Beyond the runway: Advancing Air Cargo Security: Synergies between the ICAO AVSEC Programme, UNODC Air Trafficking Programme and the Passenger and Cargo Control Programme (PCCP) (Counter-Terrorism Week Side Event)

Same. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, colleagues joining us both in the room and online, good afternoon and welcome. It is my honor to welcome you to this event in margins of Counterterrorism Week entitled Beyond the Runway: Advancing Air Cargo Security, synergies between the ICAO Aviation Security Programme, the UNODC Passengers and Cargo Control Programme, the UNODC Laboratory and Scientific Services, and the United Nations Countering Terrorist Travel Programme. My name is Agnieszka Majemysgalska, and I serve as Aviation Security Technical Officer in ICAO, and I have the privilege of moderating today's proceedings. Before we begin, allow me to note a few practical matters. This session will run from now to 6 PM and will be conducted in English only, without interpretation. In the interest of all participants, I will endeavor to keep us closely to time. This event takes place against the backdrop of the theme of the 2026 Counter-Terrorism Week: A Future Free from Terrorism. Consolidating the global commitment to multi-stakeholder approaches to counter-terrorism through Member States' leadership and actions. Today's discussion addresses a critical and often underexamined dimension of this commitment: the protection of air cargo and mail from exploitation by terrorist groups and transnational organized crime networks. It also speaks to the underlying message delivered during the opening of the High-Level Conference: Now it is time to focus on action, the prevention of illicit acts. Today we will hear how the complementary mandates of ICAO, CETA, UNODC, and UNOCT, together with the operational experience of member states, can be brought to bear on this shared challenge. Now it's my pleasure to introduce our opening distinguished speakers. We will hear first from Mrs. Katie Buckley, the Chief of Aviation Security Policy, Transport Canada, followed by Ambassador Carmen Cantor, Deputy Executive Director of the Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate, and finally from Mr. Christopher Barks, Regional Director of the ICAO North American, Central American, and Caribbean Office. I would like to invite Mrs. Buckley, Chief of Aviation Security Policy, to take the floor. Thank you. The floor is yours.

Thank you. Distinguished delegates, colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. It is my pleasure to welcome you to this important side event, Beyond the Runway: Advancing Air Cargo Security. On behalf of the Government of Canada, thank you for joining us during the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Week to discuss air cargo security, an issue that is critical not only to aviation but also to global trade, Transport and Security. Global supply chains are more interconnected than ever before. Every day, millions of tons of cargo move across borders by air, sea, rail, and road, connecting businesses, supporting economies, and delivering essential goods to communities around the world. These networks are one of the pillars of our global economy, but they also create opportunities for those who seek to exploit them. Criminal networks and terrorist organizations continue to adapt their methods, exploiting vulnerabilities across transport systems and international supply chains. Recent attempts to conceal improvised incendiary devices in cargo shipments remind us that aviation security cannot be viewed in isolation from broader national and international, um, security efforts. Addressing these threats requires coordinated action that extends well beyond the airport perimeter. This side event will explore exactly that challenge. In today's discussions, we will examine emerging threats to air cargo and consider how risk-based screening and intelligence-led approaches can strengthen our collective defenses. We will hear practical experiences from the International Civil Aviation Organization, the United Nations Counterterrorism Executive Directorate, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and the United Nations Office on Counterterrorism, who are working directly with member states. No single organization or authority can secure the global supply chain alone. Success depends on effective partnerships, timely information sharing, and coordinated operational responses across sectors and across borders. Today's program will explore how we can strengthen cooperation among government authorities, industry partners, and international organizations. While today's focus is on civil aviation, the issues we will discuss reflect a broader challenge. Securing the interconnected transportation systems that support global trade. Safe and secure transport of goods is essential for every mode of transportation. Whether cargo travels by aircraft, vessel, rail, or road, it often forms part of the same integrated logistics network. A vulnerability in one part of that network can have consequences across the entire system. Strengthening air cargo security therefore contributes directly to broader security, resilience, and continuity of global trade trade and transportation. Canada is proud to support these international efforts. As the host state of the International Civil Aviation Organization, Canada has long recognized the importance of ICAO's leadership in establishing global aviation security standards and in helping member states implement them. Canada supports ICAO in fulfilling this mandate through engagement, through technical expertise, financial contributions, and capacity-building efforts. This includes working with ICAO and international partners to help member states strengthen aviation security oversight, enhance quality control programs, and improve their ability to assess and manage evolving threats. Equally important is cooperation among states. Terrorism, organized crime, and illicit trafficking do not respect national borders or institutional mandates. As a result, our responses must include strong cooperation among government authorities, intelligence and law enforcement agencies, regulators, industry partners, and international organizations. Supporting international initiatives such as those led by IKEA, the UNOCT, the UNCTED, and the UNODC enables member states to build common approaches, strengthen operational capabilities, share expertise, and address evolving threats together. International standards and coordinated capacity building remain among our strongest tools for enhancing global transport security. Today's side event reflects that spirit of partnership. It brings together organizations with complementary expertise, united by a common objective: protecting legitimate trade and travel while preventing terrorists and criminal networks from exploiting international transportation systems. I encourage all participants to engage actively in today's discussions share experiences, and identify practical opportunities for further collaboration. The challenges we face are increasingly interconnected, but so too are the solutions. By working together across sectors, across organizations, and across borders, we can strengthen the security of global supply chains, support the safe movement of people and goods, and reinforce our shared commitment to a future free from terrorism. Thank you for your participation, and I wish you a productive and engaging discussion.

Thank you, Mrs. Buckley. It's my pleasure right now to invite Ambassador Carmen Cantor, Deputy Executive Director of the Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate, to take the floor. Ambassador, floor is yours.

