(Main Committee I) Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Conferences Date: 30 April 2026 Language: English Transcript: https://transcripts.un.org/en/asset/k1i/k1i8qrxx4i Transcripts available through this tool are created by using automatic speech recognition and are not official records nor official documents of the United Nations. Official records and official documents are available on the Official Document System of the United Nations. --- Ghana · Chair [0:02]: Your Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, this meeting is called to order. I declare open the first meeting of Main Committee I of the 2026 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, the general debate of this review conference has shown that, notwithstanding differences between NPT state parties on various issues, they recognize the value of the treaty in promoting international peace and security and the imperative of upholding the integrity of the treaty as the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation and disarmament regime. The treaty has played a vital role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices in our shared efforts towards a world free of nuclear weapons and through which states may avail themselves of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We are all aware of the current challenging international environment, but I believe we are also well aware of the importance of achieving a consensus outcome. This Main Committee provides all parties to the Treaty with an important opportunity to discuss how the Treaty's disarmament provisions are being implemented, and to reaffirm their overall commitment to the goals of the Treaty and to the consensus outcomes of previous Review Conferences. Let us now turn to the organization of work. According to the agenda, which was adopted at the first meeting of the Review Conference, and the decision on the allocation of items to the main committees of the Conference, this Committee will deal with the following items: Item 16, review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its Article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference the final document of the 2000 Review Conference, and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference. A. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament, and international peace and security. I. Articles 1 and 2 and Preambular Paragraphs 1 to 3. Article 6 and Preambular Paragraphs 8 to 12. 3. Articles 7, with specific reference to the main issues considered in this Committee. Security assurances. Security Council Resolutions 225 and 984. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Item 17, role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament in strengthening international peace and security, and measures aimed at strengthening the implementation of the Treaty and achieving its universality. Furthermore, at its first meeting, the Conference established Subsidiary Body 1 and the Main Committee 1 to consider the topic of the implementation of Article VI, nuclear disarmament and measures to avert the danger of nuclear war. Earlier this afternoon, 30th April 2026, the Secretariat circulated the draft programme of work for Main Committee I and Subsidiary Body I, contained in NPT/CONF.2026/MC.I/INF/1, including the allocation of meetings for Main Committee 1 and Subsidiary Body 1. In addition, a draft indicative timetable for the work of this Main Committee, bearing the symbol NPT/CONF.2026/MC.1/INF/2, was also circulated. As outlined in these documents, it is my intention to first commence the meetings of this main committee with a general exchange of views on the issues relevant to both main committee one and subsidiary body one. Consistent with the statement by the president of the conference, given the limited number of meetings, we will proceed with our work on main committee one and subsidiary body one on a rolling basis. Following the exhaustion of the list of speakers for the general exchange of views, it is my intention to proceed immediately to the meetings of subsidiary body 1. Delegations are kindly requested to prepare accordingly. I thank you very much for your cooperation. Let us now move to the general exchange of views. Please allow me first to briefly share some guidelines for the conduct of our deliberations under this agenda item. It is in our shared interest to have a productive exchange of views encompassing these important issues while allowing ample opportunity for the participation of all States Parties. First, Inscription on the list of speakers on e-delegate is required for the general exchange of views. The list of speakers will be closed at the end of this plenary session. In order to ensure that delegations can have advanced notice of the speaking order, QR codes for the list of speakers can be found around the room. Second, I wish to address the time limit for statements during the general exchange of views. As was advised by the president of the conference for the general exchange of views, there will be a timer shown on the screen indicating 1 minute. 1 minute remains for the statement. Followed by a street microphone cutoff. Once the time limit has been reached. Delegations will recall that the time limit for statements eight minutes for group statements, and five minutes for national statements. Delegations that wish to do so are invited to provide longer versions of their statements to be posted on the website of the Review Conference. Third, delegations are kindly asked to provide their statements in advance for the interpretation services. They may do so by sending an electronic copy of their statement to e-statements@un.org and should clearly include the meeting, i.e. NPT Review Conference Main Committee I, and the delegation name in the subject line. In addition, delegations are kindly requested to e-mail electronic versions of their statements to the Secretariat at mpt@un.org as early as possible for posting on the website of the review conference. Finally, delegations are requested to please inform the Secretariat as soon as possible if they wish to exercise their right of reply. Rights of reply will be heard at the end of the meeting. With that said, I now turn to the list of speakers we have for the general exchange of views. I currently have 77 speakers on my list. The first speaker I have on my list is the distinguished representative of Indonesia, who will take the floor on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. Your Excellency, you have the floor. Indonesia · NAM [10:10]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, I'm honored to speak on behalf of the group of member states of the non-LID movement state parties of the treaty. The full version of the statement will be submitted to the secretariat. Allow me to congratulate you on your assumption as chair and assure you of our full cooperation throughout the process. The Group reaffirms its principled positions on nuclear disarmament, which remains its highest priority pursuant to UNGA SSOD 1, and on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects. The Movement reiterates that the purpose of the Treaty is not only about preventing non-nuclear-weapon States from acquiring nuclear weapons, but it is also about disarming the nuclear-weapon States. The extended failure in delivering on nuclear disarmament obligations is resulting in compounded strain on the grand bargain on which the treaty was promised. We stress that any use of or threat of use of nuclear weapons is a breach of international law, including the UN Charter and international humanitarian law, and would represent a crime against humanity, and that even the mere possession of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the principles of international humanitarian law. The Group reiterates the importance of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice that the threat of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflicts, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law. In this conjunction, the Group stresses that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against their use or threat of use. The Group reaffirms the urgent need for conclusion of a universal, unconditional, irrevocable, non-discriminatory and legally binding instrument to assure all non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances as a matter of high priority. We express deep concern that, despite this long-standing request by NNWS to receive such legally binding assurances, no tangible progress has been achieved. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it also calls upon nuclear weapons states to commit to a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances, as an interim measure and not as a substitute to nuclear disarmament. In this regard, the Group stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT, especially by the NWS and their special responsibility pursuant to Action 10 of the 2010 Action Plan to encourage Annex 2 countries, in particular those which have not acceded to the NPT and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify it. Pending the CTBT's entry into force, we strongly call for the immediate and unconditional cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons research, development and modernization, as well as explicit reaffirmation of the moratorium on nuclear testing, until the entry into force of the treaty. The Group expresses its deep concern over recent public pronouncements and preparations suggesting the possible resumption of nuclear weapon testing, and condemns any move towards such a resumption. Any resumption of nuclear weapon testing would also undermine the object and purposes of the CTBT and the long-standing moratorium on nuclear testing. This would also run counter to the obligation of State Parties to the NPT under Article VI to pursue effective measures toward nuclear disarmament. The Group calls upon the nuclear weapons States to fulfill their multilateral legal obligations on nuclear disarmament and to implement the unequivocal undertaking they provided in 1995, 2000 and further reiterated in 2010 so as to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. We reiterate the urgent need for accountability of NWS for their disarmament obligations under the NPT through benchmarks, concrete, measurable and time-bound actions on nuclear disarmament with established deadlines, and reporting under Pillar 1 their implementation of these obligations under Article VI to the NPT Review Conference in a structured manner that allow NWS to engage constructively on their reports. The Group also calls for the full, effective and urgent implementation of the obligation of nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the Treaty. The Group expresses concern that all NWS, as well as some NNWS to the extent that the latter subscribe to extended nuclear security guarantees and nuclear weapons sharing arrangements provided by the NWS, have increased their reliance on nuclear weapons in their security and nuclear doctrines, policies and postures. In this context, the Group underscores that the policies of extended nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons sharing run counter to the letter, spirit and objectives of the Treaty and threaten its credibility and effectiveness. The Group calls on the NWS to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to all reductions, including through the placement of fissile material no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and implementation of Action 16 of the Action Plan adopted in 2010 NPT Review Conference, and to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, thus contributing to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations and facilitating the realisation of a world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date. The Group is gravely concerned with the expiry of the New START Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States, the last remaining component of strategic nuclear weapons arms control, without agreeing on a successor treaty. NMB State Parties reiterate their position that confidence-building and nuclear risk reduction measures are not substitutes to nuclear disarmament. NAM expresses its grave concerns regarding the expansion and modernization of nuclear forces, including the compounded and significant risk of integration of artificial intelligence by nuclear weapons states into command, control and communication systems of nuclear weapons, and underscores the necessity for ensuring full and effective human control over these weapons pending their total elimination. Mr. Chair, We take note of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 22 January 2021 and its subsequent meetings of States Parties. It is hoped that the Treaty, which contributes to the implementation of Article VI of the NPT, will further contribute to furthering the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. NAM said parties to the TPNW and signatories are fully committed to its implementation and are engaging constructively in preparation for the first review conference of the TPNW in 2026 towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. The Group emphasizes that the NPT is the cornerstone for achieving nuclear disarmament, halting proliferations, as well as promoting international cooperation and assistance in support of the inalienable rights of States Parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Therefore, the Group urges all countries to work together and to display their political will and commitment to achieve progress and to ensure that the Disarmament Machinery is able to unleash its potential to advance peace and security. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ghana · Chair [18:10]: I find we Distinguished representative of Indonesia, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of the European Union, on behalf of the European Union and its Member States, to take the floor. EU · EU [18:34]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The candidate countries Montenegro, Albania, Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EFTA country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Monaco and San Marino, align themselves with this statement. First of all, Mr. Chair, I would like to congratulate you on your role as Chair of Main Committee I. The EU reiterates its support for all three mutually reinforcing pillars of the NPT and for a comprehensive, balanced and full implementation of the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. We stress the urgent need to implement all obligations under the NPT and commitments made during the previous review conferences, including the need for concrete progress towards the full implementation of Article VI with the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons. The EU notes the severe consequences associated with nuclear weapons use and emphasizes that all states share the responsibility to prevent such an occurrence from happening. The EU reaffirms its unwavering commitment to advance nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, especially through the overall reduction of the global stockpile of nuclear weapons and taking into account the special responsibility of the nuclear weapons states that possess the largest nuclear arsenals. Recalling the obligations for all nuclear weapons states arising from Article VI of the NPT, the EU strongly encourages seeking further reductions to their nuclear arsenals, including strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons. The EU notes the expiry of the New START Treaty. The EU calls for urgent work towards a new agreement on legally binding framework limiting the largest nuclear arsenals and encourages the United States and Russia to maintain, in the meantime, the agreed limits on their nuclear arsenals. We urge Russia to engage meaningfully and call on China to contribute and engage actively and constructively. The EU condemns in the strongest possible way Russia's actions, its nuclear rhetoric and its threats to use nuclear force in its war of aggression against Ukraine. which are irresponsible, provocative, dangerous, and escalatory. The latest update of Russia's nuclear doctrine, aimed mostly at coercing and deterring further support to Ukraine, no longer includes compliance with international arms control obligations among the principles of Russia's deterrence policy. We are deeply concerned about Russia's announced deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of Belarus, and we call Belarus' commitment under the Budapest Memorandum to eliminate all nuclear weapons from its territory and call on both countries to reverse this decision. We categorically oppose the deployment of nuclear weapons and any other types of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, as well as their development for this purpose. Their deployment would constitute a severe and wide-reaching breach of international law. including the Outer Space Treaty. We also call on all states to refrain from the development of such weapons specifically designed for this purpose. The EU remains deeply concerned about China's rapid and opaque expansion of its nuclear arsenal, which is inconsistent with its disarmament commitments under the NPT. Its lack of transparency about its doctrine, policies, and expanding arsenal raises serious doubts about the credibility of its no first use policy and fuels mistrust. We encourage China, holder of the world's third largest nuclear arsenal and a nuclear weapons state under the NPT, to engage in risk reduction and arms control, including by enhancing transparency, establishing necessary communication lines to prevent misperceptions and clarifying its strategic objectives. The EU strongly encourages nuclear weapons states to pursue discussions on confidence building, transparency, risk reduction and verification, laying the ground for negotiation of robust future arms control agreements and reporting. While not a substitute for nuclear disarmament, concrete risk reduction contributions to the prevention of nuclear war can play a major role in creating trust, confidence and predictability, and complements disarmament and arms control efforts. As highlighted in a working paper submitted jointly with a number of NPT States Parties, the EU stresses the need to promote universal adherence to and the entry into force of the CTPP. Recent allegations about nuclear tests, statements of the resumption of nuclear testing, as well as Russia's unprecedented decision to revoke its ratification, make it all the more urgent to bring the CTBT into force. To this end, the EU calls on all States that have not yet done so, in particular those listed in Annex II, to sign and ratify the CTBT without any preconditions or delay. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, we call on all States to abide by the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any nuclear explosions and to refrain from conducting any contrary to its object and purpose. The EU calls for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, FMCT, and calls for the immediate launch of negotiations on FMCT on the basis of document CD1299. Preventing the entry into force of such an FCT, the EU calls on China, the only nuclear weapons state not to have done so, and any other states concerned to declare and uphold an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The EU underscores the value of multilateral cooperation in advancing nuclear disarmament verification to facilitate progress on nuclear disarmament. The EU reiterated support for the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification and other similar formats and are advocating constructive engagement on establishing a UN group of scientific and technical experts on nuclear disarmament verification. With regard to the development of new emerging technologies, and in particular artificial intelligence, the EU underlines the importance of maintaining human control over decisions to use nuclear weapons. The EU welcomes recent progress in this regard, including the commitment made by France, the United States, and the United Kingdom to maintain human control and involvement for all actions critical to informing and executing sovereign decisions concerning nuclear weapons employment, as well as bilateral commitment in this regard between the United States and China. The Council calls on Russia and other states possessing nuclear weapons to follow suit. The EU recognizes the legitimate interest of non-nuclear weapon states in receiving unequivocal security assurances from nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Negative security assurances are important components of binding and agreed security arrangements, strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, contributing to confidence building and nuclear disarmament, and enhancing regional and global security. Finally, The EU iterates its support for disarmament, non-proliferation education, to which the EU Nonproliferation and Disarmament Consortium is contributing through various activities, and for the participation of young people in nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Ghana · Chair [25:44]: I thank the distinguished representative of the European Union on behalf of the European Union and its member states for the statement and for the kind words addressed to the chair. The next speaker on my list is the distinguished representative of Egypt, on behalf of the Arab Group. You have the floor. Egypt · Arab Group [26:10]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. At the outset, the The Arab Group aligns itself to the statement, uh, delivered by the Non-Aligned Movement. I would like to express to you, Mr. Ambassador, our sincere congratulations on assuming the chairmanship of the First Committee. Mr. Chair. Our contemporary world has witnessed a deterioration of the security situation with more nuclear threats and erosion of disarmament and arms control. Therefore, there is a dire need to move towards a world free from nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament remains a priority for the Arab Group in implementation of legal obligations, pursuant to Article 6 and the commitments agreed by consensus in previous review conferences. It's time for nuclear weapons states to commit to a specific binding timetable for the complete elimination of their nuclear arsenals. They have to be linked to measurable, verifiable benchmarks. We stress that transparency and accountability needed are related to the need for nuclear weapons states to implement their obligations, and they should be up to par with obligations. of the non-nuclear weapons states under Article VI. We look forward to specific developments and progress in accountability and transparency, including a periodic report and detailed reports with clear formats and structures so that they can be discussed formally within the Review Conference, including in the first main committee. The Arab Group reaffirms that the confidence-building and risk reduction measures including reducing nuclear arsenals, are not a substitute for the obligations enshrined in the NPT. In this context, it should be recalled that the parties to this treaty were successful thanks to their political will, despite the Cold War environment. They succeeded by reaching a bargain, obliging nuclear weapon states to eliminate their nuclear arsenals in accordance with Article VI. We reiterate our deep concern regarding attempts by some nuclear weapons states to reinterpret their obligations under this article or link their implementation to preconditions, thereby emptying them of substance under the pretext of unfavorable security conditions or considerations of deterrence and strategic stabilities. We believe that there are certain doctrines now that encourage the use of nuclear weapons. Some are updating quantitatively and qualitatively of these arsenals, and this runs counter to the provisions of the Council. We have to ensure positive and negative security assurances to the parties to the NPT. We call that the review conferences would include the policies and reassurances that those weapons will not be used in line with the objectives of the treaty. In this vein, and until we ensure the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the Arab Group supports the establishment of legally binding international instruments that provide non-nuclear weapon states with unconditional, effective, non-discriminatory, and irreversible security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against these countries. We have to identify mechanisms to advance this objective, such as the immediate declaration of a commitment never to use these weapons first. In this regard, we call upon the US and Russia to reach a new treaty instead of the New START Treaty, which expired in February. Mr. Chair. The Arab group stresses the need to ensure a balance between all the pillars of the treaty and to address the deficiency that some countries have used against the objectives aspired by the treaty. We stress the horrific consequences of such nuclear weapons. We have to ensure the scientific gathering, the scientific evidence of the use of such weapons, the Arab Group underscores that any treaty on the production of fissile material must include the elimination of the current stockpile. We also stressed that nuclear weapons states must accelerate in subjecting such fissile material to the IAEA safeguards. And we have to start negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on setting a time-bound framework to ensure the complete, transparent, and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons, supported by an effective international verification Mr. Chair, the Arab Group welcomes the reference in the Pact for the Future to strengthening a world free of nuclear weapons and to call for a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We stress the importance to all such legal tools that support nuclear disarmament, including the CTBT. We also reiterate the need to implement the 10th action of the 2010 Review Conference on the special responsibility of nuclear weapons states to ratify this treaty and for other parties who are not yet party to the NPT which have nuclear facilities not subjected to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement to do so. In this vein, we express our deep concern due to the declarations and actions that hint to the recurrence of nuclear tests, which will be a real setback. Mr. Chair, in conclusion, the Arab Group emphasizes that achieving tangible progress in nuclear disarmament alongside universal adherence to the treaty is a vital and essential step to preserve its credibility at this critical juncture. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Ghana · Chair [32:47]: I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt. for the statement on behalf of the Arab group and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now invite the distinguished representative of Japan to take the floor on behalf of a group of states. Madam, you have the floor. Japan [33:15]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will read a slightly abbreviated version. On behalf of the following 114 NPT States Parties: Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Ghana, Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia. Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Micronesia, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, State of Palestine, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zambia, and my country, my own country, Japan, I'd like to deliver a joint statement on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation education. Mr. Chair, 80 years have passed since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Over the past eight decades, national governments, local municipalities, educational, academic, and research institutions, the private sector, media, and civil society have amassed a profound body of knowledge on the devastating and multifaceted impact and consequences resulting from the use of nuclear weapons in both short and long term. This understanding spans disciplines as diverse as medicine, public health, civil engineering, social sciences, environmental sciences, and cultural studies. The vast wealth of knowledge has made significant contributions to multilateral disarmament and nonproliferation diplomacy and education. Among the disarmament education efforts around the world, the invaluable testimonies of those who experienced and witnessed the devastation caused by nuclear explosions and its aftermath have played an indispensable role, including the distinguished work of Nihon Hidankyo, which was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, and of other longstanding advocacy endeavors of the hibakusha, those who have suffered the use of nuclear weapons, irrespective of their nationalities and origins. In this regard, disarmament and nonproliferation education, while multidisciplinary in nature, is always human-centered. However, with time, it is becoming more and more difficult to have the opportunity to hear firsthand accounts of those who experienced, witnessed, and were embroiled in such devastation, making each remaining testimony even more precious. We, the 114 countries, commend the visit to affected sites and engagement with them by political, senior, mid-career and young leaders, as well as youth delegations, and encourage all NPT States Parties to promote such initiative to ensure the stories and memories of those affected are preserved and passed on to future generations. Mr. Chair. The value of disarmament and non-proliferation education itself has long been recognized by the vast majority of the international community. In the final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, education was underscored as a useful and effective means to advance the goals of the treaty in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons. Moreover, Action 22 of the 2010 NPT Action Plan encouraged all NPT States Parties to implement the 34 recommendations contained in the 2002 report of the Secretary-General. The same point is repeatedly reaffirmed in the biennial UNGA resolutions on the UN study led by Mexico and in other relevant resolutions co-sponsored by a large number of delegations each year. We call on all NPT States Parties to renew their commitment to implement these recommendations. Mr. Chair, educating, empowering, and equipping each and every individual with critical thinking and other essential skills are crucial in navigating the complexities of the contemporary atomic age. This should aim at fostering a new generation of experts, both inside and outside governments. At the same time, the international community must remain mindful of the rapidly changing technology landscape, as those risks, challenges, and opportunities become more diverse, complex, and interconnected, reflecting the realities of current international situation, disarmament and non-proliferation education must continuously evolve. In doing so, it is particularly essential to promote scientific understanding and education. In addition, advances in ICT, including AI, have transformed the way people access, possess, and accumulate information. This is particularly relevant for younger generations. Education providers must adapt accordingly and ensure that their programs remain relevant in such a dynamic environment. To this end, we emphasize the necessity of expanding engagement with new actors, particularly from the private sector, while fostering greater cooperation and collaboration among a diverse range of stakeholders. We underscore the importance of engaging with and investing in youth. Such an approach will create synergies and maximize the impact of educational initiatives. Mr. Chair. Recognizing the significance of young people as the inheritors, protectors, and the shapers of the disarmament and nonproliferation architecture, we believe in the power of education to ensure that they have a voice and decision-making role towards achieving these goals and ensuring a peaceful world from today. The 2026 NPT review cycle presents an invaluable opportunity for the international community to reaffirm the essential contribution of education on disarmament and non-proliferation to the objectives of this treaty, as well as to sustaining peace. We therefore call on all NPT States Parties nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike, to actively promote disarmament and non-proliferation education, share progress, and exchange expertise within the review process. By strengthening our collective commitment in this regard, the international community can build upon existing efforts and advance towards a world without nuclear weapons and sustain it. I thank you, Mr. Chair. The full text will be uploaded online. Thank you. Ghana · Chair [40:56]: I thank the distinguished representative of Japan on behalf of a group of states for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of New Zealand on behalf of New Zealand, Ireland and Switzerland to deliver their statement. Excellency, you have the floor. New Zealand [41:19]: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I have the honour to speak on behalf of Ireland, Switzerland, and my own country, New Zealand, to introduce our joint working paper, working paper number seven, on enhancing transparency and accountability under the treaty in the form of a draft outcome on this matter for adoption by the conference. More than five decades after the treaty's entry into force, article six and its successive related commitments agreed in 1995, 2000, and 2010 remain largely unfulfilled. The gap between commitments and implementation, particularly under the disarmament pillar, is having a detrimental effect on the confidence of States Parties in the balance of the Treaty's implementation and the integrity of the grand bargain. Rebuilding that confidence must be a central task for this Review Conference. Our proposal on transparency and accountability is intended as a practical starting point in that effort. At present, there is no structured or shared way for States Parties to collectively assess progress on disarmament obligations and commitments. National reports are submitted by nuclear weapons States, statements are delivered, side events are held, but there is no mechanism through which that information is systematically examined, compared or discussed. This weakens the ability of the review process to perform one of its core functions: provide accountability for implementation. Transparency and accountability are issues that are integral to the effective functioning of the treaty. They are certainly not substitutes for disarmament, but without them, it is difficult to demonstrate progress, to sustain confidence, or to have a meaningful discussion on how to move forward. This is the gap our proposal seeks to address. It does so in a targeted and pragmatic way. First, through enhanced national reporting by nuclear weapons states, with a clearer and more