(Session 1) Introduction to the UN Security Council - Briefing for Delegates on the Work of the United Nations Security Council

Okay, so thank you so much for your patience.

We can start. So, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, and dear friends, good morning and a very warm welcome to each and every one of you. It is my distinct pleasure to welcome you to this briefing on the work of the United Nations Security Council. We're grateful for your presence to those joining us here in Room 8 and to those tuning in online. We thank you for your keen interest in deepening your engagement with this critical organ of the United Nations. The Security Council occupies a unique and vital position within the United Nations system and remains at the center of global efforts to prevent conflict, respond to crisis, support peace operations, and promote stability around the world. Strengthening multilateralism and the institutions that promote and enable consensus building and multilateral cooperation to advance our common humanity is essential to collectively overcome shared challenges and build a more just and equitable future. It is precisely in this spirit that Unitized the Vision for Multilateral Diplomacy organizes activities such as this one. Established in 1965, UNITAR is an autonomous institution within the UN system with a mission to deliver innovative training and conduct research knowledge systems to develop the capacities of its beneficiaries. As the training arm of the UN, its mission is to develop capacities to enhance global decision making and to support country level action for shaping a better future. At the heart of UNITAR, the Division for Multilateral Diplomacy delivers training activities to address the needs of diplomats, government officials, private sector specialists, academia, and other stakeholders to meet complex global challenges. Having said this, I would like to start by warmly thanking His Excellency Ambassador Rui Vines, Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations, for his and his Permanent Mission's leadership and dedication in organizing this two-day briefing. UNITAR has a longstanding partnership with the Permanent Mission of Portugal, who have long supported capacity-building initiatives in the field of multilateral diplomacy through briefings like today's. This partnership reflects our shared commitment to advancing global dialogue and cooperation in strengthening multilateral diplomacy. I would also like to thank His Excellency Mr. Sun Lei, Deputy Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China, in China's capacity as President of the Security Council for the month of May. I also wish to extend my sincere thanks to the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for their expert contributions and unwavering dedication to the day-to-day needs of Member States presiding of the Council. Their leadership, engagement and continued support for UNITAR and the multilateral system as a whole enable us to support the Security Council and the United Nations in carrying out its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. I also would like to take a moment to sincerely thank to our esteemed speakers and all distinguished participants for taking the time to join us today and for the contributions you will make to this briefing. Over the course of today and Friday, this program will walk you through key dimensions of the Council's work, including its procedures and documentation, the nuances of its decision-making process, and the use of the veto. and its broader engagement and opportunities. You will hear from seasoned UN experts dedicated to the Security Council work and functions, as well as ambassadors and fellow diplomats who are currently serving on the Council. Without further ado, it's my honor to invite His Excellency Ambassador Ribinas, Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations, to provide his welcoming remarks. Excellency, the floor is yours.

Thank you very much, Patricia. Excellencies, colleagues and dear friends, good morning to all of you. Thank you for being with us. And I would like to particularly thank to UNITAR for this longstanding partnership and also to the Permanent Mission of China and especially to the Ambassador. the DPR of China to be with us. I know that the Council is now in a meeting, so thank you very much, appreciate it. I have some introductory remarks that I will read very briefly. It's, of course, a pleasure to welcome you all this morning to this second edition of this briefing for delegates on the work of the United Nations Security Council. Last year's course exceeded our expectations, both in terms of participation and engagement. The strong interest shown by delegations from across regions confirmed something we increasingly observe here in New York. There is a growing need for practical capacity building on how the Security Council actually works, not only for Council members themselves, but for the wider UN membership. And that is why Portugal is very pleased to continue this initiative together with UNITAR and the DTPA. I would like to warmly thank both institutions for their partnership and commitment. Their expertise and willingness to invest in knowledge sharing and institutional memory are invaluable for strengthening multilateralism. I would also like to express our appreciation to China, holding the presidency of the Security Council for the month of May, for joining us today, and to Mr. Rabih El-Haddad and UNITAR New York Office for once again helping transform this idea into an ambitious and substantive programme. Colleagues, the Security Council remains at the centre of some of the most pressing challenges facing the international community. From ongoing conflicts and humanitarian crises, the questions related to sanctions, peace operations, the use of the veto and relations with regional organizations, the Council's agenda continues to expand in both complexity and political sensitivity. At the same time, expectations from the wider membership regarding the Council's transparency, accountability and effectiveness have also grown significantly in recent years. Discussion on working methods, on the relationship between the Council and the GA, the role of the elected members, the so-called E10, and on the implications of the use of the veto have become increasingly relevant for all Member States, not only those sitting around the Council table. In that context, understanding the Council's procedures and informal dynamics is no longer a niche expertise. It has become an essential diplomatic skill in New York. This course is therefore designed with a very practical purpose in mind. Over the next two days, participants will explore not only the formal rules governing the Council's work, but also the realities of decision-making in practice. how programs of work are negotiated, how subsidiary organs function, how presidencies shape outcomes, how elected members coordinate among themselves, and how non-members can engage more effectively with the Council's work. I'm particularly pleased that this year's program brings together such a distinguished and diverse group of speakers, senior UN officials, practitioners from the Secretariat, experienced diplomats from current and former Council members and experts on Council procedure and practice. Their collective experience will offer participants a rare opportunity to better understand both the institutional framework and the political dynamics that shape the Council's daily work. As Portugal nationally strongly believes that better informed delegations contribute to a stronger and more inclusive multilateral system, capacity building initiatives such as this one help democratize knowledge within the UN system and ensure that all member states, regardless of size or whether they currently sit on the Council, can participate more effectively in discussions on international peace and security. As a country currently presenting its candidature to the Security Council for the 27-28 term, Portugal also sees value in fostering greater collective understanding of the Council, of the Council's work and preserving institutional memory across the membership. Allow me to conclude with a simple reflection. Improving the effectiveness and legitimacy of the Security Council is not only about reform negotiations on conference rooms. It is also about ensuring that Member States understand the institution, engage with it meaningfully, and are better equipped to navigate its procedures and politics. That process begins with initiatives such as this one. I wish you all a productive, interactive and thought-provoking two days ahead. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Ambassador Vignes.

I'm now pleased to invite His Excellency Mr. Sun Lei, Deputy Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, in China's capacity as President of the Security Council for the month of May. Ambassador, the floor is yours.

Thank you for giving me the floor. As the President of the Security Council in May, China does have a lot of lot of things on the plate. Currently they are now under session. And aside from all those difficult issues, there are also other issues waiting for us. And we will try our best to arrange all the meetings in a proper manner. And we will be very encouraged to see all the members and council members and also the non-Council members engaged in the Council activities in such an enthusiastic and constructive manner. Thank you very much, Ambassador Rui Ivens, for your very constructive and very inspiring statement. Dear colleagues, it's my great pleasure to attend this briefing on the work of the Security Council. To begin with, I would like to thank UNITA, the DPPA, and also the Permanent Mission of Portugal for jointly organizing this event. As the permanent member of the Security Council and the Council's rotating president for this month, we are very encouraged to see this event and also the very active participation of the very wide UN membership in this event, both in person and also online. I'm also pleased to note that the briefing features a very comprehensive program. I read it before I came here. With speakers including many veteran diplomats and secretariat officials and think tank experts. I see Samala is here as well. And I hope this valuable opportunity will help participants gain a deeper understanding of the Security Council and better support its work. Here, I would like to share a few observations for your reference and reflections. First, we need to better uphold the authority and role of the Security Council. Eight decades ago, after the devastation of two world wars, the international community came together to establish the United Nations. Under its charter, the Security Council bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. and serves as a core of the international collective security mechanism. Over the decades, the world has remained largely peaceful, and the Council has made indispensable contributions in this regard. Nevertheless, in recent years, global instability and turbulence have intensified, placing even heavier responsibility on the Council. Last year alone, the Security Council held 255 formal meetings and 115 informal consultations, totaling nearly 700 hours, and adopted more than 80 outcome documents, including 44 resolutions. From the Middle East to Africa, from promoting ceasefire to advancing peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the Security Council has remained at the forefront of international peace and security affairs and actively promoted political solutions. At the same time, we must also be aware of that, due to various factors, the effectiveness of the Council's actions has sometimes fallen short of expectations, and the Council is now facing persistent questions and criticisms. Amid the new situation, the authority and the role of the Security Council can only be strengthened, not weakened. And this should be both the starting point and the ultimate objective of our discussions on the Council's work. We must uphold and respect the purpose and principles of the United Nations Charter, support Council's members in fulfilling their responsibilities impartially and responsibly. and safeguard the common security of the international community. Second, we need to further strengthen solidarity and cooperation within the Security Council. History has shown that whenever the Council members demonstrate solidarity and build consensus, they can bring hope for peace and stability to the world. When Council members fail to engage in dialogue and instead fall into confrontation, the Council not only struggles to function effectively, but may even contribute to further escalation of tensions. Therefore, to truly strengthen the role of the Security Council, we need more than a patch job on procedures and rules. More importantly, this requires a revival of the spirit of solidarity and cooperation. Council members should build mutual trust, enhance communication and coordination, and avoid instrumentalizing the Council for geopolitical purposes. In this regard, the role of penholder is particularly important. The penholder is an informal arrangement developed among Council members to facilitate consultation and build consensus. Serving as a penholder is a responsibility, not a privilege. China is consistently called on penholders to heed the views of all parties, including the countries concerned and the regional states, and to actively help bridge differences and build consensus among Council members, so as to produce outcomes that can withstand the test of both history and reality. I also look forward to more innovative ideas from participants during this briefing on how to further improve the penholder ship. Third, we need to further improve the working methods of the Security Council. Faced with increasingly complex international security challenges, the Council must keep pace with the times and then continuously refine its working methods in order to more effectively carry out its duties. In recent years, the Council has adopted a number of measures, including improving documents on working methods, improving the pan-holdership, balancing meeting formats, adjusting review periods in a timely manner, inviting civil society representatives to brief, and encouraging the issuance of monthly assessment reports. These efforts have yielded a positive progress in enhancing the voice of non-permanent members and improving the Council's efficiency and transparency. China also supports the Council in taking the current UN reform as an opportunity to introduce more practical measures to reduce formalism and bureaucracy and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Council's work. Dear friends and colleagues, as a responsible major country, China remains firmly committed to multilateralism and has always been playing a constructive role in the work of the Security Council. As Council's rotating president this month, China will, on May 26, hold a high-level open debate titled "Upholding the Purpose and Principles of the United Nations Charter and strengthening the UN-centered international system. The Foreign Minister of People's Republic of China, Mr. Wang Yi, will come to preside over this high-level meeting. Through this meeting, we hope to send a strong message of the international community on revitalizing the authority of the UN Charter and the role of the United Nations. We also work actively to encourage Council's members to focus on urgent hotspot issues such as those in the Middle East and Africa, and to build a greater consensus through consultation and dialogue. We listen extensively to the views of all parties and strive to identify more effective approaches to resolve the complex issues. As a rotating president, the door of our office remain open to all member states. You know the presidency, the president's office. And we welcome exchanges of views with our teams at any time. China also stands ready to work together with the international community to support the Security Council in playing its dual role in maintaining international peace and security. In closing, I would like to once again express my appreciation to all the organizers and wish all participants a rewarding experience. I also hope UNITAR will take further measures, not under Chapter 7, to help member states, especially those from the global south, strengthen the capacity building of their diplomatic personnel, address the underrepresentation of developing countries, within the Secretariat and make greater contributions towards a more just and equitable global governance system. I thank you.

