Informal Interactive Dialogue on Commodity Markets - General Assembly, 80th session

Good morning. I call to order the informal interactive dialogue on commodity markets. As mentioned in my letter on April 13th, 2026, this dialogue is convened pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 80/124 of December 15th, 2025, to review world commodity trends and prospects and possible strategies for economic and export Diversification as well as value addition for sustainable development, particularly in commodity-dependent developing countries. It aims to facilitate the exchange of experiences, insights, and lessons learned, fostering a more robust understanding of the challenges and opportunities inherent in these economies. I will now make a statement as the President of the General Assembly. Assembly. Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, today's crises are placing severe strain on commodity markets on a global scale. According to the World Bank, energy prices are projected to rise by 24% in 2026, driven largely by supply disruptions caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Energy shocks do not stop at energy. They raise transport costs, disrupt supply chains, increase everyday prices, and threaten food security. Fertilizer prices are projected to rise by 31%, adding pressure on agricultural markets already strained by the war in Ukraine and disruptions to grain supplies. Meanwhile, the pressures on commodity markets fall especially hard on countries that are already vulnerable. 95 out of 143 developing economies, including over 80% of least developed countries, depend on commodities for their export earnings. They also face a deeper struggle and structural injustice. Many developing countries hold resources essential to the clean energy transition, digital infrastructure, and the wider 21st century economy. Yet while the export raw materials, others capture most of the value through processing, refining, manufacturing, technology development, and global distribution. As a result, countries that supply resources for global growth receive only a fraction of the wealth those resources create. Our discussion therefore needs to be focused on three priorities: reducing the damage caused by ongoing crises; second, strengthening the resilience of vulnerable commodity-dependent economies; and third, helping countries with natural resources receive a fairer share of the value they create. On the first point, reducing commodity shocks also means addressing the crises that drive them. As we see in Ukraine and the Middle East, conflicts and crises extend far beyond the battlefield. The long-term answers lie in the peaceful settlement of disputes in line with the United Nations Charter. Yet while conflicts continue, the immediate fallout still has to be managed. Food, energy, and fertilizers need to keep moving, and market shocks should not become development crises. We saw the kind of practical action needed in March 2022 when the Secretary-General established the Global Crisis Response Group on Food, Energy and Finance in response to the global impact of the Russian war in Ukraine. The Black Sea Grain Initiative that followed helped export over 32 million tons of food commodities to 45 countries across 3 continents, easing pressure on global food prices. With conflicts now unfolding alongside climate shocks, debt distress, and supply chain disruptions, that same spirit of practical action is needed on an even larger scale. Second, resilience requires diversification, because commodity dependence narrows choices. When a country depends on one or two exports—whether oil, copper, coffee, or cocoa—a fall in prices can mean fewer hospitals built, fewer classrooms repaired, fewer roads maintained, and fewer services for the people delivered. The same is true for imports. Heavy dependence on imported fuel, food, or fertilizer can send import bills soaring when disruption occurs elsewhere, pulling scarce resources away from development and the people. Diversification gives economies more than one source of growth, revenue and resilience. For many developing countries, that requires affordable finance, stronger infrastructure, technology transfer, skill development, investment, and better access to markets. These are practical foundations for building new sectors, creating decent jobs, moving into higher-value activities, and giving more people the chance to build livelihoods at home. Third, Fair commodity markets require countries to receive more of the value their resources create. Often, it is developing countries that hold the critical resources necessary to advance the wider 21st century economy. For example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo accounts for roughly 70% of global cobalt mining, while Guinea holds about a quarter of global bauxite reserves. Yet too often these resources are exported raw while most of the value is created elsewhere through processing, manufacturing, technology, and distribution. Value addition can help change that pattern. When countries process and refine resources closer to home, they create skilled jobs, increase public revenues, build industrial capacity, and give local communities a stronger stake in the wealth beneath their soil. The Democratic Republic of Congo offers a clear example of what this can mean in practice. Kobold has been valued at around $5.8 per kilogram at extraction, rising to around $16.2 after local processing. That difference reflects the gap between exporting raw materials and creating greater economic value at home. Making that shift possible at scale requires finance, infrastructure, technology, skills investments, and access to markets. It also requires supply chains that are more just, transparent, sustainable, and development-oriented. This is the shift called for by the Secretary-General's Panel on Critical Energy Transition Minerals in its report, "Resourcing the Energy Transition." The United Nations Task Force on Critical Energy Transition Minerals now provides an important mechanism for carrying this work forward across the United Nations system. To further advance this work, member states should also cooperate to reflect these priorities in the norms that shape international trade. Well-crafted trade agreements can help commodity-dependent countries move up the value chain rather than leaving them to export raw materials while others capture the greater share of value. And there are examples which already have proven that this works. For example, the partnership between Chile and the European Union offers one useful example. Chile is a major producer of copper and lithium, both essential to the clean energy transition. Their trade agreements form part of a broader framework of cooperation on sustainable raw material value chain. Including processing, refining, recycling, and other forms of value addition. Together, these efforts show how trade frameworks can help create more value while critical resources are found. If such approaches become more common, they can help commodity-dependent countries, especially in the Global South, make greater progress towards the 2030 Agenda delivering on the SDGs. With that in mind, today's discussion should not remain in a silo. The reflections from this dialogue should feed into wider discussions on the implementation of the Pact for the Future and the 2030 Agenda. By delivering tangible on the priorities discussed today, we'll make direct and sustainable progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals. Because commodity markets shape daily life. The fact whether families can afford food whether farmers can plant, whether goods can reach markets, whether governments can fund essential services, and whether resources— rich countries can turn national wealth into meaningful and lasting development. That is why this dialogue matters. Reducing the damage caused by shocks, strengthening resilience through diversification, and building fairer value chains are practical steps towards greater stability. broader opportunity and a fairer share of wealth countries and communities help create. Through that work, commodity markets can better serve development and we can move closer to the promise of being better together. In this regard, I thank you and wish you a productive and engaging interactive dialogue today. I now invite Ms. Isabella Weber, Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Massachusetts, and I'm her most to deliver the keynote address.

Thank you, Madam President. President, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, it is an honor to address the Assembly. We are not— we are at a moment of acute global crisis, as the President has just laid out. The choices made here and in the capitals of the world will determine who bears the cost of that crisis. The Strait of Hormuz has been— has become the central bottleneck of the world economy. The International Energy Agency has called it the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market. Fertilizer prices are already at their highest level since 2022. The World Food Program has warned that if hostilities continue beyond June, the number of people facing acute hunger will rise by 45 million. The crisis we face today is of historic proportions, but in our age of overlapping emergencies, commodity price shocks are no longer occasional disturbances around an otherwise stable trend. They have become a structural feature of our economic life. Climate change is no longer a future scenario, it is a present reality. Armed conflicts have intensified globally, Every major shock to the price of essential commodities like food or energy is a redistribution shock, a regressive transfer from low- and middle-income households to high-income households, from workers to shareholders, and from indebted developing countries to the centers of global finance. A recent G20 report has warned of a global inequality emergency. The shocks we face are bound to push us further into this crisis, absent effective multilateral intervention. If the world community recognizes that such shocks will keep coming, then we cannot stand by and watch the distributional consequences unfold. Underregulated markets in crises like the ones we witness are not a neutral arbiter. It is the law of the jungle Those with the least capacity to save bear the brunt of the cost, while those protected by purchasing power maintain their resource-intensive consumption. National responses are not enough. High-income countries buffer their firms and citizens by subsidizing exploded prices, as is already happening, while those same prices hit middle- and low-income countries hard. Things get worse when actual shortages arrive. But even without shortages, poorer countries are forced to cut back. Low-income countries are not less willing to pay exploding prices for the oil their economies and citizens depend on. They are less able to do so. They lack the purchasing power amidst a global debt crisis. This then creates the perverse situation where factory workers in developing countries are already unable to pay for cooking oil and retrieve to their villages. Fishermen are forced to stay onshore with diesel for their boats out of reach, while billionaires keep flying private and SUVs are being used where public transportation would be readily available for to, to be used. I will today make the case that we need to build institutions of multilateral price stabilization for energy and for food commodities, the essentials of human life and production, as a core component of adaptation to climate change and geopolitical instability. Price stabilization is necessary as an emergency response to address the fallout from the Iran war, but it is also necessary as a matter of preparedness for coming shocks. Aid budgets are being cut and the debt crisis evaporates fiscal space making it impossible for many countries to respond to food and energy price shocks with cash transfers, as has been a standard response for long. We are in a period in which commodity market shocks are the new normal, and the question before us, the question I want to bring to this Assembly, is whether we will continue to manage shocks by the logic of the auction, where the scarce essentials go to the highest bidder, or whether we build institutions capable of managing shocks by the logic of cooperation, where universal access to essentials is the guiding principle. The latter is not a choice but an imperative if we adhere to the value of universal human dignity, to the first article of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights: All human beings are born free and equal in dignity. In dignity and rights. Even without actual shortages, price spikes due to market disruptions can cause famine. In his work on famines, Nobel laureate Amartya Sen demonstrated that the great hunger crisis of the 20th century, they're rarely caused by absolute shortages of food. They were caused by collapses in what he called entitlements, the ability of people to command food through purchasing power, the relation between their incomes and prices. Such entitlements' collapse were in fact key in the 2022-2023 world food crisis, when global supply was not falling short. What Sen described for food in the 20th century is now at risk of playing out for energy, for fertilizers, for the full range of essential commodities on which modern life depends. Every commodity shock is an entitlement event. The question is whose entitlements are protected and whose are allowed to collapse. But this time the situation is even worse than Sen's scenario. We are about to face actual shortages in global oil supply, and if fertilizer shortfalls translate into food supply, food shortages may follow. The world has seen what happened during the COVID-19 pandemic when critical medical supplies fell short. High-income countries outbid the rest of the world for ventilators and personal protective equipment, with far-reaching consequences for people's ability to be safe from the virus. Allocation has been a question of life and death. For food and energy too, it can be a question of life and death. There is now a real threat of shortages, but the extremely volatile prices we have witnessed in recent weeks do not present any reliable assessment of underlying scarcity. They reflect speculation about the course of the war and reactions to the latest political statements. Passing those prices on to firms and consumers one-to-one is not sending rational signals. It's sending expressions of what Keynes called animal spirits in spot markets. Even when those prices do not accurately accurately reflect fundamentals, they cause redistribution as they spike. The redistribution that price spikes bring about happens through 4 channels. The first is the profit channel. When prices spike, firms operating in the sector reap windfall profits. Our research shows that in 2022, United States, States headquartered companies benefited the most from record profits in fossil fuels. But within the United States, 50% of all fossil fuel profit claims accrued to the wealthiest 1% of individuals. The bottom half of the population received just 1%. This is the outcome of extremely unequal asset ownership, which is by no means unique to the United States. In the face of today's shock, the question is not whether there will be extraordinary fossil fuel profits this time, The question is how much, for how long, and decisively whether governments will act. And windfall profits are not confined to fossil fuels, but accrue in all relevant commodity markets. And the last inflation has taught us firms that faced high commodity input costs due to spiking raw material prices did not absorb those costs, but hiked prices— in ways to protect profits and sometimes even increase their margins. This is what I've been calling sellers' inflation. The second channel is the consumption channel. The poorer you are, the larger the share of your income that goes to essentials like food and energy. In low-income countries, households spend on average between 30% and 60% of their disposable income on food. When food and energy prices rise, The rich absorb the cost as a minor adjustment to their budgets. For the poor, it threatens basic subsistence. More than a decade of progress in the fight against global hunger was reversed in the previous World Food Price Crisis. Even in high-income countries, this has meant major real wage declines. The third channel is redistribution between countries. Net food importing developing economies suffer twice over from rising commodity prices on global markets and from the depreciation of their currencies, which makes those imports even more expensive and inflation even higher. According to the International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems, the global food import bill reached a record $2.2 trillion in 2025, with the sharpest increases concentrated in countries already struggling to service their debt. The fourth channel is the redistribution that follows from the policy response to inflation. When central banks respond to commodity-driven inflation by raising interest rates, they do not address the root cause, which is a sectoral supply shock transmitted across the economy by corporate pricing decisions. But they do impose enormous collateral damage. Monetary tightening squeezes workers whose jobs are put at risk. It squeezes indebted developing countries whose borrowing costs rise and whose currencies fall as capital flees back to the metropoles and whose industrialization and diversification prospects erode. And it squeezes the very clean energy investments that would make our economies more resilient to the next shock. So 4 channels of redistribution from price spikes in essential commodities: profits to the wealthy, consumption burdens to everyone else with the heaviest weight resting on the poor, international redistribution through import burdens and exchange rate pressures, and monetary tightening that lands hardest on workers, indebted countries, and the prospects for industrialization. As Nobel laureate in economics, Wassily Leontief put it, quote, The price system plays the role of a silent but powerful redistributing agency. That is what we are witnessing. There is an alternative to letting under-regulated markets rule in commodity crisis like the one we are witnessing. It is not utopian, it has historical precedent, and it is in fact already partially in place. For oil, we already have One emergency preparedness institution, the International Energy Agency, founded after the oil shocks of the 1970s, requires members to maintain strategic petroleum reserves and to coordinate the release in the event of a major disruption. This is a genuine achievement of multilateral cooperation among high-income countries. But in the face of the historic challenge before us, it is no longer enough. Coordinated reserve releases can dampen a price spike but do not set a ceiling. They cannot guarantee fair allocation either. What we urgently need in addition to existing reserves is a multilateral oil buyers' club. The principle is straightforward. In 2023, net importers purchased slightly more than 80% of globally traded crude oil. The European Union with the United Kingdom alone accounts for about 23%. China, the world's largest single importer, accounts for another 23%. India is over 10%. Coalitions of net importers can constitute a monopsony. They can form a club and exercise buyer's power to defend a price ceiling, as Gregory Semenyuk and I have proposed. In a way, this is an OPEC in reverse. The club would agree on a price ceiling set at a level still attractive to exporters, say $100 per barrel, well above pre-crisis levels and well below the crisis prices already being paid for physical deliveries. It would allocate scarce supply based on a commonly agreed principle. Low-income countries should maintain their pre-war import levels. Their imports are of a negligible magnitude in global trade. All other members, would reduce their imports proportionally to their pre-crisis consumption. It would prohibit refiners within the club from extracting windfall margins on sales to other members. It could include a price floor, say $65 per barrel, to entice exporters to join the club. They would enjoy greater revenue predictability and the planning security they need to pursue industrialization and diversification and manage the energy transition on their own terms. This is not a science fiction proposal. A similar scheme for allocating raw materials was implemented for Allied countries during the First World War. The European gas price cap of 2022 was built on collective purchasing power, but was implemented too late to catch the shock. The Bayer's clock extends this logic to a multilateral framework that includes the Global South. It replaces the law of the unregulated market with a principle of coordination, that the costs of a crisis manufactured by geopolitical conflict and fossil fuel dependency should be minimized and shared according to capacity, not according to the ability to outbid. There's a further function the Buyers Club can serve. Because it is, in effect, a coordinated demand management mechanism for oil, it can be used over time as an instrument for the orderly reduction of oil imports, managing the supply side of the energy transition itself. The fiscal savings generated relative to crisis market prices could be reinvested in renewable energy deployment, diversification, electrification, public transportation, and democratically designed energy savings schemes. The buyers' club is a mechanism for spreading the cost of scarcity equitably by building the institutional basis for different energy future. For food, the institutional task is somewhat different, but the logic is the same. We need buffer stock systems. They need to be built up as soon as the present crisis is over. This is not a new idea. China and India have long operated extensive public stockholding systems. China's reserve system was able to keep its food prices stable during the 2022 global spike when the cumulative median food price increase across G20 countries was 23%. And importantly, high-income countries are now returning to this approach. Sweden is re-establishing emergency food stockpiles with plans to bank, bank enough for each citizen to have 3,000 calories every day for a year. Finland, Norway, Indonesia, Japan, and Brazil are all rebuilding national food reserves. The countries that for decades insisted that the market would always provide are now hedging their bets. We are witnessing in real time the end of the consensus that food security can be left to global trade and aid. What is missing? And what I want to propose is that this national turn be matched by regional cooperation and possibly even global cooperation. In a study prepared for the G20 Food Security Task Force, together with Professor Jayati Ghosh, we developed a concrete proposal for an African Grain Management Facility, an autonomous public agency under the African Union that would operate continuous procurement and off— —and offtake of food grains. I want to emphasize something important here. Buffer stocks are not protectionism. They are not isolationism. The release of public stocks during a price shock, even when its purpose is to stabilize a domestic market, elevates demand pressures on the global market and thereby contributes to stabilizing prices for everyone. Contrary to export controls, Buffer stocks need not be a beggar-thy-neighbor policy. With proper international cooperation and information sharing, they can be the opposite, a system of mutual insurance against shocks. Excellencies, distinguished leaders, let me close where I began. We are not living through a temporary turbulence that will pass. We are living through the beginning of a new period in which shocks to systemically significant prices will be recurrent and which the question of who bears the cost of those shocks will define the new order. The shocks have arrived, the redistribution is happening, the window for action is open. The question is whether this Assembly and the governments it represents will meet this moment with the institutional ambition it demands, or whether once again we will allow the market to settle the question and let the logic of outbidding rule the day. I came here today to argue that the world can do better, and I hope it will. Thank you.