Thank you, Madam Moderator, Excellencies, distinguished Participants and partners, good afternoon. It is a pleasure to join you today during United Nations Counterterrorism Week for this important discussion on strengthening air cargo security as a critical component of global counterterrorism efforts. I thank our co-organizers, ICAO, UNODC, and UNOCT, as well as the Government of Canada for their leadership in advancing this initiative. The integrity of international transport and logistics systems is not only vital for global trade, but is also a frontline in preventing terrorists from moving materials, financing, and operational tools across borders. As CTED's assessment work on behalf of the Counterterrorism Committee has re— repeatedly shown— excuse me— aviation cargo systems remain vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist actors and their support networks. Attempts to conceal improvised explosive devices and incendiary materials in cargo and postal shipments underscore a persistent threat. The use of global supply chains to facilitate terrorist attacks including against civil aviation. Despite progress, many member states continue to face challenges in fully implementing their obligations under Security Council resolutions 1373 from 2001, 2309 from 2016, and related counter-terrorism frameworks. Persistent gaps in screening, advanced information systems, Risk management and interagency coordination create opportunities for terrorists to traffic explosives, weapons components, chemical precursors, and other dual-use materials. CTED systematically assesses these gaps during country visits and thematic analysis. Earlier this month, I had the privilege of leading the Committee's visit to Jamaica, where we met frontline officers at the airport and maritime port who are responsible for detecting illicit movements of goods and high-risk cargo. Their work underscores the critical importance of ensuring that these officers are equipped with the right tools and capabilities to remain vigilant and effectively safeguard national security against the flow of materials that could support terrorist activities. These assessments highlight where vulnerabilities in aviation and cargo security intersect with broader counterterrorism deficiencies, particularly in border security, information sharing, and disruption of terrorist supply chains. Importantly, all such measures must be implemented in full compliance with international law including human rights law, an essential pillar of effective and sustainable counterterrorism. Addressing these risks require embedding air cargo security firmly within national and regional counterterrorism strategies. Effective responses must therefore go beyond coordination to operational integration, bringing together aviation authorities, customs, law enforcement, intelligence services, and the private sector to identify, assess, and act on high-risk shipments in real time. This includes enhancing linkages with efforts to counter terrorist financing, detect illicit trafficking networks, and prevent the acquisition of materials that could be used in explosive attacks. CTED's recommendations deriving from the committee's assessments inform capacity-building programs that play a critical role in enhancing detection capabilities and supporting risk-based approaches. In this regard, CTED's assessments also consistently encourage member states to implement and benefit from established international assistance frameworks. Including ICAO's Aviation Security Programme and UNODC initiatives such as the Airport Communication Programme and the Passenger and Cargo Control Programme, which provide practical tools to strengthen cargo screening, interagency coordination, and risk management in line with Security Council requirements. Strengthening air cargo is not only about safeguarding supply chains. It is about denying terrorists the means to prepare and execute attacks. Let us use this opportunity to identify concrete measures to close implementation gaps, enhance operational cooperation, and ensure that aviation systems are resilient against evolving terrorist threats. I thank you, and I'm going to excuse myself. I have to go to another event to give closing remarks, so you're in great hands. Thank you so much.

Thank you, Madam Ambassador. To conclude the opening segment, I would like to invite Mr. Christopher Barks, Regional Director of IKEA office, to deliver the final opening remarks. Mr. Barks, the floor is yours.