consistent focus on Article VI and related commitments. And second, by establishing a regular practice of in-person, interactive dialogue on those reports, formally integrated within the review cycle. We are proposing to introduce, for the first time, a structured forum for substantive engagement on the implementation of disarmament obligations and commitments. Importantly, this builds on existing practice. We are not attempting to reinvent the wheel. Nuclear weapons states already submit national reports. What is missing is a mechanism to consider them in a meaningful and systematic way. The proposal therefore improves the utility, comparability and accessibility of reporting, rather than introducing new or burdensome obligations. It draws on agreed outcomes, including the 2010 Action Plan, while preserving flexibility and noting national security considerations. Within the review process, a structured dialogue mechanism could be accommodated under Main Committee I, given its clear relevance to transparency and accountability in relation to Article 6. Alternatively, it could be established as a cross-cutting process without a direct link to any main committee or treaty pillar. We see merit in both approaches and remain flexible as to the most effective way forward. Likewise, we remain flexible on the form of establishing such a mechanism, whether part of a comprehensive outcome of the conference or as part of a standalone decision. Mr. Chair, we are operating in an environment of increasing strategic competition, conflict, ongoing modernisation of nuclear arsenals, and concerning rhetoric relating to the use of nuclear weapons. All these factors strengthen the argument that greater transparency is needed now more than ever, to take steps towards rebuilding trust and confidence in each other and in the regime that has been steadily built over the past half century. There is an expectation from the vast majority of state parties that this review conference should deliver a practical and meaningful forward-looking outcome. Transparency and accountability is one area where consensus is achievable. Our consultations over this review cycle have demonstrated broad cross-regional support for improving the quality and horizontal and vertical comparability of reporting by nuclear weapon states. and for introducing more structured engagement with that reporting. We also wish to be clear about the nature of what is being proposed. This is a modest and balanced step. It does not impose new legal obligations. It does not require the disclosure of information that states are not prepared to provide. And it does not prejudge wider debates or measures on disarmament. For nuclear weapons states, it represents a limited and manageable commitment, participation in a structured dialogue with all states parties once per review cycle, building on and enhancing the national reports they already submit and contributing to the further strengthening of their common reporting framework. At the same time, it offers a clear strategic benefit for all. Strength and transparency can reduce misperceptions. support more informed engagement, and demonstrate continued implementation of disarmament commitments. Our proposal would also accommodate voluntary reporting by non-nuclear weapons states. More fundamentally, it helps build confidence among States Parties and sustains confidence in the NPT itself, something that is in the collective interest of all of its States Parties. Mr. Chair, we believe this proposal represents a practical step that States Parties can take now to strengthen the Treaty. Agreement on transparency and accountability would provide a much needed demonstration that this review conference can respond to evident gaps in implementation and deliver a concrete outcome in support of the Treaty. Conversely, The absence of any progress in this area would risk reinforcing perceptions that the MPT review process is no longer able to deliver, even on an area where there is overwhelming support to do so. For these reasons, we consider it important that enhanced transparency and accountability measures are reflected in the outcome of this review conference. We encourage you to give this issue due consideration in the preparation of your draft outcome text. and to support focused engagement among delegations with a view to achieving consensus. Over the course of this review cycle, we have consulted extensively with states parties. The proposal we have presented today reflects that engagement. It is not a narrow national or joint position, but what we assess to be a balanced and credible landing zone, informed by feedback from across groups and regions. We remain ready to engage constructively with all States Parties to finalize language that can command broad support and bolster our treaty moving forward. Thank you very much. Ghana · Chair [48:59]: I thank the distinguished representative of New Zealand on behalf of New Zealand, Ireland and Switzerland for their statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Ireland on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition to deliver their statement. You have the floor. Ireland · New Agenda Coalition [49:18]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I take the floor on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition: Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and my own country, Ireland. Mr. Chair, this review conference will have important consequences for the strength of our treaty and the indispensable role it plays in underpinning the nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime. The last two review cycles have failed to agree any steps forward, while nuclear weapon states have failed to advance disarmament in line with their Article VI obligations and related commitments. The central role the treaty has played in preventing nuclear proliferation and strengthening international peace and security is undeniable. However, there is a clear deficit in treaty implementation in respect of pillar one, nuclear disarmament. As the NAC stated at the 2022 review conference, the balance provided by the grand bargain must be restored for the good of the Treaty and to make progress at achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. The delivery of concrete and identifiable disarmament measures by the nuclear-weapon States is essential. For a start, they must recommit to achieving progress towards a full implementation of Article VI in line with their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenal. the 13 practical steps and the 2010 action plan. Such a message would send a positive signal of nuclear weapon states' ongoing commitment to the treaty. Chair, we are witnessing escalating nuclear risks and threats of nuclear weapons endangering international peace and security. Nuclear weapons and the threat of their use are being incorrectly presented to the international community as an acceptable response to conditions of growing insecurity, whereas in fact They serve rather as a catalyst for that very same insecurity. Such actions and threats must never be normalized. The nuclear weapons states hold a particular and special responsibility in line with Article VI and other associated undertakings. They must redouble their efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament through unilateral, bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral arms control and reduction measures without further delay. Chair, the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons are real, severe and ever-present. No State or organization would have the capacity to respond adequately to the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and their cascading transboundary impacts. The continued possession of nuclear weapons involves an ever-present risk, one which will persist as long as nuclear weapons continue to exist. Mr. Chair, our working paper presented to this review conference sets out concrete measures and recommendations towards the full implementation of obligations under the NPT, particularly those related to disarmament. In summary, the conference should reaffirm the validity of existing decisions and commitments made at previous review conferences in 1995, 2000 and 2010 without qualification. The Conference should affirm that clear, detailed plans on reducing nuclear arsenals, leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, are urgently required. The Conference should condemn all threats of use of nuclear weapons, whether implicit or explicit, irrespective of circumstance, as unacceptable, illegitimate and dangerous. The Conference should reiterate the need for interim confidence-building steps to reduce current levels of nuclear risk, including removing operational nuclear weapons from high alert status and removing non-strategic nuclear weapons from deployed sites. The conference should call on all nuclear weapon states to reduce their nuclear arsenals, encompassing both strategic and non-strategic weapons within the framework of robust, legally binding, transparent, and verifiable arms control agreements. The conference should also call upon the nuclear weapon states to put in place additional legal and procedural safeguards aimed at reducing the risk of a nuclear detonation. Pending the adoption of a new comprehensive agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States, the Conference should also call for previous limits on stockpiles under New START to be respected by both sides. The Conference should urge the agreement of new and expanding arms control and reduction frameworks. Such agreements should ensure concrete, time-bound progress towards the elimination of nuclear weapons in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner and address worrying trends in the rapid and opaque expansion of arsenals. The conference should reaffirm the clear humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons in line with the 2010 Review Conference outcome and the science underpinning it without qualification. The conference should strongly oppose any reversal or weakening of the norm against testing as dangerous and as unacceptable. The Conference should agree clear measures to advance transparency and accountability, along the principles of verifiability and irreversibility, to ensure comparability and measurability in the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments. It should agree provisions for enhanced national reporting by nuclear weapons States and associated formal, structured and recurring interactive dialogue within the Treaty review cycle. Reporting should be sufficiently detailed so as to allow for vertical and horizontal comparability across nuclear weapon states and enable objective assessment of implementation. Such assessment could be aided by agreed baselines and mutually understood criteria or benchmarks, such as targets, indicators and deadlines to measure progress, or lack thereof, on the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments. The Conference should reiterate the need for States Parties to continue addressing irreversibility and verification measures. The Conference should call on nuclear weapons States that have integrated artificial intelligence into the command, control and communication systems of nuclear weapons to ensure human control and oversight over these systems. The Conference should reaffirm the need for urgent action on the necessary full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Mr. Chair, in conclusion, familiar arguments that progress in disarmament will follow only when security conditions improve are unconvincing and are at odds not only with history, but with the legal obligations and commitments underpinning the treaty. Our treaty has established a key of commitments that remain valid to advance a world free of nuclear weapons. We can no longer wait for their faithful, full implementation. The status quo is not viable. We need action now. Thank you. Ghana · Chair [56:17]: I thank the distinguished representative of Ireland on behalf of the New Agenda coalition for their statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Egypt to deliver a statement. Egypt [56:37]: I thank you once again, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, Egypt extends its sincere congratulations to His Excellency Ambassador Samuel Yeokoma Permanent Representative of Ghana, on his election as Chairman of Main Committee I, we align ourselves with the statements of the New Agenda Coalition, the African Group, and the Arab Group. Mr. Chair, the achievement of nuclear disarmament remains the overarching objective of the NPT as the first priority towards the maintenance of international peace and security and ending the greatest threat to humanity. Hence, The total, verifiable and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons remains a legal, moral and humanitarian obligation. With more than half a century since the entry into force of the Treaty, Efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament continue to stall and falter in the absence of the necessary political will on the side of nuclear weapon states. We regret that the current developments point to the opposite direction based on the continued development of nuclear arsenals in quantity and quality and strengthening the role in military doctrines. We stress that the total elimination of nuclear weapons in a verifiable, irreversible manner is the only means to guarantee that they are not used and there's no threat of their use. And it is no secret that the continued existence of nuclear weapons in the current international context is a threat. And this is due to miscalculation, the deliberate use or in deliberate use. Hence, we express our concern that the decline in international nuclear disarmament environment and the failure of the nuclear powers to make any tangible progress in the implementation of their nuclear disarmament obligations and the expiration of the New START Treaty without a successor treaty or even a mutual commitment to keep its content in force was a matter of great concern. Here, Egypt stresses that we should not link development with any conditionality. This is not negotiable, and The disarmament pillar suffers from stagnation, which undermines the NPT, and this leads to lack of trust between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states. Egypt is following with concern the proposals that seek to circumvent the main objective of the nuclear disarmament. We refer to the no first use and working to conclude binding legal instruments. However, these are not an alternative to nuclear disarmament. Use of AI should not be included in any activity that pertains to nuclear weapons. Hence, we refer to the importance of the effective and full human control over these weapons and their systems until the full elimination, Mr. Chair. Egypt's position calling for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is a principled, non-discriminatory position that is not subject to politicized criteria. Therefore, we stress that the total elimination of such weapons is the only guarantee against their use. Accordingly, relying on the concepts of nuclear deterrence and strategic stability and adhering to the policies of extended nuclear deterrence and the arrangements cannot provide real guarantees. Egypt is concerned at the worrying signs of the repercussions that would bring the world back to an arms race. Each stresses the need to have a moratorium on all nuclear testing, and we stress that any testing of nuclear weapons would have catastrophic humanitarian consequences. We need to agree on a number of practical steps, including beginning a negotiation on binding instruments to provide negative security assurances and a timeline for the elimination of nuclear weapons based on a strategic approach. Also, there should not be any precautions and obstacles here. Egypt stresses that we need to use the experience of the IAEA in the framework of applying the principles of verification and irreversibility in disarmament by placing fissile material resulting from the desired dismantling of nuclear weapons under the IAEA safeguards system. Mr. President, the full version of the statement will be uploaded to the website of the conference, I think. Ghana · Chair [1:01:35]: I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt for the statement and for the kind words addressed to the chair. And I invite the distinguished representative of Kuwait to deliver his statement. Kuwait, you have the floor. Kuwait [1:01:51]: In the name of Allah, most gracious, most merciful. Mr. Chair, the state of Kuwait aligns itself with the statement made by the Arab Group and the statement of the Non-Aligned Movement. We affirm in this context that nuclear disarmament remains the cornerstone of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and that the credibility of the non-proliferation regime is closely linked to the implementation of the commitments relating to the total elimination of these weapons. Mr. Chair. The State of Kuwait expresses its deep concern at the deterioration of the international situation in the security environment and escalation of rhetoric related to the use of nuclear weapons and the continued development of nuclear arsenals in terms of quantity and quality, which is contrary to the letter, spirit, and purpose of the treaty. In this context, Kuwait stresses the need for full and effective implementation of Article VI. We reject any attempt to reinterpret or link it to preconditions. We stress that the obligations contained