(Main Committee II) Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Excellencies, distinguished Delegates, ladies and gentlemen. I would like everybody to take their seats. We're about to start. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, the meeting is called to order. I declare open the third meeting of Main Committee 2 of the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Excellencies, distinguished Delegates, we will continue with the general exchange of views on topics related to pillar 2 of the NPT. As noted previously, we will proceed with our work on Main Committee 2 and Subsidiary Body 2 on a rolling basis. Therefore, following the exhaustion of the list of speakers and any rights of reply for the general exchange of views, it is my intention to close the meeting of Main Committee 2 and proceed immediately to a meeting of Subsidiary Body 2. As a reminder, please allow me first again to briefly share some guidelines for the conduct of our deliberations. For the general exchange of views, there will be a timer shown on the screen indicating one minute remained until the microphone will be automatically cut off. Delegations will recall that the time limit for statements are eight minutes for group statements and five minutes for national statements. Delegations that wish to do so are invited to provide a longer version of their statement to be posted on the website of the Review Conference. Delegations are kindly asked to provide their statements in advance for the interpretation services. They may do so by emailing an electronic copy of their statement to the email address estatementn.org the email should clearly indicate in the subject line NPT Review Conference Main Committee to and Delegation name. In addition, delegations are kindly requested to email electronic versions of their statements to the secretariat@nptn.org as early as possible for posting on the website of the Review Conference. Finally, delegations are requested to please inform the Secretariat as soon as possible if they wish to exercise the right of reply. As I promised last time, rights of reply will be heard at the end of this meeting. With that said, I now turn to the list of speakers we have for the general exchange of views today. Currently 14 speakers remaining on the list. The first speaker I have on my list is the representative of Kiribati, to be followed by Islamic Republic of Iran. Kiribati, you have the floor

chair. At the onset, Kiribati congratulates our good friend Kazakhstan on its assumption as Chair of Main Committee 2. Kiribati recognizes that progress on the NPT is predicated on the success of all three Pillars. The lack of progress on nuclear disarmament directly impacts progress in non proliferation affairs. Despite the failure of the last two review conferences we still have the 64 point action plan from the 2010 NPT review conference including the relevant points related to non proliferation affairs. Chair and Distinguished Excellencies within the Asia Pacific Region, we remain concerned about ongoing developments related to nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Such activities are inconsistent with relevant UN Security Council resolutions. We note with concern regarding recent reporting by the Director General of the IAEA regarding increased activity at a key nuclear facility in the region. In this context, we call upon the international community to respond in a coordinated and constructive manner. Chair we must continue to support the international monitoring system of the Comprehensive Nucleot Ban Treaty Organization. We call upon all Annex 2 states to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay. Chair and Distinguished Excellencies we underscore the importance of Nuclear Weapon free Zones and enhance intrazonal cooperation in advancing the objectives of the npt. In this regard, we see value in sharing best practices among Treaty bodies, including between the bodies to the Treaty, including between the parties to the Treaty of Rarotonga and the Secretariat of Opanau. In this regard, we also welcome the 2024 workshop on fostering Cooperation Enhancing Consultation Mechanisms among the existing Nuclear Weapon Free Zones. The Workshop discussed measures to further deepen cooperation between nuclear weapon free Zones and interaction with other UN disarmament platforms in order to strengthen the global nuclear disarmament and non proliferation regime. We further welcome the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear weapon free zones in all its aspects. We actively monitor the second session and and submitted our views to the Group. As we continue to discuss the significance of Zones, we are carefully paying attention to trilateral deals relating to nuclear powered submarines. We note with concern decisions by certain nuclear weapons states to transfer nuclear powered submarine technology to a non nuclear weapon state. We emphasize the importance of ensuring that such arrangements remain fully consistent with non proliferation obligations and do not undermine regional peace, security or the integrity of nuclear weapon free zones. We do not want the presence of these submarines within our EEZ and our precious Pacific Ocean. Chair and Distinguished Excellencies As a strong supporter of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, we wish to recall that Article 1 of the TPNW addresses the need to prohibit the development, production, manufacturing of their acquisitions for us. We consider that the prohibitions outlined in Article 1 of that treaty suggest the TPMW also addresses Pillar 2 issues. Chair and Distinguished Excellencies, we look forward to discussions on non proliferation and regional issues within this Committee. We believe that we are in very capable hands under your leadership to address difficult issues under the purview of this Committee I thank you.

