Press Conference: IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi

Well, good morning, everyone. Thank you for joining us this morning. We have the press briefing with DG Grossi, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency here in Geneva. We are ready to take your questions, so please identify yourselves and address the DG. Thank you very much.

Yeah, Laurent Sierot, Swiss News Agency. Thanks for that briefing, Director-General. In the agreement that was signed last night, your institution is mentioned under point 8. So first, what is your reaction to the signing? And then, how are you going to prepare for the different scenarios, including the down-blending of the enriched uranium in Iran, which is supposed to be led under the supervision of IAEA?

Thank you. Yes. Good morning, everybody. It's very good to be here. Well, I think it's good when an agreement is signed after war. So that is a principle that it's important to be recalled now. I think at this point, speculating would not be a good idea. There's work to do. There's work to be done. As you say, we believe the fact that the indispensable role of the IAEA is recognized is a sound point of departure. And now it's for us to sit down with our American colleagues, our Iranian colleagues, and start formulating the concrete steps that will have to be taken. So I think it's good that the memorandum is there. Now the technical work starts.

Short follow-up, if I may. Are you going to be tomorrow at the Bergen Stock for the launch of the technical negotiations?

That's a possibility.

Thank you. At the back, please.

This is Maya Plentz from The Brief. A pleasure to see you, Mr. Grossi. My question is regarding also your career as a diplomat. You are now postulating for the post of UN Secretary-General. How do you see that your career as a diplomat informs and strengthens your position as a candidate?

Sorry for that. Well, of course, it's more than 40 years of diplomatic work, a good part of which took place under this roof, the Conference on Disarmament, many, many years. I think in particular, more than a lifetime of diplomatic professional work, When it comes to leadership of the United Nations, I think what is more decisive than anything else is what I am doing now at the IAEA, which, as we just heard, is at the center of very important processes which are crucial for international peace and security, for real. Talking about Iran, talking about the war between Russia and Ukraine, where we have been doing important work, talking about the Gulf, where we are protecting nuclear power plants for— from attacks. So these are real situations. These are not imaginary or scenarios. These are places where the IAEA is working, dealing with real and not imaginary crisis. So I think that decisively has inspired me and convinces me that what we are doing at the IAEA can perfectly well be extrapolated to—

To the world.

The wider scenario of the UN, which needs this type of work so badly.

Gentleman down the back here and gentleman down the back.

Merci beaucoup, Moussa Arsé, Al Mayadeen TV. Bienvenue à Genève, Monsieur Grossi. J'ai 3 petites questions. La première, selon l'accord qu'on a signé hier, quelle est la prochaine étape pour vous, la collaboration avec l'Iran? Les inspections vont être conduites par l'AIEA ou bien aussi en collaboration avec d'autres parties? Parce que c'est pas clair, ça. Encore une question concernant l'uranium enrichi à 60 selon l'accord. On voit pas vraiment l'issue de cette quantité. Est-ce qu'elle va être abaissée? Donc le niveau d'enrichissement va être abaissé à l'intérieur de l'Iran? Ou bien il va être transporté ailleurs en dehors de l'Iran. Et pour vous, techniquement, est-ce que vous devez être là s'il y a un abaissement de niveau d'enrichissement?

Merci.

Oui.

Bon, en fait, vous-même, vous mentionnez plusieurs alternatives, plusieurs possibilités, et il y en a plus. Donc je crois que c'est un moment, comme je disais tout à l'heure à votre collègue ici, C'est un moment de circonspection et de travail, de travail technique. Donc les possibilités sont là, selon ce qu'on a vu, le mémorandum mentionne d'une manière générale, et c'est normal que cela soit comme ça, parce que donc tous les travails techniques, on doit décliner tous ces principes d'ordre général— dans des pas concrets, comme vous dites, les pas à suivre. Donc moi, je pense qu'il serait sage, pour moi, aujourd'hui, de m'abstenir de mentionner l'un ou l'autre alternative. Vous avez vu que les textes mentionnent, oui, la possibilité de— d'un travail technique d'abaissement du niveau d'enrichissement, mais à partir de cela, il y a plusieurs possibilités qui s'ouvrent. Donc, comme je disais, c'est un moment d'énormes responsabilités pour nous, pour tous, pour essayer de consolider ce qui a été acquis à travers le mémorandum.

