(6th meeting) Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

The sixth plenary meeting of the 2026 Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is called to order. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, this afternoon, the conference will continue with the general debate. I have 35 speakers remaining on the list of speakers for the general debate. May I remind all delegations that group statements should not exceed eight minutes and national statements should not exceed five minutes. Your microphones will start to blink when you have one minute remaining of your allotted time. Delegations are reminded to please inform the Secretariat as soon as possible if they wish to exercise their right of reply at the end of the day. so that adequate time can be set aside for those statements. I would also like to inform delegations that the speakers list for the general exchange of views for the three main committees was opened on the 20th of April 2026. I invite delegations wishing to make statements during the general exchange of views of the main committees to inscribe through the e-delegate portal. We will now continue with the general debate. Delegations are kindly requested to submit electronic versions of their statements in PDF and Microsoft formats to e-statements@un.org no later than two hours in advance of delivery. I now have the honour to invite the first speaker on the list for this afternoon, His Excellency Dionisio Babo Soares, the Permanent Representative of Timor-Leste. You have the floor, Excellency.

Thank you, Mr. President. At the outset, Timor-Leste extends its warmest congratulations to you, Excellency, Ambassador Don Huhne-Viet, on your election as President of this 11th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We are confident that your leadership and steadfast commitment to multilateralism will guide our deliberations to a meaningful and constructive outcome.

We also commend the members of the Bureau.

Timor-Leste aligns itself with the statements delivered by Uganda on behalf of NAM and by the Philippines on behalf of Southeast Asian nations. We reaffirm our unwavering commitment to multilateralism, the rule of international law, and the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, in particular, the maintenance of international peace and security, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the prohibition of the.

Threat or use of force?

Mr. President, for Timor-Leste, a nation born from struggle and sustained by the values of peace, sovereignty, and justice, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is a moral, humanitarian, and legal imperative.

We reaffirm that NPT remains the cornerstones of the global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime.

And a vital foundation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This is consistent with the binding obligation under Article VI of the treaty, as affirmed by the ICG, to pursue negotiations in good faith leading to nuclear disarmament. However, we remain deeply alarmed by the deteriorating global security environment, heightened geopolitical tensions, The continued modernization and expansion of nuclear arsenals, the erosion of arms control agreements, and the growing role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines are reversing decades of progress. These trends undermine strategic stability and place humanity at an unacceptable risk, including the risk of miscalculation, accidental use, or escalation. We therefore call upon the State Parties, particularly nuclear weapons states, to fully implement their obligations under Article.

VI and to honor commitments undertaken at the previous review conferences.

We stress the urgent need to revitalize disarmament diplomacy, restore confidence in multilateral institutions, and deliver a balanced, credible, and action-oriented outcome at this conference.

Mr. President.

Timor-Leste firmly believes that the only guarantee against the use of threat or use of nuclear weapons is their total.

Elimination. The catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any nuclear detonation would transcend borders, generations, and ecosystems. These consequences must remain at the center of all disarmament deliberations, consistent with international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians. We strongly support the universalization and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We call upon all remaining access to states to sign and ratify the treaty without delay. Timor-Leste further calls for legally binding negative security assurances to all non-nuclear weapons states, the adoption of no first use policies, and concrete nuclear risk reduction measures. These should include safeguards against emerging threats, such as cyber vulnerabilities affecting nuclear command, control, and communication systems.

Which would increase the risk of unintended escalation.

We express concern at the weakening of.

Bilateral and multilateral arms control frameworks, including uncertainties surrounding the future of strategic arms limitation arrangements.

We urge all relevant parties.

To resume the dialogue and negotiation in good faith to preserve strategic stability and uphold international peace and security. Timor-Leste is proud to contribute to Southeast Asia's enduring commitment to peace by acceding to the Treaty.

On the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

This reflects our sovereign commitment to a region free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. We reaffirm our strong support for nuclear-weapon-free zones as practical, legally binding contributions to global disarmament and nonproliferation, and we support the establishment of additional zones, including in the Middle East. We recognize the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as a historic and complementary instrument. By reinforcing the normative and humanitarian rejection of nuclear weapons, it strengthens the broader disarmament architecture and advances the goal to their total elimination. At the same time, Timor-Leste reaffirms the inalienable right of all states, as enshrined in Article IV of the NPT, to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, consistent with safeguards and international obligations. Mr. President, Timor-Leste's history reminds us that genuine security cannot be built.

On fear, deterrence, or the threat of mass destruction.

It must be grounded in dialogue, justice, cooperation, and respect for humanity, principles at the heart of the United Nations Charter. Nuclear weapons are fundamentally incompatible with these values. As this Review Conference convenes at a time of profound uncertainty, we urge all States Parties to rise above division and reaffirm our shared responsibility to future generations. We must not allow political differences to erode our collective duty to prevent nuclear catastrophe.

We remain steadfast in working with all partners toward a.

World free of nuclear weapons, a world where peace is preserved not through terror, but through trust, not through arms race, but through law, and not through fear, but through our common humanity. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of Timor-Leste for his statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Kyrgyzstan.

Mr. President, distinguished delegates, I would like to also join the other speakers and congratulate Ambassador Do Hong Viet, Permanent Representative of Vietnam, on his election as the President of the Conference. I also congratulate the chairs of the main committees, permanent representatives of Finland, Kazakhstan, and Ghana on their election. You have the full support of Kyrgyzstan during the conference. My country also associates itself with the statement delivered on behalf of Central Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. Ladies and gentlemen, we meet at the defining moment. The last preparatory committee cycle concluded without agreed recommendations. Nuclear risks are rising, multilateral arms control is eroding, and treaties under unprecedented strain. Kyrgyzstan has been a consistent and committed supporter of the NPT. We remain firmly committed to all three pillars: disarmament, nonproliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Mr. President, full implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is essential. We call all remaining states to sign and ratify it. This is a key step toward nuclear disarmament. We have also signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. This reflects our firm, consistent position that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons must remain the shared global priority. We support a world without nuclear weapons. Together with neighbors, we created a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan, as a depository of this treaty, submitted information on the implementation of this treaty. Central Asia also established their cooperative agreements with OPANAL and AFGONA to strengthen nuclear nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We were proud to facilitate this process. Mr. President, there is no doubt that NPT is a cornerstone of international nonproliferation and the disarmament regime. We call on all nuclear weapons states to fulfill their Article VI obligations transparently and without further delay. The expiration of the New START treaty is concerning, and we hope that sides will consider the possibility of reaching a new agreement. Kyrgyzstan supports the goals and principles of the IAEA. Nuclear technologies are already being applied in areas such as healthcare, agriculture, and environmental protection. Kyrgyzstan continues to strengthen its national legal framework. We have ratified the Assistance Convention, the Early Notification Convention, and the IAEA Additional Protocol. Our commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation has also received strong multilateral recognition by proclaiming March 5th as the International Day for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Awareness. Kyrgyzstan, together with partners, including UNODA, annually organize events to raise awareness among the government, civil society, youth, and academia. Young people are engaged and eager to contribute. and they deserve meaningful progress. Mr. President, this conference must succeed. We urge all delegations to come to the table ready to listen, to compromise, and act in good faith. Security is not a zero-sum game. A world free of nuclear weapons is safer for all, including those states that currently possess them. Kyrgyzstan stands ready to engage constructively with all partners. We support the adoption of consensus final document that advances all three pillars of the treaty. And I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Kyrgyzstan for his statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Libya. Excellencies.

Ladies and gentlemen, at the outset, on behalf of the permanent representative, who regrets that he was not able to participate in person today, my delegation congratulates His Excellency, Ambassador Do Hong Viet, on his assumption of the presidency of this conference. And we reiterate our support for your efforts to bring divergent perspectives closer in light of the increasing security challenges facing our world today. My delegation joins the positions expressed in the statement of the Arab Group and the statement of the African Group, as well as the statement delivered on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. Our support for these positions stems from a firm conviction of the importance of collective action to address selectivity in the application of international standards. We also believe it's important for our voices to be heard, especially the voices of developing states, in the for determining the fate of international security. Libya's adherence to the NPT stems from a firm conviction that the system of collective security can be established only by balancing the three pillars of the treaty. In this regard, we recall that the voluntary and full compliance with our disarmament obligations for more than two decades was a strategic choice that aims at strengthening international confidence and advancing comprehensive disarmament. Mr. President, this compliance, which embodies a response to international demands, places the international community face to face with its legal and moral responsibilities to implement the principle of reciprocity. We cannot continue in a state of imbalance between non-nuclear states fulfilling their obligations and nuclear states procrastinating the implementation of their commitments under Article 6 of the Treaty. In this spirit, we stress the following priorities. First, consolidating the foundations of collective security by providing comprehensive and unconditional guarantees to non-nuclear states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This is an inherent right of states that have chosen the path of peace. Second, we must ensure that the right to access nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes is not politicized. Discriminatory restrictions on technology transfer impede sustainable development efforts in developing countries that have demonstrated their full commitment to the safeguards of the IAEA. Third, we emphasize that the stability of the Middle East remains closely linked to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. The continued non-implementation of the resolution of 1995 on the Middle East undermines the credibility of the NPT. Therefore, we urge all parties to exert real pressure so that all nuclear facilities in the region are subjected to the comprehensive safeguards regime. In conclusion, my delegation renews its commitment to constructive action in hope that this conference will produce a balanced outcome document that will bring the disarmament process back on track and that will prove that the approach of compliance and sincere cooperation is the only way to achieve global security with no regard for the politics of armament and threats. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Libya. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Holy See. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. President. At the outset, let me express the congratulations of my delegation on your election as President of this 11th Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We come together at a time of profound gravity for the international community. As Pope Leo XIV observes, In our time, the weakness of multilateralism is a particular cause for concern at the international level. A diplomacy that promotes dialogue and seeks consensus among all parties is being replaced by a diplomacy based on force. War is back in vogue, and a zeal for war is spreading. The implications of this are deeply concerning. Rhetoric contemplating the use of nuclear weapons has re-emerged, as too has the idea of resuming their testing. At the same time, nuclear arsenals are being modernized and emerging technologies, including AI, are being increasingly integrated into military and nuclear systems. There is also a growing tendency to reinterpret deterrence in ways that risk broadening its scope and reducing longstanding thresholds of restraint. In such a climate, the very foundations of security are placed under strain. For this reason, the NPT, with its three mutually reinforcing pillars, remains an essential framework. Mr. President, the Holy See recalls that the obligation enshrined in Article VI is a binding commitment to pursue concrete and verifiable progress towards nuclear disarmament in good faith. In the current context, this obligation has taken on a new sense of urgency. The modernization of nuclear arsenals and the reliance on deterrence in security doctrines risks re-entrenching a paradigm that is already strategically and morally questionable. Pope Leo XIV argues that such confrontational logic now dominates global politics, deepening instability and unpredictability. This concern is further intensified by the integration of advanced systems, including artificial intelligence, into nuclear decision-making processes. Decisions of such gravity must be firmly rooted in human responsibility. Otherwise, instability and ethical concerns will worsen. Advancing risk reduction and de-escalation measures assumes particular importance. especially in a context marked by heightened tensions and diminished trust. In this regard, the revitalization of arms control remains indispensable. The entry into force of the CTBT is of central importance, as is progress towards negotiating a fissile material cut-off treaty. At the same time, the TPNW makes an important and complementary contribution to the implementation of Article VI, as it provides a concrete means of achieving its ultimate goal: the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Mr. President, the Holy See reaffirms the central role of the NPT as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. It is therefore essential that all its provisions be implemented in a full and balanced manner in order to preserve the integrity of the Treaty and foster confidence and responsibility among States. Strengthening the safeguards systems of the International Atomic Energy Agency, including through the universalization of the Additional Protocol, remains an important element in ensuring transparency and accountability. Nonproliferation cannot, however, rely on verification mechanisms alone. It requires sustained efforts to address the root causes of insecurity through dialogue and responsible engagement. In this regard, nuclear-weapon-free zones continue to be a tangible regional expression of a shared commitment to peace and security. Disarmament and non-proliferation remain closely interrelated. Progress in one area reinforces the other, while stagnation in one field inevitably affects both. Mr. President, the Holy See reaffirms the inalienable right of all states to develop the peaceful use of nuclear energy in full compliance with their non-proliferation obligations. When pursued responsibly, nuclear technologies can contribute in meaningful ways to human well-being, demonstrating how scientific progress can be placed at the service of life and human dignity. At the same time, such activities demand the highest safety, security, and environmental responsibility standards. Protection of nuclear facilities, especially in situations of armed conflict, is an urgent concern for the international community. In this regard, international cooperation, especially through the IAEA, remains essential. Mr. President, the present moment undoubtedly poses serious challenges. However, this does not relieve the international community of its responsibility, nor does it extinguish hope. Pope Leo XIV strongly affirms the need to work towards a peace that is disarmed and disarming. This is a peace that does not rest on balancing mutual fears. It is built upon trust, dialogue, and the recognition of our shared humanity. The NPT continues to offer a way forward, Not only is its full and balanced implementation a legal obligation, it is also a responsibility toward present and future generations. This means choosing a path that affirms that security can be based not on fear, but on responsibility, cooperation, and hope. A full version of this statement will be uploaded. Thank you, Mr. President.

