From Warning to Prevention: Protecting Civilians in Sudan and Preventing Further Mass Atrocity Crimes Meetings & Events Date: 27 October 2026 Language: English Transcript: https://transcripts.un.org/en/asset/k1g/k1gfz9cacx Transcripts available through this tool are created by using automatic speech recognition and are not official records nor official documents of the United Nations. Official records and official documents are available on the Official Document System of the United Nations. --- UN · Coordinator, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan [0:01]: Good afternoon, everyone. First of all, thank you very much for being here with us today. My name is Caroline. I'm Caroline Buismann. I'm the coordinator of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan. We are here with the Office for Genocide Prevention. And we're still waiting for Nimat from Sudan. She's from a civil society organization. I will properly introduce her when she arrives. Last year, we were here, and this is when Al-Fashir broke out. We had just presented our report a few days after they started to take over Al-Fashir, and we reported on it, finding the that there were hallmarks of genocides. So this is why we are here today, because it's a year ago that this happened. And I would like to now introduce the chair of the fact-finding mission, Mohammed Shanda Othman, former Chief of Justice of Tanzania. Over to you. UN · Chair, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan [1:24]: Yeah, Excellencies, colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for joining us. UN · Member, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan [1:45]: Muna I’m a member of this fact-finding mission on Sudan. UN · Member, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan [1:50]: Joy Ngozi, Nigeria, and I’m a member of the fact-finding mission. UN · Member, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan [1:58]: Thank you. Now the Chair. UN · Chair, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan [2:00]: You will recall that one year ago, the situation in and around El Fashir represented one of the gravest episodes documented by the fact-finding mission since the conflict began in April 2023. Our investigations found patterns of conduct displaying hallmarks of genocide. Civilians were targeted on the basis of their ethnic identities. Entire communities came under attack. displaced, the camps which should have provided refuge and protection became sites of violence and suffering. Humanitarian access was restricted, civilians were trapped, and essential infrastructure was destroyed. The consequences continue to be felt today. Large parts of the population of Al-Fasha and surrounding areas remain displaced. Families continue to search for relatives who disappeared during the violence. Many remain unaccounted for. We have also received continuing reports of unlawful detention and demands for ransom in exchange for release. Communities that once formed the social and economic fabric of the region have been scattered across Sudan and beyond. One year later, accountability remains absent for almost all serious violations. So the story of El Fasher therefore matters not only because of what happened there, but because of what it tells us about the warning signs that precede mass atrocities. In our work, we repeatedly observed indicators that should have triggered greater international action: escalating ethnic-based violence, attack against civilians, siege-like conditions, restrictions on humanitarian assistance, forced displacement, and the increasing militarization of civilian areas. These indicators did not emerge overnight. They accumulated over time. That lesson is particularly relevant when we consider developments elsewhere in Sudan. Early this year, the Human Rights Council convened an urgent debate amid mounting concerns that El Obeid would face an assault with potentially devastating consequences for civilians. The Council requested the FETF mission to investigate and report urgently on developments in and around the city. At the time, there were genuine fears that El Obeid might become another El Fasher. Fortunately, that worst scenario has not materialized. This does not mean that risks have disappeared. On the contrary, our work shows that civilians in Al-Bayd continue to face serious threats. Drone attacks have caused casualties, affected infrastructure essential to daily life. Access to electricity, water, health care, and transport has been disrupted. Civil space has narrowed. Civilians continue to live under conditions of insecurity and uncertainty. Yet, El Obeid also offers an important lesson. It demonstrates that early warning can create opportunities for prevention. The urgent attention devoted to the situation by the Human Rights Council, Member States, United Nations actors, and civil society ensured that risks were identified, discussed, and elevated before a full-scale assault occurred. While it is rarely possible to establish direct causation in prevention efforts, the experience of El Obeid reminds us that timely engagement can matter and does matter. Prevention is often difficult to measure precisely because its success is reflected in events that do not occur. At the same time, warning signs are not confined to North Kordofan. Recent developments in Blue Nile State, including attacks affecting civilians and civilian objects, remind us that conflict dynamics are spreading into new areas. The continued use of drones technology against civilian locations and infrastructure is particularly concerning. Communities far from traditional front line increasingly find themselves exposed to violence that can arrive without warning and with devastating consequences. What emerges from all this is a simple but important message: Sudan does not suffer from a lack of warning. The warning signs are visible. The challenge is whether those warnings generate meaningful, preventive action before atrocities occur. El Fashir illustrates the cost of failure. El Obeid demonstrates that there remains space for prevention. The question before all of us is, therefore, whether the international community is prepared to act on the lessons already available. The protection of civilians in Sudan requires more than documenting violations after the fact. It requires sustained diplomatic engagement, accountability efforts, guarantees of humanitarian