General Assembly: Reform of the Security Council | Cluster Debate on the Veto - Informal meeting of the plenary, 79th session General Assembly Date: 21 January 2025 Language: English Transcript: https://transcripts.un.org/en/asset/k1c/k1cos15m0v Transcripts available through this tool are created by using automatic speech recognition and are not official records nor official documents of the United Nations. Official records and official documents are available on the Official Document System of the United Nations. --- Austria · Co-Chair [0:00]: I call to order the fourth informal meeting of the plenary on the question of equitable representation on an increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council. My fellow co-chair, Tarek Al-Banai, and I would like to extend a warm welcome to all of you. Happy New Year. still in January, so I can wish you that. I hope all of your dreams come true, especially if they regard Security Council reform. Before we begin, I'd like to make a short announcement. 30 p.m., before we continue again in the afternoon, the permanent mission of Austria will host a coffee break in the delegates' lounge, just a couple of meters to the right from here. There will be some Austrian coffee and some snacks as a token of appreciation to all of you for all the hard work and the wonderful cooperation that you've done in the IGM throughout the year. And I hope, of course, that some of you will find the time to join us there. My co-chair and I would like to express our gratitude to all the delegations for the active contributions in the IGN that we've had so far. The early resumption of the IGN meetings demonstrated the commitment that we all had together to implement the commitments that our leaders made at the Summit of the Future to strengthen our efforts in the framework of the IGN as a matter of priority and without delay. And we really showed that last year. In addition to the discussions on the five clusters, we already held a discussion on a revised model, and we had three informal meetings, taxel talks, also at the end of last year. Kuwait · Co-Chair · Tarek Al-Banai [2:04]: Happy New Year, everyone. Glad to see you all here. As indicated in our letter dated 19 December 2024, this meeting will serve as a cluster debate on the veto. As was the case in the first round of negotiations, today will be dedicated to statements by Member States and groups of States. Delegations were invited to inscribe on the list of speakers via e-delegate. and the live link to the list of speakers was circulated to all delegations. At this stage, if a delegation wishes to be added to that existing list of speakers, a representative should inform the Secretariat table. If a delegation wishes to speak on behalf of a group of states, a representative should inform the Secretariat in order to be given priority. Once the list of speakers is exhausted, we will hold an interactive discussion on the cluster and allow for member states and groups of states to respond to views and proposals put forth during the meetings in a closed meeting without webcast. Before we begin, I'd like to remind members that delegations are encouraged to email a copy of their statements to e-statements@un.org for the publication on the repository website, as well as to facilitate interpretation. I will now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Italy. Italy · Uniting for Consensus [3:41]: Good morning, distinguished co-chairs. I will make this intervention on behalf of Uniting for Consensus, a diverse cross-regional pro-reform group that comprises Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Spain, Turkey, and my own country, Italy. I wish to thank you for convening this second meeting of the IGN for this 79th session of the General Assembly, focusing on the veto cluster. The UFC's position on the veto is simple and consistent. While firmly advocating for the outright abolition of the veto, as its abuse is the root cause of many of today's shortcomings of the present Council, the UFC acknowledges the complexities involved in this matter. Although the vast majority of the UN membership agrees with us on ideally abolishing the veto, which is an anachronistic tool, this requires that the five permanent members be willing to relinquish their prerogative and agree to the corresponding Charter amendment. For the time being, we therefore call for immediate, tangible actions to address how to best limit the use of the veto. UFC proposes that the P5 commit not to use the veto in specific circumstances, such as, but not limited to, mass atrocities and war crimes, in line with existing initiatives, such as the Franco-Mexican initiative and the ACT code of conduct. Similarly, We note that just last September, the General Assembly decided to fully implement and adhere to all provisions of the Charter of the United Nations as they relate to the decision-making process in the Security Council, including Article 27.3 of the Charter. The use of the veto carries a heavy responsibility. Every time it prevents the Security Council from acting on issues of international peace and security, it undermines our collective security framework with devastating consequences, particularly when thousands of civilian lives are at risk. Furthermore, its use should be subject to accountability, and to this regard, we welcome the veto initiative spearheaded by Liechtenstein at the General Assembly. The UFC is ready and willing to discuss how these measures, which are currently implemented on a voluntary basis, could be formalized or codified, if you will, in the context of a comprehensive reform of the Security Council, so as to make them legally binding in the future. On the whole, we are convinced that the most viable and impactful approach to advance the reform of the Security Council and balance the veto and reduce its abuse is to increase the number of elected members on the Security Council. We would note that not only would the new permanent members make the Council less able to advance global peace and security, It will also make future changes to the UN Charter more difficult, rendering the UN less able to adapt to future challenges. An increased presence of elected non-permanent members would shift the equilibrium away from the disproportionate influence exerted by permanent members. In the context of a reformed Security Council, as per the UFC proposal, the weight of the elected members in the decision-making process would be much higher vis-a-vis the P5 compared to the current situation. A Security Council with more non-permanent members would rebalance the Council by being able to manage its agenda with more effectiveness. Moreover, our proposal would provide more opportunities for all Member States to be represented on and contribute to the decision-making in the Council, and thus increase the representation of underrepresented regions. We believe it will be the best solution to achieve a reformed Security Council that is more democratic, accountable, effective, transparent and efficient. For the reasons we have already mentioned, we are opposed to new vetoes. We also do not support any piecemeal approach that includes in a reform of the Security Council a review clause as a way to gradually introduce prerogatives like the veto for certain members. Distinguished co-chairs, acknowledging and building on broad agreement on the need for UN Security Council reform among member states and with a view to narrowing the existing divergences, we look forward to continuing these fruitful exchanges in the IGN on the five classes of reform. We cannot discuss the veto in a vacuum without discussing, for instance, the categories of membership as all clusters are strongly interlinked. Let us build more common ground on those so that we can bring about a Security Council that truly serves the global community. I thank you, and I look forward also to the coffee break at 2.30. Thank you. Kuwait · Co-Chair · Tarek Al-Banai [9:34]: I thank the distinguished representative of Italy, and I give the floor to Saint Vincent. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines · L69 [9:44]: Thank you, co-chairs, for giving me the floor. I have the honor to deliver today's statement on behalf of the L69, a diverse pro-reform group of 29 cross-regional developing countries in favor of justice and due representation and equity in the reform of the Security Council, both in process and in outcome. We begin by reaffirming our support to you, Co-Chairs, throughout this process. We underscore that in light of the urgency of reform and the slow progress made thus far, it is crucial that we take advantage of the full calendar available to us during this session of the General Assembly. In this vein, we emphasize the need to orient ourselves toward the commencement of time-bound, text-based negotiations to preserve the credibility of this process. Although the L69 is comprised primarily of developing countries with smaller permanent missions, we recognize how important this process is and will prioritize our contributions to its outcomes. Co-Chairs, Excellencies, First and foremost, the veto is undemocratic. It remains a disparity entrenched deeply into the Council's structure that undermines the principle of sovereign equality and gives no credence to democracy. The L69's position on the question of the veto, as articulated in the group's presentation during the last session of the IGN, is unambiguous and well established. We advocate for the total abolition of the veto, an option that we are willing to explore should the IGM decide to pursue it. However, we recognize that initiating a near-futile discussion would further delay progress, and time is a luxury we cannot afford. As such, and in the spirit of pragmatism, the L69 underscores that if the veto is to remain a feature of the Security Council, it must be extended to all new permanent members in order to preserve what is fair and equitable. No one permanent member should have the ability to exercise a power that is unavailable to fellow permanent members. That is neither just nor reflective of a truly representative Council. This is why we do not support the establishment of a subcategory of permanent membership, such as permanent members without the veto. Furthermore, the current composition of the permanent membership is a relic of a bygone era. It reflects a time when the UN's membership was a fraction of what it is today. when many member states were still under colonial rule. This outdated structure fails to represent the realities of the 21st century, causing the Council to be left behind, so to speak, by the General Assembly, which has grown exponentially to reflect the evolving international landscape. Co-chairs, Excellencies, We all agree that the abolition of the permanent category is not a possibility. While expanding a flawed system may appear counterintuitive, leaving the permanent category unchanged is to acquiesce to its anachronistic structure, one that no longer reflects the composition or aspirations of the global community. The only way to maintain the Security Council's relevance is to expand its permanent membership, prioritizing representation from the Global South, and finally, decolonizing the permanent member category. The expansion must be guided by the principles of equity and fairness, ensuring that all permanent members are granted the same rights and privileges as existing members. We acknowledge the concerns expressed about additional vetoes contributing to further paralysis of the Council. However, equity is indispensable to legitimacy. Extending the veto to new permanent members is a matter of common justice and, therefore, the only way to maintain legitimacy and credibility of a reformed Security Council. While our reform efforts must not be unrealistic. They must also not be driven by narrow geopolitical agendas. We must acknowledge the reality that the veto is likely to persist and work to ensure that a reformed Council is as inclusive, fair, and representative as possible. Co-chairs, Excellencies, meaningful reform must address the historical injustices embedded within the Council's structure. and reflect the realities of today's world. Expanding permanent membership with equal rights for new permanent members is essential for creating a more representative Council that is capable of effecting change in today's rapidly evolving and complex world. Within this vein, the L69 underscores the urgency of commencing substantive negotiations on the basis of a text in line with standard UN procedure. We continue to reject the arguments that suggest that text-based negotiations would paralyze this process, when in fact, it will do the opposite. A text provides structured framework that fosters clarity, accountability, and tangible progress. It will facilitate the evolution of positions through constructive dialogue, compromise, and consensus building. It will create a space. for member states and groups to arrive at an outcome that can garner the widest possible political acceptance. Delaying this process only perpetuates stagnation, which undermines the legitimacy and relevance of the Security Council in addressing today's global challenge. This is why the L69 emphasizes the need for the commencement of time-bound negotiations. The L69 group reaffirms its unwavering commitment to comprehensive Security Council reform and stands ready to work constructively with the IGN and the co-chairs as we endeavor to develop a draft text informed by these inputs that will form the basis of negotiations within a specific time frame. I thank you. Kuwait · Co-Chair · Tarek Al-Banai [17:03]: I thank the distinguished representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines And I give the floor to Luxembourg. Luxembourg · Benelux [17:13]: Your Excellencies, Co-Chairs, I have the honor to speak on behalf of the Benelux countries, Belgium, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and my own country, Luxembourg. We thank you, Co-Chairs, once again for convening this debate focused on the veto. The question of the veto is one of the key issues of Security Council reform, where it has been most difficult to identify clear convergences between the positions of Member States. However, there is a growing recognition that the current system, in which a single veto can block decisive action, often prevents the Council from effectively fulfilling its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. As a consequence, there is an increasing number of Member States calling for limiting the veto. The Benelux countries welcome the inclusion of the question of the veto in the Pact for the Future. In the pact, we have agreed that we will intensify efforts to reach an agreement on the future of the veto, including discussions on limiting its scope and use. That is action 39, paragraph 67g of the pact for the future that I just quoted. We must now put words into action. Reflecting the growing support among Member States, the Co-Chairs' Elements Paper includes in its Convergences section two initiatives seeking to limit the use of the veto, namely the Political Statement on the Suspension of the Veto in Case of Mass Atrocities, presented by France and Mexico, and the Code of Conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, drafted by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group, the ACT Group, which is now supported by more than 120 Member States. The Benelux countries fully support these two initiatives and urge all Member States who have not yet done so to endorse these initiatives. Co-chairs, the Benelux countries support the following steps to address the matter of the veto. There are four measures. Number one, restrict the use of veto in atrocity situations. Ensure the veto is not used in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes to avoid the Council being paralyzed. Number two, respecting Article 27.3 of the UN Charter, ensure that a member state party to a dispute abstains from voting, as stipulated in the Charter. Number three, any new permanent members in an enlarged Security Council should abstain from using the veto until a decision on the matter has been made during a review that would be held 15 years after the entry into force of the amendments to the Charter. Indeed, we must thoroughly consider the potential adverse impact of additional veto powers on the functioning of a future expanded Security Council and on the overall effectiveness of the Council. Number four, the General Assembly should play a more proactive role when the Security Council fails to act due to the use of the veto. building on the landmark veto initiative debates and the emergency special sessions held over recent years. Co-Chairs, the Benelux countries remain steadfast in our belief that reforming the Security Council, including the veto, is essential in order to ensure that the Security Council and the UN and the multilateral system as a whole continue to be legitimate and effective. We remain committed to collaborating with all member states and the IGN co-chairs to achieve actionable outcomes that uphold the principles of the United Nations and that serve the collective interests of the international community. I thank you. Kuwait · Co-Chair · Tarek Al-Banai [22:01]: I thank the distinguished representative of Luxembourg. And I now give the floor to the representative of Bahrain. Bahrain [22:13]: Thank you, co-chairs. Bahrain · Arab Group [22:19]: It is my honor to make this statement on behalf of the Arab Group. It is a pleasure for me to start by thanking you very warmly for the efforts you've been making in managing our IGN meetings during the 79th session of the