Guy Ryder (Under-Secretary-General) on the updates on UN80 - Press Conference

All right. Good afternoon. Good. Oh, good morning. Good morning.

Good morning. I never get to say good morning exactly. We're delighted to be joined by Guy Ryder the Undersecretary General for Policy, who sits in the Secretary General's Executive Office and who is leading our UN80 initiative. And I thought it'd be a good time for hear from him and most importantly, a time for him to hear from you with some questions. So, Guy, go ahead and then we'll take some questions.

Yes, thank you, Stefan. And good morning to you all. It still is the morning and I do welcome the opportunity to have this exchange with you on the state of play in regard to the UN 80 initiative. And the timing is good because I think we're now moving into, I would say, fast forward on the UN 80 initiative. There's a lot going on and a lot that is going to have to be achieved in the coming weeks.

I'm sure you're familiar with the broad brush definitions of the Unity Initiative launched by the Secretary General in March. We have these three work streams, one of which is, and has probably attracted the most comment and the most interesting, our attempts to improve our performance, our efficiencies and our effectiveness within our existing institutional arrangements. And this is leading, to simplify the story, revised budgetary proposals for 2026, which the Secretary General is now formulating. And he has given notice that in September he will produce a revised budget for, for the Secretariat, which will involve reductions in posts of some 20% and reduction in the level of the budget of 15 to 20%. This has, as I say, attracted a great deal of attention.

But let me just insist for a moment on the importance of the two other work streams. We're working very hard just now on the review of the implementation of mandates. Some of you, I think, would have seen the literature that we passed out last week, which does a bit of a deep dive on the state of advancement of that review. What I think it shows is that we have a very heavy corpus stock of mandates in the form of resolutions and decisions from previous years and decades, which it makes sense for us to subject to detailed scrutiny, not least because they result in a very heavy load of meetings, of reports being produced, make demands both of the Secretariat and of Member States, which merits looking at, with a view to improving the way that we organize our work. This, I think, is the really substantive, the real policy focus part of the UN 80 initiative, and for that reason, if not for others, deserves particular attention.

I've mentioned that we have to produce revised budget proposals in September in the case of the mandate review, the Secretary General is committed to presenting a report on his thinking by the end of now. It's this month, isn't it? It's the first of July, by the end of this month. So we have a heavy load of work to do, based on the evidence that you've already seen, to put to Member States some propositions in respect of how we can implement mandates rather better than at the moment. The third work stream, and I haven't got quite such a precise time frame to offer you in this regard, is a review of our structures.

If you have a look at the organigram of the UN system, you do find quite a baroque architecture. There's a lot of entities, they've grown over the years in a accretional, in an incremental way. Structures are never easy to change once they're in place. But it does seem sensible to subject this architecture to detailed scrutiny. To help us do that, we've established seven clusters looking at different parts and thematic parts of the system.

We have a Peace and Security cluster, two clusters working on development issues, one for the Secretariat, one for the system as a whole. We have a humanitarian cluster, one on human rights, one of our training and research activities, and another one which is defined not by the subject matter, but by the organisations which compose it, which is a cluster for specialized agencies who, in a system with very fragmented governance structures, have their own particular issues, but have shown very willing to engage in the process.

Just some last words on the overall objectives of this, this process. This is the United nations and the Secretary General responding to the totality of our circumstances, our political circumstances, our financial circumstances, certainly, but also, I think, circumstances in which the effectiveness of multilateralism is up for scrutiny. I don't think we should avert our eyes from any of those three dimensions of the circumstances that we face. And the idea is to bring the United nations out of this process and these rather turbulent times in better shape, stronger, in a position to confront the challenges of today and tomorrow more effectively and in the end, and this will be the measure of the success of the initiative, able to have greater impact for the people eventually, that we are here to serve everything that we do, and the Secretary General is very insistent in this regard, has to be with a view to the impact that we have on people's lives. A lot more, I could say, but probably best I do that through answering questions rather than continuing.

We'll go to Edie.

Thank you very much, Mr. Ryder, on behalf of the United Nations Correspondence association, for doing this briefing. My name is Edith Lederer from the Associated Press. You presented this report, I mean, these tables, to the UN membership, I believe, last week. I wonder if you can tell us what kind of a reaction you've gotten to these changes, especially to the idea of consolidating, like, 13 different programs that deal with development and getting rid of mandates. And I wonder if you could also tell us if the United States has been participating in this.