I thank the distinct representative of Kiribati for the statement and kind words addressed to the Chair. Next on my list of speakers is the representative of Islamic Republic of Iran, followed by Madagascar Excellency Ambassador Rizana Jaffe. The floor is yours.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I congratulate you on your election to chair this committee and assure you of our full cooperation. My delegation also associate itself with the non line movement statement. Despite its importance, non proliferation is not an independent objective. Rather, it derives legitimacy from the larger objective of nuclear disarmament. So overemphasizing it at the price of nuclear disarmament and as if the treaty has no other objective is both misleading and counterproductive. Likewise, non professional nuclear disarmament can be mutually reinforcing only if parallel practical steps are taken at both fronts at the same time. Non proficient measures shall in no way restrict the exercise of the inalienable right to peaceful use of nuclear energy. Nuclear weapon sharing in any form, including in military alliances like NATO, are clear violations of the explicit obligations under the treaties Article 1 and 2. The same applies to preparation arrangements under accords between Australia, the US and uk. Equally, the ongoing plans of the us, UK and France to modernize or upgrade their nuclear weapons or to develop new types of such weapons or other violations of the treaty which must stop. Despite being a valuable tool for preventing nuclear proliferation, safeguards are unfortunately exploited, become extremely politicized and applied selectively and discriminately. They are also applied in a highly restrictive manner, in particular to force States to abandon their inherent right to develop a full national nuclear fuel cycle. As a result, rather than serving its intended purpose, safeguards has transformed to to a tool in the foreign policy toolbox of a group of States. As a result of this and similar developments, not the IAEA and its safeguard system face a grave crisis of trust and confidence deficit. This trend is seriously alarming and must be addressed and stopped. Safeguards must remain technical, impartial and free from political manipulation, however important their non proficient role might be. Nuclear weapon free zones cannot substitute other non proficient measures or nuclear disarmament. Yet the establishment of such a zone in the Middle east proposed by Iran in 1974 still faces serious challenges. 31 years of delay in the implementation of the 1995 resolution in the Middle east is only due to the persistent intransigent refusal of the Israeli regime of establishment of such a zone. Consequently, the Israeli regime, the only non party to the NPT in the region possessed nuclear weapons, threatens to use them and has repeatedly conducted unlawful armed attacks against safeguarded nuclear facilities in the region. The latest of such aggressions were carried out by that regime together with the US in 2025 and 2026 against Iran's peaceful safeguarded nuclear facilities under the false pretext of nuclear weapon program which never exist. And the IAEA reports or even the US own intelligence rejected such a claim and big lie. These are serious material breaches of prohibition of the use of force, a preemptory norm of international law and constitute crimes of aggression and and war crimes. Mr. Chairman, to address the Treaty's challenges regarding non proliferation safeguards and nuclear weapon free zone, Iran proposes some elements for the inclusion in the Committee's recommendation to the conference. 1. To explicitly reaffirm the existing norms of international law regarding armed attacks on safeguarded nuclear facilities according to which any such attack is absolutely prohibited is a serious material breach of international law, constitute an act of aggression and entails international responsibility of the aggressor. 2. Firmly proclaim that any such attack seriously undermines the very objects and purposes of the NPT and IAEA statute and greatly endanger the IAEA safeguard system to condemn in the strongest terms the unlawful armed attacks of the US and Israeli regime against the peaceful safeguarded nuclear facilities of Iran. The other elements will be in the full version of my statement which will be posted later. Thank you very much.

I thank Ambassador of Iran for the statement. The next speaker on my list. And thank you. Actually, I'm grizzled for the words of cooperation. Next speaker on my list is Madagascar, followed by Greece. Madagascar, you have the floor.

Mr. Chairman, the delegation of Madagascar would at the outset like to congratulate you on your chairmanship of Main Committee 2. Rest assured, you have our full support as you steer our proceedings. Madagascar would like to align itself with the statement delivered by the Africa Group and the naming over 50 years after the NTP entered into force. We're compelled to acknowledge that the crucial objectives enshrined in the Treaty are for the most part beyond reach. Nuclear arsenals persist. Some states are qualitatively modernizing their arsenals and there are risks linked to proliferation, revised nuclear doctrines and the weakening of multilateral commitments. All of this is concerning. It's a cause for disquiet, in particular for many non nuclear weapons states who are continuing to hope for tangible and verifiable progress. Madagascar believes that meticulous respect for Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty is indispensable. Non proliferation obligations must be upheld universally without selectivity nor the use of double standards. Furthermore, we would like to recall that we cannot seriously discuss non proliferation unless we address with the very same determination the issue of nuclear disarmament. These two dimensions are inextricably linked. Non proliferation is not an end in and of itself. It should be a concrete means of advancing towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. On this note, Madagascar believes that the genuine guarantee of non proliferation, whether it be vertical or horizontal, that this guarantee lies in complete, transparent, verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the risk of them being put to use, whether that be voluntarily or accidentally, cannot be fully ruled out. For that reason, we call for more ambitious commitments, commitments that are more credible and easier to measure, and these commitments on the part of all nuclear weapons states. Furthermore, we view with concern the ongoing modernization of arsenals, the development of new types of weapons and the changes being made to certain nuclear doctrines which give us reason to think that some believe these weapons could still be used under certain scenarios. These developments would be at odds with the spirit and the letter of the NPT and would weaken the confidence necessary for the international disarmament and non proliferation regime to function properly. Madagascar would like to reiterate the crucial role played by the IAEA within the framework of safeguards and verification. Issues linked to non proliferation should be addressed within the appropriate framework through diplomatic and political channels. With full respect for international law and the UN Charter, we remain convinced that multilateralism remains the most legitimate and the most effective path for tackling these challenges. Madagascar attaches particular importance to promoting nuclear weapons free zones which make a concrete contribution to collective security and regional stability. We're of the view that these mechanisms help to build trust between states and on the ground result in a common resolve to build a safer world. Madagascar hopes that this review conference will allow us to strike a balance, a genuine balance between the NPT's three pillars. Such a balance is vital for the treaty's credibility as well as for the State Party's confidence in our collective capacity to render real the treaty. Mr. Chairman, nuclear disarmament is not simply a legal or a political objective. It's a moral, humanitarian and collective security requirement. It's also a necessary prerequisite for future generations to be able to live in a world free from the nuclear threat. Therefore, Madagascar calls on all States parties to exhibit responsibility, to show political courage and to seek compromises to make sure that this conference becomes a real step forward. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank the distinguished representative of Madagascar for the statement and kind words addressed to The Chair Next on my list is the representative of Greece, followed by Libya. Greece, you have the floor.

