Press Conference: Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations on his recent trip to the Middle East and peacekeeping operations
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All right, good afternoon. Efraim, this way. We're delighted to be joined by our colleague Jean-Pierre Lacroix, who, as you know, is the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations. Jean-Pierre just came back from the Malis. He'll tell you a bit about that, and then we'll take some questions. So, Jean-Pierre, welcome, and you have the floor.
Thank you very much, Stefan, and very good afternoon to all of you. Let me perhaps share some observations from my recent visit to the Middle East, and I will also briefly raise Western Sahara and Abyei, our unsung mission in Abyei. So, Lebanon. I was there. I met with senior Lebanese officials, as well as UNIFIL's leadership and peacekeepers. And obviously, one of the main intention of that visit was to pay tribute to our colleagues from UNIFIL. most likely the last time that I had the opportunity to visit UNIFIL peacekeepers, and I really wanted to pay tribute to what they've done over the last decades. And of course, I also reiterated our strong commitment to supporting peace and stability in Lebanon, as well as the full implementation of resolution 1701. Now, I also want to emphasized that, and what I've seen on the ground is that UNIFIL's colleagues, UNIFIL's peacekeepers, continue to do their work. They continue to implement their mandate. They continue to monitor developments in their area of operation, as well as report on violations. They maintain liaison and deconfliction with the parties. And they facilitate, that is very important, they keep facilitating humanitarian access in southern Lebanon, because as you know, there continues to be people living in those areas, including, from what I heard, and again, don't take my word for it exactly, I mean, the exact figure is difficult to to have, but about still 10,000 people living in the area between the so-called yellow line of the Israeli forward defense line and the blue line. So that humanitarian access and the humanitarian system that is provided to these people continues to be really vital. But now, as you know, we are waiting for the Security Council to give us guidance in terms of the way forward. You would remember that in June this year, the Secretary General put forward to the Security Council options for a UN presence after UNIFIL, and that was a request by this very Security Council. And obviously, we would want to see, again, guidance from the Council as far as we are concerned, and I think that is made clear in the Secretary-General's report containing these proposals. We do believe that a UN presence in Lebanon continues to be needed. I believe that is also the view of the Lebanese authorities. I met with them, I met with President Haroun, Prime Minister Nawwaf Salam, Speaker Berry, and others, ministers, the chief of the Lebanese Armed Forces, and all of them, I believe, expressed concern. I cannot speak on their behalf, of course, but I can tell you what I heard from them, concerned about Some would have called it a security vacuum, but essentially what happens when there is no third-party presence between the Lebanese army and the Israeli Defense Forces? What happens when there is no monitoring and reporting on developments, particularly along the Blue Line? potentially, what about the Blue Line? What happens to the Blue Line itself? What about the support that I just mentioned, the support to the communities in the south? And concerned also about some of the capacities that UNITIL has, like mining or demining rather, and engineering, which are seen as very important and useful. So again, hopefully we will see some movement at the Security Council, but ultimately we are in the hands of our Member States, we are in the hands of the members of the Council, and we would be, of course, very happy to get some clear guidance from this Council. Ultimately, the UN's objectives have not changed. We want a successful political process with resolution 1701 as the compass. a process that creates the conditions for the UN to move towards supporting stability and, you know, the welfare of the population of Lebanon and a situation where the security concern of Lebanon as well as of Israel would be fully addressed. Very briefly, I also visited Syria and our mission on the Golan Heights, UNDOF, and I thanked our peacekeepers for their work in supervising the implementation of the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces under that 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement. The UNDOF mission does not enforce any any engagement doesn't have any enforcement mandate, but it has a role for the monitoring and reporting of, you know, again, developments on the ground, and it plays a very important role in terms of liaison and deconfliction between the parties. I would also add that in the current environment, in which now the area of operation underfunds itself, this role of liaison and deconfliction has probably increased importance. And then in addition to that, we have Our colleagues at Omdurman are regularly interacting with the population, the civilian population on the ground. The civilian population feels a very strong impact as a result of the presence of the Israel Defense Forces on on the ground, they convey their complaints to us about people being detained, about properties being or restrictions of access, or properties being confiscated, and