Preparatory Commission: Agreement on Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (Third Session, Informal Working Group)

Good afternoon delegates. I trust that everyone had an enjoyable lunch and actually got some time out in the sun. We shall now resume our work under item 5 of the Agenda to consider Rules of Procedure for the Conference of the Parties and this morning we will consider the revised text of the draft Rules of Procedure for the Conference of the Parties contained In the document a AC 2962026 CRP1, which was circulated to delegates yesterday afternoon. Before moving substantively on to that, I would like to provide some clarifications after consultations with the Secretariat in relation to inquiries made in Friday afternoon's session. So, in response to the requests for clarifications made during Friday's session, I would like to make the following observations with regard to the use of the phrase urgent and important in Rule 13 addition, deletion, deferment or amendment.

The coaches understand that this phrase or its equivalent of an important and urgent character reflects standard language used across Rules of Procedure, including those for the General assembly, the meetings of States Parties under unclos, the International Seabed Authority and other multilateral environmental agreements.

Some questions were raised regarding the use of the terms documents of the Meeting and official documents in the practice of the United Nations Secretariat. Official documents are included in the official records of the relevant body, such as the Official Records of the General assembly, and published as such. In addition to official documents. The term documents of the Meeting could apply to documents subject to limited distribution, which the Secretariat may distribute and circulate at the request of delegations or officers of the Meeting on an informal basis, such as Conference room papers, information documents or working papers. While these documents may be widely available, including through online document systems, they are typically not published in Official records.

With regard to a query on whether amendments to the Agreement itself were covered under Rule 40 on proposals and Amendments to Proposals, the Co Chairs wish to recall that the modalities for amendments to the Agreement are covered in Article 72 of the agreement itself, and that, as per Rule 51, the provisions of the Agreement prevail over the Rules of Procedure. So, with those clarifications, I would now like to turn to the arrangement of our work for this afternoon. Delegates, I indicated this morning that I intended to open up the entirety of the Rules of Procedure for discussion at this afternoon's session. I am afraid I have exercised that most sacred and fundamental of the prerogatives of a chair. I've changed my mind.

I think it will be easier if we proceed to consider the rules of procedure in batches, given the size of the document. So I would propose to proceed as follows. We will start with chapters one and two, that is pages two to four. We will then move to chapter three, that's pages four to six. We will then move to chapters four and to eight, that is page six to 11.

And we will then move to chapters nine to 15, that's pages 11 to 18. I will of course remind you at each stage as we move. But we'll open up shortly for comments on chapters one and two. That's pages two and to four. I would apply the same request as this morning.

Please focus your comments in particular on red line issues.

What you absolutely can't live with in terms of what is included, what you absolutely have to have in terms of what is not included. And please, if it is fit for purpose, even if it is not exactly as you would have it, please, let's just leave it alone. Again, if somebody receives the next version of this and it's perfect as far as they are concerned and it has absolutely everything they want, then from a chair's perspective, something has gone terribly wrong. So please look at it all with that in mind. I will adopt the same approach that if we do not hear comments on any particular rule, we will assume that that rule is in final form.

That is of course without prejudice to the rights of delegates to return to any issue at any stage. But our working assumption will be that any rule that is not raised in these proceedings is in near to final form. Delegates, we will break at 5:30 for myself and Janine to have a discussion about where the respective processes have gotten to and therefore what the organisation of work is for for tomorrow. And I will come back into the room at 5:45 and Janine will do the same and we will advise on the organisation of work for tomorrow. Finally, as we go through these documents, I would like to note some comments with respect to two sets of issues, both of which we know are subject to active smaller group processes at the moment.

And we thank those states who've taken a particular interest and those individuals who've taken a particular interest in guiding those issues forward in respect of regional economic integration organisations, that is Rule 44, with a related tie in to Rule 34, which is quorum, that is subject to some smaller group discussions at the moment. And I think it is best left to that we will park that rule for a minute. In respect of what I will define or for shorthand I will call rule 39bis issues. So that is rule 30, 39 and the related question of references in rules 9, 10, 12 and 13 the co chairs have received information from States who are informally leading consultations in the margins. Those States have been consulting with delegations on a potential landing zone regarding proposals for a rule 39bis and on a related note, also on rules 9 to 13.

I would like on behalf of both Janine and myself to particularly thank those States. I know that they worked all of yesterday on this issue in order to assist the Chairs and the process. There seems to be convergence on important aspects. Firstly, the need to preserve the delicate balance of the BBNJ agreement, including on Article 18. Secondly, a shared concern that the COP should not be drawn into matters that are subject to bilateral disputes for which it has no mandate.

In this context, delegations consulted expressed the view that the COP should focus on conservation and sustainable use. While there continue to be strong views on different sides on whether and how to reflect Article 18 in the Rules of Procedure, the consultations have revealed areas where further discussions could be productive. While proposals received so far have not yet attracted consensus, they contain elements that provide a useful basis for further discussion. Largely, there are two elements in the proposals received.

Firstly, there is the element of a procedural process for raising concerns under Article 18. This could take the form of a formal notification to the Secretariat.

Secondly, there is the element on what follows from such a notification and in particular the extent to which it would affect the further consideration of the proposal. Noting that there seem to be differing levels of comfort between these two elements, I propose discussions today could explore what elements could form form part of a rule 39bis that can command consensus.