access, and concrete measures to address the factors that continue to fuel the conflict and increase atrocity risks. The lives of countless civilians depend on our ability collectively to translate warnings into preventive action. Thank you very much. UN · Coordinator, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan [8:52]: Thank you very much, dear Chair. And indeed, the members are also present, and they are willing to, when there are questions afterwards, they will speak to you. Joy Ngozi Ezilo is a distinguished law professor and senior advocate of Nigeria. And Mona Rizkawi is a former senior official at the United Nations, where she served as head of office for the UN Special Envoy for Syria based in Damascus. And she had various other important positions in the Secretariat. And on that note, I want to also now introduce the Chief of Staff at the United Nations Office of Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. Mario Bilmerse, if I say it properly, will speak on behalf of the office here. He also served as a political affairs officer in the same office from 2010 to 2021 and various other positions. Over to you. Thank you so much. UN · Chief of Staff, Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect [9:58]: Thank you very much. Is it on? It is okay. Thank you. Thank you so much. Thank you very much, distinguished delegates, members of the Independent Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan, Mr. Chair. Unfortunately, the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, Mr. Chalot Chabellani, cannot be here with us today because he's traveling at the moment and outside of New York. But he was very interested for the logical reasons to deliver a statement for this event. So, what I will do is I will read the statement that he has prepared, starting now. Ladies and gentlemen, I am very grateful for the opportunity of addressing you in this side event focusing on protecting civilians in Sudan and preventing further mass atrocities. It is exactly one year since the Rapid Support Forces, the RSF, launched a devastating attack on El Fasher in October 2025. This attack contained levels of brutality of a staggering scale, even in the context of a conflict in which, according to United Nations reports, both RSF and the Sudan Armed Forces, the SAF, as well as their respective allied militias, have committed serious and systematic violations of human rights law and international humanitarian law, accompanied by hate speech. Since this war started in April 2023, the parties to the conflict have deliberately, and we underline deliberately, targeted civilians through summary executions, torture, arbitrary detention, and inhuman treatment in detention, including denial of essential needs. What happened in El Fashir one year ago brought this violence to new levels. RSF and allied militias in North Darfur conducted systematic and ethnically motivated attacks against specific groups, the Zaghawa, the Masalit, the Fur communities, through mass killings, sexual violence, murder, rape, sexual slavery, torture, forced displacement, ethnic persecution targeting non-Arab communities, starvation as a method of warfare, depriving civilians of food, medicine, and relief supplies, and destruction of livelihoods. These acts were accompanied by hate speech and by direct incitement to violence on the basis of ethnic identity. Furthermore, RSF have used rape, reportedly, to engineer the genetic composition of the targeted African groups to a mixed Arab racial profile of the children to be born from rape and enforced pregnancies. These acts indicate cumulative risk factors showing a foreseeable likelihood of a deliberate intent by the RSF to destroy these groups in whole or in part within the meaning of the crime of genocide as defined in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Ladies and gentlemen, impunity for the past precedes the serious risks of the present. I am deeply concerned that the siege on some of the cities in the Kordofan and Blue Nile regions today could lead to another display of violence to the scale of the atrocities committed in Al Fashir. We urgently need to take action to prevent further commission of atrocity crimes in Sudan. We should support every effort to achieve an immediate ceasefire to prevent further atrocity crimes and to protect populations from these crimes. The parties to the conflict claim to exercise territorial control, and therefore they should be pressed to bear responsibility to protect the civilian population and guarantee unhindered access of humanitarian aid and humanitarian workers. They must also allow the provision of life-saving services. Both RSF and SAF should demilitarize and demobilize their forces in the cities to prevent further atrocities in Darfur, Kordofan, and Blue Nile regions. We also require a credible and inclusive peace process. Multiple peace processes or platforms may only lead to parties playing one against the other in what could be forum shopping. We require leadership to bring multiple platforms into one platform, and I believe that the African Union and IGAD can play an important role in this regard. The United Nations would be in support of such efforts. Ladies and gentlemen, in this conflict, there is no doubt whatsoever that the complicity of foreign actors is enabling the continuation of the hostilities. The international community, including and starting with the region, should make concerted efforts to stop the arms flow into Sudan, in line with existing United Nations Security Council arms embargo and the African Union's Silencing the Guns initiative. Flow of arms into Sudan has exacerbated the conflict and the human suffering that comes with it. Lastly, we need a victim-centered approach to address the cycle of violence and atrocities that have been committed in the past and continue to be committed in the present. Impunity has fueled further violence in Sudan. This cycle must be stopped. Whereas the International Criminal Court is investigating some cases in Darfur, we must look into broader accountability mechanisms in the form of a dedicated tribunal, a hybrid court, extraordinary chambers or the activation of the criminal jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice. There is also need for robust and sustainable transitional justice and healing initiatives. I am continuing to hold consultations with various actors in