our colleagues do convey these concerns and complaints to the Israel Defense Forces, and I'm happy to report that on a number of occasions, we have been able, through this liaison work, to secure the release of people, detained people, and also the return of properties. So, of course, not 100%, but still something that I believe we should be proud of, and we'll continue to do our work, but it's clear, as is mentioned in the latest report by the Secretary General that there is a strong concern about the impact of the presence of the Israel Defense Forces in the end of area of operation on the civilian population. Now, very briefly, Western Sahara MINUSO, as you know very well, Following the Security Council's failure to agree on an extension of mandate, the mandate of MINUSO has expired on 31 October, and the mission now has ceased its operation after 35 years. I want to Again, reiterate our deepest gratitude to all the military and civilian personnel who have served with MINUSO, very often in austere, actually very austere conditions and very remote locations. And a particular tribute, of course, paid to the 20 MINUSO personnel who lost their lives serving this mission. Now, Manuso has entered this liquidation phase. As you know, this came rather abruptly, but we're working very closely with the Department of Operations Support, which he's in the lead now to ensure an orderly process, and we count, of course, on the full cooperation of all the parties. As the liquidation gets underway, we wish to reiterate the Secretary General's call on all concerned to exercise maximum restraint and to refrain from any action that could further increase tension or undermine regional stability. And as the Secretary General also emphasized, the UN remains committed to supporting the parties in their efforts to reach a mutually acceptable political solution that provides for the self-determination of people of Western Sahara. Now, again, very briefly, I wanted to say a few words about Abyei, as I will be briefing the Security Council on our peacekeeping mission there tomorrow. First of all, I want to again express or reiterate our deepest condolences to the families and loved ones of those who lost their lives in the recent drone attacks in Abyei, and wish a swift recovery to those injured. UNICEF has played a very important role in bringing support to the affected people, as well as firefighting capabilities, quick reaction forces, the deployment of medical personnel, providing emergency assistance, supporting casualty evacuation, et cetera, et cetera, helping prevent the fires from spreading. So just to say that on this occasion, as well as on many other, our UNICEF colleagues really demonstrated a very remarkable capacity to quickly react and really a strong dedication to supporting people affected by this terrible incident. And the mission has also intensified patrols and engagement with local communities and relevant authorities to help prevent further violence. But I think if we look at the bigger picture, what we see from these attacks is the increasingly complex threats that we're facing, including from drones. And you'd have seen, I believe, the recent pronouncement by our Secretary General about this very, very concerning trend. The safety and security of our peacekeepers remain obviously a top priority. We're working very hard. a body of work that we have initiated to tackle this challenge of drones, the threat of drone on us, but also on the population we serve. But obviously, that is a very, very major topic now. And it's not only about finding out adequate responses to these threats. Of course, there are a number of measures that can be taken to mitigate the threats, but ultimately it's a question of political responsibility. And I believe that as we will be moving forward, the importance of advocacy, advocacy towards the parties, towards all those who can help us prevent and mitigate these evolving threats will be critically important. So that is really what I wanted to share with you, and perhaps a few words on the review of all forms of peace operations, because the report has been issued now a bit more than two months ago, a bit three months ago. And I want to just emphasize that we have already initiated a number of follow-up exercises based on the recommendation of that review. One of the important recommendations is to conduct a review of the peacekeeping capabilities to ensure that, you know, peacekeeping tomorrow will be equipped with the right and adequate technologically advanced capabilities so that we can be more effective and also more cost effective. So that process has been initiated. Obviously, it will be a very inclusive and interactive process with our member states. We are equally working on revisiting the plan for the safety and security of our peacekeepers, which initially was launched in 2017, where a number of bodies of work initiated on the basis of that plan. We have also worked on a number of recommendations regarding how to operationalize the important objective of securing more progress on accountability for crimes against peacekeepers, And we intend to work on a few other important issues, but what I just wanted to say is that, you know, we haven't waited for the launching of these important bodies of work, and we will be interacting increasingly, of course, with our Member States on the implementation of the review of all forms of peace operations. So this is really what I wanted to share with you. I will leave it at that. Thank you.
Thank you, Jean-Pierre.