I would note also that the proposed references to Article 6 in Rules 9 to 13 are a related issue which needs resolving without prejudging the outcome. Consultations suggest that convergence might be found on including a single reference. I invite delegations to comment on this while keeping primary focus on Rule 39bis. I would finally invite any group or delegation to share any further landing zone proposals regarding Rule 39 biscuits in writing with the CO Chairs before the end of the day for consideration.

So I would propose to open up the chair now. Those States that have been particularly involved in leading the informal processes I think would greatly appreciate any guidance on those questions that that States can provide at this stage. I would propose to open the floor up now for any comments in this regard before I then Move on as flagged to consider Chapters one and two of the Rules of Procedure. And with that the floor is open.

Maybe just leave it here just in case.

I see that the European Union has requested the floor. Eu, the floor is yours.

Thank you very much Co Chair. And let me first thank the Co Chair and the Secretariat for the new draft document. I know that you have worked tirelessly over the weekend and this is really appreciated by the delegation. I guess we'll come back onto the draft itself. I'll just focus right now on the Rule 39 BIST.

I understand that's what you've opened the floor on.

The EU and its member states continue to consider Article 18. That Article 18 is clear enough and does not need operationalization in the Rules of procedure. In particular, we do consider that Option one and Option two in the previous Draft provided some sort of veto for delegations actually from any States on any ABMT proposal through a simple notification to the Secretariat. And that text for us was incompatible with Article 23.2of the agreement where there is a 4 5th majority if a consensus is not reached. As noted by many delegations last week, and also as noted in the summary that you have just outlined, Article 18 strikes a very subtle balance that should not be upset when we are trying to operationalize this text.

Having said all this, the Unit's Member States understand that there is a need at this stage to try to compromise and we would thus like to propose the following wording instead of option 1 and 2. Article 39 Rule 39bis would read when looking at proposals for the establishment of area based management tools, including marine protected area, the Conference of Parties shall act in accordance with Article 18. I'll read it again if you want. When looking at proposals for the establishment of area based management tools including marine protected areas, the Conference of Parties shall act in accordance with Article 18. The idea here is that by making a direct cost reference to Article 18, we preserve the balance that is provided for in that provision and that was struck during the igc.

This text at the same time ensures that proposals referred to in Article 18 would not be considered for decision by the COP as provided by an article 18, while at the same time enabling the COP to look at such proposal as provided in the understanding of that Article that has been referred to in many occasions. We hope that this proposal is seen as a constructive step in trying to find a compromise on that. We hope that this text as it is would be acceptable to all and are happy to engage on the references to Article 6.

We would like to recall again that first, the agenda of the BB&J cop is subject to the agreement in its entirety. We do not see the need to refer to a specific article. And in particular, Article 6 is a clause that defines the legal effect of the BB&J agreement on cop decisions. It does not define the subject matter that the BB&J may or not address. And to us, including Article 6 in one of those paragraphs in one of those rules would change the meaning of the article of the agreement, and thus we struggle to see how to include it.

Thank you.

I thank the European Union. I thank you for putting your proposed compromise text forward to this session. I would invite further comments, including, where possible, I would encourage delegations to respond to the proposal that has just been put forward by the European Union. I would add again that our purpose in ventilating these issues now is to provide assistance and the guidance to those states that are very vigorously working on a smaller group process to try and ensure we can reach a consensus outcome on this very important question. I thank the European Union and the floor is open.

It.

I see no one wishing to take the floor. I thank the European Union again. Oh well, that got everyone going.

I will now give the floor to Mike Rhonesia on behalf of psids. The floor is yours.

Thank you, Co Chair. And just breaking the ice here, I think there's two elements to that question. One is about the trigger, the other one is about the effect. The trigger is someone writes a letter, says this is an area that's either within my national jurisdiction or that is disputed. And then the question is, what is the effect of that?

Now if we look from our perspective on the trigger, first in Article 20 in the Implementing agreement, we have a specific provision that gives a mandate to the STB to look at any proposal to actually do a fact check. Is it in the right place? Is it here? Is it there? So we would hope that that provision would actually provide some reassurances because they would report back accordingly.

We would not be comfortable just by a blanket veto where someone could say this falls within whatever, because that needs to be fact checked. And again, the STB could be of use in that respect and I'm sure both sides will violently disagree with me. Thank you.

I thank Micronesia on behalf of psids. And I give the floor to the Philippines, to be followed by China and Saudi Arabia. Philippines, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Co Chair. And we thank you for your earnest efforts.

Mr. Co Chair. We join delegations that have previously expressed serious concerns regarding the rule 39bis as previously proposed, and we will later on give preliminary remarks to the proposal coming from the EU. Mr. Co Chair, the way we are approaching this matter seems to place the onus on delegations to converge on elements that would reflect Article 18. At the outset, we underscore a point that we have repeatedly articulated. Rule 39bis is neither necessary nor appropriate.