Thank you. Take them one by one. Well, I think, by and large, this applies both to the briefing we gave last week, which you referred to specifically, but also in the broader conversations around the UNH initiative. Let me answer your question by taking the broader and the more specific points. I think, by and large, member states regard this initiative as timely and necessary.

So there is a following wind, I think, encouraging us to advance on all of the three areas of work that I've outlined to you. I think it fair to say that there are some member states, particularly those who, I think, invest and contribute substantially to the system, who are encouraging the Secretary General to boldness and ambition. They want to see this process bring significant change, an improvement in the system. But I think it's fair to say as well that there is another body of opinion amongst members who urge a certain degree of caution, that in the intent of making change and bringing reforms, being rigorous in terms of our financial management, things might be lost which they value. And I think this is an important reflex to recognise as well.

There are those who will emphasize the need at a time when back to basics is a mantra, and we're being encouraged in the UN to get back to basics. We're being encouraged to recognize that the basics of the United nations are all three columns, all three pillars of the Charter, and not one as opposed to another. So some are very anxious that we be attentive to our development responsibilities, as well as, of course, peace and security and human rights. So I think there is a slight variety in that regard. More specifically, what are the reactions from last week?

I think the first one is, my goodness, this is complicated and difficult. We wonder if you're going to be able to do it and not to hold back on that. We sometimes ask ourselves the same question. It is difficult, if you look at the, you know, the rather formidable array of statistics and analysis we've done already on the mandates, and I repeat, this is the meat of the. Of the year and this is the work that we do.

We recognize that we have a difficult task of untangling the undergrowth of decisions and resolutions and mechanisms that we put in place to implement them, and we wonder if we're going to be able to advance significantly. When a similar review undertaken 20 years ago ran rather quickly into the sand, it did not produce the results that were hoped for and expected at that time. We're looking at that experience of 20 years ago and we hope we can avoid some of the pitfalls. I can go into some of the details if you would wish, but here's my point. Yes, get on with this encouragement.

Be careful. What I worry about is a certain degree of skepticism that, you know, this is difficult. We've heard this before. No reason to believe you'll do better this time. I think that should encourage us to greater efforts in the secretariat and hopefully the complexities of the exercise combined with the difficulties of the moment should concentrate our minds to the types of effort that might take us forward.

Amelie deji Sorry, I'm sorry. I didn't deliberately forget that one. I just forgot it. The US I've engaged with representatives of the US government in different fora. I think the message to the United States is that they are following the process with interest.

A representative of the US Government did intervene in the briefing last week.

It was a sort of, I think, an encouragement to proceed with this process, but without any particular expression of how the US government would judge the results. Frankly, until they see the results. Amelie Deji Lenka then Pam thanks.

Amelie Beautellier from AFP News Agency. I have two questions, I mean two different questions about the jobs.

The posts you mentioned several times, 15 to 20% of the post financed by the regular budget. Have you got any answer from all the services where you ask them to go cut jobs and what's going to happen to the rest of the jobs that are not, I mean for the job that are not financed by the regular budget because it's 2/3 of the secretarial employment force. And my second question is about the mandates, the 4,000 mandates that are included in the budget. Could you give us some examples? Because I guess none, I mean not all of them have the same impact on budgetary issues.

So could you give us some example? It's not only reports, it's can you give us some example of what are those mandates and what could be easily or more easily cut? Thank you.

Thanks for those two questions. On the well, the objective is a 20% reduction in post for the regular budget. As you've pointed out in the secretariat, the process up until now is that the different entities, the different departments have now submitted to the Secretary General Their proposals, their ideas on how those objectives might be met one by one. And those inputs are now being examined by the Secretary General and his colleagues here. It's quite clear that we can reach the targets that have been set.

But I think what is important in the process of review that the Secretary General is now engaging in is that it will not result in a 20%, can I use a phrase, haircut across every department. It is not a one size fits all solution. Rather, the Secretary General is reviewing the inputs. He will make his determinations on where he believes certain services, certain activities need to be. The word I could use is protected or not, subject to the full rigor of a 20% cuts.