Thank the distinguished representative of the Holy See for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Luxembourg. You have the floor, ma'am.

Thank you very much, Mr. President. Allow me to sincerely congratulate you on your election to the presidency of this 11th Review Conference. Rest assured, you have the full support of my delegation. Luxembourg aligns itself fully with the statement of the European Union. I would now like to add several remarks in our national capacity. Mr. President, the international environment is under extreme strain. The rhetoric of some nuclear powers and the collapse of the non-proliferation framework are posing a growing risk of a new wave of proliferation. Since its entry into force, the NPT has allowed us, as much as possible, to ensure control over nuclear proliferation-related challenges. We therefore call upon the delegations here present to understand the consequences of the weakening, the violation, or even the disappearance of the treaty. the expiry of the New START Treaty cannot be the prelude to a more significant reversal. In this context, Luxembourg reaffirms its commitment to the NPT as the cornerstone of the global security architecture. To revitalize the treaty and to imbue it with constructive momentum, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is necessary, as is necessary the launch of negotiations aiming to prohibit the production of fissile Even more urgently, we call upon the States that possess the largest nuclear arsenals to, without delay, begin substantive discussions on strategic stability. This Review Conference represents a genuine opportunity in that regard. Mr. President, Each signatory State of the NPT is obliged to support the IAEA in its essential role to prevent proliferation and nuclear accidents. Throughout its first term on the Board of Governors of the Agency, Luxembourg supported efforts aimed at maintaining the seven pillars of nuclear safety and security. In this context, my delegation once again calls upon Russia to stop compromising civilian nuclear infrastructure in Ukraine. And since that cannot be fully guaranteed as long as this war of aggression continues, we call upon Russia to withdraw from Ukrainian territory. In view of the worrying situation in the Middle East, Iran must immediately reestablish comprehensive cooperation with the IAEA. What's more, any strike targeting nuclear infrastructure or the surrounding area could lead to catastrophic consequences. We therefore call for de-escalation and we welcome the ceasefire between the United States and Iran. Lastly, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues its illicit weapons of mass destruction programs. growing military cooperation between the DPRK and Russia, as well as Moscow's irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, are all the more worrying because they contravene multiple Security Council resolutions. That is compounded by the tacit support of China to the DPRK, which undermines the spirit of the NPT. Mr. President, Luxembourg categorically refutes erroneous or even fallacious reinterpretations of NATO's extended nuclear deterrence, promoted by a minority of states for just a few years. NATO's nuclear posture remains fully in accordance with the NPT and has manifestly contributed to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. These current questions seem above all to aim to distract attention from Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and also from the rapid and opaque growth of the Chinese nuclear arsenal. Mr. President, we have a collective duty to to return to the spirit that led to the creation of the NPT. We must also turn our principled commitments to the Treaty into concrete measures, that is to say, these mutual confidence building, transparency, and heightened predictability, as well as effective export controls. We must show responsibility, good faith, and determination in order to preserve our credibility. By returning to the spirit of cooperation that has always guided the NPT, we can once again pave the way towards a safer and more stable future for all. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Luxembourg for her statement. And I have the honor to invite His Excellency Sun Xiaobo, Director General for Arms Control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China.

Mr. President, the Chinese delegation congratulate you on your election as the President of the 11th Review Conference. At present, the international order is marked by increasing uncertainty and instability, and the global security situation is complex and grave. Certain major country pursues a policy that puts its own country first and follows the hegemonic and bullying logic that whoever follows it will survive, while whoever defies it shall perish. It has wantonly imposed sanctions and blockades on other countries, started conflicts and wars across the globe, and blatantly trampled on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other countries, posing a grave threat to national security and even the basic right to survival of small and medium-sized countries. Such actions have severely undermined the UN-centered international system, the international order based on international law, and the basic norms governing international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. Hegemonism, power politics, and unilateralism constitute grave threats and challenges to the NPT. Certain major country has been pursuing absolute strategic superiority, wantonly withdrawing from multilateral and bilateral agreements on arms control and placing its own self-interest above the international consensus on arms control and the common security interests of all countries. It is also strengthening nuclear alliance. deploying strategic offensive forces such as nuclear weapons and intermediate-range missiles in close proximity to other nuclear weapons states, and building the Golden Dome global missile defense system. These actions heighten the risk of an arms race, severely undermine global strategic balance and stability, and lead to increasing politicization, bloc-based polarization, and the fragmentation of multilateral arms control. Mr. President, the NPT is the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime and a key pillar of the post-World War II international security order. The pressing priority is for all countries to jointly oppose the use or threat of use of force in international relations and to strengthen the shared resolve to prevent a nuclear war. China calls on nuclear weapons states to demonstrate political courage. through early negotiations on and the conclusion of a mutual no-first-use treaty or issuing a political statement to that effect. The review conference should attach equal importance to the nuclear threats faced by non-nuclear weapon states. China calls for the early negotiation on the international legal instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states. Nuclear disarmament should be advanced in a step-by-step manner in accordance with the principles of maintaining global strategic stability and undiminished security for all. Certain country has been hyping up the nuclear threats posed by other countries in an attempt to justify its own investment of trillions of dollars in modernizing its nuclear forces. It has been calling for the so-called multilateral nuclear arms control and strategic stability dialogue. with the real purpose of shirking its special and primary responsibilities as a country with the largest nuclear arsenal. Such attempt to shift the burden of nuclear disarmament to other countries will lead nowhere. China has no interest in such kind of arrangements. China calls on relevant country to actively consider Russia's proposal and handle the follow-up arrangements following the expiration of the New START Treaty in a responsible manner. China is committed to the objectives and purposes of CTBT and strictly adheres to its moratorium on nuclear testing. We urge relevant country to recognize the grave consequences of resuming nuclear testing against the prevailing trend of history. Countries benefiting from nuclear umbrella should play a constructive role in nuclear disarmament rather than creating obstacles to it. Without the authorization of the Security Council, launching military strikes against the nuclear facilities of other countries under IAEA safeguards constitutes a serious violation of international law. In essence, such actions under the pretext of nonproliferation trample on the sovereignty of other countries, seek regime change, and pursue geopolitical self-interest, thereby greatly increasing the risk of nuclear proliferation. All countries should be highly vigilant regarding the nuclear proliferation risk posed by the AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation. In the current context, it's even more important and urgent to promote the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. China calls on parties to fully and effectively implement the relevant decisions and resolutions on establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Israel should join NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state as soon as possible and place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Senior government officials from a certain country have publicly announced its intention of possessing nuclear weapons, which seriously undermines the authority and credibility of NPT. Japan, as a defeated country in World War II, refuses to acknowledge this status. It is pushing to revise its pacifist constitution and the three non-nuclear principles, expand its long-range strike capabilities, and seek to have nuclear weapons deployed on its territory by its ally. The international community must stay on high alert, strengthen its oversight and verification of Japan, take seriously the grave imbalance between Japan's production capacity and consumption of sensitive nuclear materials, and resolutely prevent Japan from acquiring nuclear weapons. No regional security architecture should be based on nuclear proliferation. China advocates for the abolition of NATO's nuclear sharing and extended deterrence arrangements. The international community should resolutely oppose any new nuclear sharing arrangement. Forward deterrence may have a negative impact on nuclear nonproliferation and warrants close attention. China opposes nuclear weapons states deploying nuclear weapons, constructing nuclear weapons infrastructure in non-nuclear weapons states, or transferring to them weapons-grade nuclear materials for military purposes. Non-nuclear weapons states have inalienable rights to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We should resolutely oppose the politicization of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, promote a balanced approach to nonproliferation and the peaceful uses, and safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of all countries in the peaceful use of nuclear technology. China supports increasing assistance to countries in the Global South in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Mr. President, China's nuclear policy maintains a high degree of stability, consistency, and predictability. China's nuclear strategy of self-defense will not change. Its policy of no first use of nuclear weapons will not change. Its stance against participating in the arms race will not change. Its willingness to participate in efforts to reduce strategic risks will not change. And its commitment to keeping its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security will not change. China's nuclear forces serve to deter nuclear war, promote development and prosperity, and safeguard global and regional peace. China will participate constructively in the deliberations in this review conference and consultations on the outcome document. At the same time, China opposes any country distorting and vilifying China's nuclear policy. and will never allow any actions that undermine China's sovereignty, security, and development interests. Thank you, President.

I thank the distinguished representative of China for his statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Croatia.

Mr. President, Excellencies. Croatia aligns itself with a statement delivered by European Union and would like to add following in its national capacity. We gather at the time of mounting geopolitical instability marked by rising nuclear risks and intensifying strategic rivalry. In this context, the NPT remains indispensable. It is the cornerstone of global efforts to prevent proliferation, advance disarmament, and ensure the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Safeguarding and reinforcing the NPT is not optional. It is a strategic necessity for international peace and security. The global security environment is deteriorating. Arms control architectures are eroding. Trust is diminishing. And emerging technologies are reshaping the risk landscape. Any weakening of the NPT undermines global stability. We call on all States Parties to fully and without reservation implement their obligations across all three pillars. The case of the DPRK remains a clear and urgent warning of the consequences of non-compliance. Nuclear safety and security risks have escalated, particularly in Europe. Russia's aggression against Ukraine, including military operations near nuclear facilities, places millions at risk and is wholly unacceptable. Russia's irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and coercive posture dangerously raise the risk of escalation and are incompatible with its obligations under the NPT. We are also deeply concerned by the scale of China's nuclear expansion. We urge China to uphold testing moratorium, engage substantively on risk reduction and verification, and support the CTBT framework. Croatia is equally clear that Iran must never acquire a nuclear weapon. We call on Iran to fully comply with its NPT obligations, cooperate fully with the EIA and engage constructively in negotiations toward a credible and verifiable agreement. The International Atomic Energy Agency remains central to the credibility of the non-proliferation regime. Its safeguards and its Its safeguards and its role in enabling the safe and peaceful use of nuclear technology are essential for maintaining trust and supporting sustainable development. A strong, independent, and well-resourced IAEA is indispensable. At the same time, rapid advances in artificial intelligence are introducing new strategic uncertainties. A robust, inclusive, and effective multilateral approach is urgently required. Human control over nuclear decision-making must remain absolute. In this context, the continued delay in the entry into force of the CTBT is unacceptable. The global moratorium on nuclear testing must be upheld and strengthened without exception. Croatia's position is shaped by its own experience. Having endured aggression and successfully transitioned from non-alignment to full integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, Croatia understands both the costs of insecurity and the value of collective defense. This underpins our firm commitment to a rule-based international order. Croatia neither possesses nor seeks nuclear weapons. However, we are clear-eyed about today's realities. Credible deterrence remains essential to prevent conflict. As a committed member of NATO, Croatia contributes actively to collective defence. Allies have increased defence investment to reinforce readiness, resilience and deterrence. This is not escalation. It is a responsible action to preserve peace, protect democratic societies and prevent further proliferation. NATO's nuclear arrangements remain fully consistent with the objectives of the NPT. At the same time, Croatia remains firmly committed to the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons, achieved through a realistic, step-by-step and verifiable process that ensures equal security for all. The challenges we face are serious but manageable, and NPT remains our most effective instrument. Croatia reaffirms its unwavering commitment to multilateralism, international law, and collective security. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Croatia for her statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of the Republic of Cyprus. You have the floor.