I wish to congratulate you for your appointment and and I wish you success in your endeavors. Greece fully aligns with the statement delivered by the European Union and would like to add the following remarks in its national capacity. My country is deeply alarmed by the persistent nuclear proliferation crisis that are directly challenging NPT and in particular the safeguard systems under the International Atomic Energy Agency. We recognize that the technical expertise, independence and impartiality of iaea. It will reiterate that its comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional Protocol constitute the current verification Standard under Article 3 of the NPT. Mr. Chair, developments in the Middle east reminded us the need of addressing nuclear challenges through diplomatic means. As an elected member of the Security Council for the term 2025 26, Greece strongly supports diplomatic efforts to achieve a sustainable solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. While we believe that Iran must be never allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon, we support the resumption of talks between the interest parties that will address the international community's concerns over Iran's nuclear program. We call upon Iran to re establish full cooperation with IAEA and contribute to efforts towards a comprehensive and verifiable agreement on its nuclear program. Greece affirms that the decisions made by the Security Council last September, including with regard to the Snapback Mechanism, were both valid and legitimate. Therefore, 1737 Sanctions Committee should be able to function effectively. This means in practical terms that the Committee must be able to rely on a panel of experts, exercise its responsibilities regarding the listings and proceed under the guidance of its Chair as foreseen in its mandate. Greece condemns the Democratic People Republic of Korea's continued development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in violation of multiple Security Council resolutions. We call upon the DPRK to engage in meaningful discussions with all relevant parties within the aim to achieving the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, Greece reiterates its condemnation of Russia's unprovoked unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular its illegal seizure at militarization of Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which has severe implications for nuclear safety and security in Ukraine. We call on Russia to withdraw its military forces from ZNPP and return the plan to the full control of the combated Ukrainian authorities. Nuclear Weapons free zones represent an important regional complement to the global nuclear disarmament and non proliferation regime. Greece supports the establishment of such a zone free of nuclear Weapons and other WGMDs in the middle East. We hope that the relevant discussions within subsidiary body 2 will conclude to a concessional outcome on the matter. Greece remains committed to supporting the effective and universal implementation of security council resolution 1540 of 2004. As White said of the 1540 committee in 2025, Greece prioritized the efforts of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery to non state actors in including for terrorist purposes. To conclude, Mr. Chair, rest assured that Greece stands ready to support your efforts. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Greece for your statement and thank you for kind words of support to my delegation. Next on my list is Libya, followed by Kyrgyzstan. Libya, you have the floor.

At the outset. Please allow me, Mr. Chair, to congratulate you on your election as Chair of the Committee. We support your efforts to make a success of the Committee's work. In addition, we align ourselves with the statements delivered by the African Group, the Arab group and the NAM. Mr. Chair, our participation today reflects our unwavering belief that strengthening the non proliferation regime is the only means to build a world free of nuclear weapons. The total and effective implementation of the NPT requires the balance, the delicate balance that must be maintained. We reject any other restrictions and limitations that restrict the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Nuclear energy must continue to be developed under the IAEA's oversight in this control. In this context, we reiterate that the CSAs are the only verification global norm under Article 3 of the NPT. The Additional Protocol is a sovereign voluntary state for each state. Mr. Chair, the non proliferation regime grapples today with immense challenges that are of concern. We would like to note the following. First, we reject the attempts to legitimize new categories of states under different denominations, such as the nuclear possessor states. The NPT is clear and distinguishes between nuclear and non nuclear weapon states. Second, we warn against nuclear cooperation with non state parties, mainly the Israeli regime. The Israeli regime refuses to join the NPT and to place its facilities under international control. There are reports about the expansion of the MONA reactor and Israel pursues its positive ambiguity policy. As a result, the international community must shoulder its legal and moral responsibility and must take immediate action. Thirdly, we express our concern over the imbalanced implementation of the safeguards. We reject double standards that undermine the global non proliferation regime. Mr. Chair, Libya has taken a voluntary historic decision and decided to renounce its nuclear program. Security can only be maintained by full compliance with Article 6 of the NPT. Accordingly, we would like to advance the following asks 1. Security Council Resolutions 487 must be fully implemented. The Israeli regime must be compelled to join the npt. We must pursue our efforts to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle east through a legally binding instrument. 3. The IA's verification rule must be strengthened in an impartial and professional manner. We must look also into the uses of AI in this context. In conclusion, Mr. President, to preserve our credibility, we must address the shortcomings and we must ensure that all parties come under international oversight. This will help us achieve our ultimate objective of a safer and more stable world. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Libya for his statement and for the kind words of support. Next on my list is the representative who of Kyrgyzstan, followed by United Arab Emirates. Kyrgyzstan, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor at the outlet. Allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of main commit. 2. The Kyrgyz Republic extend its full support and cooperation throughout the work of this conference. We are confident that under your leadership, the commit will achieve meaningful and substantive outcomes. The NPT remains the cornerstone of the global non proliferation regime and we are committed to its universality. We call all states that have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty without delay. We also want to be clear. Non proliferation and disarmament are two sides of the same coin. You cannot strengthen one by ignoring the other. We urge nuclear weapons states to fulfill their obligation under Article 6 and take concrete time bound steps toward the total elimination of their arsenals. Mr. Chair, this year marks the 30th anniversary of the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban treaty. And yet, 3D cuts later, the CTBT has still not entered into force. This is a situation we cannot accept as normal. We call on all remaining Annex 2 states to sign and ratify the treaty without further delay. Any resumption of nuclear testing by any state will constitute a serious setback for international peace and security and must be firmly and unequivocally condemned. Until entry into first. All states must continue to observe their moratoriums on testing. The Kyrgyz Republic is proud to be as one of the founding states party to the Treaty of Semipalatinsk. Central Asia made a clear and irreversible choice. Our region will remain permanently free of nuclear weapons. The Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone is is our concrete contribution to global non proliferation. We call on nuclear weapons states to ratify the protocol to the Treaty of Semipolatinsk. This means providing legally Binding negative security assurances to the states of our zone. A guarantee that nuclear weapons will never be used or threatened against us. This is not a symbolic request. It's a matter of trust and of international law. More broadly, we support the establishment of new nuclear weapons free zones, especially in the Middle east. As agreed in 1995, 2000 and 2010. These zones are building blocks of a safer world. Beyond of the technical dimension, we also invest in education and public awareness because we believe that a durable non proliferation regime must be built not only on treaties and verification mechanisms, but also on informed citizens and engaged young people. In 2022, Kyrgyzstan, with broad support from United nations member states, initiated the establishment of March 5th at the International Day for Disarmament and Non proliferation awareness through UNGA Resolution 77 51. Each year we bring together 15 officials, academics, students and civil society for substantive discussions. We invite all state parties to make this day their own because sustainable security requires informed societies, not just signed documents. Mr. Chair, we stand at a crossroads. This conference can either restore confidence in the NPT or deepen their fractures that are already visible. Kyrgyzstan is here. In a spirit of good faith and genuine engagement, we urge all delegation to do the same. We support a balanced consensus final document that delivers real progress across all three pillars of the treaty. The goal, a world free of nuclear weapons requires all of us. I thank you, Mr. Mr.

Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Kyrgyzstan for the statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. Next speaker on my list is the representative of United Arab Emirates followed by Dominican Republic, United Arab Emirates, you have the floor.

Mr. Chair, at the outset, please allow me to congratulate you on chairing the Main Committee. Second, we align ourselves with the statement delivered by the Arab Group. Mr. Chair, we reiterate the critical importance of the NPT as a key cornerstone of regional and international stability and security. As challenges continue regarding nuclear non proliferation, all countries must uphold their international obligations, mainly the verification measures of the IAEA within the framework of the csas. In this context, we fully support the Additional Protocol. This Protocol is an integral part of the verification regime that ensures strengthened verification measures to verify the peaceful nature of nuclear activities. Mr. Chair, the United Arab Emirates reiterates that these States Parties have the right to develop nuclear programs for peaceful purposes. This is an inherent right, but the exercise of this right is inextricably linked to full compliance with TSAs. This will strengthen trust in the peaceful nature of these programs. Mr. Chair, the review of the NPT must clearly address the challenges on the challenges relating to non compliance Mainly Iran's nuclear program. We express our deep concern over the outstanding issues in relation to Iran's nuclear program, mainly with respect to Iran's obligations under the CSA with the iaea. The IAEA have repeatedly referred to concerns about undeclared nuclear activities and programs and the IAEA could not confirm Iran's peaceful nuclear program because Iran does not show enough and transparent cooperation. Iran does not comply with the Additional Protocol and the other agreements under the comprehensive safeguards and Iran is not providing clarifications about outstanding issues. These undermine international trust and increase uncertainty surrounding Iran's nuclear program. The United Arab Emirates during this conference have mentioned that the Iranian nuclear program cannot be addressed in separation from Iran's activities in the region. Our concerns cannot be separated from Iran's destabilizing activity in the region. In this context, Iran must take tangible and verifiable measures. Iran must cooperate in full and unconditionally with the IAEA and must address all outstanding issues without delay. It must uphold its obligations under the safeguards. The technical aspects of the Iranian nuclear program must be addressed within a comprehensive approach by the international community. This includes non proliferation Iran's missile program and its destabilizing behavior in the region. Iran has continued to attack my country, including this morning. Nuclear transparency and good neighborliness and refraining from destabilizing activities are essential to maintain regional security and stability. Mr. Chair, on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle east, we reiterate that we remain committed to this objective in accordance with the 1995 resolution on the Middle east and this resolution was confirmed by several GA resolutions. The establishment of this zone is a critical priority and a pillar to maintain regional peace and to support our non proliferation objectives. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of United Arab Emirates for his statement and thank you. Thank you for kind words Addressed to the Chair. Next in my list, the representative of Dominican Republic followed by Zambia Dominican Republic, you have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. Well, firstly allow me to congratulate you on your election as Chair of of this Committee and reiterate to you our support for your leadership of our work and we subscribe to the statement delivered by the Non Aligned Movement Chair the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stands as the cornerstone of the international disarmament and non proliferation regime. In this context, we reaffirm its essential nature and the need to ensure its full, balanced and non discriminatory implementation in strict observance of its three fundamental nuclear disarmament, non proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Dominican Republic underscores the essential role of Article 3 concerning safeguards applied by the IAEA as a key verification mechanism to ensure compliance with non proliferation obligations obligations. These safeguards strengthen trust among States and promote transparency while facilitating international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy

in

accordance with Article 4. In this context, we reaffirm the inalienable right of all States Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in accordance with articles 1, 2 and 3 of the treaty. Measures aimed at strengthening non proliferation must not under any circumstances undermine this right. With respect to Articles one and two, we reiterate the need for States Parties to fully comply in order to prevent the transfer and acquisition of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, Thereby preserving the integrity and solid nature of the non proliferation regime. Likewise, we highlight the importance of nuclear weapon free zones established under Article 7. These are effective instruments for strengthening international peace and security. In this regard, the Dominican Republic reaffirms its firm commitment to the regime establishment established by the Treaty of Zlatelolco which serves as a model for other regions of the world. Chair the Dominican Republic emphasizes that the full implementation of the Treaty of the NPT in all its aspects is essential to preserve its credibility and to advance towards its universality. In this regard, we underline that progress in nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article 6 is indispensable to maintaining the balance and legitimacy of the Treaty. We call upon nuclear weapons States to fulfill their obligations and commitments, including those undertaken at previous review conferences, by adopting concrete, verifiable and irreversible measures toward the total elimination of these weapons. Finally, we reiterate our firm commitment to to the strengthening of the NPT and call upon States that are not yet parties to accede without delay. Thank you very much.

I thank the distinguished representative of Dominican Republic for the statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. The next speaker I have on my list is the representative of Zambia who will be the last speaker for the general exchange of views. Zambia, you have the floor.

Mr. Chair, allow me and my delegation to congratulate you on your appointment as the Chair for the for this committee, Zambia align itself with continued centrality of Treaty on the 9th proliferation of nuclear weapons as a cornerstone of global nuclear discovery, disarmament and 9th proliferation regime. Its credibility and effectiveness, however, depends on full, balanced and non discriminatory implementation of its three mutually reinforcing disarmament, non proliferation and the peaceful use of energy. Zambia remains deeply concerned by the persistent lack of meaningful Progress towards nuclear disarmament Decades after the Treaty's entry into force, the continued existence and some cases modernization of nuclear arsenals undermines both the letter and the spirit of the Treaty. This situation erodes confidence among non nuclear weapon states and weakens the global non proliferation architecture. We therefore call. Call on a clear and on nuclear weapon States to honor their obligations under Article number six by taking concrete, time bound, transparent, irreversible steps towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The indefinite retention of these weapons cannot be justified under any security doctrine. Their existence poses an existential threat to humanity with consequences that would be catastrophic and indiscriminate. Mr. Chair, Zambia reiterates the importance of strengthening the non proliferation regime through robust and credibility verification mechanisms. In this regard we underscore the indispensable role of international atomic energy agencies Safeguard systems, comprehensive safeguards agreements complemented by additional protocols remain essential in ensuring that nuclear materials and technologies are not diverted for military purposes. We urge all States that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and the additional protocols. We without delay. Strengthening compliance and verification is not optional. It is fundamental to maintaining international peace, security and trust. Zambia further emphasized the vital contribution of nuclear weapon free zones to region and global security. These zones serve as practical and legally binding measures towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. Africa's code commitment through the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty stands as a clear demonstration of collective resolve. We call on all nuclear weapon States to fully respect these zones and to provide legally binding negative security assurances to States within them. Such assurances are critical in strengthening confidence and reinforcing security of non nuclear weapon states. Mr. Chairperson, Zambia reaffirmed the rights of all States parties to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with the Treaty. This right must be upheld without discrimination. At the same time, we stress that the expansion of peaceful nuclear applications must be accompanied by the highest standards of safety, security and safeguards. We encourage enhancement of international cooperation particularly in support of developing countries to ensure equitable access to nuclear technology for sustainable development including health, agriculture and energy sectors. Mr. Chairperson, the current international security environment marked by rising geographical and has caused the agent to recommit to the multilarism and collective security. In conclusion, Zambia stands ready to work constructive with the Member States to advance the full implementation of the Treaty. We remain committed to a rule based on international order, the strengthening of global peace and security and realization of safer nuclear free world. I thank you Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Zambia for the statement and the Kind words addressed to the Chair, Excellencies, distinguished delegates. That was the last speaker on my list for the general election. Exchange of views. Excellencies, I note that there are two requests from. Okay, I'm sorry, it's five. Now we have five requests from delegations to exercise their right of reply pursuant to Rule 19 of the Rules of Procedure. We will hear them now. May I remind delegations that in accordance with Rule 19 that these statements should be as brief as possible. Delegations should limit the interventions to five minutes. May I also remind the delegations that

in accordance with the established practice, the

number of interventions in the exercise of the right of reply for any delegation is limited to two.

The second intervention should be limited to

three minutes consistent with the advice provided by the President of Conference speaking limits will be strictly enforced for rites of reply. A timer will show on the screen indicating when there is one minute remaining after the time limit has been reached, the microphone will automatically be cut off.

The first state to exercise the right

of reply is Australia. To be followed by China. Ambassador Sadler, the floor is yours.