Thank you, Ambassador Lee, for your welcoming remarks.

Prior to moving into the substantive portion of our briefing, I would like to take a moment to explain how today's briefing will be structured. It is organized around two sessions. The first session will take place in the morning, and the second session will take place in the afternoon. The first session is on introduction to the UN Security Council. So this session will cover the Council's functions and powers, the foundations of Council procedure and working methods and the programme of work, meeting formats and agenda items. During session two, the sessions will revolve around mechanics of the Security Council in action. And during this session, we'll cover procedures and documentation, sanctions committees and other subsidiary organs, research tools and repertoire, and Council decisions and other outcomes. Each presentation would last approximately 30 minutes, followed by a 10 minute Q&A. So during the Q&A, when you take the floor, I kindly ask you to press the microphone button. And once the light turns red, if you could please state your name, the permanent mission or the organization you work for. So this will help our presenters and the fellow participants to contextualize your interventions. 00 p.m., at which point we will break for lunch. We will reconvene for session two at 3:00 p.m., and today's proceedings will conclude at 5:15 p.m. I strongly encourage you to take full advantage of this opportunity to engage with our outstanding presenters. ask questions, share perspectives, and connect with one another. The strength of this briefing lies in your participation, your insights, and your commitment to collective learning. So without further ado, we now turn to session one, an introduction to the United Nations Security Council. This session will lay the conceptual and procedural groundwork for everything that follows over the course of today and Friday. Our first presentation will examine the functions and powers of the Security Council, the charter-based foundations that define the Council's mandate, authority, and scope of action. I take this opportunity to express our appreciation for the contribution of our first speaker, and I'm pleased to give the floor to Ms. Shamala Kandia-Thompson, Executive Director at Security Council Report. Ms. Kandia-Thompson, the floor is yours.

Think that's working. You can hear me. Yes. Good morning and thank you for coming to this session. I'm always pleased to see that people are interested in in the UN Charter still. It feels sometimes like, you know, we talk about it a lot to Council members, but I'm really pleased to see that the wider membership is interested in the aspects of the Charter that relate to the Council. I will look at mainly Chapter 6 and 7, and maybe a little bit of working methods at the end. But if we, just to start, sorry.

Okay.

So, I collected a few pictures of the charter, the original as well. I have my own and I suggest everybody keep one in their pocket if possible because this is probably the most useful document you can have, especially if you're on the council, but also if you want to know what the council is doing and what it is able to do under the charter. So, I feel like it's Not a very big book, but it is got a lot of very good information and it's really very clever in how it's been written, I think, to allow for a lot of flexibility and for things to sort of be developed in the way we've seen over the years. I have a quote from the second Secretary General that talks about the principles of the charter and how basically they are greater than the organization, that these are sort of the principles to be upheld. So I usually sort of think of certain articles as being key to understanding how the council functions, but also how member states respond. And Article 24 and Article 25, I see I spelled article wrong there, but Article 24 is what I see as the job description of the council, and that is the responsibility it has for the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 25 is the Article 25 is what members have agreed that they accept this, they accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. And maybe just to say that it's when I, you know, going through it like this, it may feel a little bit dry, but you know, all the members who have been on the council, council members, members watching the council, you know that the actual activity based on the Charter is not dry. So what I'm going to try and do is show what the articles are, but also how they're used, where we can see that they are used in the actions of the Council as well as Member States. So There are four chapters of the charter that relate to the council, five, six, seven, and eight. As I said, I will focus on six and seven. Five, we'll touch on a little bit because that covers the working methods of the council. Some of that comes under that. And chapter eight on regional arrangement. is increasingly something that we are seeing in resolutions and that we're talking about in terms of the cooperation with regional organizations. So under Chapter VI, and this is what we often think of as the sort of conflict prevention chapter, the chapter that looks at ways of providing mediation and other possible actions before moving into what might be further measures, as we heard, under Chapter 7. And with the articles here, I mean, this is a brief summary and I'll go into it, I have just included some examples, but they are really, and I'll go into some of them, but you'll see that they allow for certain types of actions, particularly by the parties to a conflict before the council starts to get more and more involved in what they may be telling the parties to do. Let me go into a little bit more. And I put this up because if you look at the charter, as Kofi Annan said in 2003, that really chapter six is at the heart of the charter when you think of the idea of collective security. I think very often Chapter VII is better known because there are certain things that come under it that are perhaps more visible, but a lot of the Council's work is done under Chapter VI, and it is perhaps quieter but as important in preserving the collective security that the Charter is built around. Article 33 is the first one. What you are looking at is the idea that the council has given power to the parties to settle their disputes through a series of activities, such as negotiations, inquiry, mediation and conciliation. Those are suggestions for what the parties can do to settle their disputes. And that is the first step that the Council is likely to take as a conflict comes in. 32.2 suggests that when it is necessary, they could ask for, they could suggest certain means by which it could be settled. This is an example just to sort of show you the language. And Article 33 is interesting to me a little bit in the sense that many of these articles are not spelled out in resolutions anymore. In the earlier days, you can find some examples, but Article 33 and 35, quite often they're cited. Also 41, we'll come to that. Here's an example from 2018 where you can see that they have identified the particular article that they're asking for this dispute to be settled by. The next article is article 34 and investigations. And this is one where it is, if I believe that is right, that it is the one provision in the charter which expressively expressly assigns to an organ of the UN the competence to investigate. And I think this is a really important aspect of what the Council can do under Chapter VI, where it's able to investigate any dispute or situation which may lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute. It's something that has given rise to So for example, in practice, you can see that it's able to set up certain types of investigative bodies. This is the resolution that set up the body that investigated the-- it was the International Independent Investigation Commission for Lebanon when Hariri, when there was a bomb that killed the president. and is an example of what Article 34 can do under the idea of investigations. We also saw this when they set up the mechanism together with the OC, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on Syria, where they set this up in 2015 to investigate the possibility of chemical weapons in Syria. And this would have been under the idea of Article 34. Now, Article 35 may be the one that member states should be the most familiar. And this is because it is the way in which member states can bring to the attention of the council or the general assembly any dispute to which it is a party. And we see quite often in letters, for example, here in letters to the president of the Council, the Article 35 will be cited. So it is the way to bring something to the attention of the Council as a member state. And it is used frequently, which doesn't always, but can lead to the Council having a meeting as it did in this case. on the screen where Guyana asked for the Council to have a meeting of the Security Council following an incident related to its border with Venezuela. And other examples of 35 on the screen where under the Ethiopia and the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam the situation there, Ethiopia had written as well to the President to ask for it to be discussed. And the second one is on Armenia, Azerbaijan, where again, on the basis of Article 35, we had Armenia writing to the Council. So it is the first step in asking for the Council to have a discussion. And with any of these articles, what it allows, if you think about it in terms of what type of actions can you take as member states and also what you're asking the council to do. It's the basis does go back to the charter and what it's so to suggest the range of possibilities within different types of actions. If you look at article 36, it says that the council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to, recommend appropriate procedures. So, we are getting to a point where the council in article 33 may have asked for certain things to be done, and if this is still not done, We come to Article 36 where they may start to sort of make more suggestions about the type of things that they may want the parties to do. And Article 36.2 is related to the fact that this was put in because There was a sense that the Council should not ignore what may already be done, so that they should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of a dispute which has already been adopted by the parties before they just pronounce certain things. So this is the same one. So here's an example from South Sudan in 2019, where the Council asked for the parties to continue to hold regular face-to-face meetings. So this is something that had been happening and they're asking them to try to do more of it to be able to resolve outstanding issues. And to continue consultations on the number and boundaries of states. Article 36 is something that is specific to legal disputes where it says that as a general rule, it should be referred to the ICJ. Does anybody know how often that has happened? Anybody? You don't get to answer. Paul knows the answer, but he's not ready. I forget, I was tired of hearing my voice, so I've decided to ask questions. So there's only been one occasion where that has happened. So it's not, and it may seem like a surprise because it's not that ICJ advisory opinions are not asked for, but generally, recently particularly, they've come from the General Assembly. So you've not had the Council doing that very often, and I think, There are a number of reasons, and we can talk about that if you want to, as to why they may not. It was in relation to the Corfu Channel, and that was in 1947, so it was a very long time ago that they used this particular article. But it's there and can be used if a member chooses to do so. Okay, so that was my first question. So I've got two examples, if you can see up here. both related to Sudan. And they, I think they relate to two different articles and I wonder if you see it the same way. So the first one says that it's in 2024 with a ceasefire during Ramadan asking for all parties to seek a sustainable resolution to the conflict through dialogue. The second one, a few months later, where it called on the parties to the conflict to seek an immediate cessation of hostilities, leading to a sustainable resolution to the conflict and true dialogue, et cetera. So I had a specific suggestion. Any guesses? Or maybe you know? OK, this one Paul can answer. It's a new one I put up, actually. What do you think? I think the first one is Article 33. Yeah. Yeah. And the second one.