General Assembly. The Arab Group received your letter of the 19th of December on the calendar for the IGN negotiations. the remainder in the current sessions, and the fact that the meeting today is on the issue of the veto. Co-Chairs, the issue of the veto is an important one on the issue of Security Council reform. And this was confirmed by the Pact for the Future when it is stated that this is an essential element of the Security Council reform, together with intensifying efforts for consensus on the future of the veto. including the discussions on limiting the scope of the veto and its use. Given that the Arab region historically has been most impacted by the use of the veto, most of the cases of the veto, unfortunately, have to do with issues in the Arab region. We, therefore, have the greatest interest in the veto issue form and in restricting its use, making sure that the Council can discharge its responsibilities as it should. The abuse of the veto undermined the credibility of Security Council decision-making on several occasions, and in certain cases, it incapacitated the Council to shoulder its responsibility and to check the measures that it had that were needed for the maintenance of international peace and security. A good example is the Israeli action in Gaza Strip, which lasted for 15 months. In case there is an enlargement of the members in both categories, it's important to make sure that the permanent members have the veto power similarly to the current permanent members. For as long as veto power remains, we remain convinced of the need to have a permanent representation of the Council, including having the right to veto. We have reiterated on many occasion in the course of the recent years our request to have a permanent Arab representation with full powers within the permanent members category in case there is an enlargement of the Council, in addition to the proportionate representation in the non-permanent members category in the enlarged Council. And this is because of the political and demographic weight of our group, HAPS. We are 11% of all member states of the United Nations and of the influence we have in a number of issues in particular. the volume and the number of Arab-related issues on the Council agenda. And we have seen that in the Council's work recently. Therefore, the Arab presence is important to have a better understanding of the issues that impact us, to deal with them, to take part in decision-making in the Councils on the issues which have to do with stability of the region and the world. Now, as regards the transregional representation, we have to acknowledge the particularity of Arab group or within the Security Council. We shouldn't be considered as part of the African group or the Asian group. As regards the various initiatives on the use of the veto, including the implementation of Resolution 3377 on the and the resolution on the use of veto. We are convinced that the use of veto has to be exhaustive, without partial use. So the restrictions of the veto in specific cases is an incomplete reform, which will not help with the reform of the Council the way we're hoping will be. We would like to say that the IGN within the General Assembly is the only forum to arrive at a consensus on the enlargement, the reform of Security Council. According to the Security Council and the General Assembly, the decision is a 72nd session. The 5 clusters of the reform on the GA decision are interconnected and have to be considered together. as we try to arrive at a functioning model. Finally, let me reaffirm our determination to have an objective, radical reform of the Security Council, and we encourage everyone to continue discussions in a positive view to find a common ground for consensus, which could be, uh, help us with the reform of Security Council. Kuwait · Co-Chair · Tarek Al-Banai [27:10]: I thank the representative of Bahrain. Sweden, please. Sweden · Nordic Group [27:17]: Excellencies, co-chairs, I have the honor to speak on behalf of the Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and my own country, Sweden. Please allow me to begin by wishing you a happy and prosperous 2025. Let me also take this opportunity to again express our sincere gratitude to Ambassador Barnai and Ambassador Majchik for your continued efforts as co-chairs of the IGN process. Under your steadfast leadership, we have collectively taken important steps forward towards Security Council reform. The agreed language in the Pact of the Future is strong and ambitious. Now is the time to consolidate and build on these achievements. Co-chairs, as you point out in your letter dated 19 December, our leaders have committed to strengthen our efforts for reform as a matter of priority and without delay. In that spirit, we very much welcome your plans and the IGN roadmap for 2025. I assure you that the Nordics stand ready to contribute in order to make further progress during this year's session. The UN Charter tasks the Security Council with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Thus, the Security Council has been entrusted by, and on behalf of, the wider membership to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations. The challenges of today's world are many and complex, and the need for prompt action remains as urgent as ever. For people affected by war and conflict, the Security Council's ability to act can mean the difference between life and death. We need a Security Council that is better equipped to respond. We need a Security Council that reflects today's world and thus is better equipped to serve. The question of the veto remains a key element of Security Council reform. The veto was established in a particular historical context, and while it is something we have all agreed to by signing the UN Charter, it must not stand in the way of the Council's effectiveness. Its misuse is not only preventing the Council from effectively fulfilling its vital mandate of maintaining international peace and security, but also undermining the legitimacy of and respect for the Council. Co-Chairs, last year there were seven draft resolutions that failed to be adopted as a result of the veto being cast. This is the highest number since 1986. During the same period of time, year 2024, global security continued to deteriorate. We saw alarming numbers of armed conflicts, sharply increasing number of civilians affected by conflict, not to mention other challenges to international peace and stability. As we all know, there are issues on the Council's agenda that were, and are, in dire need of prompt, decisive action. Discontent with the Council's inaction is becoming more and more audible around the world, and the increase in the use of the veto only adds to the criticism. In this context, and in line with the Pact for the Future, the Nordics are supportive of further considerations on how to limit the scope and use of the veto, including how to ensure the consistent application of Article 27.3 of the UN Charter. The use of the veto must also come with transparency and accountability. The Nordics commend the veto initiative, as adopted by the General Assembly, as a step in the right direction. Let us continue to work together in this spirit to keep a stern spotlight on the veto whenever cast. A veto must always be used in strict adherence with the letter and the spirit of the Charter. Co-Chairs, we must continue to consider the negative impact of the veto on the work of the Security Council today and, here in the IGN, also on a future enlarged Council. The Nordics are supportive of efforts and ideas aiming at restricting the scope of the veto, whether looking at the type of decisions, ways of adding layers to the voting process, or considering the role of the General Assembly in matters of peace and security. We feel that it's important at this point in time to remain open to all good ideas. We must leave no stone unturned in our efforts to break the current impasse. The Nordics are committed signatories of the ACT Code of Conduct, reflecting our commitment that the veto must never be allowed to stand in the way of Council action to prevent or end genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, and that preventative actions must be taken in this regard. We warmly welcome that this was also agreed by our leaders in the Pact for the Future. The Nordic countries also support the French-Mexican political declaration on suspension of the veto in cases of mass atrocities. Co-Chairs, the Nordic countries reiterate our support for your persistent work and for the efforts towards Security Council reform. We are looking forward to building on the commitments and momentum achieved with the Pact. Thank you. Kuwait · Co-Chair · Tarek Al-Banai [32:32]: I thank the distinguished representative of Sweden, and I give the floor to Germany. Germany · G4 [32:40]: Thank you, co-chair, for giving me the floor, and I have the honor to deliver these remarks on behalf of the G4, Brazil, India, Japan, and my own country, Germany. We commend the co-chairs for their persistent efforts to advance progress in the IJN and appreciate the early start of this year's cycle. However, we note with concern that discussions continue on the five clusters of reform as they have for the past 16 years, we have already made significant progress. The Pact for the Future provides us with a unique opportunity to advance negotiations on the reform of the Security Council in a meaningful way. We have a clear objective of preparing a consolidated model as soon as possible, in line with the call made by all world leaders in the Pact for the Future. While we continue to encourage all Member States to submit and update their proposals, we must not wait indefinitely to begin actual negotiations on a consolidated model. In our view, the widespread demand from member states for an expansion in both membership categories must be reflected in the consolidated model. We need to enhance the participation of under and unrepresented regional groups and of those significantly contributing to international peace and security in the Security Council. Additionally, the widely shared support for greater representation of Africa in line with the common African position can only be realized through an expansion in both categories. We would like to underline that the commitment of the G4 in this regard is real. Pro forma statements that seek expansion only in the non-permanent category, excluding the permanent category, are incongruent with the so-called support for common African position and greater representation of Africa in the Council. The G-4's position on the veto is well established. While new permanent members should, in principle, bear the same responsibilities and obligations as current ones, they would not exercise the veto until a decision on the matter is reached during a review. We have, however, also signalled openness and flexibility on this issue and seek to foster constructive negotiations. We would also like to encourage a restrained use of this instrument. Notably, some current permanent members have refrained from using their veto power for decades. This demonstrates how meaningful engagement as a permanent member is possible without relying on the use of the veto. Recognizing the importance of the veto issue, we believe it should be addressed alongside other critical topics. However, it is essential that the question of the veto does not obstruct progress on the broader issue of Council reform. Thank you. Kuwait · Co-Chair · Tarek Al-Banai [35:16]: I thank the distinguished representative of Germany. I now give the floor to. The representative of Egypt. Egypt [35:28]: Thank you very much, distinguished co-chairs, my dearest colleagues and friends. Ambassador and Ambassador Axel, allow me to start by aligning with the statements delivered by Sierra Leone on behalf of the African group and Bahrain on behalf of the Arab group. Distinguished colleagues, once again, we engage in this annual IJN cluster debate on the way to one of the principal and key pillars of the GA, the decision 62/557. In this context, allow me to reemphasize a few points. The question of the veto was and will remain a key fundamental aspect without which no meaningful reform of the Council could be achieved. Egypt's position on the question of the veto has been and remains very clear, crystal clear. We support the total and full abolishment of the veto. All member states of the Security Council should be equal, permanent, and non-permanent. No state should be more equal than the others. The veto is an aberration to the principles of justice and equality from which the UN Charter is inspired. Nevertheless, and as long as the veto remains pending the achievement of the ultimate goal of its abolishment, Egypt, and indeed all the African countries, is of the view that it should be extended to all new permanent members as a matter of equality and common justice. Creating permanent seats without the veto power would be akin to creating a new category of membership, a notion that we categorically reject. This position is enshrined in the common African position, as I said, and as it's related in the Lusaka Consensus, the Sirt Declaration, as well as the successive African Union summit decision. This position is solid as a rock. Thus, the two new African permanent members, as per the common African position, shall be granted the veto power until the time that there is a decision to totally and permanently abolish the veto. No hollow promises there, no reviews, no whatever, right away. In the meantime, we believe that any partial solution and temporary measures to address the question of the veto will not be productive. The question of the V2 can only be addressed in, in one holistic, comprehensive, single undertaking along with all other clusters of the, uh, decision 62, uh, slash 55, 5, uh, 57. Anything short of this will constitute a setback to the IGN process and will not yield any tangible outcomes. Egypt acknowledges the presence of different initiatives on the voluntary suspension of the use of the veto. While we understand the good intentions behind these great initiatives, we remain of the view that they are not a solution to the question of the veto. And we affirm that they all remain outside the scope of decision 62/5. 62557 and not part of this IGN discussion. We also reject any piecemeal approaches to the question of the veto, including the recently suggested the review clause that would defer the consideration of the veto to a future review process. Egypt remains of the view that the Council reform was constituted as one comprehensive package in that very famous decision, 62557. for the purposes of this IGM process and shall be resolved through one comprehensive package by this IGM process. Last but not least, we believe that the relevant actions agreed by our heads of states and governments in the Pact of the Future are a testament to their trust and faith in the process thus far. Hence, we're concerned over any attempts to circumvent this process through premature and untimely textual negotiations, imposed on the membership without due consideration. We will remain opposed to any such attempts that would risk unravelling the entire IGM process. Only through steady, consensual, well thought, incremental progress with all with will these negotiations bear fruit, culminating in a solution that would garner the widest possible political acceptance. Now, distinguished coaches, I have read the formal statement or so, but I wish to say that you see, when we had that charter, when we founded the UN 80 years ago or so, the spirit was giving those heavy-weighted country a certain privileges to work as guarantors of a system or whatever. If they agree five of them all well and fine. Yes, it will be a veto if they agree. But giving each and every one of them the right to block international consensus, you see, it leads to what you're seeing, a dysfunctional system or so. So please, we should remain very firm on that. We fix it once and for all. We fix it correctly for the better of humanity. Anything short of that, believe me, it will not apply. Thank you very much. I submit, distinguished co-chairs. Kuwait · Co-Chair · Tarek Al-Banai [40:46]: I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt, and I give the floor to Japan. Japan [40:57]: Thank you, co-chairs, as usual. and Japan free alliance with the Germany's statement on behalf of the G4. I will make additional remarks in my national capacity. Confronted with the reality of a permanent member of the UN Security Council invading another sovereign member state against the UN Charter while protecting its own national positions through the use of or threat of use of the veto, the majority of the member states have been emphasizing the need to limit the use of the veto in certain circumstances. This is reflected in the Pact for the Future adopted last September to, quote, "intensify efforts to reach an agreement on the future of the veto, including discussions on limiting its scope and use," end of the quote. From this perspective, The French-Mexican initiative and the ACT groups code of conduct are variable, variable efforts as immediate measures that contribute to the above objectives without amending the charter, and Japan supports them. These initiatives are not, however, supported by all permanent members of the council, And therefore, Japan continues to urge all permanent members who have not done so to commit to voluntary restraint on the use of a veto without delay and to implement this commitment accordingly. Co-chairs, a more fundamental issue is the need for a solution to the existing imbalance within the