therein constitute an unconditional legal obligation that must be fulfilled without delay. The State of Kuwait also stresses the importance of adopting a practical and time-bound approach leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons within clear, measurable and internationally verifiable stages. This would enhance transparency and accountability and restores balance to the treaty system. In this context, my country calls on nuclear weapons states to provide accurate and transparent data on their nuclear arsenals and their plans for their disarmament, and to intensify their efforts in the area of irreversible reduction of such arsenals. Mr. Chair, the State of Kuwait believes that the continued reliance on nuclear deterrence, the expansion of scenarios for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and the development of new generations of nuclear weapons undermine international efforts to achieve disarmament and weakens confidence in the international system. In this sense, Kuwait stresses the importance of taking immediate measures to reduce nuclear risks, including reducing the readiness of nuclear weapons, promoting confidence-building measures, and working to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines. Kuwait also renews its support for the creation of legally binding instruments that provide effective, unconditional, and non-discriminatory negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states. And we call for the adherence to the principle of no first use of nuclear weapons as an essential step towards confidence building and strengthening collective security. Mr. President. The State of Kuwait stresses the importance of advancing negotiations aimed at banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons in a comprehensive and non-discriminatory manner, including existing stockpiles, and in a manner that contributes to the achievement of the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation simultaneously. We also stress the need to place fissile material not used for weapons purposes under IAEA safeguards without delay. In the same context, the State of Kuwait underlines the crucial importance of the CTBT. We call for its early entry into force, as this plays a pivotal role in preventing the development of nuclear weapons and promoting disarmament efforts. Mr. Chair, the State of Kuwait reaffirms the special importance of the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. This is an essential element in achieving regional and international security and stability. We call upon all States concerned to engage seriously in efforts aimed at achieving this goal without delay. In closing, the State of Kuwait affirms that the success of the current Review Conference requires tangible progress in the field of nuclear disarmament and addressing the shortcomings in the implementation of previous commitments, including those contained in the 1995 resolutions and the steps of the year 2000 and 2010. Speaker 17 [1:06:52]: The microphone has been cut Ghana · Chair [1:06:58]: I thank the distinguished representative of Kuwait for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Mexico to deliver their statement. Mexico [1:07:13]: Mr. Chairman, nuclear weapons are not providing security, the NPT, is based on the fact that the majority does not have nuclear weapons. The persistence of the justification of nuclear weapons and the doctrine of deterrence simply leads to an increase in military expenditure and proliferation. That's why we reject the conditions attached to obligations with regard to nuclear disarmament, whilst nuclear arsenals are expanded in both terms of quality and quantity, and we're seeing an increased use of nuclear weapons, and the nuclear taboo is not being adhered to, and threats are being made with regard to the use of nuclear weapons, and other norms are being doubted, such as the prohibition of nuclear testing. In this context, We need to condemn, as many times as required, any threat of the use of nuclear weapons, explicit or implicit, by any actor under any circumstances. The use of these weapons is contrary to international humanitarian law and constitutes a war crime. The consequences of any nuclear detonation, whether intentional or accidental, would be disastrous, cross borders, and disproportionately affect women and girls, and would be beyond control. No international organization would have the capacity to respond adequately to such a disaster. Mexico has consistently emphasized that the full implementation of Article VI is a priority obligation and, unfortunately, is still an outstanding task for the NPT. The lack of progress in its implementation continually undermines confidence in the grand bargain and generates increasing tensions within an already asymmetric regime. This is the first NPT review conference taking place in the absence of arms control agreements among the major nuclear weapons states. We regret the expiry of the New START Treaty, which leaves its signatories without numerical limits on their arsenals for the first time since the 1970s. We urge its parties to respect previously agreed limits and to resume negotiations for a successor agreement with deeper reductions. in line with commitments undertaken under the NPT. We also call on all nuclear weapons States to participate in efforts in this regard. Chairman, Mexico identifies the following priorities for the Committee's consideration: to reiterate the unequivocal commitment of nuclear weapons States to eliminate their arsenals; to reaffirm previous commitments and agreements which constitute the baseline for our obligations; to renew the collective conviction for the entry into force of the CTBT and to strengthen the norm against nuclear testing; to advance verification, transparency and accountability measures; to respect the prohibition of placing nuclear weapons in outer space; and to highlight the importance of disarmament education. We must also recall the contributions of civil society and international organizations in renewing interest in nuclear disarmament. Their voices, including those of the hibakusha and communities affected by nuclear testing, are an indispensable component of our collective work. The Conference should also take note of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons fully compatible with the NPT, which offers a concrete pathway toward fulfilling the obligations of Parties to both treaties. Furthermore, Mexico considers it is important to discuss the risks associated with artificial intelligence in nuclear command, control and communications systems. These developments increase the risk of accidental, unintended or unauthorized use, and therefore human oversight and control must be ensured at all times, as provided for in the resolution presented by Mexico and adopted by the 80th UN General Assembly. Chair, the success of this conference will not be measured by the mere reiteration of previous commitments, but by the collective capacity to advance towards their full implementation with concrete goals, indicators, and timelines. and to deliver results that are commensurate with the historic moment that we are going through. We stand ready to work towards this end. Thank you very much. Ghana · Chair [1:11:59]: I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Finland to deliver their statement. Excellency, you have the floor. Finland [1:12:20]: Mr. Chair, let me congratulate you on your election as the chair of this Main Committee. You have Finland's full support in your important task. Finland aligns itself with the EU statement. I would like to add a few points in our national capacity. Article VI is a central pillar of the NPT. It reflects the shared understanding that nuclear disarmament is essential for international peace and security. For Finland, the NPT remains the primary treaty for advancing nuclear disarmament. Even when we encounter security challenges, the NPT provides the framework to reduce strategic risks and to enhance strategic stability. One of the main reasons for the deteriorating international security environment is Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. We condemn Russia's actions and its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric that undermine efforts for nuclear disarmament. Mr. Chair, Finland is concerned about the rapid expansion of China's nuclear arsenal and the lack of transparency surrounding its capabilities and intentions. Transparency is a basic requirement for building trust and for reducing risks. All nuclear weapon states should engage in dialogue, provide clarity about their doctrines, and contribute to global arms control efforts. The expiration of the New START Treaty is another serious concern. Without this treaty, there are no existing limits on the world's two largest nuclear arsenals. Finland urges the parties to return to dialogue and to preserve this important element of strategic stability. We also welcome the United States' proposal for multilateral strategic stability talks. More broadly, Finland calls on all nuclear weapons states to fulfill their disarmament commitments under the NPT. This includes refraining from increasing the number of nuclear weapons, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines, reducing the overall stockpile of nuclear weapons, and addressing the risks posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons. We encourage all State Parties to work constructively to advance disarmament objectives agreed by all State Parties, including 13 steps and the action plan, and to demonstrate concrete progress. Risk reduction is an essential part of this effort. Finland is an active participant in international work on nuclear risk reduction. We support practical measures ranging from crisis communication channels, notification mechanisms, doctrinal transparency dialogues, negative security assurances, to formal arms control agreements that help prevent the risks for nuclear conflict. While risk reduction cannot replace disarmament, it plays an important role in maintaining stability and creating conditions for further progress. Finland is also contributing to the work of Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament, which has proposed three working papers during this review cycle. The working papers have concrete proposals related to negative security assurances, emerging technologies, and strengthening the implementation of the NPT. Additionally, Finland supports developing reliable and sound multilateral nuclear disarmament verification capabilities, such as the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. For us, the promotion of the entry into force and full implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is of the utmost importance. We are actively working towards this goal as a member in the Group of Friends of the CTBTO. Pending the entry into force of the treaty, maintaining moratorium on nuclear testing remains crucial. Mr. Chair, in nuclear disarmament, we underline the importance of creating security environment in an effective and verifiable way that promotes international stability and enhances security for all. Finland remains determined to support the treaty and to work towards a safer world free from nuclear weapons. Thank you. Ghana · Chair [1:16:39]: I thank the distinguished representative of Finland for the statement. And I invite the distinguished representative of Oman to take the floor. Oman [1:17:03]: Chair, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, we align ourselves with the statements delivered by the Arab Group and NAM. These statements reflect the utmost priority that must be accorded to nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament is the core of NPT obligations. The full and effective implementation of Article VI is a key condition to preserve the NPT's credibility and sustainability. In this context, we express our concern over the ongoing disarmament stalemate in the absence of practical and tangible measures for the reduction of nuclear weapons or for the diminishing of their role in nuclear and security policies and military doctrine. Ongoing modernization and development programs undermine international efforts for a world free of nuclear weapons. We reiterate that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee against their use or threat of use. Partial measures cannot serve as a substitute for the total, verifiable and irreversible elimination of these weapons. In this context, we call on nuclear weapon States to honour their legal obligations to take practical, transparent, and verifiable arsenal reduction measures pending their total elimination according to a clear and specific timetable. The Sultanate of Oman underscores the importance of the principles of transparency and verifiability in all disarmament measures. Periodic and comprehensive reports on nuclear arsenals and relevant policies must be submitted, thus ensuring progress. The TPNW is the first international non-discriminatory instrument. This adoption responded to the international community's concern over failure to uphold disarmament obligations in accordance with the NPT, particularly Article VI thereof, thus strengthening international efforts for the total elimination of these weapons. We underscore the importance of moratoria on nuclear testing. Favorable conditions must be created for the entry into force of the CTBT. This is essential for disarmament and the prevention of an arms race. It's important also to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines. Policies must be adopted to reduce risks, including refraining from the threatening to use these weapons under any circumstances. Restoring momentum for nuclear disarmament requires genuine political will and a multilateral approach grounded in cooperation and respect of international law. This will lead to tangible results that promote international peace and security. In conclusion, we remain committed to supporting all international efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons in accordance with the NPT and its objectives. Thank you. Ghana · Chair [1:20:46]: I thank the distinguished representative of Oman for their statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Nigeria on behalf of the African Union to deliver their statement. Nigeria · Africa Group [1:21:02]: Thank you, Mr. President. At the outset, let me congratulate you on your election and assure you of fullest support of African member states. The group aligns its statement with non-aligned movement and wishes to deliver the statement in the following. The total elimination of nuclear weapon remain the only absolute guarantee against the use of threat of use. In this context, the group reiterates the urgent need for our planet to be free of nuclear weapon as their presence is associated with catastrophic, humanitarian, and environmental consequences and constitutes a threat to global peace and future survival of humanity. The group take note that a moment of heightened concern for integrity of global nuclear proliferation and disarmament regime and underscore the responsibility of this conference to deliver concrete, balanced, and measurable outcome across all the three pillar of the treaty. The African Group notes with concern the challenging environment acknowledged by the President in his opening remarks. I hope that this conference will serve as an opportunity to strengthen the NPT by implementing its three pillars in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner and to address the persistent deficits in implementation of the treaty's nuclear disarmament pillar. The Group remains committed to promoting the overall objective of the Treaty and calls on all nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their legal obligations and political commitments and their irrevocable undertaking under Article VI of the NPT by pursuing the total elimination of nuclear weapons without further delay or preconditions such as the fallible and obsolete concept of deterrence and strategic stability. Africans support the principle of complete, verifiable, and irreversible nuclear disarmament as the uttermost prerequisite for maintaining international peace and security. It is in this spirit that the African group reaffirm its unwavering support for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon, which enter into force on 22nd January, 2021, and continue to attract growing adherence from the international community. The African Group stresses that the TPNW does not in any way undermine the NPT, but rather complement and strengthen the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, with the NPT as its cornerstone. The Group urges all states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the TPNW, and call upon all member states of the international community, in particular nuclear weapons states, to engage constructively with this instrument as an expression of the global imperative to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. The group call upon nuclear weapons states to take urgent measures to reduce and eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security doctrine, concept and policies. The African Group continues to be deeply concerned with nuclear sharing and extended nuclear and forward deterrence arrangements and calls for their total termination due to their incompatibility with the letter and spirit of the NPT. The Group supports enhanced transparency and accountability by nuclear weapons states on the implementation of the obligations under Article