36.

I think it's 36. It could be 33, but I think the reference to the. activities of the personal envoy is a deference to process that's already ongoing.

Exactly, the continued support, that's how I see it. So it's an example of how, so when you're looking at resolutions, I said, you're unlikely to have, you know, according to articles such and such, and then it spells it out, but it's the language from the charter, it's understanding the spirit of what is being asked for that's important in understanding understanding what the Council is asking for. When you look at the work of the Council, whether you are a party or whether you are a member state that is trying to understand what they are doing, being able to first know the Charter in order to read and understand the impact or the relevance of what you are likely to see now from the resolution. Hopefully that is correct from those who have written these resolutions. Okay, chapter seven. So, I know I'm going quite quickly, but we can come back if you have questions. Chapter seven, all right, again, when I say chapter seven, what comes to mind? First thing, anybody? I put some pictures as a hint. All right, I'll give you one answer. That's an easy one. I think that's the easiest, right? I know you all know these answers. Anything else? Okay, I'll give you another answer. I think interdiction would come under it, right? I would think so. That picture of the ship is sort of, not quite, it's actually UNIFIL. Use of force, I think that's the one that a lot of people would think of, and my last one here, Does peacekeeping come under Chapter VII? How many of you think it does? Two, three, four. And the rest of you think it doesn't? What? We join the five. Okay. Anybody who thinks peacekeeping doesn't exist in the Charter? So it's not in the Charter. But I think you're right. I think now it is under Chapter VII. I mean, what Doug Hammerschmidt called it was VI 1/2, which I think is sometimes right because it depends on the nature of the mission. But it's an example to me, peacekeeping, of the potential of the charter. It's not in the charter, but because of the idea of the standing force, for example, there were things in there that I think gave people the idea that this is something you could have. but it's within the charter. So it was created with certain ideas. So I said that chapter six was really sort of the conflict prevention aspect of the charter. And chapter seven is seen as the enforcement part, where if You don't have to do all the chapter six actions before going to chapter seven, but I would say almost always that's how it works. You would try to get the parties to resolve their differences through mediation, dialogue, before you get to chapter seven and trying to use enforcement. But if you really had to, you could go to chapter seven, there's nothing that says you can't. But what you do need is article 39. to think about that, and I'll talk about this a bit more, but this determination of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression is the gateway into the activities or the actions of Chapter VII. And I will talk largely about Article 40, 41, 42, which give rise to some of the things we just talked about. So The idea of making that determination, and again, when you look at resolutions, you'll see that they don't always say chapter, so Article 39, and there's a reason for that, but there is the use of the language. If you see a determination of a threat to any of those things, and they are not all the same, and it can be a regional threat as well, with a number of resolutions more recently, that is the sign that you are moving into what I think of as chapter seven territory. It's a signal or an indication. So the threat to the peace is the most expansive. It's the most common and it's before something has actually happened. And as an example, okay, so here I have a few examples. So So for example, interstate conflict is something that is the most, particularly traditionally, and we see it again in some ways, that we've seen one example, I've just put examples in brackets. So interstate conflict, there's been a determination that that's a threat in many resolutions. Terrorism, I think you know that that is The September 11 attacks is one example, but there's actually been a determination even before that. Famine, humanitarian catastrophe, we've seen it with Somalia. So it would say, the language would be that it determines that, for example, the humanitarian catastrophe in Somalia is a threat to the peace. Public health. Ebola, the first determination came with a resolution on AIDS in 2000, even before Ebola. And the determination with COVID-19 was a little different, but they had looked at the fact that this had happened before. Violations of democratic principles, not common, but with Haiti and the coup with Aristide, in 1993, the language seemed to indicate that it was connected to the idea of a violation of democratic principles. Nuclear proliferation, I think you know with DPRK, Iran. Piracy, Somalia, there's been a determination. Organized crime, drug trafficking in Afghanistan, we have that in a resolution. Climate change, have we had that? I didn't have anything in brackets, so no. AI, no. So these are things that we do not have as a determination to the threat as such. Sorry, now I have to go back. I shouldn't have done this. I don't know why, but my breach of peace slide is a bit early. So if you look at, this is just an example to show you it's far less common to have a determination when something is a breach of the peace. And it is sort of as it sounds, it's when something has actually occurred, that something has taken place, so the breach has happened, and that's when we've seen examples. And they're just four that, at least, I have found in the past. And one example of that was in 1982 with the Malvinas. and the language very specifically uses breach of peace. And the three other examples I have that again go back sometime 1950 when there was an armed attack on South Korea and ROK from North Korea, 1987 with Iran and Iraq, and then in 1990 with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. and the language in those resolutions specified that it was a breach to the peace. Sorry, pass all this. And now I know what happened, I had two. So acts of aggression are even less, it's even more rare for the council to use this language in a resolution that we've only seen three occasions where they've done that. And part of it was that for a long time, they did, sort of, there wasn't a clear agreement on what is aggression. And I've got there the General Assembly Resolution of 1974 that came up with a definition that I think is somewhat used now. But it takes a lot for the Council to make that determination that something is an act of aggression. So you can see it's something that would be very careful in making that determination. So, article 40, I think of it as the article where the Council sort of saying, you know, please do these things, otherwise we're going to really start having to get more serious about what, you know, what the actions we take. So, you see that The Council can, before making recommendations, deciding on measures, so these are the other measures that could come in, it will ask the parties to comply with provisional measures. And that could be whether it's to go back to mediation for a ceasefire, to be in effect if it's not. So they ask them to sort of go back to these things and try and do it. in order for the council not to have to go ahead with other measures. And an example here from the Iraq and Kuwait situation, you can see that in resolution 660, you had both article 39 and 40 spelled out. Again, it's a little bit unusual, I feel, to have it like that so clearly, so one, it There was the determination that there was a breach of international peace and security, but then it also demanded that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces. And this was a demand that had already been made. The case with Iraq and Kuwait is very interesting, because there were 12 resolutions, and I feel like it used almost everything it could in the charter between six and seven. Finally, they did use Article 42. Article 41, as I said, is sort of often associated with sanctions, but if you look at the language, it talks about a number of possible actions that could come under it, as long as it does not involve armed forces. And I find that this is an interesting article because of the way it says, they may include, so I've always wanted the Council to come up with a new Article 41 that does not involve the use of armed force, because this article suggests that there may be other things that could come under it. And so this is not a complete list, and you'll see that I think, you know, it does include the idea of sanctions. Obviously, some of it is quite old. when you talk about telegraphic means of communication. But the idea, but it has other means of communication. So it somehow was aware that this could change over time. And out of the language that you saw there, which as I said, was general enough to allow for all of these things to now be considered under Article 41 measures. As I said, sanctions, ICC referrals, the criminal tribunals. I mentioned the investigative idea for Article 34. You can set up an investigative body, but if you're looking at trying to try to look at it as a criminal tribunal, that would come under 7. the naval blockade interdiction. So all of those could come under 41, I think, as well as investigated. Here's an example of language where, it's an example where it does not cite Article 41, but it's clearly Article 41 language 'cause it's sanctions. And then under 1718, which was the resolution that set up the DPRK Sanctions Committee in 2006, It very clearly states that it's acting under Article 41. You'll also see resolutions where, like the DPRK resolutions after that, would cite Article 41. And sometimes in resolutions, they mention other measures which can be often taken as if certain things do not happen, sanctions are a possibility or more. And the more would be under Article 42. which I think of as the may be necessary or as may be necessary, because it talks about the measures that, you know, if 41 is inadequate, it may take action by ASC land forces as may be necessary. So it does not, and this is in reading a resolution when you'd see the, you know, necessary means the language around the use of force, it does not spell out exactly what it will do very often, but you know that this is the authorization to use force. And we've seen it in a number of resolutions, as I said, with the Iraq-Kuwait situation, the final resolution very clearly allowed for, you know, to use all necessary means, which I think of as the code for, okay, you know, this is likely to be the use of force. And I will just quickly, just one more article that I wanted to look at, which is Article 51 and the idea of collective self-defense, which we have seen more use of, particularly since 2001, I feel, where under sort of, you know, terrorist attacks, et cetera, but also more recently, and the idea that, you know, that It's one of the ideas that members can exercise the right of self-defense if there's an armed attack against a member, but until the Security Council has taken its own action. So what you will see quite often is that there'll be communications to the council saying that certain actions have been taken under Article 51 of the charter. And that therefore, they've reported that they've acted under the idea of self-defense. And this has come up, I think, more regularly in recent years. So I know I've kind of run through it quite quickly, because it's a lot. But I mean, with more time, I would do it where there's also a bit more of an understanding of how it's used. I think first just understanding what the articles are, but then to think about, like when you look at resolutions, how it's used. And I wanted to just, because I understand Lorraine is not able to do her session and I feel, I think we've already had a little bit about working methods and the idea of how important it is. So I will say just a few words, 'cause it is connected, I feel, because the foundations for how the Council works is the charter, the provisional rules of procedure, and working methods. And you have to take them together because the Council works in a way that's both formal and informal. But these are some of the foundations for understanding what it's able to do and what it is doing. And I would say that the-- so we looked at the charter. Under the provisional rules of procedure, there are certain things that-- this was the very first-- this was a photo of when they gave the draft provisional rules of procedure. at the first meeting of the Council. And as you can see, they were able to smoke in the Security Council, so things were a little bit different in those days. But they were unable to agree on it, so it's still provisional, but it's clearly, you know, there are rules of procedure that are followed. And, you know, the kind of thing, the number of things that come under the rules of procedure say there's some that very commonly come up right now, like, you know, whether calling a meeting, you know, rule two and three in terms of asking for a meeting, does the president call for it? How soon does a meeting have to be held? All of these things come under rules of procedure. The the formats of meetings are not quite under that. That's more under Chapter five, the participation of meetings. who can brief and who under Rule 37 and Rule 39, whether certain member states can participate in a meeting. And these, I think, are issues that have a lot of, in recent years particularly, they are discussed a lot because They are not just rules. They matter in terms of the type of meetings you can have, the type of participation you can have. But understanding what the rules say is really important, particularly during your presidency, because you will be asked, for example, if you have a meeting on Ukraine, for example, as you did yesterday, many member states may wish to participate because they will see that under Rule 39 that they feel they a member who has a connection to the issue. And then, you know, the presidency in some ways will then have to decide which of these members really fall under this particular rule. So the way the council works is guided by the provisional rules of procedure, but also by looking at in some ways at, you know, informally what has taken place while the discussions around it. Voting and the veto was mentioned. This is another part of working methods. I feel that we have covered a lot. I brought Paul in because he wrote a report on the vetos. If anybody wants to ask about it, I figure he will talk about it. But we have looked at the range of things under working methods and not just the use of veto, but procedural votes under Article 27. is also something that is part of the area of working methods and understanding when something might be called or when a procedural vote might be called, why that matters, what that allows you to do. And under the working methods, there's also, I had put up a slide on the informal working group on basically on working methods, which has been sort of around and functioning in a way where they, I think the presidential notes were mentioned in the opening statements where certain presidential notes have been issued over time. Note 507 is a compendium of the different notes. allowing members to be guided on working methods. It is very hard to cover this in a few slides, so I am not doing a great job, but the idea of the formats of meetings is really for council members, I think, and also for the wider membership to understand how different meetings allow for different types of participation. different formats, whether it's a resolution, a presidential statement, press statement, why you would use one or the other, and what it means to be able to work within this environment where you're guided by these things. And then I have as my last slide, what is to be a penholder, because we love talking about penholders, but also, I mean, I think it's an issue that a lot of members wonder about, and we're doing a report that will come out next week, I hope, on it. We did one about 10 years ago, and we thought it was time to update it because things have changed. There are new forms of pen holding. Co-pen holderships have become more common. Members that hadn't been a pen holder, as China has done, is now a pen holder on Afghanistan. So we wanted to also be able to report on these developments in a longer report. So we are working on one. So I will stop now maybe and let people ask questions maybe instead of like talking, so yeah.