Africa to address the impunity gap, not only in the raging Sudan conflict, but in the continent as a whole. There is no reason why the people of Sudan need to continue enduring this tragedy. The moment of action to stop this cycle of violence is now. Thank you for your attention. And this concludes the statement of the Special Rapporteur. UN · Coordinator, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan [16:29]: Thank you very much for these important remarks. And we are still waiting and have a quick look for Ms. Nimat Ahmadi. She's the founder and president of Darfur Women Action Group. She's looking for the room, so I'll step out maybe for one second. I wanted, in the meantime, to also give an opportunity to Mona Rishmawi and Joy Ngozi Ezeilo to make some brief remarks, and then we would like to hear from you. So over to you, Mona. UN · Member, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan [17:01]: Well, thank you very much. Thank you for being here. Meeting in New York just basically makes me feel that a lot of the solutions and next steps reside in here, in this place. A lot of what needs to be done for Sudan resides in this place. We need, as was said, we need to extend the arms embargo. Long-range drones are killing people everywhere in Sudan. We need humanitarian access. The denial of humanitarian access by both parties Bureaucratic, you will see tomorrow, we will report on Al-Obaid, and their bureaucratic measures are preventing humanitarian access to the needed populations, to the populations in need. We need accountability. We need, of course, the International Criminal Court to step up. Let's be honest. We need it to step up and do more. But whatever the International Criminal Court will do will never be enough. We need additional mechanisms because the International Criminal Court will only focus on the most serious perpetrators. We are talking about perpetrators in the perhaps hundreds of thousands. of rapists, looters, killers. These people need to be brought to justice. And that cannot just be on the shoulder of the International Criminal Court. That we need an independent judicial mechanism to take for that. And lastly, we need the civilian population of Sudan to have a voice. We cannot just be always focusing on the two generals. Sudan is for all the Sudanese, and the voice of the Sudanese people needs to be heard, and their aspirations need to be respected and sought. And for this, we need action at the Security Council level. Let's face it, we need action at the Security Council level, and all of us here need to join hands to make sure that the situation in Sudan is prioritized and is not talked about in minimum terms. Do we have a humanitarian truce here? Do we have this? People are dying as we are speaking, and atrocities are being committed as we are speaking, and we need to take that seriously. And we need action from New York, from bodies here, to respond to what is actually a very acute crisis in the world. Thank you. UN · Member, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan [20:12]: Thank you so much. Thank you for attending this side event. I will just briefly speak to an issue of women and children, especially how they are disproportionately impacted by this conflict. First is also to note the fact that what should be of paramount importance is the protection of civilians in Sudan and preventing further mass atrocities. We are all here speaking one year after the fall of El Fashir, and our report as fact-finding mission made it clear that we found that El Fashir displayed hallmarks of genocide, and the sequence is telling: siege, starvation, takeover, displacement. And women and girls were exposed at every stage of it, on the road, at home, and at checkpoints. And one year after El Fashir atrocities, this risk remains acute. Sexual violence is used as a weapon of war, and the situation demonstrates that sexual violence is used in a coordinated manner, it's not just collateral, it's the Zagawas, the FUR, the African, just like the SRON genocide noted, we are targeted. So rape in this conflict, make no mistake about it, is not random brutality. it is communication. It sends a message: you are not safe, you will not be protected, you should not return. We want to change the demographic. We had women who attempted, of course, to return to Al-Fashir. What happened to them? Those that went to Tawila. And till today, some of those that have disappeared, we know about them. The forced recruitment of children is still there. Some of the earliest warning signs of atrocity came from the voices of women and girls. They have their homes burned, yet men and boys have also been subjected to sexual assault. And because of the stigma that comes with it, you hardly, you don't hear much about that, even for the women, you know, given the culture of silence. But the war, the women bodies have become the marks of this. of this atrocious war. So I think for us here, the findings, we've done a lot of talking, and then now we are focusing also on early alert and the early warning, like the Chair said, may have the way all the states reacted and other stakeholders may have prevented it, and we can't sometimes recognize this, but yellow bed. After that, there is blue night, there's Sudan, there's Zanz. So what are we doing? So do we wait until it happens? The issue of deprivation for food, for healthcare, for pregnant women, the drones, indiscriminate attacks, and the impact, disproportionate impact on women and girls is all telling. So our latest report, of course, which we will present tomorrow, also speak to this Sudan's unrelenting war and the civilian devastation and rising insecurity within El Obeid and beyond. I think, you know, I'll stop because it's important that we have enough time to dialogue and then, you know, interact and answer your questions. Thank you so much. UN · Coordinator, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan [23:42]: Thank you very much, both of you. I would like to hand over now to Ms. Nimat Ahmadi, the founder and president of the Darfur Women Action Group. So I think she's extremely important to hear from her. She's been a voice calling out against genocide and atrocity prevention for many years, both here and in Darfur. Unfortunately, she had to flee Darfur 21 years ago when there was another wave of violence and genocidal acts committed there. I think she has a very