Mr. President, Excellencies, Distinguished Delegates, It is an honor to address the 2026 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Kindly allow me to add my delegation's congratulations on your election as President of the 11th NPT Review Conference. Cyprus fully aligns with the European Union statement and would like to add the following remarks in its national capacity. Cyprus, a party to the treaty since 1970, remains steadfast in its commitment to the NPT as a cornerstone of the global architecture for nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament. The NPT and its three pillars of nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy is central to our collective security and the advancement of a rules-based international order. We reiterate our strong believe in the full implementation of the FPT. In line with the spirit of multilateralism, Cyprus underscores that only through multilateral approaches can we address the complex and evolving nuclear risks of our time. It is clear that unilateral actions and fragmented efforts will not be enough to safeguard our future from the perils posed by nuclear weapons. As we look to the future, it is imperative that we pursue verifiable and irreversible steps towards nuclear disarmament, consistent with Article VI of the NPT. We call on all States to demonstrate transparency in their nuclear policies and to take concrete actions to reduce nuclear arsenals. Cyprus remains committed to working with all partners to make progress on these vital issues. Mr. President. To further reduce the risks posed by nuclear weapons, we emphasize the need for enhanced risk reduction measures. This includes stronger communication and greater efforts to ensure stability and predictability in nuclear relations. We believe that confidence-building measures are crucial to reducing the likelihood of miscalculations that could lead to conflict. Additionally, we remain firm in our belief that strengthening the nuclear safeguards system is essential for the credibility and effectiveness of the NPT. It is of utmost importance that the International Atomic Energy Agency maintains its ability to verify compliance with nonproliferation commitments and that states uphold their obligations under the treaty to ensure that the peaceful use of nuclear energy is not diverted for military purposes. In this context, Cyprus reaffirms its unwavering support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We call for the entry into force of the CTBT without further delay, recognizing that the complete cessation of nuclear explosions is a critical step toward global disarmament and non-proliferation. Let us, therefore, reaffirm our resolve to strengthen the NPT and work together toward a world free from the threat of nuclear weapons. Let us work together to ensure a successful NPT Review Conference, one that enhances the treaty's effectiveness and lays the foundation for a safer, more secure world for generations to come. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Republic of Cyprus for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Liechtenstein.

Thank you so much for the floor, Mr. President. The NPT has stood for decades as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime, reflecting a broad consensus on nuclear non-proliferation and on the long-term objective of complete nuclear disarmament. These commitments continue to reflect the wishes of an overwhelming majority of states, civil society and people around the world.

Nevertheless.

We cannot simply state that things are moving in the wrong direction, as we gather for yet another review conference. Geopolitical tensions are escalating. Nuclear weapon states are modernizing and expanding their nuclear arsenals. The threat of the use of nuclear weapons has been used as a tool of blackmail in international relations. And there are no credible disarmament negotiations underway. while previous agreements have expired. We face a massive threat to the stability and credibility of the global nuclear governance system. In this context, this Review Conference takes on particular urgency, even when prospects for a successful outcome are limited. The Conference offers a vital opportunity to reaffirm that working towards a world without nuclear weapons is not just an ideal, but a shared global duty. Adherence to international law is indispensable to allowing us to change course in a positive manner, addressing the risks of nuclear weapons and of further proliferation. In this context, the International Court of Justice found that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular, the principles and rules of humanitarian law. The reality of the humanitarian consequences is stark. Any use of nuclear weapons would cause indiscriminate and catastrophic harm. making compliance with international humanitarian law implausible, if not outright impossible. Today, there is a growing emphasis on military preparedness in our part of the world, an unfortunate one, given the NPT's emphasis on disarmament, but one that reflects the grim reality. The aggression against Ukraine and the resulting destruction of the European security architecture cast a long shadow over Europe. We are appalled that the Russian Federation has repeatedly threatened to use its nuclear weapons. We're equally concerned by the DPRK's continuous build-up of its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs and have thus aligned ourselves with France's joint statement. Mr. President, we are concerned that the global race for nuclear weapons is at a record high. This trajectory undermines the treaty's credibility at the moment of growing global insecurity. Liechtenstein remains extremely concerned by the situation in Iran and reiterates its firm opposition to Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapon, which is illegal under international law and will only make the people of Iran, the wider region and the entire world less safe. Accordingly, we support all diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions and to bring about a lasting solution to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. We call on Iran to fully implement its obligations under the NPT, relevant Security Council resolutions and its legally binding comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Mr. President, Liechtenstein supports all efforts towards complete disarmament under strict and effective international control as enshrined in the TPNW. We also wish to stress the importance of preserving the global norm against nuclear testing. with the CTBT remaining essential to preventing a renewed arms race. And the NPT remains essential to global security too. In a moment of growing nuclear risks, we must reaffirm our commitment to the treaty's core obligations and to the international law that underpins them. Mr. President, this Review Conference offers an opportunity to rebuild trust, restore dialogue, and renew credible progress on disarmament and non-proliferation. Our shared security depends on collective action, and Liechtenstein stands ready to work with all partners to strengthen the NPT and advance a safer world. I thank you so much.

I thank the distinguished representative of Liechtenstein for his statement. I now invite His Excellency Andrey Belousov, Ambassador-at-Large of the Russian Federation for the NPT review process, to make a statement. You have the floor, Excellency.

Thank you, Mr. President. Before delivering my national statement, I will carry out the instructions of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, and read out his address to the participants and guests of the conference. Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, I welcome you on the occasion of the opening of the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The obligations on non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy provided for by the Treaty are of fundamental importance to international security and fully serve the interests of both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. Our country, as a responsible state party to the NPT and one of its depositories, strictly adheres to the letter and spirit of the treaty. We believe that in the current challenging international situation, additional multilateral efforts are clearly required in order to create conditions for further progress towards building a world free of nuclear weapons. while necessarily upholding the principle of undiminished security for all. It is our position that all states complying with their obligations under the Treaty in good faith have the inalienable right to enjoy the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without any restrictions. I would like to reaffirm that Russia, as a leader in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, is ready to continue to develop constructive cooperation in this area with all interested NPT States Parties. We hope that the Conference will be productive and will make a significant contribution to strengthening the non-proliferation regime, ensuring peace, security and stability on the planet. I sincerely wish you success in your work and all the best, President Putin. Mr. President, Allow me to congratulate you on your election to this position of responsibility and assure you of our continued readiness to engage on all issues arising during the conference. We are grateful to the UN Secretariat for its efforts in organizing this forum. And now I will proceed with our national statements. Mr. President, distinguished colleagues, the Non-Proliferation Treaty is a cornerstone of international peace and security. As a State Party and one of its depositaries, the Russian Federation remains committed to the letter and spirit of the treaty, fully complies with all its obligations thereunder, and advocates for its further strengthening. The national report we have submitted details the steps that have been taken by our country in recent years to implement the treaty's provisions. Over the years of its existence, the NPT has proven to be a viable instrument that serves the interests and common good of humanity. A historic milestone in this regard was the indefinite and unconditional extension of the treaty in 1995. And that decision cannot be revised. The uniqueness and the value of the NPT lie in the balance between its three equally important and mutually reinforcing pillars: nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The interrelationship between these elements is the very foundation of the treaty, and it cannot be broken. The current state of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime gives cause for concern. The treaty is under severe strain. The trend of instrumentalizing the NPT for self-serving political purposes, unrelated to the substance of the treaty itself, has once again found expression in the unprovoked, unjustified, and unlawful aggression by Israel and the United States against Iran, during which the civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards have been subjected to multiple attacks in Iran. Only tragedy of the current situation in Iran for the NPT lies in the fact that under the pretext of false allegations of a military nuclear program, a state blatantly disregarding the treaty, together with a depository state acting in its interests, have jointly attacked a good faith party to the treaty. The deterioration of the international security environment and strategic stability continues to be fueled by the provocative and destructive actions of Western nuclear weapons states. This significantly undermines the prospects for a substantive and fruitful dialogue on arms control and disarmament, both within the NPT framework and in other relevant forms and formats. The United States categorically rejected Russia's initiative to preserve the legacy of the New START treaty through voluntary self-restraint measures and declared its readiness to increase its nuclear arsenal beyond the limits of that agreement at any time, as well as to resume nuclear testing. The United Kingdom has been building up its strategic nuclear capabilities for several years. It has also redeployed U.S. nuclear weapons in its national territory and announced its participation in the further expansion of NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements, a practice that is deeply destabilizing and has been undermining the NPT regime for many decades. France which announced plans to increase its nuclear capabilities on the eve of the review conference, is actively drawing European non-nuclear weapon states into arrangements reminiscent of the so-called extended nuclear deterrence frameworks practiced by the US in the Asia-Pacific region, which are intended to reinforce the US nuclear umbrella over Europe. All this is taking place with the enthusiastic approval and has already been noted often the direct involvement of other countries of the collective West. Many of them are ever more insistently making suggestions that are detrimental to the NPT, implying the possibility of a move towards the possession of nuclear weapons. The leadership of the EU appears to be guided by similar considerations. Moreover, information has come to light that certain actors in London and Paris We're seriously considering the outrageous and utterly unacceptable idea of transferring elements of nuclear weapons to Ukraine, a step that would directly undermine the NPT's core provisions. This crosses all conceivable boundaries. We have listed only a small part of our concerns regarding the obstacles created by Western states to the full implementation of the objectives of the NPT. These concerns are set out in detail in the relevant section of the national report of the Russian Federation and in our working papers. In these circumstances, our country seeks to act in the most responsible and well-considered manner possible. In the absence of US engagement with our pragmatic proposals on post-START arrangements, we will continue to chart our course in this area based on a thorough analysis of the military policies of Western nuclear weapons states and the overall strategic environment. In the longer term, we remain open to seeking equal, mutually acceptable, dialogue-based solutions aimed at the comprehensive stabilization of the strategic environment. but only provided that appropriate conditions are in place for such engagement, which should focus on viable solutions serving the core interests of all parties. Taking into account political, military, and strategic realities when considering any disarmament initiatives remains an immutable imperative for the Russian Federation. With regard to the implementation of the disarmament pillar of the NPT, the only international legal benchmark for us is the treaty itself. At the same time, the ultimate objective of building a nuclear-weapon-free and safer world for all must be pursued through a fundamental approach that ensures that such efforts are seamlessly integrated into the framework of general and complete disarmament, while strictly adhering to the principle of undiminished security for all. We cannot agree with attempts to impose an immediate and unconditional renunciation of nuclear weapons and the concept of nuclear deterrence on nuclear weapons states without developing effective alternative security mechanisms. Such a radical approach amounts to a complete disregard for the legitimate interests of our country and for fundamental disarmament principles. as well as a deliberate unwillingness to adequately assess and duly consider the state of international security and strategic stability. At the same time, the Russian Federation remains open to the highly difficult yet inevitable discussion on how to collectively foster an environment conducive to disarmament. Both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states will have to contribute to this process. Mr. President, We consider the IAEA safeguards system to be a reliable instrument for verifying states' compliance with their non-proliferation obligations. Our view is that the presumption of innocence and respect for the sovereignty of states must continue to underpin the agency's safeguards activities. And any reforms must ensure that the agency's verification mechanism remains objective, depoliticized, technically sound, and fully consistent with the safeguard agreements concluded between states and the Agency. The establishment and functioning of nuclear weapon-free zones in various regions of the world, as envisioned by Article VII of the NPT, contribute to the strengthening of the NPT-based international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Nuclear weapons states' accession to the relevant protocols to the treaties establishing such zones is the best way to provide the members of the nuclear-weapon-free zones with legally binding assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them. Russia has ratified all protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties that it has signed, thereby providing legally binding negative security assurances to over 100 countries. Our reservations to the protocols are intended to provide clarity and do not affect the interests of states that faithfully comply with their obligations under NWFZ treaties. We believe it is necessary to give serious consideration to whether there are sufficient grounds for providing negative security assurances under a possible universal agreement to states that are conventionally regarded as non-nuclear weapon states under the NPT and the meaning of the NPT, yet which through interstate military cooperation frameworks are involved in nuclear sharing and extended nuclear deterrence arrangements. This matter calls for the most careful and thorough consideration. We reaffirm the significance and relevance of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East adopted at the NPT Review and Extension Conference. As one of its co-sponsors, we support the efforts to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the region. The growing global interest in nuclear energy demonstrates its continued relevance and importance. More and more states are incorporating nuclear energy into their energy mix and are stepping up the use of peaceful nuclear energy in industry, agriculture, medicine, and other key sectors of their economies. Nuclear energy ensures both stability and security of energy supply while also contributing to climate agenda objectives. due to the low-carbon nature of nuclear energy generation. This unique combination of features gives nuclear technologies a crucial role in the future of humanity. Article IV of the NPT guarantees the inalienable rights for States Parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Russian Federation is actively exercising this right itself and assisting other countries in doing so. We have consistently advocated for broader access for NPT States Parties to the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy and the development of international cooperation in this field. We stress that each State Party to the NPT has the right to freely pursue an independent national nuclear energy policy and to engage in cooperation in this field without discrimination. We hope that the conference will be held in a spirit of mutual respect and constructive engagement. We believe it is essential to focus our efforts on developing consensus-based solutions acceptable to all participants, with a view to strengthening the Treaty and its fundamental pillars. Thank you very much for your attention. The full text of the statement will be available on the official website of the conference.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation for his statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Chile. You have the floor.