The Agreement already provides a carefully calibrated balance through Article 18, read together with the decision making framework under Part 3. Reproducing or expanding this balance in the Rules of Procedure risks unsettling what was already deliberately negotiated. We have expressed concerns that the initial proposed options would alter the nature of decision making under the Conference of Parties. Under the Agreement, concerns relating to geographic scope are one among several considerations to be assessed through a structured process, one that includes scientific input, consultations and ultimately collective decision making by the State's parties through the COP. However, Rule 39bis would elevate such concerns into a threshold, effectively preventing the COP from even examining a proposal.

If we go back to the previous option two, it introduced a single state veto for which there is no basis in the agreement, and so we would express caution with regard to such elements in light of its broader institutional implications. It would undermine the authority of the cop, diminish its evaluative function, and create a precedent whereby unilateral assertions, whether framed as jurisdiction claims or disputes, can preclude the consideration of the State's parties altogether. From a practical standpoint, this risks rendering the agreement inoperable precisely in areas where cooperation is most needed. Mr. Kocher, we believe that the strength of this agreement lies in its ability to balance these sensitivities with functionality and to ensure that we move forward with achieving the goals of the Agreement.

We also wish to offer a brief preliminary observation on the proposal from the EU. So we recall that Article 18 already applies fully and directly to the work of the COP as a matter of treaty law. Its legal effect does not depend on our statement in the Rules of Procedure, and I'm hard pressed to find similar rules of procedure that have a similar rule. Against this backdrop, we really see no added legal value in reproducing Article 18 in the rules. On the contrary, doing so risks introducing ambiguity.

In particular, embedding Article 18 at the procedural level may have unintended effect of conditioning the cop's ability to consider proposals on their merits. And this shifts the sequence of decision making away from science based and consultative processes set out in the Agreement towards procedural questions that are not clearly defined. And so we would really caution against elements or any formulation that could be interpreted as creating a threshold requirement before proposals can be considered, it really constrains the authority of the COP and may affect the effective functioning of the agreement. Again, the agreement already contains carefully negotiated safeguards, including in Article 618. These provisions strike a deliberate balance and in our view this balance should be maintained.

And so for these reasons we do not see the need for Rule 39bis and would support relying on the agreement as drafted. Thank you.

I thank the Philippines and I now give the floor to China.

Thank you. Co Chairs. At the outset, China wishes to join others to thank distinguished delegates from EU for presenting a new draft in relation to rules 39 base on other part of China. Any kind of inputs are more than welcome and considering that this new draft is quite new to us, so we reserved a position in giving response to that before we receive the proposal in writing. We certainly hope that the proposal from EU could be available in writing on the website or through some other mechanisms.

Yes. Having said that, if I may, I would like to give some preliminary response to some interventions made by other delegations. The first one goes to the intervention made by eu, because EU refers to the issue of the veto on this specific point on the part of China. So we could hardly agree with that because in accordance with the language and spirit of the Article 18 of the agreement, the application without any doubt that application of this specific Article and relates to the area which is outside the scope of application of the BBN Agreement. Yeah, because it may refers to the area within the national jurisdiction or the disputed area.

So in that cases those matters are outside the mandate of the BBNG Agreement. So having said that, and so it's impossible for us to agree with the point of veto. Yes, Application of the Article 18 aims to provide a safeguard to a faithful implementation of the PBNG Agreement, not the exercise of the veto power. So that is totally unacceptable in relation to the intervention made by distinguished delegates from Micronolysia. And we agree with that point that there are two fundamental elements.

One is the the threshold in application of the article 18 and the other one is what it follows or the effect of the threshold. So we sincerely Hope that those two fundamental elements could be included in the rules 39B's we believe that those two fundamental elements are interactive ones and like the Co chair is just a summary in your summarizing about the common ground among the all delegations in relation to the Rule 39B. So we sincerely hope that those two elements could be included, not just a part of it. So I should stop here. And once again we appreciate any kind of new inputs before us, in particular at this critical moment to move ahead.

Thank you, Mr. Koch.

I thank China and I give the floor to Saudi Arabia, to be followed by Iran and Uruguay. Saudi Arabia, the floor is yours.

Thank you. Co Chair, Let me start by saying that we truly appreciate the work that was done by you and the Secretariat over the weekend. Not taking a rest like the rest of us, maybe even for one day.

That's truly appreciated. We think that I will speak to the text in general, we think it's this cleaner version speaking to a lot of our requests that was submitted and we will be coming in to address certain element as you request input 4 as appropriate. For as the matter under discussion right now is Article 39bis. For us, we see this element to be necessary and important.

We support a balanced approach in this manner. So. So you asked us to look at it from an elemental process like how is it submitted in the beginning and then we have how this Submission is processed. I believe that the proposal made by the distinguished delegation from EU does not speak to that. We are trying to operationalize Article 18.

We are trying to find a practical way to operationalize this Article and make sure that it's effective and fit for purpose, let's say. And for us in particular, we underline the importance of ensuring that non party States are not excluded from the process if this Article is not operationalized. We are effectively doing that. We are ignoring how this area Management tools proposals are affecting their jurisdiction, sovereignty and rights of States that cannot speak to them once it's proposed. So for us we will be reserving on the proposal made by our distinguished colleagues from EU and we will be writing a submission before the end of the session today regarding how we envision the submission process which we think would first regard the initiation of the process, which should be a clear, clear, explicit possibility for a State to submit a written notification or request where it should consider that a proposal for an area based management to raise concern in relation to its rights, including sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction.