Okay, thank you. A little by way of introduction, the NAC is the North America, Central America, and Caribbean office of ICAO. I'm based in Mexico, and I'm proud to include Canada as one of my members. So thank you very much. Canada is part of the NAC office and has been a great support both in the region and globally, and as was mentioned, is the host state of ICAO. So we're very, very grateful. So, you know, as we lead off, and I don't see the slide anymore, but I trust that it's there. Okay. I think I advanced it. There we go. So, a little bit about IKEA. IKEA The International Civil Aviation Organization is the United Nations specialized agency for civil aviation. We were established by the Chicago Convention in 1944, a little bit before the United Nations, and we count 193 member states as of today. Our mandate rests on 3 pillars. First, we issue international standards and recommended practices, or SARPs, that govern civil aviation. These are contained in 19 annexes to the Chicago Convention. Annex 17 is the aviation security standard, and Annex 9 covers facilitation, including security-related provisions related to the border security and management. Second, we audit states. We assess whether national systems actually implement what they have committed to on paper. And third, we assist. Where gaps exist, and they do exist, ICAO works with states to close them. That three-part cycle—standard, audit, and assist—is how international aviation security moves from obligation to reality. ICAO's work is not simply technical. It is grounded in binding international law. On the ICAO side, the Chicago Convention and Annexes 17 and 9 define the how of aviation security. 10 of the 19 universal legal instruments against terrorism were developed under ICAO's auspices. On the UNCT side, the framework of Security Council resolutions is equally clear. Resolution 2309 adopted in 2016, explicitly names civil aviation as an attractive target as well as tool for terrorist attack and requires states to strengthen screening, inspection, and risk management through ICAO mechanisms. This is not soft guidance. These are legally binding Security Council obligations, and ICAO is the designated mechanism through which states are expected to deliver on them. That is what makes ICAO central, not peripheral, to the counterterrorism agenda. The Madrid Guiding Principles and the Abu Dhabi Non-Binding Guidelines connect this architecture to the broader UN counterterrorism architecture, reinforcing that civil aviation is a shared responsibility across the multilateral system. The governance, governance chain for Annex 17 runs from the international level to the operational floor, and every link matters. At the top, international conventions and ICAO standards set the requirements. States then translate those into national legislation and national civil aviation security programs. From there, airport and cargo operators, whether government-owned or private, implement the measures on the ground. Quality control and oversight is multilayered. States oversee operators, and ICAO audits states. The implication is important. A weakness at any level in this chain, inadequate national legislation, poor oversight capacity, or non-compliant operators compromises the whole system. Meeting the standard on paper is not the same as securing the chain in practice. The Global Aviation Security Plan places risk assessment as one of the 6 global priorities, and for good reason. ICAO's dedicated Working Group on Threats and Risks produces global risk advice for states and ICAO governing bodies annually. The risk picture is updated yearly based on a pre-established methodology that considers a full range of threat scenarios, including explicitly IED and IED concealment in cargo and mail. That advice is translated into actionable guidance through two key documents: the Aviation Security Global Risk Context Statement, which provides the global risk picture, and the Risk Management Manual, currently in finalization, which will equip states with a repeatable, defensible risk assessment methodology. The objective: move states from reactive security to genuinely risk-informed decision-making. Let me turn to the threat landscape itself, which is taken into consideration in our work. There are two dimensions. The first concerns people: illegal entry, document fraud, human trafficking, suspected terrorists and criminals, and foreign terrorist fighters who pose a threat to national security. The second, and this is where today's conversation is focused, concerns weapons, drugs, and goods. Arms, ammunition, and explosives illicit synthetic drug and precursors, hazardous materials, contraband, and cash. Air cargo security sits squarely in this second dimension. It is high volume, high speed, and increasingly targeted. The cargo hold is not just a commercial space, it is a potential attack vector. And the Cargo Side Threat Assessment methodology is as CTED assessments confirm, a decade behind what we have built on the passenger side. The threat continues to evolve and in important ways. IEDs and IEDs remain the primary vector in aviation security. I want to pause on IEDs specifically because they represent a distinctive and often underestimated risk. An improvised incendiary device functions through combustion, not detonation. That distinction matters operationally. It means an IED may not trigger the same detection protocols as an explosive device. The components are unremarkable: an initiator, a match head, a chemical reaction, a trigger, a timer, a pressure switch, a phone alarm, and a power source, a battery, and a flammable accelerant— gasoline, alcohol, or an aerosol. Common materials assembled into a weapon. IED and IED concealment in cargo is not a hypothetical threat. There are documented incidents. This is precisely why Annex 17 security controls on cargo and mail prior to aircraft loading are non-negotiable. Alongside this, attacks targeting the aircraft itself or using the plane as a weapon remain a concern that the international community continues to monitor very closely. Landslide attacks, cyberattacks, attacks at distance, and insider threat can continue to be difficult to mitigate effectively. This last one cuts across all scenarios because an insider with access can undermine even the most robust physical security regime. Background checks, access controls, and behavioral detection all matter here. And on UAS, I want to be clear about this. The misuse of unmanned aerial systems is no longer an emerging threat. It is a real one.. We have seen it in conflict zones and we have seen it near airports. ICAO is working with member states to address this, but the pace of the technology is outrunning the pace of regulation, and that gap is something this community must urgently close. Now let me show you where we stand globally. This data reflects ICAO audit findings on Standard 4.6. The Cargo and Mail Security Standard, across all regions. The methodology: mean state scores within each region averaged across audited states. Every gap in this map is a seam that well-resourced networks are actively trying to exploit. The weakest link in the global cargo supply chain is the point of vulnerability regardless of where the shipment originates. Or where it is bound. Major progress has been made that is real and worth acknowledging, but there is still significant work ahead and it is not evenly distributed. So what can states do? Take into account ICAO's state letter entitled Considerations to Support States in Mitigating the Risks Posed by IEDs in the Air Cargo and mail supply chain. It is intended to assist member states in understanding and addressing the evolving threat, as well as in mitigating the risks posed by improvised incendiary devices in cargo and mail. Train relevant personnel— screeners, cargo handlers, and postal workers— on suspicious indicators. The human layer matters as much as the technological one. Ensure that occurrence and incident reporting procedures are functioning. We cannot improve what we do not measure. And critically, bring postal authorities into coordinated supply chain security. Mail streams and general cargo are not separate problems. They are the same problem traversing different channels. And postal operators are often outside the aviation security environment. When they should be inside it. At the international level, the agenda is equally clear. International experts are already working to enhance existing guidance material, and that work must be accelerated. We need to assess technological solutions more rigorously. Detection technology is necessary but not sufficient if it's not paired with intelligence intelligence-led targeting. Information sharing and international cooperation are not optional features of an effective system. They are structural requirements. And harmonization of cargo and mail security measures across jurisdictions is the only way to prevent regulatory arbitrage, where shipments are routed through the weakest point. Here's why This is important for the United Nations system. On 12 September 2024, ICAO was notified of an act of unlawful interference involving IEDs and cargo. One parcel ignited on the tarmac of an airport before being loaded onto an aircraft. A second ignited in a cargo warehouse after being trucked from the airport. These were not simulations. They were operational incidents. IIDs do not stay within commercial supply chains. They move through aid shipments, diplomatic pouches, postal systems, and general cargo, which means they pose direct risk to UN logistics operations and field missions in fragile settings. The level of sophistication of recent devices makes them genuinely difficult to detect, whether by physical search or by technological screening. That is precisely the point. The devices are designed to evade. For colleagues here from across the UN system, this is not an IKO problem. It is a shared operational risk. A common baseline of awareness and standardized screening practices across all agencies is not a nicety. It is a necessity. No single entity can do this alone, and I mean that not as a diplomatic formality, but as an operational fact. Aviation authorities set the standards. Customs authorities detect. Law enforcement prosecutes. Postal operators manage the mail system. Private logistics companies own the physical supply chain. Forensic laboratories provide identification and attribution. Each is necessary, but none is sufficient. The UN Global Counterterrorism Coordination Compact is the connective tissue that aligns these efforts under a coherent architecture, and it is why today's side event brings together 4 organizations whose mandates, taken together, cover the full spectrum of what effective cargo and mail security requires. Canada's role as co-organizer of the event is itself an example of what member state leadership looks like. A government, government bringing its own expertise, its own methodology, and its convening power to bear on a multilateral challenge. This captures what I believe is the most important structural point of today's session. IKEA's AVSEC and facilitation programs Establish the normative framework, the standards, the audits, the implementation support. That is the foundation. CTED's country assessments provide the evidence base that tells us where obligations end and gaps begin. No other body has that breadth of direct on-the-ground visibility. UNODC's Passenger and Cargo Control Program brings the border management and law enforcement lens. PCCP units at airports are the operational manifestation of what interagency cooperation looks like in practice. And UNODC's laboratory and scientific services bridge forensic science and frontline detection, a vital but often underappreciated link. UNOCT's Countering Terrorist Travel Program, and specifically the Threat Assessment Models Program, represents a qualitative leap. It connects intelligence to aviation security risk assessment in a structured, sustained way. That is the methodology we need to extend to cargo. The power of this partnership is in the complementarity. No one program secures the global cargo supply chain. Together, with sustained commitment of member states, we can. Finally, I would also like to share with you that last week the ICAO Council approved the convening of the High-Level Security Conference on— High-Level Conference on Aviation Security to be held in April 2027. We cordially invite all member states and international organizations, as cargo and mail security will be a key topic of discussion. I thank you for your attention, and I look forward to the discussions and presentations of our partners. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr.

Barks, and thank you to all our distinguished speakers for opening remarks. And now we will transition to the panel discussion. We have an exceptional panel of experts with us today, and let me invite and let me welcome Mrs. Henna Shah, Associate Legal Officer at CTED, to open our panel discussion. Mrs. Shah, drawing on CITES country assessments across many member states, where do the most significant gaps lie between states' legal obligations and their operational implementation in respect of cargo and mail and security, of course? And what would CITES recommend as a priority measure? Mrs. Shah, the floor is yours. Thank you.