Thank you, Ms. Candia Thompson, for that comprehensive and rich overview on the functions and powers, and also for your presentation on the Council procedures and working methods, especially as the next presenter was not able to come. So thank you so much for sharing this information with us. Now we can move to the Q&A session. During this session, we'll be joined by Mr. Paul Romita. So thank you, Mr. Romita, for being here with us.

Thank you so much.

Mr. Romita is the managing editor of Security Council Report. So the floor is now open for questions. So I invite all of you to raise your hand and take the floor. And please briefly introduce yourself. You could please say your name, the name of your permanent mission organization you work for, and then we can start.

So thank you so much, and the floor is open. Yes, thank you. Thank you so much.

Good morning, everyone. I'm a fellow within the Office of the President of the General Assembly. I'm part of this year's fellowship, PGA's fellowship program. And this is the closest I've been to the work of the Security Council, because back in capital, I used to address second committee issues. Thank you so much. I have a question about something I feel I was not fully able to understand about the difference between the breach of the peace and the act of aggression. Because we saw, for example, an invasion. as the term, it was determined a breach of the peace and not an act of aggression. So which is the criteria to differentiate one and the other? Thank you.

Thank you so much for your question. Do you want that we take traditional questions? Yes. Perfect. Is there any additional questions or how we can take the questions in group of three? So if anyone has any questions, don't hesitate to raise your hand.

Thank you very much.

Article 35, where any country can bring a dispute or a situation for consideration by the Security Council. In your experience or your understanding, what is the difference or significance of a term dispute? Because as you know, it also refers to some other articles that ask members of Security Council to abstain from voting in a case of dispute. So I would be very interested to hear from you about the practice in this case. Thank you.

Perfect. Thank you so much. So we'll take another question. I believe we have a question there. Yes, please go ahead. Thank you.

I'm with the Permanent Mission of Belgium. And my question is, what do the rules say when there is a disagreement on the rules, whether the working method or the provisional rules? How do the Council members find agreement? Thank you.

Perfect. Thank you so much for your question.

I think maybe we can stop here and then we'll let you answer your questions.

I mean, the The question about breach and aggression is a good one because it is, so maybe I should have said this, the determination in many ways is political, right? I think, you know, there is a difference between the threat because that is not yet taken place, but I think between the breach and whether it's aggression, Again, the breach is something that has occurred, so we know that, but whether that constitutes aggression versus just you've breached the peace, it is really a political determination. And I think for a long time, there was a disagreement, let's say, over what constitutes aggression. So that, and I think the ICJ has now got some language on it that's also used besides the General Assembly one, and I think So, yeah, so it's not a clear answer because I think it will be determined case by case. I've seen draft resolutions on an issue that did not get adopted that had the language, and I was surprised, but then, you know, it didn't even get adopted, but because I think that that determination would have to have an agreement of all council, I don't know Do you want to do 27.3 or you want me to?

No, I can do it.

Okay.

So the question of what a dispute is, I think it's a great question because I don't think there's a simple answer to that. In fact, I'm sure you know that there is actually a draft resolution in the General Assembly being discussed now on Article 27.3 and has a, and there's a working definition on a party to a dispute and what constitutes a party to a dispute. But I do feel that Article 27.3 is one of the, is a topic of discussion, especially of significant discussion now, especially in the context of the obligatory abstention, meaning that a country that is a party to a dispute should not vote under Chapter 6 resolutions. And historically, in the early days of the UN, that article was often adhered to, but at least since 1960, it's been, for the most part, conveniently ignored. So I do think it's a very important issue. And it was also raised actually adherence to Article 27.3. And the importance of that was raised in the Pact for the Future. So I'm glad to see that Member States are discussing this issue and hopefully we'll see some progress in adherence to this because it is in the charter. So that's a roundabout way of saying that there is no universally agreed definition on a dispute, but I think that we see that the member states are working towards that.

And on the disagreement on the rules, so I think it depends on which rules. And there are some that the president would be able to decide, but it's not on all. So, I mean, there may be things like the order maybe of voting. The presidency would decide on that. sort of thing. Now, if there's a disagreement on a briefer under Article 39, sorry, Rule 39, that would be decided really from what we see in practice through a procedural vote. So I think most of you probably know that the veto doesn't apply to a procedural vote. So you need nine votes and no, and the veto does not apply. So if you have a disagreement over whether someone is a suitable briefer, that is one way of doing it. And the council has used that in recent years quite regularly to be able to get agreement if there isn't agreement on a briefer. On whether or not to hold a meeting, I think today the council tends to work very much by a more informal consensus, you know, agreement where they would send out an e-mail saying that so and so has asked for a meeting. Do you, you know, and it's almost not even do you agree, but like if we don't hear any disagreement, we will hold it. And then it's up to someone to disagree. And again, I think the way in which that would be resolved would be a procedural vote rather than the presidency just deciding to hold it because the presidency could decide to hold it. But if there's a real opposition to it, you can have a vote on whether or not to have the meeting under the agenda. Yeah. Another question.

Yes, please go ahead.