VI and their respective commitments agreed at the 1995, 2000, 2010 review conferences through the submission of systematic, standardized, and detailed reports subject to interactive discussion under Main Committee I of this conference. The Group of Quadra called for the outcome of this conference to establish a robust and time-bound framework for accountability on nuclear disarmament commitments. Defending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the African Group continues to stress that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones constitutes an important measure towards achieving nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. Thus, the group wishes to restate the proud position of the Africa as a nuclear weapon free zone through the entry into force of the Treaty of Pelendaba on 15th July 2009. The group sees this opportunity to call on all member states to support effort to replicate this measure in the remaining part of the world, especially in the Middle East. The group unequivocally support the call for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and continue to express deep concern at the protracted failure to fulfill long-standing commitment and obligation arising from the 1995 resolution on the Middle East regarding the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapon and all other weapons of mass destruction in the region, and which constitute an integral part of the basis which enabled the indefinite extension of the treaty. The group reaffirmed its support for the implementation of the 1995 resolution and for its validity on its objective are achieved. In this context, the group reaffirmed its full support for the United Nations Conference process established pursuant to the United Nations General Assembly decision 73/546 and call upon all states and relevant parties to participate, engage constructively, sustain the momentum achieved, and demonstrate the political will necessary to advance this vital Mr. Chair, the Group highlighted the importance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, especially in view of pronouncements to resume testing of nuclear weapons. The Group restated that such testing would be contrary not only to the CTBT but also to the NPT. The group therefore call upon nuclear weapons states and those states that are yet to accede to the NPT to undertake their special responsibility toward the entry into force of the treaty portion to Action 10 of 2010 Action Plan. The group strongly support reaffirmation by new nuclear weapons states, by nuclear weapons states to continue to adhere to moratorium on nuclear testing until the entry into force of the CTBT and its universality. The African group wishes to emphasize humanitarian consideration in the context of all deliberation on nuclear weapon and call on all states, particularly nuclear weapon states, to take into consideration the catastrophic humanitarian consequence of the use of this weapon on human survival and health and the environment and vital economic resources among other, and to take measures aimed at renouncing this weapon in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. pending the total elimination of this weapon. Finally, Mr. Chair, it is essential that all non-nuclear weapons states should be provided with universal, effective, and unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable, and legally binding assurance by all nuclear weapons states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstance, and that nuclear weapons states ratify the additional protocol to the Treaty establishing a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone and withdraw their reservation and interpretative declaration thereto. The Group, therefore, recalls and underscores the importance of General Assembly resolution 80/49. The Group restates its position that confidence-building and nuclear risk reduction measures are not a substitute for nuclear disarmament. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Ghana · Chair [1:28:44]: I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria for the statement delivered on behalf of the Africa Group. I now invite the distinguished representative of Germany to deliver the statement. You have the floor, sir. Germany [1:29:01]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Germany congratulates you on your chairmanship of Main Committee I of the 11th NPT Review Conference. We assure you of our full support. Germany fully aligns itself with the statement made by the European Union. Mr. Chair, despite many crises and changing geopolitical context since the inception of the NPT, the NPT has proven to be a very successful treaty which contributes largely to international stability and security. We need to protect and treasure it. The challenges today are manifold: military conflict in the Middle East, at the origin of which lie the high international concerns about Iran's non-compliance with its nuclear safeguards obligations and covered nuclear activities; Russia's resort to coercive nuclear rhetoric in its reckless war of aggression against Ukraine; the DPRK proliferation crisis has aggravated even further. Alongside, many countries question the rationale and intent behind China's buildup of its nuclear arsenal. Whilst all these developments are certainly not conducive to our ambition to achieve a world without nuclear weapons, we must do everything we can to advance the purpose of the NPT across all its three pillars. Because we know, the NPT remains the only viable way for achieving a world without nuclear weapons. With regard to this first pillar, nuclear disarmament, I would like to make three points. Firstly, we need to clearly recommit to the NPT and reaffirm its existing obligations. Facing Russia as a very real threat in Europe, Germany has to focus on strengthening its deterrence defence with NATO and the EU. Our commitment to the NPT remains ironclad. We will continue to work towards our shared goal of a safer world without nuclear weapons. There is an imminent need to preserve the nuclear test stop norm and strengthen the CTBTO. Expressed concerns that the zero-yield standard may not have been adhered to should be clarified and the test moratorium reconfirmed and adhered to by all nuclear weapons states. Transparency and accountability remain key elements of implementing the NPT. Germany is resolved to do this, including as a co-chair of the Stockholm Initiative in Nuclear Disarmament. Secondly, we need to adapt to the new realities of an evolving global security context. On strategic arms control, we support the U.S. approach to reach out to Russia and China, aimed at readjusting strategic stability to a changed reality with three states with large nuclear arsenals. In this evolving reality, Germany puts a strong focus on nuclear risk reduction, not as a substitute for nuclear disarmament, but a necessity to help prevent the worst and to de-escalate in unintended crisis scenarios. This is why, with many partners in the Group on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Conflict, we put forward concrete proposals to strengthen risk reduction, to avoid inadvertent nuclear escalation, let alone nuclear war. Thirdly, we have to prepare for the technologies of tomorrow. We need to address new emerging technologies, including AI and quantum. While they undoubtedly pose risks, they also offer opportunities for adapting, modernizing, and perhaps even revolutionizing arms control, monitoring, and verification. We currently do not know what future nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements will look like, but we will surely need to explore what options there are on the horizon for strong and effective verification. Germany invests exactly in this field. We are bringing political and physical scientists together for joint research projects and encourage young people to pursue this path. We initiated last year a project called EXPAN, the Expert Panel on Nuclear Disarmament Verification, where we particularly look at nuclear verification. Mr. Chair, to conclude, there are challenges ahead of us. In the interest of preserving our treaty, let us look together at where the opportunities are and how they can be amplified on our joint path forward. We owe it to the NPT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ghana · Chair [1:33:55]: I thank the distinguished representative of Germany for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Saudi Arabia to deliver their statement. Saudi Arabia [1:34:11]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. At the outset, please allow me to congratulate you on presiding over this committee. We are confident that under your guidance, the committee will achieve outcomes the States Parties look forward to. We align ourselves with the statements delivered by the Arab Group and the NAM. Mr. Chair, we underscore the paramount importance of the NPT, and its nuclear disarmament objective, thus strengthening the three pillars of the NPT in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner and while maintaining international peace and security. The NPT is not only intended to prevent non-nuclear weapon states from acquiring nuclear weapons, but also aims to advance the disarmament of nuclear weapon states for the ultimate objective of a world free of nuclear weapons. In this context, we call on nuclear weapon states to honor their obligations under Article VI of the NPT After all, the complete and total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee against their use. Balance among the three pillars of the NPT must be respected. They must be implemented in equal measure of importance. The NPT's credibility depends on the complementarity among the three pillars in equal measure of importance. Mr. Chair, The UN proclaimed 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. In this context, it is important for States Parties to honour their obligations under the NPT, mainly their full, effective and urgent implementation of their disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT. We call on all States Parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. We reiterate that the only guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons lies in their total and complete elimination. We call on the international community to advance the ultimate objective of total nuclear disarmament across the world. Mr. Chair, security, peace, and development can only be achieved through dialogue, confidence building, and stronger peaceful cooperation among states, and by averting a race to the production and development of nuclear weapons systems. In conclusion, we hope that the international community's nuclear disarmament efforts will achieve tangible results on the ground for a world free of nuclear weapons and their threats. this will help achieve security, peace, prosperity, and stability for the world at large. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Ghana · Chair [1:37:24]: I thank the distinguished representative of Saudi Arabia for the statement. And I invite the distinguished representative of Sweden to take the floor. Sweden [1:37:40]: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Sweden associates itself with the statement of the European Union. The following remarks are made in a national capacity. The current security environment is deeply worrying. Tensions have increased and rhetoric has hardened. The absence of an international arms control agreement and rapid expansion of nuclear arsenals without transparency are cause for concern. We condemn in the strongest term Russia's ongoing brutal war of aggression against Ukraine Russia's recurring threats to use nuclear weapons is irresponsible and unacceptable. By suspending its participation in the New START and by withdrawing its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Russia is undermining global security. Sweden's accession to NATO was a direct consequence of Russia's actions. We fully support the nuclear sharing arrangements of NATO acknowledging their compatibility with the NPT, support for the collective security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, and the contribution to non-proliferation. Chair, Sweden remains fully committed to the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons and the fundamental role of the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. While the nuclear weapons States hold a special responsibility for implementing Article VI, all States Parties should actively strive towards the full implementation of the NPT. We urge the nuclear weapons States to engage constructively to achieve concrete measures related to nuclear disarmament and risk reduction. And we call on all NPT State Parties to refrain from actions that contradict or undermine the Treaty's objectives. We regret the absence of an agreement on strategic arms control after the expiry of the New START. Engaging in arms control discussions without preconditions would be an important step in building trust. We welcome U.S. efforts to initiate such a dialogue and urge Russia and China to participate. Key steps toward nuclear disarmament are the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the establishment of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We urge all states who have not yet done so, especially those in Annex 2, to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay or preconditions. And we call on all states to abide by the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. and to refrain from any action contrary to the objective and purpose of the Treaty. Sweden also strongly advocates for greater involvement in the nuclear disarmament verification. The IPNDV and the Quad partnerships have provided valuable insights and results. Irreversibility remains a key topic that deserves our attention. Chair, in the spirit of contributing to a strong outcome of the Review Conference that affirms reaffirms commitments to NPT I would like to draw your attention to two transregional formats that we participate in the Stockholm initiative for nuclear disarmament and the initiative to reduce the risk for nuclear conflict and the working papers that have been present been presented during this review cycle we hope that they can contribute to support the ambition to find consensus language and reinforce the NPT chair in conclusion let me also address the work of the strengthening of the review process, including the importance of inclusiveness and the effective participation of women and the integration of gender perspectives in all aspects of our work, and not least on enhancing transparency in reporting. We welcome all steps taken in that direction. Thank you. Ghana · Chair [1:41:52]: I thank the distinguished representative of Sweden for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Norway to deliver their statement. You have the floor. Norway [1:42:05]: Chair, we are witnessing a global security environment with rising tension. Bilateral arms control has expired. Reductions in stockpiles have stalled. The situation underscores the urgency to work towards the common goal of a world without nuclear weapons. We must increase our efforts to prepare the ground for future disarmament by actively rebuilding confidence and by finding ways to ensure progress, also when trust is absent. We must use the time effectively so real progress becomes possible when global conditions allow. Chair, let me highlight five points. First, the three core principles of nuclear disarmament, verification, irreversibility, and transparency, should be given priority in our work. Previous review conferences have repeatedly acknowledged their indispensable role to sustainable nuclear disarmament. Work on nuclear disarmament verification has shown that progress on disarmament is possible. two successful group of governmental experts have paved the way for the establishment of the group of scientific and technical experts on nuclear disarmament verification, which will start its work in January next year. Irreversibility is less explored, but is gaining increasing attention. There is an intimate relationship between the three principles. Discussing disarmament in the abstract has limited value. These three principles offer a practical approach to disarmament, to envision concretely what the disarmament process could look like and what components it could involve. Second, we strongly support confidence-building measures, including greater transparency from the nuclear weapons states. Transparency is an essential feature of the NPT and a key enabler for accountability. We welcome nuclear weapons states' national reporting as an important tool, but regret that reporting remains uneven. We commend the US, UK, and France for organizing side events to present their national reports. We need reporting in greater detail and a system for structured engagement. We need political will and commitment, not attempts to deflect attention through unfounded claims against NATO's extended deterrence an arrangement that predates the NPT and was essential to its very feasibility. Third, we encourage all nuclear weapons states to take active and practical steps to reduce nuclear risks. Risk reduction is not a precondition for disarmament, but it can be critical to ensure we have a tomorrow in which disarmament can take place. We appreciate efforts to promote dialogue on risk reduction and strategic stability, and we welcome the US proposal for a multilateral arms control process. Pre-launch notifications pursuant to the Hague Code of Conduct is an