prestigious background and has given a lot of expert opinions in different institutions, but we really want to hear from you. Thank you very much for being here. DWAG · Founder and President [24:36]: Yeah, thank you for your kind introduction. Thank you, everyone. It is indeed dismaying to look at the situation one year after the fall of Al-Fashir. But also to refresh your memory, it is not just Al Fashir, because before Al Fashir, it was Al Jenaina, where this patterns of depopulating the largest cities, cities with historical significance, because Al Jenaina is a home to the Sultanate of Masalit. The eve of the fall of Al Jenaina, the RSF has said, Now we have liberated Al-Jannayna from the Abid. It is no longer called Dar Masalid. It is now called Dar Arabs. And they went into changing buildings names, taking people's homes. And we have seen that, like nearly 15,000 people were murdered in less than a month. And the same tactics have been employed in many other cities that they were not visible, like Al-Fashir, Fort Burunga, areas in Wadi Saleh, Zalingi, many other cities. But these cities, what makes them special is that this city is inhabited by the majority of indigenous African tribes, of Maasali, for Segawa. Unfortunately, these people is the very people who have been targeted 20 or 20 something years ago before this attack in Al-Jenina and Al-Fashir. And the pattern and the tactic used are very similar. The RSF would come into a city, And besieged the city. Al-Jannah was encircled for about 58 days, looting markets, looting pharmacies, looting people's homes, destroying civilians infrastructure, including water sources, electricity, communication, completely. It is quite an intent to isolate people from any survival means. On the day where, um, Camus Becker, who is the governor of Al-Jana, spoke, there was 5,000 people wounded. There is no way to take them to receive the care they need. Similar tactic was employed in Al-Fashir. Before the fall of Al-Fashir, the villages surrounding Al-Fashir were completely burned down to the ground. This is not just burning the homes, but burning crops, burning food that people could store for years. Some areas in Darfur, people can store grain for more than 10 years. So this is an intent not just to kill, but also starve these people. emptying the internal displaced camp, Zamzam camp, was emptied and completely destroyed in broad daylight. A camp that housed nearly 800,000 people, and this, most of whom are the survivors of the previous Darfur genocide. These people who were uprooted from their villages long ago, and now they are again uprooted from this camp. Many people have died. Many women have been abducted until today. Nobody knows their whereabouts. Then in preparation, Abu Shour camp had received the most shelling. This is a camp for the most helpless displaced people. Then after that, the encircling of Al-Fajr preventing fuel, any medical supply, any kind of assistance to come into the city, and also preventing people who try to flee from fleeing. I can never forget. A video that was documented by RSF, about three of 12 to 13 years old boys who sneaked and went into the wheel. They bought rice, flour, and sugar for their families. They were asked what they are carrying. They all identified themselves, identified the goods they are carrying. It was like a small bag like this. And then they were shot at and killed immediately at the spot. This was well documented. It tells something. It tells that this is an intent to kill these people by all means, either by bullet or by starvation. And let me tell you, the tactic of starvation has been the deadliest because starvation does not have noise, does not have a flame or smoke, so people cannot see. And that is what they have employed in many, many cities. And in Al-Fajr, it worked well for them because a city that houses nearly 2 million people, it left with 70,000 people after the fall of Al-Fajr. Where are these people gone? Of course, many people have fled, but many more have died and they have yet to be documented. In the eve of the fall of Al-Fajr, People who survived, they followed them and killed them, precisely those who are wounded. I myself have lost so many people. We couldn't trace the bodies of our loved one. I was scrolling through WhatsApp group when I saw the picture of my the dead body of my cousin, two other young cousins, there are 23 and 24. They were killed. We have yet to recover their. their bodies. So this, the numbers and the people we are talking about, these are relatives. These are families. There are loved ones of millions of people in Darfur and Sudan. And now we have seen the same patterns is going to repeat itself in Al-Ubeid. And it already repeated itself in Darling and Kadugli. And you can tell precisely they are targeting this historically marginalized region well before were targeted by the very Janjawid militia and Al-Bashir regime's forces long ago. South Kordofan, Darfur, and now the Blue Nile is the new place for their target. And we keep on talking about this, and we say Al Obeid is next. Al Fajr has gone under siege for 18 months, and we have cried to everybody who can listen. Until when? How many people and how many Sudanese have to die in silence, in a form, the worst form of humiliation, before international community can act? I think the international community has failed. people of Sudan and the people of Darfur in particular, because Al Fashir was preventable, and it was not prevented. Why? Because This murder and this genocide and the systematic killing did not happen in vain, or it is not just militia or the two generals. It is well supported by external actors who are acting on behalf of these militias. The Colombian mercenaries who were arrested in several areas in Nyala, in El Fashir, they did not come on their own. Many other nationalities in West Africa, people were recruited from about five, six, seven countries. And it is visible and quite obvious Unfortunately, to no avail, the United Arab Emirates is very determined to continue to perpetrate the genocide, and many members are violating the Security Council own terms and all resolutions on that point, including the arm embargo, and helping people defy criminal defy sanction and all of this, and we are not talking about them. It's well documented, thankfully, to the fact-finding mission, and many others, many as a credible human rights organization