Thank you very much. My name is Abshalom Mifiti Keeko. I'm the DPR at the mission of Namibia to the UN. And I just want to acknowledge and thank UNITAR for this briefing, as well as our distinguished briefers. So you mentioned Article 36, 3, I guess. on the legal disputes and you said there was only one time that the council had referred a case to the ICJ in 1947. Maybe can you go into why you think the council does not take such matters, does not use this article more? I mean, there's so many border disputes and land disputes but it seems this is not the case that the ICJ is used as a referral. So maybe just elaborate your thoughts as to why.

I've often asked the same question, but I think one major reason is that it would require the council to defer its decision-making authority to another UN organ, and Oftentimes, the Council is, especially the permanent members are reluctant to do that. Then there's the issue of, you know, which countries agree to the compulsory jurisdiction of the court. Many member states don't, including four of the five permanent members, and the fifth, which is the UK, does, but with certain caveats. So I think that the reasons are largely political, which is why you often, you know, where you have a larger body where there is no veto power, like the General Assembly, you often see the General Assembly asking for advisory opinions from the ICJ.

Yeah, I mean, the point about, I think the General Assembly has been very active that way and having And there was one advisory opinion on, yeah, wasn't that, yeah.

Yeah, in addition to the reference that Shyamala made to the Corfu Channel, there was an advisory opinion as well that the council asked for in 1971. And I actually think it, in Namibia, it had to do with South Africa's in the Nubia, which the court determined was illegal.

Perfect. Thank you so much. So perhaps we can take two to three questions. If there's any other questions from the room, don't hesitate to raise your hand. We'll give you the floor. Thank you. Yes, please, if you want to sit here and use the microphone, thank you.

So, hello, I'm Lizzie.

I'm from the Permanent Observer Mission of the Sovereign Order of Malta.

And my question is about whether the Charter is ever updated or amended, or if it's seen as a document that's set in stone. Yeah, thank you.

Perfect. Thank you so much for your question. Lizzie, is there any other questions? Whereas we can take another question, if there's any from the audience. No? Perfect. Yes, over here. Yes, please. Go ahead.

Thank you very much. My name is. I'm from the Permanent Mission of Mexico to the UN. And I don't know-- sorry, I was following this meeting through UN Web TV. So I don't know if this question has been already raised. So my apologies if that's the case. But it's probably more related to the UN Charter. Article 24 and you know I know that the Charter specifies that when the Security Council is discussing or analyzing one specific subject the General Assembly cannot analyze it but I don't know if you could probably elaborate more about this because I know that there have been like some cases in history in which probably they have been discussing the same subject so I don't know if there is like a specific rule Or it's something that applies to the procedure. So if you could explain more about that, I will truly appreciate it. Thank you very much.

Perfect. Thank you so much for your question. So perhaps we can take these two questions and then we'll continue.

Thank you. Amendment to charter. Yeah, that's a big question in some ways because once you, so it has been amended. in the past. The last time was in 1970, no, 68. I'm looking. The expansion. Yeah, the expansion. And when the council went from nine to 15, no, 11 to 15, sorry. And it's something that if And I know you all are familiar with the discussions around the reform of the Council. Any changes to the composition of the Council would need the Charter to be revised. And that process is sort of a two-step process. I think there would need to be first the General Assembly would need to agree. with the concurring votes of the five already. No, no, sorry. And then the ratification.

The way it would work is that if you have an amendment, it's a fairly high bar. You would need two-thirds of the membership to vote. in favor of the amendment. And then that's the first step. And then the second step would be that two-thirds of the members need to ratify that decision through their constitutional processes, including all five permanent members. And this is sort of at the center of the discussion on Security Council reform, for example, or any other reform in the Charter, because there is a high bar. It would be very difficult. First of all, to get two thirds of the membership to agree on any one reform proposal, but then to get all five of the Security Council's permanent members to agree through a ratification is quite difficult.

I mean, the other thing that I think could happen with if you were to open it up is that it may be open to other revisions that not everybody wants. So I think it's it's sort of how it's done as well for some members. if you are opening up to just a specific thing, say if you're trying to change the veto on Article 27.3, but then it could be opened up to a number of other things as well. But these discussions are taking place right now, and I feel quite actively, so we'll see where it goes. There's also Article 109 and the idea of conference around the charter to discuss some of these things. Right. On the other one, the article, well, it's not so much Article 24, but the idea of the General Assembly not discussing something that the council is discussing. It's something that you'll see that that's not really true anymore. It's clear that, you know, Syria, Ukraine, Myanmar, Gaza, all of these issues are actively being discussed in the Council and in the General Assembly. And what my understanding is that it was in the days where both bodies did not meet as frequently as they do now. So I think the idea was that almost it was when the Council was in session and discussing it, the General Assembly would not at the same time be discussing it. But that has changed because this is not how we are meeting anymore or how the GA and the Council are meeting and I there's still the idea that you know the council there's certain things like chapter 7 type of decisions would come from the council whereas you know the General Assembly can make decisions on those issues but they would not have some of the elements of a chapter 7 type of resolution.

Just very quickly that, I mean, if you look at the charter, it's also clear that the General Assembly does have a role on peace and security issues. It's just that the Security Council has the primary responsibility. So, but I understand that your question was more about the idea of the General Assembly not meeting when the Council's meeting. But as Shamlah said, the practice has been on many cases for the General Assembly to meet concurrently on several issues, you know, that the Council's discussing, like she mentioned, Myanmar, Syria, Ukraine, and there are others, Middle East. Yeah.

I mean, in the Charter, Article 35 says that any member can bring any dispute or situation to the attention of the Council and the General Assembly. But then 36, sorry, 35.3 says that the proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to the attention under this article be subject to the provisions of article 11 and 12, and that's the one you're thinking of, that they can discuss it if the Council is not currently discussing it. But that understanding seems to have shifted and expanded a little.

Perfect, thank you so much.

Perhaps we can take the last round of questions in case anyone has any burning questions that you would like to ask, and then after that we can close this first session.

So if there are any further questions, please don't hesitate to raise your hand, thank you. Okay, so now please.

Yes, thank you so much. I'm just going to, use my privilege of co-organizing and ask just following on that, I think, isn't there also a provision for the General Assembly to meet to discuss issues of the veto after the Security Council have met to discuss on that, correct? If maybe you can comment a little bit about that, just because it's relevant to the previous discussion. Thank you.

So there is something called uniting for peace, which can be triggered either by the Security Council or the General Assembly. And basically what it says is that if the Security Council is gridlocked in an issue, the General Assembly can take it up. Now, what's very interesting about the way the voting would work in the Security Council is that it wouldn't be subject to a veto. So if the Security Council is gridlocked and some members think that the issue needs to be discussed and they're worried about the veto and the Council, they can then by a majority vote, nine members or more, have the issue go to the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace provision. And so, you know, we've seen uniting for peace be used in many cases historically. But I would say it's more of a political tool than anything else these days, because as you know, we just discussed the General Assembly often already discusses issues that the Council is gridlocked on. And but it does sort of bring attention to the fact that the issue needs the attention of the wider membership.

I think you were talking more about the veto initiative, is that right? Oh, you're talking about the veto initiative. That's okay. We now know about the Uniting for Peace.

I'm sorry, the veto initiative is basically something that was initiated by Liechtenstein and several other member states in 2022. And the idea was that there should be some transparency and accountability around the use of the veto. So it's based on a General Assembly resolution, and it says that whenever a veto is cast, within 10 working days, the General Assembly should have the opportunity, or the wider membership should have the opportunity to discuss the topic of the veto. the permanent member casting the veto is given the opportunity to to speak and explain why they may cast their veto. And there's no obligation to do so. But I should note that all permanent members that have used the veto have taken up the opportunity to do so. So, I mean, I think it's a it's one of several ways of holding the permanent members accountable. But I mean, it's not a silver bullet, but at least it has added some transparency and accountability to the use of the veto. I'll.

Just add, it's also given the General Assembly a role it didn't have where this is concerned, because as Paul said, every veto since this has happened in 22, it has gone to the General Assembly within that 10 day period. Member states have had the opportunity to speak about it. So it's given the General Assembly a role, a voice.

Perfect. Thank you. Thank you so much. I don't think there's any last final questions in the room. Okay. Perfect.

So if there is no more questions, I think we can conclude this session. I would like to thank again, Samal and Paul for your presentations and for the rich discussion and also to all the participants who contributed. For our next presentation, it was going to be delivered by Ms. Lorraine Shivers. Unfortunately, she had a last minute conflict and she's not able to join us today. But thank you so much for giving us an overview.

No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no.

I really appreciate it. I think it was like a glimpse of the foundations of the cancer procedure and what you made.

We'll talk about what you made.

Thank you. Wonderful. Thank you so much.

So what I would suggest is that we take a short break and we resume at 1150 here and then the next session will be on the program of work, meeting formats and agenda items. So thank you so much and see you in 15 minutes. Thank you.

But yeah, I think it's good.

Play all songs of the Kapil Sharma Show.

Hi, again. We're going to start in a few minutes. So the speaker is about to come in a few seconds. Here it is. Thank you so much. Hi again.

So we're about to resume the next session. During the previous session, we heard a bit from Security Council report about working methods and Council procedure. Now we're going to hear from the Secretariat perspective on this topic, as well as on the Council's programme of work, how the Council plans and structures activities, as well as the different meeting formats it employs. and how items are placed on and managed with its agenda. I am pleased to give the floor to Ms. Claudia Vance, Director at the Security Council Affairs Division. So, Ms. Vance, the floor is yours.

Thank you.