En ce qui concerne votre collaboration avec le côté iranien, Est-ce que vous avez déjà eu des contacts avec eux pour un début de contrôle, un début de collaboration entre les deux parties? Parce qu'on sait que depuis la guerre de 12 jours, la collaboration à Vermont était au plus bas niveau, à part ce contrôle qui a été fait entre le 1er et le 3 juin passé. Est-ce que vous allez bientôt augmenter le niveau d'observation, de contrôle?

Je dirais que nous sommes toujours en contact avec eux. Il y a un travail technique, évidemment à un niveau beaucoup plus bas que celui qu'on devrait vraiment avoir. Il y a certaines inspections qui se passent encore pas au niveau et aux endroits où l'on devrait être. Mais il y a des contacts. Moi-même, je suis en contact avec les autorités iraniennes. Mais c'est maintenant qu'on peut commencer, je dirais, pour de vrai, ce travail technique.

Gentlemen down the front, please.

Hello.

Hello.

Good morning, Mr. Grossi. Last year, before the 12-day war which US and Israel launched against Iran, your report days before that attack, your report apparently being seen as having caused that particular 12-day war. In fact, the Iranian minister Aragachi has severely criticized you immediately after the report was released, and that you were playing— tilting the scales in what the U.S. and others are asking for. Are there any serious trust and credibility issues concerning your actions against Iran? And secondly, you were silent both at the 12-day meeting— war, and even now. So how do you— how do countries see you as a trustworthy candidate?

You are mentioning a number of things. You are recalling some opinions that some in Iran had. Of course, the work of the IAEA is an impartial technical work. People have views and opinions. Maybe you have those views and others have those views, but that doesn't affect the fact that the IAEA performs an indispensable impartial work. It continues to do so. And of course, in times— and especially in times of war— harsh words like the ones you have just mentioned sometimes are pronounced. I see. Our work is to precisely to try to be above that level of political discussion or qualification and concentrate ourselves in our work. Nobody can ever believe that the report of the IAEA is the cause of a war. I have said it before, and this is all I have to say about that. So our work will continue. And, you know, the fact that in this memorandum of—

Yes.

Treaty understanding that has just been signed, the indispensable role of the IAEA is recognized, mentioned. I think it says it all in terms of our credibility and the indispensable role we have to play.

Just a follow-up question.

Yeah?

When it comes to Israel, which has 100 nuclear weapons, the IAEA, of course, it's not NPT number and things like that. But you are extravagant— I mean, you're basically a large focus just on Iran, trying to enable the big countries to do the kind of things that it wants to do.

Could you hear? Yeah? No, you have to have a red light. Yes.

I got the red light here. Now you have it. Yeah, I'm sorry. You know, coming back to the kind of treatment that is being meted to Iran on one side, and of course Israel is a non-NPT member, but it still has some 100 nuclear warheads. Can IAEA or will IAEA make a statement that they are more serious than Iran, which has never developed a weapon? Which has promised not to develop a weapon. I mean, generally the question here is the impartiality issue, whether you are very critical about Iran, I mean, a country which is causing this whole crisis, Israel. How do you deal with it, IAEA?

Well, again, you are basing your question on your own assumptions and opinions. So what I'm telling you is the objective legal and technical situation we have. We don't have opinions on countries, okay? Or their intentions. We don't. We have legal basis upon which we do our work. The— Iran is a party to the NPT and has a comprehensive safeguards agreement. With the IAEA, and it has to comply, as every other nation that has to do that. Israel does not, as other countries as well. Unfortunately, the NPT is not universal, and we have very— been very clear. I myself have been very, very clear on the necessity for the NPT to be universal and for all countries to adhere.

Okay.

To the NPT. So the issue of impartiality, because we do not address a country that is outside the NPT, is immaterial. We, we of course wish and exhort every country in every continent to subscribe to the NPT. This is without, without a doubt. All the rest is speculation and political opinion, and I will not get —of that.

The issue here is that an NPT—

Well, sir, I think—

Yeah, I'm sorry. Just last question. An NPT member like the United States, which violates the so-called— your partner— I mean, membership— your— U.S. is a member in the IAEA, which has violated the normal norms by attacking Iran. Do you criticize U.S. as well in the same way?