Thank you for the question. Distinguished colleagues, representatives of member states and partners. CTED's mandate under Security Council resolutions on counterterrorism places us at the intersection of legal obligation and operational reality. CTED has performed 209 country assessments to 120 member states. Each country assessment gives us a granular, evidence-based picture of where implementation gaps exist. And I want to use this time to speak directly to what those assessments tell us about air cargo security and what they demand of us collectively. Resolution 1373 is unambiguous. States are required to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts, deny safe haven,— and critically for today's discussion, take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including through the prevention of illicit cross-border movement of goods. Resolution 2309 goes further, explicitly recognizing civil aviation as both a transport vector and an attack surface for terrorist groups, and obliging states to prevent illicit good flows through aviation by strengthening security systems screening, inspection, risk management, specifically through ICAO mechanisms. Resolution 2370 of 2017 is dedicated to preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons, including explosives and IEDs and their components. Uh, there we go. What our assessments reveal is a persistent and troubling implementation gap between these obligations on paper and the operational realities on the ground. Let me be specific about the nature of that gap. First, on screening architecture, many states have adopted the ICAO Annex 17 framework in their national aviation security programs, but implementation of the cargo security standards, particularly Standards 4.6 through 4.8 concerning security controls for cargo and mail prior to aircraft loading remains inconsistent. Our assessment shows that a significant number of states do not yet have functioning regulated agent regimes with robust chain of custody controls. Cargo is cleared not because it has been screened, but because it has passed through a known cosigner relationship that in practice lacks the verification protocols and ANIX 17 contemplates. This is a structural vulnerability. Second, on advanced cargo information and risk profiling, the exploitation of pre-departure data, such as cargo manifests, airway bills, shipper declarations for intelligence-led targeting remain underdeveloped in many jurisdictions. UNODC's PCCP has made significant inroads in building customs capacity to use advanced electronic information for risk stratification. But we consistently see that the interface between customs risk analysis units and civil aviation security authorities is weak or absent. There are separate bureaucratic silos operating on the same cargo flows with minimal data sharing architecture between them. From a counterterrorism standpoint, that is an exploitable seam. Third, and that is the threat dimension that warrants serious attention, our assessments have documented a pattern of attempts to conceal improvised explosive devices and improvised incendiary devices within cargo and airmail shipments. These are not hypothetical scenarios. The operational challenge these incidents pose is not primarily one of detection technology. Such as X-ray and CTX systems are reasonably well deployed at major hubs, but it's of risk-based targeting, identifying which of the millions of daily cargo consignments warrant secondary examination. Without functioning intelligence-led targeting, screening becomes statistically random rather than risk-based, and that is insufficient against a determined adversary with knowledge of cargo workflows. Fourth, on strategic trade and export control. Resolution 2370 of 2017 provides CTED with the broader mandate of covering all weapons, including explosives and IED components. Our assessments show that export control frameworks in many states do not adequately cover dual-use transiting through air cargo or CBRN-applicable precursors moving through free trade zones adjacent to international airports. The firearms and parts component, including the trafficking of disassembled weapons through postal and courier channels, remains a significant gap in many regional contexts. Fifth, on terrorist travel and the civil aviation nexus. Under the UN Countering Terrorist Travel Program, The threat assessment models capability co-established by UNOCT and ICAO provides member states with a structured methodology for intelligence-led threat assessments in civil aviation. CTED's recommendations consistently urge states to ensure they conduct full and systematic risk management processes, keeping in mind the effectiveness of interagency cooperation. CTED's assessments have underscored that passenger side security has advanced significantly since the post-2001 architecture was built through PNR collection, API data, and watchlist screening. But cargo side threat assessment is a decade behind in terms of systematic intelligence-led methodology. We need to close this gap, and the TAM Framework provides a vehicle for doing so. So this brings us to what does CTED recommend operationally? We urge member states to conduct explicit mapping exercises between their national aviation security programs and their customs risk analysis frameworks, identifying where information sharing protocols are absent and establishing them, not as a matter of courtesy between agencies, but as a legal implementation requirement under Resolution 2309. We recommend that states building or reforming their regulated agent regimes do so with supply chain traceability as the organizing principle, meaning that the integrity of a consignment must be verifiable from point of origin to aircraft loading with documented break of chain protocols that trigger enhanced screening. We call on member states to institutionalize interagency cooperation and information exchange exchange mechanisms. And we urge engagement in building national threat assessment processes for cargo and mail that are genuinely intelligence-led, drawing on financial intelligence, watchlist data, and pattern of life analysis on freight forwarders and logistic intermediaries, not simply reactive and physical screening anomalies. CTED stands ready to support member states in and through its mandate to facilitate technical assistance in translating these recommendations into concrete legislative and administrative action. Our technical assessment visits provide a structured mechanism for identifying specific implementation gaps, and our legal and policy tools are available to support that work. The threat is technical, and the response must be equally so. Aviation cargo security is not a peripheral concern within the counterterrorism agenda. It is a central vulnerability that well-resourced terrorist networks and transnational organized crime groups are actively seeking to exploit. Our collective obligation is to close the gaps they are mapping. Thank you.

Thank you, Mrs. Shah. I would like to give the floor right now to Mr. Helpin. I invite— sorry. Yes, Mr. Helpin. Mr. Greg Helpin, Senior Security Advisor at Transport Canada. Could you walk us through Transport Canada's risk-based methodology for aviation security and how the National Risk Context Statement combines threat, vulnerability, and consequences in into single defensible measures to guide national risk management. Mr. Helpin, the floor is yours.