I thank Ms. Weber for her expert insights and recommendations on the issue of commodity markets, which we are debating today. As indicated in the program, this opening segment will be followed by two panel discussions and interactive dialogue with member states and stakeholders, which will be moderated by Ms. Kate Duggett, US Markets Editor at Financial Times. I now invite to the podium the moderator, Ms. Kate Duggett, and the panellists for the first panel. The opening segment is concluded.

panelists, and then thereafter the floor will be open for comments, observations, and questions. Our first panel is on world commodity trends and prospects. I'd like to introduce our panelists: Mr. John Baffez from the World Bank, Mr. Paul Sankey from Sankey Research, and Mr. Kenan Arcan from JPMorgan. This session will review the latest developments and medium-term prospects in global commodity markets, focusing on energy, minerals, and agriculture. To frame our first panel, I'd like to ask: What is fundamentally new in today's commodity markets compared with previous cycles? In particular, how are structural drivers such as geopolitics, the digital and energy transition, climate shocks, financialization, and changing industrial demand reshaping commodity markets beyond traditional boom and bust dynamics? For our first question, I'd like to go to Mr. Baffez. My question is, from From a medium-term perspective, do you see current commodity price volatility as driven mainly by geopolitical shocks, or are we entering a period of structurally tighter markets, particularly for energy and critical minerals?

Thank you, Katie. Good morning, everybody, and many thanks to the General Assembly for extending the invitation to the World Bank and me. Specifically. Thank you for the question, very relevant question in the current context, and let me start by saying that shocks have played an important role in driving current commodity price volatility, but let me also remind ourselves that global commodity markets have been subjected to numerous shocks during the past few years, beginning with a pandemic in 2020, followed by Russia-Ukraine, two Middle East conflicts a few years ago, last year's trade wars, and now the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. By a quick count, we have at least 6 shocks in 6 years, so one shock per year. On top of that, we have longer-term issues such as climate change, more frequent adverse weather conditions, protective trade policies, declining budgets allocated for research and development, rising debt levels which make the spending even worse. And if I may add, we also have cyclical problems that appear quite frequently. The most important one in the current context is El Niño. So current volatility, I would say, results of a series of shocks. Longer-term issues and some cyclical phenomena. Now, in terms of whether we are entering tighter markets, especially in the case of energy metals, I think so. This tightening in the markets, of course, reflects higher consumption, population and income growth, which have been the traditional drivers for— of demand for individual commodities. It's also important to know that energy and metal markets are non-renewable resources and as such, when you extract one ton of metal, one ton is less below the surface of the earth. Another issue in those commodities that we have kind of extracted the low-hanging fruits, so extracting more of these commodities becomes more difficult, more technologically challenging and more expensive. And to these factors we should add also new sources of demand such as electrification of the economies, energy and metal demand for data centers, to name a few. In fact, what has been an important development during the past few quarters, I think 6 or 7 quarters or so, is that the prices of some of metals have reached record highs in in nominal terms. This kind of development did not make headlines because all our attention has been focusing on the Middle East and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. So, very complex answer.

Thank you. Mr. Sankey, I'd like to go to you next with a question. Energy markets have become increasingly affected by geopolitical developments with renewed risks around key chokepoints and supply disruptions. How does this change the outlook for energy exporters and improving developing countries and importing developing countries?

Just a word, if I could recognize my father, John Antony Sankey, who was British Ambassador to the United Nations in the late 1990s in Geneva, and may he rest in peace. Honour to be here at the United Nations for me for that very reason alone. The characterisation of the current situation is completely different from what we've previously seen for a number of reasons. I think the first very notable and dramatic aspect of the market has been the record highs that we've seen in demand for oil, gas, coal. If you look globally, we're actually at an all-time record high in February 2026, as we went into the current crisis, 108 million barrels a day of oil was our estimate of global oil demand. Natural gas demand was an all-time record high. Stunningly, in many ways, global coal demand was a record high, and actually we've said that we believe global wood demand is at a record high. The one element of all of this which I think comes out very strongly as a potential solution to many of the problems we find today namely nuclear power, has actually more or less been stagnant for the last 20 years and has lost about half of its global energy market share. So that was the situation going into the crisis, and what was different was the all-time records that we're seeing across fossil fuels. And of course, underneath of all that, we have the AI boom, which is, for me as a Wall Street analyst, the big theme of the day, with unprecedented levels of capital expenditure being spent by companies with unprecedented levels of profitability. So when they say they're going to spend $100 billion in a year, which is what they say for this year, on the AI theme, much of which of course relates to energy, you can be sure they're going to spend that money because they have the money to spend. And in fact, we had reached a point where we were questioning whether Microsoft should be considered a better risk-free rate than the US government in terms of financial theory, to give you an idea of the financial fire— bar per that these companies have. So we have a massive energy demand challenge going into the crisis, which is the first thing that's different. The second thing that's different is that as of 2022, as an independent research analyst, I was able to say, if you're worried about World War III, you better be because you're in it right now. And of course, that was the first land war in Europe since World War II. That obviously changes entirely the setup of what we're looking at today with the world split basically Western Hemisphere, Eastern Hemisphere, and some sort of war theatre across Europe and the Middle East, and so that again presents enormous challenges to the point where very clearly we now look at ESG— environmental, social, and governance concerns— whereas the CEO of Citigroup had said the 'S' now needs to stand not for social but for security. So it's an environmental security and governance issue that we face here, and this applies very much across the board in commodity markets, and with that 'S' for security should be the touchstone of all energy policy in the current and forward environment. The way the world has changed is extremely dramatic in another respect, and we characterize it as OFAC versus UCAV. In the case of OFAC, what we're talking about is the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control, which has an unprecedented level of power over commodity markets, the like of which really hasn't been previously seen or exercised. So you can see that the US Treasury Secretary can turn on or off Russian oil. Iranian oil at times, and of course that presents an enormous new environment that really should lead everyone with any kind of contract globally to reconsider, you know, where they sit as relates to OFAC and the long-term sustainability of any contract signed outside that. So that is an extraordinary power that the Treasury now holds over markets and has been demonstrated. And the UCAV is the unmanned combat aerial vehicle, or drone, which has completely changed the metrics of modern warfare and again is absolutely visible in current markets because you now have a $20,000 device or less that can effectively shut the single biggest and most important global shipping lane. And of course the question is, How do we— will that ever change now going forward, or have we permanently denigrated and undermined the security of supply by ship, which of course is an enormous part of global commodity markets, to say the least? And now you really have to question, you know, whether or not you can rely on shipping delivery as an energy security measure in terms of how much energy you're going to actually want to import at any given time. So obviously, there's an enormous implied outcome here, which is the development of domestic energy and secure means of supply, which clearly would be some combination of nuclear, solar, wind, and other non-shipborne domestic energy. Geothermal would be another example, and we would encourage everyone to look hard at investment on that theme. So the world is a very different and much riskier place and one, as I say, which we think will lead to the upsurge in domestic investment in energy supply because it's going to be absolutely necessary in the future. To give you one example to illustrate the concern and fear that we have around shipping markets, since the the emergence of issues in Yemen 3 years ago, you've seen around more than 50% reduction in Suez Canal traffic, shipping traffic, and that just illustrates the point that these problems will not be easily solved. So people are talking about a June opening or whenever of the Strait of Hormuz, but if you look at what actually has come to pass with the Suez Canal, you'll see that— even 3 years later, from a much relatively smaller risk, we're still at only 50% throughput. So these are the dramatic changes that we see today, and early in this crisis I was asked to give some advice to the British government, and my advice was do not underestimate the scale of this crisis. Thank you.

Thank you so much. Mr. Arfan, How are commodity-importing developing countries adapting their procurement strategies in response to rising volatility and supply disruptions?

Um, I want to first say thank you again for the opportunity to be here. It is a true honor. As for the question, it's not just how importing developing countries are adapting their procurement, but which procurement and supply architecture choices they are making. To operate in a world, as the previous speakers have said, where chokepoint risk and resource leverage are repeatable instruments rather than tail events. That premise, I believe, changes the playbook. There are two populations of buyers emerging. I'm going to describe both because I think the difference is instructive. There are the adapters. Adapters are doing several things in combination, not in isolation. Among them, long-dated contracts with diversified origin, not eliminating any single supplier, but ensuring no single supplier has outsized leverage. Multi-route logistics, redundancy at the transport layer, strategic and commercial storage sized to a stress event, not optimization under normal conditions. And I think we've seen in the most recent events how important strategic stockpiles are. Equity or offtake participation in extraction and processing in stable jurisdictions. The buyer becomes a partial owner of their own resilience. And domestic processing optionality where it's viable. Even modest domestic processing capacity, whether it's for critical minerals or refined products or the ability to make the inputs into renewable technology, changes the buyer's optionality at the moment of stress. There's another set of countries, those that are exposed. The exposed retain single origin or single route no strategic stocks, and a fuel mix that's dependent on routes that can be closed. It was brought up during the opening remarks, a lot of this needs to be solved from a fiscal perspective, which not every participant is able. Energy systems are physical. They scale on construction timelines, not always on policy timelines. Procurement frameworks that retire firm capacity ahead of replacement or assume substitutability across various energy pathways and faster than the underlying buildup can deliver increased spot exposure, they do not reduce it. Procurement and energy policy have to be co-designed as a result. There is no procurement workaround for a policy that ignores the throughput physics. Volatility shows up in the commodity markets and the cause is upstream of it. I think one item that it's important to point out is resource nationalism as a design parameter. Nationalization and producer-side economic participation is rising. This is durable. This should be treated as a design parameter. Financing infrastructures exist, whether it's for streaming, royalty, prepayment, or project finance built around offtake commitments. The constraint has not been capital. It has been the absence of demand-side commitments. Sufficient duration and creditworthiness to underwrite the project. This is all solvable as we think about this as a design parameter. So when I think about closing around how these countries are shifting their behavior, the procurement is moving away from price optimization to insurance as a focus. The cost is being repriced for where procurement behavior is taking place to include reliability and certainly geography. Regionalization of supply chains is likely to be the new norm going forward. Countries that move from spot exposure to architecture do so by combining a few things. One, long-dated offtake with creditworthy counterparties. Two, diversified logistics. Three, equity or partnership stakes in the upstream or the midstream process. And four, very importantly, strategic stockpile size distress. I believe the shift is rational and it's likely durable across this cycle and the next. It's also the entry point for private capital. Thank you.