Please, sir, I don't know which norms are you referring to. Again, our role here is to perform work which is technical, and the issue of having political opinions and condemn— we don't even condemn Iran. You are not, I think, reading well what we are saying. We are referring to what Iran should be doing there. Commitments and obligations. We are not in a— that's for you analysts, people who comment on international relations. It's not my work. What we try to do is to make sure that norms are complied with. When norms are not complied with, we say it and we substantiate that on our technical opinion. On why we do it and what is the ulterior motive, I leave it up to you, and you seem to have very strong opinions about that. Perhaps we can move on.

Lady at the front, gentleman at the back.

Thank you.

Anyway, many thanks for the briefing. With the start of the 60 days period before the final agreement is signed, my question is where does the biggest obstacles lie on the technical part?

Sorry, every time I forget. No, as I was saying before, I think we will see when we start. And having speculate about what could cause a problem or not is not wise at this point, because we are about to start. And we have to initiate any negotiation on the assumption that we are all in good faith, that we want to be successful. And this is what we— what we need to stress at this point. I think if they have signed this, if they can have taken the step of signing this memorandum, this important document, It's because everybody wants this to be a success. So, on the technical aspects, we will see. It will depend on the different alternatives, and it is obvious that there might be here and there different positions. This is why the IEA is there, because there are technical requirements sometimes, and of course one or the other may have a different interpretation. So, I think in the next few days, over the next few days, we will be able to give you a more, I would say, substantiated answer. But please bear with us at this point. It's a point of, as I said, enormous, enormous responsibility for all. Thank you.

Gentlemen.

Good morning, Director-General. I'm Jamie Keaton from Associated Press.

Hello.

Thank you again for coming to see us. I had just a couple of questions. The first is, just very basically, How much does this memorandum of understanding move Iran farther away from a nuclear weapon? Does it actually make a substantial step away from that? My second question has to do with the access that your agency may have. How realistic is it for you that your agency will have access again to, to Iran? And then if I could also just throw in, the United States has talked about going in to take the nuclear dust, and you mentioned legal basis. What would be the legal basis of that?

Thank you.

That, and would they be able to work with IAEA in that endeavor? Thank you.

Thank you very much for the question. I think all of this depends on the political will of both sides. Let's not forget that this is a bilateral agreement. So what they will be doing will be on the basis of their own political will to undertake the steps that are required to do all of that. And the fact, as I said before, the fact that they are mentioning that this will be done under the supervision and control of the IAEA is very important, because in our conversation, what we are going to be doing is defining what we need to see, what we need to access, So at this point, I wouldn't be able to tell you here now what are the specific things, places that we need to access. We have a pretty good idea, of course, but it is incorrect— it would be incorrect on my part to step ahead of the process. So we are at the gates of the decisive phase of the technical conversations. Thank you. Let's have them and then we'll see.

Gentlemen down the back.

The Americans want to take the nuclear dustbin. Are they going to work with you guys on that? Is that possible?

Again, anything can work when two sides decide that they want something to be done and they ask the IAEA to verify that. What we are going to be telling them is what is needed. What is required. This is a very complex operation and it's not a secret, so we will have to be very, very detailed.

Gentlemen in the back.

Yeah, good morning. Thank you for the briefing. Nick Coming-Bruce for New York Times. I wonder if your contacts so far have suggested to you a possible timeline for deployment of an IAEA delegation to Iran. And I'm wondering, in relation to the enriched uranium, what do you think is the kind of size and range of the IAEA delegation that will be needed to deploy to provide a credible exercise of determining the fate of that enriched uranium? Thank you.

We will have the necessary technical deployment. Nothing more, nothing less. We know exactly what is needed and we will do it. What is needed? What is needed will depend on the final technical agreement that we will have. As I said, I understand your curiosity, but it's not prudent to jump ahead of facts. We are going to sit down now and define what we need to do. Obviously, the IAEA will do only a process which is technically sound. If we do not feel that we have the technically sound basis, we would not do it. But it is obvious that it will be the case because the parties themselves are saying, "We want to enter into this agreement and we want the IAEA to verify it." Thank you. So we have been doing this. This is our job. We have been doing this for decades. We know everything that needs to be done. And the dimension, the magnitude of the job is going to be determined by the provisions, the final provisions of the technical agreements we are going to be working on.

