion of some is that the term "identification" can be subsumed within the term "selection," then there should be no substantive problem in repeating it again, once independently and the second time under the cover of term selection as it should not impact the scope. Thirdly, we would like to emphasize the need for inherent design instead of capacity with regard to elaboration of term lethal given in para 2. In our view, a kitchen knife, for instance, has the capacity to kill, but it was not designed as a weapon. A medicine has the capacity to harm, but it was not designed, but it is designed to heal. If we relied solely on capacity alone, we would risk, you know, calling these everyday items as weapons. Similarly, take a self-driving car as an example. If misused, it could strike and kill, but it is designed for transportation and not combat. Similarly, an autonomous bulldozer could theoretically cause death, yet it is built for construction. Relying on capacity would wrongly classify such systems as laws, diluting the definition and its focus. By requiring inherent design instead of capacity, we tether the definition firmly to weapons that are designed to cause death, while preventing overreach into technologies that are designed for peaceful purposes. And in this regard, we also take note of the comments by the delegation of the US, with their emphasis on both design and/or intended use. Our delegation can also support comments by the Russian Federation on positioning the first sentence of para 2 as a part of the first paragraph, which has the main characterization. Finally, on the question of exclusions, my delegation can go along with your proposal of not listing particular items or particular systems that are to be excluded. In any case, our view is that uncrewed aerial vehicles, which are remotely piloted and currently in use, are not covered under the characterization that you provided. Mr. Chair, in each of these aspects, the aim of my delegation is not to obscure, but to focus. Without these refinements, we might risk a definition that either covers too much and loses credibility or covers too little and loses relevance. I thank you.

We have, uh, only a few more minutes left, so I would, um, and we have quite a long list of, um, uh, delegations asking for the floor, that is, IPILS, Bulgaria, Sweden, Article 36, Panama, Norway, Asia Pacific Institute for Law and Security. So I would like to propose that we continue the discussion after lunch. I would like to thank the interpreters. I think this has not been an easy morning for them with lots of very technical discussions. So many thanks to them for making multilingualism work. I wish you a pleasant lunch, and I hope to see you back at 3:00.