Thank you very much, Mr. President. Allow me to express our congratulations to you on taking up the leadership of this review conference. We fully trust in your ability to conduct the work inclusively, and we express our firm commitment to make a positive contribution to this undertaking. For my delegation, this conference is particularly important. We have from the outset reaffirmed our commitment to strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as the pursuit of a consensus outcome, with a view to preserving the legitimacy and effectiveness of this regime, Mr. President. the eight decades after the first use of the nuclear weapon, the international community remains permanently responsible to make sure that these weapons are not used under any circumstances. This conviction not only responds to the historic memory of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences related to their use, but it also is an ethical and political basis upon which the international disarmament and nonproliferation regime was built. Consequently, with this obligation, Chile is and has been a firm promoter of general and disarmament, always leading the debate in a broad and inclusive multilateral space, we firmly believe in the principle of the indivisibility of international security and shared responsibility of all states to preserve it. The Non-Proliferation Treaty is undoubtedly a central part of the border based on rules and cooperation. It is the cornerstone of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. We are convinced that this international instrument has been essential for the maintenance of international peace and security. Mr. President, this review conference asks us to comprehensively evaluate the implementation of the treaty based on its three fundamental pillars, nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Chile believes it is essential to make balanced progress in this implementation. We recognize what has been achieved in particular in, um, containing nuclear non-proliferation, however, we believe it is necessary to re-evaluate efforts and renew them in the area of nuclear disarmament, that is an area in which there continue to be significant challenges, in this regard, we wish to be clear. Although on the one hand we see that since the origins of the NPT, the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been limited, at the same time we regret the fact that we are not making significant progress on nuclear disarmament. When it comes to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, we wish to reaffirm our commitment to Article IV of the Treaty. The full relevance of the inalienable right of all parties to research, produce, and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must be strengthened. We recognize the valuable work of the International Atomic Energy Agency in this area. It provides a platform for cooperation in the nuclear sphere that is inclusive and open to all states to promote the use of nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes and in safe conditions. Mr. President, the NPT continues to be an essential instrument. It shows that multilateral agreements can contribute to stability, predictability, and confidence and trust among states. For that reason, Chile reiterates the importance of strengthening this regime, not only through the results and outcomes of this conference, but also through the continued commitment of states parties to its objectives and obligations. We hope for and we are committed to the adoption of a consensus outcome. At the same time, we hope that the bar for measuring the success of the NPT is not just in the form of this adoption every five years, but rather the commitment of all Member States to continue contributing to the disarmament regime and the NPT. This must transcend this moment of uncertainty. so that we can achieve results from a treaty with unique characteristics. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

I thank the distinguished representative of Chile for his statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of San Marino.

Mr. President, first of all, I would like to congratulate you on your election. You can count on this delegation's full cooperation and support. Slovenia aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union. Now I would like to add some comments in my national capacity. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Our collective commitment to the Treaty and its three mutually reinforcing pillars remains fundamental. For more than five decades, the NPT has played a critical role in strengthening international peace and security. However, today the treaty is facing profound and growing challenges. San Marino reiterates that preventing nonproliferation remains a central objective of the treaty and that we need to ensure full compliance with all the nonproliferation and disarmament obligations. The work of the Atomic Energy Agency for the implementation of comprehensive safeguards is critical to maintaining confidence in the non-proliferation regime. All states must fully cooperate with the Agency and uphold the highest standards of transparency and accountability. At the same time, my delegation underscores the equal importance of nuclear disarmament. Still today, nuclear weapons remain one of the greatest threats to our existence. We should not underestimate the catastrophic humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. Recent scientific studies have highlighted the devastating, complex and cascading humanitarian impacts of a nuclear detonation. which would create transboundary short and long-term consequences on the environment and on the life and health of present and future generations, including a disproportionate impact on women, girls and children. Progress towards a world without nuclear weapons remains an urgent and shared responsibility. The total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against their use. States possessing nuclear weapons must continue working toward the reduction and elimination of their arsenals, while also strengthening nuclear risk reduction measures and enhancing transparency and accountability. All states have indeed a national security interest in ensuring the highest possible level of transparency and accountability, as we all work to safeguard our population and territories from the risk and consequences of nuclear weapons. Mr. President, nuclear weapons are the most inhumane and indiscriminate weapons ever created, and they continue to pose an existential threat to humanity. More than 50 years after the NPT entry into force, nuclear-armed states still possess more than 12,000 nuclear weapons in the world, many of which can be used within minutes. Furthermore, integrating emerging technologies into nuclear weapon systems may increase the risk of nuclear use by heightening the chances of miscalculation, escalation, and loss of control. Meaningful human control over nuclear weapons and their delivery systems must therefore be preserved. San Marino is deeply concerned about the global increased militarism, and about the increasing relevance of nuclear weapons in security doctrines, and firmly condemns the increasing nuclear rhetoric. We reiterate that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is a violation of international law. My country is also deeply concerned about the emerging nuclear arms race, the increasing expenditures in nuclear weapons, and the modernization of nuclear arsenals. These trends contradict the spirit of the NPT. Together with the erosion of arms control framework, they undermine our confidence in our collective commitments and the credibility of the treaty itself. San Marino calls on all states, especially those possessing nuclear weapons, to undertake concrete, transparent, and irreversible measures towards nuclear disarmament. Mr. President, this review conference provides an important opportunity to rebuild trust and to strengthen the NPT regime. We cannot miss another opportunity to reaffirm our shared commitments to the treaty and to uphold the credibility of this important instrument. Thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the distinguished representative of San Marino for her statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Rwanda.

Mr. President, thank you for giving me the floor. My delegation warmly congratulates you on your election as President of the Conference, and we thank you for your leadership. Please be assured of Rwanda's constructive engagement and support. Rwanda aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and the African Group. I would like to deliver the following remarks in our national capacity. Mr. President, in this review, Rhonda begins with a direct question grounded in deliberation of the last review conference. Who are we speaking to and who is prepared to act? Because while we meet and deliberate, nuclear risk do not pause. They grow, they evolve, and they are increasingly normalized. And we must ask who benefits from this status quo certainly not the 8.3 billion people whose lives remain at stake. 8.3 billion people remain exposed to the risk posed by weapons held by a few. Rwanda is of the view, as member states, that we hold both the key and the padlock. We can choose to unlock ourselves from this threat or continue to lock future generations into permanent insecurity. For Rwanda, this is not an option. This is a test of our political will. Mr. President, the urgency of this moment has already been recognized in the Pact of the Future, where Member States committed to reducing nuclear risk and advancing disarmament. The question before us is whether we will implement those commitments or simply reaffirm them. In an era of advanced nuclear capability, continuing with business as usual is not neutrality, it is complicity. And let us be clear. No state, regardless of power or geography, will be shielded from the consequences of failure. Mr. President, nuclear weapons remain among the gravest threats to humanity and peaceful coexistence. As the United Nations marks its 80th anniversary, we must ask whether we are honoring its founding purpose or drifting away from it. Today, that purpose is under strain. Conflicts persist, trust amongst states is declining, and the global disarmament architecture is steadily eroding. Meanwhile, technological advancements are outpacing our collective ability to regulate them. Nuclear disarmament is not optional, nor is it indefinite. The total elimination of nuclear weapons remains the only absolute guarantee against their use or threat of use. Rwanda remains firmly committed to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, but commitment must be matched by credibility, and credibility requires implementation. Mr. President, we must be candid. Disarmament continues to be deferred. Commitments under Article VI remain unfulfilled, while nuclear arsenals are not only maintained but modernized and, in some cases, expanded. This contradiction cannot be ignored. It weakens trust, undermines the Treaty, and raises a fundamental question: Are we preserving the NPT or are we hollowing it out? There is also a persistent narrative that security derives from possession. Rwanda rejects this premise. True collective security cannot be built on indefinite retention of weapons capable of catastrophic destruction. Those with the greatest capabilities therefore carry the greatest responsibility to lead both in word and in action. We must therefore ask, are we generally managing risk or normalizing them? Rwanda believes the current trajectory is unsustainable. Nuclear weapon fissions demonstrate that alternatives are not only possible, they are effective. In this regard, Rwanda reaffirms its strong support to the Treaty of Pelindaba, which reflects Africa's clear and principled rejection of nuclear weapons. Mr. President, we must also rebalance priorities. Nuclear technology must not be defined solely by its destructive capacity. Its peaceful applications hold transformative potential. Rwanda underscores the fundamental importance of Article IV of the NPT, the inalienable right of all States Parties to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, and it must be fully respected. This is not a secondary issue. It is central to the Treaty's legitimacy. We therefore call for a clear shift. away from doctrines of deterrents based on destruction, and toward nuclear science in service of development in health, energy, agriculture, and climate resilience. In this regard, we commend the IAEA for its vital role in advancing safe and peaceful nuclear applications. Mr. President, in conclusion, the credibility of the NPT will not be judged by reaffirmations, but by results. Rwanda hopes that the 2026 Review Conference must not repeat past circles of unmet expectations. We must aim to deliver measurable progress, restore balance across all three pillars, and rebuild trust in the treaty's effectiveness. I thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the distinguished representative of Rwanda for her statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Sudan.

Thank you, Mr. President. At the outset, please allow me to congratulate you and your Bureau members on your election as President of the Review Conference of the NPT of 2026. We commend your tireless efforts that paved the way for the convening of this conference amid highly complex security and political circumstances. We align ourselves with the statements delivered by NAM, the Arab Group, the African Group, and the statement on behalf of the states members of the conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. I would like to deliver this statement in my national capacity. Mr. President, more than 10 years have passed since the adoption of a consensus outcome document. This setback goes beyond procedural aspects. Rather, it reflects limited political will by states to honor their obligations. We hope that the current session will achieve outcomes that meet the aspirations of all States Parties and support the NPT's credibility and sustainability. We remain committed to the NPT as a pillar of the global disarmament and nonproliferation architecture. We underscore the importance of the balanced implementation of the three pillars of the treaty. namely disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in equal measure of seriousness and commitment. For Sudan, total nuclear disarmament is the most important guarantee to prevent the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pending their total elimination. We would like to note the following: 1. The current nuclear disarmament status quo is inadmissible in any event. Gradual reduction of nuclear weapons has stalled significantly of late. Nuclear modernization programs by some countries have weakened the arms control architecture, which foments instability. and complicates challenges facing the nonproliferation regime. All indicators signal revival of nuclear competition and a nuclear arms race, which undermines the credibility of the NPT and weakens total disarmament efforts. Nuclear weapons states must honor their nonproliferation obligations under Article VI of the treaty. Transparency must be strengthened, and efforts for the effective implementation of agreed-upon commitments must be expedited. We must focus on the following priorities: One, immediate cessation of the production of fissile materials used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. This is essential to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and strengthen the credibility of the nonproliferation regime. 2. A tangible, verifiable timeline for further reductions in nuclear arsenals. This will ensure effective follow-up through the CSAs. This will also pave the way for real progress in nuclear disarmament. 3. Legally binding international instruments. that provide non-nuclear weapon states parties with effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory, and irreversible security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by nuclear weapon states, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Second. The nonproliferation regime is grappling with serious challenges. These include a lack of serious efforts to achieve the universality of the NPT and repeated cases of noncompliance by nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. These challenges must be addressed heads on. from undeclared facilities to the armament of civilian programs. This puts the CSA integrity to constant test. In this context, we reiterate our full support for the IAEA as an independent verification authority. We recall that the nonproliferation obligations are binding obligations on all states. They must not be compromised. They must be upheld to preserve the credibility and effectiveness of the nonproliferation regime. Third, on the peaceful uses, we reiterate that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is an inherent and inalienable right of the states parties to the NPT in accordance with Article 4 thereof. This advances the attainment of the SDGs. We reject any attempts to restrict this right or to impose any conditions, regardless of the justifications. Such restrictions go beyond the treaty obligations. Mr. President, the international community has acknowledged the importance of establishing zones free of nuclear weapons across the world, including in Article VII of the NPT. In this context, the Sudan calls on the Conference to recommit to the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. The resolution was adopted during the Extension and Review Conference of 1995 and was sponsored by the three depository states. This resolution is a pillar of the indefinite extension of the NPT without vote. In conclusion, Mr. President, the 11th Review Conference is not a traditional diplomatic event. If we fail to take action, the risks of miscalculation, escalation, and catastrophes will increase. We do not need new promises, but implementation. Let the Conference demonstrate to the world that we are not false witnesses to the emergence of nuclear threats. Let agree on a realistic, balanced and actionable outcome document. It doesn't have to be ideal, but it must be implementable. The choice before us is simple. We must either uphold the NPT as an indispensable pillar of global security, or we should watch it falter under the weight of our inaction. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Sudan for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mauritania.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, Ambassador Viet, at the outset, allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the 11th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