Thank you very much, Mr. LaCroix, on behalf of the United Nations Correspondents Association for doing this briefing. Can you tell us what is the UN's view of what will happen if there is a security vacuum with the end of the UNIFIL mission on December 31st.
Okay, please. Well, I think we heard the concerns expressed by the Lebanese authorities, and I believe that, and I mentioned these concerns to you. I mean, how can there be avoidance of unintended incident or escalation between the Lebanese army and the Israeli Defense Forces, because they will end up being sort of face to face. And I know that the liaison and deconfliction mechanism that UNIFIL has in place is a very effective one. It's a very effective one, not only to avoid these unintended escalation, But it's also very effective in terms of securing convoys, particularly humanitarian convoys, because those convoys obviously have to be deconflicted with the parties and certainly with the IDF. So that is really, I believe, a concern that if we don't have that anymore, then do we really have any other mechanism that would provide for these kind of de-escalation? And do we really believe that the Lebanese army and the Israel Defense Forces can be just left facing one another without, again, any third party? That's number one. And number two, one of the key mandated role of UNIFIL is to to observe and report on developments on the ground, including along the Blue Line. Now, that capacity will disappear with UNIFIL. Yes, the military observers, UNSO military observer, will continue to have their mandate. By the way, that would be the mandate predating UNIFIL. But What could be the condition by which they could be able to operate, particularly in southern Lebanon, especially in the area between the yellow line and the blue line, if they don't have the kind of supporting capacities that they would need? Because it's a military area, so it's full of Yoksos, and there is kinetic activity going on there, so you can't just have those military observers unarmed, you know, without any kind of protection. So these are the kind of concerns that were expressed by the Lebanese authorities, and I believe that some of these concerns are warranted. And that is our view, because otherwise, if it had not been our view, then you wouldn't have, or the Security Council wouldn't have on its table the proposals that were made by the Secretary-General.
A quick follow-up. It's no secret that Israel is supported by the United States. strongly support the end of UNIFIL's mission. Are there any discussions that you know of going on now, and even possibly as a result of the election results yesterday for democratic congress?
I hope that the Security Council will start discussing about the post-UNIFIL. As I said, we need clarity, we need clear guidance from the Council. The plans for the withdrawal of UNIFIL are ready, and one of the things that I did in Lebanon with my colleagues at UNIFIL was to make sure that the plans were there. They have been very well prepared under the leadership of the force commander, Major General Banyara, and at the same time, these plans are sufficiently flexible so as to enable us to adapt should there be any decision from the Security Council about some sort of UN presence post-UNIFIL. But again, we're in the hands of members of the Security Council. So far, there hasn't been much by way of movement. I hope, I think that there will be more activity there. But then again, you know, we would we could use clarity and guidance from the Council.
Efraim, then Sellya.
Thank you so much, Mr. Lacroix. Efraim Kosaifi from Arab News Daily. Also a follow-up on ED's first First question, where does Hezbollah fit in all of this? What are the concerns regarding, you mentioned the Lebanese army versus Israel, but what about Hezbollah, the disarmament, 1701, where does that all fit? That's a quick follow-up. And second, waiting for guidance from the council, we hear, here, reporters who are here, that there has been complete intransigence on the part of the US that there would be no UN presence in the south whatsoever. Do you have any reasons to believe that that is not the case? Do you foresee any actual UN presence, or do you think the other efforts by the EU, France, and Italy would be a good alternative? Thank you.