Thank you very much. I want to begin by saying happy Canada Day to everybody. It's our big day, so I'll get all your letters in the mail later, and you guys can email me and tell me how— yeah, anyways. As noted in both of the presentations and a lot of the speeches that we've had around so far this evening. And in alignment with that, a risk-based approach is something that Canada had been seeking for a long time. Um, no pun intended, we had to blow up our program to put it back together so that we could get to a point in which we were, you know, doing our best to be proactive and not reactive in our approach. So in response to IKEA's global risk context statement, and, uh, Canada did its best to work with not only, uh, international, uh, but domestic partners in trying to find a way, uh, through the woods. Um, often in security, we have pieces of the puzzle. We have, um, incomplete data, incomplete intelligence, and we are doing our best to make our way through that forest without tripping. And, you know, it's often a reactive approach, and risk-based approaches, often we need to push ourselves into as, as best a proactive approach as possible. And so the design of our National Risk Context Statement approach is one where we build a relevant risk model to inform both of the strategic and operational level. We, we continue to know that aviation is an iconic target for terrorist entities, and with emerging threats, and as noted, threats that are here to stay now, we have to make sure that we are nimble and on our toes and as flexible as possible in the wide range of ways in which aviation can be affected by various means means of disruption and destruction. So how do we find our way in the dark? Evidence-based approaches, obviously, grounded in credible, reliable, and verifiable data. Risk-informed, aligned with assessed threats, vulnerability, likelihood, and the potential consequences. Subject matter expert-informed, not only domestically but internationally. Structured and well-organized, designed to support clarity, consistency, transparency, and ease of use so that when we We present our methodology up the chain and down the chain and horizontally. Everybody understands it. It's not overly complicated. One of the things that does irritate me in the risk world is overly complex— overcomplicated datasets, overly complicated assessment requirements. Sometimes less data is actually better data. For example, we could be doing an assessment of all the airports in Canada. And you could put together a bunch of different data vectors together to understand which, which airport is of highest threat and, and/or highest risk, hypothetically. But for the most part, population density in and around the airport itself really does speak to many of those variables. And so sometimes understanding your data and simplifying your data can get you further along than trying to overcomplicate it with, with larger data sets. Controlled and systematic, so applying standardized, repeatable, and defensible methodologies and processes. Accountable, ensuring that there's clearly defined roles within the methodology itself, the responsibilities, the authorities, and the decision-making ownership with respect to those, uh, outputs. And well documented. This was something that was really pushed forward within our program over the last 4 to 5 years, was ensuring that our decisions are very clearly well documented across threat vulnerability, consequence, and overall risk. So we went through an approach of trying to modernize our own risk approach. You know, obviously, as noted, emerging threats or the threats that are here, the shifting global security climate, uh, demand greater agility in our approach. UASs, IED, cyber, all of these, and, uh, you know, protests within that environment. So the, the magnitude of different types of, uh, attack vectors that could hit the aviation sector., we identified a need to be more proactive and forward-looking as best we could within that environment, uh, to strengthen the evaluation. Uh, we wanted to ensure our calculations were both credible and defensible, and so we, we did, uh, go out, as noted, uh, internationally benchmarked, domestically benchmarked within our security intelligence community, um, worked with IKEA as well to get insight as to where they may be going from the global risk context statement approach.— did our best to influence as well. But also ensuring that you're integrating that appropriate applicable data set as well. We have 3 levels within our— so once again, within the organization of Canada's aviation security risk approach, we have strategic, which is that overarching, which is that our national risk context statement approach methodology that we'll provide here today. This informs the direction of regulation, the direction of policy, uh, and the direction of the organization at large, putting in place a relevant understanding of our risk and doing our best to move our resources strategically in a way that makes sense operationally. These are things both within the domestic but also international oversight, ensuring that we understand what's going on on the ground, appropriate data sets to inform actions that, you know, putting our resources towards those areas of highest risk. Tactical, so this is our lowest level. This is responses to bomb hoaxes or bomb threats that are occurring directly on the ground and ensuring that our system as a whole, both between our agency but also national defense, public safety, multitude of different departments and agencies, if an attack or a plane was to be taken, It's averted and everybody understands their roles from a risk-based approach and who has the authority to ground that flight or take that flight out of the air. So there's 4 key components of our National Risk Context Statement that we wanted to ensure, uh, right off the bat. So it's our annual high-level report on risks related to the unlawful interference of Canada's civil aviation system, relevant risk Um, it guides risk-based decisions within the program, uh, from regulatory to oversight. As noted, it meets the international standard, uh, that ICAO puts forward, uh, as well as serves as a starting point for our industry as well. So not only is this looking at ourselves internally relevantly, but it also helps our airports and our air carriers understand the risk that Canada at the national level is considering and they can make adjustments to their threat, they can make adjustments to their vulnerability and/or their consequences accordingly, and ensure that they on the ground are, are, um, ensuring their resources are placed on the highest areas of risk as well. Simplified, our methodology employs a scenario-based approach to assess security risks, um, the method of attack, the target of the attack, the actor, and the attack pathway. So this could be an IED, uh, target is the aircraft, the actor is a non-insider, and the attack pathway is kind of one of the most important components of the scenario. So how is that IED making its way through the system? And obviously with the cargo nexus, it makes it more difficult because of the way the supply chain network can be kind of pushed out, pushed out, pushed out, and ensuring that we understand the different ways in which, uh, an IED or an IED could hypothetically make its way onto an aircraft. And assessing that with subject matter experts across the vector of— sorry, across the landscape of not just regulatory but also cargo handling agencies, air carriers, airports themselves to really inform and document our understanding of these systems and these scenarios. We use a descriptive scoring table approach. It is a probability scale from 0 to 1. Um, it assesses the relative threat, vulnerability, and consequences of the approach, uh, based on that scenario. Once again, subject matter expert informed, applies a very simple consistent formula, which is threat times vulnerability times consequence. And something that we have put out there is, uh, we want to express our final risk score in Canadian dollars. So our consequences are all financially based. Now, we could sit here and argue about the absolute dollar costs of a plane going down. This is a relevant model, right? And so as long as we come to some type of an agreement on generally speaking what the attack would do and those hypothetical destructive and disruptive costs, the relevant nature of the varying scenarios still comes into, clarity. So our threat assessment, uh, considers intent to carry out a specific type of attack and the capability, feasibility of carrying out said attack. Um, this is very much driven on intelligence, the intent part, but also history of attack. I mean, all of us understand in the world of aviation security and counter-terrorism that there is hist— history of attack types against civil aviation, but we don't have a huge amount of data sets necessary necessarily to, to point to. A lot of this is driven on chatter. A lot of this is driven on an understanding of what some of the big players may be wanting to do against the aviation system, or in some cases against the transportation system at large. And some of these are just being, you know, pieces put together, certain products being purchased, um, certain suggestive elements within intelligence to try to guide our understanding of what some of these, uh, malicious actors may want to do to the system. The second component is the capability feasibility. It's the reasonable capacity of a malicious actor to su— to su— uh, to successfully carry out an attack. Uh, so this can be simply stated as, you know, if I am a malicious actor and I want to go to the airport and I wanna stab some people, it is pretty easy for me to go to my kitchen, pull out a knife, and drive to the airport and be successful in that attack path. It is more difficult to build an IED to do so. It is more difficult to build an IED that I feel may be successful in circumventing a pre-board screening system. So there is a, a granularity, uh, in, in the way in which that we look at these things. Obviously subject matter expert informed. We have bomb experts within Transport Canada that help support important understanding of the different types of bombs that could be brought into the system, as well as incendiary devices through cargo, to really hone in on what the capability feasibility of an average actor could be to, to be able to do these things, not only in the physical nature of building these things, but also in the aptitude of the average individual to learn the approach. This is, as noted, assessed in collaboration with government security and intelligence partners, not just domestically but also internationally. Um, this is an intelligence-led process. If there's no intelligence for us necessarily to, uh, to say that's— that there's malicious actors, uh, that have an intent to do something, we try to do our best not to get too focused on it. We want to ensure that overarching intelligence is the driver of our risk-based approach. I've highlighted there reasonable worst-case scenario. This is another area in which things can get carried away. We're not talking about, uh, a malicious actor jumping out of a helicopter with an IED on his back and slapping it on the side of a moving aircraft. Uh, we are talking about the reasonable real world. I understand none of us saw 9/11 coming, um, but we have to play within the ballpark as best we can, obviously allowing for our intelligence as best we can to understand the system that we are up against. Consequences as well, reasonable worst-case scenario. We're not talking about, you know, another 9/11 necessarily, but an aircraft likely hitting a stadium or a major, a major building in a major city. Vulnerability evaluates the likelihood that an attack would be successful if attempted. This is an evaluation of the presence or absence of security measures and controls along said attack pathway. The effectiveness of those controls as well, once again on a scale of 0 to 1. So within our public areas of our airport, you have CCTV, you have the occasional walk-by of some type of a law enforcement individual, but it is not the same level of security measures as making its way to the aircraft itself, right? So something like the Belgian attacks, an attack on IED with firearms, it is much easier for a malicious actor to pull that off than actually making its way to an aircraft itself. This also takes into consideration our national compliance rates, understanding not, you know, speaking to the effectiveness of our system as well. Consequences are evaluated in terms of the degree of destruction, disruption, and harm to people expressed in Canadian dollars. A relative cost estimate of consequences of each scenario is assessed using what we have is a value of statistical life. I want to make sure that we are not saying how much a person's life is worth. Uh, it is a cost-benefit analysis number. It doesn't matter what number you use necessarily, as long as it is consistent. So on an average aircraft leaving Canada, making its way over the Atlantic, it's approximately 225 people on board.— that's 225 people that would be passed if, if that incident was to occur, as well as the cost of the aircraft and the general disruption costs. Also, in conjunction, this data set is built on not only Canadian information, but also it's supported by our Five Eyes partners and an understanding of our Five Eyes partners with respect to that data. Reasonable worst-case scenario, once again, Calculating said risk, the score of threat on a 0 to 1 scale, vulnerability on a 0 to 1 scale, and the consequences in dollars are therefore multiplied, arriving at a final risk score. So risk is threat times vulnerability times consequence. For example, 0.4 times 0.75 times a billion dollars, risk equals $300 million. That is also put on a low, medium-low, medium, medium-high, high scale to inform senior management direction as well. That's all, folks.