I seize the occasion to express Mauritania's full confidence that under your able leadership,

this RIFCON will make the tangible progress it aims for and be a successful session.

My delegation supports the statements delivered by Uganda, Nigeria, Egypt, respectively, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, the African Group, and the Group of Arab States, and Oman in its capacity as the President of the seventh session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Free Zone of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction. I would like to make the following remarks on my national capacity. Mr. President, there is no doubt that the NPT has contributed greatly to making our world safer and more prosperous since it first entered into force in 1970,

over 50 years ago, thanks to its three pillars of nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This makes it the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. It has not only helped prevent additional

states from acquiring nuclear weapons, but it enabled dramatic reductions in nuclear stockpiles and laid down the environment for cooperation

and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Yet, this positive landscape is not to be taken for granted, as tremendous challenges

are increasingly facing the utmost

goal of freeing the world from nuclear weapons, especially the uncertainty and the fragility of peace

caused by the growing international tensions and the polarized world resulting from, which make of nuclear disarmament a must. Therefore, the nuclear weapon states must start without further delay the implementation of their obligations.

and dismantle their nuclear arsenal and adhere to the principle of

no first use of nuclear weapons and to the negative security assurances pending the full, irreversible and verifiable nuclear disarmament.

It is equally crucial to strengthen the non-proliferation regime through multilateral negotiations and the comprehensive, universal and non-discriminatory agreements to attain the larger objective of nuclear disarmament in full compliance with the ICJ conclusion on the obligation to pursue in good

faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects and the strict and effective international control.

Mauritania reiterates its position on the inalienable

rights of states to benefit from nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in full compliance with the comprehensive safeguards agreements with the AIA and the additional protocols and comments.

This crucial role the agency is playing under the technical cooperation programs, a useful mechanism through which it transfers nuclear technology and helps countries, especially developing countries, in addressing key development priorities. Mauritania fully believes in the establishment of zone free of nuclear weapons as an effective way to achieve the goals of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.

That's why we joined the that established the nuclear weapon free zone in Africa, opened for signature in April 1996, and entered into

force in July 2009, along our full engagement in the process aiming at establishing a middle

East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in accordance with General Decision 73/546 of 2018,

following which six sessions of the conference dedicated to the goal of freeing the Middle East

from nuclear weapons and WMDs were held successfully, including the fifth session under the presidency of my country, Mauritania,

held in November 2024.

While Mauritania reiterates its commitment to the goal of the conference to advance regional and global

peace and security, we think that the establishment of such a zone with all Middle Eastern parties, including Israel, on board is an indispensable step towards the universal

versality of the NPT and the advancement of the non-proliferation and we are confident

that the current session of the conference under the Omani presidency will continue to deliver with great success.

Mr. President, to avoid the failure of the previous two review conferences, states parties to the treaty should demonstrate political

will

and good faith during the upcoming days to reach a consensus on a set of commitments

and principles to ensure nuclear disarmament and achieve the universality of the treaty, building on confidence-building measures and nuclear risk reductions that should not halt or replace the utmost goal of nuclear disarmament.

I thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the distinguished representative of Mauritania for his statement. I now have the honor to invite His Excellency, Jamal Al-Ghawai, Permanent Representative of Bahrain. You have the floor, Excellency.

Mr. Chair, I would like to deliver this statement on behalf of the states members of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, namely the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar, the State of Kuwait, and my country, the Kingdom of Bahrain. At the outset, we congratulate you, Ambassador Do Hong Viet, on assuming the presidency of the 2026 NPT Review Conference. We have every confidence that your wise leadership will guide our deliberations towards ambitious, consensus-based outcomes. We also express our appreciation for the efforts undertaken during the preparatory process, including the work of the Prep Committee, which contributed to laying the necessary groundwork for convening this conference. The States of the GCC also align themselves with the statement delivered by the fraternal delegation of the Arab Republic of Egypt on behalf of the Arab Group. The 2026 review conference is a critical opportunity to reaffirm the importance of the treaty and to strengthen its credibility in light of the growing challenges facing the disarmament and nonproliferation regime. The GCC countries affirm that the treaty remains the cornerstone of the international security architecture and providing a comprehensive framework that balances its three pillars, nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is critical. In this context, we underscore the need for a full and balanced implementation of all provisions of the treaty, especially Article VI on nuclear disarmament. It's also important to strengthen the comprehensive safeguards regime of the IAEA and to ensure full compliance by all states and respect the inalienable right of states to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the treaty's provisions. It's also important to enhance transparency, confidence building, and nuclear risk reduction through practical and verifiable measures. Mr. President, we are deeply concerned about the fact that some nuclear weapons states continue to modernize and develop their nuclear arsenals. They pursue military policies and doctrines that expand the role of nuclear weapons. This is a troubling trend that veers towards a new arms race and clearly contradicts the obligations stipulated in Article VI of the Treaty. Our countries also stress the paramount importance of adopting security assurances that are effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and legally binding, that guarantee the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States. This is an essential measure to build confidence and enhance international security, pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Mr. President, we underscore the critical importance of the regional dimension in the implementation of the Treaty, particularly in the Middle East. We reiterate the need to fully implement the 1995 resolution on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. This is a standing commitment and a priority that cannot be postponed. We welcome the progress achieved through the conference on the establishment of the WMD-free zone and continue to fully support this multilateral track on a basis of inclusivity and non-selectivity, with a view to reaching a legally binding agreement that reflects the will of the states of the region. We also fully support the efforts of the fraternal state of the Sultanate of Oman as the President of the current session of the Conference. We commend its constructive leadership, which has contributed to sustaining momentum and facilitating dialogue among participating States, as well as advancing the process towards achieving the Conference's shared objectives. In this context, Mr. President, It would be remiss not to mention the grave security threats that our states are suffering, which have a particular impact on disarmament and nonproliferation. We have suffered Iranian attacks that are a flagrant violation of the principles of international security and the UN Charter, and this destabilizes regional peace and stability. There is no legal basis for such attacks. The international community's position has been clear, especially through Security Council Resolution 2817, which has received support from 136 states and has condemned such acts on the part of Iran and emphasized that they are considered a threat to international peace and security. In this context, we underscore the importance of Iran abiding its international obligations and collaborating in a transparent manner with the IAEA in order to guarantee that its nuclear program is totally peaceful. We emphasize the importance of enhancing shared security through good neighborliness and non-interference in the internal affairs of states and supporting the efforts of states aiming to achieve de-escalation. It is also important not to use any pretext to undermine regional security and stability. The challenges facing the non-proliferation regime now are not theoretical, rather they affect the stability of the international community. Accordingly, the success of this conference will not be measured by statements, but by our ability to take practical steps that address existing shortcomings and restore balance in the implementation of the treaty obligations. The states of the Gulf Cooperation Council stress that any selectivity or absence of accountability, particularly with regard to nuclear disarmament and the universality of the treaty, will undermine its credibility in the long term. Against this backdrop, we reiterate our full commitment to constructive engagement with all partners. We call for mobilizing the necessary political will to achieve tangible outcomes. that enhance international peace and security and bring us closer to the shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the distinguished permanent representative of Bahrain for his statement on behalf of the GCC. I now invite the distinguished representative of Madagascar.

thank you very much Mr President at the outset I would like to congratulate you on your election rest assured you have the full support of the malaga's delegation to make this review conference not just an opportunity to state what divides us but rather the driver of a renewal of multilateralism Madagascar aligns fully with the statements delivered on behalf of the African group and the non-aligned movement and in our national capacity, would like to add the following. Mr. President, we are meeting at a worrying moment where the shadow of the nuclear threat is once again hanging over international relations. For Madagascar, an island state at the heart of the Indian Ocean, security cannot rest on the accumulation of arsenals capable of annihilating our civilization several times over. Far from being a utopian quest, Disarmament for Madagascar represents a legally binding obligation, in accordance with the commitments signed up to under Article 6. We call upon nuclear weapons states to abandon the sole logic of risk management for the sake of a momentum of the total, irreversible and verifiable elimination of them. As long as these weapons exist, the spectre of accidental miscalculation or intentional use will continue to be an existential threat for all of humanity. Mr. President, Madagascar is absolutely firm on disarmament because we firmly believe in the potential of the atom for life. We reaffirm our inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. For a developing country such as ours, access to nuclear technology represents much more than mere technical cooperation. It is an imperative of human dignity and a major lever for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. In the medical arena, we have the ambition that cancer diagnosis and treatment will no longer be an unaffordable luxury, but will instead be an effective right that is accessible for each Malagasy citizen. Similarly, faced with the environment emergency, the civilian atom, needs to allow us to transform our agriculture so that it can resist climate shocks and, at long last, guarantee sustainable food security for our population. In this regard, Madagascar calls for the strengthening of technology transfer mechanisms. The technical assistance of the IAEA must be preserved and protected from any politicization. Mr. President, Madagascar reaffirms with conviction that it belongs to a sanctuary of peace as a state party to the Pelindaba Treaty, which enshrines Africa as a nuclear-weapons-free zone. We call upon nuclear-weapon States to scrupulously respect this status. Similarly, the Indian Ocean must remain a zone of peace in accordance with Resolution 2832 of the United Nations General Assembly from 1971. It must not become a theater for the projection of nuclear power. Along the same lines, Madagascar reiterates its tireless commitment to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We encourage the remaining States in Annex 2 to ratify the Treaty without delay. While we await its entry into force, we call upon nuclear-weapon States to maintain their unilateral moratoria on test explosions. Mr. President, The success of this conference will be measured by our ability to restore confidence. Madagascar refuses a world divided between those that claim the right to destroy and those that suffer in fear. We call for a world where the atom is exclusively synonymous with progress, healing and light. To conclude, Madagascar calls upon States Parties to renew their faith in the NPT regime. It is now up to us to adopt a final document that is balanced and substantive, which is the only capable -- the only compass capable of leading the next review cycle towards genuine peace. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Madagascar for his statement. I now have the honor to invite Mr. Christopher Yeo, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control and Nonproliferation of the United States of America. You have the floor, Excellency.