Security Council in terms of the veto. Reform of the Security Council is an urgent task, and discussion of the veto is an important part of it. Regarding the veto, Japan, as a G4 member, takes the position that new permanent members should, as a principle, have the same responsibility and obligations as current permanent members. In this regard, Japan supports a common African position, including First, the opposition to the veto in principle. And second, so long as it exists, the veto should be made available to the new permanent members. On this basis, the G4 takes the position that the new permanent members shall not exercise the veto right until a decision on the matter has been taken during a review to be held 15 years after the coming into force of the reform. This is to offer flexibility while stating the principle in order to resolve issues surrounding the veto from a practical perspective and for constructive negotiation. Co-Chairs, this year marks the 80th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. It is crucial not to let this moment pass us by. We must make concrete progress in discussions on an integrated model to realize a more representative, efficient, and effective Security Council as soon as possible. Japan is committed to contributing constructively to the discussions through the IGN. I thank you. Kuwait · Co-Chair · Tarek Al-Banai [44:23]: I thank the distinguished representative of Japan, and I give the floor to Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone · Africa Group [44:33]: Thank you, distinguished co-chair. Thank you, distinguished co-chair, for the floor. And before I commence my statement, let me also thank you for the invitation to Austin Coffee in the afternoon. I have the honor to speak on behalf of the African Union member states in today's debate on the question of the veto in the context of the reform of the United Nations Security Council. At the outset, I would like to express our gratitude to you, co-chairs, for convening this important meeting and for your insightful introductory remarks. We appreciate your efforts in outlining the timeline for the work of the IGN during the remainder of the 79th session, and we commend your exemplary leadership in guiding this process. As we gather for the first meeting of the year, I extend my best wishes to all for a year marked by collaboration, shared commitment, and tangible progress in the IGN process. Africa looks forward to continued collaboration with all member states to achieve significant progress and build the broadest possible consensus on the crucial issue of Security Council reform. Distinguished co-chairs, Africa firmly demands equitable and meaningful representation in all United Nations decision-making bodies, particularly in the Security Council, which bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Achieving full and equitable representation of Africa in the Security Council is paramount. This includes the demand for two permanent seats with all the rights and privileges of permanent membership, including the crucial right to the veto. Furthermore, Africa should be allocated five non-permanent seats to ensure effective regional representation and to guarantee that Africa's interests and voice are fully considered in matters of international peace and security. In this context, and in line with our long-standing position, Africa strongly reiterates its support for an expansion of both the permanent and non-permanent categories of the Security Council. This approach reflects the directive given by our leaders in paragraph 153 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, which stresses the need for early reform of the Security Council to, and I quote, "make it broadly representative, efficient, and transparent, and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions," end of quote. Distinguished co-chairs, Africa's position on the veto is clear and has been consistently articulated in various documents of the IG and process. However, for this debate, let me reiterate, the common African position fundamentally opposes the veto and calls for its abolition. However, should the veto be retained, it is a matter of common justice to extend the veto to new permanent members. ensuring that Africa enjoys equal rights and privileges in the Security Council. Therefore, while we believe that a veto-free Council is the ideal, the next best pragmatic and legitimate option is to extend the veto to new permanent members. To ensure true equity and fairness, new permanent members must be granted all the rights, privileges, and prerogatives associated with permanent membership. Accepting anything less would imply that these new members are relegated to a second-class status, which would fundamentally undermine the core principles of reform, equitable representation, and sovereign equality of states as enshrined in Article 2.1 of the United Nations Charter. It is essential to recognize the significant role the veto plays in the functioning of the Security Council. Historically, the veto has had a profound impact on the Council's effectiveness, particularly for non-permanent members. Any proposal to expand the Security Council must directly address the veto issue to ensure that the expansion is meaningful and impactful. By tackling this challenge, we can enhance the Council's ability to respond to global challenges with greater legitimacy and effectiveness. The extension of the veto is not merely a procedural matter. It is a question of fundamental justice and equity. The veto is deeply embedded in the Security Council's operation, and the discussion around its extension is closely tied to the call for expanding the permanent membership. Without addressing the veto, the voices and the influence of non-permanent members will remain diminished, which in turn hampers the overall effectiveness of the Council. Any effort to expand the Security Council that fails to extend the veto to new permanent members will ultimately fall short and will fail to bring about meaningful progress in the reform process. Distinguished co-chairs, it is well understood that the working methods and size of an expanded Security Council are intrinsically linked to the veto, the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly, and the principle of regional representation. This is why we continue to call for comprehensive reform of the Security Council as outlined in Decision 62/557. None of the five clusters should be negotiated in isolation. Expansion of both the permanent and non-permanent categories is inextricably connected to the issue of the size and veto. An expanded Security Council must also ensure equitable geographical representation. which enforces the call for comprehensive reform of the UN Security Council. We see no value in the proposal that seeks to downplay or delay meaningful and good discussions on the veto. We acknowledge that the veto may have become outmoded in light of contemporary realities, given that the circumstances justifying its establishment in 1945 may no longer apply. The relevance, effectiveness, and the democratic nature of the United Nations particularly the Security Council, have been questioned based on its composition and decision-making process, especially the use of the veto. This is why Africa continues to advocate for the abolition of the veto. While we recognize the veto remains central to the Security Council decision-making process, proposals to create an intermediate category of permanent membership without veto seem misguided. These proposals do not resolve the issue. Rather, they risk entrenching the current inequities. The African position is both principled and practical. It aims to address the undemocratic nature of the Council and seeks to enhance the legitimacy of its decisions, either by abolishing the veto or by extending it to new permanent members if it is retained. In conclusion, distinguished Co-Chairs, as we work towards meaningful progress in the reform process, We continue to express our gratitude to Member States, interest groups, and regional organizations that have consistently supported the common African position as articulated in the Ezulwini Consensus and the SADC Declaration. We remain committed to engaging constructively and transparently, building on the progress we have already made, and fostering a constructive approach to reforming the Security Council, particularly in light of the consensus to address the historical injustice being perpetrated against Africa. I thank you. Kuwait · Co-Chair · Tarek Al-Banai [52:42]: I thank the distinguished representative of Sierra Leone, and I give the floor to Brazil. Brazil [52:50]: Thank you. Distinguished co-chairs, Brazil aligns itself with the statements made by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines on behalf of the L69 and by Germany on behalf of the G4. As we restart our negotiations in 2025, I want to commend you for your dedicated support in bringing change to this long running process and encourage you to shift to a higher speed so that we can really start delivering in our mandate. The unprecedented momentum for Security Council reform was evidenced by over 120 member states calling for urgent action during last year's general debate and the adoption of the Pact for the Future. This clear roadmap presented by our leaders to the world, a clear mandate that it is up to us to implement. Both developments demand an effective, meaningful, and timely response from the IGN process. Our focus must shift from theoretical discussions of the five clusters, which have been exhaustively debated over 16 years, to examining specific models presented during the IGEN cycle and developing a consolidated model that can facilitate genuine reform. This is the fundamental task we have before us. Anything short of this raises further doubts about the seriousness, effectiveness, and perspectives of the IGN process. We must rise to the occasion. The abuse of the veto power has led the Council to repeatedly fail its responsibility under the Charter. This makes it only natural that a growing number of member states show interest in discussing initiatives to limit and regulate the veto. As we know, the increased use of the veto power reflects deepening divisions in the Security Council, where fundamental disagreements among permanent members prevent effective action on major conflicts. This has led to paralysis in some cases, which is a failure on the part of the Council, in particular of its permanent members, to meet the organ's primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security. Brazil reiterates what it has been saying again and again: The powers granted by the Charter to the permanent members is to be used to maintain international peace and security, and not to threaten it by inaction through the use of veto. The core and solvable problem facing the Security Council is its anachronistic composition, which not only undermines its political authority and effectiveness, but also exacerbates the confrontational dynamics we have witnessed. Addressing non-representation and under-representation is the most critical aspect of reform. I thank you. Kuwait · Co-Chair · Tarek Al-Banai [55:52]: I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil, and I give the floor to India. India [56:00]: Co-Chairs, at the outset, I wish you and all colleagues a happy, peaceful, and prosperous new year. I would like to align my position with the statements delivered by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines on behalf of L69 and by Germany on behalf of G4. I will make additional comments in my national capacity. 2025 marks 80 years of the United Nations. Hence, as the first IG and plenary of 2025, today's discussion is significant and symbolic. Rewinding to 1945, the UN was founded by 51 member states. the architecture was reflective of the outcomes of one of the monumental events of the previous century. In these 80 years, the membership of the United Nations has almost increased four times, but the architecture of the permanent membership of the Security Council remains the same. We are in a multipolar world. The Security Council does not reflect the contemporary realities of today. These 80 years have witnessed many significant events. In recent times, We saw a pandemic that affected all of humanity. A global health crisis is a Security Council matter, where the memories of the suffering and loss of lives in the Global South caused due to lack of availability of vaccines during COVID is still fresh in our memories. We see ensuing conflicts that question the UN's relevance and the UN Security Council's primary mandate of maintenance of international peace and security. It is in this context, veto as one of the five clusters under the mandate of the IG and as per resolution 62/557, needs to be looked at. Veto has been used on more than 200 resolutions and almost 300 times by five member states. Some of these vetoes in the past were cast to block the membership of significant participants in the multilateral system, including, ironically, the countries of the co-chairs, Austria and Kuwait, besides Vietnam, Ireland, Nepal, and Mauritania. Ironically, the veto on peace and security matters and proxy wars impinge upon the peace and security mandate of the UN Security Council itself. There is also the subterranean architecture of subsidiary bodies and their working methods, where the unwritten rule of consensus can or hold any proposal. The argument of consensus has been harnessed as a disguised de facto veto. This has unfortunately crept into democratic negotiation platforms like the IGM. Here we are 16 years later after the inception of the IGM with no outcomes to show. India has a principled position on veto which is very similar to the common African position. As long as the veto exists, it must be held by all permanent members as a matter of fairness and justice. There are indeed many schools of thought on reining in the veto. While my delegation agrees with many of those arguments, we firmly believe that a piecemeal approach will not help in bringing about reform. I would like to reiterate what I said earlier in November last year. The veto initiative of 2022 was considered a harbinger of change, making the Security Council more accountable to the General Assembly. However, statistically speaking, since the adoption of the veto initiative in April 22, the veto has been exercised on 18 occasions already, four times in 22 itself, six times last year, six times in 23, and eight times in 2024, whereas it was used only three times in 2020 and once in 2021. Piecemeal approaches, however well-intentioned, failed to work during difficult times. We need to move forward on all the five clusters. We need to update the framework document of 2015, where countries have given their suggestions under the five clusters. Text-based negotiations is the most democratic and time-tested way forward, and it should commence at the earliest. These are to be taken forward in a time-bound manner in order to achieve real reform. India will continue to support all efforts that are aimed at realizing meaningful reform. Thank you, Co-Chairs. Kuwait · Co-Chair · Tarek Al-Banai [1:00:05]: I thank the distinguished representative of India, and I give the floor to Indonesia. Indonesia [1:00:13]: Thank you, co-chairs, for convening this meeting. The topic of today's discussion, the question of veto, indeed, is one of the most challenging issues. And as mentioned, in 2024 alone, eight vetoes by the permanent members have been casted. As a result, four out of seven draft resolutions on Palestine and Gaza, for instance, failed to be adopted in the midst of the necessity to address dire humanitarian situation. It is becoming clear that with every single use of veto, not only is the credibility of the Council undermined, the international community's confidence to the whole multilateral system is also diminished. We must start finding ways to reverse this trend, and there are two points I wish to make in this regard. First, regulating the veto should be a step towards phasing out veto. Veto must not be exercised in a situation where there is violation of international humanitarian law, war crimes, and genocide occur. Second, where veto has not been yet abolished and amidst lack of progress in regulating the veto, fail-safe mechanism must be strengthened. We can do so by improving complementary role of the General Assembly to the Security Council by further empowering the ESS and veto initiative. After all, this IGAN process falls under the purview of the General Assembly. Further mechanism can be explored in this regard, such as possibility of granting GA resolutions adopted in the veto initiative and the ESS the same legal authority as the Security Council resolutions, and possibility for the Council to respond substantively to what has been requested or mentioned in the ESS or veto initiative. Co-chairs, as each day passes, the need for reform is only growing stronger. We must use all opportunities to make progress, including by implementing the actions in the Pact for the Future. Rest assured of Indonesia's constructive engagement. Thank you. Kuwait · Co-Chair · Tarek Al-Banai [1:02:28]: I thank the distinguished representative of Indonesia, and I give the floor to Spain. Spain [1:02:38]: Distinguished co-chairs, Spain, as part of the United for Consensus group, endorses and aligns with the statement made by Italy and wishes to add some comments in our national capacity. At the outset, we're grateful to the co-chairs for devoting this second meeting of the IGN to the veto. which has been identified in the Pact for the Future as one of the key parts of Security Council reform. Spain recalls its position, and this position has been repeated many times already. We were opposed to any reform of the Security Council that leads to an increase in the number of permanent members and an expansion of the use of veto. At the same time, we support abolishing the veto at the Security Council, and while it is still in place, we support strongly support any initiatives that lead to limiting its use, such as the French-Mexican initiative and the ACT code of conduct. There are many different reasons for this position, and now I will cite three. One, the veto affects the main work of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security. It often conditions, slows down, and paralyzes its actions, sometimes causing tragic humanitarian consequences. We're seeing how the veto has exacerbated conflicts rather than resolve them. Two, veto is an outdated tool that is not in line with the realities of the 21st century, where the sovereignty of member states, democracy and decision making, as well as rotation in decision making bodies, is very important. The prerogative of veto gives disproportionate power to the five permanent members. often ignoring the will of the majority of the Member States, including the 10 elected members of the Security Council. 