Thank you so much. I would like to return to Mr. Bafes. Um, another question: many developing countries are also heavily dependent on imports of energy, food, and fertilizers. How do you expect policymakers to balance short-term affordability concerns with long-term strategies? What policy measures and tools can governments adopt to mitigate the impact of global supply chain disruptions and have caused an increase in import bills of energy, fertilizers, and food?

Thanks, Katie, a very heavy question, heavy-loaded question, and let me say that I've been in the profession for a little more than 30 years and the issue of diversification comes up often every few years, and so this is an issue that we have dealt both personally, me as an analyst and researcher, as an institution very often. Now, policymakers have to walk a very thin line when it comes to diversification and policy measures in order to address disruptions such as those we are going through right now. Now, it's important that economies diversify for energy and food security reasons. An example is the risks that we are facing now, but We should also not overlook a basic principle in economics and what dictates demand-supply and price outcomes. This is a comparative advantage. So, and that's where the policymakers have to walk the thin line to ensure that you have availability, but at the same time you do not, so to speak— let me use a bit of a harsh term— you do not want to kill your comparative advantage. Let's start with energy and the food security. It is important that countries build strategic reserves, and this is an issue highlighted earlier by our keynote speaker, but policymakers and the governments should also ensure that markets work and they do their job, and those reserves do not become tools that they manage the markets. We have a lot of examples of policies that were introduced in the 20th century, especially in the earlier part of the 20th century, where countries formed the so-called International Commodity Agreements, and in fact some of them were sponsored by the UN and by UNCTAD. They involved stockholding mechanisms, but most of them went too far and most of them collapsed. And often with adverse impacts on commodity markets. So again, it's very important to make sure that interventions are in place to protect consumers and producers, but they do not kind of distort markets too much. Another example, more recent, is biofuels, which admittedly they provide some limited relief in terms of energy security, energy security, but they could also cause massive diversion of food commodities for industrial uses and they could induce price spikes, and the prime example was the 2010-2011 price spike that, in part, was a reflection of the diversion of biofuels for energy needs. So, again, policymakers should try to solve one problem, but at the same time they should not create a bigger one. Now, strategic partnerships are also important, including trade agreements, jointly managed strategic reserves, which, by the way, the International Energy Agency is sort of sponsoring, and those are pathways to ensure— to address food security and the energy concerns. Let me also make the last point that policymakers and the national institutions could use the current crisis as an opportunity to ensure that the global economy does not depend heavily on strategic checkpoints—chockpoints. Another aspect that I could add is that high fossil fuel prices that we are facing today, especially natural gas and oil, that will make alternative energy sources, including renewables,, as Paul mentioned earlier, more attractive, and policymakers should use that opportunity to promote those energy sources. So with that, I would like to add my answer to your question. Thank you so much.

Mr. Sankey, going back to you, I am curious about what role long-term contracts can play, hedging instruments regional energy cooperation in reducing exposure to volatility for vulnerable economies?

Yeah, I mean, obviously, I just spoke earlier about the challenge to all long-term contracts that we see in current markets with, you know, the obvious example of the various force majeures that we're seeing not only from directly out of the Strait of Hormuz affected sellers of energy and other products, but also on the part of the Asian petrochemical business, for example, you are seeing rolling force measures where you are unable to meet your contractual commitments due to legally inactive God. And so the entire framework for long-term contracting is up in the air, and we would remind ourselves that LNG was originally developed as an alternative to oil and it's actually still mostly priced against oil on the basis of energy security of supply for East Asia. This was the original sort of Australia to Japan type trades that we saw that were very much based on long-term contracts that would be alternate to excessive oil importation in those East Asian countries and it's Interesting to reflect that in many ways, given today's situation, there was a failure to diversify sufficiently in terms of energy sourcing because there had never really been perceived the level of risk to supply, even allowing for a view of a level of risk. The level of risk was underestimated very clearly and in that regard, we've had a major shock here that has really put a question mark, as I said, under all long-term contracts, especially those that are transported by sea. So that's clearly one major concern. Going forward, the next— the overall thematic that we've been following for decades now is the concept that the 20th century was driven by oil and the 21st century will be driven by electricity., and that really is coming through to an extent more slowly than we had previously expected, particularly the adoption of electric vehicles globally, especially in the United States, has been much slower than we would have anticipated 20 years ago, but at the same time, in other elements, is actually accelerating, and the obvious example that we've already mentioned is AI, artificial intelligence, and the need for electricity. So I think the future of energy, if you want to think in very long-term thematic terms, is going to be about electricity contracting and how to commit your countries to the most available electricity at the cheapest possible price, because we characterize— another theme that we write about in the research is power is power, and obviously what we're looking at here is that the countries with the best ability to develop electricity supply at the lowest prices will be the success stories of the 21st century. Of course, with that comes a whole lot of resource requirement to build the electricity systems, which is— well, it's different in many ways from what comprises the oil age, nevertheless also involves quite strong demand for oil, for example, backup generation, mining operations, everything else that comes from an economic boom related to electricity and to AI in many ways triggers many of the same resource chains that we've seen historically. And one of the struggles that we've been finding in terms of your question is to know really what is being signed in terms of long-term electricity contracts in order to commit to the kind of development that is being pursued here in data centers and electricity supply. And so our concern is that the market is going to start lagging very badly between the long-term contracts you've spoken about and the need for those long-term contracts and the actual signing of them, because we seem to be lagging in terms of reality here, how fast this stuff is developing. Generally speaking, on the hedging side and the concept of using financial instruments, as a stock analyst, we strongly recommended companies not use hedging and expose themselves to the free market That was somewhat of a technical argument related to the market wanting risk when it would buy a refining company or buy an oil company, and by hedging you undermine the risk. Now, of course, from a government's point of view, the exact opposite would be in place, that you would want to hedge and commit to long-term contracts so that you have that security of supply. And so I think we'll be looking at a new— a future where paper markets, as we call them, do remain enormously important, in how countries manage their energy systems. What above all we would recommend is stability of energy policy, and what we've seen globally over the last 50 years is the countries with the most stable, consistent energy policies with the least corruption will be the success stories, and in that regard, things like long-term contracts and hedging will follow very naturally. Thank you.

Thank you so much. Um, turning back to you, Mr. Arkan, um, I'd like to ask what practical steps can international financial institutions take to help countries move from spot market exposure towards more resilient and predictable supply arrangements? Thanks for the question.

Um, obviously, as the other speakers have said, there is likely to be a tremendous opportunity in whatever the post-ORMUZ order is.. And a lot of that will include regionalization, redundancy, and a desire for resiliency. And in this, new architectures will have to be built. And I firmly believe capital is not the binding constraint in and of itself, and I want to be very direct about this. Bottleneck is also not access to financial hedges. It's potentially new firm physical capacity, resilient routing, entrusted and diversified jurisdictions. And the financial system can help intermediate if those exist. Where they do not, no amount of hedging is going to unlock new supply. And so as I think about where international financial institutions can help, they have disproportionate leverage. Talk about specifics first. Transport corridor finance in the form of redundant routing doesn't depend on a single choke point. Processing and storage capacity, refining, fertilizer plants, mineral processing, renewable inputs located in jurisdictions that hold under stress, risk-sharing instruments, political risk insurance for processing logistics assets, and blended finance for offtake guarantees, as well as anchor financing for redundant routes. And then very importantly, standards and conditionality, physical capacity disclosure, route diversification metrics, and processing chain transparency as conditions of support. So the IFI role here is enabling, not necessarily owning. IFIs are not necessarily meant to aggregate demand, but they can make the aggregated demand bankable. The most consequential thing this room can do to help is build the demand pool architecture. Supply-side subsidies do not necessarily move private capital on their own. A credit committee committing capital needs an enforceable, creditworthy, long-duration revenue line, and that deal architecture at scale is going to combine a few things. Many of which I already talked about, whether it's long-dated offtake, a price that reflects the true price of production and the standards that the people in this room support, equity from a strategic party with optionality, debt syndicated through financial institutions, and then public capital size to close the gap, but not necessarily substitute for private participation. I believe that the aggregation of private sector demand in this post-Trump disorder is going to be needed at scale. Pulled into bankable instruments, and individual buyers are not always going to be large enough or have a long enough time horizon to finance this supply. International financial institutions and standard bodies are well placed to convene the aggregator without picking projects. So this is a convening, not necessarily a subsidy. One other item I want to talk about as someone who's in the commodities markets is price discovery. Many critical commodities do not trade on exchanges. There's no forward curve, there's no hedging infrastructure, and they have opaque bilateral pricing. Without any sort of credible price reference, the financial system cannot price risk, cannot hedge, and cannot intermediate. Where reference prices do exist, they're often anchored to dynamics in single jurisdictions that operate at times under non-market conditions. Capital allocation across the global system is being signaled by a price that does not clear— does not clearly reflect market fundamentals in the way that a textbook assumes. So 3 practical moves that international financial— where international financial institutions can lead: lending covenants and IFI procurement programs that anchor demand for better price discovery and require new alternative benchmarks; support for new exchange-cleared or agency-reported reference prices through technical assistance; and benchmark anchoring for commodities that are currently traded bilaterally and cross-border recognition of these reference prices across international financial institution lending and investment programs. The optionality in price discovery in and of itself is resilience. One more item I'll talk about, which is standard alignment and mutual recognition. I'm a firm believer that international financial institutions can help in qualifying parties in one jurisdiction and qualifying them in all across the their various remits. Mutual recognition starts within the IFI ecosystem. A producer qualified under one IFI standards framework should be recognized across the others in order to avoid a fragmentation tax. The mechanism this fixes is duplicative compliance costs at each border that erode margins and make projects that are already thinly financeable unfinanceable. In closing, I believe there is a large-scale standards-based build-out of resilient commodity supply chains that is going to have to take place buildouts, and this is one of the largest that's going to occur in recent history. These buildouts did not happen in the past because governments picked individual companies. They happened because the conditions were set—predictable rights, infrastructure, and a functioning price signal allowing capital to flow to predictive uses. This is what crowds in private capital, and I'm a firm believer this is the role that IFIs can play. Thank you. Thank you so much.

I'd now like to open the floor for comments and statements. I would like to remind delegations that there is no established list of speakers for this meeting. Delegations wishing to speak are requested to press the microphone button. Delegations are requested to limit their statements to 3 minutes when speaking in their national capacity and 5 minutes when speaking on behalf of a group of states. Time limits will be strictly enforced through an automatic microphone cutoff. A timer will be projected on screen. Delegations may also submit their full-length written written statements through email to eastatements@un.org, which will be posted under Eastatements of the United Nations Journal. I thank you for your cooperation. I now give the floor to Uruguay, to the distinguished representative from Uruguay, followed by Guyana, and then Palau, and finally the European Union.

Mr. Moderator, I have the honor to deliver this statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China. The Group stresses that despite the progress achieved, the imbalances in the global economy and the inequitable structures and outcomes in the trading, financial, monetary, and technological systems that led to the establishment of the Group persists to this day. Commodity-dependent developing countries bear a disproportionate share of these structural asymmetries which perpetuate cycles of economic instability and undermine development prospects. The Group recalls that the commodity sector continues to be the mainstay of the economy of many developing countries in terms of the generation of income, savings, and foreign exchange, as well as employment and livelihood, particularly for the poor and women. In this regard, the Group reaffirms the need for securing competitive conditions in commodity markets and addressing price instability and declining terms of trade through both governmental action and market-based instruments, as well as enhanced equitable and predictable market access for commodities of key importance to developing countries. The Group reaffirms that international trade is an engine for inclusive economic growth and poverty eradication, and that it contributes to the promotion of sustainable development, structural transformation, and industrialization, particularly in developing countries. The Group stresses that the issues of particular concern to developing countries should be addressed, especially as related to sectors of special interest to them, with a view to enhancing their capacities to finance development and to diversify their economies. The Group highlights the urgent need for support to structural transformation and to enhance productive capacities for building diversified, resilient, and sustainable economies that can generate decent and productive employment and investments in areas such as infrastructure, innovation, technology, and skills development, as well as support for small and medium-sized enterprises. In this line, the Group wishes to highlight the crucial role of small-scale farmers and fishers in eradicate— fighting hunger, reducing rural poverty, and improving global food security, especially when these farmers and fishers are assisted to achieve sustainable agricultural production and use of marine resources. National, regional, and international strategies are needed to promote the inclusive participation Thank you so much.

We now go to the distinguished representative from Guyana.

Madam Moderator, distinguished panelists, I have the honor to deliver this statement on behalf of the 14 member states of the Caribbean Community, CARICOM. Caricom welcomes the convening of this informal interactive dialogue on commodity markets. For our region, the commodity question is not abstract. It is directly linked to food and energy security, fiscal stability, external balances, jobs, and the capacity of small island developing states to finance sustainable development. Caricom countries are affected on both sides of the commodity equation. Some remain exporters of energy, agricultural products, minerals, and other primary goods. At the same time, most are highly dependent on imports of food, fuel, fertilizer, and other essential inputs. This dual exposure means that commodity price volatility can quickly translate into inflationary pressures, higher import bills, fiscal stress, and increased vulnerability for households, especially women, youth, small farmers, fishers, and other persons in vulnerable situations. We therefore underline 3 priorities. First, commodity markets must become more stable, transparent, and responsive to development needs. Timely data, stronger market information systems, and fairer participation in global value chains are essential. We also call for continued support to help developing countries address trade misinvoicing, transfer mispricing, illicit financial flows, and other practices that reduce the development benefits derived from commodity sectors. Second, diversification and value addition must be placed at the center of national, regional, and international policy responses. For CARICOM, this means moving beyond the export of raw or minimally processed goods, strengthening agro-processing and sustainable agriculture, building linkages with tourism and services, promoting renewable energy and energy efficiency, and investing in skills, innovation, logistics, quality infrastructure, and digital technologies. Regional integration must also be leveraged to expand markets, reduce transaction costs, and build resilient supply chains. Third, international cooperation must be scaled up. Commodity-dependent and commodity-importing developing countries require predictable finance, risk-sharing instruments, technology transfer, capacity building, and support for resilient infrastructure. These efforts must be aligned with the Antigua and Barbuda Agenda for SIDS, the SEVIA commitment, the 2030 Agenda, and the need to make the international financial architecture more responsive to vulnerability. Madam Moderator, the energy transition also presents both opportunities and risks. It must not reproduce old patterns in which developing countries export primary resources while value, technology, and decent jobs are captured elsewhere, as was highlighted by some of the panelists. Critical minerals, renewable energy technologies, and emerging supply chains must support equity, local value addition, environmental sustainability, and structural transformation. In closing, CARICOM calls for a development-centered approach to commodity markets. one that reduces volatility, strengthens resilience, supports diversification, and enables developing countries, especially SIDS, to convert their natural resources and productive capacities into inclusive and sustainable development. I thank you.