Thank you very much for the introduction, for the warm welcome, and for having us. It's great to see so many of you here in this wonderful room, which always reminds me a bit of the Security Council with the round table, so familiar terrain, but also, of course, all the colleagues which are following this online. Thank you to Portugal and, of course, UNITAR. I think it's a great initiative for putting together this comprehensive program. This is really an important opportunity for Member States, but also the Secretariat and experts to share insight and exchanges on the practices and procedures of the Security Council. My presentation will be the first of four from SCAD, the Security Council Affairs Division. I'm the director of this division. On some of the key practical aspects on the Council's work and the type of support that the Secretariat provides to the Council, but also to Member States. We are not just here to support Council members, but also the wider membership. and how we do that on a daily basis. I very much look forward to sharing our thoughts with you and having, hopefully, an engaging discussion. In my remarks, I'll focus on, one, the foundations of the Council's procedure and working methods, its monthly provisional programme of work, the agenda, and the formats of the meetings and other activities of the Security Council. On the normative framework, just a couple of words on what's the basis of this framework. So, the UN Charter lays out the general principles, the composition, the functions, powers, voting, and basic elements of procedure related to meetings, subsidiary organs, and participation. So really the fundaments that you need nine votes to pass a resolution, that there are some permanent members, elected members, so that's kind of the framework. But Article 30 of this charter also provides that the council shall adopt its own rules of procedures. This is, of course, you can now also find it online, but this is this booklet that is the provisional rules of procedure. The Council adopted this at its first meeting on the 17th of January 1945, and it has since been amended 11 times, I would say, considering the 80 years, only 11 times. Most recently in 1982, which is also a while ago, and this was to add Arabic as an official language of the Security Council. Beyond the provisional rules, the Council has developed an extensive body of procedural practice, which has come to be known as its working methods. Why is this important? These are the rules. And then many times, how is this interpreted? We look at how has this been interpreted in the past? How has the council approached certain aspects of these rules or things that have not been codified? But most of these practices have been codified in notes by the president of the Security Council. And this constitutes a decision of the Council that has been agreed upon by consensus. Over 50 working methods related notes have been issued by the Council since 1993, since these working methods were discussed more systematically, so to speak. And there is also this working group We call it the IWG. That stands for the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions. That's a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, or a working group. And the subsidiary body tasked with that comprehensive-- so discussing the comprehensive or these notes. And then there is a comprehensive compilation, which we refer to as Note 507. You would have, if we can go back, I think we had it there, this matcha green book. So that's the handbook where you have a compilation of these practices. How long should a briefer speak? How, very also practical aspects are actually captured in that. It's a compilation of all these Note 507. moments of or minutes of silence. How has how should the council approach this? And that that has been codified about two or three years ago, which we thought was a very good agreement among council members because we had some moments when someone called for a moment of silence, some were standing, others were not. So now it's clear that if someone, a council member, wants to call for a moment of silence, a minute of silence better, then you would need to notify the president ahead of time, otherwise it should not be entertained. And Rule 37, so you as a wider, um, from the wider membership, if you participate and you feel that there should be a minute of silence. You cannot just propose that, or it will not be entertained. If you just propose it as part of your statement, then you would need to probably talk to the president before and get the president to suggest it or a member of the Security Council ahead of time. So these are the kind of also very practical aspects in the Note 507, which really considers a very interesting and relevant part of practice. Most of these practices have been codified, as I said, and here on the slide you would see working methods of the Security Council. I think I mentioned the most important ones, right? The Charter, of course, was the first one. You would find that also online. We have done this a couple of years ago with the support of Japan, that now you can find this. It's interactive and a searchable version. of Note 507. Either you want to, if you have the time, and probably you don't have, you can read this notebook, the handbook, the matcha green, but the searchable version is actually, we would really recommend and facilitates to find something more specific. It's available on the website of the Security Council. Don't hesitate to signal if you have questions or comments. We, of course, have some time at the end, I hope, but it really should be interactive as well. So, this is the monthly provisional program of work. You find this on the website. I This really, I always carry this with me because it's a very important document and actually this is our work indicates, it's a very important planning tool. The programme is one of the most well-known and also scrutinised documents related to the Council. The programme is particularly important as both, as I said, a planning document and also a transparency tool vis-a-vis the wider UN membership and the public at large. The program of work helps guide the work of the rotating monthly presidencies of the Security Council and the organ as a whole in fulfilling these requirements. Of course, you know, every month the presidency rotates. And this is kind of the planning document that we start working with incoming presidency. So we start working about this three to four months before the council member then assumes its presidency. And that's where we discuss what are the mandated meetings. So mandated meetings means meetings that when the Security Council adopts a resolution and extends the mandate of the UN mission in Colombia, and then there are the reporting requirements are in the resolution and request the Secretary General to report, I guess it's every four months or Yeah, every four months on a quarterly basis, for example, or every one month or every six months or once a year. That's usually decided in the resolutions related to mandates, what the reporting requirements are for the Security Council or for a mission, an African Union mission, or some or and who has to report. This is in the resolutions. That's what we mean with mandated meetings. So the Council has already decided that it wishes to report, not a meeting in most cases, but a report. So on this document, you would see in May the reports that are due. That means the reports of the Secretary General to the Security Council. So on the 1st of May, we had a UNICEF report, for example, and today we have the 20th, we don't have a report, but Earlier this month, this week, we would have had, or last week, we would have the 2722 Red Sea report, due protection of civilians in armed conflict report, and then practice has been. that once the Council receives the report, or when it's scheduled to receive it, that this is taken up in a meeting, that the report is presented in a meeting like Protection of Civilians. I just came from the open debate on Protection of Civilians. The report was circulated a week ago, or on the 11th of May, and then the usual practice is that this follows by a meeting. Now, I will come to talk about the format of the meeting, on whether it's an open debate, a briefing, a private meeting, we will talk about this a little bit later. But there's no strict rule that the Council needs to meet The Council can always decide to say, well, now this month we don't take-- it's unusual, but they could say protection of civilians is not a good example because it's a very topical issue. But on something they could say, well, we just had a thematic issue which a country situation was covered. we could not take it up. So this is, there's no strict rule that you have to, but it's the practice. So this then is important because that guides your work. So there's also a rule of thumb that the council should receive the reports at least four days prior to the meeting. So to give the experts and the delegations a chance to prepare properly, especially for open debates. Ideally, of course, it's already published the report. We try to make sure that the wider membership, you also have a chance to prepare. Not always possible. And then mostly for mandated reports. Thank you. We we circulate the unedited, how do we call it? Advanced copy, thank you. It's a PDF format of the advanced version based on this one, but it's four days. We have had meetings when it was two days or maybe one day, of course, if no one objects. But if someone objects, then we would need to reschedule the meeting. There are the mandated meetings and then there are the signature events that we call. So these are more the elected meetings. If you're the presidency, you are this month, for example, it's an open debate next week, and it's about upholding the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. That's this one signature event that the Chinese presidency wanted to have. It's their high level event. The Minister of Foreign Affairs will be here. So that we would consider as an elected meeting. It's not mandated. It's so, of course, we'll come and talk about the number of the meetings and the program and the schedule is very heavy of the Security Council. This is considered a light month, May. So and you would see, I mean, It's still pretty busy, but it's really a light month. If we consider what is coming, what we are going to see towards the end of this year, this is light. So you may have your elected member. It's very important. You invested a lot in your campaign. You get finally a seat on the Security Council, your presidency. Some even have only one. It depends on the alphabet. Not everyone gets two presidencies, 24 months, 15 members, or 10 elected members. So, of course, you want to make the best, the most out of, to get the most out of it. But then if you come up with too many signature events, you risk facing some pushback because it's of course, it's a lot of meetings and a lot of additional meetings. So sometimes less is more. That is at least our advice to elected council members. So these are the two kind of main categories. The program is considered provisional because even if this is agreed at the beginning of the month, So if someone has an objection, then it's not adopted, so to speak. Even after it's adopted, it's still provisional because it will change. You call for a meeting on the third of the month and you say, this is the situation in yesterday. We had a meeting on the Middle East requested by Bahrain that was not on the program before. So then it will be updated. If you have changes to it, calling for a meeting, every council member can call for a meeting. And you as a presidency, you basically have to schedule it. It's rule two. Changing the format, for example, after it has been adopted, you would need to make sure that you don't have any objections. So it's consensual, but it's still provisional. What happens if it cannot be adopted? Because it's provisional and it's kind of informal, that means that we as a secretariat, we cannot upload it on the website, so you wouldn't see it. So it has happened at occasions that there were some issues that couldn't or some presidencies decided not to iron out and still to go ahead, so that would mean Most of these presidencies have then made it available on their website. But for us, we only upload it once the sticking or the contested meeting has been gavelled. That means there was no objection anymore because it went through. So just maybe a quick word about what types of proceedings and activities you would see also still on this grid. We call it the grid. They're all formal meetings of the Security Council with an indication on the format. So you would see if it's a briefing, a briefing means it's a meeting in the chamber. If it's an open debate, it means that it's open to the wider membership. So that's indicated what we call the format. In this month, for example, Bosnia and Herzegovina on the 12th was a debate. That's a different format. That means I'll come back to what the difference is. But you will see that on this grid. If it's closed consultations, you will also see it on that grid. That means you will not be able to observe because you're not Council