3. Article 24.1 of the United Nations Charter confers on the Security Council the core responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, acting on behalf of the members of the United Nations. When the veto is used to defend countries' own interests, we see an erosion of legitimacy that affects trust and confidence in the Council and undermines the very value of the multilateral system. Distinguished co-chairs, in the framework of these intergovernmental negotiations, whose mandate is to achieve a reform and improvement, of the Security Council, it would be beneficial to focus on discussing ways to eliminate or to limit the veto, because it is inconceivable and, frankly, outdated that we can still continue to justify and talk about its extension to other members of the Council, calling it a question of justice. Actually, in the interest of justice, we defend a reform that makes the Security Council a more representative, transparent, legitimate and democratic body, only expanding the category of elected members and abolishing or limiting the use of veto. Thank you very much. Kuwait · Co-Chair · Tarek Al-Banai [1:06:01]: Distinguished representative of Spain, and I give the floor to the United Kingdom. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [1:06:09]: Thank you very much, co-chairs. We welcome today's important discussion on the veto power in the context of our wider discussions on UN Security Council reform and continued efforts to implement the Pact of the Future. During last year's General Assembly debate on the use of the veto, many of us expressed the view that the veto power should be exercised responsibly and with accountability. The UK continues to support responsible use of the veto. For ourselves, we have not used our own veto since 1989. The UK has supported a number of initiatives aimed at enhancing accountability and transparency around the use of the veto. We were proud to co-sponsor the resolution adopted in 2022, which enabled the General Assembly to scrutinise the Security Council's use of the veto. And we were pleased to introduce, for the first time, a new chapter on the special reports on the use of the veto to the Security Council's annual report last year, in response to clear requests from the wider membership. The UK is also a proud supporter of the accountability, coherence and transparency code of conduct, through which we have committed not to vote against a credible draft Security Council resolution that would end or prevent a mass atrocity. We continue to encourage other members of the Council and of the wider membership to join us. Co-chairs, thank you again for the opportunity to listen and engage and advance this critical issue. Thank you very much. Kuwait · Co-Chair · Tarek Al-Banai [1:07:50]: I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, and I give the floor to France. France [1:08:01]: Thank you, co-chairs. At the outset, I wish to thank you for organising this second I.G.N. debate on the veto. At the same time, I wish to wish you and all of our colleagues a productive year 2025. Seven Security Council resolutions were not adopted in 2024 due to the use by a permanent member of its right of veto. The record for the last more than 30 years is a sad one. However, it is not an isolated phenomenon. Sixteen resolutions were not able to be adopted following a veto. That's since 2022, and that is more than a quarter of the cases we've seen so far in the 21st century in just three years. The Security Council must be able to act and fully assume its role in the maintenance of international peace and security. The international community has high expectations for Palestine, for Ukraine, for Sudan, and when it comes to so many other conflicts. And we must do more because the preservation of the authority and credibility of the Security Council is at stake. Co-chairs, France's position on the right of veto when it comes to Security Council reform is clear. And our Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs confirmed this in Addis Ababa and to our African partners. Any new permanent members could legitimately demand all the prerogatives associated with this status, including the veto. This is in line with the African position and is also in line with the G4 position that Germany, Japan, Brazil, and India just recalled. France, however, believes that veto is not a discretionary privilege, but rather a unique responsibility. And the following principle is the one that we apply. We made the choice, we made a heavy decision to not use it. since 1989, and the President of the Republic committed unilaterally before the 70th General Assembly in 2015 to France, renouncing all use of the veto in cases of mass atrocities. Co-chairs, it is in this spirit of responsibility that we have had since the same year, 2015, so for 10 years now, With Mexico, we have been supporting an initiative supported by 106 states to contain veto in cases of mass atrocities. So that's in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, and widespread war crimes. I'm delighted that it is part of the elements of convergence that have been identified for the IGN and that the member states of the United Nations have collectively reaffirmed in the Pact for the Future. That is their support for this ambition. This initiative, I wish to recall, does not mean that we have to reform the Charter. Co-chairs. In the wake of the Summit for the Future, let us make the 80th anniversary of the United Nations an opportunity to ramp up our efforts to achieve a responsible use of the veto. France will be up to the mark here. We will rise to this occasion with our partners to progress towards a real, authentic reform of the Security Council. Thank you. Liechtenstein [1:12:02]: co-chairs, and thank you for convening the discussion on an issue that is obviously central to the question of Security Council reform, as it continues to be central to the functionality or lack thereof of the Security Council, as we have witnessed again in the past year, where we have seen eight vetoes in the Security Council on seven separate texts. We wish to state again that while we obviously have accepted the veto as part and parcel of the Charter when we joined the United Nations, we are firmly of the view that the veto must never be used in a manner that is contrary to the treaty itself, the Charter, and especially contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter, and that unfortunately we have seen that principle violated various times in the recent past. In the context of our discussion, we continue to believe that the veto is absolutely central and the core piece of Security Council reform, or as it were, Security Council enlargement, which is what we are discussing today. And in this context, of course, there are really two questions with respect to the veto. The first is who has the veto, and the second is how the veto is used. On the first question, and people in this room notice very well, given that we have put forward the enlargement model for the Security Council, we are firmly of the view that reform of the Security Council should not result in the creation of any new vetoes for potentially new permanent members of the Security Council. We do believe, in turn, that we should establish a system under which states are able to serve de facto permanently on the Council, but without having a veto, given the pernicious effect that the veto has had not only for the functioning of the Council itself, but indeed for the organization as a whole. Complementary to that, and as part of a package, a political package on Security Council reform, we do believe that we need to see an agreement on modification of the use of the veto and to take the veto to a different place than it is in the current practice of the Security Council, much to the detriment of its effectiveness. In this respect, of course, we have seen important and useful initiatives in the past, in particular the ACT Code of Conduct, dealing with reflecting a political commitment of two-thirds of the membership of the United Nations on the question of mass atrocities and the responsibility and role of the Council in this respect, as well as the French-Mexican initiative that our French colleague has just talked about, which we have also which we have also supported. With respect to the use of the veto and modifications, of course, the most important initiative recently has been the veto initiative that we had the honor to lead on and that has been referenced in this room various times in the course of this morning. The Importance of the veto initiative, of course, has only increased given the increase in parallel of vetoes cast in the Security Council. And we do believe that the veto initiative is an essential step to help find a balance, an institutional balance, in our organization between the Security Council and the General Assembly, which actually reflects the philosophy that the founders and the drafters of the Charter have applied. So we all know that the General Assembly has a very important role on matters on peace and security and that it has de facto delegated the authority on peace and security to the Security Council and an authority that it can take back anytime that is so required, and sadly, that is required very often these days. So the veto initiative, of course, in our view, ideally should result in decisions also by the Security Council in light of decisions that are impossible or blocked in the Security Council itself, but it should also serve as a tool to empower the General Assembly on matters of peace and security, also in the absence of a veto. So the GA very clearly constitutionally has a role on matters of peace and security, irrespective of whether a veto has been cast or not in the Security Council. Finally, As others, we are very gratified to see that the Pact of the Future has given us a clear mandate with respect to the proper application of all relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular of Article 27.3 that others have talked about. And we do believe very strongly that we therefore have a clear mandate to move forward in this respect during the session that we find ourselves in, and we look forward to working with colleagues in this room to bringing the practice in the Security Council in line with what is in the Charter of the United Nations and to overcome the gap between the law reflected in the Charter and the way it has been applied in recent years in the Council. I thank you. Kuwait · Co-Chair · Tarek Al-Banai [1:18:14]: I thank the distinguished representative of Liechtenstein, and I give the floor to Portugal. Portugal [1:18:21]: Co-Chairs, let me start by thanking you for your engagement in promoting a constructive process for the IGN on the reform of the Security Council, including positive developments in working methods towards more transparency and inclusivity. The Security Council must be more representative, agile and functional in order to preserve its recognition among member states, its legitimacy in safeguarding the principles of the Charter, and its effectiveness in dealing with multiple security crises, potentially more recurrent. One of the most pressing aspects of the Council's reform is addressing the use of the veto. as put forward by our Prime Minister in the general debate and I quote we support the limitation and greater scrutiny of the use of the veto the right of veto before being a power represents a responsibility and that's how it should be exercised end of quote resolution 76/262 the veto initiative has been a significant step forward, requiring the General Assembly to convene after a veto is cast to debate the situation. This mechanism has enhanced accountability and enabled the international community to scrutinize the use of the veto more effectively. However, we should further explore the opportunities these meetings provide, including the potential for the General Assembly to take action. by adopting resolutions or making recommendations to the Security Council. Portugal also highlights the relevance of the Uniting for Peace mechanism, which empowers the General Assembly to take action when the Security Council is paralyzed by a veto, demonstrating that a veto need not halt UN action. We also underscore the importance of adhering to Article 27 of the Charter, which requires abstention from voting by members who are a party to a dispute. This principle, rooted in fairness and impartiality, has often been ignored and must be strictly enforced. Portugal supports limiting the vetoes used in cases involving genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The ACT Code of Conduct and the Franco-Mexican Declaration are crucial tools in this regard and have garnered broad support from member states. We encourage further countries to subscribe to both initiatives. Besides, the Pact for the Future, adopted in September 2024, provides a strong framework for advancing discussions on veto reform, aligning this effort with broader goals of inclusivity and effectiveness within the Security Council. We welcome the inclusion of a dedicated section on veto usage in the Security Council's annual report and the development of the Assembly for Peace Digital Handbook, which serves as a valuable resource for enhancing the General Assembly's role in maintaining peace and security. Portugal was proud to co-fund the handbook and encourages all delegates to make the best use of this resource in your future deliberations. Empowering non-members and elected members of the Security Council is indeed a critical step towards reform. Expanding pen-holdership to include elected members and ensuring better consultation with regional groups and stakeholders will prevent veto misuse, contribute to a more constructive mindset in the Council, and foster a more inclusive approach to decision-making. We would also like to encourage discussions on a Charter review conference, focusing on Security Council reform and particularly the question of the veto. Portugal remains committed to supporting this process and encourages your leadership in advancing meaningful reform that enhances the Council's legitimacy, representativeness and accountability. Thank you. Kuwait · Co-Chair · Tarek Al-Banai [1:22:46]: I thank the distinguished representative of Portugal and I give the floor to Switzerland. Switzerland [1:22:55]: Co-chairs, We would like to thank you for convening this, uh, cluster debate on the veto, the first one this year. Until the end of last year, Switzerland had the honor of, uh, serving as a member of the Security Council. And during this time, we saw firsthand the detrimental impact the veto can have. It too often prevented the Council from fulfilling its mandate. On many recent occasions, the 15 vetoes were cast by permanent members, blocking decisions that could have protected civilians, saved lives, and alleviated human suffering. For example, in November, a resolution which aimed at protecting civilians in Sudan, this is a country which is ravaged by war, famine, and with widespread accounts of sexual and gender-based violence, was vetoed. Another resolution proposed by the elected Council members to address the catastrophic humanitarian situation in Gaza also failed because of a veto. And this shows a worrying trend. The use of the veto has reached unprecedented levels and is setting a worrying record over the past two years. Throughout Switzerland's tenure on the Council, we also observed how the mere threat of a veto contributed to inaction. This pattern paralyzed the Council on numerous issues ranging from Europe, the Middle East, to Southeast Asia. And in each of these instances, we saw a worsening of the crises with widespread violations of international humanitarian law and human rights. Through the Pact for the Future, we have collectively committed ourselves to strengthening the Council's response for the maintenance of international peace and security and its relationship with the General Assembly. For Switzerland, this commitment translates into the following priorities: First, limiting the use of the veto in cases of atrocity crimes. Switzerland together with two-thirds of this Assembly, believes that no member of the Security Council should ever vote against a resolution aimed at preventing or ending genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. And