Excellencies, colleagues, it is a pleasure to be here with you today. And congratulations to Ambassador Viet on your election to the presidency. I trust we are in good hands with you. For over 50 years, the NPT has underpinned the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, enabled cooperation on peaceful uses, and set the obligation for all states parties to pursue negotiations related to nuclear disarmament and arms control. This room holds some of the world's foremost experts on these issues. Together, we have tremendous capacity to make progress over the next four weeks, but it will not be easy. China's mysterious and opaque and even reckless nuclear expansion has already multiplied its arsenal sevenfold, several fold in just the past decade and a half. This disturbing trend could well be interpreted as Beijing seeking to drive an arms race. China has even conducted yield-producing nuclear tests. Meanwhile, Russia unlawfully purported to suspend its New START obligations while it was in force, developed novel nuclear weapons, and has deepened its relationship with the DPRK, which continues to pursue its own weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. And of course, since the last REVCON, Iran accelerated its production of highly enriched uranium, accumulating a stockpile enriched to a level for which it has no credible, conceivable civilian justification. and has refused to provide the IAEA critical access to, or information about, the status of this material for nearly a year. This conference convenes during a time of undeniable crisis, but that is not an excuse for inaction. Rather, it is why we must act now. The United States is ready to do so. President Trump has been very clear: the power of nuclear weapons is too immense, and the cost of their employment is too great. He has repeatedly expressed his desire to see a world with fewer nuclear weapons and to move further to the goal of eventual worldwide elimination. Those are our marching orders. That's why we have proposed multilateral strategic stability and arms control. We provided detailed proposals to Russia and China and among the P5 on possible initial steps, including on transparency, risk reduction, and testing. On an optimistic forward-looking note, we are encouraged our Russian and Chinese colleagues have shown some willingness to engage on these topics. But this is only the beginning. Under Article VI, all nuclear weapons states must engage in good faith on negotiations on arms control and disarmament to avoid an arms race. This RevCon should affirm the value of these multilateral talks and call on nuclear weapons states to engage in them. endorse measures to reduce risk, and emphasize transparency, including through interactive discussion of national reports with participation by all nuclear weapons states. This would generate real momentum. States parties must also support and strengthen the treaty's nonproliferation pillar. We are inspired by the tremendous progress that has been made toward comprehensive safeguards agreement universalization. We congratulate Guinea and Somalia on entering CSAs into force, and we hope Equatorial Guinea will soon join them before this conference is over. If they do so, this RevCon will have made history. At the same time, we are deeply concerned by the failure of some States Parties to comply with their treaty obligations, including Iran's flagrant violation of Article III. Iran has been found by the IAEA to be in noncompliance with its NPT-required safeguards agreement not once, but twice. I repeat, two separate findings over the course of 20 years. To defend the foundation of the nonproliferation regime, this conference should reaffirm support for the vigilant work of the IAEA, hold violators to account, and explore ways to ensure violations do not happen again. I call on all States Parties to use this conference to defend this Treaty and the safeguards system. The time is now and the need is urgent. After all, there are many ways the States in this room benefit from them. The time is ripe for tremendous progress on peaceful uses. Under President Trump, the United States is unleashing a golden age of American energy and empowering partner countries to deploy nuclear energy under the highest standards of security, safety, and nonproliferation. We are also committed to supporting the IAEA's important peaceful uses work, but we must do more. That is why, with the UK, we are launching the Ascent Initiative to amplify non-power peaceful uses and pave a pathway to future civil nuclear power programs for responsible NPT states. This conference should reaffirm the tremendous benefits of the peaceful atom and the central role of the IAEA in realizing its full potential. Finally, the United States is committed to reforming multilateral bodies to be more effective and efficient. We have a real opportunity to do so through strengthening the NPT review process. After living with years of inefficiency, now is the time to get it done. Colleagues, that statement rings true for all the issues I have raised today. Now is the time to ensure the NPT regime is prepared to face the challenges of today and those of tomorrow. This conference can be remembered as a turning point, so long as we drive momentum forward rather than backward. This is the approach the United States will take at this RevCon. My team and I stand ready to work with you.

I thank the distinguished representative of the United States of America. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Armenia.

Mr. President, at the outset, I would like to congratulate you, as well as the other members of the Bureau, on your election. For more than five decades, this treaty has served as a cornerstone of the international security architecture. It is designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament. We sincerely hope that inclusive and transparent discussions on global security matters will create more conducive environment, thus bringing us closer to achieving tangible results on all three pillars of the Treaty. Armenia remains firmly committed to fulfilling its obligations under the NPT and reiterates its firm support for the full, complete, and effective implementation of the Treaty. The implementation of Article VI obligations remain pivotal for advancing nuclear disarmament and to reinforcing the international security architecture, especially in the current challenging security environment. In parallel, taking meaningful steps to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict is of vital importance today. We applaud continued observance of the voluntary moratorium on nuclear test explosions. We strongly believe that disarmament agenda should be further pushed forward in accordance with the spirit and letter of the NPT. There are crucial steps that must be taken to further advance disarmament efforts, and among them is the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Armenia views the CTBT as one of the key elements of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and a strong instrument for constraining nuclear weaponry. We reaffirm our unwavering support for the objectives of the CTBT and encourage Annex 2 States to sign and ratify the treaty. We underscore the indivisibility of non-proliferation and the full compliance with all obligations under the NPT and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements. In this respect, we appreciate the crucial role of cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency through its safeguards agreements and additional protocol. We are also proud that the Agency is able to regularly draw comprehensive safeguards conclusion for Armenia on an annual basis. Nuclear-weapon-free zones are an important regional approach to strengthening global nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament norms and consolidating international efforts towards peace and security. Armenia reaffirms its full support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Mr. President, The treaty recognizes the inalienable right of all state parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and guarantees that all parties have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, scientific and technological information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In this vein, the safe and secure use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes remains and will continue to remain a priority for Armenia. In view of the emerging nuclear security threats, Armenia is consistently improving its nuclear security regime in close cooperation with its partners and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Driven by the successful uphold of high standards of safety and security in the operation of the Armenian nuclear power plant, and with the ultimate goal of smooth transition to a new capacity by 2036, Armenia opted for a transparent and open policy for safe and peaceful uses of nuclear energy and will continue to pursue this policy further. In this respect, we appreciate the crucial role of the cooperation with International Atomic Energy through its safeguards agreements and Protocol, as well as its technical assistance program. International cooperation has been playing an essential role in Armenia's efforts to improve the physical protection regime. Thanks to such cooperation, the Armenian nuclear power plant has been implementing a number of projects for the enhancement of nuclear security at the facility level in line with relevant recommendations of the IAEA. Armenia values the IAEA's key role in facilitating international cooperation on matters relating to nuclear security. Mr. President, the purpose of NPT review cycle is to reinforce the treaty and reconfirm its enduring relevance. Today's such reformation is more important than ever. We remain firmly committed to working with all State Parties to safeguard the global nonproliferation regime and will work constructively to ensure that this Review Conference marks the beginning of meaningful progress. In conclusion, Armenia disassociates from the statement delivered yesterday by the delegation of the Russian Federation on behalf of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Armenia for his statement. Distinguished delegates, 10 delegations have requested the floor to exercise their rights of reply pursuant to Rule 19 of the Rules of Procedure. I will therefore invite these delegations to take the floor. May I remind delegations that in accordance with Rule 19, Such statements shall be as brief as possible. I urge delegations to limit their interventions to five minutes. May I also remind delegations that in accordance with established practice, the number of interventions in the exercise of the right of reply for any delegation is limited to two. The second intervention should be limited to three minutes. and time limits will be enforced by microphone cut-offs. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Iran.

Thank you, Mr. President. My delegation categorically rejects the baseless allegations advanced by the United Arab Emirates and certain other States. It is regrettable that, notwithstanding your clear request to avoid issues outside the scope of the conference, some delegations choose to disregard this guidance and raise political and irrelevant allegations against Iran. These delegations seek to portray themselves as victims by distorting the facts, while omitting their own roles in facilitating the brutal attacks carried out by the United States and the Israeli regime against Iran. Such operations were enabled through using territory and airspace of these countries by the United States for planning, preparation, equipping, and execution of unlawful military attacks against the Iranian people. In this regard, we wish to underscore the following points. The joint military operations carried out by the United States and the Israeli regime against Iran commenced with a deeply tragic and reprehensible incident on February 28th, when an elementary school in Minab was struck, killing 168 schoolgirls. Since then, a wide range of civilian infrastructure has been deliberately targeted, including cultural heritage sites, oil refineries, hospitals, petrochemical complexes, and residential areas across my country. These attacks have been facilitated through operational support originating from military installations in parts of our region. Territory and airspace of these countries have continued to be used by the United States for planning, preparation, equipping, and execution of unlawful military attacks. We have detailed the use of these countries' territories in attacks against Iran in multiple letters to the United Nations Security Council, which remain available for delegations seeking further information on this matter. This raises a fundamental question: How could such actions take place while we maintained confidence in the assurances of our neighbors that their territory would not be used for aggression against Iran. Since February 28, thousands of homes have been destroyed, dozens of hospitals and schools have been struck, and more than 3,000 people, including hundreds of children, have lost their lives. Responsibility of these acts lies not only with the United States and the Israeli regime, that carried them out, but also with those who facilitated, supported, or enabled them. Iran reaffirms its inherent right to respond to such attacks at their source and to prevent their recurrence, in accordance with international law. Responsibility for these acts rests... Certain delegations have asserted that Iran's response lacks a legal basis. In this regard, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314, entitled "Definition of Aggression," adopted on December 14, 1974, explicitly provides that the action of a state in allowing its territory to be used by another state for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third state engages its responsibility. This provision establishes that a host state is complicit in any act of aggression launched from its territory. Mr. President, the positions advanced by the United Arab Emirates and other delegations are entirely one-sided and deliberately ignore the root cause of the current situation: the unlawful use of force against Iran and its peaceful nuclear facilities by the U.S. and the Israeli regime. as well as the support provided through military facilities in parts of the Persian Gulf region. This omission alone calls into question the credibility of the statements we have heard. It is deeply troubling that we have not heard a single word of condemnation from these delegations regarding these unlawful acts. This silence is telling. It reflects a pattern of selectivity and double standards that undermine.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom.

Thank you, Mr. President. I am taking the floor to exercise our right of reply

to comments made in this session by the delegations of Iran, China and the Russian Federation. We completely reject the assertion by Iran that the United Kingdom is engaged in a nuclear arms race.

The UK maintains a minimum credible deterrent

with the smallest nuclear arsenal of all nuclear weapons states.

Our declared stockpile figure is a ceiling, not a target.

We also seek to make progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons by engaging on a range of initiatives on transparency, irreversibility, and verification. Iran and others have mentioned NATO's extended deterrence arrangements.

We recognise that there are concerns among States Parties.

Indeed, we engage actively in dialogue with several partners on that issue. However, it is important that we do so on the basis of fact. Those arrangements have always been fully consistent with the NPT. Indeed, they predate the NPT and were fully understood by States Parties at the time of its negotiation. Allies have always complied with their obligations under the Treaty. NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements have been key in preventing proliferation, providing assurance to Allies that they do not need

nuclear weapons of their own, and therefore supporting one of the NPT's core objectives.

Turning to the ludicrous comments from the delegation of Russia, the

UK and France are not providing, and would never provide, nuclear weapons or related capabilities to Ukraine, as we stated

at the UN Security Council in February. This is yet another piece of disinformation from Russia, and a transparent attempt to deflect attention from its ongoing, unprovoked, and illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

We remain fully committed to our obligations under the NPT and to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of China.