I mean, as long as the discussion at the Security Council hasn't really started, We can't really prejudge the outcome. You know how Security Council works. We know. I mean, so I think it's, i think, a bit pointless to sort of speculate on what kind of position ultimately that particular member state or that other member state will take. So that's number one. Number two, I think Lebanon needs international support. That's very clear. And from that point of view, the EU operation, which is focused on providing training, capacity building to the Lebanese army, as well as the police and security forces, that is, of course, needed, and I believe it's welcome. And as far as the Multinational force, what I understand is that the discussions are still ongoing. We haven't had, we haven't seen any final sort of decision about how and when and, you know, what modalities, if any, that multinational force would have. So we'll have to see that. But the bottom line is that it's clear that Lebanon needs, I mean, You know, there has been, I would say, a courageous decision made by the Lebanese authorities, and they have engaged in a process. including the so-called tripartite framework discussion with Israel, mediated by the United States, which the UN supports, and the objectives of the resolution 1701 are, I believe, universally shared by our member states, they're shared by the parties. So the question is how to get there, and how can the international community, including the UN, best support these process and avoid any stalling or even reversal of the trends or the movement that have been observed since the beginning of this year. And in response to your question about Hezbollah, I think the response is in what I've said about the objectives of resolution 1701. Ultimately, it's about restoring Lebanon's full sovereignty, including full control on arms by the legitimate security forces and armed forces of Lebanon, security concerns of Lebanon being addressed as well as security concerns in the region, including Israel's security concern. So these are objectives, I mean, at least on Lebanon, the key objectives are not disputed. The question is how to get there, how to provide the best possible support. to the parties in those efforts.
Thank you. Celia.
Celia Davaren, Africa Confidential. What concretely can be done to improve the security and the safety of peacekeepers other than writing a report?
There's a lot of things that not only can be done, but are being done to protect peacekeepers. First of all, the medical support has tremendously improved, and credit really goes to our colleagues, Department of Operation Support, my brother, colleague, friend, Yoji Kari, and the team, and they have been really working a lot on telemedicine and all kinds of measures that have improved really medical support. intensely on mine and IED threats, and now we not only have a policy, but we have implemented that policy, and that has brought result. A couple of other examples, camp protection was something for which there was not really a policy. It was not even clear who in a camp where you had military, civilian, police, you know, who would take the lead in case of attack. All of this has been addressed as well, but of course, threats are evolving. And as we had many fatalities in Mali as a result of IED attacks, now we're seeing drone attacks and the recent fatalities, particularly the six peacekeepers from Bangladesh who were killed in Kadugli, Sudan, were killed as a result of a drone attack. So now we are working on drones and how to mitigate that threat. So it's not about report, it's actually about concrete actions. But, you know, it's like, you know, we're running on the treadmill. I mean, the threats are evolving very fast and we have to be faster than this. But it requires very strong support and cooperation from our member states, both in terms of the kind of capacity that they can bring to us. and also in terms of the resources that are provided to peacekeeping operations, because improving safety and security also has a cost.
Thank you, Linda. And then Gabriel.
Thank you, Mr. Lacroix. My question has to do with, you had mentioned how And regarding UNIFIL, the Force Commander is trying to maintain flexibility for the future. In a situation, for example, now with MINUSO and it's the liquidation process is underway, if political circumstances change or diplomatic circumstances, and the decision was made to re-establish MINUSO, how long would it take?
Well, I think it's very, very, very hypothetical. And following the good example repeatedly provided by Steph, I think it's better to abstain from commenting on this hypothetical.
I would say, yes, very, very, very hypothetical. Gabriel, please.
Hi, Mr. LaCroix. Gabriel Elizondo from Al Jazeera English. Can you give us an update on funding situation for peacekeeping? Last I checked my notes in late September, member states owed 4.1 billion, 3 billion by the U.S. Are those numbers still correct or have they changed at all?
Right. So obviously our controller is better positioned to update on the sort of actual status of our liquidity. My sense is, and my answer will be a general one, but my sense is that we will have probably a better financial situation with peacekeeping, better than last year, but not exactly where we would want it to be. And so far, at least, we continue to be under the hiring freeze regime. And we continue to tell our mission that they have to be extremely sort of conservative in terms of spending their money. But then again, my sense is that we are looking at a situation which, again, will be still constrained, but I would say not the kind of situation we had last year where we had to cut 25% of missions capacities as a result of partial payment by one very important financial contributor. I want to emphasize that there has been a lot of work by our Secretary General, by our colleagues, of course, our Chief Auditor, the Controller, all of them. I want to really express my gratitude to all of them. Of course, we've been part of that. We've been trying to advocate for adequate resources and payment provided by peacekeeping. What I want to add, though, is that when we don't receive a full payment, what happened is that obviously that puts us in the situation where there is inconsistency between the mandate that are requested, that are created by the member states and resources to implement those mandates based on budget also adopted by those very member states. But that is also very unfair to the troop and police contributing countries. Many of them, most of them, are developing countries because one of the variable of adjustment is payment to those troop and police contributing countries. And yes, it is unfair because there's nothing we would be able to do really without the support of our troop and police contributing country.