Thank you, Chair and good afternoon. I wish to briefly take the floor to address unfair, unfortunate and misleading assertions which have been made in the debate this morning by the Russian Federation regarding Australia's naval nuclear propulsion program. Chair, as we have consistently stated, Australia's acquisition of conventionally armed nuclear powered submarines and accompanying infrastructure in Australia is fully consistent with our international non proliferation obligations, including under the NPT and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Rarotonga. The Rarotonga Treaty does not prohibit the acquisition or operation of conventionally armed nuclear powered submarines. The treaty is focused on the prohibition of the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices. Aukus has nothing to do with nuclear explosive devices. Australia will not acquire and does not seek nuclear weapons. The rotation of US and UK nuclear powered submarines at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia under Aukus is consistent with Australia's long standing bipartisan policy of having no foreign bases on its soil. All activities will be consistent with this policy. Australia is making transparent investments in defence capabilities that will enable us to make a credible contribution to strategic balance and stability in the region. Thank you very much, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Australia for the statement. The next state to excise the right of reply is China. To be followed by United States of America. China, you have the floor.

Mr. Chair. Having heard the lame defense offered by certain countries on the issue of Aukus at The Main Committee 2, the Chinese delegation believes further elaboration on our position on this matter is in order. Aukus is a textbook case of nuclear proliferation. It is by no means a project of cooperation for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in its traditional sense. For starters, the IAEA's current safeguard system cannot ensure that Australia would not divert the relevant nuclear material for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. The ORCA safeguards differ fundamentally from the hundreds of safeguards projects implemented by the IAEA since its inception. U.S. nuclear submarine reactors are loaded with over 200 kilograms of weapons grade enriched uranium fuel with an enrichment level of 93 to 97% and have a design life of up to 33 years. That means that in the future tons of weapons grade HEU will remain beyond the reach of the IAEA's physical inventory verification, or PIV for short for decades to come and the IEA will lose continuity of knowledge of vast quantities of controlled nuclear material. Second, the safeguards issues Aukus has given rise to are more contentious and challenging than ever before at the political, legal, procedural and technical levels and cannot be put to bed by a mere verbal commitment to quote the highest non proliferation standards. Any new safeguards arrangements negotiated between the three countries and the IAEA Secretary without the full participation and consensus of the wider membership inherently lack representation and are set to cause division among member states with far reaching negative implications for the IAEA safeguard system and indeed the NPT regime. Last but not least, Aukus has the effect of provoking other countries to follow suit as it sets a dangerous precedent that seriously undermines regional peace and stability. The US has given the green light and that glaringly to two of its allies in the Asia Pacific to develop nuclear powered submarines. It only makes more salient the increasingly pressing challenges posed by the transfer of nuclear material and the safeguards issues arising from nuclear submarine cooperation between military allies. The very existence of Aukus is also in breach of the objectives and purposes of the Treaty of Rarotonga and undermines the efforts of ASEAN countries to establish a nuclear weapon free zone in Southeast Asia. It is bound to stir up broad confrontation and provoke an arms race. Thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of China for the statement. The next state to excise the right of reply is United States of America, to be followed by Lithuania, United States of America. You have to flow

Chair. I will not respond to the wholly unsupported assertions regarding US actions in Iran as we are addressing those currently in Main Committee 3. And I would respond to the overheated comments on Aukus as my Australian colleague already has. However, I am responding to the criticisms from the Russian Federation, Russia accuses the United States of undermining the non proliferation regime. It has itself continued to deepen its cooperation with the dprk. This should concern anyone committed to the npt. We are disappointed but unsurprised that Russia continues to offer excuses and unpersuasive justifications for the DPRK's actions and moreover seeks to thwart the international community's efforts to respond to the DPRK's defiance of its UN Security Council resolution obligations. We are also disappointed by the Russian Federation's baseless claims about the application of IAEA safeguards. State level safeguards approaches have been a standard part of safeguards implementation since 2002 when the IAEA Board of Governors took note of the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards. These efforts began with the clear recognition beginning in the 1990s that a strengthened safeguard system was needed following developments that came to light showing that the safeguard system as implemented previously had been exploited and was at risk of being further exploited by would be proliferators. Efforts to second guess the IAEA Secretariat's work are thinly veiled attempts to politicize safeguards and would turn back the clock on the Agency's strides in seeking to verify that State's declarations are correct and complete. I would also like to address some delegations misconceptions on NATO nuclear burden sharing and extended deterrence arrangements. Under Article 1 of the NPT, nuclear weapons states are not allowed to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosives directly or indirectly. Under the same article, nuclear weapons States may not assist, encourage or induce any non nuclear weapons States to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices. None of these prohibited activities are occurring within US Extended deterrence arrangements or NATO nuclear burden sharing. None. And the same applies to our Aukus Agreement with our allies. To suggest these arrangements are illegal or even contrary to the spirit of the NPT is entirely lacking in any foundation. Indeed, as we have Frequently stated, the U.S. maintains full custody and control of our nuclear weapons. Moreover, these arrangements do not encourage but rather discourage nuclear proliferation, supporting the objectives of the NPT and the pillar that we are here to discuss. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of United States of America for the statement. The next state to exercise their right of reply is Lithuania, followed by Islamic Republic of Iran. Lithuania, you have the floor.

Thank you.

Mr.