members. Informal consultations, I already mentioned the due dates for the submission of the reports to the Security Council, you see on this little thing, and when mandates expire. You would also see that, and most of the time it's preceded by an adoption to extend the mandate, unless it's already clear indication from penholders that they will not seek an extension, or sometimes the Council has already decided, UNIFIL, for example, or On certain missions, when the Council said this is the final extension, then of course you would not be followed by an adoption. But that's what you also see there. You also see some other activities of the Council, customary activities during the month, which means the informal interactive dialogues. I'll come to that, what it exactly means. It's the equivalent of closed consultations, but with possible participation for non-council members. It's in a meeting room. So you would also see that under IID. You cannot see it on this one because this month we don't have one. And it's not that often. You also would see Secretary-General's luncheon. The Council has, it's not a formal meeting, it's informal. That is a customary activity or a practice that the President hosts a lunch where the Secretary General is invited once a month, where then the Secretary General identifies two topics to discuss in an informal format. You will also see that on this document. What you cannot see on this is the ARYA formula meetings. Are your formula meetings are important for many council members and for the wider membership, but it's not considered as a Security Council activity. It's really an informal, informal. We are not part of this meeting with the Secretariat. Of course, in the planning, it is mentioned, you just don't see it on the on the agenda because for council members they also need to factor that in to these are additional meetings that are important. What you also cannot see there is, we call it informal informal because closed consultations are already considered informal consultations although they are relatively formal at least as the planning goes. That's why for discussions among experts, negotiations on text, we call it informal. Informal, that you don't see here. I already mentioned the difference between the mandated meetings and the elective meetings or signature events. Maybe one more thing, I've touched on it, but just to say, we call them previously unscheduled meetings or emergency meetings. So these are the meetings that are added, like the one yesterday requested by Bahrain after the adoption of the programme of work. And we have seen in terms of the we also monitor statistics and or compile statistics and monitor trends. There is a clear trend of an increase in previously unscheduled meetings, which is kind of something important to bear in mind when we prepare programmes of work because more, I mean, never a program that you will adopt on the in these days and the first will stay the same at the end of the month. There's always at the beginning is much lighter and then at the end it becomes very packed. So that is definitely a trend that we are seeing. But I think also Overall, of course, it's a prerogative for members to call for a meeting at any time, but the fact that we have so many more previously unscheduled meetings, and maybe the next slide. So this is, I think this is a very interesting and telling slide. So you would see we start in 1950 and we go until now or until last year. And the dark blue are the meetings, formal meetings and the light blue consultations, right? This weird red thing that was COVID. So we don't really consider COVID because COVID were not considered meetings. The Council came up with meetings, how do you say, virtual meetings, but they were not considered as Security Council meetings. Yes. So there were a form of VTC Yeah, open and closed. So that's why this red thing is. But you would see the trend is really significantly up, although I think 2024 was the highest in terms of the overall number, and 2025 was slightly lower. But still, we also have other slides where you would see the time of the discussion and the time of council members spent in the Security Council. also significantly up overall. I think what is also interesting to mention here that the Charter, Article 21, actually stipulates that the Council functions continuously. So if there would be a need, if there is a need, the Council meets on weekends. If there is a need, you can meet in late in the evening. That's, of course, nowadays a bit, we need some advance time or notice so that we can get the services come in. Of course, if you look back in history, there were many more evening meetings, weekend meetings back in the day. Why is that? I guess whenever the Council managed to reach agreement on something, it was very important to immediately go and vote, for example. So it has become over time now more difficult to reach agreement on many issues. So why call for a meeting on Sunday or if you know, you, unless there's really an emergency, it makes no sense. But in principle, the Council functions at all time. There's also in the provisional rules of procedure, there's rule one, which is very interesting, that says the interval between Security Council meetings should not be more than two weeks. So after two weeks, you really, the Council should meet again. So that was obviously an issue in the 50s and 60s and the, you know, early days where there were much fewer meetings. Now, I mean, there's never a risk that the Council wouldn't meet for two weeks. But so that's how this has evolved, I would say. So it's a very high workload of the Security Council. Just some figures. In 2025, the Council held 255 formal meetings, which is 16% less with regard to 2024, but of course still high. In 2024, it was 305. This was the highest number on record. And Council members also convened in 115 informal consultations. which were compared to 124 in 2024. On average, this came out to 21 meetings and 10 consultations per month. It's a lot. But I think I just mentioned at the beginning, and this is a nice photo. It's really an important tool for also the transparency of the work of the Security Council, because even if you call for consultations in the morning, or a member calls for consultations in the morning, and then as soon as the presidency confirms, this will be updated on that grid. And so that's where you can double check. Yes. We put that also because you would see that the curtains are open on this picture, which is a particularly contentious issue in the Security Council, but which is a very rare sight, so we just wanted to show this to you. I think also a customary activity by the President of the Security Council, it's described in detail in Note 507. that at the beginning of the month, the incoming presidency holds an informal briefing on the programme and a press conference immediately following its adoption of the informal consultations of this programme of work. Some presidencies have also opted to hold information sessions with civil society representatives. At the end of the month, So the beginning of the month is the so-called wrap-in, where you probably participate or where you could. And at the end of the month, there is, we call it wrap-up sessions with the wider membership to brief them on the main developments during the course of the month and to respond to questions. Beginning of the month to present the program, at the end to kind of wrap up. This was the press conference earlier, I mean, this month by the presidency. I also, in the program, I was asked to say a couple of words on the agenda of the Security Council. So I think it's important to distinguish that there are like two meanings to this agenda. One is the list of items which are under consideration of the Security Council or of which the Council is seized at any given time. And the second one has to do with the adoption of the agenda at each individual meeting. The agenda needs to be adopted. Maybe to the first one, this seizure list, as we call it, This is something that since we call it summary statement that lists all the agenda items that or all the items that are on the agenda of the Security Council. So the practice has been for the Secretariat to add to the statement each new agenda item upon a formal meeting. How do you establish a new agenda item? you need to propose. First, you will face resistance because there's a lot of effort went in to kind of keep this list manageable, so to speak. But then, you know, if the world evolves and maybe there is a need for a new agenda item, if everyone agrees there will be or not everyone agrees if it's gavelled through, if there are not, there's no procedural vote that you would lose. Then once the president says the agenda is adopted and there was no objection, I mean, objection, even if you have an objection, but there's a procedural vote and you do not lose the procedural vote, then you have a new agenda item. So and then This is in addition, it's important because there are also, once you request for a meeting, then there is discussion under which agenda item this is held. It is, and I will come to that, it may make a difference to you in terms of it's a political judgment call on whether you want to call something under the situation in the Middle East or someone in somewhere in Africa or under threats to international peace and security. It depends what, and sometimes there are divergent views, but clearly there are different options on the which agenda items you would hold a meeting. Most of them, of course, we look back to the practice. That would always be our first. So how was a similar situation handled on the which agenda item in the past? So there is again why this practice is important. And at the end of the day, I think what is important is In spite of this provisional rules of procedure, the Council is the master of its own procedures. If everyone agrees that you would deviate for once for good reasons, or there's no objection means, then the Council can do that. Of course, If you come up with something and it has never happened in the past, you have not, I mean, it's more difficult to reach agreement that you would deviate. If you can say this has happened in the past, you have a better chance. Of course, if that past is 1947, it's a little less strong than when it's like five years ago, right? So that's where the practice comes in. So back to this summary statement, this list of all the agenda items. The current summary statement, the latest comprehensive list was issued on the 4th of May. And so there is this Security Council symbol S/S means secretariat slash the year 2026, and then 10/10. 10 is the reserved symbol for this list. So every year, you'll find it under the same symbol. So this latest one has 65 agenda items. So the Council has under consideration 65 items. Most of these items on the agenda today can be categorized as country or region-specific issues. such as, for example, the situation in Cyprus or the situation in the Middle East, or thematic items, such as children and armed conflict or the protection of civilians in armed conflict. The debate that we are having today is under this agenda item. 49 of these items have been discussed with some level of regularity, at least once within the last three years. 