Those where a greater effort might be called for. All of this underpinned by the efforts that we are making to find efficiencies and improvements across the Secretariat. The point I make here is that he's undertaking this review and you will see a strategic approach to this revision of the budget, not a simple non considered across the board cut. You've asked what happens to extra budgetary funded posts. That depends in very great measure to the behaviour of those who provide extra budgetary funds.

And we, we've seen some of the phenomena of recent months in that regard, but that's a slightly separate exercise to the regular budget process. We are of course subject to the decisions of Member States in terms of voluntary contributions. When it comes to regular budget contributions. You will have heard the Secretary General repeat his calls for Member States to pay their contributions fully and on time, which in the end is the only solution to the liquidity difficulties that we face. UN80 is not a solution to the liquidity problem in and of itself.

On the mandates issue, of course, we're looking to the resource investments that we make in the implementation of mandates. And the. The evidence that we've provided last week shows that the resource inputs are very considerable. But what we're not trying to do is pick off one mandate because it's expensive or in view of its resource implications. We are trying to have a more methodical, systemic review of mandates as a whole, the corpus of mandates, identify where duplications and redundancies may exist, where we can approach implementation in a more rational, streamlined way and produce the types of proposals that we hope Member States will give favourable consideration to.

And it's for that reason, if you understand the approach, that it's a bit difficult for me to say, well, that mandate could save us some money or there's a low hanging fruit over there. That's not the way we're approaching it. I think we're trying to approach this on a. I hate the word holistic basis, but looking at the whole body of what we have before us and how we could structurally improve our circumstances. Thank you.

Deji Lenka, Pam Abdelhamid and then Mr.

Ryder Sridhaju with China Central Television. Two questions. First, during your last weekend, last week's conversations with member states, what do you think is the most complicated or most difficult dilemma for you to handle? And secondly, I'm just curious, if I'm the member state, I want to. I have to pay the contribution.

If you do job cuts, I pay full and on time, does that mean that I don't need to get involved in the job cuts? I mean, it's natural for a member State to think like, if I paid this much money, why should they first cut the jobs of this country? Right. So how are you going to respond on that? Thank you.

Well, on your second question, I mean, the reality of our situation is that all Member states, whatever you think the merits of their views and their behaviour might be, all Member states will pronounce upon the budget as of September, and we will have to respond to. To their views and to their wishes. I can only repeat what I've already said. It would help the whole situation enormously if we did have the benefit of full and timely payment of financial contributions. I really would not make a link between, though the.

The payment behavior of Member states and this process of job reductions. I'm not sure that it's helpful. I'm not sure that it influences the way that we approach the issues. It is extraordinarily difficult to pick out what the most difficult dilemma. There seem to be quite a few of them.

But in the end, I think one of the things I find quite difficult is that we are, because of the calendar, obliged to come up with budgetary proposals already in September. We need a result by then. So, in a sense, we're looking at the resource base first. Then we're going to do our ongoing work on mandates and then come to structures. In an ideal world, in laboratory conditions, I would want to do it sequentially, looking at mandates first and drawing the lessons from our review of mandate implementation.

And that would inform resource allocations. We don't have that luxury. We don't live in ideal conditions. So I think articulating these three work streams, and the more we do this work, the more it becomes evident they are interlinked and making sure Member States keep their eyes on the full picture rather than a segmented approach that that might not really inform decision making in the best way. This is going to be something we're going to have to do.

And I think the answer lies in consultation in informing member states on a continuous basis.

Thank you, Lenka. Thank you very much. Lenka White with Rhea Novosti, please.

Just a follow up to EDI's question.

You mentioned that you have spoken with the US administration on various levels. Could you by any sense specify have you been in contact directly maybe with the Trump administration or is it mainly the US Mission here and also has the US Given some concrete recommendations what they would prefer to see to be reduced? Thank you.

Well, my own contacts have been with State and with the mission here. That's been my, my contacts.

I think the messaging from the United States, it has emphasized the back to basics narrative and there's an emphasis on peace and security and the responsibility of the United nations in that field, I think. And that was on record from last week's briefing.

Pam, thank you.

USG Rider, nice to see you. It's Pamela Falk from U.S. news & World Report on the numbers.