Ladies and gentlemen, Hi, good morning.

Is this on? I think this is on. I'll try this one.

Just wait a second. No, this is not working. I'll try another one.

Ah, there we go. Perfect. Thank you. It's Olivia Le Poivre from Reuters. Thank you. Hope you can hear me. Just a couple of questions from my side. Are you able to tell us who you're speaking to here in Geneva today going into tomorrow? So who are you meeting with and speaking to in Geneva? You sounded maybe a bit uncertain about whether you're going to be there tomorrow in Bergenstock. Can you explain why there's uncertainty, or maybe you actually are more certain? Either way, if you could just explain, that'd be great. And just in terms of the role of yourself and the IAEA, I mean, what do you expect that role to be, and will there be any kind of extra powers that will be needed at your discretion? I appreciate, as you said, one needs to be prudent, and there's probably little you can say, but I don't know if already you're expectant of a kind of an enlarged role be it for yourself or for your agency? Thank you.

Well, at this point, as I said, it is important not to speculate. The IAEA will have a role there, and I think everything will be determined by that, by the conversations we are going to have. And as I said, I will not get into a speculation. About what the agreement is going to be, what should be there, what shouldn't be there. It's not appropriate. It's not appropriate. I'm going to sit down with both sides. We have been doing this also in the past, so we know each other well. And, you know, in the next few days, maybe there will be more clarity. But at this point in time, today, Thursday, In Geneva, when the process has not started, it is not prudent to do that, and we have to be very circumspect. What I can tell you is that we are very clear as a technical organization of what needs to be done, what sustains a technically sound process, and of course this is our point of departure. Then we will see.

And sorry, just my two other questions. Beginning, if you could tell us who you're meeting with today in Geneva and tomorrow, and just clarity on whether you are or are not attending tomorrow's meeting in Böckenstock. Thank you.

Well, today in Geneva, we have a number of activities here on my job as— my current job as head of the IEA. We're going to be discussing artificial intelligence and nuclear energy in a few minutes with colleagues from UNIDIR. I will be addressing the Graduate Institute where I graduated. I had my PhD there, so it's a very important moment also personally for me. I studied there a few decades ago, so that we will have there a good conversation about international politics and what is happening around the world. As to the meetings somewhere else, again, I will not go into that at this point. We will be there, and then we will see.

Generally speaking, the agency had a lot on its plate in the last years with Zaporizhzhia and other fronts. So in terms of resources, Would you say that the IAEA will be able to face any situation it might be requested to deal with in that Iran affair?

Well, yeah, thank you for the question because, of course, a lot is expected from us as an organization. And this, as in the case of Zaporizhzhia and the work not only in Zaporizhzhia, in Ukraine in general, because as you know, we are deployed at all nuclear facilities in Ukraine. And also now we have the situation in the Gulf where Barakah was attacked, and we might be setting up an operation there as well. So it is conceivable. Mm-hmm. That if we are successful— but I'm already speculating, you see, which I said I wouldn't— we will need to have support. Experience shows that when agreements of this dimension and importance are presented to us and we have to do it, we do have the resources to do that. Of course, I will be requesting support, and I'm sure— I'm sure because of the importance of this for international peace and security, I'm convinced that many countries beyond those who are directly involved in the process will support the IAEA and give us the resources to do our job. Thank you.

Thank you.

We'll take 2 questions from Zoom for now. So we've got some questions. The first one is from German Press Agency, Albert Otti, please.

Hello. Thank you for taking my question. I understand that the final agreement has not been negotiated, but the Memorandum of Understanding says that while it is being negotiated, Iran would maintain the status quo of its nuclear program. So my question to you is, is it your understanding or your expectation that the IAEA will verify that the status quo is indeed not changed?

Again, I will not go ahead of the discussions. We will have this discussion when we have it, not now.

And Svenska Dagbladet from Gunilla von Hall, please.

Yes, thank you. I'm Gunilla von Haal, Swedish journalist, Svenska Dagbladet. Thank you for the briefing. My question is similar to many of my colleagues. It's about the enriched uranium, and I understand you cannot give a lot of technical details, but talking about it in the memorandum of understanding to be down-blended, how complicated is this? How time-consuming is this? Are we talking about months or years? Have IAEA done this before? Do you have something to compare with? Um, thanks.