Thank you so much. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Palau, on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States.

Madam Moderator, I have the honor to deliver the following statement on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States. For Small Island Developing States, commodity market volatility is felt immediately in electricity bills, food prices, transport costs, debt burdens, and fiscal stability. SIDS remain heavily dependent on imported fuel, food, fertilizers, and industrial inputs. As a result, geopolitical instability and global market disruptions are transmitted directly into our economies, often with disproportionate consequences. We saw this clearly during the COVID-19 pandemic. Today, the ongoing instability and conflict in the Middle East is generating renewed uncertainty in global energy markets, shipping routes, and supply chains. For SIDS, Every external shock has the potential to become a domestic crisis. Higher energy prices translate directly into higher electricity costs, transport costs, and food prices. This means fluctuations in global energy markets quickly affect households, tourism operators, shipping, and public finances. Currently in the Pacific, some SIDS have been forced to implement emergency protocols such as rationing, and shortened office hours due to declining fuel reserves and escalating freight surcharges. At the same time, rising fuel import costs and external price pressures have placed additional strain on foreign exchange reserves and fiscal space despite the recovery in tourism revenues. These realities are not new. This is exactly why the Antigua and Barbuda Agenda for SIDS places resilience at the center of the program of action. It recognizes that SIDS face interconnected structural vulnerabilities and calls for stronger energy security, resilient food systems, improved transport connectivity, and greater access to affordable and concessional finance. It also includes concrete deliverables designed to support long-term resilience and structural transformation in SIDS. It also includes concrete deliverables designed to support long-term resilience and structural transformation in SIDS. This includes the SIDS Center of Excellence, including the Island Investment Forum and the Innovation and Technology Mechanism. However, SIDS still face prohibitively high borrowing costs, constrained fiscal space, and financing systems that rely too heavily on income per capita while ignoring vulnerability. For EOSYS, this highlights three key priorities. First, vulnerability must be integrated into global financing and development frameworks. Income alone cannot determine access to support. Second, the energy transition must become a resilience opportunity for SIDS, supported by technology transfer and concessional finance. Third, international cooperation must help strengthen resilient infrastructure, regional transport systems, local food production, and supply chain resilience. In closing, resilience in commodity markets cannot be measured solely by whether global supplies remain stable. It must also be measured by whether vulnerable countries can absorb shocks without losing decades of development progress. I thank you.

Thank you. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the European Union on behalf of the EU and its member states.

Madam President, Excellencies, colleagues, I have the honor to speak on behalf of the European Union and its member states. The candidate countries North Macedonia, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Georgia, as well as San Marino, align themselves with this statement. We meet at a moment of acute strain on global commodity markets. Recent disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz are triggering oil prices to new highs with spillover effects on fertilizers and food prices beyond the Gulf and proximate countries. Recent UNCTAD, FAO, and IFPRI assessments make clear that the heaviest impacts fall fall on import-dependent developing economies, in particular LDCs, where higher fuel and freight costs compound debt distress and erode the gains made on poverty and human development. We urge all involved to fully respect the ceasefire across the region, cease all military operations, and fully ensure freedom of navigation as well as free and safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz in line with international law as reflected in UNCLOS. The food security dimension of the shock deserves particular attention. Energy and freight prices feed directly into fertilizer costs, into the price of staples on local markets, and into import bills of countries that depend on shipping grain and inputs to feed their populations. The result is felt at the household level, in food baskets that buy less, in school feeding programs under pressure, and in the nutrition of children whose families now spend a larger share of their income on smaller shares of essentials. WFP estimates that an additional 45 million people could fall into acute food insecurity in the next months. Hunger and malnutrition are downstream of decisions taken on energy, freight, and fertilizers, and they cannot be separated from the broader commodities agenda. This is not an isolated incident. It is the latest in a sequence of shocks: COVID fallout, Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine, climate-driven crop failures, intensification of conflicts, and the weaponization of trade and critical inputs, and persistent volatility in food and fertilizer markets. Each shock has exposed how few alternatives many countries have when single choke points or suppliers fail. Resilience in commodity markets is no longer a technical question. It has become a development question, a peace and security question, a food security question, and a sustainability question all at once. Madam President, the European Union's response rests on clear conviction: economic security and building partnership reinforce one another. The European Union is acting on its conviction across the board. We are working to diversify our sources of supply and reduce concentration risk in critical inputs. We are accelerating the circular use of materials in our economies, recovering value from waste streams and end-of-life productions. We are investing in innovation and domestic processing capacity and in substitution where it's technically and economically viable, and we are deepening partnerships with resource-rich companies— countries on terms that are mutually beneficial that prioritize local value addition. Each of these strands is designed to make markets more resilient, not more closed. I want to be direct on the international dimension because this is where this body's work matters most. The EU's approach is not and cannot be about retreat. Through Global Gateway, the European Union and its member states are investing alongside partner countries to build local processing capacity and reskilling workforces to adjust and adapt to new technologies and develop the soft and hard infrastructure that allows producing companies— countries to capture more of the value generated by the resources. Strategic partnerships have been concluded concluded with countries across Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, and Indo-Pacific. Fragile countries require particular attention. Many are heavily dependent on humanitarian assistance and need stronger resilience to withstand shocks on their own. The Commission will adopt in the few weeks the Integrated Approach to Fragility accompanying a broader Commission communication on humanitarian assistance. This document will provide a framework to better align humanitarian humanitarian development and peace efforts, ensuring more coherent support to fragile countries. The premise is straightforward: a more diversified and circular global system is one which more countries benefit, not fewer. We also recognize that diversification on its own does not address the underlying vulnerabilities. Furthermore, markets need rules, and rules need to deliver for the most exposed. The EU continues to support international initiatives on responsible sourcing, including its conflict minerals regulation requiring due diligence on tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold imports, and engage constructively with OECD guides— guidance for responsible mineral supply chains. We support stronger international cooperation against trafficking, smuggling, and the criminal networks that thrive when oversight is weakest, particularly in artisanal and small-scale mining contexts where the human cost of poor governance is borne by some of the most vulnerable communities. Madam President, climate, environment, and human rights cannot be treated as a footnote in commodity markets. Mining, processing, and transport carry significant environmental social risks. Recycling and substitution are not sufficient on their own to meet the demand of energy transition, but they are essential to relieve pressure on landscapes, water, biodiversity, and frontline communities. The European Union is committed to ensuring that its commodities policy advances rather than undermines the climate, biodiversity, and human rights agendas which have collectively signed up. The European Union and its member states stand ready to do our part, and we look forward to working with all of you to ensure the commodity markets contribute contributes to peace, sustainable development, food security, and shared prosperity. Thank you.

Thank you. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Bahrain on behalf of a group of member states.

I have the pleasure of making this statement on behalf of a group of countries— the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and my country, the Kingdom of Bahrain. Mr. President, commodity markets are experiencing major changes, unprecedented changes. These dangers include increases in prices as well as geopolitical tensions. This has consequences for the economy and energy, especially when it comes to countries that are commodity exporters. The FAO spoke about prices in April. There was an increase for the third consecutive month due to the situation in the Middle East. Our countries reaffirm that Price stability is a cornerstone of international development and stability. Our countries have always said that the closing of the Strait of Hormuz would lead to an international crisis and would have consequences on maritime transport and international trade, as well as production. This strait is a crucial artery for oil and international trade. The closing of the strait by Iran is a flagrant violation of international law. Our countries reaffirm the importance of keeping maritime routes open in accordance with international law and Security Council resolutions. Especially Resolution 552 and 2817. We must take immediate measures to demine this strait and to avoid imposing rules or fees on ships. This is an international obligation for international stability. And for energy security. This closing has led to losses of 20% of international oil and gas supplies, and this is unprecedented since World War II. This will have impacts at various levels, wide-ranging impacts in the long term. Our countries reaffirm our commitment to the stability of commodities markets as well as energy security. We will work hand in hand with the international community based on dialogue, cooperation, international law in order to protect the global economy, international peace and security. Thank you.

Thank you. An announcement: if it would be possible for the member states to shorten their statements to 2 minutes, You will be cut off after 3 minutes. I would now give the floor to the distinguished representative from France.

Merci, Madame. Thank you, Madam Moderator, panelists, distinguished colleagues. Thank you for this very important debate. The numbers are clear. In April, price— energy price indexes increased by 12% due to the rise in crude energy prices. The prices of fertilizer, metals, especially aluminum, have also steeply risen. The crisis experienced in the Middle East is shaking our markets. The message is clear: we have to immediately open the Strait of Hormuz and respect the rules of navigation. We have been sending this message since the beginning of the conflict, and we are sending it together with our G7 partners who are presiding over the G7 this year. Together with the UK, through the Initiative for Maritime Navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, we're working with countries that are determined to defend international law and global economic stability. This crisis is exposing our vulnerabilities and demonstrates to us our collective dependence on hydrocarbons, which is no longer sustainable. My first point is that we have two main conclusions to draw. First of all, the need to turn away from fossil fuels highlighted in the resolution adopted yesterday, historically, at the General Assembly, led by Vanuatu. Secondly, the importance for every country to move toward energy sovereignty, including through international solidarity, to move away from fossil fuels. That is no longer a climate necessity, but a strategic driver for our economies. This crisis must also lead to strengthening supply chains for other commodities diversifying them to make them safer, more sustainable, and resilient. That's the case for minerals and strategic metals. Concentration of production capacity and processing capacity has led to the siloization of supply chains as a major obstacle. Distinguished panelists, France will continue to support all producer countries that want to carry out local processing for sustainable development. In 2026, G7 is fully committed to this path. Lastly, in conclusion, the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine continues to risk plunging millions into food security crises, and it must end. Unlike what we've heard, this is not an East-West conflict. It's a direct aggression against international security. The instrumentalization of commodities, including agricultural products, is unacceptable here and elsewhere. After the launch of the Farm Initiative in 2022, France announced at the Africa for One Summit last week in Nairobi another fund that will expand or strengthen supply chains and support African production for fertilizer in the long term. Resilience of food systems requires transition toward more sustainable production systems that are less dependent on fossil fuels and that strengthen food sovereignty. Thank you. Thank you.

I would now like to give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

Muy buenos días, Venezuela. A very good morning. Venezuela aligns itself with the statement made by the United States and China On behalf of the G77 and China, commodity markets continue to play a central role in the economic stability of developing countries. Nevertheless, current geopolitical tensions, financial volatility, and logistics disruptions lay bare the persistent structural vulnerabilities that economies dependent on raw materials have. For Venezuela, this debate must not only be focused on managing the volatility of the markets, but also on promoting more resilient development models that are more sovereign and inclusive and able to bring about added value and drive industrialization. With a country with vast energy resources, Venezuela reaffirms the principle of sovereignty of states over their natural resources and the right of each and every nation to define their development policies and to harness their own strategic assets. At the same time, we recognize that exclusive dependence on raw material exports has constituted an historic challenge for our economies. National efforts for economic diversification incorporating the productive apparatus in the broader sense of the term giving special relevance to local and communal production, synergy between production. The goal is not only to increase macro— a positive macroeconomic impact on the medium and long term, but also to achieve immediate effects on the development of indigenous capacities of each community. Even facing unilateral coercive measures that have hampered our productive capacities, Venezuela has managed to implement economic adaptation mechanisms focused on strengthening national production and stimulating development initiatives on a local and regional level. We believe that it's essential to strengthen financing for development, to facilitate technology transfer, to promote more inclusive value chains, and to guarantee an international trade system that is not discriminatory, that enables developing countries to move towards higher levels of industrialization and productive sovereignty. Lastly, Venezuela reiterates its readiness to continue to contribute within the framework of the United Nations to building a balanced international economic order where natural resources are tools for sustainable development and for reducing inequalities. Thank you very much, Madam President.

Thank you. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation.

Distinguished moderator, thank you. Effective functioning of commodity markets is the foundation of the global economic system. It is commodity markets that ensure sustainability of production, trade, and financial processes. Price volatility for commodities in recent years, unfortunately, are caused not so much by usual cycles of supply and demand as by unprecedented pressure, including illicit unilateral coercive measures, politicization of rules of trade, leading to the fragmentation of supply chains, as was mentioned by our speakers today, as well as efforts to force an energy transition without taking into account the realities of developing economies. Neither can geopolitical factors be ignored, also mentioned by the panel. Let's be frank, the current crisis is caused first and foremost by the military actions unleashed by the US and Israel against Iran. It's important to keep in mind that the escalation of violence in the Middle East has exacerbated the situation caused by an entire series of previous to stabilizing measures, as I already mentioned, including unilateral sanctions, as well as the imposition of price ceilings for oil, terror attacks and sabotage of critically important trans— cross-border energy infrastructure, pirate-like attacks on trade ships, on commercial ships, violating the principles of freedom of navigation. Some have noted today that certain delegations are concerned about the fate of navigation. Only in the Strait of Hormuz. But the combination of all of these factors are not an accidental confluence of circumstances, but are political decisions and actions which we're now dealing with in the world, and they have been taken by the Western countries who lost in fair competition. This situation disproportionately affects the commodity-importing countries, mainly developing economies, We're especially concerned about the situation with global— on the global food market, a rise in energy prices that directly increases the cost of agricultural production, fertilizer, and transport, which once again is most keenly felt in the Global South. The Russian Federation, as a responsible and reliable supplier of commodities and energy, minerals, and agricultural products in particular, The WTO continues to advocate against politicizing the economy and for the stability of commodity markets based upon a fair balance of the interests of both exporters and importers. Unfortunately, we note that the politicization we're talking about today continues to take place, but the trend of global trade and markets will not stop. Thank you.