Thank you. Adla then.
Monsieur Lacroix, Adla Massoud with The National. I'm going to play the devil's advocate. Critics would say that UNIFIL was ineffective in Lebanon. What would your argument be to, I mean, if you want to extend the mandate of UNIFIL, what would you do different? What would you say to them? Why is it so important?
Yeah, I mean, I think there's been a sort of ongoing debate about UNIFIL and, you know, whether it was effective or not effective and so forth. Now, my view is the following. created with a mandate which was essentially about two things. One was liaison, de-escalation, and avoiding the unintended resumption of hostilities. And that is something that it did well, also because there was no intention to resume hostilities, and whatever could have been inadvertently triggered, a resumption of hostilities was diffused with the support of UNIFIL. Now, the other mandated task was supporting the Lebanese authorities in the disarmament of armed groups, including Hezbollah, of course. Well, that would have required political will, which didn't exist in Lebanon. And I'm not judging, but it's a reality. The mission of UNIFIL was not to disarm Hezbollah, it was to support the Lebanese army in its operation aimed at disarming Hezbollah and other armed groups. That did not happen, again, there was no political will. Whenever UNIFIL was facing access restrictions or all kind of incidents limiting its ability to operate, then there was no way of securing a proper sort of removal of these obstacles by the relevant authorities at this time. Bottom line is that any peacekeeping operation requires, is created to support a political objective, but it cannot achieve that unless there is political will, and I think that is something which is a key, I would say, lessons learned, but we know that it's a reality of peacekeeping. Wherever you have a peacekeeping mission, then it's there to support a political process, but it needs the support of the parties, the political will from the parties, and the unity of the Security Council in pushing the parties to play the game. I think what's important now is to move forward, because like I said, ultimately, the key objectives regarding Lebanon are still there. It's Resolution 1701, and no one is disputing those objectives. Again, how to get there, how to avoid a paralysis, or even worse, I mean, a reversal of some of the progress that we've seen, at least from the point of view of political processes over the last couple of months.
Mona, and then we'll go online to take questions. Go ahead.
Thank you very much, Mr. Lacroix. This is Mona with Al-Quds Al-Arabi. I just have a quick follow-up, please, on Ms. Celia's question. give us any concrete examples of probably some technological upgrades that the UN is developing to counter drone attacks against peacekeepers, and how are the current financial cuts can impact the development and deployment of these innovative solutions? And thank you.
All right. Well, on the second part of your question, obviously, We would have to provide you with some assessments, which I currently don't have, really. But on the first part, I think the response to the kind of threats, drones, like other responses to other threats, is a combination of technological responses, but also many other things, training, of course, Considering the environment in which all of this is happening, we usually operate in member states' territory. I'm saying usually because sometimes we also operate in disputed territory. So if you look at destroying drones Then this question of has to do with using the airspace, the airspace doesn't belong to you and it's belonged to member states. How do we make sure that it doesn't interfere with, number one, the uses of airspace, number two, the fallout of destroying a drone, and then, you know, if you destroy it, then it falls somewhere. We don't want that to create more damages, certainly no fatality, no injuries. So I would say that without entering into technological detail, which I'm really not qualified to sort of comment on, but it's always a very complex and multi-dimensional set of responses having to do with the better capacity to better detection capacities, the situation awareness, and making sure that even prior to any concrete drone threat, sort of making sure that the missions is aware of its environment and where potentially the threat could come from. And AI can help in this, and all this new sort of technological tool can help. But then also, then again, how training is, how people are trained, who's responsible, what are the passive protection that have been added so that as to reduce the impact of potential drone attack on our people. And then again, what is the best way to deactivate those drones? Is it to sort of just shoot them, but with the risk of having them fall and creating more damages in potentially on the civilian population? Is it another way of doing things? I mean, we're currently looking at all this. It's work in progress, but it's not only work in progress because we have also reacted quickly to address some of the immediate demand of the most exposed missions, including the one that I mentioned, IBA.