Thank you very much, Greg, for this presentation. Could I ask for the remote, please? Thank you. Now I will give the floor to our colleague who is online. And Luke Hardree, who is the program officer for our— the program close to our hearts, TAMM, will present a presentation on the threat assessment model programs. So, Luca, could you explain how the Threat Assessment Models Programme builds trust and shared understanding among stakeholders? And what does experience suggest about the translation of threat information into standardized actionable deliverables? The floor is yours.

Thanks very much, Agnieszka, and good afternoon, good evening to everyone. Greetings from the UNOCT office in Rabat, Morocco. Thanks also to the Government of Canada, to IKO, CTED, and UNODC for organizing this event and for the opportunity to talk to some of the work that we're doing together on threat assessments. And finally, thanks to all participants for preferring our panel discussion over watching Belgium versus Senegal tonight. So this first slide that's up on the screen now is an attempt at explaining what TAM is about. Thank you, Ignatia, for your kind words towards the program. Actually, we learned in working with the Vietnamese where we were cooperating within the TAM program that TAM actually That means heart in Vietnamese. So TAM is currently a capability that's running under this, the Countering Terrorist Travel program. TAM stands for Threat Assessment Models. It is an initiative that was created by both ICAO and UNOCT really out of an observation and often actually a frustration that aviation security risk managers are often left in the dark when it comes to the current threat picture. And that's a problem when they are the ones responsible to develop risk assessments on a regular basis. Because threat information, as you all know, forms the basis of this work. So as we set out to work on this well-known issue, the first structural pain points that we identified with IKEA colleagues was that we're dealing with two communities that don't really think in the same ways and don't really necessarily think it's worth it to talk to each other on a regular basis. On the one side, you have the counter-terrorism and national security community that tends to operate on a need-to-know basis, while the AFSEC community tends to think in terms of the need to manage a risk. So based on that, we had to find a way to respond to this challenge in a practical way by first establishing a joint approach to help these communities, you know, build that relationship. We're not saying this is going to be easy, but we've set some principles that you can see on the slide there, and it all starts with, you know, building that trust and awareness. And it really is about generally trying to explain at first what the other side is doing, to clear any myths about sometimes what the intelligence community can or cannot do, and also importantly identify value points for the other side. Next, it's key for those two communities to start establishing clear communication channels and protocols. Institutionalizing the relationship really does help building, you know, this routine and reinforces the informal that shouldn't be left on its own, but that's necessary to kind of smoothen the processes. Thirdly, practice. Sorry, I see that, yeah, still on the pyramid shape slide. Practice, because It's only through practice that you get to refine your processes, your methods. Once you've established that working methods on how to assess threats and how to communicate them effectively, you have to practice it. And then lastly, the icing on the cake, feedback mechanism is really key to help you know, both the producing side and the consumer side to align and get to work in a way that is more efficient and to bring more quality to your products. So based on these principles, we've worked with several states to enhance their own threat information frameworks for AFSEC, with the caveat that the angle was mostly on commercial aviation.. But I think it's fair to say that we can transfer some of that to cargo security. So next slide, please. So I said what TAM does really is to help states develop their own national frameworks for threat information sharing in the context of civil aviation. Now, these frameworks— and that's important to say— is that they're threat agnostic. So we're not looking at the actual threats itself as part of that programme, as part of that initiative. That is left to the actual information holders, right? We're here to help build that kind of framework through which you can channel information. So what matters to us is that member states really find that effective way to systematically produce information security-focused threat assessments, assessments that respond to the needs of the AFSEC risk managers, assessments that are analytically driven. In other words, we need to find a practical way to convey critical information within the constraints imposed by the national security community. It's also important to find a way, you know, to develop a framework that makes sense in the local environment. You know, not all frameworks will work in the same place. So if we look at some of the key factors that allow for switching to this analytics-driven approach, some would say intelligence-led approach, there are really 3 that I'd like to highlight tonight. The first one being that It all starts with identifying your producing forces on the one side and your consumer base on the other side. When you talk about a threat assessment, you start by identifying your stakeholders, get them to understand their roles and responsibilities, their value in the chain. It may sound obvious, but effective cooperation on aviation security requires a comprehensive all-inclusive approach encompassing multilateral exchange between the counter-terrorism community, government authorities, civil aviation regulatory authorities, and operational-level industry stakeholders. Don't overlook them, they have a lot of information, lots of expertise as well, that operates within around the state's aviation ecosystem. And by that I mean the security screening system providers, postal services, the freight forwarders, the shippers, even the insurers might have something to say about risk. So all of these people, it's important to hear what they have to say and find a way, you know, to kind of bring that information together in a way that makes sense. The second piece to that slide is that through the program, we're trying to bring those, you know, core stakeholders around the table to spend time to discuss, you know, how best to develop a national interagency framework that really works for everyone. We do that through, you know, developing coordination processes, standard operating procedures, sometimes developing the architecture of your interagency arrangements. And at the end of it, the result might range from, you know, a network of liaison officers, you know, a network of focal points among specific agencies, or sometimes a more integrated kind of whole-of-government approach if the state is able to go as far as that. But that's a minimum to be able to rely on some key people that can, you know, provide the basis for that information. And then lastly, as a third factor, it's key, we find, to develop standardized deliverables. Establishing harmonized risk assessment methodologies require a lot of work in the background. I mentioned some work towards establishing SOPs, but behind that, you have to really go into the details to find out what a very simple product can look like and how to produce that on a regular basis. We find that set frequency for assessments is key. Work that is based on clear scenarios is often also a very important factor, as it, amongst other things, allows you to kind of see how a threat evolves over time by being, you know, assessed over and over again. And it's also important to define from the onset the classification levels and access levels to those documents. Mr. Greg Helpin spoke to all of the key ingredients that you can expect to find in such threat assessment products and how they can feed the risk assessment. So I won't go into the details of what we do on that, but I think it already gives you a very clear example of, you know, a practical way to go about this. Next slide, please. So finally, I think some takeaways from past experiences and best practices that we've observed with our international partners that could maybe be applicable when talking about a cargo environment. And by the way, I think this could also be applicable to general aviation, which is widely used in illicit trafficking. But really, 3 things here to retain. First is that the end result of this rapprochement between the CT community and the civil aviation risk managers is that you get mitigation measures that evolve and adjust much more smoothly through those steps that I mentioned. Previously to meet the current risk challenges. In cargo, the threat information holders can support in establishing new route patterns. For instance, they can help towards flagging new substances of interest, whether we're talking about illicit drugs, drug precursors, explosives. They can also help with uncovering new concealment methods that we need to look out for. For instance, methods that are being used or tested by certain threat actors in other regions of the world and, you know, provide some regional or international context that allows you as a risk manager to anticipate the trends that may be coming your way in several months or perhaps years. Another tip or insight that we got from our cooperation with States is that it's always good to be as inclusive as possible in your intelligence-based approach. I mentioned some of the stakeholders that we tend to encourage to meet within, you know, those cooperations. I didn't mention the airport coordination units that you can find, especially in Africa, for instance, at certain airports, joint cells that would combine police and customs and other entities, local joint cells that would actually have a lot to feed back to the community to kind of make sure that they're on top of the threat picture at the very local level. Finally, economic operators, I mentioned, are a valuable source of expertise and information. And this sometimes can be seen as a bit of a deterrent for some in the intelligence community to share information with. But we tend to say that in this work, you know, for risk managers in aviation security, not everything needs to be classified. There are very practical ways to convey critical information without having to go through, you know, very classified information. So again, if we take those principles that I mentioned at the beginning in highlighting trust and awareness, the more you get to know each other, the more you can convey that message within the boundaries, within the constraints imposed by the community of counterterrorism. So I mentioned some of the states that we were working with— sorry, no, I did not mention those states yet except Vietnam. But maybe to flag it for the participants in the room, TAM has been tested and deployed with Vietnam, the Philippines, Botswana, and Nigeria. We were also very lucky to work with some of the thought leaders in this kind of discipline around the world. Special mention here to Canada, who's really helped the program, including on some of the methodological aspects of the work, and also Morocco for developing a case study that highlights their way of doing things in Morocco, and that has been really helpful for some of the states in the African continent. So I'll stop here, and thank you very much for your attention.