we urge the remaining third of the membership to follow suit and sign the related code of conduct by the ACT Group. Second, abstention by parties to a conflict. We support the Pact for the Future's essential call for Council members that are parties to a dispute to abstain from voting, as is stipulated in Article 27 of the Charter. This principle has been invoked inconsistently in the past and must become standard practice if we want to maintain the legitimacy of the Security Council decisions. Three. We need to empower the General Assembly. When the Council is prevented from acting by a veto, the General Assembly must step up. There are numerous examples where the Assembly has effectively taken the lead on peace and security issues in the past, for example, in Korea, Afghanistan, and Myanmar. Fourth, enhancing transparency and accountability. It is essential to strengthen institutional links between the Council and the General Assembly. Debates on the use of the veto ensure that permanent members are held accountable to the wider membership. We welcome, therefore, the informal consultations which took place last week on introducing of the annual report of the Security Council. which now is to include a dedicated chapter on vetoes. Um, such, uh, exchanges are small but significant steps towards greater transparency. Co-chairs, the veto. which was conceived almost 80 years ago, should not prevent the United Nations from acting in the face of conflict. Switzerland will continue to advocate for its responsible and restrained use of the veto. And should it persist in a reformed Council, we must ensure that it no longer prevents the Council from fulfilling its obligation to the peoples of the world, who expect it to take effective and constant action for peace. I thank you. Kuwait · Co-Chair · Tarek Al-Banai [1:27:16]: I thank the distinguished representative of Switzerland, and I give the floor to Singapore. Singapore [1:27:25]: Thank you very much, Co-Chairs. As this is the first time that we are meeting as a group this year, please allow me to begin by expressing our appreciation to both of you, Permanent Representative of Kuwait, as well as the Permanent Representative of Austria, for your leadership and tireless work as co-chairs of this important process. I want to also assure both of you of my delegation's full support. Last year was an important and busy year for the IGN process. We made important strides in strengthening the efficiency, transparency, and inclusiveness of this process through a structured dialogue greater innovation and increased engagement with groups and Member States. Most importantly, our leaders adopted the Pact for the Future last September. The commitments on Security Council reform contained in the Pact represent, to date, among the strongest and most forward-looking language on this issue since 1963. The Pact underlines our collective agreement that the Security Council should be reformed in order to make it more representative, inclusive, transparent, efficient, effective, democratic, and accountable. It is therefore entirely appropriate that we are beginning a new cycle of work this year by focusing on the question of the veto. If we are able to build some convergence on the question of the veto, we can potentially unlock the impasse in our process and create some progress for the question of Security Council reform. There's a more pressing reason why I think we need to focus on the veto, as it is beginning to have a very serious effect on the credibility of the United Nations and in particular on the Council itself. Now, it is a reality that the overuse, misuse, or the threat of use of the veto has had a detrimental effect on the effective functioning of the Council, leading to paralysis and gridlock. In fact, the veto was exercised, and others have pointed this out, eight times in relation to seven draft resolutions covering a range of issues, including pressing issues of the day, such as the issue of peace in the Middle East. This is the highest number in the past decade in terms of the use of the veto. This is simply unacceptable as a situation. The paradox is that each time the veto is cast in the Council, it amounts to an abdication of responsibility on the part of the Security Council which has been entrusted the mandate for the primary maintenance of international peace and security. And so when the veto is cast, it may well be a demonstration of individual power on the part of a particular permanent member, but collectively, it results in a situation where the council simply abdicates its responsibility, leading to questions about what exactly is the role of the council and what exactly is the role of the General Assembly and the relationship between these two principal organs. Co-Chairs, you may know very well that Singapore is not part of any informal grouping within the IGM process. We've always spoken in this process as an independent voice presenting the perspective of a small state. Our objective as Singapore is to contribute to a reform process that will enable the Council to be stronger, more effective and inclusive. And for any future Council to be effective, it is our view that we must avoid the mistakes of the past. We have previously said in the IGM about how the veto has prevented the Council from discharging its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is for this reason that Singapore is not in favour of extending the right of the veto to any new permanent members. We are not persuaded that increasing the number of veto-wielding permanent members will make the Council more responsive or more effective. On the contrary, it will exacerbate the problem that we are already facing. The question of the veto is fundamentally a question of equity, and I think several others have referred to this issue as well. Now, it is a fact that we have accepted the veto right from the beginning in San Francisco, and for those of us who joined much later, we have accepted it as part of the institutional architecture for collective peace and security. But we do not believe that creating new vetoes will lead to greater situations of equity. On the contrary, we believe that it will entrench further the situation of inequity and as well as create situations of gridlock. From the perspective of a small state, We believe that what is needed is a Council that is more effective and efficient, and we do not see additional vetoes as contributing to such a Council. My Foreign Minister, Dr. Vivian Balakrishnan, had stated at the Council's open debate last September that we must constrain the exercise of the veto. And we believe that it is important to reach an understanding on how the veto is exercised in the Council and if we can potentially make progress on some elements of convergence on how to limit the use of the veto and how to prevent its abuse, then I think we have a good chance of making further progress in terms of reform of the Council as a whole. Action 39, paragraph 67 of the Pact of the Future clearly outlines the commitment to intensify our efforts to reach agreement on the future of the veto, including discussions on limiting its scope and use. And this provides us a good basis for our discussion today to begin to draw some parameters for the use of the veto for both present as well as future permanent members of the Council. Allow me to make three specific points. First, accountability in the use of the veto. Singapore is encouraged that there has been progress to ensure greater accountability in the exercise of the veto and will continue to support such initiatives. In particular, the veto initiative led by Liechtenstein is a significant step in increasing the accountability and transparency of the Council. It's a very good reminder that the Council acts on behalf of the UN membership in exercising its primary responsibility. And when it doesn't, then it is incumbent on the General Assembly, the other principal organ of the United Nations, to exercise leadership. Second, refraining to use the veto under certain circumstances is an important aspect of drawing parameters. We strongly support the ACT's code of conduct and the French-Mexican initiative to suspend the veto in cases of mass atrocities. We also welcome the commitments made by France and the UK not to use the veto in cases of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. And we'd like to see this act of leadership being emulated by other permanent members of the Security Council. Singapore itself had previously put forward the idea of a declaration of responsibilities to be adopted by the General Assembly. And this declaration, we believe, will provide all permanent members as well as non-permanent members to abide by a code of conduct as part of any reform package which will be eventually adopted. Thirdly, we call on existing permanent members to lead by example by upholding the Charter and respecting international law. The frequent use of the veto to shield violations of the UN Charter and obstruct the Council's own resolution prevents the Council from discharging its mandate as outlined in Article 24.1 of the Charter. We, as many others, strongly urge the permanent members of the Security Council to respect the plain meaning of Article 27.3 of the Charter, and we encourage permanent members to refrain from voting on a dispute to which they are party. This practice is contrary to the spirit of the Charter and only serves to further undermine legitimacy and credibility of the Council. Co-Chairs, as we approach the 80th anniversary of the United Nations, the Council and the UN itself must reflect on the current state of affairs and we must adapt to emerging realities. If the IGN process is to make any progress, all sides have to show flexibility and make compromises. We must make a genuine effort to bridge these differences and find convergences. Most importantly, we need to move forward and engage in serious discussions within this process. I assure you of my delegation's full commitment to work with you and other members to take our work forward. Thank you very much. Kuwait · Co-Chair · Tarek Al-Banai [1:37:50]: I thank the distinguished representative of Singapore, and I give the floor to China. China [1:37:58]: Thank you, co-chairs. China welcomes the convening of the IGM meeting again during the current session. In the new year, China will continuously support the two co-chairs in your work. The issue of the veto is one of the focuses of the IGM. The dissatisfaction of member states with the status quo of the Security Council and the growing call for reform in recent years are indeed largely a result of the abuse of the veto. The repeated and single-handed exercise of the veto by a certain permanent member has led to the Council's inaction on the Palestinian-Israeli issue. It is not the veto that undermines the Council's authority and effectiveness, but rather the contempt of international law, justice, and righteousness by a permanent member. Regarding the veto, I would like to make the following points here. First, the veto by permanent members of the Council is a unique component of the institutional setup of the UN, which draws upon the failure of the League of Nations and comes from thorough considerations. Essentially, it aims to encourage communication, coordination, and consensus-seeking among major countries and to prevent them from lapsing into wars amongst themselves. In practice, the veto does bring some challenges unforeseen initially. However, in order to ensure the effective functioning of the Council, there has always been a need for communication and coordination among major countries. The veto is by no means a privilege, but a special responsibility on the permanent members emanating from the UN Charter, and as such, a higher requirement. The veto has always served as a safety valve in the collective security mechanism of the UN. Second, the current unreasonable composition of the Council membership is also related to the use of the veto. The glaring over-representation of the developed countries and the serious under-representation of the developing countries, especially African countries, often lead to the over-represented bloc with their advantage in a number of votes, imposing their propositions on others, thus creating bloc confrontation in the Council. If the Council's composition were able to better reflect the current international political realities, the use of the veto could have been avoided on many occasions, which is why we advocate that discussions on reforming the Council should not only cover the issue of the veto, but always tackle the five clusters as a package. and adhere to enhancing the representation and voice of developing countries as the only correct direction. Africa, in order to rectify historical injustices, safeguard common interests, and uphold the common position of the African Union, is seeking the right of veto, which is understandable. Third, a close look at the use of the veto in the Council will reveal that a considerable portion of draft resolutions have been drafted by certain countries. It also reminds us that who holds the pen is equally important. As long as the pen holders stick to objectivity and impartiality, they will promote the constructive interaction among all parties we have seen a growing awareness among Member States that reforming the Council's penholdership can effectively improve the quality of the Council's work. We welcome the latest consensus in the Council on reforming the penholder arrangement and look forward to the proper implementation of the relevant provisions to enable better discharge of the Council's responsibilities Co-chairs, China, as a permanent member of the Security Council, is acutely aware of its special responsibilities and has always been prudent in the use of its veto. China is ready to work with all parties and engage in in-depth discussions on the veto, along with other issues related to the Council's reform for a deeper understanding and broader consensus so as to ultimately reach a reform plan that reflects the needs of our times, response to the calls of developing countries, and enjoys the widest support. I thank you, co-chairs. Kuwait · Co-Chair · Tarek Al-Banai [1:43:18]: I thank the distinguished representative of China, and I give the floor to Argentina. Argentina [1:43:28]: Thank you very much, co-facilitators, co-chairs. At the outset, I wish to Thank you for organizing this meeting, the IGNs. Argentina aligns itself with the statement made by the PR of Italy on behalf of United for Consensus and wishes to thank the coordinator of the group. We'd like to draw your attention to the current state of play vis-a-vis these negotiations. It's been more than 46 years that we've been talking about the need to introduce substantive reform to the Council. For more than 17 years, we've been having the IGNs that were preceded by the open-ended working group that was set up in 1993. Decades of work, we're talking about, where the states have been committed to assist a UN system that is more representative, transparent, and equitable. with efforts and resources to support negotiations that, as we're seeing in general, are not achieving the results that we're hoping for, and society is calling for results. President Millet was clear when he spoke at the General Debate in September 2024 and warned about the UN increasingly not fulfilling its original mission, and that includes the issue that we're dealing with today. And he said, to paraphrase him, we're even seeing a situation where the Security Council has been distorted because the veto by permanent members has been used to defend the individual interests of some. Having said that, I wish to reaffirm once again our position, Argentina's position, in rejection of the use of veto. And that has been clear for a long time. Since the negotiations at the conference in San Francisco in 1945, Argentina established a steadfast position that has been consistent against the right to the veto and the interpretation of Article 27.3 of the UN Charter. The existence of the veto has been, since the organization was founded, a permanent source of tension between member states. and a limit on the functioning of the Council to work as it was intended to. Co-Chairs, Argentina understands that the privilege of the veto is a violation of the principles of equality between States and implies de facto that States that have that privilege are able to thwart the will of the rest of the members of the Organization. The use of the veto imperils the purposes that the United Nations were created for, both now as well as in the future. Argentina is a member of the Uniting for Consensus group, pursuing the removal of the veto, and we cannot conceive of a reform of the Security Council that at least doesn't limit its use. In this regard, we support the Franco-Mexican initiative and the code of conduct put forward by the ACT group. Thank you. Kuwait · Co-Chair · Tarek Al-Banai [1:47:04]: I thank the distinguished representative of Argentina. And I give. The floor to South Africa. South Africa [1:47:14]: Co-Chairs, we thank you for convening this meeting. South Africa aligns itself with the statements delivered by the delegations of Sierra Leone on behalf of the Africa Group and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines on behalf of L69. We welcome the early convening of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform. The question of the veto deserves specific attention as a key element and one of the more challenging aspects of the Security Council reform debate. South Africa reaffirms the common African position, which is clear that any future