And then second, the second part of the process would be regarding how is this Submission is processed and the procedural consequences of that. We consider that this part specifically will be consistent completely with Article 18 and it will be put to the Conference and the Party. So it will be a clear procedural process that actionable for the cop. So we will be writing to you, Mr. Couture, regarding this process and how we envision it and maybe this will help to have a Landing zone on this. Regarding the mention of Article 6, I thought we were only speaking to 39 bits, but regarding the mention of Article 6 as well for us Article 6 is very important.

We think it should remain in Rules 9, 10, 12 and 13. We consider these references essential to ensure that the function of the remain anchored in the agreement. I'm not sure how this article is not is being in dispute. We are basically reaffirming an essential part of the agreement within the Rules of Procedure, which we have done throughout the Rules of Procedure in other areas and other concerns. I'm not sure if you need reflections also on the regional economic for the voting for Rule 44 and 3034 at this stage.

Then we will come in when it's open. Thank you very much. Shukren. Afwan on the specific question you raised on Article 6 to say I think it is fair to say we are trying to deal with the issues overall in the sense that whatever the outcome is on Rule 39bis will no doubt the references in Rules 9, 10, 12 and 13 will be a part of what is the overall package here. So thank you for that.

It's all part of the one picture, if I can put it that simply. Okay, thank you. I give the floor to Iran. Iran, you have the floor. Thank you.

Mr. Chair, as we mentioned we see merit in adding paragraph 39bis in the rules of Procedure. We understand that we have rule Article 18 in the Agreement itself as a substantive provision. But we believe that in the Rules of Procedure we should address the procedural aspects of Article 18. So we see this really fit for the purpose to have those languages reflected in a procedural manner to ensure that the Conference of Parties remains within the ambits of the agreement.

And looking, sorry, looking into 39 bits which comes after 39, we should envisage a situation where the Conference of Party involves in questions that are there might be of political nature and the decision on the competence of the Conference would prejudice Article 18. So we do seem merit to have these languages here. And I believe in addition to the sensitivity of the question of claims or sovereignty of States, one of the reasons that Article 18 is in the agreement is to maintain the technicality of the Conference of Parties. And we believe there's a risk that due to procedural issues non inclusion of such provision would risk having Conference of Party that instead of working on technical aspects of the question we have at hand enter into political discussions. And I believe this is good also for the sake of maintaining the very nature and atmosphere of the Conference as we have Also seen through these two weeks, we have very good technical discussions and along the same lines, we believe that there should be also a discussion on Article 6, which by the same token need to be reflected in the rules of procedure.

And as for the proposal of our distinguished colleague from the eu, we would be waiting to see their proposal in writing and then comment on that. Thank you.

I thank Iran and I give the floor to Uruguay to be followed by Costa Rica. Uruguay, you have the floor.

Thank you very much, Mr. Cocher and good afternoon colleagues. On behalf of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay, we would like to underscore that Article 18 requires effective operationalization within the procedural framework of the Conference of the Parties in a manner consistent with the Agreement. In this regard, the objective of draft rule 39 BS is precisely to serve this purpose and we stand ready to engage constructively, ensuring that they reflect the object and purpose of the BB&G agreement.

In addition, we circulated over the weekend a textual proposal aimed at operacional operationalizing this Article through the Subsidiary Bodies and we remain open to further discussion on this basis. With respect to the reference to States or States Parties, we support the inclusion of the term concerned States without requiring that they be parties to the Agreement. This approach is consistent with the spirit of Article 18, read in conjunction with with Article 5 and 6 of the agreement. Accordingly, an objection raised by a non party State on the basis of an excising dispute or in relation to the establishment of area based management tools within areas under national jurisdiction should result in the relevant submission not being considered by the Conference of the Parties. In this context, we also wish to draw attention to comparable approaches reflected in Annex 1 of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and in the ecologically or biologically significant Marine Areas process which contain similar provisions.

Thank you, Mr. Co Chair.

Thank you. Uruguay and I give on behalf of a group of States and I'm sorry, I didn't quite catch all of those, so I'll just say on behalf of a group of of States, I'll give the floor to Costa Rica, to be followed by India and Argentina. Costa Rica, the floor is yours.

Thank you very much. Co Chair.

And being the the first time that. We take the floor, we would like to express our appreciation to you and to the Secretariat for the preparation of the Documents. With regard to the Discussion on Article. 1939 Bis, our preference remains that the. Rules of Procedures procedures do not make.

Reference to Article 18. However, in light of the efforts undertaken by several delegations on this matter, we can Be flexible with regard to the new. To the new proposal and to have a general reference. Thank you.

I thank Costa Rica for that indication of flexibility. And I give the floor to India, to be followed by Argentina. India, the floor is yours.

Thank you, Koch. With regard to Article 39bis and the language introduced by the EU, we are currently consulting with our capital and therefore we reserve our position at this stage. Nevertheless, we are of the view that the reproduction of Article 18 alone may not be sufficient. This provision will need to be sufficiently operationalized, which is why we are in the process of developing the necessary procedures. In this regard, I would like to read the language from Article 18, just two lines to quote.