Thank you. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico.

Muchas gracias. Thank you very much, Madam Moderator. Mexico thanks you for convening this timely and relevant dialogue that allows us to exchange perspectives on the challenges and opportunities that commodity markets face in the current international context. For Mexico, global energy markets as well as mineral and agricultural markets are going through a step of increasing volatility and interdependence. Today, an energy shock is quickly spreading to fertilizers, food, and logistics change— chains, increasing the impacts on inflation, food security, and macroeconomic stability. The recent conflict in the Gulf laid bare this fragility, affecting strategic routes where a significant share of global trade in oil and fertilizers travel through. Geopolitical and trade dynamics are increasing systemic risks. Export restrictions, concentration of providers, and the vulnerability of global supply chains are bringing about enhanced pressure on developing countries dependent on strategic imports, particularly energy, fertilizer, and foods. What's more, increases in energy prices are generating global inflationary, inflationary pressure, reducing the purchasing power of households, and can slow down economic growth. Against this backdrop, for Mexico, it's a priority to strengthen the resilience of markets by taking concrete actions. First, by advancing in the diversification of providers, trade routes, and regional supply chains. Second, strengthening national and regional capacities for the production of strategic inputs, including fertilizers. And thirdly, by driving investment in sustainable and climate-resilient agriculture, as well as in infrastructure and strategic stockpiling. Energy transition will also profoundly transform our markets over the next decade. Growing demand for critical minerals, green technology, and renewable energy represent an important opportunity to promote industrialization, innovation, and added value in developing countries. However, this transition must be fair, orderly, and inclusive, avoiding new dependencies and guaranteeing access to finance and technology transfer. Finally, FOMEXICO is fundamental to strengthen international cooperation and to avoid trade restrictive measures that entrench vulnerability and affect global food security. Stability in commodity markets is essential in order to advance with sustainable, inclusive, and resilient development. Thank you very much.

Thank you. I now give the floor to this— to the distinguished representative of Belarus, and that That will be the final speaker for the moment. We will take care of the rest of the delegations after the second panel. You will then have an opportunity to speak.

Thank you, Madam Moderator. Belarus agrees with views about the importance of ensuring the smooth functioning of commodities markets. According to UNCTAD, Commodity dependence affects two-thirds of developing countries, which critically limits their economic sustainability, making their economies vulnerable to shocks on external markets and price volatility. Unilateral trade restrictions on commodity goods such as fertilizer only exacerbate the situation, leading to price surges and destroying hard-won socioeconomic progress in the most vulnerable regions. Collateral damage caused by economic, financial, and trade sanctions lead to disruption of regional and global supply chains, and thus spillover outside of the states that are targeted by these sanctions. Under these circumstances, sustainable development of states is best ensured through integration into the global economic space through external economic diversification, especially through expanding trade categories and the geography of exports and imports of commodities from various sources. The external economic strategy of Belarus has long consisted of multivector diversification. This manifests as a policy focus on economic security and reduced dependency on any one market through the development of partnerships and balanced relations with various other states. This approach allows Belarus as an export-oriented country to maintain the sustainability of its economy despite external challenges. The effectiveness— the issue of diversification requires major government efforts. So Belarusian producers are focused not only on increasing the quantity but also the quality of their production, expanding the range of products provided, updating production lines, introducing new technologies, and importantly, adapting production to specific needs of importing regions. In addition, we are convinced that a major factor in reducing the vulnerability of states to changes in the global trade market is diversification of export markets through deepening regional integration. Which for us has been proven through the experience of economic integration as part of the Eurasian Economic Union. In closing, I'd like to emphasize that under the current conditions of global turbulence and uncertainty, when markets are closing and sanctions are being imposed, as well as trade barriers, diversification is a key instrument for strategic autonomy and economic sustainability in states. Thank you.

In fact, we will have one more representative from the United States Council on International Business, and then we will move to panel 2. Thank you, Madam Moderator, and distinguished colleagues. I'm speaking today on behalf of the United States Council for International Business, representing over 300 Fortune 500 companies from all sectors operating throughout the world. As this dialogue correctly notes, commodity dependence and import vulnerability leave many developing economies highly exposed to price volatility and structural shocks. Demand for critical energy and mineral inputs is rising sharply, yet supply chains remain highly concentrated, capital-intensive, and increasingly exposed to artificial friction. Consider the market distortions: export restrictions on industrial raw materials, have increased more than fivefold since 2009, with a sharp acceleration since 2023. Furthermore, waste and scrap, the very feedstock of circularity and secondary supply, have become some of the most restricted categories in international trade. These protectionist trends make supply diversification, market stability, and investment more difficult at the precise moment we need greater scale, speed, and resilience. But business is not coming to the table empty-handed. Our members bring real solutions, technologies, and innovations to these challenges, and we are eager to partner with governments to help solve them together. To mitigate these risks and secure macroeconomic stability, USCIB urges the UN and member states to focus on 4 immediate avenues. First, enable open market access. We need stronger transparency around trade measures, a serious response to non-market practices, and predictable rules-based trade that allows realistic diversification across global value chains. Secondly, unlock capital for long-lead projects. Capital-intensive mining and processing projects routinely take 10 to 15 years from discovery to production. They can't move forward without time-bound permitting, strong investment protections, and coordinated international financing instruments. Third, unblock the circular economy. Secondary materials are integral to resilient supply. We must address inconsistent classifications and digital barriers that are currently stranding low-risk, high-value recyclable materials at borders. And last, streamline and make interoperable responsible business conduct which is non-negotiable, and due diligence frameworks so that high standards support, not stall, investment and participation by firms of all sizes in the global value chains. No single country has every material it needs, and no government can build resilient supply chains alone. True market stability requires robust partnerships between industry and governments across the entire value chain. Global Business stands ready to partner with you to translate this cooperation into into action. Thank you. Thank you. Um, we understand that the timer was cut off for Uruguay. On behalf of the Group of 77 and China, so if you'd like to complete your statement, please do so now.

Thank you, Mrs. Moderator. I then will finish the intervention. I was finishing the intervention. In this line, the group wishes to highlight the crucial role of small-scale farmers and fishers in eradicating hunger, reducing rural poverty, and improving global food security, especially when these farmers and fishers are assisted to achieve sustainable agricultural production and use of marine resources. National, regional, and international strategies are needed to promote inclusive participation of farmers and fishers, especially smallholder farmers including women in community, national, regional, and international markets. The Group expresses a determination to break away from commodity dependence by adding value to our commodities and strengthening our national productive capacities with a view to achieving structural transformation and economic diversification. The Group reiterates that developing countries, including African countries, the least developed countries, landlocked developing countries, small island developing states, and middle-income countries with limited productive capacities and trade infrastructures continue to face challenges in integrating into regional and global value chains. Finally, the Group remains concerned about the persistent vulnerabilities faced by developing countries due to commodity dependence, which hinders economic resilience, weakens fiscal stability, delays structural transformation, and exposes them to price volatility and external shocks. The Group invites countries to increase voluntary contributions to the Common Fund for Commodities to enable the Fund to scale up support to developing countries, especially least developed countries, for projects that promote value addition particularly in agriculture and to expand into processing and manufacturing. In this regard, its creation remains one of the most enduring institutional achievements of the G77, translating South-South solidarity into practical instruments for value addition, diversification, and sustainable livelihoods in commodity-dependent developing countries. I thank you. Thank you.

I'd like to thank our first panel of guests and welcome the second panel to the podium. Thank you. Our second panel is on strategies for economic and export diversification and value addition for sustainable development. I'd like to introduce our panelists: Miss Erika Westenberg from the Natural Resource Governance Institute, Mr. Peter Nielsen from the Common Fund for Commodities, and Ms. Zainab Usman from the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University. The session will focus on policy experiences and lessons learned in promoting economic diversification and value addition, particularly in commodity-dependent developing countries. I will ask the panelists a question, and after that, we would also encourage in which we will hear from the delegates that we had not heard from in the last session. To start, Ms. Westenberg, I would like to ask you, many countries see critical energy transition minerals as an opportunity for diversification, downstream processing, and value addition, but governance challenges remain significant and successful implementation is limited. What approaches and policies should countries pursue to enhance domestic benefits?

Thanks very much for the question, and many thanks to the President of the General Assembly and to the member states for the opportunity to contribute to this important discussion. The organization I represent, the Natural Resource Governance Institute, is a global independent nonprofit organization that works with governments, civil society, and other stakeholders to strengthen governance systems and ensure that natural resources contribute to sustainable and equitable development. And one of the main issues we work on is mineral sector governance. Against the backdrop of increasing geopolitical competition around minerals for the energy transition, but also increasingly for AI data processing and defense applications, we've analyzed producer country strategies for mineral value addition to identify what has worked and what hasn't. And our analysis has revealed 4 steps that are key to advancing viable, well-governed, uh, value addition strategies that, uh, benefit all parties. First, governments should clearly define the strategic objectives that they are aiming for, and these objectives need to be specific to the differences between individual minerals and stages of the value chain and based on national development plans, economic feasibility assessments, market outlooks, and rigorous cost-benefit analysis. Establishing such targeted strategies requires a toolkit that includes the type of diversification mapping being done by UNCTAD, as well as project-level feasibility assessments and cost-benefit analysis to assess the trade-off of potential policy measures. That cost-benefit point brings me to our second recommendation, which is that governments should place the principles of accounting for and managing environmental and social impacts and seeking equitable distribution of benefits, including for marginalized and vulnerable populations, at the core of their value addition strategies. Sometimes the cost of socio-environmental impacts and imbalanced benefits can actually outweigh the upfront economic gains. For example, an external study of nickel smelting operations in an emerging market producer country found that smelting growth in 3 regions would have a positive economic impact in the first few years, but within 10 years, the industry's impact on the environment and public health would actually begin to negatively affect the region's overall economic output. So lessons like these really underscore the importance of comprehensive cost-benefit assessments. A third priority is that governments and companies should address corruption risk unique to the midstream. NRGI research on corruption in value addition projects across 15 countries has shown how corruption can make mineral supply chains less reliable and delay mining projects, sometimes by years or even decades. Yet corruption risks are often missing from value addition policy debates and strategies. So So we recommend implementing risk-based integrity measures targeted at key vulnerabilities around policy capture, licensing and permitting, financial incentives, and infrastructure development. And last but certainly not least, governments should ensure a transparent approach involving citizens, rights holders, and impacted stakeholders at every step of the chain to build trust. I'd also flag that it's important that countries consider other strategies beyond value addition to benefit for minerals, whether that's mining services, local suppliers, robust systems to tax mining and use the resulting revenues, and of course regional cooperations. In the UN context, NRGI was honored to have participated in the Secretary-General's panel on critical energy transition minerals. The principles and actionable recommendations developed by the panel represent an important consensus around a new paradigm for equitable mineral development. Just last week at the Africa Forward Summit in Nairobi, the Secretary-General highlighted the panel's recommendations on fair value chains, in-country processing, transparency, environmental and human rights standards, and meaningful benefits to affected communities, summing it up with a clear directive: no more exploitation, no more plundering. Mobilizing political will, action, and resources around this new paradigm are now the urgent next steps. We welcome the UN Task Force on Critical Energy Transition Minerals that was announced at the end of last year, which is already starting to play an important coordination and consultation role, and we're pleased to be contributing to these efforts along with civil society organizations and non-state actors. On issues of diversification and value addition, the task force has a key role to play in terms of developing this comprehensive toolkit to support strategic decisions in countries. On transparency, traceability, and accountability, the task force should set high bars and bring clarity to a fragmented standards landscape. And the task force is also well placed to convene member states around setting equitable targets for material efficiency and circularity. Beyond the UN, the G7 coming up next month and minerals being at the center of many policy discussions really means that the next few weeks could be a major test of the direction of travel for international mining partnerships and policies. And we welcome the intervention from the distinguished representative from France reaffirming G7 commitment to advance local value addition in developing producer countries. At NRGI, movements in the right direction that we're hoping to see in this critical timeframe are first that producer countries are full participants in shaping plurilateral trade agreements, traceability mechanisms, and standards-based markets, whether as part of the G7, G20, or other frameworks. We also think both producer and consumer countries should avoid the risks and instability associated with using minerals as short-term transactional tools. For example, when access to minerals is bargained in exchange for health resources or security support. We think balanced and fair partnerships should deliver technical and financial support for independent evidence-based mineral-specific strategies, as well as greater investments in producer country regulatory capacity and maintaining strong transparency, accountability, and oversight standards will be key too, like maintaining robust EPIC policies and environmental assessments despite pressure to fast-track permitting. At a regional level, mineral partnerships and trade mechanisms should avoid producing countries in— forcing producer countries into fragmented deal-making, instead supporting regional integration of mineral value chains. In sum, the goal is to ground mineral partnerships in equity to advance a just energy transition, to build diversified stable supply chains and to deliver sustainable development for all. Thank you.

I'd now like to ask Mr. Peter Nielsen, based on the Common Fund for Commodities experience, where do you see the greatest missed opportunities for value addition in commodity-dependent economies? And how can commodity-based development strategies be made more resilient and countercyclical in the face of of commodity price volatility? Thank you.