I've read the report and forgive me if there are evidence somewhere, but is the funding gap $4 trillion that I've seen and is what are you anticipating? It's hard to say, but the loss from the US and other countries on development aid on that front, the Joint SDG Fund and the Fund for Nutrition are all looking at the private sector. They have numbers in the billions that they're bringing in from tax, tax programs and all sorts of things that bring private sector money in. Do you how much of the funding gap do you anticipating, anticipate getting from other sources, like private sector things?

Yeah, this broadens the scope of the conversation a little bit because the $4 trillion which you're referring to is the SDG funding gap.

This is the sorts of issues which are being discussed right now in Seville at the Financing for Development conference. And I think for, for the more detailed response to your question, I'd refer you to the Compromiso de Sevilla, which is the document with, of course, the abstention of some member states, which is being worked out in Seville. UN80 does not directly address, as you'll appreciate, that funding gap. We're very much looking at the United nations own resource and policy circumstances, circumstances which of course is material and relevant to that bigging funder gap. But I think that's a separate conversation in terms of development finance.

What is absolutely evident from Seville is that there are insufficient funds being devoted to sustainable development. We need to do better and we need to use what funding is available to the maximum benefit and explore innovative approaches. For example, bumping up financing through the multilateral development banks. But these issues do really lie beyond the scope of understood.

What is your sense of what you're looking at for what you're doing for UN80 in terms of the funding gap?

What's the big picture, ballpark number?

Well, I think we're talking about apples and pears here. And I'm not able to to relate, you know, the deficit in funding for the UN Secretariat itself, our budgetary circumstances, to the much greater funding gap for sustainable development.

What do you put your funding gap at?

Well, I mean, we'd have to look at whatever the collection of funding is now for this year.

One thing is certain, we are operating in the UN secretariat this year at 83% of budget. That is to say, the work that we're doing is at the level of 83% of the assessed budget as originally adopted. So that probably gives you the measure of the shortfall of contributions, if that's the best answer to your question. We have 112 member states that have paid in full this year. We can get you the total amount that adds up to.

And obviously you subtract that to get the budget.

Abdul hamid

thank you, Mr. Rider. Abdelhamed Sayyam from the Arabic daily Al Qudsel Arabi. I have two questions. The first, who will benefit from the US cuts when the US as the largest contributor, when they do major cuts, which member states would benefit from that?

But my second question is also about the benefits that the US is gaining from having the UN headquarter in New York and Bretton woods in Washington. Just to recall one short story. During the tenure of Boutros Botros Galley, Germany offered the UN to move UNDB to Bonn because they moved the capital to Berlin. All these buildings were empty. So Butrous Ghali was lenient to accept the offer.

Mayor Dinkins came to his office and said not one single office will be moved. UN is the largest employer of Americans in the city. I think maybe he said after ATT or the largest employer and he refused to allow UNDB to move out of the city. So the US is benefiting. Would you comment on that?

Also having 195 missions here, having hotels, rental buildings, airlines, restaurants, banking and all that. Why the UN does not put these facts also when they discuss the budget or the contributions with the U.S. thank you very much.

Well, to your first question, sir, who benefits from US Countries cuts. I find it very difficult to envisage or articulate anybody who benefits from funding cuts to the United Nations. If one accepts that the funding that we receive is used to the benefit of people, then clearly cuts are a negative.

They're not a benefit, not for people, not for countries. The presence of the UN in New York we have cut actually got some figures about what the UN's presence means for the local economy in New York.

I have to say this notion of the benefits to local economies, of the presence of the UN is a conversation which occurs much more in Geneva and in Vienna. For obvious reasons. The relative impact of the multilateral system's presence in those capitals is very much greater than the impact of the UN in New York, which grosso modo is a relatively marginal factor in the overall local economy. But I take advantage of your question to say that we are looking at relocations. This is part of the first work stream, the relocation not of entities, but of functions that could be moved from higher to lower cost locations.

No decisions taken in that regard as yet, but a couple of points about that process. Firstly, the relocation of possible relocation of functions, of course has a cost consideration behind it. The whole notion of moving from higher to lower cost locations makes that clear. But we are also conscious that the types of functions we are talking about should be those which for their effective implementation do not depend on proximity to our member states, representatives in the diplomatic community. So it's more the back room functions than the membership facing functions that will be first in line for consideration.