The Conference of the Parties shall not consider for decision proposals for the establishment of such area based management tools. So from these lines we understand that there is a clear difference between shall not decide and shall not consider for decision. Thank you, Co Chair. At this stage. Thank you.

I thank India and I give the floor to Argentina. Argentina, you've got the floor.

Thank you very much. Mr. Co Chair, we are speaking in national capacity, in addition to what former colleague, previous distinguished colleague from Uruguay already said. But we would like to first react or to have have a comment on the proposal of the European Union.

Although we haven't seen it in the text, even when we yesterday hold this meeting with the co facilitators, it would have been very useful to have this text to be analyzed in more detail.

Mr. Co Chair, with respect to the proposal of the European Union, we have serious concerns.

The formulation suggesting that the Conference of the Parties shall act in accordance with Article 18 leaves Rule 39 BS at hand with no content.

It's just referring to what we all know. We all know that Article 18 is there and we know which is the wording of Article 18. The thing here is to operationalize what Article 18 already states. Therefore, Mr. Co Chair, we understand that this proposal is insufficient and lacks legal precision. What does it mean in practical terms that the COP will merely look at the proposal?

That's not clear. That's not a legal term, that's not a practical term. Article 18 is inequivocal. Proposals falling within its scope shall not be considered for decision. Shall not be considered for decision.

And this is clear. This is a clear safeguard. This is not a general guideline. This is not a discretionary standard. This is not something that can be satisfied by simply looking at a proposal.

The wording proposed by the distinguished delegation from the EU is therefore far from reflecting a meaningful compromise. We are here to work on that to find a landing zone, to serve as a bridge and to find consensus. We want that. But we understand that this is far away from that consensus we are here working for. So if we are to remain faithful to the agreement, the rules must clearly reflect that such proposals will not be considered anything less risk diluting a core safeguard of the agreement.

That's our position. Mr. Co Chair, thank you very much.

I thank the distinguished representative of Argentina. Do I see anyone else looking to take the floor?

Australia, followed by the United Kingdom, Vietnam and Brazil. Australia, the floor is yours.

Thank you, Co Chair.

On behalf of Kansi, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Iceland and Australia, like the EU and the Philippines and others we consider Article 18 is clear enough and does not need to be transplanted into Rules of procedure. We agree with the Philippines that the legal effect of Article 18 doesn't depend on its inclusion in Rules of Procedure and that embedding it there may have unintended effects. And we thank the Philippines for their considered analysis today, including on the institutional ramifications of a procedure that would amount in effect to a vis veto and what this would mean for the efficacy of the BB&J agreement on Article 6. We agree with the legal explanation of what Article 6 does offered by the distinguished Delegate for European Union. We think it's a provision relating to the effect of acts under the BB&J Agreement and it doesn't relate to procedures.

Procedure. So on that basis we also aren't persuaded for a need to include that in Rules of procedure.

In relation to the remarks of the distinguished Delegate for Micronesia on behalf of the Pacific small island developing States, we have some questions about the idea of bringing the STB into this.

It's a question that is not purely factual, of course. And so in light of the function of the stb, we're not sure that that's heading in the right direction to consider the STB involvement in this.

But having said that, we understand that there is a need to move forward on this issue and we are listening to carefully to views. We thank the European Union for their proposal today, but we'll need to consider that further.

We have heard some ideas for procedures for notification and for COP decision making and we're not sure that this is heading in the right direction. Like many others, we want to avoid the COP effectively becoming a forum for dispute settlement.

We'll need to study the proposal put forward and read out on the floor by the distinguished Delegate for Uruguay on behalf of the Group of States. We do note that it envisages an ex ante procedural block to preclude a proposal for being looked at by the stb and we consider such a procedural block to go further than the balance struck in the agreement. But of course we are listening to views and keen to work constructively with all on this and we thank the co chairs and the facilitators for their efforts in assisting us to move this issue forward. Thank you Co Chair,.

I thank Australia and I give the floor to the United Kingdom. Floor is yours uk.

Thank you very much. For us, we've spoken out on this issue a number of times. We want to reiterate that we agree. Obviously there's a key principle of BBNJ agreement is that ABMTs should not include any areas within national jurisdiction. In our view and as has been expressed by many other delegations today, EU, Philippines, Kanzi the second part of Article 18 of the BBNJ agreement really for us represents the limits of how that key principle needs to be articulated.

And it's worth keeping in mind the fact that this compromise wording was alighted upon at the 11th hour and we really feel that that reflects the delicate balance that this wording seeks to achieve. And as others have mentioned, it's important to keep this at the forefront of our minds. A provision like 39 bis in and of itself seeks to open up that delicately crafted wording and provide for further operational details which in our view are not appropriate. And the proposals in the previous draft provided for shift that balance in a way that to us is unacceptable, effectively allowing for a veto by one state on a proposal and in our view that goes beyond Article 18 of the agreement. And we also join others in thanking the Philippines for their detailed consideration of the ramifications of that from a legal and institutional perspective.

We've heard our other delegations referring to potential ways in which this may be unblocked. We note the intervention from the PSIDs. We are not in a position to consider that we need anything to articulate this in the rules of procedure and in particular we had real concerns about the effect of any such trigger on who is taking decisions on what is or is not within the parameters of Article 18.