representation of Africa on the Security Council through permanent seats should be with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership, including the right of veto. This means that the veto is intrinsically linked to permanent membership on the Council. Therefore, Africa's position is clear that even though Africa is opposed in principle to the veto, so long as it exists, and as a matter of common justice, it should be made available to all permanent members of the Security Council. In this respect, South Africa supports the abolition of the veto in totality. However, this should not be at the expense of the Security Council becoming truly representative and inclusive. The African continent remains excluded from the key decision-making structures in the current Security Council dispensation. A reformed Council should thus not mean a second-class status for African permanent membership. The Pact of the Future calls for redressing the historical injustice against Africa as a priority, while treating Africa as a special case. This will also mean that Africa should not be discriminated against in terms of the full rights entailed by permanent membership. We believe it is important to bear in mind that rights afforded to permanent members of the Security Council extend beyond the provision of Article 27 of the Charter. It includes matters related to the selection and appointment of the Secretary-General, as well as any amendments made to the Charter. Therefore, it would be unreasonable to conceive of a category of permanent membership that precludes any provisions in Chapter 5 of the Charter. Co-Chairs, it is apparent that the Security Council today is not reflective of the current realities of the world we live in, and it does remain ineffective in carrying out its Charter mandate to maintain international peace and security. South Africa, therefore, calls for urgent steps to invigorate the negotiations on reform in this forum to ensure substantive and early progress on Council reform. We believe that text-based negotiations is a tried and tested means of achieving outcomes in the UN system. We should urgently move forward on this basis without any further delay, as mere deliberations do not equate to actual negotiations. Co-chairs, there's no doubt that the veto has been misused by permanent members on the Council, in some cases prolonging conflicts based on narrow self-interests. While we acknowledge the ongoing efforts to bring accountability for such misuse, these initiatives cannot replace true reform. South Africa believes that the structural reform of the Council is necessary to curtail the misuse of the veto And we look forward to building on the models of reform that relate to this matter. We reaffirm the outcome of the Pact of the Future, agreeing on intensifying efforts to reach an agreement on the future of the veto, including discussions on limiting its scope and use. I thank you. Kuwait · Co-Chair · Tarek Al-Banai [1:51:56]: I thank the distinguished representative of South Africa. And I. Give the floor to Mexico. Mexico [1:52:08]: Thank you very much, co-chairs, distinguished colleagues. Mexico aligns itself with the statement made by the United for Consensus group, and I will now make some comments in our national capacity on the cluster for this session of intergovernmental negotiations. The cases of Ukraine, Gaza and Sudan remind us that inaction from the Security Council as a result of the use of the veto has direct and very real implications when the lives of thousands of civilians is at stake. It's clear that not all permanent members use their veto in the same way, nor with the same frequency. However, what is clear is that the veto does not contribute to the collective interest of the international community as a whole. It has not promoted unity at the Security Council as we were promised it would in 1945 at the San Francisco conference. Rather than serving the collective interests of the international community, the veto in practice invariably has responded to the individual political interests of those that use it or those that threaten to use it. The narrative that the veto is a tool that supposedly promotes responsibility on the part of the large powers is not only outdated, but rather runs counter to the principles and the goals of the UN Charter. Security Council reform therefore cannot replicate and extend such significant limitations as is the use of the veto. Expanding this prerogative would be a step back and a stumbling block to achieving a Council that reflects the democratic values and accountability promoted by the UN Charter. Removing the veto, therefore, is a legitimate aspiration, and that is something that we hear from a significant part of the membership of this organisation. However, it would be naive to think that amending the charter of the organisation, especially such a significant amendment right now, given the provisions laid down in article 108, which is used as a lock really imposed precisely by the five permanent members to protect their own prerogatives. The path for the future in action 39 is very clear when it says, and I'm going to quote it now, "The question of the veto is a key element of Security Council reform. We will intensify efforts to reach an agreement on the future of the veto, including discussions on limiting its scope and its use." It's possible, both politically and legally, to establish mechanisms to contain or to limit the use of the veto. This is especially necessary in contexts such as, for example, where we're seeing the commission of mass atrocities or even when a permanent member is involved in a situation that has given rise to the use of the veto. The premise, co-facilitators, is very simple. A working method cannot be placed above the principles or the purposes of the UN Charter, and neither can it be placed above the lives of civilians. In addition to the collective commitments that we made in the Pact for the Future, I call once again upon all countries who have not yet done so to join the Franco-Mexican initiative to restrict the use of the veto. This initiative currently benefits from the support of 106 signatory states. This effort that is tangible convergence between delegations should be a departure point for the current debates. The models put forward by Mexico and United for Consensus in the past cycle of intergovernmental negotiations refer to initiatives to limit the use of the veto. Lichtenstein's revised model also includes a new mention to this. We hope that other models will follow this trend and that the limitation of the veto will continue to be identified as an area of convergence for this process to reform the Security Council. We will continue to engage in dialogue with all interested Member States, and in particular with the permanent members of the Security Council, with a view to achieving a shared vision of the terms that, in specific circumstances, will free us once and for all from this huge limiting thing that is the use of the veto by five states. By way of conclusion, I wish to be explicit. Mexico's position on veto must not, nor can it be interpreted as accepting any proposal that implies the creation of new permanent seats within the Security Council, even if they didn't have the prerogative of the veto. The periodicity of elections, in our perspective, is an unavoidable element, an important part of the reform, because this is the only way that the Security Council will be more democratic, accountable, and representative. Thank you. Austria · Co-Chair [1:58:05]: I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico and give the floor to the Russian Federation. Russian Federation [1:58:17]: Thank you, distinguished co-chairs. Russia welcomes the convening of yet another unofficial GA meeting within the framework of the IGN discussion on Security Council reform. We have always underscored the unique and the only legitimate nature of this platform to consider all aspects of reform. Any attempts to create parallel negotiating tracks or to be guided by the provisions which are contained in non-specialized documents, such as a pact for the future, will not get us anywhere good. The topic of the issue today, the right to veto, is for many a cornerstone for the reform process and also the most acute one. This is a topic that specific parallel meetings are spent on informal discussions. Three years ago, an ambiguous practice was introduced of General Assembly discussion of the use of the veto. The logic of the advocates of these initiatives is always based on the groundless assertions that that instrument is an outdated one and it makes it more difficult to pass decisions in the Security Council. Opinions are being voiced, including today, according to which that it's this that prevents the settlement of armed conflicts, that it blocks compromise in Security Council, and undermines its legitimacy. Colleagues, this is a deeply flawed approach to which has nothing to do with the reality. And to see that, all you have to do is imagine the Security Council working without the right to veto, and not in a specific high-impact case, but rather in a broader context, and also taking into account the various institutional ramifications this can have. As practice has shown, the practice of considering the urgent issues of international peace and security, without this instrument, the Council inevitably will become a body churning out draft shallow decisions dictated by the countries which are prevalent in Security Council, the Western countries, and they will act in accordance with their bloc discipline. We have all seen many times the instances where instructions from Washington or Brussels are handed down to remaining members of NATO and EU, who then click their heels and implement them without displaying their own national position in any way. At the same time, developing countries are also under severe pressure, and in the end, they are unable to withstand this pressure. And this is something that they tell us about discreetly. This way, the Western position is imposed on other states as the only correct one and supposedly enjoying a wide-scale support, even though that is not the case, far from it. Frequently, Washington and its satellites in such cases do not even go to the trouble of trying to look for a compromise. And in these cases, the use of the veto is the only way of preventing decisions which would otherwise not only undermine the authority of the Security Council, but also would damage international peace and security and would further widen the differences in a given region and ultimately do great harm to everyday people. That, for example, was what happened in the context of the situation in the Gaza Strip, where the United States and its allies, as we all remember, tried to push through a Security Council decision which would have essentially blessed and endorsed the Israeli military operation. Furthermore, it's not a secret for anyone, the Western members of Security Council very frequently consider its decisions as a punitive instrument against those states who are out of favor, regardless of what the laudable pretext for them. they use. Western delegations very frequently introduce intrusive, politicized, hectoring drafts. Their only goal is to protect the geopolitical interests of the former colonial powers and impose on other states the Western patterns of development. We cannot allow a situation wherein the Security Council platform is used for such unseemly and openly neocolonial goals. And that is why we are ready to use a veto without hesitation when comes to protecting the weak from arbitrary action and pressure and restoring justice. We are also always ready to openly describe the reason, explain the reasons that prompted our action. Let me underscore here that veto is not a privilege. It is first and foremost an instrument which stimulates looking for a balanced decision. That is also a huge responsibility, and that is exactly how we have viewed this institution during the 80 years of its existence. Russia has consistently been trying to make sure that all differences are resolved prior to voting. As we can see from the statistics of resolutions in the Council, the Council can resolve agreement in the overwhelming number of cases. And the threat of the veto plays an important role here, stimulates delegations to on the text, come up with amendments and alternative proposals. In other words, do everything that is the essence of multilateral diplomacy and the multipolar world, where each voice of each member of the Security Council is important. This way, it is the veto which stimulates members of the Council to work responsibly with due regard to the opinion of the others, regardless of geopolitical differences. And of course, the veto is a very last resort when other options for decision-making are exhausted. If this is abolished, what we will end up is with the so-called rules-based order. In other words, where the influential and loud minority will impose on the silent majority their decisions on issues of international peace and security. And we are convinced that what needs to be criticized is not the veto itself, but the irresponsible behavior of some members of the Security Council, their lack of readiness to listen to others' opinions and try and reach for compromise and balanced decisions. We have seen a situation regularly where Western delegations introduce drafts which they know are unacceptable. They know this in advance. Obviously, this is done exclusively for the purposes of creating background information noise and smearing their opponents. Such political manipulators are also responsible for the increased number of the uses of veto, and they're openly abusing their membership in the Council. This is an issue that is also directly related to the ill-faith work of the penholders and the fact that they are dominated by the Western states. The same Western states, distinguished colleagues. What needs to be criticized also are those who are not implementing the provisions of the Security Council, who are ignore them or interpret them overly broadly. The international community still remains taken aback by the statement made by the U.S. representative, according to which the Security Council resolutions are not legally binding, and that was a quote. And that is an open violation of the UN Charter. Amongst such resolutions, which are openly undermined by Western colleagues following this logic, are the decisions on Palestine, Western Sahara, Kosovo, and the Iran nuclear program. At that time, they were deliberate and consistent in ignoring what was another thing that was approved by Security Council, namely the Minsk agreements on resolving the intra-Ukrainian conflict. And the result of this criminal and short-sighted policy is something that we are all witnessing today. We think that we also need to closely consider another aspect of the veto issue, namely the use by the Western countries and the satellites of the so-called hidden veto, where in many instances, when they're overrepresented in the Council, they prevent their opponents from garnering the needed number within the Security Council, the number needed to pass a resolution. We expect that such unseemly situation will be rectified in the course of Security Council reform. The reform needs to increase the proportional representation in the Council of the developing states from Asia, Africa and Latin America. To sum up, Pushing forward initiatives aimed at limiting or abolishing the right to veto is something that is for us unacceptable, because they're aiming at undermining the cornerstone of Security Council work. And going after them will immediately lead to the breakdown of the organization with all of the consequences that it entails for international peace and security. We call on colleagues not to waste time there, but rather to concentrate on attainable and very important goals, first and foremost on getting greater representation for the developing countries, the countries of the global south. I thank you. Austria · Co-Chair [2:07:57]: I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation and give the floor to Estonia. Estonia [2:08:06]: Co-Chairs, let me first thank you for tireless efforts and incredible work and continued leadership, actually. and reiterate that you have Estonia's full support to bring this process to a meaningful end. We welcome your plans for the 79th session and ready to contribute. We have already had several fruitful discussions in the IGM during this GA session, both during the formal and informal meetings, and we hope to continue in the same way to focus on the implementation of the Pact for a Future. This use of veto is a key element of UN Security Council reform, as also agreed by our leaders in the Pact for a Future, and rightly so, as the use of veto has too often prevented the Security Council from effectively fulfilling its primary responsibility for maintenance of peace and security. Eight vetoes mentioned here during the last year speaks volumes about this. Therefore, in Action 39G of the Pact for the Future, we agreed to intensify our efforts to reach an agreement on the future of the veto, including by advancing discussions on limiting its scope and use. Allow me to make a few points precisely on this subject. Estonia believes that the standing mandate to convene a General Assembly debate whenever a veto is cast, the veto initiative, is a significant step towards accountability, transparency and responsibility of all of the permanent members of the Security Council. But more needs to be done to hold the Council members with veto power truly accountable. All