Thank you, President. The U.S. delegation, over the past two days, deliberately misinterpreted China's positions and proposals, and distorted and smeared China's nuclear doctrine and the development of China's national defense forces. China categorically rejected these claims. Regarding China's nuclear doctrine and our efforts in nuclear arms control, we have already elaborated in detail in our previous statements and will not repeat them here. China would like to make the following additional points in response. First, the U.S. proposal of the so-called multilateral nuclear arms control and strategic stability talks has far more elements of political posturing than of serious dialogue. The proposal is based on the erroneous narratives, such as the so-called the three major nuclear weapons states and China's nuclear threat, attempting to overturn the global nuclear disarmament consensus and to revive in a disguised form the false narrative of China, US, Russia trilateral nuclear arms control talks. It is in essence an attempt to find an excuse to deflect its own special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament. It is disarmament in name, rearmament in practice. China will not accept any hypocritical approach that calls for dialogue in words but pursues confrontation in actions. is the single greatest source of disruption in the field of nuclear arms control and strategic stability. Over the past two decades, the US has successfully withdrawn from the ABM Treaty, the INF Treaty, and the Open Skies Treaty, and has allowed the New START to lapse without extension, continuously undermining international security and the global nuclear arms control regime. Obsessed with strengthening its monopoly advantage in nuclear capabilities, the US invests nearly $100 billion each year in nuclear force modernization. It refuses to renounce a policy of first use of nuclear weapons and, through arrangements such as nuclear sharing and extended deterrence, seeks to build a so-called nuclear alliance. The US has also promoted the Golden Dome missile defenses program and deployed strategic offensive and defensive capabilities in close proximity to other nuclear weapons states. This series of negative actions by the US has gravely damaged global and regional strategic stability, increased the risks of nuclear confrontation and nuclear conflict, and fueled a new nuclear arms race. Third, the US should give a positive response to the legitimate concerns of the international community. If the US delegates expectation yesterday of working towards a solution that mutually improves the current security environment is genuine, then can we ask the US to first seriously consider and respond to China's proposals? China calls on the US to engage as early as possible in negotiations on the conclusion of a treaty among nuclear weapons states on mutual no first use of nuclear weapons and to participate as soon as possible in negotiations on the international legal binding instrument on negative security assurances for non-nuclear weapon states. China also urges the US to seriously consider the proposal put forward by Russia and to address in a responsible manner the follow-up arrangements concerning the expiration of the New START. Finally, and most importantly, China calls on the United States to earnestly abide by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and to abandon hegemonic practices of arbitrarily using or threatening the use of force in international relations. I also take note of the high frequency of the use of the word sincerity, good faith. Well, the international community should have formed a clear understanding of their good faith. Over the past two years, the conduct of the US during diplomatic negotiations with non-NPT, non-nuclear weapons state party has, in effect, given the term "good faith" a new definition. Thank you, President.

I thank the distinguished representative of China for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States.

President, I take the floor to respond to several previous speakers, including the remarks made today about U.S. military action in Iran. However, before I do so, I would like to take a moment to respond to my Russian and Chinese colleagues, particularly China, which used essentially the entire duration of its national report in an unfounded seven and a half minute tirade against the United States. followed by another five-minute reply just a few minutes ago. Unlike them, I will not engage in a lengthy list of grievances at this time. To them, I say only it is not the United States that is refusing to engage on strategic stability and arms control. It is not the United States that is refusing to provide transparency. Instead, as I said yesterday, it is the United States that has extended the offer to meet in good faith and try to make actual progress on Article VI, not simply use the majority of its own national statement to levy accusations against others. I will not repeat all the arguments I made yesterday in this regard, but to the countries in this room, I will simply say, you heard me then, and you heard Russia and China today. I will ask you which of us is actually, to quote my Chinese colleague, placing its own self-interest above arms control, and which one of us is offering to engage. As I noted on Monday, on February 28th, the United States began an operation to protect the American people, U.S. forces, and partners against threats posed by a regime that has for decades undermined U.S. and international security. Our actions were directed at military and strategic assets tied to specific threats. The United States continues to take seriously and observe fully its obligations to avoid targeting personnel and facilities in Iran, including technical personnel and facilities that are entitled to the protections afforded to civilians and civilian objects under the Geneva Conventions and customary international law. Meanwhile, Tehran's indiscriminate attacks on neighboring states and civilian objects underscored this regime's threats to international peace and security. Concurrent with these operations, the United States engaged in direct and indirect dialogue with Iranian counterparts to negotiate a ceasefire to test whether we could work constructively toward an enduring diplomatic resolution. These diplomatic efforts remain underway. The United States continues to seek a strong deal that would advance regional peace and stability and in which Iran would forego its domestic nuclear enrichment program. We have thus far not succeeded, primarily because Iran has refused to commit to the responsible path. Today, we heard Iran assert a supposed, quote, "inalienable right," end quote, to enrichment. To be clear, no such right exists. On Monday, the representative of the UAE noted that Iran wants all of the rights of the treaty and none of the obligations. I will go one step farther today. Iran is claiming imaginary rights while outright rejecting its clear, unambiguous obligations. It is true that the NPT guarantees the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with obligations under Articles I and II of the treaty. However, the treaty does not expressly grant Iran or any other country an inalienable right to enrich. Iran can realize its Article IV rights without enrichment. Furthermore, pursuant to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737, Iran is currently legally obliged to suspend enrichment-related activities. If Iran wants to fully exercise its Article IV rights, it must also fully implement its obligations under Articles II and III, as well as its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions. For too long, Iran's willful noncompliance and continued advancement of nuclear capabilities have posed a direct threat to the United States, our partners, and the nonproliferation regime itself. There is a path forward, but Iran must make the right choices. We ask again this body to join us in urging Iran loudly and resolutely to engage constructively with us. Thank you, President.

I thank the distinguished representative of the United States. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Russian Federation.

Thank you, Mr. President. We have asked for the floor in exercise of our right to reply in connection with the situation that has emerged in this room over the last three days. Instead of immediately, after addressing all procedural matters, beginning to consider relevant issues related to strengthening the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, we have, for six meetings now, been forced to listen to statements by the representatives of the collective West that are either partially or, in some cases, almost fully focused on unjustified, politicized, and absolutely false anti-Russian attacks. And their aggressive tone towards our country and the rhetoric of those statements together exceeds what was used to justify the inhumane actions of NATO member states against Yugoslavia, against Iraq, against Libya in 2011, and now against Iran. Mr. President, everything that we're seeing in the hall shows that the collective West has once again, as represented by a number of states, organized a broad, well-orchestrated political campaign against Russia. Most of the states that have made unjustified anti-Russian statements are NATO member states, an alliance that is most hostile to Russia and other member states that are protecting their sovereignty and international affairs. These states are abusing delegation's attention And there are times, which is always valuable and lacking, have brought elements of a hybrid war that they are waging against our country for more than 10 years to this review conference. This situation is not a new one for us. We saw a similar situation at the 10th NPT Review Conference, as well as during the three sessions of the preparatory committee for this conference. These political actions on the part of states that claim to be protecting the NPT in the review process are particularly cynical and glaring. And they are particularly cynical because this is happening during one of the main events in the area of disarmament, non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, when the fate of the main and essentially only treaty of its kind is at stake, an element that is a load-bearing, a treaty as a load-bearing element of the international security system. In connection with the statements made by our opponents, it would be justified to ask the question of what goal these countries came to the conference with, we have the persistent impression that their main purpose for coming to this forum and participating in this conference is to use the NPT platform to settle political scores. Mr. President, that was the introductory part of my statement, because more than 50, and we counted more than 50 anti-Russian statements were made, we believe that we have the right to ask for additional time for a right of reply. We must once again provide additional clarifications on those issues or problems that were raised in the statements of our opponents and foes, and which in their interpretation were presented as violations committed by the Russian Federation. I'll begin with the Budapest Memorandum, which was an element of a package agreement in the form of a political declaration that placed equal obligations on all parties, and Russia complied unfailingly with those documents.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Japan.

Thank you, Mr. President. Since the end of World War, Japan has consistently contributed to international peace and prosperity, and this remains unchanged. Japan, as a staunch supporter of the NPT, has been advocating for the implementation of all its provisions. This, of course, includes compliance with its own obligations under the NPT, and Japan continues its cooperation with the IAEA in a transparent manner. The Government of Japan observes the three non-nuclear principles as policy guidelines. Under these principles, the introduction of nuclear weapons is not permitted. Japan has been limiting its research, development, and use of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes, under the Atomic Energy Basic Act. All nuclear materials in Japan, including plutonium, are subject to the exceptionally stringent IAEA safeguards, and the IAEA has been drawing the conclusion that all materials remain in peaceful activities. Therefore, there are no issues in relation to nonproliferation. Japan also continues to uphold the principle of not possessing plutonium without specific purposes. Japan has declared the policy to reduce the amount of its plutonium stockpile in 2018, and the amount has decreased since then. Under this policy, Japan will continue to take appropriate measures. Moreover, As our own voluntary measures, Japan has secured transparency of its nuclear material through its efforts such as publishing information on its plutonium management, which is more detailed than the one required in the international guidelines. Japan, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings in war, will continue to work closely with the international community to realize a world without nuclear weapons. We will continue to advance realistic and practical efforts to maintain and strengthen the NPT regime. Thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the distinguished representative of Japan for her statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Australia.

I take the floor on behalf of the delegations of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to address some misleading assertions which have been made in the preceding debate regarding Australia's naval nuclear propulsion program. Australia's naval nuclear propulsion program is proceeding in full compliance with AUKUS partners' respective international obligations, including under the NPT, Australia's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and Australia's obligations under the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.

Naval nuclear propulsion was foreseen by the drafters of the NPT and remains aligned with the Treaty.

As the Director General of the IAEA has repeatedly made clear.

Article.

14 of the IAEA's model CSA is the specific provision acknowledging CSA states' ability to use nuclear material in naval nuclear propulsion within the legal framework for safeguards implementation. Australia is continuing its engagement with the IAEA to develop a safeguards and verification approach for its NNP program.

Within the framework of Australia's CSA and AP, including an Article 14 arrangement.

As we have made clear, Australia's Article 14 arrangement will not remove nuclear material from IAEA oversight. Australia's conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine program will be subject to a robust package of safeguards and verification measures. enabling the agency to continue to fulfill its technical safeguards objectives for Australia at all stages of the submarine's life cycle.

The IAEA has the.

Clear authority under its statute to negotiate directly and in confidence with individual member states on the establishment and application of safeguards and verification arrangements. We hope all delegations.

Will continue to reject any effort to undermine the independent technical authority of the IAEA and its mandate to engage.

With states on implementation of their own safeguards arrangements. The technical mandate of the IAEA is critical to the nonproliferation regime and something we as NPT parties should all strive to uphold. President, consistent with our commitment to transparency, Australia, the UK, and the US will host a side event on Friday, 8 May, to update the international community on AUKUS partners' approach to preserving the integrity of and strengthening its nuclear nonproliferation regime through our work with the IAEA. The event will provide an overview of recent developments, including the release of a working paper for the NPT RevCon and the IAEA Director General's November 2025 report on Australia's naval nuclear propulsion program.

All NPT member states are warmly invited to attend.

I thank you, President.

I thank the distinguished representative of Australia. I give the floor now to the distinguished representative of Poland.

Thank you, Mr. President. I would like to briefly respond to the criticism against NATO deterrence policy, in particular against NATO nuclear sharing arrangements. I would like to start by supporting the remarks by the UK Ambassador. NATO's nuclear arrangements are fully consistent with the NPT. They were established before the entry into force of the NPT and since then have operated in a manner that fully respects both the letter and the spirit of the treaty. There is nothing illegal about NATO's nuclear policy, full stop. Recent attempts to politicize this issue within the framework of the NPT should be seen for what they are, a distraction from the most serious proliferation and security challenges of today, including Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine, its reckless nuclear rhetoric and irresponsible behavior, as well as the opaque nuclear buildup by China. These actions are destabilizing in contrast with the strictly defensive and responsible NATO nuclear policy. NATO does not seek confrontation, nor does it lower the threshold for nuclear use. Any increase in the salience of deterrence must be understood in its proper context. It is a direct response to Russia's aggressive and revisionist policies, its repeated nuclear threats, and its attempt to undermine the European security order by force. Thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the distinguished representative of Poland. I now give the floor to the distinguished permanent representative of Czechia. You have the floor, Excellency.

Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, having listened to the statement delivered today by the Islamic Republic of Iran, and in particular its egregious invocation of the so-called Nazi big lie in relation to the State of Israel, The Czech Republic, as a country that endured the brutality of Nazi occupation during the Second World War, cannot and will not remain silent. In our view, the statement delivered by the Iranian delegation runs counter to the purposes of the United Nations as clearly referenced in the preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In these circumstances, the Czech Republic wishes to express its serious doubts as to how the Iranian Vice President can properly exercise the functions of this important office. That is why the Czech Republic fully subscribes to the statements of those Member States that have dissociated themselves from the consensus on this appointment. I thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the distinguished Permanent Representative of Czechia. I now invite the distinguished representative of Germany.