Turning to the EU's proposal, we thank them for setting this out and for their explanation and we're willing to take this away and consider this in the spirit of compromise and move things forward. We would need to give it further consideration, but we do thank them for bringing that to the table.

As others have said on the references to Article 6, again this was a deliberate balance of wording within the treaty and we agree with others as to the nature of that clause. It's a without prejudice clause clarifying the legal effect of the bbnj. So we can't see how it is appropriate to include a reference to that in the rules of procedure of the cop. And we've heard some other suggestions of proposals. Just in brief reaction to the suggestion or the the text referred to by the delegate from Uruguay.

We haven't seen that proposal but we note co chair, your allusion earlier to a key area of convergence that the COP ought not to be drawn into bilateral sovereignty disputes. And we would not consider acceptable any text which effectively puts the STB or another subsidiary body into that very position. Thank you.

I thank the United Kingdom and I give the floor to Vietnam to be followed by Brazil. And that ends my speaking list. Vietnam, the floor is yours.

Thank you, Mr. Grove. Chair, I would like to make two comments, the first one being on Article 6, the reference to Article 6.

So we think that the provisional agenda should be prepared in accordance with the agreement and other relevant rules, not only Article 6. So we think that it not necessary to refer to Article 6 in Rule 9, 10 and some other rules. And secondly on Rule 39B, we would like to reiterate our position on that. We propose removing this rule from the text because its subject matter is already addressed in Article 6 and Article 18 of the Agreement and it's not necessary to have it there to create a duplication for the EU's proposal. We thank the EU and we take note of that.

However, we also need further consideration and we reserve our right to come back to this matter later on. Thank you.

I thank Vietnam and I give the floor to Brazil to be followed by the Philippines. Brazil, you have the floor. Thank you very much, Mr. Coitier. Brazil fully aligns itself with a statement delivered by Uruguay on behalf of a group of countries. And I'd like to make some additional remarks in my national capacity.

Brazil thanks the delegation of the European Union for its proposal. At this moment we will reserve our position but as a preliminary reaction the proposal does not seem to provide the necessary legal certainty effectiveness for Article 18. Article 18 is clear that the Conference of the Parties shall not consider for decision proposals for the establishment of an ABMT when it may involve areas within the national jurisdiction which obviously falls outside the scope of the agreement. And in our review this provision needs to be operationalized in the rules of procedure. In our view, as a preliminary reaction, the proposal just made from the floor by the European Union does not provide for the necessary effectiveness specifically in terms of the procedures to be followed for the Conference of the Parties not to consider for decisions such proposals.

We don't think the COP should deliberate on bilateral disputes or areas within national jurisdiction and that's why we think it's necessary to have a clear procedure for the way how the COP will not consider such proposals in any case. My delegation remains open to different alternatives and to find a consensus based language that preserves the balance of the agreement while ensuring its effectiveness. I thank you Mr. Co Chair,

I. Thank Brazil including for the clear indication of flexibility and I give the floor to the Philippines to be followed by the European Union. Philippines, the floor is yours.

Thank you Mr. Co Chair and we'll try to keep it brief. Practice and precedent is important as we proceed with our task of completing and finalizing the Rules of Procedure. There have been delegations and we take them seriously that call for safeguards in our Rules of procedure of the COP in light of Article 18. And we would like to make a brief observation on the relationship between the Rules of Procedure for meetings of State Parties under the UNCLASS and the safeguards relating to sovereignty and jurisdiction as indicative of our practice with regard to the law of the sea. At the outset, we recall that the Convention itself already contains carefully calibrated safeguards that preserve the rights, jurisdiction and claims of States, and we would like to invite delegations to look at how the Rules of Procedure of the SP loss of the Annual Meeting of the State's Parties reflect these safeguards.

These safeguards include the principle of sovereign equality, the limits on institutional competence and the consistent practice of non prejudice to maritime claims and disputes. But in this context, the Rules of Procedure should be understood as procedural in nature and they are designed to facilitate the orderly conduct of meetings rather than to restate or renegotiate substantive legal protections that are already in the body of the Agreement. The rules reflect in structure and operation important procedural expressions of these safeguards. The principle of sovereign equalities upheld through equal voting rights of the States Parties, the emphasis on general agreement before recourse to voting and ensures that decisions are not imposed but are built on broad convergence and the requirement of qualified maturities for decisions on substantive matters provides an additional layer of protection against outcomes that could affect core State interests and so forth. The ability of States to raise questions relating to competence of the Meeting serves as an important procedural safeguard.

Taken together, these elements demonstrate that rules can incorporate these processes procedural safeguards consistent with the Convention but not in the manner that is being discussed currently with regard to Article 18. So we would support an approach that we rely essentially on the main agreement as a primary source of the substantive safeguards, while maintaining the rules of procedure as a neutral and facilitative instrument. Mr. Co Chair,.

I thank the Philippines and I give the floor to the European Union eu. The floor is yours.

Thank you very much. Co Chair. I'll try to be brief as the second time I take the floor. The EU and its member states are of the view that Rule 39 is not necessary. As eloquently explained by Philippines.