documented this. So it is not that we don't know of, but it is when will our international community, our leaders, the Security Council, have its own mechanism that can be utilized to protect civilians and to hold perpetrators accountable. But I just don't know why we are not using it or it is that not enough people spoke about it. Women who have been abducted. It is, people are, it stopped being outrageous about it. It become normal. It's been normalized. Before the fall of Al-Fashir, there was a prison in Nyala that elected to be housing 19,000 people. Most of them are women and children. After the fall of Al Pashir, many thousands more were taken there. These people were forced to render domestic services, and they were raped constantly, and many of them died in custody. A few have been released after their family paid a huge amount of ransom. And some people, even after they paid, they have not been released. This is simply the situation, but it is going on and on, and I think it has to end, and if it has to end, it has to end now. I will stop here. I'll be happy to answer any questions later. UN · Coordinator, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan [34:22]: Thank you so much, Nima. It really brings home why this cannot be forgotten, and that's why we are here today, to really memory, for memory. sake. I would really like to open it for questions or remarks or observations. Anyone? Please. And please state your name and ask the question. Thank you. ECFR · Visiting Fellow; Advisor to The Elders [34:57]: Sure. My name is Jonas Horner. Right now, I'm a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, and I'm an advisor to the elders who are taking on Sudan as an issue, which they've just started, really, but we're trying to put them in a position to be responsive, do something useful, do something different. My sort of primary counsel to them is to not walk down the same path as a lot of the diplomatic and other external actors have done, because I think that's Yeah, as my Darfur colleague has mentioned, the existing approaches are not really having impact. Just a few things that came up, though, in what's been said here. First of all, concern that there is a conflation of Obeid and Fashar in terms of their characterization. They're very different, and I saw that at the time, that there was some sort of quite lazy suggestion that they were somehow equivalent, but mainly because of demographics, these represent very different contexts and therefore very different responses, and bottom line is very different reasons for violence in each of these places. In Fashir you see The RSF and Arab tribes affiliate with the RSF in particular, viewing this as more or less existential, as it is for many of the African tribes in there, Tfur, Zaghawa, and others. And as a result, there's a strong level of motivation. And arguably, if there had been that same motivation at a local existential level to capture territory, to exit large sections of African tribes, you might have seen a much more effective RSF assault on Obeid. Obeid is a much more strategic, tactical pursuit for the RSF, you know, as is the rest of North Kordofan. But I urge caution about this because the demographics are so different where you have much more diverse and with heavy displacement, heavily displaced community in Obeid. It presents a very different context, one that the RSF could not operate and would never would undertake the same approach. Doesn’t mean it doesn’t deserve our attention, it does, but all to say that if we’re genuinely looking for responses here, ways to engage with the RSF, particularly in terms of how they can be talked out of this, because they have been talked out of offensives in the past. We’ve had the UAE talk them out of an initial attack on Fasher early on, and they’ve been talked out of other offensives. So, you know, if we’re interested in understanding it, and also providing policy responses to this, interventions basically at a diplomatic level. I urge attention to the differences between these. This applies to all. It applies to Nahud, it applies to Fula, it applies, you know, all to say, you know, important to take care of the demographic context and what that motivates in terms of the violence that goes on in each of these places. I also wonder about as a policy response here. I also wonder about the prospect of, and in conversation with both sides of the conflict, I've seen some receptiveness to this, maybe not at the highest levels in public, but at some high levels in private. But one of the problems is that there's very little interest in developing constituencies. On either side, because the main concern is to win the war. That is the existential need that comes above anything. There's no real need to develop constituencies, and by that I mean there's no real need to take care of people's human rights and to do the right thing by a larger population. But I think as the prospect of a peace comes closer, there will be a greater need for both sides to attend to this. And because, you know, primarily, the people in this room are the constituents for most political and armed actors in Sudan, not Sudanese, which is a real shame. But also say that there is scope for pushing for the kind of approach that organizations like perhaps Geneva Call do work on, which is to say pushing both sides to undertake the conflict. We can say, look, fight your stupid war, but do so in a much more respectful way that cares for civilian lives and, yeah, and cares for civilian lives. I think there's scope for that line of logic if Member states that the warring parties trust deliver that message. Saudi Arabia are a good idea, UAE are a good idea, and KSA and UAE need to talk to each other about this so they can do it in a coordinated fashion. So there can be, as with any disarmament, there needs to be a proportionate drawdown. You can't have one, just do it. Nobody's going to do it, nobody's going to volunteer on one side. So it has to be evenly done. And then, you know, just in terms of a characterization as well. People have alluded to this, but what we're all calling human rights violations, they see very much as strategic and tactical moves that, again, are in service of a military victory. And to place that on as the main lens through which everything occurs is very important. It has to come over and above everything else that we talk about. And