And secondly, this is not a free for all. The Secretary General has been clear, clear in saying where we're considering relocations, it might be to locations where the UN already has a presence. We have a certain degree of infrastructure. We have a reliable set of conditions which would enable us to function effectively. So it's a very carefully considered process and as I say, no decisions yet.

If you'll allow me, Guy, just to add, Abdelhamid, there is a study published by the City of New York a few years ago which outlines the economic impact. And the UN Foundation Better World Program puts out every year a look at the procurement that the UN does inside the us state by state. There's a new study coming out in August for 2024. 2023 was about $2.2 billion worth of procurement and almost 490 million in New York State.

Yes, in the back.

Thank you for the briefing, Mr. Ryder. This is Ahmed Ali with Sphinx News TV. The UN80 initiative is quite clear on. Its stance of Advancement by leveraging its use of various digital platforms. To what extent does this involve the use of AI?

And do you think this will have. Some altering effect on future jobs or within the organization? Thank you. Yes, AI seems to loom very large in all of our lives and our working lives as well. At the policy level I would refer you of course, the Global Digital Compact and everything that that says about the governance of AI.

But your question is directed to the impact and implications of AI to the work that the United nations does itself. Well, yes. And within the the framework of the UN 2.0 process, we are increasingly using AI applications. The materials that we produced last week is a reflection of that use. We think that we are beginning to find our way to extract very useful dividends from the application of AI.

We've looked very carefully about how we should apply artificial intelligence, the parameters that we should observe. This has been a subject for conversation in the High Level Committee on Management. And my view is that we need and if we're serious about efficiencies and effectiveness, we need to embrace AI applications in that regard. I don't believe we're different from any other workplace which is already taking up a AI in increasingly rapid way. And this will have an implication for the way the organization works.

As always with these things, you have to manage change. You have to be very, I think intentional about what you want to get out of AI. But at a time when you know we're being encouraged to do more to service member states with. I'm not going to say with less. Do more with the resources that Member States choose to make available to us.

AI's got to be a part of that story moving forward.

We'll move back up. Joel C. And then Kyoto.

Thanks very much. This mandate review. I did look at some of the charts then got needed more coffee. But it looks like it's as you say, it's the most challenging aspect of. Because you have to really deal with the member states directly on these decisions.

Are the member states actually taking up a role in the mandate reviews? Because I listened to the forum last week, I didn't hear them taking up that role and also the timeline. So these changes will take effect in 2026. January. Thanks.

Just to answer that last point, the budgetary changes will take effect from the beginning of 2026. I would love to believe the mandate review would be done and dusted by the 1st of January. I don't think it will be. It's a slightly longer term prospect up until this point. To answer your question, The Secretariat has been trying to do its homework, as it were, in presenting compelling evidence to Member States in respect of the advisability or merits of mandate review.

It is self evident that in the final analysis, Member States will decide what they want to do with the mandate. We can provide evidence on what we do to implement mandates. The mandates are the property of Member States. It will be for them to decide what to do about them. Now, the deadlines ahead of us mean that Member States will move center stage quite quickly.

The Secretary General will produce his report on the mandate implementation review at the end of this month, and as I've indicated, he will present that report to Member States, and it will then be for Member States to agree on their intentions. A discussion is already underway about whether it would be advisable to open up an intergovernmental, formal intergovernmental process, bearing in mind that that's what was tried 20 years ago without the results that we wanted. But what I heard from Member States last week was that, yes, they're anxious to pick up their responsibilities in this regard. They're ready to do so, but they want the Secretariat to do the preparatory work, which will give them a chance of succeeding where the previous effort did not succeed. So what I heard was Member States say to the Secretary General, yes, go ahead, do your homework, but come to us with recommendations and options that would frame a potential intergovernmental process with the best chances of success, understanding the really deep complexities involved in the process.

But what is that criteria going to be based on in terms of the Secretariat deciding what to recommend and what to do not to recommend? It will be based on the evidence that we are busy putting together. And the Secretary General will. And, well, he's being encouraged at least to make recommendations. There's a nice phrase from the.

From the report of 20 years ago. The objective of all of this is to enable Member States to be better and more effective custodians of the mandates which they have created. In a nutshell, that is the. The objective of the report that we want to put together, not as an interesting intellectual exercise, but as a practical political exercise, one that can help us improve the way that we do our work.

Thank you, Kyodo News.