important risk-reducing measure that we encourage all to join. Fourth, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is fundamentally linked to the NPT. Its negotiation was part of the package that enabled the indefinite extension of the NPT. Its early entry into force was identified as a priority step toward implementing Article VI. For three decades, it has contributed to a powerful norm: no nuclear test explosions anywhere by anyone. The focus on humanitarian consequences is an important aspect of the work on nuclear disarmament. It shifts the discourse from purely strategic considerations to the catastrophic consequences a nuclear conflict will have for people and the environment. That is, after all, the core reason why we all deeply care for and want nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Chair, nuclear disarmament can only be achieved through balanced, mutual, irreversible and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons. The NPT is the cornerstone of our collective efforts. We must do our utmost to ensure the continued strong and unconditional support for the NPT. Let's start by picking the lowest hanging fruit of them all, a reaffirmation of previous review conference commitments. I thank you. Ghana · Chair [1:47:01]: I thank the distinguished representative of Norway for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of the Netherlands to deliver their statement. Excellency, you have the floor. Netherlands (Kingdom of the) [1:47:14]: I congratulate you on the assumption of your duties. In addition to the statement delivered by the European Union, I would like to make the following remarks in my national capacity. Chair, Excellencies and distinguished delegates, Each State present in this room has expressed the desire, through the NPT's preamble, to ease international tension and strengthen trust so that nuclear weapons can eventually be eliminated. However, With a nuclear-armed Russia waging war in Europe, with a China rapidly and opaquely increasing its nuclear arsenal, and with the arms control architecture in disarray, it is safe to say that trust is low and tensions are high. I take no pleasure in painting this bleak picture, since it is my country's disposition to search for common ground. However, it would be of little benefit to anyone to pretend that the world has not undergone fundamental changes. Chair, we however remain unwavering in our belief in the possibility of a brighter future, one where ultimately no nuclear weapons exist anymore. To not lose sight of that prospect, urgent work is needed to support a climate conducive to disarmament. For that reason, the Netherlands prioritises balanced and realistic measures that lower risks, ease tensions, and help to build trust and confidence. First, We must discuss and identify effective measures to minimize nuclear risks, without being prescriptive or exhaustive. It goes without saying that such measures are not a substitute for disarmament. Second, nuclear weapon States should clearly and unambiguously reaffirm their commitments under Article VI of the Treaty. Given the expiration of the New START Treaty, we call on the three holders of the largest nuclear arsenals, namely Russia, the United States and China, to negotiate a follow-up agreement to New START that is fit for purpose and verifiable. Third, we have to improve transparency and accountability to increase confidence and trust. Reporting is a key measure in this regard, and we underline the importance of robust and transparent reporting by all States Parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States. Let me compliment France, the UK and the United States for presenting their national reports. Fourth, a nuclear-weapon-free world requires robust, credible and effective verification. The GDE on nuclear disarmament verification and the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification have done important work to develop mutual understandings of verification. It is important to continue these efforts through the IPNDV and the upcoming group of scientific and technical experts as a meaningful step towards full implementation of Article VI. Finally, the CTBT and the FMCT are indispensable instruments for achieving and sustaining a nuclear-weapon-free world. The Review Conference should, therefore, encourage States that have not yet done so to ratify the CTBT and, in particular, to uphold the moratorium on nuclear testing. States parties should also formulate steps to commence negotiations on an FMCT as soon as possible, and we call on all States that possess nuclear weapons to instate an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. Chair, let me conclude by extending an open hand to others in the room, so that we may work together to ease tensions, build trust, and once again take steps towards our common goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Thank you, Chair. Ghana · Chair [1:51:13]: I thank the distinguished representative of the Netherlands for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Canada to deliver a statement. Canada, you have the floor. Canada [1:51:28]: Thank you, Chair. Our delegation is pleased to see you presiding over our deliberations, and we assure you of our full support. Canada remains fully committed to the universalization and full implementation of the NPT. We also expect commitments made under past review cycles to be respected. It is our view that not only despite, but because of the difficult international security environment, we need to make progress on nuclear disarmament and reduce the risk of use of a nuclear weapon. whether by design, miscalculation, misunderstanding, or accident. Canada calls on nuclear weapons states, in particular the three states holding the largest arsenals, to engage in negotiations on nuclear disarmament and risk reduction. We also call on the DPRK to dismantle its nuclear weapons program immediately and return to compliance with the NPT. Finally, we strongly encourage nuclear-armed states outside the NPT framework to and eliminate their nuclear weapons and join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. Canada continues to support the practical proposals towards nuclear disarmament, strategic stability and risk reduction advanced by the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative and the Stockholm Initiative. We endorse the working papers produced by these groups and the joint statements. Mr. Chairman, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty remains a central component of the global disarmament and non-proliferation regime. However, its long-term effectiveness hinges on a sustained political commitment. Its entry into force remains a priority for Canada. The international monitoring system is constantly proving its utility in detecting military activity as well as other seismic activity, thereby making a significant contribution to transparency and confidence. When the CTBT enters into force, the international community will benefit from additional tools for confidence-building and verification under the treaty, the aim being to consolidate the norm prohibiting nuclear test explosions, gathering evidence related to potential violations of the treaty, and all of this will also contribute to the irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons. In the meantime, We call on all states to respect and uphold the moratoria against nuclear test explosions in keeping with the zero yield standard. Canada also supports the immediate and unconditional launch of negotiations on a treaty on fissile materials for nuclear weapons. The preparatory work was completed long ago, and all of the relevant issues of substance, including the scope, all of these issues can and should be addressed at the negotiations table. In the meantime, Canada calls for the implementation of moratoria on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Last but not least, we believe that transparency and heightened responsibility are vital as we implement the NPT. They can play a useful role to help us advance towards nuclear disarmament and strategic stability. We call on the nuclear weapons states, in particular on those who have not yet done so, to strengthen the transparency of their arsenals, their capabilities and their nuclear doctrines. as well as to commit to partaking in interactive discussions on their national reports within the framework of the NPT review cycles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ghana · Chair [1:56:20]: I thank the distinguished representative of Canada for the statement. And I invite the distinguished representative of Turkey to deliver their statement. Türkiye [1:56:35]: Mr. Chair, congratulations on your role as chair of Main Committee I. Turkey reaffirms unwavering commitment to the treaty's goals and provisions across all three pillars, as well as to its universalization and continuing strengthening. We consider the NPT as the irreplaceable cornerstone of the global non-proliferation architecture and a vital pillar for advancing nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The ultimate aim of a world free of nuclear weapons depends on the full, effective and universally applied implementation of the NPT. Our efforts do not begin from scratch. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2010 Action Plan laid out two central objectives across the Treaty's three pillars. As in previous review cycles, Turkey remains firmly committed to actively advancing the goals and priorities of the NPT. In the context of the 11th Review Conference, we hope to achieve a meaningful outcome document that reinforces the Treaty and its objectives. Mr. Chair, no single measure is sufficient to address the challenge of nuclear disarmament. Meaningful progress requires a gradual and sustained approach, mindful of prevailing security environment. Turkey supports a nuclear disarmament process that is systematic, step by step, verifiable, and irreversible. We urge all nuclear weapons states to take additional steps in line with Article VI. In the meantime, though, we underscore the importance of strategic risk reduction and strong confidence building measures as well, while acknowledging that this is not a substitute for nuclear disarmament, Mr. Chair. As we underlined also in our national statement, the international security environment is increasingly complex and dangerous, with intensifying strategic competition and erosion of arms control mechanisms, expansion of nuclear arsenals, and declining trust among states. Fostering transparency and addressing mutual concerns can help prevent miscalculations, build trust, and create groundwork for meaningful negotiations on issues critical to global security. We underscore the importance of reasoned discourse and a strong commitment to multilateralism, fostering mutual understanding and responsibility towards future generations. Turkiye will continue to engage constructively and proactively, both at national level and through multilateral initiatives, such as the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative and other relevant platforms, with a view to strengthening the Treaty and promoting tangible progress across three pillars. We firmly believe that these mechanisms make valuable and concrete contributions to addressing complex challenges while fostering dialogue and bridging dividers, particularly in today's evolving security environment. Disarmament and non-proliferation goals are interconnected and reinforce one another. Commencement of negotiations for FMCT and entry into force of Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty remain pending. Pending its entry into force, continued adherence to existing moratoria on nuclear weapon test explosions remains vital. Mr. Chair, The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, based on arrangements agreed among regional States, is a key step toward advancing non-proliferation and disarmament. Turkey reiterates its strong support for establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East, in accordance with the 1995 decision and the 2010 action plan. Our firm position in support of peaceful settlement And concerns related to Iran's nuclear program remains unchanged. And we will continue to support all efforts in that direction. To conclude, we reaffirm the enduring relevance of the NPT and stress the importance of sustained progress toward fulfilling its core goals. Turkey will continue to act in forward-looking and constructive manner, focusing on common ground to advance our shared vision of a world without nuclear weapons. I thank you. Ghana · Chair [2:01:16]: I thank the distinguished representative of Turkey for the statement. The next speaker I have on my list is the distinguished representative of Australia. You have the floor. Austria, sorry. You have the floor, sir. Austria [2:01:35]: Mr. Chair, Austria aligns with the European Union. Congratulations on your election, and you have our full support. We left the last review conference with a sober assessment. The obligations and commitments of the nuclear weapons states given in '95, 2000, and 2010 remained unfulfilled. They remain unfulfilled today. The Doomsday Clock stands at the closest to midnight ever. The erosion of norms, the weakening nuclear taboo, the modernization and expansion of arsenals, more deployed warheads, a vanishing of transparency and accountability. These trends are deepening mistrust, fueling proliferation, and pulling us further from a world free of nuclear weapons. The deterioration is concrete. New START expired. For the first time in over 50 years, the two largest arsenals face no binding limits. Senior Russian officials have repeatedly resorted to unacceptable nuclear rhetoric and threats in the context of Russia's unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine. This has caused fundamental changes to the security environment in Europe and beyond. But we need to draw the right lessons. Austria is deeply concerned by the renewed insistence in several regions that nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence are essential to security. A doctrine that rests on the readiness to inflict catastrophic global harm, including on one's own population, is not sustainable. For three reasons. First, the more nuclear weapons are claimed essential, the more actors will seek them. This contradicts Article VI. It drives proliferation, and no one is safer when more weapons are in more hands. Second, nuclear deterrence is a high-risk strategy, a system of manufactured and escalating risk. Accidents, miscalculation, technical failure, irrational behavior, new technologies, disinformation, these are not hypotheticals. They are increasingly probable. Third, the consequences of nuclear use would not stay within any conflict. People on every continent risk becoming collateral victims. Reliance on these weapons diminishes the security of all humanity. Mr. Chair, these are not abstractions. The conferences hosted by Norway, Mexico and Austria in 2013 and 2014, and the 159 State Statements delivered by Austria's Foreign Minister in 2015, established what science has long shown. Working Paper 57 highlights this, and we call for substantive engagement with humanitarian and environmental consequences in the NPT. Mr. Chair, having considered these risks and consequences, the majority of states have chosen to join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Far from competing with the NPT, the TPNW gives legal substance to Article VI. We call on all states to join the treaty, and to those staying away, we ask you to engage, to send observers, to engage with the legitimate security concerns posed by nuclear weapons. Chair, we are deeply concerned about developments regarding the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. For 30 years, it has been the international community's North Star to end nuclear testing for all time. Any nuclear test explosion by any state at any yield would gravely damage this treaty. We call on all states to reaffirm the zero yield moratorium, and we urge all remaining Annex 2 states to ratify the treaty without delay or precondition, and to pledge at this RefCon to respect the nuclear test taboo without reservation at any yield. We also appeal to use the CTBT mechanisms to clarify whether testing has taken place. Mr. Chair, risks are evolving. Hypersonic systems compress reaction time. Cyber vulnerabilities threaten command and control. Artificial intelligence could erode the space for human judgment. Working Paper 54 sets out concrete risk reduction measures. Among them, nuclear weapons must remain under human control. Transparency and accountability is an overdue deliverable. TB and W states have considered this in the security concerns process. At a time when trust between nuclear weapons states is missing, this could offer an avenue to foster meaningful engagement. In addition, working paper 56 proposes concrete reporting elements, including on cross-border effects and international humanitarian law. Mr. Chair, Austria comes to this Review Conference with the urgency that real progress demands. We need to set aside artificial hurdles such as misinterpretations of undiminished security. Instead, we need a strong signal that the foundational bargain of the NPT remains. To restore that trust, we urge the five possessor states to engage without delay, to prevent a renewed arms race, to deliver credible nuclear risk reduction measures, and to reduce, not increase, their arsenals. Austria stands ready to support you, Mr. Chair, in making this review