We do see that the risk here is the more we try to operationalize this text. Let me start somewhere else. There is clearly some delegations that do not want the conference of party to decide on claims. There are also some delegations that do not want the BBJ to serve to assert claims. And we want the BB and J to focus on the sustainable use and conservation of biodiversity.

This is what we are here about. The risk is that the more we try to operationalize the rule Article 18 in the rules, the more we're going to have to make a call on touch one of those two issues which is clearly a red line for delegations in this room. So the reason why the EU made a proposal, the unit's member state made a proposal that is as some called high level or lack legal certainty or whatever the terms that were used, is that because we want to make sure that the balance found in Article 18 is respected and that we do not try to on the one hand have the COP deciding dispute, but on the other hand not have states asserting claims through the bbnj. And this is the reason why we made this proposal as it is now. We are here trying to find a compromise.

Our starting basis is not to have anything. We are happy to engage and we're happy to engage on something that we feel a bit more comfortable to work with than what has been on the table so far. We have taken the views here. There's clearly still a divergence of views in this room. We are happy to engage with every delegation to try to find something that works everywhere.

But we are conscious that if not everybody makes a step in the other side's decision, we are not going to find a compromise on this key issue. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of the European Union delegates. I'd like to make a couple of observations. Firstly, this has been a useful discussion on what we all know is a critical issue. I think I would begin by reverting to my comments of Friday morning and saying firstly, and these are my assessments at the moment as Chair, I might be wrong, but these are my assessments of where we stand at this point in time. I think on Friday I noted that the policy concerns that underlie the various proposals that have been put forward on the table, I think were first stated by a delegation on the second day of PrepCom1.

My friend may perhaps want to correct me and tell me it was the first day of Prepcon 1, but it was certainly the second day of Prepcon 1. I remember and have been consistently stated since and shared by a number of delegations. And so it is fair to say my judgment would be that we cannot reach consensus unless those policy concerns are addressed in some manner in the rules of procedure. It is also my judgment that Rule 39bis, as currently drafted, is not capable of attracting consensus. So that is just my judgment as chair, I might be wrong.

So that provides the tracks into which we must now negotiate and for which our facilitators are doing tremendous work. I thank the European Union for, for putting a compromise proposal on the floor. I would make the following observation. It is of course the right of any state to say that a compromise is not an acceptable compromise. But there comes with that the obligation to then be able to state what would be an acceptable compromise.

Saying what you want to say no to is the easy part, but we have to hear what states can say yes to if we are going to be able to resolve this issue. There are two facilitators who are working around the clock to try and bridge these gaps. You have two chairs who are committed to taking this process through to a successful conclusion. Our doors are open at all times, at any time to hear what states can live with and what states do think will be an acceptable compromise. And again, thank you, the European Union, for your proposal.

It's been noted by the two excellent co facilitators in this regard who have listened carefully to this debate across the board. We have three, three and a half days to go. Delegates, this is obviously a critical issue and again, all proposals are very much. All attempts to bridge the gap are valuable and appreciated as such. So with that I'll draw a line, I think under this discussion for now, and unless anyone wants to take the floor, we will move on to a consideration of chapters one and two of the Rules of Procedure.

More broadly, that is pages two to four. I'll give everyone a second to settle in and get their Rules of Procedure open and then I'll open the floor.

Yeah, that's not a bad thing, actually, Chapter 1 and 2.

Otherwise I will presume that they have been beautifully drafted and a meeting with overwhelming support. And I'll move to Chapter three. Floor remains open for Chapter one and two, but not for much longer. Japan. Japan, you have the floor.

Thank you. Co Chair Japan would like to make a comment on Rule 4, paragraph 1. So we. Japan considers that. It is important to.

Decide at the beginning the duration of. Having ordinary meetings from the perspective of. Controlling administrative costs and and budgets. So Japan accepts holding meetings on an. Annual basis at the initial stage only.

If the duration is clearly set. But so as a landing point, we. Would like to propose to hold the. First five ordinary meetings instead of three. Ordinary meetings on an annual basis.

That's our proposal. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Japan and I give the floor to Singapore, I presume on behalf of aosis, but please correct me if otherwise to be followed by Argentina, I presume on behalf of Clan, but please correct me if. If I'm wrong on that. Okay. Singapore, on behalf of aoc, the floor is yours. Thank you.

Co Chair Eosas thanks the Co Chairs and dualos for their hard work over the weekend on the revised ROP text. So I will speak to Rule 3bis. AOSIS supports Rule 3bis and we thank Norway for their hard work in consulting on this text in person meetings are and should remain the primary modality for the copy. And Rule 3bis ensures that the COP has a clear procedural basis to continue its essential work in exceptional circumstances, rendering in person meetings practicable. And we consider that Rule 3bis is carefully circumscribed with a suitably high threshold.

And further, the decision requires consultation with the Bureau and substantive decision making is limited to what is necessary for the COP and its subsidiary bodies to continue to function. And on paragraph four, we also welcome the revised text, in particular the addition of participation of all parties on an equitable basis, which signals that the practical challenges that many developing countries face, including time zones, bandwidth and access to platforms, must be taken into account when virtual meetings are convened. And we have no issues with the COP adopting guidance regarding the convening and modalities of virtual meetings. And we see this as a way of potentially addressing the challenges faced by developing countries. So all in all, we are very happy with the text that we see in Rule 3bis.