Yu. Thank you, Mr. Guy Raida. My name is Yu from Kyodo News, Japanese News Agency. I have two questions.

One is the third Workstream Structure and Program Rearrangement. So could you provide us some example of organizations concerning reorganization or integration or operation? So second is about. For 22,000, for 2027, not 26. So I mean, as you said, you will cut 50%, 20% cut for 2026.

So. So how about 2026? Will you cut more people or more budget for 27? Thank you. Yeah, thank you for the questions.

Look, I don't think it would be helpful or indeed possible for me to give you examples of entities where mergers or abolitions might be under consideration. Again, we are in the process of gathering information, gathering the views within the system, and the seven clusters which I referred to earlier on, are canvassing within their different thematic areas, ideas about where streamlining realignment might be made. And the words are important. Structural change implies that you look at the organigram and maybe you put the boxes together or get rid of one of the boxes. It really is architectural change.

Program realignment is a slightly different concept. That is where you look at the architecture and you see that maybe two parts of that architecture are doing similar work or duplicating each other. And without changing the architecture itself, you realign the work and the connections between the different parts of the system. And I think in the end, although attention is much more easily attracted to structural change, it will be the work of aligning the work of different parts of the system, different entities, that might give us some maximum results. And again, I'm sorry, also to be a little unhelpful, I cannot tell you what the 2027 budget will look like.

Let's see where we get on the 2026 budget. Member states will have to pronounce on that. One problem at a time might be a way to look at this, but clearly the guidance we get from Member states in terms of whatever budget they determine for 2026 and their ongoing views in terms of mandates, in terms of structures, would be, I think, precisely the factors that would inform the formulation of the budget for 2027. But the Secretary General has specified that the UN 80 process will be relevant not only to the budget exercise for next year, but also for 2027. Sorry, I missed a question in the back.

Yeah, please.

My name is Izuma from nhk. I have a question about the relocation. So I just came back from Nairobi. So how much. If you have any estimation on how much you can save by those relocation.

Those calculations are being done and factored into the budgetary proposals. And of course, we have to look at all of the relevant factors when it comes to the costs and benefits of relocation. And sometimes these are not so obvious and sometimes they're counter intuitive. There is a major difference between the costs of the relocation of an international civil service post and a locally recruited general service post. Nairobi's are actually quite a striking example for an international civil service post.

The cost in Nairobi are pretty close to those in New York or in Geneva. There is not a major change. But that situation is quite different when it comes to locally recruited general service posts. So it's an example of the need for us to dig quite deeply into all of the factors involved. Salaries is one, but there are others as well and make sure that the decisions or the proposals that are eventually made for Member State consideration take into account all of the aspects and it's not so easy.

Yes, please.

Hi. Hi, I'm Kyoto Tanaka from Asashimben, the Japanese newspaper. I'm interested in a conversation that you're having at this stage with Member States, apart from those open conversations that we saw last week. Are you, you just mentioned, you know, you talk to the US Administration at different levels and gathering information. Are you below the surface?

Are you talking to like member states? And if so, what would be the purpose of that?

Well, the answer is yes, we're talking to member states. I mean, I spent time in Geneva talking to the diplomatic community in Geneva. There is a particular perspective when it comes to the multilateral system viewed from Geneva.

We are interacting with groups of member states, regional groups, G77, cross regional groups. I'm meeting Ambassadors individually and I think Yesterday I met two ambassadors on UN80. And I think the objectives are not difficult to to understand. Firstly is to explain, to share with Member States the development of our thinking. And I'm encouraged that we're able to have, I think, quite substantive and helpful conversations in that regard, but also to get their guidance and their reaction, you know, as we go about trying to formulate the Secretary General's proposals in whatever of these three work streams it may be.

I think we benefit from this conversation with Member States. And my impression is there is an appetite for exchange of information and ideas, be it formally in the briefings like the one last week, or as you said, in a slightly more reserved context. And I think that's a good way for us to try to move forward. What I think would be unhelpful would be if Member States were to gain the view that the Secretariat is sitting in a court corner developing a plan for the future of the United Nations. We think we're in possession of all of the ideas and wisdom and then launch it on Member States.

We need to co create to a certain degree. On that note, could you specify the actual process that we expect to happen after the release of the report this month and also the proposal in the September, what will actually happen?