Thank you for the question. Thank you for the invitation. Also, a special thank you to the delegate from Uruguay who so eloquently already expressed some of the major concerns that we seek to address through our work within the Common Fund for Commodities. Some of these are very well known. They've been discussed for decades, decades—issues of increased value addition through processing, appropriate infrastructure, quality, finance, market access, etc. Rather than delving deeper into this topic right now, I'd rather want to pick up on a topic that has not yet been discussed in full detail. It was somewhat hinted at by Franz, and it was framed very well by the resolution passed yesterday reaffirming the commitment of all member states to act for climate action. Specifically, I want to address the issue and the opportunities posed by the concept of nature-based solutions that can be implemented alongside commodity production, especially within agricultural economies. By nature-based solutions, I talk about positive environmental outcomes implemented or produced through specific land uses or land use changes. Some of them are well known: conservation, forest conservation, afforestation, but also within more productive commodity activities such as agriculture, forestry, etc., there are regenerative and sustainable land use practices that can generate positive environmental outcomes that in this day and age facing climate crisis, biodiversity crisis, etc., take on an increased value. And we now stand at a particular point in time where technology is also becoming so ripe that these positive outcomes can be more thoroughly vetted, verified, documented, and in many cases now marketed also. This results in, for commodity-producing countries and specifically agricultural countries, an income increase and an income diversification opportunity. These nature-based solutions, these products, are products that can be marketed and sold in addition to existing agricultural products, and with prices that are largely delinked from those of agricultural products. So there is both an opportunity to grow and diversify and make more resilient economies. Within our own portfolio of projects that we've been implementing over the course of the last few years— and I'll try to keep it short here— most recently, we launched a project within the DRC, Under the umbrella of the Central African Forest Initiative, we'll be working with 4,000 smallholders to implement agroforestry for fuelwood production as well as staple crop production. These smallholders, through this intervention, will receive in-kind and cash contributions from donor states up to $300 per year. That's about half of the local GDP per capita, so quite significant, and that's as a reward through verified positive outcomes, environmental outcomes. In Peru, we're working with local implementing organizations to outfit communities, rural communities, forest-dwelling communities with the capacity to implement non-timber forest product projects that will result in the generation of carbon credits that can be marketed alongside coffee produced by the same communities. Generating incomes for each community member in the range of about $1,000 per year, also quite significant within this economy. Now, so I'll try to conclude and provide a couple of policy recommendations in the interest of time. Nature-based solutions are no panacea. They're not going to solve the issue of commodity dependence or get countries out of the trap, but they will provide tangible tangible effects on the ground. They will provide income opportunities, in particular for smallholders, and as such, they merit the scrutiny of the member states in this regard. At the same time, they will provide part of the solution for global climate and biodiversity changes— crises, sorry. In terms of the economic potential, difficult to assess. But member states have committed hundreds of billions to combating climate change per year. There are also similar amounts gonna be needed for combating biodiversity crisis. Within the private sphere, voluntary carbon markets are now growing at a pace that will probably see them take over the global exports of raw cocoa beans within the next 5 to 10 years. Quite significant amounts, and as such, they merit scrutiny. We need exporting countries to put in place infrastructure to allow for the production and verification of these nature-based solutions that include both the regulatory and legal frameworks, as well as supporting local tech businesses that can help in the verification. This is already a multimillion-dollar industry,, but it's largely overseen by commodity importing countries. That's a potential for the exporters as well, in addition to the production of the solutions. For the importing countries, growing markets, sending market signals, putting in place regulation, putting in place disclosure requirements and traceability systems, promoting these that allow for consumers to make informed choices that promote also the adaptation of nature-based solutions and the marketing of them towards the provide significant opportunities. Then for industry or players like ourselves, development finance institutions and businesses, we have a responsibility to pilot these initiatives such as we already do and to scale them up when we see them working. This requires coordination and it requires funding, but it's a significant opportunity and it should be considered alongside all of these other opportunities that are facing commodity-dependent developing countries. As it will address both income resilience and the crises posed by climate change and biodiversity loss at the same time. Thank you.

Thank you so much. I'd now like to turn to Ms. Ousmane with a question about what is fundamentally different about today's commodity markets compared with previous cycles. For decades, many resource-rich countries in the Global South struggled to use commodity booms to diversify and transform their economies. Does the current era marked by geographic— geo-economic fragmentation, industrial policy, and the scramble for critical minerals create a genuinely new set of opportunities and risks?

Good day, good afternoon, all protocols Very grateful to the President of the General Assembly for the invitation to address this important topic and very grateful to the member states as well for this opportunity. The aspiration by low and middle income countries to harness their natural resources to diversify to diversify and transform their economies is not a new one. Every commodity boom happens in a specific global economic context which creates distinct opportunities and unique risks. This time around, the global economy is characterized by geoeconomic fragmentation, the pursuit of industrial policy to secure supply chains for critical commodities, and the realization and emphasis by governments of resource-rich countries to build broader economic linkages. And I want to go through this— these three dynamics individually. Starting with geoeconomic fragmentation, the global economy is indeed in some ways becoming more fragmented. There are trade tensions, among various countries, high-income countries, and also between high-income countries and low- and middle-income countries, with resulting impacts of rising trade barriers which are taking the form of import tariffs and levies, sourcing restrictions, as well as the rollback of preferential trade programs such as the Generalized System of Preferences, which historically gave low- and middle-income countries' access to export markets, which we know is quite vital for industrialization. Consequently, access to export markets for processed and refined minerals, resources and derivatives, as well as manufactured components of renewable energy or electric mobility or even digital technologies are becoming difficult for many low and middle-income countries. Still, there is regional integration happening across Africa, across Asia, across Latin America, with large regional trade agreements such as the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, which is the largest free trade area by number of participating countries, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which is the largest free trade area by market size, among several others. These are just specific examples. These increasingly large regional trading areas hold potential promise as destination markets for resource-rich countries with industrialization ambitions. Now, the second dynamic in the global economy today is that industrial policy is increasingly becoming salient as a means and as a mechanism for securing mineral and energy supply chains, and indeed the supply chains for critical commodities. Many countries around the world are now pursuing industrial policies to secure these supply chains. In addition to tariffs, countries are rolling out— particularly wealthy countries are rolling out general subsidies and tax incentives to exclusively support their domestic firms along the minerals and energy value chains, whereas low-income countries, middle-income countries, which often do not have this kind of, you know, the resources to provide such generous subsidies, often resort to export restrictions to ensure that or to try to convince investors to add value to minerals and commodities before exports. Overall, the global policy discourse has rapidly shifted shifted in the last couple of years towards an acceptance of a more interventionist role for the state in markets through the deployment of industrial policy, and in fact commodities, particularly critical minerals industries, are an important arena in which we are seeing new forms of interventionist policies and industrial policies being rolled out and being tested. And then the final element about the global economy today is that there's there's a growing realization by a variety of low and middle-income countries on the necessity and indeed the imperative of building economic linkages between their resource sectors and the rest of the economy, whether these linkages are forward linkages in which their mineral endowments provide inputs to other industries such as renewable energy industries, electric mobility, electric vehicles, batteries, storage, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and advanced manufacturing, or whether these are backward linkages that source input from other domestic industries such as chemicals, financial services, human resources, etc. Across the board, governments in low and middle-income countries are now putting out bold minerals and commodity strategies that include plans for beneficiation, whether it's building refineries, setting up processing facilities, setting up factories, they make it very clear that they no longer want to be relegated to reprising their roles of decades past as being suppliers of unprocessed commodities to be used as input in advanced manufacturing elsewhere. Now, thinking about what can be done to ensure that low- and middle-income countries in particular, but more broadly, countries around the world do not remain trapped in commodity dependence. Obviously, there's significant heterogeneity among resource-rich countries, and therefore the specific solutions that would work for countries in different parts of the world, whether in Africa or Europe or Asia or Latin America or North America, would need to be context-specific. Having said that, there is a broad set of principles that need to be considered at national regional, and also at global levels. Now, at the national level, strategies to pursue resource-based industrialization need to take a holistic approach rather than siloed sector-specific initiatives in the following ways. These strategies need to be based on actual demand signals from a clearly identifiable market to avoid commercially unviable, wasteful, and white elephant projects which really characterized many of the industrialization approaches and strategies of the mid-20th century. There also needs to be a systematic approach to going up the value chain. Countries can start with areas where they have a clear comparative advantage, for example, building a processing facility or refining capabilities in a specific commodity where they can exercise market power, starting with that and then gradually planning to build capabilities and segments with increasing complexity to then go ahead to defy their comparative advantage. And then countries need to adopt an integrated approach to policymaking that takes into account the complementarity of trade policies to ensure that they continue to have access to export markets, investment promotion policies to attract private investments in specific segments of the resource value chain and indeed expand industrial activity, private sector development policies to support and develop domestic private firms and investors to increase their productivity and to position these domestic firms to better be able to enter into joint venture partnerships with foreign investors, which is how empirically and historically technology transfer tends to happen. And then finally, complementarity with foreign policies to ensure that countries are negotiating productive and dynamic relationships with external powers for partnerships that are mutually beneficial rather than asymmetric. A second set of policies needs to be at the regional level, so there needs to be transnational coordination of resource-based industrialization efforts at a regional level, primarily for countries to be able to benefit from economies of scale. And let me explain a little bit here. In the African continent, for example, only 11 out of the 54 countries have a population of more than 40 million people. Many others, most of the others have small— smaller populations translating into smaller markets, About 22 of these countries are low income. There's a small skilled labor supply, and populations often tend to be highly dispersed in, for example, the Sahel in Southern Africa, which are some of the resource-rich regions on the continent. Therefore, efforts to capture the midstream segment of the mining value chain or resource value chain and develop capabilities in downstream segments of component manufacturing in Africa in these subregions that I mentioned may require regional coordination through resource transport corridors, shared infrastructure, transnational skills-building programs, etc. In South Asia and Southeast Asia too, where there's some coordination already happening, but more needs to be done, especially around labor market and migration policies. Another element of Regional coordination has to do with updating geological mapping and surveys in resource-rich regions of the world, where in some cases their geological maps are really outdated, you know, they date back to sometimes decades ago, as well as a harmonization of this geological data across different countries, because we often hear from investors that the geological data is often, you know, fragmented fragmented and not well harmonized. And then finally, with uncertainties in the global trading environment and the increasing preponderance of asymmetrical mineral trading agreements that are coming up right now, low and middle-income countries may need to consider negotiating these minerals deals as a collective rather than as individual countries. This is what would help increase their bargaining power with respect to large countries and high-income countries, whether through the framework of the AFCFTA, Africa Continental Free Trade Area in Africa, ASEAN in Southeast Asia, Mercosur in Latin America, or CARICOM in the Caribbean, resource-rich countries would need to increasingly think about working together to negotiate these new minerals trade deals that are becoming a phenomenon. And then the final set of Solutions need to be thought about, considered, implemented, designed at the global level, and they should involve the following stakeholders. The first set of stakeholders are multilateral organizations such as the UN system, the multilateral development banks, and the development financial institutions, which all, with all due respect, would need to overcome the paralysis of analysis sometimes that tends to kind of take a hold of these institutions to be able to offer timely solutions and support for the economic diversification and industrialization ambitions of low and middle income countries. This timely support can include technical assistance on geological surveys and mapping, conducting project preparation and feasibility studies to identify bankable projects, associated with building refineries, processing facilities, and factories, and coordination around stopping illicit financial flows associated with leakages of resource revenues, and global governance around resources that take into account new opportunities and challenges of resource-based industrialization. Another set of global actors are corporate philanthropies that are increasingly becoming important providers of development finance and development assistance, particularly in energy-related sectors. In the year 2023, according to the OECD DAC database, these philanthropies provided up to $11 billion of assistance. So they are important actors, but they also need to go beyond promoting the adoption and uptake of green and clean technologies, whether renewable energy technologies or others, and think about investing in developing the value chain, various value chain segments in low- and middle-income countries. And then the final set of actors are— is really the private sector, the private sector in high-income and wealthy countries and jurisdictions, that they also need to lend their voices to make the case for making— to ensuring that trade remains free and open. Thank you very much.

Thank you. I open the floor for comments and statements. I would like to remind delegations that there is no established list of speakers for this meeting. Delegations wishing to speak are requested to press the microphone button. Delegations are requested to limit their statements to 3 minutes when speaking— or 2 minutes when speaking in their national capacity, and the microphone cutoff will be at 3 minutes. Time limits will be strictly enforced through an automatic microphone cutoff. A timer will be projected on screen. Delegations may also submit their full-length written statements through email to estatements@un.org which will be posted under e-statements of the United Nations Journal. I thank you for your cooperation. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative from Malaysia.

Thank you, Madam Moderator, and the panelists for their valuable sharing. Malaysia aligns itself with the statement by the Group of 77 and China in the earlier panel and will deliver the following remark in its national capacity. As a developing country that is both a commodity exporter and importer, Malaysia recognizes the opportunities and vulnerabilities arising from evolving global commodity trends. Commodities such as palm oil, rubber, petroleum, electrical and electronic products remain important contributors to our economy, employment, and export revenues. At the same time, we remain exposed to external shocks, supply chain disruptions, and price volatility in food, energy, and critical industrial inputs. Malaysia believes that commodity dependence should not be viewed solely as a vulnerability, but also as an opportunity for structural transformation. Greater emphasis must therefore be placed on value addition, downstream industries, technology transfer, and sustainable industrialization. Developing countries should not remain at the lower end of global value chains. In this regard, the international community must support developing countries through enhanced access to financing, capacity building, and fair market access. Discriminatory measures that undermine developing countries' commodity sectors should be avoided, particularly where sustainability standards become barriers to trade. Malaysia also underscores the importance of ensuring that the global energy transition is just, orderly, and inclusive. The growing demand for critical minerals and green technologies must create shared prosperity and support sustainable development for producing countries while taking into account national circumstances and development priorities. Finally, stronger multilateral cooperation is essential to improve market transparency, strengthen supply chain resilience, and address excessive commodity price volatility that disproportionately affects developing economies. Malaysia therefore remains committed to fostering international cooperation towards a more stable and sustainable commodity ecosystem. I thank you.