so, yeah, basically, it's a question of, as with my first point, understanding the deeper value behind this, yeah. UN · Coordinator, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan [40:36]: All right, thank you so much. Anyone else before I give an opportunity for the speakers here to respond? Any other observations, questions? No? Did you want to speak? Liberia [41:04]: Thank you. My name is Inishas. I'm from the Liberian Mission. My question has to do with the early warning indicators. As you stated, the UN and other bodies were duly notified. by what took place in Al Shafa prior to it happening. Indicators were widely reported, yet did not trigger timely prevention. What specific form of early warning we could implement at this time, though you told us clearly that a similar thing that took place in Air France is also taking place in other parts, and it might move forward to the Blue Line. So what form of early warning mechanism do you think that exists or that could be put in place to prevent what happened in other areas from happening in the Blue Line? UN · Coordinator, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan [42:22]: Thank you very much. If there's no other questions or observations, yes, please. STPT [42:30]: Hi, my name is Olivia Bueno. I work with the Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker. I was actually just interested from your perspective and like the conversations that you have with states. I do feel like in the run-up to the fall of Al-Fashir, I was personally involved in advocacy, trying to push action around that, and it was just very difficult to get any kind of traction. I think the member states that we engaged with largely felt sort of helpless, disempowered, I don't know, but it was just very, very difficult to get any kind of traction on advocacy. And I just wonder if you think that the perspective has changed in the last year, and how we might best be able to kind of capitalize on that from an advocacy perspective to prevent something similar from happening again. UN · Coordinator, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan [43:28]: Well, thank you very much. If there, yes, please. I'm not sure exactly how it works, but I guess you can Oh, just put this one on. Yes, it's on now. Austria [43:47]: Yeah? Sorry. No, first and foremost, thank you so much. My name is David. I work at the Austrian mission. Thank you so much to all the briefers. Thank you very much for the information that you gathered here. Maybe just to go back to the New York conversations and the New York institutions that were referred to before by the member of the FMM. I was wondering, ideally, what would the UNSC action, what would the UNSC product look like? I think around this table, we are all aware of the cognitive dissonance that we feel and that maybe also we practice between the institutions of the UN bodies and the mandates that they have and the sad geopolitical realities that we confronted with, shall we say, and also the POC ramifications of them. If we could just think maybe within the box about what kind of product you are thinking of. Thank you. UN · Coordinator, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan [44:50]: Thank you very much. Just looking, then if there's no one else, very, very brief because we really. ECFR · Visiting Fellow; Advisor to The Elders [45:00]: Just a genuine question as well. I wonder if there's an exercise to be done, given all of the advocacy that was done prior to FASHA, if we might, I think in the US you call it Monday morning quarterbacking, but having a look at what might have been done in advocacy terms. Did we do everything we could? Or was there genuinely nothing to be done realistically? UN · Coordinator, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan [45:25]: Thank you very much. over to the chair, Mona, and Joy, and then over to you. Thank you. UN · Member, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan [45:32]: Maybe I'll start, and then, of course, the colleagues can come in. The parties will not stop on their own. What needs to be done is to look at the backers. It is there where we can make a difference. And therefore, our report, last report that we did, because tomorrow will be the last report, but it's not issued yet, is on external actors and how these actors actually fuel and benefit from the conflict. We are halfway through in this discussion, and that's very important because not only that they supply the parties, with weapons, but also personnel, as I think Leema said very well, from different parts, meaning personnel means expertise to use very sophisticated weapons to hurt the population. So the starting point is really, to be very honest, is to name and shame. You are doing this, and that's really important that you hold, you know, you cannot be treated as an innocent bystander. that you are hurting, your action and your policy is hurting people, and you need to know this. And frankly, we have seen some change of behavior as a result of some of the reports that we have done. So to answer you, which I think you asked a very good question, we have the warning signs. Frankly, and I think you said it, Lima, very, very well. When El-Jenina happened, we said extermination. Nobody can. We had to say genocide in Al-Fashir, and then still, where is the action? It's amazing that you use the G word today, and there is no action. So it's very important that we keep calling things as they are. engaging with those who have influence and reminding them of their responsibility. And again, here, the Security Council and Security Council member states have a big role to play. Because if they keep giving this message that we are blocked and we don't know, and our national interest goes above the life of people, then really this maintenance of international peace and security means very little. So I would turn it back on its head and go from outside inside, go from the backers to the parties, and make sure that they have, this is where the action is. This is how you stop the war. This is not how you make peace. To make peace, you need all Sudanese, not only those who are fighting. And therefore, we need to distinguish between these phases. One goal is to stop the war. Another goal, which is associated with it, is to build a democratic Sudan and civil Sudan that works for all its people. And they are not the same actors on both sides. We