Thank you very much, Luc. I now turn the floor to Mr. Jeffrey Bawa, Synthetic Drug Strategy Regional Coordinator for West and Central Africa from UNODC. So, Mr. Bawa, given that air cargo represents roughly a third of global trade by value, how is UNODC integrated response spanning from the Passenger and Cargo Control Programme and the Laboratories and Scientific Services addresses the operational vulnerabilities at airports? And what are the results so far been achieved? And what are the next steps? Mr. Bauer, the floor is yours.

Thank you so much, Agnieszka, for the introduction. I have a presentation which will probably be presented shortly. Thank you. Before I start, I would like to also wish Happy Canada Day to our Canadian colleagues. I know of other ones around. Thank you for taking a day off from your day off to come and speak to us.

Perfect.

So I work for UNODC. I'm based in Dakar, Senegal, so I also have a little bit of a West African experience, but I have also worked on this issue as well in Latin America, in Colombia, and covering the whole region there. So the presentation that I'll have today is basically how do we coordinate internally within UNODC through different programs, but also externally with partners? And especially, how do we infuse science for better detection at airports? But also, how do we leverage our experience in border management to better detect drugs, precursors, but also the threats from terrorism as well, as it's all integrated. So, our— internally, the way we approach this goes into 4 different spheres. The first one is linked with the laboratory and scientific services in which I work under. As the synthetic drug strategy coordinator for West Africa. And we have also our amazing team from our passenger and cargo control program called PCCP, but also our terrorism prevention branch colleagues also working with OCT and with ICAO and different partners. All of this, in a way, it's also— is aimed at disrupting criminal networks. If we're able to do this, then the threat is lowered in this sense. A little word on our passenger and control— passenger and cargo control program. I think Luc mentioned it a little bit about how we work at airports, but it's not only airports. It's also ports and land borders. And the model in which we work in one country in an integrated way with the member states is developing a unit that covers the various agencies on the topic. At the airports, it's usually customs. It's law enforcement. It depends on each country if it's gendarmerie or police or various other agencies working on commodity or illicit trafficking. But it's also immigration and airport authorities or in even some private companies working on security. And these units basically do risk profiling and is able to communicate between each of them. When we're looking at ports, we usually work also with the World Customs Organization in terms of connecting the various ports across the world to be able to get a better profiling of various consignments that could pose, that could pose a risk of either explosive but also illicit commodities like drugs or wildlife or firearms, for example. So this interagency cooperation is, is quite a good model to build upon, especially when we are looking at aviation security and the model that already works within an airport. I It's written 190 units. I think we've just crossed the 200 threshold, but I'm not sure if it's exactly 200. I was just being conservative in the numbers, but that includes ports, and we're talking about 65 units at airports in 57 countries. On a map, it looks pretty much like this. It's pretty extensive and global. And this network not only brings internal coordination but also collaboration across countries. There was a case, for example, of the team in Bamako warned the team in Abidjan about a suspicious package coming their way, and they were able to quickly set up a controlled delivery to our— the one in Gabon or to the team in Gabon as well so that they could follow the consignment. So, this communication happens live or it's pretty efficient and this brings a lot of success in terms of the results that has allowed member states to showcase seizures, and I'll come back to a slide after that. In terms of information exchange, I mean, we work with ICAO very, very closely, especially in the Counterterrorism Travel Program and the API PNR data framework. Interpol also with i24/7. This brings a lot of information from our Interpol counterparts from the national bureaus. And yeah, red alerts and so forth. And WCO, as I've mentioned earlier on, for especially containers. You've mentioned that, yeah, one-third of all the The global trade is through air cargo. But what really is rapidly changing is the express consignment. So the increase of DHL, FedEx, or parcels being trafficked— not being trafficked, but being— yeah, trafficked, I think. Transported. Thank you. Is really, I think, a vulnerability that, that we have to be looking at. I can tell you of a story which isn't explosive, but drugs, where a processing facility in a country in my region, one of the workers that was there manipulated an envelope which contained fentanyl and ended up 3 weeks in the hospital because of this. Now, this is one example of the different means of transportation that is happening in the drug sector because we're moving a lot more from traditional plant-based drug trafficking to synthetic drug trafficking, and the quantities needed is much smaller than tons, that we usually see in the news. Um, and the synthetic drug is that last point there. Uh, the detection is, is extremely important in terms of the safety of officers, but also the various people working at airports. Um, so what we are bringing is, yes, we're infusing science through laboratory services, uh, training and equipment. To better detect synthetic drugs and precursors that could be used also in IDs. And yeah, leveraging as well the techniques in terms of interdiction at borders that we've developed throughout the years. This is just a snapshot of the seizures that have been made last year on— in both ports and airports. But the key point is on the right in terms of the increase of precursor chemical seizures that happened compared to 2024, mostly by sea, but more and more by air as well. And this brings also additional security threats to airlines. It's not explosive from a helicopter to a snapped into a thing, but it's also a security threat. So in terms of the next steps, just to highlight here, when we're talking about precursors, these precursors, they're the same precursors that are being used to manufacture synthetic drugs, and those to produce explosives as well. So we're looking into different types of meetings and consultation meetings to develop guidance on understanding the dual-purpose substance that could be used for both the manufacturing of drugs and explosives, but also in terms of how does— what does that mean concretely for for people on the ground working at airports, but also airline companies and how they assess these risks. I'll leave it up there, but if there's any questions, you can also contact me by email. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Jeffrey, for this presentation and also being shorter than expected. I'm so sorry for it, but Due to the time we have allocated for our side event, we may not take the questions online, but if you would like to post any questions for our colleagues online, if you could write them in the chat, we'll ensure that we will be able to answer them later. I know that there is one question on the floor. I will allow for this, please, but then we have to rush because we will have to close the meeting. Thank you.