Thank you. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative from Indonesia.

Thank you, Madam Moderator, and also thank you to the panelists for the valuable insights. Indonesia aligns itself with the intervention by Uruguay on behalf of the Group of 77 and China. We see commodity markets are central to macroeconomic stability, food and energy security, and structural transformation. Yet today, they are also becoming a channel through which global shocks are transmitted more rapidly to developing countries. Recent volatility is deeply concerning. Overall commodity prices are projected to rise by 16% in 2026, with energy prices increasing by 24% and fertilizer prices by 31%. These trends risk worsening inflationary pressures, raising production costs, weakening food security, and narrowing fiscal space, particularly for developing countries. For Indonesia, this outlook highlights the vulnerability vulnerability of commodity-dependent economies to price volatility, supply disruptions, and external shocks. It reinforces the need to build resilience not only through trade but also through structural transformation, value addition, and stronger domestic productive capacity. Madam Moderator, in this regard, Indonesia continues to reduce excessive reliance on raw commodity exports by expanding domestic processing capacity and strengthening higher value production. Through downstreaming, Indonesia seeks to develop nickel, bauxite, copper, tin, palm oil, and other strategic commodities into higher-value products, including batteries, refined metals, bioenergy, and agro-industrial products. The objective is not merely to increase export value, but to raise productivity, create decent jobs, strengthen domestic supply chain, and support a just and inclusive energy transition. Indonesia's biodiesel program, This program also demonstrates how community policy can contribute to resilience by reducing reliance on imported diesel, increasing domestic value addition, supporting farmers and industry, and contributing to emissions reduction. In conclusion, commodities must become engines of transformation, not sources of vulnerability. International cooperation and the UN system are therefore essential to improve market transparency and early warning, mobilize accessible and affordable finance, enable technology transfer and skills development, and ensure fair, predictable, and non-discriminatory trade. I thank you.

Thank you. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Bangladesh.

Thank you, Madam Moderator. We welcome the convening of this timely discussion and thank the speakers for their insightful deliberations. We align ourselves with the statement delivered by Uruge on behalf of the G77 and China in the RDR panel. Commodity markets are critical to sustainable development prospects. They affect the daily lives of millions and are linked to socioeconomic stability in the developing world. While climate change is already causing increased uncertainty for producers in our countries, ongoing disruptions in energy supply is creating shortage of fertilizers and increased transportation costs. These push up prices, place stress on valuable foreign exchange, and add to inflation. All these in turn constrain the fiscal space available for social protection and other development priorities. We fully share the keynote speaker's important reminder that for food security, market forces alone cannot be relied on. Indeed, achieving this requires sound public policy, predictable supply arrangements, and robust international cooperation working together and in coherence. Domestically, with limited means, the Government of Bangladesh is placing emphasis on supporting farmers, including through initiatives such as Farmers' Card, in order to improve farmers' access to inputs and markets and to expand agro-processing. Predictability of commodity flows is crucial. Sudden disruption in cross-border essential commodity supply creates uncertainty, and weaken food security in importing developing countries. This underscores the need for preserving confidence in cross-border trade and equitable burden sharing on all sides. Value chain inequality in global commodity markets is another critical concern. Smallholders, including women farmers, in commodity-exporting developing countries often receive only a limited share of the final value generated. The CFC emphasized that Stronger support for smallholders and SMEs can help them participate more effectively in value chains and retain more value from their work. Let me conclude by reiterating our call for stronger international cooperation to help developing countries strengthen productive capacities and participate more fairly in global value chains, including in food, raw materials, critical minerals, and other strategic commodities. Commodities ecosystem must become more transparent, predictable, equitable, and supportive to sustainable development.

I thank you. Thank you. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Palau, who is speaking on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States.

Madam Moderator, I have the honor to deliver the following statement on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States. For SIDS, diversification is not optional. It is essential for resilience, stability, and sustainable development. As indicated earlier, when energy prices rise, SIDS face higher food costs, more expensive transportation, inflationary pressures, and shrinking fiscal space. Tourism-dependent economies also face rising aviation and logistics costs that directly affect growth, employment, and foreign exchange earnings. These shocks are no longer isolated events. They are becoming persistent features of the global economy. For SIDS, it is clear that resilience to these shocks requires economies that are broader, more competitive, more innovative, and less exposed to external volatility. It is for this reason that the Antigua and Barbuda Agenda for SIDS places economic diversification, productive capacity, digital transformation, resilience building, and finance at the center of our collective ambition towards resilient prosperity. The ABAS recognizes the importance of technology transfer, digital connectivity, renewable energy, resilient infrastructure, and ocean-based economies in supporting long-term structural transformation. Across AOSIS members, important progress is already underway. The blue economy is supporting sustainable fisheries and marine industries while creating innovative financing opportunities through blue bonds. Digital services are helping to diversify export earnings and employment opportunities. The Abbas also includes important deliverables such as the SIDS Debt Sustainability Support Service and the SIDS Center of Excellence, which can help our countries access the tools, expertise, and financing needed for sustainable transformation. However, SIDS continue to face structural barriers, including small markets, geographic isolation, climate vulnerability, high costs, and limited fiscal space. That is why international cooperation remains essential. Development finance must become more accessible and responsive to vulnerability. Technology transfer and digital infrastructure must be expanded, and SIDS must be supported to move up value chains rather than remain at the lowest end of the global production systems. For SIDS, diversification must also be sustainable. Economic transformation should reduce exposure to external shocks and climate risks, not deepen them. AOSIS therefore calls for the full and effective implementation of the Antigua and Barbuda Agenda for SIDS and stronger international partnerships that support resilient and sustainable economic transformation. I thank you.

Thank you. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Arab Emirates.

Thank you, Madam President. The United Arab Emirates welcomes this timely discussion on global commodities and their implications for international economic stability and sustainable development. At the outset, the United Arab Emirates aligns itself with the statement delivered by Uruguay and the Kingdom of Bahrain and wishes to add the following remarks in its national capacity. Today's commodity markets are facing unprecedented pressures driven by geopolitical tensions, supply chain disruptions, inflationary trends, and accelerating impacts of climate change. These developments only underscore the interconnected nature of energy security, food security, and global economic resilience. With this disproportionate consequences for developing countries and their populations. In our region, Iran's unlawful actions and threats, including aimed at closing the Strait of Hormuz, demonstrate how quickly such egregious behavior can generate global economic consequences. As one of the world's most strategic maritime corridors, the Strait remains essential for the flows of energy supplies as well as for the movement of critical commodities, including agricultural inputs that are indispensable to global food security and agricultural production. Iran's unlawful closure of the strait in violation of international law, particularly the right to lawful transit passage, has resulted in increased transportation and insurance costs, strained supply chains, and contributed to heightened commodity price— volatility. Nutrient fertilizer prices in particular have risen sharply, surging by as much as 80%, placing additional pressure on food systems and exacerbating challenges faced by countries already confronting food insecurity. It's our collective responsibility to safeguard the stability of global economy, and we must work together to find innovative ways to drive diversification and enhance our resilience. International waterways that support the global economy cannot be held hostage by one state. The UAE therefore stresses the importance of safeguarding maritime security, ensuring freedom of navigation, and maintaining open, predictable, and resilient supply chains in accordance with international law and relevant security Council resolutions. We also underscore the need for enhanced international cooperation to support developing countries in managing crisis shocks, strengthening resilience, and advancing sustainable and inclusive development and evolving global market conditions. Thank you.

Thank you. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative from Paraguay.

Thank you very much, Madam Moderator. In Paraguay, agriculture and its value chain represent a fifth of GDP and 74% of total exports. This is why it's particularly important for our country to promote diversification and adding value in countries that are dependent on commodities, particularly for countries, um, developing landlocked countries like mine, whose integration into global markets depends on predictable, fair, and open trade conditions. Nevertheless, for countries like Paraguay, diversification and adding value cannot be discussed separately from market access conditions. For many sectors, exporting processed products remains considerably more difficult than exporting raw materials due to unfavorable market access conditions. Tariff peaks, tariff escalation, and non-ad valorem tariffs continue to discourage industrialization and adding value on a national level for developing countries. In agriculture in particular, tariff escalation remains one of the clearest examples of how current trade conditions can continue to restrict developing countries to productive sectors with less added value. And the persistence of— persistence, rather, of non-ad valorem tariffs, as well as tariff rate quotas with prohibitive out-of-quota duties and other distortive measures, severely restrict diversification opportunities for agricultural exporters. What's more, Market access conditions are being worsened by a proliferation of non-tariff barriers, some of which with supposed environmental goals behind them that pose clear negative impacts on trade. Sustainable production efforts undertaken by developing countries must be recognized and supported, not undermined by means that run the risk of excluding competitive producers from high-value markets with clearly negative impacts not only for development but also on sustainability. For these reasons, Paraguay believes that if we really want to support diversification, structural transformation, and sustainable development, we must move towards the long-term goal of achieving substantial progressive reductions of subsidies and protection for agriculture in order to establish a fair, and market-focused agricultural trade system. This is also a legally binding commitment and a treaty-based commitment from WTO members. Finally, we underscore that diversification strategies must continue to be led by countries themselves and focus on development, bearing in mind national circumstances, the comparative advantages, and different levels of development, avoiding uniform approaches applicable to all equally. Thank you very much.

Thank you. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Food and Agricultural Organization.

Thank you, Madam Moderator, and at the outset, allow me to thank the President of the General Assembly for convening this very important and timely meeting. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, ending hunger, food insecurity, and all forms of malnutrition worldwide depend in part on transparency transparent and efficient agriculture commodity markets and trade. As a knowledge-based organization, FAO plays a key role in the gathering and analysis of agri-food data, the development of projection assessment to inform policies and drive action. In practice, we draw upon the many different but complementary efforts across our organization, from data and global assessments to monitoring agriculture commodities and fertilizer trade, the development and use of modeling frameworks and policy analysis. Collectively, these allow us— these efforts allow us to identify trends, pinpoint risks, forecast supply and demand prospects, and provide policy support that facilitates trade along with increased market predictability and stability. However, commodity markets do not operate in the vacuum, as the critical juncture we face illustrates. Global food security clearly hinges on effective— evidence-based action to manage this major supply shock. To this end, FAO's suite of tools and services are instrumental. Through the FAO Food Price Index, we observe the uptick of food commodity prices prompted by the disruption in the flow of fuel and fertilizer. If the situation persists, commodity and food prices will increase further. Moreover, the ripple effects of shortages in energy and fertilizer supplies could have devastating effects on global agrifood systems, affecting in particular the food security and nutrition of the most vulnerable countries and households. Consequently, it is essential to safeguard the flow of trade, avoid export restrictions, continue to make use of the different information systems and analysis, increase the coordination of logistics policy responses, diversify supply sources, and improve farmers' access to inputs and enablers, support vulnerable countries including food import-dependent countries, and moving forward, we must invest in building resilience. As we reflect on the unfolding interconnected global dynamics and their impacts on global commodity markets and in turn sustainable development, integrated and collective approaches should be prioritized. Accordingly, FAO will continue to do its part. Thank you.

Thank you. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Saudi Arabia.

Madam Chair, Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, we would like to thank the President of the General Assembly for convening this dialogue, and we Thank the panelists for their valuable presentations. In light of the rapid change in the global economy that affects the stability of supply chains and markets and energy stability, we emphasize that the market for essential commodities is necessary in supporting the global economy and achieving stability and process and development which requires global cooperation and increasing the effectiveness of markets and especially taking into consideration the factors that affected developing nations, particularly big exporters— rather, importers. We emphasize the importance of value addition and stability in the global supply chains as necessary pillars for more diverse economies that can absorb international shocks. Accordingly, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia continues the Saudi 2030 Vision, which has expanded our economic base and developed non-oil sectors and expanded the use of renewable energy. We reiterate the need to achieve a realistic and responsible balance in the transformation, the energy transformation to guarantee that supply and stability can take place, and also taking measures with regards to a circular carbon economy. We similarly emphasized the need to promote international cooperation in the area of technology transfer, capacity building, development financing and supporting developing nations in their efforts to increase their ability to benefit from international value chains. In conclusion, the Kingdom reiterates its commitment to supporting international efforts to stabilize global markets and achieve sustainable development in a manner that contributes to global economy prosperity and achieving the best interest of all countries. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

Thank you, Moderator. Let me start by thanking the panelists and OPJA for the excellent discussion that happened today. UNCTAD was honored to have supported the OPJA with this dialogue. Commodity dependence remains a central development challenge and has always been at the core of UNCTAD's work. Two-thirds of the developing countries and over 80% of LDCs remain commodity dependent. This means that 60% of their merchandise exports stem from commodities. For 73 countries, mostly in Africa and in South America, this share is over 80%, leaving all these countries highly exposed to external shocks and constraining development and growth. Recent overlapping crises, tensions, disruptions, and instability have generated extreme price volatility across agricultural, oil, gas, and metal markets. This has resulted in multifaceted impacts that extend beyond the commodity sectors. When prices fall, fiscal revenues contract abruptly, forcing cuts in investment and social spending. When prices rise, procyclical spending patterns often emerge, increasing macroeconomic stability and debt risks. Volatility also shortens investment horizons, discourages long-term investment, raises the cost of finance, and weakens the prospects for diversification and structural transformation. Vulnerabilities aren't limited to exporters. Food and energy import-developing countries, many of which are LDCs and SIDS, also face mirror-image risks. Risks. Prices spikes drive up import bills, widen current account deficits, and rapidly deplete foreign exchange reserves, leaving little fiscal and reserve buffers to absorb shocks. UNCTAD is doing its part to address this problem, for instance, through our recent work in Madagascar, Namibia, and Zambia on critical energy transition minerals. With the generous support of the Government of Japan, we work with these countries in identifying opportunities for value addition and diversification. including through strong domestic— stronger domestic linkages, local processing, skill development, and sustainable industrialization strategies. A similar project is in the pipeline for the Democratic Republic of Congo. Let me just share, to conclude, a couple of thoughts. Addressing commodity dependence is at the intersection of trade, technology, investment, and macroeconomic stability. Volatility continues to present severe development challenges. Commodity sectors can become engines of inclusive growth and development, but this requires long-term investment. This means that coherence and comprehensive long-term policy, together with international cooperation, are essential to build resilience and support structural transformation. I thank you.