conference a turning point to lower nuclear risks and address the nuclear disorder of our time. I thank you. Ghana · Chair [2:06:25]: I thank the distinguished representative of Austria for the statement. And I invite the distinguished representative of Ireland to deliver the statement. You have the floor, sir. Ireland [2:06:40]: Mr. Chair. Congratulations on assuming your role. We align with the statements of the European Union, the New Agenda Coalition, Switzerland on behalf of a group of states, and New Zealand on behalf of a group of states. We are meeting at a time of great geopolitical upheaval, strain on international law, and nuclear dangers. The promise of Article VI and its related commitments remain unfulfilled and are in retreat. Increased reliance on nuclear weapons and suggestion of their indefinite possession threaten to erode the effectiveness of the Treaty. Mr. Chair, we condemn Russia's reckless nuclear threats and rhetoric in its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. All nuclear threats, whether implicit or explicit, are unacceptable. This Review Conference should be very clear on this. We deeply regret the expiry of the New START Treaty, which leaves the world without any legal limits on the number of strategic nuclear weapons or systems of mutual inspection and monitoring. To guard against a rapid nuclear arms race, we call for urgent dialogue on a successor agreement. In seeking reductions to nuclear arsenals, those with the largest stockpiles should engage urgently, actively, and constructively as a means of building trust and increasing confidence. We are deeply concerned about the rapid and opaque expansion in nuclear arsenals, which are inconsistent with the NPT's disarmament commitments. The norm against nuclear testing must be upheld. Any weakening of that norm or resumption of explosive nuclear weapons testing would be a serious regression with grave humanitarian, environmental, and security consequences. It must be avoided at all costs. The NPT's preamble charges us to make every effort to avert the danger of a nuclear war. We must make tangible and demonstrable progress on reducing the risk posed by nuclear weapons. This demands unilateral, plurilateral and multilateral efforts. Efforts to reduce nuclear risk should also deal with the challenges posed by new and emerging technologies, in particular the need to retain human control over nuclear weapons and their control systems pending their elimination. The devastating humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons must both inform and give urgency to our work. Our response to the dangers posed by these weapons and the risk of nuclear war must be based on the latest scientific research and modelling. In building a better global understanding of how these consequences impact humanity and our environment, we welcome the ongoing work of the independent UN Scientific Panel on the Effects of Nuclear War. Mr. Chair, an ineffectual Article VI means a weakened treaty. A weakened treaty weakens our collective security. Article VI is a persistent and urgent obligation. We call on all nuclear weapons states to use this conference to clearly state their active commitment to Article VI and associated NPT obligations. One way of demonstrating that commitment to Article VI is to take action on enhanced transparency and accountability. Over this review cycle, we have seen the overwhelming demand to make progress on this issue. More than 150 States Parties made reference to it at the Third Preparatory Committee. There is a particular demand to understand the nuclear weapons States' implementation of article VI. We have worked with our partners, including New Zealand and Switzerland, the New Agenda Coalition, and within the European Union, to advance constructive proposals which allocate dedicated time for interactive dialogue on comprehensible and comparable information from the nuclear weapons states. While it would be a modest proposal to improve how our treaty works, it presents a rare area of convergence at a time when avenues for progress are in short supply. Success on this issue would send a badly needed political message, and we call for constructive willingness from all States Parties to achieve that. Thank you very much. Ghana · Chair [2:10:50]: I thank the distinguished representative of Ireland for their statement. And I invite the distinguished representative of the Philippines to deliver a statement. You have the floor, Excellency. Philippines [2:11:05]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. The Philippines congratulates you on your election and associates itself with the statement of NAM. The Philippines reiterates that the heart of the NPT and related frameworks rest not only on legal obligations, but also on a shared moral and political consensus that nuclear weapons are highly dangerous and to be ultimately eliminated. We are concerned with the deepening mistrust and the erosion of long-standing disarmament commitments that threaten to undo decades of painstaking progress. We're also concerned with the shift from a humanitarian focus that should be the center of disarmament efforts, fueling renewed debates on the acquisition or even forward deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, alongside calls for more assertive deterrence postures. Mr. Chair, we place forward the following positions. First, all state parties, most especially nuclear weapons states, bear a legal, ethical, and moral obligation to pursue complete, verifiable, and irreversible disarmament of nuclear weapons without delay and regardless of shifting security environments. This must be done in line with the NPT obligations, in particular Article VI, as affirmed by the ICJ in its advisory opinion and elaborated in action five of the 64-point action plan. We support nuclear risk reduction as an interim measure on the path towards total elimination. However, risk reduction must recognize that risks emanate from nuclear weapons themselves, must not legitimize continued possessions of nuclear weapons, nor must serve a substitute for concrete nuclear disarmament progress. Nuclear weapons states must accelerate their reduction of nuclear arsenals and set concrete, verifiable targets. These efforts must be pursued through all available channels, including the P5 process and bilateral or multilateral mechanisms. Additionally, nuclear weapons states must be subject to the highest level of transparency. We call for them to be the gold standard in this regard, through putting in place a reporting mechanism. This reporting mechanism must contain information regarding the number, type and status of nuclear warheads, the number and type of delivery vehicles, the amount of fissile material produced for military purposes, and measures on risk reduction. and on reducing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in security and military doctrines, among other details. Their reporting mechanism must also allow the interactive discussions of reports among relevant stakeholders. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, or NPDI, a group that we are part of with representation across regions, elaborated on this proposal in its landing zone paper. This paper also contains other relevant suggestions pertinent to this committee, Mr. Chair. We also invite your attention to what appears to be a broad support for the principle of a reporting mechanism as a method to enhance transparency, and we urge its inclusion as part of this review conference's concrete outcomes. Next, we call for the remaining Annex 2 and non-Annex 2 states who have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT. Finally, we urge nuclear weapons states to adhere to an effective and immediate moratorium on fissile material production pending the commencement of negotiations of an FMCT. The Philippines also underscores the importance of engaging the public in renewed dialogues on the long-term dangers of the normalization of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons do not guarantee security. They are the security threat themselves. Strengthening the NPT in the face of global challenges is not optimal, it is essential. The challenge, therefore, lies in addressing legitimate security concerns without compromising the principles that underpin lasting peace. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Ghana · Chair [2:15:51]: I thank the distinguished representative of the Philippines for their statement. And I invite the distinguished representative of South Africa to deliver their statement. South Africa, you have the floor. South Africa [2:16:06]: We congratulate you, Chairperson, on assuming the leadership of Main Committee I. You can be assured of South Africa's support throughout this session. We associate ourselves with the statements delivered on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and the New Agenda Coalition. During this review cycle, as in previous cycles, South Africa has consistently advocated for the full implementation of commitments to nuclear disarmament as outlined in Article VI of the NPT. Unfortunately, while non-proliferation commitments have seen significant progress, disarmament remains largely unrealized. Non-proliferation efforts must be matched by concrete, transparent, verifiable, and irreversible action to eliminate all nuclear weapons and achieve universal adherence to the Treaty. Chaperson, modernization programs, strengthening of deterrence doctrines, and nuclear sharing arrangements, underserved to entrench the indefinite retention of nuclear weapons, polarizing the non-proliferation regime, and undermining the NPT. Recent nuclear policy reviews that elevate the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines, alongside the development of ever more sophisticated delivery systems, fuel the growing risk of a renewed nuclear arms race. The hardening of positions in defense of nuclear deterrence not only obstructs progress under Article VI, but also contributes directly to proliferation risks. South Africa believes the NPT cannot succeed if it serves the security interests of a few rather than all. States that rely on nuclear weapons for their own security cannot credibly champion non-proliferation, as such double standards undermine the treaty's legitimacy. Nuclear weapons do not enhance security, rather they threaten it, regardless of who possesses them. South Africa is of the firm view that any future outcome must preserve and uphold, and not roll back or reinterpret, the agreements reached during the 1995 and 2000 review conferences and reaffirmed by the 2010 review conference, which remain the agreed benchmarks for nuclear disarmament and should be fully implemented. Given these concerns, South Africa recommends that this conference, one, urges all states parties to pursue policies and actions fully aligned with the objectives and purpose of the treaty. Two, reaffirm the validity of the 1995 principles and objectives, the 2000 conference commitments, and the 2010 conclusions and recommendations. and call on nuclear-weapon States to adopt clear timelines and benchmarks for irreversible disarmament. Three, urge nuclear-weapon States to halt nuclear modernization and expansion, and redirect resources towards development assistance and the achievement of the SDGs. Four, reaffirm the unequivocal undertaking by nuclear weapons states on nuclear disarmament and insist that transparency, verifiability, and irreversibility apply to all disarmament measures supported by defined timelines and benchmarks. Chairperson, beyond legal obligations, the most compelling case for nuclear disarmament lies in the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. These concerns have existed since their first use and remain as urgent today. They must form the core of all deliberations and decisions on nuclear weapons. In this context, South Africa recommends that this Conference, one, reiterate States Parties' deep concern regarding the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapon use and testing. Two, note the TPNW as a legal pathway toward the implementation of Article VI and as a complementary instrument that strengthens the NPT without diminishing existing obligations. Chapeau in South Africa supports nuclear risk reduction and as a complementary measure, not a substitute for genuine disarmament, nor as a means to legitimize the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons, obscure their inherently catastrophic nature. Preferably, transparency and measurable benchmarks must take precedence. In conclusion, South Africa therefore recommends that this conference: 1. Calls for concrete and effective nuclear risk reduction measures beyond symbolic gestures or exclusive nuclear weapons state dialogues. 2. Ghana · Chair [2:21:11]: I thank the distinguished representative of South Africa for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Poland to deliver their statement. Poland, you have the floor. Poland [2:21:29]: Mr. Chair, distinguished delegates, we stand at the crossroads where the architectural integrity of global security is not just being questioned. it is being systematically dismantled. Poland fully aligns itself with the European Union, but I must address the gravity of our current reality from our unique national perspective. Let us be clear. The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is not merely a document. It is the unique and only credible instrument we possess to prevent global catastrophe. Poland remains unshakable in its commitment to Article 6. However, we reject the illusion of shortcut disarmament. It must be verifiable, irreversible, and rooted in a stable security environment. Approaches that ignore these conditions risk undermining rather than advancing international peace and security. Disarmament cannot be discussed in a vacuum while a full-scale war of aggression rages at Poland's borders. Russia, a nuclear state and permanent member of the Security Council, has shattered the very foundation of trust by violating the Budapest Memorandum, by attacking Ukraine, a state that voluntarily relinquished the world's third largest nuclear arsenal, Russia has sent a chilling message to the world. Such actions undermine the credibility of the nonproliferation regime and weaken the security assurance under which many non-nuclear weapons states rely. In this deteriorating security environment, NATO sharing arrangements remains an essential pillar of Poland's security. Let there be no doubt, these arrangements are fully complement with the NPT and remains shield against systematic our necessary shield against systematic aggression. Poland condemns in the strongest possible terms the nuclearization of Belarus and Kaliningrad Oblast. This includes expansion of nuclear-related infrastructure and announced deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. The increasing role of the non-strategic nuclear weapons and the lowering of the thresholds for their potential use run counter to international efforts aimed at reducing nuclear risk and strengthening strategic stability. We demand that Russia immediately de-escalate and withdraw all forces from the sovereign territory of Ukraine, respect the rule of law, Arms control is dead without mutual trust and respect for international boundaries. And third, engage in multilateral talks on restoring strategic stability. The old world of arms control is fading. We desperately need a forward-looking framework that moves beyond the limitation of the past. Future treaties must account for all nuclear weapons, specifically the thousands of non-strategic tactical warheads currently absent from formal oversight. In this context, Poland calls for greater transparency from the all nuclear weapons states regarding their arsenals, doctrines, and modernization efforts, as transparency is indispensable for building trust, enabling future progress in disarmament. Despite the darkness of the current geopolitical climate, there are flickers of hope. Poland is proud to contribute to the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, NPDI, which seeks progress on disarmament by building the bridges between different regions and political perspectives. We reaffirm that risk reduction is not a substitute for disarmament, but an essential and complementary step towards creating conditions necessary for the world without nuclear weapons. Mr. Chair, the NPT is our best hope, but it is not a self-fulfilling prophecy. It requires active defense against those who would see it fail. Poland stands ready to do that work. I thank you. Ghana · Chair [2:25:54]: I thank the distinguished representative of Poland for the statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Qatar for their statement. You have the floor. Qatar [2:26:10]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. At the outset, we congratulate you on your selection as chair of the Main Committee I. We associate ourselves with the statement of the Arab Group and the statement of the Non-Aligned Movement. Here, the State of Qatar reaffirms that nuclear disarmament constitutes one of the fundamental pillars of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and represents an essential step within the framework of international community's efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons and to divest itself of stockpiles and remnants thereof. We stress that Article VI of the Treaty constitutes a clear and legally binding obligation upon nuclear weapons States to pursue in good faith serious negotiations leading to complete nuclear