Thank you. We'll take two questions online. Wissam from Media24 in Morocco. Wissam, go ahead.
Hello, can you hear me?
Yes, go ahead.
In fact, I have two questions. One, in fact, the two regards MINURSO. So in fact, with the MINURSO no longer monitoring military activities, has the United Nations considered an alternative verification mechanism? In case, for instance, of an incident If an incident occurs, who will establish the facts? And the second question is, in fact, about the posts east of the berm, because there's a berm, as you know. In fact, will they be dismantled or handed over? And in fact, has any agreement been reached on their future?
All right. The answer is that as of 31 October midnight, MINUSOR only has one task, which is to carry out its withdrawal. That's it. So no verification mechanism, no nothing. It just has to organize its exit. And as I indicated, of course, the support from the parties to that process will be very important. And second question, but the answer is very much the same. I mean, what MINUSO has to do is to basically vacate its position and dispose of its equipment. There are different ways of doing it. Again, my, the broadly or sisterly department of operational support is in the lead, so I would defer to them in terms of, you know, the specifics and the modalities by which, you know, these processes carried out. But ultimately, you know, wherever it has, position and presence, then all of this would have to be removed as a result of the end of the mandate.
Thank you. Sylviane Lorient-Le Jou. Sylviane? Okay, Edie, you go ahead with a quick follow-up, and then Sylviane will connect or not?
I have a quick follow-up on MINURSO. What's the estimated time that liquidation is going to take? And you're going to be turning over their positions, bases, whatever, to the Moroccan government, I would assume. What about the equipment? Is it going to go to other peacekeeping missions in Africa?
All right, then again, I mean, I want to be very cautious there because our colleagues at DOS have reacted very quickly in terms of putting together a team in charge of that and starting the interaction with MONUSO, but in terms of the timeline, I believe it's a couple of months, but then again, I would rather defer to them instead of speculating. And similarly, in terms of the equipment, I mean, like I said, there are different ways of disposing of equipment. Yes, in some cases, if I refer, for example, to what we did with MINUSMA in Mali, then some of the equipment were ultimately handed over or transferred to other missions. But exactly how that would be done in the case of MINUSMA, a smaller mission, though, I mean. You know, I think that it's better for me to sort of defer to those colleagues. They are the experts, and I'm not really the expert.
Great. Jean-Pierre, thank you very much. Thanks to all of you. Sylviane, yes, go ahead. You can. Go ahead.
Good afternoon. Thank you for doing this briefing, Mr. Lacroix. Once UNIFIL is gone, what will compel the parties to respect resolution 1701? Without an international presence on the ground, how can the United Nations move from monitoring violation to ensure actual compliance? How do United Nations capacity to force respect for its own resolution?
All right. Well, once UNIFIL is gone, it doesn't mean that there would be no UN presence anymore in Lebanon. Our political coordinator position currently occupied by my compatriot Jean Arnaud on an interim basis will continue to be there, and of course, it will continue to support the implementation of Resolution 1701. Similarly, we have the country team, it's a very active one, and they will continue, of course, to do their best to support the Lebanese people. But at the same time, of course, once UNIFIL is gone, then you, unless there is a Security Council decision that would provide for some sort of UN presence after UNIFIL south of Lebanon, then you wouldn't have that physical presence in the south of Lebanon to do what UNIFIL is currently doing, that is, again, monitoring, reporting, liaising, de-conflicting, supporting humanitarian assistance to the population, all this, of course, would have gone. So in particular, the observation and reporting capacity will not be there. unless, again, there is some sort of UN capacity able to fulfill these tasks. So, I mean, this is really a situation which then we would have in Lebanon. Obviously, whatever UN presence there is on the ground, ultimately, the progress depends on the political will of the parties. It depends on how much drive there is and traction there is on the political process. But I believe, and we believe, that UN has been and can continue to play, has been helpful and can continue to play a useful role in supporting these process. But then again, we'll see what will come from the Security Council.
While we wait for the Security Council to come up with something, we thank you, Jean-Pierre, and thanks to all of you.