Of course, thank you. I'll try to rush, but I'm from Turkey, and I'm from Ankara. I'm Eldevant, Fahmi Eldevant Özkan, from the Turkish MFA CT Department. And as a country with the airport that's most connected in the world, and perhaps the— as a co-lead of the Terrorist Travel Working Group in the Global Coalition Against Daesh, I might have to take just a little longer. So of course, when we made the distinction between like the person and the item, of course, as part of TTWG, we focus more on the person. But when it comes to this, we, in our system, the data flows to our PIU and the PIU disseminates the data to our customs enforcement and our risk analysis units. And the risk analysis units look at the terrorist travel and our customs enforcement try to see, make a risk analysis on whether there's a risk on smuggling. But, uh, in our TTWG meetings, uh, we have noticed a gap. So, uh, when it comes to this data flow into PIU, what is important is API PNR. Uh, so resolutions 2178 and 2396. Uh, and in their implementation, Of course, we are collecting data from airliners, but we have an issue there. Airliners are trying to basically over-comply with an over-regulation that is data protection. So when we try to get data from certain airliners, we receive the answer, "But no, we will get penalized by our own national authorities because we have to comply by data protection rules." And then when we try to penalize them, or at least enforce this rule of getting the PNR so that we can comply with these resolutions, we get angry letters from IKEA sometimes. So I was going to ask this, in fact. We had, back in the day, in 2025, CETA had sent Mr. Morange, thankfully, to talk to us about 178 and 296. Sorry, I'm trying to rush. And, you know, he was kind enough to explain to us the situation, but I'd like to listen to your views about this contradiction between data protection rules and our attempt to enforce these resolutions by getting API PNR data. Thank you.

Yeah, I know.

Thank you very much for this question. Okay, I'll answer in this way. The API and PNR, it's in the terms of our side event right now at CARGO is not that relevant because it responds to people. So we can have a conversation about this after maybe closing of our event. But yes, but it's very important that there is also data transfer for cargo, and there is data which is similar to API where the information is being conducted. And yes, it's true, it is connected with WCO. So it's a little bit different animal, but you see, this does connect with the data. But I'm happy to talk to you afterwards about the the person side and data protection elements. Okay? Just a bit.

There is a relevance there between the person and the item, the cargo, because when you look at the person, you can see whether there's a risk over at the cargo. That's why I decided to ask this question.

No, I totally understand your point because somebody has to ship the cargo. That's, that's yes, but I'm just saying that there is a little bit more complication and not complication but the complexity with regards to the data protection which you mentioned. That's why I said I can take it with you offline just in the spirit of closing on time because we will be cut off. So thank you so much. So with that, I would I would like to give the floor to our distinguished speaker from UNOCT, the head of the Madrid office, Ignacio Ibañez, to provide the closing remarks. Thank you. The floor is yours.

Thank you so much, Madame Jiraneska, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen. As we come to the close of this timely and insightful side event, allow me on behalf of the United Nations Office of Counterterrorism to express our sincere appreciation to the International Civil Aviation Organization for leading the organization of today's discussion and for bringing renewed attention to the critically important issue of air cargo security. I would also like to extend our gratitude to the Government of Canada— happy Canada Day— the Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime for the partnership and contributions to this event. My thanks as well to all speakers and participants for your engagement, your expertise, and your continued commitment to advancing this agenda. Today's exchanges have taken place against the backdrop of an increasingly volatile global context. In such a landscape, It requires little explanation to recognize that safeguarding our global supply chains is not only an economic imperative but also a fundamental security priority. Ensuring the integrity of air cargo systems should therefore be one of our priorities alongside the maritime domain. What has clearly emerged from our discussion today is the central importance of multistakeholder cooperation. Aviation security remains one of the domains where multilateralism delivers tangible, measurable results. Across the UN family, the collaborative efforts highlighted today across ICAO, UNOCT, CTED, and UNODC programs demonstrate the value of coordinated approaches. Through joint capacity-building initiatives and operational insights, partnerships, we are helping Member States strengthen their ability to detect and disrupt illicit trafficking, while at the same time facilitating legitimate trade and travel. More generally, I would also like to underline the depth and consistency of collaboration across the United Nations system, which in recent years has enhanced threat and risk assessment capacity. In this regard, robust collaborations are now spanning commercial aviation, cargo security, and the protection of critical infrastructure. Indeed, drawing on the combined knowledge of the civil aviation and counter-terrorism communities is essential. This integrated approach enables Member States to continuously assess risks to utilize relevant and timely threat information, and ultimately, to better protect civil aviation against an evolving and increasingly complex threat landscape. And let us not forget the key role of the civil society and economic operators in these efforts. Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, as we conclude, let us carry forward the momentum generated today Strengthening air cargo security is a shared responsibility which requires sustained cooperation, innovation, and vigilance. The partnerships we reaffirm here are a strong foundation upon which to build safer, more resilient global aviation systems. Thank you all for your participation, and I wish you continued productive engagements during the remainder of Counterterrorism Week. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Mr. Ibanez, for these kind words to all of us. And from my side, I would like to extend my sincere thanks for, especially for our colleagues in CETA, but also in UNODC and UNOCT, of course, and our host government of Canada and our colleagues from Transport Canada with whom we work very closely on daily basis. So I thank you for this successful event, and I will be in everyone to say happy Canada Day. Thank you all. Bye.