Well, I think on the budgetary to that first work stream in September, it's all pretty predictable. There is standing machinery of which I have a relative understanding. The ACABQ of the Fifth Committee, it will go through the machinery.

And the Secretary General's made very, very clear that he will be fully respectful of established process in determining the budget. So I think that's, in process terms, relatively clear. On the second work stream on mandates, this doesn't really have the same type of precedent that we might follow. But just to repeat, the Secretary General will present proposals, ideas, options, maybe to member states, and it will be for member states on receipt of that report to determine what path they want to follow. And one option, I repeat, is the establishment of an intergovernmental process.

It may be that they want us to do they'll send us back to do more preparatory work before the launching of intergovernmental process. But here I'm speculating because it will be for Member states to pronounce themselves on what they consider to be the best way forward. What I think people want to avoid is, is a very, very, very prolonged process. It's quite easy to imagine a process of this complexity dragging out for a very long period of time. And I think everybody would appreciate it if we could move rather more expeditiously forward to a result.

But my view on that is if you want to move and move quickly and effectively, you have to establish the baseline on a very clear, a very clear standard.

Going to squeeze in two last questions, Magdalena, and then Gabriel, if you have one, otherwise.

Hi, I'm Magdalena Del Valle from Bloomberg News. I'm just wondering what we can expect to see from the Secretary General's report in the end of the month. So will it be a more detailed.

Version of what we got last week or like, what might we expect it to look like?

Yeah. Again, I will spend my afternoon with colleagues trying to work out an answer to your very good question. But I think there's one thing that is clear. We probably will have to do a little bit more work on the data, on crunching the data, and there are masses of data out there just to give Member States a bit of a clearer insight into our current circumstances.

But the report cannot simply be a more elaborate presentation of what we produced last week, just data and analytics. It's got also to point the way forward in terms of process. I think we're going to have to establish very clearly an understanding of the objectives for which we are shooting. Is it simply a resource driven process? We want to lighten up the burden on our budget and on Member States capacities.

Is it a more strategic approach to the substance of mandates and then the question of how we proceed moving forward. So I think we have to combine a deepening of the data piece, but also a clear statement of objectives and then a process that gives us a reasonable chance of getting to those objectives. I think it's good that we start with an idea of what the success of this process would look like. So those are the variables that we're throwing around in the Secretariat right now.

Thank you, Gabriel.

Hi, Mr. Ryder. Gabriel Zondo from Al Jazeera English. Just Quickly, you mentioned 20 years ago the UN went through a similar process that I don't think you said failed, but you said it kind of hit some sand or quicksand or something. Can you just explain briefly what was the main challenge on why that failed and what you think will be done differently this time to avert that? Thank you.

Yeah, I, I spent the last, last weekend looking at the evidence of 20 years ago. The, the people who led that process, the co facilitators of that process, attribute in the first instance, the other people have called it a failure. So I, I'll use their language. The failure of that process to the inability to lay link mandates to resource use. They couldn't make the link because our systems did not permit it.

I think that's only part. And they also refer to a loss of political interest and investment by Member States, although I think probably that loss of interest was a consequence of the process getting bogged down. I think we can learn and we're being encouraged to learn from, from that experience, we'll do our best to marshal information about resource allocations. We have some basis to do that. One of the advantages that we have is that we are in a much better place now to present evidence in a more compelling way.

Through data analytics, through artificial intelligence, I think we are able to place before Member States in a way which was not so easy to 20 years ago, the realities of our system. Where the difficulties may lie, where duplications can be presumed to exist and engage them in a process that could result in a successful outcome. I think it's fair to say, although it might sound rather negative, that the difficulties of the moment today are also a positive factor in concentrating the minds of Member States. You know, if you've got an issue which really matters to Member States, they're liable to invest more effort in finding results. I also think we can adopt a more systemic.

But these are embryonic thoughts in my mind, a much more systemic approach to what we are doing. One of the benefits of this mandate review is that it is embedded in a broader process which looks at our budgets and looks at our structures and our program alignments. Those are complementary to getting the story on mandates right. So I think the fact that this is embedded in a broader process, if we manage it smartly, can increase our prospects of success with no certainties. Of course.

Guy, thank you very much. And thank you. Thank you for your time. I think Sharon will be here probably close to on time, and I will be my usual.