Chair, I would like to address several points raised during the Committee debate. I would like to respond to the statements that have questioned the legality of NATO extended deterrence and nuclear sharing arrangements. NATO nuclear policy is long standing, predates the NPT, fully respects Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty and remains unchanged. Any contention to the contrary is legally and factually incorrect. NATO nuclear sharing arrangements do not entail the transfer, sharing or receipt of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. Full control over all nuclear arsenals remains exclusively with NATO, three nuclear weapons states and as many countries already stated, these facts are well established and should remain the basis of any discussions on this issue. Further, Chair, we have all heard Russia make false claims asserting that the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is a Russian nuclear facility under Russian jurisdiction. Lithuania categorically rejects and will not recognize any attempts to legitimize Russia's illegal occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. Any assertion that the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant has been transferred to the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation is legally null and void, has no validity under international law and cannot produce any legal consequences. To recall a general principle of law, that illegal act cannot produce legal rights for the benefit of the lawbreaker. This principle imposes an active duty of non recognition on all states and on Russia. Federation claims that cooperation with the DPRK is legal. What is described as legal cooperation in reality includes arms transfer and the sharing of proliferation sensitive technologies. Such activities constitute clear violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions and this has also been confirmed by the latest findings of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team. It bears recalling that the Russian Federation, in its capacity as a permanent member of the Security Council itself adopted these resolutions. I thank you, Chair.

I thank distinguished representative of Lithuania for the statement. The next state to exercise the right of reply is Islamic Republic of Iran, followed by Russia. Islamic Republic of Iran.

You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation has already addressed over the past days the unfounded allegations against the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. I will therefore not revisit those points. Instead, I wish to respond to the assertions made by the United States and certain Western delegations, including the U.K. france and Germany, regarding their so called commitment to a diplomatic solution. A review of record demonstrates that this claim does not withstand scrutiny. First, in October 2003, following intensive negotiations with the three European countries, Iran concluded the Sa'dabad Agreement. Under this arrangement, Iran voluntarily suspended uranium enrichment and implemented the Additional Protocol as a confidence building measure in good faith and with the expectation of reciprocal action. However, this process ultimately collapsed due to the failure of the European parties to honor their Commitments shifted the goalpost by demanding a permanent suspension and under pressure from the US pursued referral of Iran's peaceful nuclear file to Security Council. Instead of recognizing Iran's legitimate rights, they sought the complete cessation of activities explicitly permitted under the treaty. Second, The JCPOA in 2015 marked another demonstration of Iran's commitment to diplomacy. Iran fully implemented its obligation as repeatedly verified by the iaea. Nevertheless, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the agreement and initiated a so called maximum pressure campaign. Third, upon the return of the current United States administration for a second term, renewed claims were made regarding an interest in reaching an agreement. Iran once again engaged seriously. However, this process quickly revealed a lack of genuine intent. Instead of constructive engagement, the US and the Israeli regime resorted to acts of aggression two wise within less than one year, targeting Iran and its peaceful nuclear facilities during ongoing negotiations, thereby betraying diplomatic efforts. Fourth, despite the unlawful attack of June 2025, Iran once again chose the path of diplomacy and reached an agreement with the IAEA in Cairo. This was yet another demonstration of Iran's commitment to engagement. Yet, rather than supporting this effort, certain Western countries choose to reward the attackers and punish diplomacy through the unlawful invocation of the snapback mechanism. Mr. Chair, despite all of the above, including acts of aggression against its territory and peaceful nuclear facilities, Iran remains committed to diplomacy. However, negotiation cannot succeed if one side merely pay lip service to dialogue and diplomacy while in practice advancing unrealistic and unlawful demands. At this very conference, all delegations held coercive and legally unfounded assertions by the representative of us regarding the imaginary right to enrichment. Such a position runs counter to the inalienable rights of State parties under the Earth Article 4 of the NPT and constitutes a central obstacle to meaningful progress. This statement has made clear to the international community that it is the imposition of unlawful and unreasonable demands by the United States and certain Western delegations that continues to obstruct the path toward a credible and sustainable diplomatic solution for Iran's people. Peaceful nuclear program negotiations cannot succeed if the very rights enshrined in the treaty are denied. I thank you, Mr.

Chair.

I thank the distinct representative of Islamic Republic of Iran for the statement. The last state to exercise the right of reply is Russia.

I would like to give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation in the exercise of the right of reply. You have the floor, sir.

Thank you very much. I would like to note that we listened to Australia's statement regarding the fact that Aukus is not in contravention of Australia's obligations under the npt, given that within the framework of the system, nuclear weapons are not being transferred. We listened to the US's statement as well, which spoke to the fact that extended deterrence and nuclear sharing are not at odds with the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. Because of the framework of these mechanisms, nuclear materials are neither transferred nor accepted or rather received. We listened to these statements and Julie took note of them. What I will say is that these statements do nothing to allay concerns about the fact that in Australia, military infrastructure of nuclear states is being set up. Infrastructure within the framework of which a nuclear weapon could appear at any moment whenever the states in question deem this to be necessary. Furthermore, the statement regarding nuclear testing and extended deterrence do nothing to allay our concerns about the fact that these weapons on the territory of which there are nuclear weapons, whether temporarily or permanently, they're not getting an extended conclusion from the iaea. These findings are not in keeping with reality. We have no certainty about the fact that within the framework of that cooperation, knowledge is not being transferred that could be used to develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. Rest assured, the Russian Federation's cooperation with the DPRK in no way, shape or

form

relates to the npt. Within the framework of that corporation, nuclear material is not being transferred. That's a certainty. This corporation is or does possibly actually strengthens the NPT because it reduces the sentiment of isolation in the DPRK and therefore disincentivizes the expansion of or the development of nuclear arsenals. Thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation. I thank the representative of the Russian Federation for his statement.