have one actor here that most probably in a peace talk, on the talks of laying down the arms, she will not be on the table, but she needs to be on the table for building Sudan. So I stop here. UN · Member, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan [49:08]: Thank you. I think just like Mona has said, It's important to understand that the strongest drivers of this continuing or relating war in Sudan is the external factors, so we must prevent. all parties to the conflict, including these external actors, from aiding, abetting, and fueling the war, and impose sanctions that enable the enablers as well. So, and it's important that Security Council, because the paralysis we see now shouldn't happen. looking at the devastating consequences of this war on the people. And it's not sufficient, I will just talk to my African people here too, to say, to abdicate this responsibility and say, yes, we need African solution to African problems, but the solidarity must always be with the people of Sudan that has been put in harms way. We must always prioritize them, and we cannot block international community intervention, and why we are still looking for a solution that is not even on the table, that we can enforce, that we can ensure that hostility ceases, that we can read the riot act and not encouraging parties, because it all goes back to legitimacy question, and even why did AU suspend Sudan? And on the one hand, at the same time, you're also supporting what is going on with regard to the sufferance of the people. So we must really find solution and avoid regionalization. of this war is actually taking that dimension, which is dangerous and unruly horse that we don't know where it will land the whole region, given the disparate interests of different parties and strategic location of Sudan and how people are aligning and realigning on the external backers. Thank you. UN · Chair, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan [51:11]: Just one dimension in terms of possible action, and this is really to continue to press for accountability. So far, the main effort has been the ICC, but you know it is incomplete, incomplete even for the situation of 2005, okay, with a number of fugitives still Not yet. Who is pressing Sudan authorities into delivering the fugitives? Nobody is pressing Sudan on that. What about exploring other possibilities within different countries, universal jurisdiction? It is being tried now in Kenya, tested, but only one country. and so on. There could be multiple forums, I think, instead of waiting until the end of the road or end of the peace process, which we don't know when. So I think a discussion on accountability, the models that can be applied, bring on board the African Union. There's an example, Hissène Habré, in Senegal, and so on. I think all these are efforts to make sure so that those who commit atrocities, especially at the command and leadership level, know that they should be accountable now, not accountable at the end of the -- when things have already gone too far. So I think you can put on the table accountability efforts, and then we can try jointly I think, to see how we can push, press this for further action. Thank you very much. UN · Chief of Staff, Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect [53:23]: No, thank you very much. I mean, let me react on the last point, because actually in response to the question on where we see some potential areas for positive movement, we think that that's one of them. I mean, consultations that the Special Advisor has had in the last few months with a number of key actors in respect to, you know, different jurisdictions that could be applied. specific actions that could be taken and leading the direction of us thinking that there's some space in there. So further consultations will be undertaken with ministers of justice in the region to promote some ideas, but we see some opening there. So I think that's a conversation that can certainly continue. In terms of the early warning question, sir, that you placed, I mean, I think, of course, things can be reiterated, but the points have been made very clear from very early on, and, you know, anything that we've said to date, here you have a fact-finding mission that has documented very, very serious violations, and the mandate, the Office of the Mandate Holder of the UN on Prevention of Genocide, basically saying that, you know, the hallmarks of genocide exist in crimes that have been committed, pending, you know, judicial confirmation of this. and that the risk factors, virtually all the risk factors that the Special Adviser on Prevention of Genocide looks at, are present in the situation of Sudan. The previous mandate holder said this to the Security Council in a briefing in May 2024, two and a half years ago. So I think, you know, that, of course, continues to be important, that it is underlined, and we will continue doing so. But we have all the evidence we need to demonstrate that the risk factors are present and that the very, very serious human rights violations that have been committed in Sudan have been preceded by incitement to violence, which has been preceded by hate speech at the top leadership level of the parties. So, you know, all of that, of course, can continue to be reiterated to the organ where we think that matters most, and we agree, is the Security Council. I think Security Council members have a special responsibility, and the Special Advisor on Prevention of Genocide continues indicating this in his bilateral meetings with Council members. Thank you. DWAG · Founder and President [55:49]: Thank you for the comment and the question. I think in terms of early warning, I think bringing attention to the tragedy, but also if what if this situation continued? I think it may lead to the collapse of the country completely. It's already, right now, Sudan is not in a place to call it like a country as a whole. But then, like where the 40 million people have to go. This will create also spillover across the region, like the flow of refugees. We already have seen the way refugees are treated in Egypt. Chad has been bearing the brunt of having nearly more than a million refugees, some of whom have been living there for years, putting pressure under the limited over the limited resources. South Sudan is a fragile state, but also another warning sign that especially, and I'm glad this