Well, again, this will depend on what is agreed. I'm sorry if I cannot give you more details, but this will depend on what is agreed. So more work requires more time, less work less time. It's very simple. So we will see. We will see. I think we all need to exercise some patience here and not jump ahead of facts.

John Zaragoza, please. John, are you there?

Can you hear me now?

Yes, we can.

Can you hear me?

Yeah.

Yes. Good morning. My question is a technical one from the point of view of the International Atomic Energy Agency. For civilian purposes, would the enriched uranium of 60% to be in conformity, you have to be within 3 to 5% diluted down to 3 to 5% from the point of view of the Atomic Energy Agency? And secondly, I have a follow-up question. You're at the Atomic Energy Agency trying to oversee non-proliferation. The latest report from ICAN showed that the nuclear weapons powers increased their expenditure by 19% last year to nearly $119 billion. What does this tell us for international security? Thank you.

Thank you. On your first question, again, that takes us straight into the realm of speculation, right, which I am not going to do. There are many different alternatives, as I said. There are different ranges of enrichment in the current Iranian inventory, and we will see what is agreed. So then we will see. On the second question, I think it's very pertinent. I see what we are— I think what we are seeing is a process whereby the reduction in nuclear arsenals has stopped, and in fact nuclear arsenals are increasing. I think this is a symptom of a world where there is so much fragmentation, and in this context, the attacking the sources of that fragmentation and geostrategic competition is what we all need. One step is, for example, having an agreement like the one we are trying to have now. This will decrease anxieties and perhaps perhaps the need to have more nuclear weapons, and that can reproduce itself into several other conflicts. What we need is a multilateral system, a UN, why not, which is more effective in this area.

We'll take the two more, lady in the middle and gentleman in the back, please.

Yes, thank you very much for taking my question. My question is regarding Director General, during the crisis when it started in Ukraine, you were always on the ground, which was a kind of relief for us, you know, the citizens of Europe, watching that someone was actually going on the field to try to deal with the situation. That was much appreciated, I'm sure, by all Europeans. I would like to know if you could give us a quick appraisal of the situation now in terms of nuclear safety since the war started. Seems to continue in Ukraine.

Thank you. That work that you saw has never stopped. I have returned several times, and my technical experts are still there. We have just brokered a 6th ceasefire between— localized ceasefire, of course— between Russia and Ukraine. Which is indispensable to have very, very important repairs of the high-voltage lines that are feeding the nuclear power plant to ensure some essential safety functions. This was very important to prevent a nuclear accident there. That being said, we also see an increase in military activity activity at the front, at that part of the front. So we continue to be extremely, extremely concerned. The important thing, as you said, is that the IAEA is mobilized. We are there. In fact, this work has been possible because the IAEA experts were monitoring the demining, the demining at their own— at our own risk, at their own risk, of the place places where the repairs have to be done, and then they are staying on to check that while these repairs are done, are conducted, there are no attacks mutually. So on the one hand, I can reassure you on the fact that the IAEA is not going anywhere. We are there. But as to the behavior of the belligerents Unfortunately, we should exhort them to act with restraint. But let's see what happens.

Thank you. Final question down there.

Merci beaucoup.

[SPEAKING FOREIGN LANGUAGE] TV, encore une fois. Mr. Grossi, le 26 février passé, vous étiez là à Genève, la dernière rencontre entre Iraniens et Américains. On était très positifs à l'époque. And the Monday after, on had decided that there would be des négociations techniques à Vienne. Aujourd'hui, on a signé un accord hier, et ça doit commencer, quelque chose de technique, prochainement. Est-ce que ces souvenirs du 26 février vous font peut-être un peu craindre? Vous avez peur que ça se répète, la même chose? Ou vous êtes plus optimiste après la signature de cet accord? Merci.

Merci pour la question. Quand il s'agit de travailler pour la paix, on ne peut pas se permettre d'être frustré par les échecs du passé. Donc ce qui s'est passé, c'est passé. Là maintenant, on a une chance, il faut la saisir. Et c'est ce qu'on va essayer de faire avec toute notre force et notre conviction.

Thank you very much for joining us this morning. This conference is concluded. Thank you.

Thank you very much.