Member States must fully implement and adhere to all provisions of the Charter, including Article 27 of the UN Charter, which stipulates that a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting in the Security Council, as also mentioned in the Pact for the Future, Action 41. Unfortunately, the voluntary abstention principle in Article 27 is repeatedly ignored, and we therefore urge a solid recommitment to the letter and spirit of the text. And of course, we are ready to contribute to what we send. There should be no veto right if there is a suspicion, or even more so, a clear evidence that the one who uses it may have acted or have acted against the international law. Estonia therefore supports the French-Mexican initiative on veto restraint, and we call on all UN members to urgently join this initiative, including those countries and groups of countries entertaining hope to get additional seats in the Council. As a member of a code of conduct by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group, Estonia, with 130 member states, insists on refraining from voting against resolutions aimed at ending mass atrocities, including crime of aggression. I call on the signatories of the Council, permanent and elected, not only to refrain from voting against credible draft resolutions, but to support timely and decisive action to prevent or halt mass atrocities, including drafting products and calling meetings. As these initiatives have gained large support among UN member states, we should try to agree how to universalize and codify them. We need a collective deterrence against the use or rather abuse of it, right, because no one can be above the international law. Co-chairs, let me reiterate our commitment to engage constructively in the upcoming IGN sessions. We must make progress on the implementation of a pact for the future, discuss models forthcoming, and work towards a consolidated model, hopefully by the end of this session. keeping also in mind that this year we are celebrating 80th anniversary of the UN. Our overall aim remains the same, to make the Council more transparent, effective, representative, and accountable. For achieving this goal, we need to start text-based negotiations. Finally, let me also add that maybe wider UN membership would profit from P5 members presenting their models for detailed views on the reform, which would be very much appreciated. I thank you. Austria · Co-Chair [2:12:58]: I thank the distinguished representative of Estonia and give the floor to Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe [2:13:06]: Thank you, Co-Chairs, for convening this cluster debate on the veto, a key element of Security Council reform. Zimbabwe associates itself with the statement delivered by the permanent representative of Sierra Leone on behalf of the African group, and I'll make some additional points in a national capacity. Co-Chairs, today's debate is critical as part of ongoing efforts to achieve deeper structural reform of the Security Council. Over the years, The reputation, legitimacy, and credibility of the Council have been undermined due to the paralysis occasioned by the frequent use of the veto. Just last year, seven resolutions could not be adopted following vetoes cast in the Council. Co-Chairs, the common African position as espoused in the Ezulwini Consensus and CETA Declaration is clear on the question of the veto, that it must be abolished. In demanding two permanent seats and an additional two non-permanent seats, Africa is also clear that if the veto is retained in the enlarged council, it must be available to both current and new permanent members. This would promote inclusivity, representation, transparency, and the democratization of efforts to maintain international peace and security across the five regions of the United Nations. My delegation is of the view that ongoing initiatives that seek to limit the veto, while commendable, are insufficient as they do not resolve the structural inequalities entrenched in the Security Council, where the veto is the preserve of the privileged few. For example, Resolution 76262 mandates the General Assembly to debate a veto cast in the Security Council, But such a debate cannot reverse the negative impact of the veto on the affected country and region. The situation in Gaza serves as a prime example. Furthermore, proposals to introduce a third category of permanent membership without the power of the veto would render our efforts to reform the Security Council ineffective. Such an approach would perpetuate the status quo and the historical injustice suffered by Africa and other regions. My delegation, therefore, underscores that the veto must be addressed within the framework of a comprehensive reform, ensuring that its use or abolition reflects the contemporary geopolitical realities. I thank you, Co-Chairs. Austria · Co-Chair [2:15:44]: I thank the distinguished representative of Zimbabwe and give the floor to Guatemala. Guatemala [2:15:57]: Co-chairs, we thank you for organizing this meeting to discuss a topic that is highly relevant to the peace and security pillar of the United Nations, the reality of different conflicts and the misuse of veto, as a result of political positions, has laid bare the need to undertake structural changes to our organization. We have borne witness to the significant implications that the use of the veto has had on the capacity of the Security Council to intervene in critical situations, in many cases preventing the adoption of sanctions or the deployment of peacekeeping missions that has prolonged human rights violations, perpetuated cycles of violence, and hindered the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Furthermore, its use increases mistrust between nations and, in turn, undermines the legitimacy of the United Nations. The interests of just a few must not prevail over the common good and needs of the whole of the membership. Co-Chair, the multiple vetoes that we've seen throughout the year 2024 have shown the paralysis of the supreme body tasked with international peace and security. While resolutions continue to be vetoed, resolutions that address the causes of conflict, the crises will continue to escalate. The Security Council must be consistent with its role as established by the United Nations Charter. Guatemala believes that it's necessary to continue to hold comprehensive debates on the reform of the Council that includes the implementation of measures to prevent the irresponsible use of veto. We reiterate our support to the full implementation of the Uniting for Peace resolution that allows the General Assembly to be involved and to extend recommendations on the resolution of conflicts when the Security Council is not able to fulfill its role. Further, we continue to support the implementation of Resolution 76262 since it increases transparency and accountability of the Council. We launch once again an appeal to avoid using the veto when it is to prevent or to when the resolution seeks to prevent or to halt situations of mass atrocities in line with the Franco-Mexican initiative that Guatemala supports. based on the premise of the responsibility to protect. We underscore in turn that Guatemala is in favor of restricting the use of veto as contained in the ACT code of conduct. Co-Chair, We call upon the Security Council, in particular the permanent members, to be up to the circumstances to fulfill their obligations in terms of international peace and security and to thus avoid more bloodshed, especially among the civilian population, and also to avoid grave humanitarian crises and underdevelopment. We unequivocally reiterate how urgent it is to put an end to all aggression and to seek a peaceful outcome to current conflicts with absolute respect the sovereignty, independence, and for the territorial integrity, and the human rights and security of all. We hope that the different discussions taking place within the framework of the intergovernmental negotiations on the reform of the Security Council will achieve substantive progress to lead to an organization that better responds to the current needs. Thank you very much. Austria · Co-Chair [2:19:42]: I thank the distinguished representative of Guatemala and give the floor to Australia. Australia [2:19:53]: Co-chairs, in the Pact of the Future, we agreed the key elements of Security Council reform for the intergovernmental negotiations to progress, which included the future of the veto. Australia has opposed the use of the veto since the inception of the United Nations. It undermines the ability of the Security Council to fulfill its fundamental responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. While the veto remains a method of the Security Council, member states must intensify efforts to reach agreement on limiting its scope and use, as we agreed in Action 39G of the Pact of the Future. Veto constraints are already specified under Article 27.3 of the UN Charter, which states a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting on the Security Council. We support exploring measures to assist Council members to uphold Article 27.3 by establishing clearer criteria for what constitutes a dispute to ensure consistent application of the article and considering a process to assess whether a member is a party to a dispute. Another form of constraint is for permanent members of the council to exercise voluntary and collective restraint in the use of the veto by, for example, refraining from using their veto in situations of mass atrocities as per the France-Mexico initiative, not noting against resolutions intended to prevent or halt mass atrocities as per the Act Code of Conduct. Secondly, member states must be Member States should support initiatives that promote more transparency and accountability on use of the veto by, for example, co-sponsoring the Liechtenstein veto initiative that requires States to explain why they have cast their vote. Finally, intergovernmental negotiations must also carefully consider the implications of proposals to expand the veto. Expansion would make the Council less effective in carrying out its core mandate to maintain international peace and security. As such, Australia does not support expanding the veto to new members. In the Pact of the Future, we agreed to strengthen our efforts in the framework of the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform as a matter of priority and without delay. Australia will continue to be a constructive contributor in these efforts, including on the future of the veto. Austria · Co-Chair [2:22:14]: I thank the distinguished representative of Australia and give the floor to Vietnam. Viet Nam [2:22:22]: Co-chairs, Vietnam appreciates your efforts to facilitate discussions on this cluster and throughout the broader IGM process. Our delegation takes this opportunity to reaffirm Vietnam's steadfast and unwavering commitment to the ongoing efforts aimed at reforming the Security Council. As Council reform is a matter of collective interest for all Member States and proves particularly crucial in light of the unprecedented international peace and security challenges that we face today, it is essential that the Council evolves to become more representative, democratic, transparent, accountable and efficient in fulfilling its mandate as the primary body responsible for maintaining international peace and security. Regarding the question of the veto, we acknowledge the historical and geopolitical context of its origins and recognize the complexity of this issue. However, the very nature of granting decision-making privileges to an exclusive few undermines the democratic and representative principles that guide the reform of this organization, principles that are fundamental to all modern intergovernmental bodies and institutions. Take the Gaza conflict as an example. The numerous vetoes that were cast on this issue have effectively paralyzed the Council's efforts to end violence and suffering and address the dire humanitarian crisis. When casting a veto in the Security Council, a country should bear in mind that it is acting not only in its own interest or within the parameters of 15 members, but also on the authority conferred by the broader membership of 193 States. Vietnam advocates for the eventual elimination of the veto. In the meantime, the use of the veto is seen as an interim step and should be limited to only to the Council's decision taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Co-Chairs, To conclude, Vietnam stands ready to engage in constructive dialogue with all Member States to find the most effective path forward in reforming the Security Council. I thank you. Austria · Co-Chair [2:24:44]: I thank the distinguished representative of Vietnam and give the floor to Latvia. Latvia [2:24:53]: The Co-Chairs, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to you both. for convening this meeting on the issue of veto and for all your commitment towards a meaningful result. And I can assure you once again of Latvia's full support to your efforts. Since the creation of the United Nations 80 years ago, the organization has gone through considerable change through increase in membership, mandates, and agencies. And the only significant reform of the Security Council took place 60 years ago. Permanent membership and the right to veto remain unchanged. The right to veto in its conception was not a privilege or immunity, but a responsibility to ensure peace and security. In the last year, we have seen the Council struggle to address new and ongoing conflicts across the world as tensions have divided the veto powers. Under these circumstances, the Council is unable to perform its chief task and resolve conflicts. Latvia commends the call of France and Mexico for the permanent members of the Council to voluntarily and collectively pledge not to use the veto in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in large scale. And we believe that the above-mentioned initiative provides necessary impulse for the change in Council's working methods and outputs. And we call on all UN members to join that pledge. Central to the discussion on the use of veto power is Article 27.3 of the UN Charter, which imposes a limitation on the use of veto and requires members of the Council to refrain from voting on disputes in which they are party. It is both timely and necessary to address the persistent lack of compliance with this critical provision of the UN Charter. The adoption of the veto initiative already has contributed to the efforts aimed at empowering the General Assembly and ensuring that the UN is not voiceless when the Council appears deadlocked. Looking ahead, Latvia continues to advocate for equitable regional representation of Africa, Latin America, and small island developing states in the Council. Expansion of the Council's membership should also reflect the increase of the number of countries represented in each regional group since the last expansion of the Council. Furthermore, when deciding on any potential increase in the number of permanent seats, we must consider two major aspects. On the one hand, equality of the rights of the permanent members of the Council. On the other hand, the efficacy of the work in the Council to reach decisions. Solving the underrepresentation of regions, yet having a stale Council would mean mission half accomplished. Latvia strongly believes that no matter the size, all countries can have an impact on the Security Council, and we are committed to further demonstrate also our responsibility to contribute to international peace and security, protect rules-based international order, and advance effective multilateralism. With this in mind, we are running for the elections of the non-permanent member this year. In conclusion, we can find in the leadership of the co-chairs in facilitating the substantive results of the reform of the Security Council in a text-based format that would trigger the progress in the negotiations. And we believe that the consolidated text of positions of the member states following also this session would benefit taking the next step. And I thank you. Austria · Co-Chair [2:28:31]: I thank the distinguished representative of Latvia and give the floor to Costa Rica. Costa Rica [2:28:38]: Co-chairs, distinguished colleagues, Costa Rica is grateful for the organization of the second meeting of the intergovernmental negotiations on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council. My delegation aligns itself with the statement made by the distinguished representative of Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group. And in our national capacity, we would like to underscore five points. First, the veto creates a barrier to decisive action to address urgent global challenges such as conflicts, humanitarian crises, and mass human rights violations. The repeated use of the veto perpetuates the stalemate at this organization and its inaction, leaving millions of innocent lives at risk and eroding hope in the United Nations. Moreover, the unchecked use of the veto undermines the principles of democracy, equality, and transparency that the United Nations strives to uphold. Our second point. Costa Rica has consistently called for limiting the scope and use of the veto within the Security Council. This limitation should be applied in situations involving mass atrocities, crimes against humanity, and serious violations of international peace and security. The veto should not be used to protect narrow national interests, nor should it be used to shields perpetrators of serious human rights abuses from accountability. Costa Rica strongly supports initiatives