Thank you. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Colombia.

Gracias, señora moderadora. Thank you, Madam Moderator. Colombia aligns itself with the statement made by Uruguay on behalf of the G77 and China. Colombia sees this dialogue as an opportunity to exchange experiences vis-à-vis the persistent dependence on commodities and measures to move towards more resilient, diversified economies with more added value. In this context, Colombia recognizes that volatility on the commodities market and its oil shocks continue to pose structural challenges that affect economic stability that reflects the need to move towards more sustainable and inclusive productive models. Colombia has been consolidating a comprehensive strategy to diversify our economy and our exports. This transition is based on a policy of reindustrialization that seeks to drive forward intensive activities in the area of knowledge, strengthening productive supply chains, and promoting higher levels of added value in our economy, in particular in sectors such as agro-industry, manufacturing, and the metals and other parts of the economy. We have been strengthening our export baskets to more sophisticated sectors, particularly in the agro-industry sector. In this regard, our country is seeking to position itself as a supplier of food with higher added value, such as specialized coffee, fine cacao, processed fruits, and national— and natural ingredients. Additionally, Colombia has been focusing on sectors like sustainable tourism, consolidating this as a driving force for growth to bring in currency and inclusive territorial development. At the same time, we are moving towards a just energy transition that does not only seek to reduce our dependence on fossil fuels but also seeks to develop new sources of economic growth. These activities enable us to generate added value and to attract investment in different services that are in sectors that are different to extractive industries, diversifying the income of our country and boosting our resilience in light of the commodities market. We are also attracting financing for development and we believe that technology transfer are key for accelerating this diversification. By way of conclusion, moving towards more diversified economies with higher added value is a collective effort that requires coherent policies on a domestic level in addition to enhanced international cooperation as a basis for sustainable and inclusive development. Thank you.

Thank you. I'd like to remind delegates that we ask that your statements be 2 minutes. Your microphone will cut off at 3. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the region refocus on behalf of CSO FFD mechanism.

Thank you, Madam Moderator. As has been noted, worsening food and energy price shocks are having devastating impacts, particularly in developing countries. And as with all economic shocks, women and marginalized constituencies are bearing the brunt. These frequent shocks are symptomatic of a fundamentally unbalanced global economy. The problem of commodity dependence is twofold. First, there is primary commodity export dependence, which has led to hugely unequal exchange through global trade. Through this unequal exchange, rich countries rely on a large net appropriation from the Global South, including tens of billions of tons of raw materials and hundreds of billions of hours of human labor per year. The systematic price suppression of exports and labor from the Global South has extracted an estimated $62 trillion since 1960. There's also the issue of commodity import dependence. The cost of imports consistently exceeds the revenue being earned from primary commodity exports. Imports, worsening debt dependence, and hindering structural transformation. Import dependence for essential goods, including food, fuel, and medicine, leads to structural vulnerability to external price shocks and volatility, which are generated by both direct and indirect violence, ranging from wars to the use of tariffs as unilateral coercive measures. The recent illegal invasions in the Swana region have painfully exposed these vulnerabilities and connected the issues of commodity dependence to questions of trade and climate justice. A staggering 75% of the world is dependent on fossil fuel imports. In 2023 alone, the oil and gas industry reaped a record combined income of more than $2.7 trillion. The two biggest investment funds in the world, BlackRock and Vanguard, are major shareholders in each of the 8 most profitable pesticide and fertilizer companies, the petroleum-intensive inputs fueling the agri-food system. This does not reflect an economic system designed to propel development or respect planetary boundaries. A full transition away from fossil fuels is necessary to avert complete planetary breakdown. However, the question of how to structure this transition is a deeply political one. Critical minerals form the basis of the majority of renewable energy sources, and approximately 70% are located in developing countries. The central question of a just transition is: extraction for who, on what terms, and to whose benefit? There are attempts by developed countries to secure their own access to critical minerals on the one hand, and to impose sustainability standards on the other. The transition away from fossil fuels must remain a justice issue at its core, beyond investor priorities, and certainly beyond making this transition profitable for multinational corporations. A just transition is our last chance to build a new global economy that ensures the fulfillment of rights, including the right to development, and respects planetary boundaries. It is high time to democratize both the form and function of the economy, breaking out of the extractive patterns of commodity import and export dependence that have held us back. I thank you. Thank you.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Thailand.

Thank you, Madam Moderator, and a thank you also to the panelists for their presentations. In the 1970s, Thailand was largely commodity-dependent. Then in the '80s and '90s, following export-oriented industrial policies, raw commodities came to account for only— for less, excuse me, than 30% of our total exports. Thailand is now making efforts to become a truly value-based economy and our transition strategy centers around the following priorities. First, is advancing sustainable and value-added agriculture. While nearly half of our population remains in agriculture, the sector contributes less than 10% of GDP. So what we are doing is doubling down on higher-value agricultural products, from herbal to elderly-focused to halal to future, future food products such as plant-based proteins, and developing these products is complementary also to our efforts in promoting high-quality tourism and medical and wellness tourism. We are also approaching import markets differently through a city-focused policy targeting specific high-potential cities, provinces, and states in our key trading partners. The second priority is integrating MSMEs into the global value chain. and we are doing this by improving their access through helping them to align products with demand and strengthening compliance with global standards, including sustainability requirements. The third priority is leveraging technology and innovation across domestic value chains. This includes supporting farmers in applying smart farming practices to enhance product productivity and meet global standards, as well as equipping them with more precise climate-related data by digitalizing and connecting different government databases. And last but not least is strengthening international cooperation, and we are doing this through expanding trade partnerships bilaterally and within ASEAN. This is, of course, not the end of our journey. National ownership must remain central. Alongside stronger international cooperation to support developing countries in building resilient, sustainable, value-added economies through technology transfer, capacity building, and more equitable integration into global value chains. I thank you.

Thank you. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization.

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, in many developing countries, persistent market failures continue to constrain industrial transformation. Limited access to finance, high energy costs, inadequate infrastructure, and shortages in skills and human capital remain major obstacles for governments to diversify their economies. Evidence-based industrial policies can address these obstacles and offer crucial support for priority sectors. While many developing countries prioritize sectors based on existing capabilities, today's global megatrends also create opportunities for them to venture into advanced sectors. The green transition, digitalization, shifting supply chains, and growing demand for agro-processing offer new pathways to move up global value chains. But these megatrends also create new challenges. Compliance with complex standards and traceability requirements is just one of them. Excellencies, there are several important lessons from countries that have successfully diversified their economies. First, government capacity and long-term strategic commitment are decisive. The experience of countries like the Republic of Korea and China demonstrate how export-oriented industrialization combined with strong government coordination can drive structural transformation and poverty reduction. Second, resource-based upgrading can succeed when linked to domestic value addition. For example, Indonesia's nickel processing policies and Chile's lithium strategy show how resource wealth in critical minerals can support participation in high-growth sectors such as electric vehicle battery value chains. And finally, successful integration into global markets requires more than openness. The most successful economies have combined export orientation and foreign direct investment with deliberate efforts to build domestic capabilities, strengthen supply linkages, and invest in skills development. To achieve all this in International cooperation remains indispensable. Focus must be on ecosystems approaches and not on isolated firms. Before concluding, allow me to draw attention to UNIDO's flagship Industrial Development Report 2026 dedicated to the future of industrialization. The report addresses all the major issues we've been discussing here today. And let me also draw attention to UNIDO's and UMTAD's joint work under the Secretary General's Task Force on Critical Energy Transition Minerals, where we are co-leading the work on Action Recommendation Number 1 on local value addition. Ultimately, economic diversification is not only about economic objectives. It is a pathway towards resilience, sustainability, and shared prosperity. And at UNITO, we stand ready to continue to work with member states through partnerships and concrete solutions on the ground. Thank you very much.

Thank you. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation.

Moderator, economic diversification and increasing added value for countries dependent on commodity exports is of vital importance today. We agree with the assertion that the transition toward producing more complex products and Expanded processing of commodities is not only a strategic goal but also a necessary condition for strengthening sovereignty, macroeconomic stability, and long-term development, first and foremost for the Global South. We believe it's useful to diversify supplies of commodities, especially energy and minerals. However, this diversification should not be politically motivated in nature. The example of Europe, where diversification Russia's situation was used as a pretext to deliberately disrupt reliable and accessible delivery of Russian energy shows that sacrificing national economies and people's well-being for political interests of certain countries' ruling elite only worsens the global crisis. It's unacceptable to impose this kind of suicidal approach on other states. We believe that there are no universal templates for economic diversification. Every country must forge its own path economic diversification based upon its own national specificities, resource base, and geographic position. In this regard, developing alternative transport and logistical routes is a priority, as well as settling accounts in national currencies and strengthening regional economic associations. These measures can help reduce dependency of global trade on politically motivated restrictions and increase sustainability of international economic systems. We call on Western countries to move away from sanctions policies and on developing countries to join their efforts to resist the colonial rhetoric imposed by the West. Madam Moderator, Russia, Russia continues to support forming a stable global economic system based upon sovereign, sovereign equality, supremacy of international law, and multilateralism. We believe that the right of every state to freely choose its own partners and cooperation models is inviolable. And any attempts toward hegemony, control over the destinies of other countries, and monopolization of development are unacceptable. Thank you.

Thank you. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Office of the Special Advisor on Africa.

Madam Moderator, Excellencies, distinguished delegates. We thank the President of the General Assembly, for convening this timely dialogue on commodity markets. We thank the panelists for their insights. Africa's position in global commodity markets reflects a profound paradox. The continent is extraordinarily resource-rich, holding around 55% of global cobalt reserves, half of manganese, and major deposits deposits of lithium, graphite, and copper. However, the continent captures only 40% of the potential value of its mineral resources due to limited refining, processing, and manufacturing capacity. African countries are increasingly recognizing the limits of this commodity-dependent model and are seeking pathways to capture greater value from their natural resource endowments. In this regard, the forthcoming 2026 Flagship Report of the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa calls for a shift towards a strategic asset management approach, an integrated approach aimed at capturing, retaining, and reinvesting value generated from Africa's natural resources. Madam Moderator, allow me to highlight three priority areas that are critical for maximizing the benefits of Africa's mineral endowments. First, Africa needs greater mobilization and retention of financial resources to support diversification and value addition, tackling illicit financial flows and better leveraging sovereign wealth funds pension funds and foreign exchange reserves will therefore be critical. Second, commodity diversification requires investment in productivity, technology and industrial capabilities. Third, African countries need to coordinate policies across borders to create integrated regional industries for resources such as lithium, cobalt, manganese, and rare earth to facilitate specialization across regional value chains, from mining and refining to battery assembly and logistics. In closing, unlocking the full development potential of Africa's mineral wealth will require partnerships anchored in equity, justice, combustion and shared commitment to inclusive prosperity, as underscored by the Secretary-General's panel on critical energy transition minerals. I thank you. Thank you.

We're going to now return to the panelists and ask them for concluding remarks of about 1 minute each. Ms.

Westenberg, I'd like to start with you. Thanks very much. I appreciate all the interventions. It's been such a rich discussion. The last thing I'd say is really bringing us back to what is one of the most fundamental and basic tenets of good governance and accountability, and that is of transparency. We've spent so much time over the past few hours talking about the technical policies and approaches and strategies that we want to see out of commodity markets and partnerships, but Research that NRGI did a few years ago showed that in the mineral space, about two-thirds of critical mineral partnerships, you could not find any public information about it beyond the initial press release. And everything that we've talked about today, the aspirations and the goals, we will not be able to monitor and hold decision makers accountable without that fundamental transparency element. Many of these commodities are public resources to be managed in the public good, and we know that to have fair and equitable partnerships and deals, we need that public scrutiny and monitoring, and transparency is so core to that and is so often absent.

Thank you.

Mr. Nielsen. Thank you. Thank you again for the opportunity to speak. I address to you today the opportunity that comes from nature-based solutions, and I want to acknowledge again that this is not going to be what drives structural transformation. You all mentioned so many good and important interventions that are required in order for commodity-dependent developing countries to transform their economies, to move beyond dependence. However, nature-based solutions are coming. Technology is the push and demand is the pull. This does create quite significant opportunities for agricultural economies, and it's very timely that all of you representing such economies now seize those opportunities in order to grow economies and diversify them for future resilience. I want to leave it at that. Happy to follow up any policy discussions afterwards. Thank you.

Ms. Ousmane?

Thank you very much. It has been such an honor to address this very distinguished group of member states, organizations, and on the invitation of the President of the General Assembly. I suppose my concluding remark would be that I hope that, you know, despite the challenges given the fragmentation, the uncertainties in our global economy today, that important entities and bodies such as the one we're in right now, the UN system, can come up with timely— emphasis here being on timely— solutions to support low- and middle-income countries, developing countries that are resource-rich in their industrialization, in their economic diversification, and in their structural transformation plans and ambitions, and there are tangible, concrete things that can be done. Mechanisms around coordination, around governance associated with these resources, with these commodities, need to be updated, and I hope that this is an area where we're going to see more action, particularly around providing technical assistance and support, which is an area where I think a lot of countries would require that help around knowledge sharing between countries that have had more success with expanding refining value addition and achieving resource-based industrialization, and also around kind of just general coordination, but also in partnership with other important and powerful non-state actors, particularly the corporate philanthropies as well as the private sector.

Thank you very much. Thank you. I'd like to thank our interpreters for staying on for extra time today. The The interactive panel is now— panel discussion is now closed. The meeting is adjourned.