question come from you to the African Union, the African leaders. If the situation in Sudan, it is not about Sudan. This pattern is going to be systematic to dismantle many other African countries. Sudan is bordered by nearly eight countries. Most of them are fragile states. And the fighters came from several other countries. They are capable of doing this in Chad. They are capable of doing this in Central African Republic, Niger, Mali, Mauritania, any other countries. And this is a strategy. It is not just about Sudan, but if it is successful in Sudan, then You cannot prevent it in other African countries. So this is really a warning sign, and the involvement of the UAE in Africa has been, this is part of the tactic. We just have to say it. Someone has to say it. And if that person is me, I have to say it. So it is very important to take this serious. We have seen the conflict in Ethiopia. The situation in South Sudan is very intense. And we have seen also the recent bombing of people who are at the mining in the northern part of Sudan. These are all a lot of tension that can create additional crisis. And if not today, we intervene, at some point, the international community and the African Union will be forced to intervene. But at that moment, it will be too late. My answer to Olivia about the advocacy, I think there hasn't been enough people who spoke up. I think if we can mobilize more people speaking about it, putting pressure on the bad actors, as well as also as the leaders, I think the international law is still valid. The reason it is not that it's not valid, it is that it's not implemented. The Security Council still has an instrument. The General Assembly, if the Security Council is reaching a deadlock, there are many opportunities, but we have to ask, and we have to speak, if needed, shame and name and hold people accountable. I think in terms of also mechanism that can be used. Using criminal accountability is one, including the ICC, the universal jurisdiction, financial accountability, also sanctioning not just the perpetrators, but also the enablers, isolating the countries that are supporting both sides. I also would like to respond to the comment raised by the speaker from the Council on Foreign Relations. Speaking about Al Obeid, I'm a Sudanese, and I know every single city in Sudan by heart who's living there. It's not about the ethnicity of the people that makes them supposed to be killed. It is the way the RSF doing things. People sometimes say, oh, the RSF has been defeated, and now they're defecting. I told people, it is a self-defeat. It is not just they are defeated in a battle because when they come into the city, civilian cannot dare to stay. Those who stayed, they stayed by force. In Kordofan, they killed Hamar, the Dar Hamar people. They identify as Arab, but because they did not agree with them in exterminating these people and burning their own cities, so they are killed. So I'll avoid a majority living there are people from Dar Hamar, even though they identify as Arab. And what you do to the Nuba, the Dajo, the Fulani, all the indigenous Sudanese tribe that are But Al-Obaid is strategic because it cuts the supply to South Kordofan, it cut the supply to Darfur. It is happening. What happened to Musa Hilal when he was sitting in North Darfur, not fighting along their side? They attack him. He's Rizegat. He's a cousin of Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo. And so we kind of We cannot water it down. And you mentioned that RSF can be talked out. No, RSF cannot be talked out. Ask me. We advocate on behalf of human rights defenders. If we raise a noise when SAF arrest people, we can raise noise, they feel ashamed and release the people. And we can even reach out to the people we know, the woman minister and all of that. With RSF, if you make a noise, they kill the person or torture them. So we can't even, my cousin has been picked and have yet to return back until today. I cannot speak about him as much advocacy as I do. And my nephew has been picked out. They forced my family to pay 119 million Sudanese pound. Have you heard ever I spoke about them? Because we cannot speak, they will be killed. And many people have been killed. So let us not say this is different. It happened in Al Fashir, it can happen anywhere, in South Darfur. Bani Halba have been the target. Their cities have been wiped out. They identify as Arabs. So for the RSF and their backers, the target is to empty these cities so that they can have more control. But now they are self-defeated because they emptied the cities from the hospital. They do need hospital. They burn the market. They need market. They burn all the other institutions they needed. And they are not fit to govern because of the destruction they created. They cannot. And right now, even NGOs, they can register and operate with all the red tape and irregularities. That doesn't mean SAF does not commit violations, but the violations of the RSF is beyond describable. People and NGOs can register, and the UN agencies present here can tell me, can register and operate in self-controlled area, even though self is not my favorite. But you cannot register and operate. People get picked from their offices, and they are told that you are affiliated of X, Y. They confiscate Starlink. It is just unbelievable. You can't live with RSF. People living by force. And so, it is quite clear that we have to be serious about it. We have to raise the alarm, no matter whether even if they are going to Dougoulou village, we have to raise the alarm. This is about people. It's not about the tribe. It's not about my tribe. It's not about the other person's tribe. It is about the people, and it is about the mass destruction and the slaughter that is going on. So, it is really dangerous to say that they can be talked out. No, they cannot. It's just true, unfortunately, and I survived the early Darfur genocide only to tell the truth, nothing but the truth. Thank you. UN · Coordinator, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan [1:03:53]: All right. Thank you, everyone, and thank you very much for these very important remarks. These are very important. Thank you, everyone, also the chair, Mona, Joy. And also the whole office, thank you very much for putting this together and for you all to come here to this very important event. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you so much.