to limit the veto. I will refer now to two of these initiatives. Regarding the 2015 Code of Conduct for the Security Council response in case of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, known as the ACT Group Code of Conduct. For my country, it's crucial that more states express their support for this document of commitments. We're convinced that the universalization of this code of conduct would contribute to the prevention of acts constituting the most heinous crimes. We therefore invite all states, in particular, the members of the Security Council who have not yet done so to express their support for the Code of Conduct. In addition to universalization, it's essential to effectively implement the Code of Conduct. And therefore, we remind the current members of the Security Council who have already expressed their support for the Code to comply with the commitments laid down in it. While the code is designed in a way that each subscribing state must engage in a self-evaluation of their compliance with the commitments in it, for Costa Rica, civil society plays a fundamental role in enforcing compliance. On the other hand, it would be beneficial for all States that support the code of conduct, regardless of whether we are part of the Security Council or not, to consider mechanisms to incentivize the General Secretariat to comply with operative paragraph 3 of the code. As regards resolution 76262, known as the veto initiative, This is a fundamental tool to substantially increase accountability for use of the veto. Given the political cost of using a veto and this new obligation to justify its use to the membership, there was an initial expectation that the veto initiative would generate a deterrent effect. However, we regret that this second objective does not seem to be being met. In any case, we believe that resolution 76262 lays the groundwork for the General Assembly to go even further. This brings me now to our fourth point. How about changing the vision and culture of this organization on this issue? And instead of thinking not only about how to limit the veto, we increase the use of the tools offered up to us by the charter for more decisive action by the General Assembly in peace and security matters. In the plenary meetings of the General Assembly, mandated by Resolution 76262, A very relevant group of States have recalled that such meetings also allow the adoption of resolutions on the issues under discussion. We also recommended to the General Assembly the importance of the use of its functions and powers described in Articles 10 to 14 of the Charter. including that of making formal and explicit recommendations to the Security Council on any matter related to the maintenance of international peace and security. We also note that in the context of the transformation of global governance processes, we must look at how to empower the General Assembly to act in a more decisive manner when the Security Council is unable to do so. And we urge all member states interested to consider measures that we can collectively adopt to this end. Now, our fifth point, we wish to underscore that the only limitations on the power of veto that are really, truly able to be effective are those that stem from reforming the UN Charter. An additional example of this almost absolute power of the Security Council is precisely that related to possible reforms of the Charter. Article 108 of the UN Charter requires the ratification of the five non-elected members for any reform of the Security Council to enter into force. This provision is a straitjacket that prevents any meaningful reform of a binding nature and therefore leaves us only with voluntary options. It is worth asking whether, if a Charter reform were to be achieved to include some limitations to the veto, would these provisions be complied with or would they be would they fall on deaf ears, as Articles 26 and 27.5 in fine of the Charter already do? Thank you. Austria · Co-Chair [2:36:37]: I thank the distinguished representative of Costa Rica, and I give the floor to Morocco. Morocco [2:36:54]: Thank you, co-chairs. Morocco associates itself with the statement made by Sierra Leone and Bahrain. And in our national capacity, we would like to make the following points. First of all, I would like to thank you all for your letter on the 19th of December, which shows us the program of work for this session. And also, Thank you for convening this meeting on the right to veto. Your constant commitment to guide this crucial process, crucial for the future of the organization, is something that we're very grateful for. For the Kingdom of Morocco, the reform of the Security Council is a priority within the framework of the UN reform. It's essential to make sure that this be a comprehensive report touching upon all of the clusters we have in decision 62/557 of the General Assembly without distinction or exclusion to ensure that there's a balanced and representative enlargement of this key body asked to maintain international peace and security. Co-chairs. The five clusters of the reform of the Security Council are intrinsically interlinked and interdependent. They are a consistent structure to ensure we have balanced reform. As regards the right to veto, this issue is of capital importance. Morocco is of the view that considering this should be done at the same time as we consider other issues. First, therefore, the security council reforms means enlargement in both of the categories we have in the charter, namely the permanent members and the elected members. And in all decisions to add permanent seats means there has to be a discussion about the right to veto for new members. And this is essential to make sure that there is no inequality. in the reform or that we don't create a third category of seats. If the veto continues to exist, it is imperative to make sure that it's extended to the new permanent members to make sure there is justice and fairness. Therefore, the issue of the veto is linked to the membership of the Security Council because it directly influences the decision-making and the balance of powers. Secondly, The issue of the veto is linked to regional representation within the reform. Morocco reaffirms its support to the common African position in the Azawini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration. It requires at least two permanent seats with the right to veto and five elected members. It's up to Africa to decide on its representatives within the Security Council. We also support greater representation of the Arab world, one permanent seat with all of their prerogatives, and a better representation amongst the elected members. Given the veto to the region, which is currently excluded, will make the Council more representative. Thirdly, increasing the number of members in the permanent and elected members is essential if we want to reflect the current geopolitical realities. However, the broadening without also extending equitably the right of veto will maintain historic inequalities. Thinking about the size of the Council needs to include a discussion on the use and restrictions on the veto. This also influences the working methods of the Council. We think that the reform of the Security Council must be accompanied by our thinking about the decision-making mechanism, including the voting method. In the enlarged Council, it is crucial to make sure that there is a system for effective decision-making, whilst preserving equity and the legitimacy of the body. If the veto exists, it has to be equitably distributed without impacting the decision-making. The broadening of the Council, the reform of the working methods, has to be thought of together with the issue of the veto. Effective reform needs to guarantee that the use of restrictions of veto does not undermine the capacity to make decisions, whilst strengthening its legitimacy and its representative nature. Four, the right to veto reserved to the permanent members of the council impacts the relationship between that body and the General Assembly. A reform of the right of veto could improve that relationship by reducing certain blockages within the Council. Further, we support initiatives aimed at limiting the use of the veto in the Mexican initiative, for example, and the ACT code of conduct. To conclude, co-chairs, we reaffirm our commitment to the framework and format of intergovernmental negotiations, which is an essential platform to arrive at a consensus on Security Council reform. My country will continue actively, participatively, and constructively in this process so as to have a better Council, more inclusive one, and more representative, reflecting contemporary realities. I thank you. Austria · Co-Chair [2:42:37]: I thank the distinguished representative of Morocco and give the floor to Turkey. Türkiye [2:42:46]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. At the outset, allow me to express our gratitude to the esteemed co-chairs for convening this discussion. Turkey fully aligns itself with the statement delivered by the permanent representative of Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus Group. I would also like to make the following remarks in my national capacity, Mr. Chair. On the eve of its 80th anniversary, it is imperative that the UN is fit for purpose so as to properly address contemporary challenges in an efficient and urgent manner. The current system, established in another and a much different era, renders the Security Council dysfunctional. We have all witnessed time and again the paralysis of the Council on urgent humanitarian matters. We must strive for and collectively ensure that the reform council reflects today's realities. The reform process needs to look for ways to address and eliminate the current shortcomings of the Security Council. Reform must be effective and functional, more transparent and democratic, while also seeking accountability. The question of the veto is a long-disputed and much-contested complex issue. For many, it is the root cause of the paralysis the council often finds itself in. And we all know that the underlying motive of it is usually, if not always, political and for the benefit of a select few. Mr. Chair, the use of veto is causing a disparity among the membership. It adversely affects decision-making and most certainly undermines the principle of sovereign equality. It confines an unfair prerogative to a privileged circle for furthering their own national and narrow interests. We therefore once again reiterate that ideally, the veto should be abolished. Failing to do this, it is paramount to limit the use and framework of the negative vote, especially under specific circumstances, such as crimes against humanity or war crimes. Mr. Chair, veto is a relic of the past, and it has no place in a reformed UN Security Council. It would be a huge failure for the whole membership to repeat the same mistakes and expect different outcomes. New vetoes will only bring more problems, make it more difficult to find solutions in the future. It will harm the adaptability of the UN to future challenges and will create new disparities among the wider membership. An increase in the number of rotational elected non-permanent members, on the other hand, would have a balancing effect on the influence sought by permanent members in decision-making processes, thereby pressuring them to refrain from the use of veto. On this note, allow me to acknowledge the constructive role undertaken by the elected members of the Council, and we thank their efforts. Furthermore, we are also pleased to witness that the veto initiative, spearheaded by Liechtenstein and co-sponsored by my own country, Turkey, as a core group member, proved to be a valuable tool on issues pertaining to international peace and security for the collective good of humanity. Turkey will continue to be actively engaged in the IGM process, and we look forward to continuing these discussions aimed at identifying further convergences. Thank you. Austria · Co-Chair [2:46:02]: I thank the distinguished representative of Turkey and give the floor to Pakistan. Pakistan [2:46:10]: Thank you. Thank you, co-chairs. It's good to see you back again guiding this very important process. Pakistan aligns itself with the statement made by the Permanent Representative of Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus Group. I would like to add a few comments in my national capacity. Co-chairs, the issue of the veto, which we are considering today, is central to the issue of reform of the Security Council. It is the exercise of the veto or the threat of a veto, which is responsible for the frequent inability of the Security Council to act decisively in response to threats to or breaches of international peace and security. Therefore, to make the Council more effective, it is important to either abolish the veto rights of the permanent members, or failing this, to restrict its use as much as possible. In any event, it is vital not to add to the problem by enlarging the veto rights to additional states, and this is one of the principal reasons that Pakistan, the Uniting for Consensus, and many other member states have opposed the creation of new permanent members on the Security Council. Kochas, we appreciate the argument that the imbalance of influence within the Security Council between permanent and non-permanent members should be redressed. We believe that this should be achieved firstly by restricting the use of the veto as much as possible. We support proposals to constrain the use of the veto in situations of mass atrocities and genocide. Secondly, the General Assembly should adopt greater responsibility when the veto is exercised. The veto initiative proposed by Liechtenstein and adopted by the Assembly is a welcome first step that enables the General Assembly to seek an explanation for the use of the veto. We can build on this initiative by requiring the Assembly to be obligated to, in fact, address itself to the issue on which a veto has been exercised. The influence of the P5 and their proclivity to use the veto could be constrained also by the addition of new non-permanent members to the Security Council. Apart from the obvious impact of a larger number of non-permanent versus permanent members, the higher majorities which will be required for the adoption of Security Council resolutions, that is, for example, 16 or 17 in a council of 26 or 27 versus 9 of 15 members, would provide the non-permanent members a de facto counter-veto, thus achieving some measure of influence to counter the influence in arbitrary positions of the permanent members. Another device to do so would be to legislate in the reform proposal that the adoption of resolutions relating to a particular region would require the unanimous support or perhaps a two-thirds majority support of the Council members belonging to that region. Together with a higher number of members from each region in a reform proposal, such a requirement for regional support would go a long way towards redressing the historical injustice against Africa and the regions of the global south. Co-chairs, nor are we averse to according greater rights of approval and disapproval to countries representing their respective regions. However, such rights cannot be claimed by individual states merely for their own national interests. Coches, we are therefore pleased that the revised common elements paper which you circulated after last year's IGN incorporated some important convergences, and I would like to mention some of these. First, the importance of the regional approach. Second, agreement on the expansion of the non-permanent members of the Council. Third, the priority for Africa and other regional and cross-regional groups such as the SIDS, the Arab countries, and the OIC, which, by the way, besides Africa, all of these groups align with the regional approach to Security Council reform. It is therefore important that this year's IGN meetings include a dedicated discussion of the regional approach, which I believe is presently missing from the program of meetings that have been circulated. Let me conclude, Co-Chairs, by reaffirming some evident and widely accepted propositions. One, the IGN is the sole format in which we should promote the widest possible agreement on Security Council reform. Two, we can commence so-called text-based negotiations only once we have convergence on all five clusters of Security Council reform. Without such convergence, a text will quickly lead to a deadlock in the IGC. Three, similarly, The formulation of a consolidated model for reform should be attempted only once there is visible and sufficient convergence on the five interlinked clusters. For any unilateral attempt to force through a proposal not evolved through the IGM process will lead to political division within the U.N. membership and derail the IGN and Security Council reform process. And five, which is no artificial deadline can be set for the conclusion of the Security Council reform process. It should conclude only once a reform proposal enjoys the widest possible support as stipulated in the resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly. I thank you. Good cheers. Austria · Co-Chair [2:54:03]: I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan. Colleagues, we heard the last speaker for this meeting this morning and will reconvene in the 00 p.m. in this chamber to continue the discussion. And right after the end of that discussion, we'll have a closed interactive dialogue without webcast. Also, very short reminder, join us at the Austrian coffee break in the delegates lounge 30 p.m. This meeting is now adjourned.