And if I just may move on to just address the comments just made by Japan on Rule 4, EOSIS supports the text in Rule 4, paragraph 1. We note that this reflects the broad convergence in the room that for an initial period the COP will be held on an annual basis and eventually will transition to a biannual schedule. We do not think that it is necessary to specify when this change should occur and in any event, the second sentence apologies, the first sentence of paragraph 22 already provides that the COP shall decide on the date, duration and venue of the next Ordinary Meeting at each Ordinary Session and the transition to a biannual frequency can therefore be initiated at any COP with the agreement of the Parties through the Ordinary operation of Rule 4, paragraph 2. So for these reasons we support the text in the Chair's revised draft. Thank you very much.

I thank Singapore including for the kind comments and of course neither the Chairs nor the incredibly hard working DOUALOS team are the only people working on weekends and I thank Singapore for all their help in the process and with that I give the floor to Argentina on behalf of clam.

Thank you Co Chair. Yes, this time on behalf of clamor, we would like firstly to express our appreciation for the work and dedication invested in the preparation of a new revised version of the Rules, with a view to achieving consensus based solutions grounded in the negotiations held during the first week. In particular, CLAM wishes to offer a number of comments and observations regarding specific rules without prejudice to the positions shared by the groups of countries within CLAM as well as national positions. On Rule 3, BIS paragraph 4, CLAM supports inclusion of the expression on equitable basis concerning the modalities of virtual meetings to ensure interactive participation.

However, we consider that its implementation may pose challenges for some developing countries. Therefore, CLAM would like to reiterate its proposal to add after equitable basis the following text, bearing in mind the challenges that many developing countries face moving on to Rule 4. In Clam's view, in the previous version of the Rules of procedure, the opening paragraph 1 with the phrase am unless otherwise decided by the cop, already safeguarded the possibility for the COP to review the frequency of meetings. At the same time, it ensured the annual convening of the second and third Ordinary meetings, a period during which heavier workload is anticipated for the implementation of the Agreement. We consider it important to revert to the original wording in order to avoid a situation in which this issue is no longer reviewed in the future and meetings become fixed at an unnecessary annual frequency while preserving the cop's authority to determine annual meetings when deemed appropriate, then moving to Rule 5.

While we support the deletion of the expression for reasons of urgency, we believe that the reference for extraordinary meetings does not fully address our concerns. In particular, the use of the verb may implies that the shortening of the notification period will be decided on on a case by case basis. But the question that arises for us is what will be the criteria to shorten or not the notification period and who would have the authority to shorten such period. Thank you, Mr. Couture. Thank you.

Argentina, on behalf of CLAM. And I now give the floor to the European Union EU. The floor is yours.

Thank you very much, Mr. Kocher.

Let me just first thank the delegation of Norway and delegation of Singapore for their hard work on 3bis and 3ter. We can support both article as presented. We do note that on Rule 3 bis 5 we would have preferred to have a wording that enabled the subsidiary bodies to continue to exercise their mandate. But we do know this is a moment where we need to find consensus. So while we would prefer what we had proposed, if we can't get consensus on that, let's focus on other key issues.

On Rule 4, I would like to fully agree with what the delegate from Argentina in the name of CLAM has just mentioned. We believe that the text as it was struck a much better balance in the different interests in the room. There is clearly many delegations, including the EU and its 27 member states. The that consider that there should be a moment in which we should switch to COPS every two years. And this should be in the text as we've explained last time.

And also what the colleagues from Argentina just mentioned. The fact that it's unless otherwise decided by the cop provides a balance and there is always the possibility to call for extraordinary meetings. So we do think the text as it used to be, was a better reflection of what could be the landing ground for this PrepCom. And I would like to note the proposal from Japan which I've proposed as a landing ground instead of having the three first Audrey meeting, the first five Audrey meeting. I'll obviously have to reserve on that because I learned about it in the last few minutes, but we'll have to come back on that.

But maybe this is more the parameters we should be playing with instead of reverting to language which I think we were closer to consensus in the previous text. That's what I'm trying to say. Thank you.

You're not suggesting that it takes the European Union and its 27 member countries more than a few minutes to consult, surely. Pierre, I will now give the floor to Jamaica on behalf of caricom, I presume. Jamaica, the floor is yours.

Chair. Thank you. Co Chair. I have the honor to speak on behalf of the member states of the Caribbean Community. Co Chair.

Like other delegations. We wish to thank you and the Duala Secretariat for the hard work done over the weekend in providing us with with this revised Rules of Procedure of the Conference of the Parties, CARICOM aligns its position with the intervention of the delegation of Singapore on behalf of the alliance of Small Island States OASIS and offers the following additional comments with respect to Rule 3bis, we continue to support the streamlined version of this rule and concerning paragraph four, we are supportive of the inclusion of language that allows the participation of Parties in the virtual meetings of the COP on an equitable basis. Developing countries in particular face challenges such as adequate Internet access which must be considered in order to ensure their effective participation in such meetings. For paragraph seven, TARICOM has no objections to the inclusion of a paragraph on the adoption of guidance by the cop. Convening and modalities of virtual meetings with respect to Rule 4 dates of meeting CARICOM reiterates the AOS position, including the response to the proposed.