disarmament. The State of Qatar considers that any delay in the implementation of these obligations undermines the credibility of the international system. international order and that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee against their use or threat of use. Moreover, the continued existence of military nuclear capabilities outside any framework of international verification or accountability erodes confidence, fuels arms race dynamics, and gives rise to a security environment that is both volatile and susceptible to escalation. In this context, we call for the adoption of a gradual and verifiable approach founded upon the following steps: achieving regular and measurable reductions in nuclear arsenals, enhancing transparency with respect to nuclear military doctrines and levels of readiness, expanding confidence-building measures in ways that reduce the risks of accidental or unintended use of nuclear weapons. We are of the view that these steps serve not only the objective of nuclear disarmament, but also contribute to the reduction of strategic tensions at the global level, thereby reinforcing international stability and regional and international peace and security. In closing, Mr. Chair, the State of Qatar reaffirms that the pillar of nuclear disarmament is not merely a technical or legal matter, but rather a strategic choice that reflects the degree of the international community's commitment to human security and the future of coming generations. The Middle East region, confronted with the protracted security challenges, merits to be at the forefront of this global trajectory. We renew our full commitment to working with the states in the region within the international community to advance progress towards the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, founded upon collective security, mutual respect, and sustainable development. Ghana · Chair [2:28:47]: I thank the distinguished representative of Qatar for the statement. And I invite the distinguished representative of Zimbabwe to deliver their statement. Zimbabwe [2:29:03]: Mr. Chair, my delegation congratulates you, Ambassador Samuel Yaw Kuma, on your election as chair of Main Committee I and assures you of its constructive engagement towards an agreed outcome. Zimbabwe aligns with the statements delivered by Indonesia for the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT and by Nigeria for the African Group. We add the following remarks in our national capacity. Mr. Chair, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains the cornerstone of efforts to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. This objective, first articulated in section 5C of United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 1, adopted 80 years ago, called for concrete proposals for the total elimination of atomic weapons and all other weapons adaptable to mass destruction. As the General Assembly pronounced through the first special session devoted to disarmament in 1978, the nuclear arms race runs counter to efforts to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States. SSOD1 further underscored that removing the threat of a nuclear war is the most acute and urgent task, as nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to the survival of civilization. Zimbabwe reiterates that the choice confronting humankind today, as in 1946 and in 1978, is either disarmament or annihilation. There is no viable alternative to States Parties taking concrete steps towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. A nuclear war should never be fought, because it can never be won. Zimbabwe calls for the full, effective and urgent implementation of the obligation of nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the Treaty, and in line with the relevant agreed provisions in the 1995 Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, as well as the 13 practical steps agreed to in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference. We further reiterate the agreements reached in the Treaty's 2010 Action Plan on nuclear disarmament. Mr. Chair, We are concerned that the ongoing qualitative and quantitative nuclear arms race, which appears to be underway, runs counter to the principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures. Zimbabwe calls on nuclear weapons states to adhere to Action 5 of the 2010 Action Plan on the further diminishing of the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines, and policies. Instead of increasing the salience of nuclear weapons, we call on nuclear weapons states to discuss policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination. lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons. We reiterate Action 8 of the 2010 Action Plan in which all nuclear weapons states committed to fully respect their existing commitments with regard to security assurances. We implore all nuclear weapons states that have not yet done so to extend security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states parties to the treaty. Zimbabwe calls for effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In line with Action 21 of the 2010 Action Plan, we encourage all nuclear weapon states to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information in line with the NPT review process. We call for the further development of verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements. Mr. Chair, let me conclude by calling upon all States Parties to reaffirm that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control, of which nuclear disarmament remains the highest disarmament priority of the United Nations. Mr. Chair, We are hopeful that the 2026 NPT Review Conference will see a resolute, irreversible and firm commitment to the track of nuclear disarmament. I thank you. Ghana · Chair [2:33:41]: I thank the distinguished representative of Zimbabwe for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Cuba. Cuba [2:33:57]: Thank you very much, Chair. We extend our congratulations to you on your appointment to lead the Main Committee I, and we wish you success in your duties and reaffirm Cuba's constructive participation in the Committee's work. We endorse the statement delivered by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement that are parties to the NPT. More than five decades have passed since the Treaty entered into force, the NPT. However, the goal of nuclear disarmament appears to be sidelined at a time when, more than ever before, efforts in favour of peace must be intensified. It is urgent to prioritise dialogue, diplomacy and cooperation in the face of the sustained increase in military spending, the rise in bellicose rhetoric and the materialisation of aggressions against sovereign states. The international community must not continue to wait indefinitely for the elimination of nuclear weapons. The political will of the majority should prevail, given the threat represented by the existence of these weapons, Chair. We are deeply concerned about the lack of progress in implementing the commitments undertaken at previous review conferences. including the three practical measures towards nuclear disarmament agreed in the year 2000 and the actions of nuclear disarmament of 2010. The indefinite extension of the NPT does not in any way imply the perpetual possession of nuclear weapons. Interpreting it otherwise would be contrary to the very purpose of the treaty. Chair, the total elimination of nuclear weapons requires a defined time frame and strict international verification. This is the only way to guarantee irreversible, transparent and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament. Cuba reaffirms the importance of the universalization of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which complements the NPT and brings us closer to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. It is essential that the Conference enable us to adopt concrete measures that establish specific timelines for the implementation of Article VI. We reiterate that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against their use or the threat of their use. Nevertheless, until the total elimination of nuclear weapons is achieved, a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument is required to provide guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We insist on the need for the immediate cessation of all plans to modernize these weapons. Military postures and doctrines based on nuclear deterrence, strategic stability or the need to create the conditions for nuclear disarmament must be definitively abandoned. Nuclear-weapon States bear primary responsibility in this regard. Chair, it is not justifiable that States Parties to the NPT continue to be subject to strict verification regimes while nuclear-weapon States have not taken have not taken concrete steps towards disarmament. This trend must be reversed urgently. We cannot continue postponing the commitment to advance in good faith toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. The time has come to take decisions that send a message of commitment to the preservation of multilateralism, peace and international security. Thank you very much. Ghana · Chair [2:37:38]: I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Indonesia to deliver their statement. Indonesia [2:37:51]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, allow me to congratulate you on your appointment and assure you of our full support. Indonesia aligns itself with the statement of the Non-Aligned Movement, state parties to the NPT. Nuclear disarmament remains our highest priority and the foundational cornerstone of the NPT's grand bargain. While the global disarmament architecture is regressing, we need to approach this review conference with determination. We possess the collective power to revitalize our commitments and advance concrete disarmament, thereby generating renewed confidence and credible pathway toward a more peaceful and secure global environment. To unlock the full potential of the disarmament pillar, we must confront several misconceptions, that security interests fundamentally differ, that nuclear disarmament must wait for favorable conditions, that nuclear weapons possession and reliance are legitimate or rational. Indonesia wishes to highlight several points. First, delegitimizing nuclear weapons. As long as nuclear weapons remain embedded in military doctrines, their elimination will remain out of reach. Reliance on nuclear deterrence perpetuates fear. reinforces adversarial postures and increases the risk of miscalculations. It cannot provide mutual security. The continued modernization and expansion of nuclear arsenals are also incompatible with Article VI of the Treaty and further entrench their perceived legitimacy. In this regard, we urge nuclear weapons states and states relying on extended deterrence to adopt non-nuclear defense strategies and policies rooted in diplomacy. While risk reduction measures are essential, they must not become a substitute for disarmament. Second, delivering measurable disarmament progress. Unequivocal disarmament undertakings must be implemented through measurable benchmarks, strict declines and detailed reporting. Indonesia supports more structured reporting and collective review mechanisms. Transparency must act as a direct pathway to irreversible and verifiable reductions, rather than an endpoint in itself. Third, securing the universal adherence to the CTBT. We urge all remaining Annex 2 states to sign and ratify the treaty. Pending its entry into force, the moratorium on all nuclear tests must be reaffirmed. Fourth, enhancing arms control frameworks. We regret that recent expiration of the New START Treaty. We urge nuclear weapons states to enhance their strategic dialogue to negotiate a successor agreement to achieve deeper irreversible reductions. Simultaneously, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons continues to be a profound source of optimism and momentum in complement to the shared objective of the NPT. Finally, safeguarding our future against the risk of integration of emerging technology into nuclear weapons system. The integration of artificial intelligence into military frameworks presents compounded risk of miscalculation and escalations. It is imperative that we guarantee full human control at all times over the command, control and communication systems of nuclear weapons, a minimum safeguard for humanity, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapon. Mr. Chair, we cannot take the NPT for granted, nor can we accept indefinite delays in fulfilling its core obligations. Let us seize this Review Conference as a historic opportunity to demonstrate political will, honor our legal obligation in good faith, and build a secure, nuclear-weapon-free world for present and future generations. I thank you, Mr. Chair. Ghana · Chair [2:41:52]: I thank the distinguished representative of Indonesia for the statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka to deliver their statement. You have the floor, Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka [2:42:08]: Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation congratulates you on your assumption as Chair of the Main Committee I. We assure you of our fullest support and cooperation. Sri Lanka aligns itself with the statement delivered by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. We wish to make the following observations in our national capacity. Mr. Chair, four years ago, at the 10th Review Conference, our delegation spoke of a tipping point, warning that a treaty built on three pillars risked standing on only two. We regret to say that the situation has become more dangerous. The New START Treaty expired in February this year without a successor agreement. For the first time in over half a century, there is no bilateral instrument constraining the strategic arsenals of the two largest nuclear-armed states. Nuclear arsenals are being modernized and expanded. New types of warheads, including low-yield weapons, are being developed, which lowers the threshold for actual use. doctrines are being revised to increase the prominence of nuclear weapons in military planning. The continued and evolving nuclear weapons sharing arrangements and extended deterrence policies run directly counter to the whole point of this Treaty. And the resumed nuclear testing will further escalate the geopolitical tensions. Mr. Chair, Article VI of this Treaty is a legal obligation binding all States parties at all times and in all circumstances. Regrettably though, more than 50 years after the Treaty's entry into force, over 12,000 nuclear weapons remain in the world. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the nuclear weapons States party to this Treaty gave the world a clear promise to eliminate their arsenals. 26 years later, we are still waiting. The 13 practical steps have been largely set aside. The 2010 Action Plan has yielded no measurable progress. Similarly, the last two Review Conferences failed to produce consensus outcomes. We are also alarmed by the integration of AI into nuclear command, control and communication systems. The compression of decision-making time lines increases the risk of catastrophic miscalculation. pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, human control must be maintained over all decisions relating to their use. Mr. Chair, Sri Lanka's commitment to nuclear disarmament is unwavering. That commitment rests on the conviction that small nations have a right and responsibility to shape the disarmament agenda. It is in this spirit that Sri Lanka acceded to the TPNW in September 2023 and ratified the CTBTTO earlier that year. As a small island nation at the crossroads of the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka bears no responsibility for the nuclear threat, yet it is disproportionately exposed to its consequences. We think of the communities across the Pacific who still live with the effects of nuclear testing decades later. The cost of nuclear weapons are not felt equally. For small states like us, the case for disarmament is of fundamental importance. Mr. Chair, we reaffirm the urgent need for a universal, unconditional, and legally binding instrument on negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties. We call upon the nuclear-weapon States to commit to a moratorium on the first use of nuclear weapons until we reach the goal of total elimination. We also call on the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate concrete, irreversible and verifiable progress on disarmament, and for the resumption of meaningful negotiations towards that end. Finally, we reiterate the importance of disarmament education. Regaining momentum depends on investing in the next generation. We must equip our youth with the political, legal and technical expertise to carry forward the campaign for complete elimination. We must meet this moment with the seriousness it demands. The credibility of this Treaty rests on the fulfilment of the disarmament obligation. We owe it to those who have already suffered the consequences of nuclear weapons. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Ghana · Chair [2:46:57]: I thank the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka for their statement. That was the last speaker. On my list, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, we will continue with the general exchange of views tomorrow, the 1st of May, at 3:00 p.m. And in the absence of any announcement from the Secretariat, this meeting is adjourned.