Another State to ask to exercise the right of reply. It is the United Arab Emirates. The floor is yours.

Mr. Chair. The United Arab Emirates would like to exercise the right of reply vis a vis the intervention of the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the morning session. The UAE rejects Iran's attempt to reduce or undermine the concerns or to depict the picture that they are outside the concern of this conference and the three main committees. Issues pertaining to safeguards, transparency and cooperation with IAEA are within the essence of the non proliferation regime. A claim that what the UAE has put forward does not require a response. It does not undermine the fact that there are existing concerns when it comes to Iran's commitment in the safeguards area. And this does not build confidence. It actually asserts that we need full cooperation and transparency with the IAE in this regard. Mr. Chair, the United Arab Emirates says that speaking of Iran's nuclear file is relevant to non Proliferation and safeguards Any peaceful nuclear program needs to have the characteristics namely transparency, full cooperation and the nuclear program of any state cannot be seen in separation from its aggressive policies that threaten the stability of its neighbors. Hence, their nuclear program will become more of a threat when it's linked to escalation at the regional level and interference in the internal affairs of countries and arming militia and threatening critical facilities. Hence, linking their nuclear activity to the regional behavior is a prerequisite and this is part of the security environment of nuclear programs. The international community cannot ignore the wider context. When all these question marks are in place, we call upon Iran not to distract attention from serious matters and to address technical and legal issues seriously. The road to building trust is clear. Ending aggression, full compliance, total transparency and cooperation with the IA without conditions and responsible regional behavior that respects countries stability, security and sovereignty. I think

I thank the distinguished representative for United Arab Emirates for the statement. Now I have China that would like to to exercise a second right of reply. China, you have the floor.

Mr. Chair, I would like to exercise my right of reply in response to the statement made by the Japanese delegation. Japan has long advocated for a nuclear weapon free world. Yet in reality it shelters safely under the US nuclear umbrella. It constantly strengthens extended deterrence, pursues nuclear sharing and has repeatedly issued dangerous statements about acquiring its own nuclear weapons. For years, Japan has produced and stockpiled plutonium far exceeding its actual civilian nuclear energy needs. This make it a non nuclear weapon state capable of extracting weapons grade plutonium. Furthermore, several former Japanese political figures have publicly claimed that Japan possesses the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons. This demonstrates that Japan has both a strong intention and the solid conditions required to arm itself with nuclear weapons, severely challenging international nuclear non proliferation regime. This year marks the 80th anniversary of the Tokyo trials. Japanese right wing forces still refuse to reflect on the country's history of aggression and war crimes. Instead, they are pushing to accelerate Japan's remilitarization, seeking powerful offensive weapons and relaxing restrictions on the export of lethal arms. Japan's surging new militarism has become a growing threat threatening regional peace and stability while challenging the post war international order. Should Japan acquire nuclear weapons under these circumstances, it would only compound the danger and destructive potential. China calls on Japan to do serious soul searching, earnestly fulfill its treaty obligation and strictly abide by its three non nuclear principles. Japan must commit not to seek nuclear weapons in any form since cease its provocative policies and actions and take concrete actions to promote rich strategic stability, regional peace and security. I thank you Mr. Chair,

I thank the distinguished Superintendent of China for the statement. I have Japan to exercise the right of reply. Japan, the floor is yours.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Our delegation wishes to exercise the right of reply regarding the unfounded allegation which was made by a previous speaker. As I have stated before, in this chamber we Japan observe its three non nuclear principle as possible policy guidelines. As a staunch supporter of npt, Japan has been advocating for the implementation of all its provisions. This of course includes compliance with its own obligation. Under the npt, all nuclear material in Japan is used exclusively for peaceful purposes and is under exceptionally stringent IAEA safeguard, including additional protocol. Therefore, there is no preparation concern regarding Japan. Since the end of World War II, Japan has consistently maintained its path as a peace loving nation upholding freedom, democracy and rule of law and contributing to international peace and prosperity. This remains unchanged in this regard. Japan would like to point out that the working paper number 64 submitted by a certain country contains unsubscientiated claims and numerous error errors. I would like to remind all of you of the importance of the INFSAC549 mechanism for the civil plutonium management and of the fact that the same State has ceased to implement it in 2017. This is causing a serious lack of transparency. Thank you very much, Mr.

Chair.

I thank the Ambassador of Japan for his statement this. We don't have any other willingness to access right of reply. So, Excellencies, distinguished delegates. That was the last speaker I have on my list for this meeting.

Next one says distinguished delegates.

As we have exhausted the list of speakers for the general exchange of use In Main Committee 2, we will commence with the work of the Subsidiary Body.

I will therefore close this meeting of

Main Committee 2 and we will have a short pause of five minutes before commencing the first meeting of Subsidiary Body 2.

The Subsidiary Body 2 will be presided

over by the Vice Chair of the Main Committee Committee, His Excellency Thor Henrik Andersson of Norway.

I remind everyone that the meeting of subsidiary body 2 will be a closed meeting. It will not be live streamed and NGOs are not permitted to attend. The next meeting of Main Committee 2

will be on Thursday 7th of May

at 3pm in the Trusteeship Council Chamber where we will begin discussions on a

draft final outcome document.

There will be no list of speakers for that meeting and therefore no need

to inscribe in advance. The meeting is adjourned.