Mr. President, after having carefully listened to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the E3, namely France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, strongly reject the accusations of Iran against the E3. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom firmly stand by the NPT. We have never contested the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy enshrined in Article IV of the Treaty, and have indeed supported the access of NPT States Parties to peaceful uses through cooperation and supporting the IAEA's respective programmes. But the NPT is not a treaty to pick and choose from. It establishes a unique, legally binding global safeguards architecture that all States Parties must adhere to. Contrary to what the Iranian representative has claimed, Iran has a long history of insufficient cooperation with the IAEA on safeguards matters, as confirmed by subsequent IAEA reports over a period of more than 20 years. In June 2025, the IAEA Board of Governors, based upon a report by the Director General, found Iran non-compliant with its legally binding NPT safeguards obligations. Since then, instead of returning to full compliance with its obligations, Iran has not provided the IAEA with any of the legally required reports on its nuclear program, including nuclear accountancy reports and design information nor provided IAEA access to confirm the non-diversion of nuclear material. The verification of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile, including of about 440 kilograms of high-enriched uranium, is long overdue, and the Agency has lost continuity of knowledge in relation to Iran's stockpile. As a result, the IAEA is not in a position to confirm that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. The E3 urge Iran to return to full compliance with its legally binding safeguards obligations without further delay and to address the international community's grave concerns regarding its nuclear program. The E3 remain committed to resolve the concerns about Iran's nuclear programs through a negotiated solution. President, in my own national capacity, I would like to correct the following two points. First, NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements have been and continue to be fully consistent with the NPT and were put in place well before the NPT entered into force in 1970. They did not stand in the way of major disarmament achievements like SALT, INF, or New START, and they will certainly not stand in the way of further agreements. To the contrary, extended nuclear deterrence prevented non-nuclear weapon states to develop their own nuclear weapons. Second, we categorically refute any false accusations of Germany advocating for the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Germany has constantly reaffirmed its commitment to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state, just as our State Secretary did confirm here yesterday. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Germany for her statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Bahrain.

Mr. President. On behalf of several GCC countries, namely the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the State of Qatar, and the State of Kuwait, and my country, the Kingdom of Bahrain, I find myself compelled to respond to the representative of Iran. The claims we heard have no legal or factual basis. These claims represent a direct attempt to mislead In this context, we reiterate that these allegations run contrary to the facts on the ground. In fact, Iran's recent practices have included direct attacks on our countries and civilian infrastructure, as well as critical waterways. This poses a dangerous threat to the freedom of navigation and the global economy. We categorically reject Iran's attempts to characterize the current status as a result of other root causes in flagrant overlooking of the fact that this attack, that this crisis started by direct attacks against our country that are not party to the conflict. This is a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Mr. President. claiming that these Iranian measures are self-defense, are not realistic, and are not factual. Iran has targeted our countries that are not parties to the conflict, and these attacks cannot be justified under Article 51 of the Charter. These acts are not precautionary measures and not preemptive measures. These acts are illegal. and unlawful. In this context, we reiterate that the international community made a clear position as reflected in Security Council Resolution 2817, which was supported by 136 states. This resolution condemned these attacks and called for their immediate cessation. The resolution said that these attacks were a flagrant violation of international law and posed a dangerous threat to international and regional peace and security. We reject claims that our countries of the region are responsible. We reject claims about the use of our territories for military attacks, we reiterate that these allegations are not based on -- are baseless and are part of repeated attempts to mislead the international community and to shift the blame to other parties. At the same time, we reiterate that we remain fully committed to the principles of good neighborliness and noninterference in the internal affairs of a state. We will continue to respect the principle of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. But what we are seeing from Iran runs counter to these principles. Calls for diplomatic solutions are not credible, as we heard from Iran. These must be complemented and coupled with a lasting cessation of hostilities and full commitment to international principles and transparent cooperation with the IAEA in order to maintain the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. In conclusion, Mr. President, we reiterate that the current attacks are not the result of conflicting narratives, but a real test to the international community to maintain international peace and security and promote respect of international law. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Bahrain for your statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of United Arab Emirates.

Mr. President, I regret that I have to take the floor again, yet Iran has chosen to misuse this conference by spreading a false narrative, distorting the facts, and making unfounded allegation against my country. It is therefore necessary to set the record straight. The UAE strongly rejects the baseless allegation made by Iran. The UAE is not party to the armed conflict. It is fact that on 28 February, Iran began attacking its neighbors, including the UAE, that are not party to the conflict. Iran has launched thousands of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones towards the UAE, with 90% of these heinous attacks deliberately and indiscriminately targeting civilian infrastructure. The UAE has not permitted the use of its territory, including its airspace or territorial waters, for the planning, preparation, equipping, launching, or carrying out of a hostile military operation against any state, including Iran. Iran's allegation is false. It is reckless. and is a blatant attempt to divert attention from Iran's own unjustifiable conduct. The UAE's position has been clear and consistent. We are committed to upholding international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, to good neighborliness, and to de-escalation. Mr. President, Iran has failed to meet its safeguard obligation. Iran has obstructed the work of the IAEA. Iran has failed to provide the transparency required of every responsible state party to the NPT. And Iran continues to act in a manner that threatens regional and international security. If Iran's nuclear program is exclusively peaceful, as they claim, then Iran should answer a simple question: Why is Iran enriching uranium to 60 percent? There is no credible civilian justification for such enrichment. Mr. President, Iran appears not to have listened carefully to the statement delivered by many delegations in this conference. Those statements reflect serious and persistent concern regarding Iran's nuclear program, its safeguard failures, and its lack of transparency. Iran should also not misread the position of the wider international community. The international community has repeatedly condemned Iran Iran's destabilizing behavior in various international fora. Security Council Resolution 2817 condemned Iran's attack against the UAE and other countries in the region, and was co-sponsored by a record number of 136 member states. The message is clear. The world is not blind to Iran's conduct. The world is not silent, and the world is not persuaded by Iran's rhetoric. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of the United Arab Emirates for his statement. I have received requests from the delegations of Russia and China for the floor for the second intervention in the exercise of their rights of reply. I would like to remind delegations that the second intervention should be limited to three minutes and microphone cut-offs will be enforced. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation.

Thank you, Mr. President. After the coup d'etat in 2014, the Budapest Memorandum once and for all lost its relevance as a political document. After this, after the coup, an active and the formation out of Ukraine of an aggressive opponent to Russia began. This created a real threat to the security of our country, which we were not able to ignore. Thus, In 1994, the agreement of that year was undermined by the destabilizing course to expand NATO, including with Ukraine, to the detriment of the fundamental security interests of Russia. This fundamentally contradicts the content of the Budapest package of documents. We believe it necessary to refute the unfounded speculation over the fact that Russia is allegedly considering the possibility of the use of a nuclear weapon in Ukraine or threatening its use. It is clear that this is being done intentionally to ratchet up anti-Russian hysteria. Based on the joint statement of the five nuclear powers from January 2022, Russia is making efforts to prevent any military confrontation between nuclear opponents. because it could lead to a nuclear-level escalation. Russia is not interested in escalating tensions. Our interests are for nuclear weapons to never be used. That is the essence of Russia's warning about the possible consequences of direct aggression by NATO countries against our country in the context of the Ukrainian crisis. As for Russia's suspension of its participation in the New START Treaty, everything was done to undermine our national participation, which directly contradicts the preamble of the New START Treaty, the fundamental principle therein. upon which that treaty was founded. There was a fundamental change in the situation compared with the situation that existed at the time when that treaty was concluded, which led to the suspension of the effect of the treaty. Moreover, before the suspension of the New START treaty, Washington was significantly violating the central provision of that document about qualitative restrictions and limitations on existing arms. These are only two reasons why the effect of the treaty was suspended. And before the 5th of February this year when that happened, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, in September 2025, proposed another initiative to exercise restraint in the nuclear sphere. Specifically, he proposed that Russia and the United States adhere to the New START limits on strategic armaments for a year after the expiration of the treaties. effect.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of China.

Thank you Mr. President The Japanese representative was evasive in her ROR statement. As a matter of fact, what Japan said was just the opposite of what it did. It failed to directly address the serious concerns of the international community, including China, regarding its negative moves towards nuclear armament. Japan is internationally recognized as a nuclear threshold state. It is the only non-nuclear weapon state among NPT state parties that possesses reprocessing technology, has the capability to extract weapons-grade plutonium, and operates functional reprocessing facilities. Since the administration took office, The issue of Japan's pursuit of nuclear weapons has become a reality rather than a potential threat, posing a serious challenge to the post-Second World War international order and the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The international community must remain highly vigilant against the following three negative developments. First, the Prime Minister's office has brazenly declared that Japan should possess nuclear weapons. while right-wing forces are seeking to revise the three non-nuclear principles, continuously testing the international community's reaction in preparation for a policy shift. Second, Japan has long stockpiled vast quantities of plutonium, far exceeding civilian needs. The total amount of separated plutonium under its domestic and international management stands at approximately 44.4 tons. Japan possesses the technical capability to develop a nuclear and could achieve a nuclear breakthrough in very short order. Third, Japan's stance on nuclear nonproliferation is self-contradictory. On the one hand, Japan has long portrayed itself internationally as a victim of a nuclear explosion and misled the world by posing as a supporter of a nuclear-free world. On the other hand, it has continuously strengthened the cooperation with its allies on extended deterrence. illegally seeking to replicate nuclear sharing arrangements and bring allied nuclear weapons into Japan. President, China has submitted a working paper on the issue of Japan's pursuit of nuclear weapons and welcomes all parties to study it carefully. China believes that this RevCom must engage in in-depth discussions on relevant issues and effectively strengthen verification and oversight of Japan's nuclear activities. Thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the distinguished representative of China. I have to recognize there is a request for the floor from Japan. I invite the distinguished representative of Japan.

Thank you, Mr. President. I will not repeat my statement on Japan's policy, which I already mentioned. I would just like to mention a few of them, just to mention some of them that I already mentioned, which includes the three non-nuclear principles as policy guidelines that the government of Japan observes. And under these principles, as I said, the introduction of nuclear weapons is not permitted, no nuclear sharing arrangement. Also, I already explained Japan's policy of peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the Atomic Energy Basic Act. And under this act and the IAEA safeguards, there is no issue in relation to nonproliferation. And also, As I said, Japan will continue to work closely towards a world without nuclear weapons, and Japan's unwavering support to the NPT, of course, includes compliance with its own obligations under the NPT. Thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the distinguished representative of Japan. now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Thank you, Mr. President. In response to the representatives of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, first, I don't want to dignify their statements that are irrelevant to the scope of this conference, but I wish to state very briefly that their assertions that their territories were not used in attacks against Iran are entirely incorrect. As previously indicated, Iran has documented the use of these countries' territories in such attacks in multiple communications addressed to the United Nations Security Council, which remain available to delegations seeking further information, particularly representatives of Bahrain and the UAE. These communications contain precise details, including the locations and timing of the attacks launched from their territories against Iran. I thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Arab Emirates.

Mr. President, I take the floor. Again, to reply to the unfounded allegation made by the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Once again, the UAE strongly rejects these false allegations. The UAE is not a party to the conflict. The UAE has not allowed its territory, airspace, or territorial waters to be used for a hostile military operation against Iran. Iran should Stop making unfounded accusation and address the real issue before this conference and before the international community, its own conduct. Iran must comply with its obligation under international law, including the Charter of the United Nations. Iran must stop threatening its neighbor. Iran must refrain from unleashing large-scale, unprovoked attacks against its neighbors. And Iran must stop undermining the peace and security of our region. I thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the distinguished representative of the United Arab Emirates. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Bahrain.

Mr. President, I apologize for taking the floor once more. On behalf of a number of GCC states, namely the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, and my country, Bahrain, we believe it's very important to respond to what came in the statement of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The statement included a number of allegations that have no realistic legal basis. This is an attempt to fabricate reality. The allegation that Iran's actions were in self-defense is not legally feasible. The targeting of states not parties to the conflict cannot be justified. An attempt to reframe these actions as necessary preemptive measures is not a matter that can make them legitimate. We also reject the representative of Iran's attempt to frame this as a response to root causes or hold others responsible, especially because this escalation came as a result of Iran's unjustified attacks on the 28th of February. We also reject any allegations that the states of the region were responsible or have used their airspace or territories to launch any attacks. There is no evidence of this, and this is a repeated attempt to mislead the international community and hold others responsible. Thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the distinguished representative of Bahrain. This concludes my list of speakers for this meeting. We will continue the general debate tomorrow morning at 10:00 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.