16 items have not been addressed within the last three years, the majority of them not even in the past several decades, in fact. For example, items such as the letter from Sudan dated 20 February 1958 in relation to its border with Egypt, with the first and last meeting on that item having been held in 1958. Or the situation between Iran and Iraq, first introduced in 1980, the last meeting was held in 1991. So, there is a process for that, and I think, as I mentioned before, the Council has made significant progress over the years in simplifying the summary statement into its current manageable form. These reforms emerged from discussions within this IWG, the working group on working methods in the Council. and were codified in several notes by the President, including all four editions of the comprehensive Note 507. So the main way of what it was introduced was an annual review process, how this numbers could be brought into a manageable way. So, as it is defined in this note, 507, during the first week of January of each year, the Secretariat, we issue this comprehensive version of the summary statement under this document symbol that I already mentioned, slash 10. that we list all the items on the agenda in two different sections. One is the first section indicates which items have been considered by the council during the preceding three years. And then the other ones, which lists those items which have not been considered during that period time. That time period, sorry. And then Items in this category that have not been considered are subject to deletion, unless a Member State notifies the Council by the end of February that it wishes the item to remain on the list. So that explains why you would have still the item that has not been considered since 1958, because a Member State feels that this should remain on the list. So, for example, that's how do you get off the list. Burundi had a peacekeeping operation and then a special political mission for many, many years, were on the agenda of the Security Council. And then once there was no meeting after three years, they got into the second category and no one said we think Burundi should remain on this list. So, of course, if, not to single out any member state, but if you have either an agenda item that was deleted or an agenda, a country situation that has never been on the agenda of the Council, how they would get on the Council's agenda again is by convening a meeting, a formal meeting, a briefing in the chamber and gavelling the agenda item, saying, I don't know, which country are you from? I'm from Spain. Spain, you know, there's an agenda item, no objections, and then you're on the agenda for the next three years, at least. So that's how it works, this annual review. The latest items to be removed from the summary statement in this way have included the situations in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Burundi in 2023, and Guinea-Bissau in 2024. The Council has not removed any items from the list in the past two years, 2025 and 2026. Venezuela is interesting. Venezuela was removed. Venezuela is not on the agenda of the Security Council anymore. We had a meeting on Venezuela earlier this year, you would remember. That was held under threats to international peace and security, a different kind of umbrella agenda item. So that is a difference. If you have consultations, close consultations on informal consultations. That's why the informal is important, although they are a little bit formal. You would not, you don't, you agree on the agenda, you don't adopt the agenda, a difference. And these meetings are not held under an agenda item. You would see on the grid, this monthly program, that there is a heading, but it's not, for example, you could have this afternoon or whenever, consultations on Guinea-Bissau, but Guinea-Bissau would not be on the agenda again unless there is a meeting in the Chamber. So this is a difference. Closed consultations, basically the Council can discuss any subject and this wouldn't require to indicate what you want to discuss. Of course, there is this indication which is similar to agenda items that we try to for the logic, but it's not the same process. It's different from this process. In addition to this annual review, there were, yeah, I had some figures somewhere about how much they brought them down. Oh, yeah, here, I highlighted it even. So the results of this reform efforts, this annual review, are quite impressive. So for example, the council was seized of 207 items in 1993. By 2009, that number had decreased to 106 and has been in the 60s since 2016. more as indicated in the chart above, the number of new items introduced on an annual basis has also decreased significantly. As you would see, this is just explains the graph that shows how this effort to simplify actually yielded results. Then now this other agenda item, the adoption of the agenda at the beginning of a meeting. So this is the first order of business at every formal meeting of the Security Council. And this is provided in Rule 9 of these provisional rules of procedure. And so there's a provisional agenda item that is provided or drawn up by the Secretariat and then approved by the President of the Security Council. So under which agenda item a meeting is held, I refer to that. We come up with a suggestion, the Presidency approves. And then the practice has been that this agenda is just approved by silent consent, as most of the meetings, the agenda and then is adopted and that's it. Then we go ahead with the meeting. Where there's no unanimity, does not exist, including in a number of cases in recent years, that decision is taken by a procedural vote which require nine members to vote in favor. So if you are, I would say, against the agenda item, but of course you're probably not against the agenda item, but you just do not want this meeting to take place for a number of reasons that you may have, and then you can question or challenge, let's put it like this, challenge the adoption of the agenda. So that you would, how this usually works, you want to challenge the adoption of the agenda, you put up your hand, you would make your case, why you think this is not legitimate to have now this meeting on the topic of discussion. Then someone else who wants this meeting would then make also the case, usually, to say, This is in line with the practice. And then the president says, okay, I put this to a vote. And then you would vote. Who is for that we adopt the agenda? Who is against? If you have nine votes, if you want to proceed, you need to have votes, nine votes. Then if you have the nine votes, you go ahead. If you don't have the nine votes, we end the meeting, that's it. We do not continue. There is no, there's one distinction about the procedural vote, there is no veto. Procedural votes is just nine or not nine, there is no veto. So that's an important distinction. Now, I already mentioned it, let's say a couple of words on the formats of meetings. I already indicated it, you would see, I don't know if you can see that grid, but this is not new to most of you. So I think the, this chart breaks down different types of public and private formal meetings of the Security Council, and is followed by informal formats such as closed consultations, informal interactive dialogues, and ARIA formula meetings. So the main distinction is open and closed door formats. This is an important and a longstanding debate. You have those who say we should have more closed door discussions. And then it's the transparency versus having a space where you can speak more openly and more freely, and hopefully that the Council can agree on certain aspects or take certain decisions. So that's a longstanding debate. At the core of this discussion has been, as I said, how to balance the usage of formal open Council meetings mainly briefings and closed-door informal consultations, which some Council members have viewed as more conducive to frank discussions and ultimately more effective decision-making. For a number of years, you would see this briefing plus consultation format. That has evolved over the years. The way this is now working is that there is a briefing on What did we have this UNISFA, for example, this month. So we have a briefing in the chamber. Everyone makes a statement. You have South Sudan and Sudan participating, Rule 37. And then after that, you go to close consultations. Sometimes they are canceled if the briefers have nothing to nothing to add and there's no objection, then the Council decides to, or the President decides to cancel. That happens sometimes. But otherwise they go to the closed consultations room. It's this room adjacent to the Chamber. There are no cameras. There are only Secretariat and Council members that can enter and participate in that discussion. This has evolved. I would say 10 years ago, there was a practice that you would have the briefer speak in the chamber, and then Rule 37, Sudan and South Sudan would make their statements, and then the Council went to close consultations to deliberate. Now, over the past couple of years, the practice is really that everyone speaks in the chamber, and in close consultations, it's more additional comments or suggestions. information from the briefers and then questions or comments. So that has evolved. Just a good example to show how actually the practice of the Council evolves quite significantly over the years. One of the things that also in closed consultations, as I said, there is no camera. There has been a practice a little less frequently so, or used less frequently, or not for the lack of trying, but you hear less, elements to the press, sometimes at the end of the meeting, the pen holders or any Council members proposes that the President should go to the media stakeout and say a couple of words. summarizing or giving an indication what was discussed, why the Council considered a certain matter. That you can only do as a President of the Security Council, speak in your capacity as the President, if everyone is okay, lack of objection. I say everyone agrees means no one objects to what you said. So you need to negotiate the content of what you're going to say. You can always go to the media, stake out, and say something in your national capacity, but in your capacity as the President, because you speak on behalf of the Security Council. That also explains why many, or not many, all of them, the meetings in the chamber are scripted. Like you declare, I now make a statement in my capacity as the president of the, in my national capacity, I resume my function as president of the Security Council. You need to distinguish, these are two different roles. Open debate format, I think you're well versed with that format. They They're important, I think, because it's an opportunity for you, for the wider membership to participate actively in a debate. They are important for, I think, transparency for elected members. This is important because they're elected by you, you know, to have that. They take a lot of time. We have 91 speakers, I think, today. So they will overflow. So that's just something to consider. And I think you have all followed already open debates. It's hard, almost impossible, to follow an entire debate, to listen. So the energy that goes in there, the outcome, that's something to consider when you you are the presidency and you consider scheduling an open debate. But they are definitely, it's an important format. Briefing versus debate. Briefing usually is you have the concerned countries. You have, I mentioned, UNISFA, South Sudan, Sudan is an obvious one. You have Central African Republic, and Central African Republic participates then. Debate was formats like Bosnia Herzegovina, Afghanistan back in the day when you had larger coalitions. Haiti back in the day was a debate where there was almost like a group of friend type of thing. And you had more Rule 37. However, this distinction, since we have Ukraine on the agenda, or at least since 2022 is a little bit different because there it's called a briefing, but you have sometimes up to 810. We even had more rule 37, but that would have been the idea behind. Private meetings, private meetings. They are actually the equivalent of briefings in the chamber, but without cameras and without public access. You could request participating. If you have, just out of curiosity, probably this will not be maintained, but if you have, you're like country concerned or from the region, then you could be invited under Rule 37 as a member state. I think we have seen an increase on number of private meetings. Of course, it's not not transparent because you wouldn't see the outcome. There's a communique adopted at the end of a private meeting, but it doesn't say much. It says maybe who participated, but not on the content on the discussion. But for example, sometimes this is also suggested if you have very heated exchanges and some council members have an impression that this is really playing out for the cameras, for the audiences at home. There are sometimes suggestions, couldn't this be taken into a private format? So there are pros and cons, and there are certainly reasons why certain discussions you would like to have in a closed format, but still with the participation of directly concerned, because that's possible. Rule 37 is one is just observing, but the other one, if you're directly concerned, you you will be invited to sit at the table. You are familiar with the TCC/PCC meeting, that means meeting with troop contributing and police contributing countries. There are also practice always before mandate renewal, there are formal meetings, there are also some informal meetings. These are also under the format of private meetings. So of course as troop contributing country or police contributing country, you have access. but not if you're the host government, for example, in situations where you have peacekeeping operation. Area formula meetings, I mentioned already, or these are IIDs. Yes, IIDs, it's informal interactive dialogues. It's an interesting format. It's like the equivalent of closed consultations, so no cameras. But you can invite, and it's informal, because private meeting is formal, it's with speaking notes and IIDs is more informal, like the equivalent of closed consultations where you don't have the scripted so much, scripted meetings, more flexibility, and you can invite non-secretariat, briefers, for example, or rule 37, they're not called rule, but member states to participate. So that's, and it's not in the chamber and not in the closed consultations room. These meetings take place in a conference room. Yes. Finally, the area formula meetings. We do maintain statistics also on our website that's available. So it's interesting to see. There you have more flexibility. You don't necessarily need to follow agenda items. What we have seen, area formula meetings, you can choose as an organizer. This also, usually it's with council members, but we have also seen co-organizers. organized by also member state, non-council members and council members. Not all the council members need to participate, but it's a very flexible format. And as I said, not considered as Security Council activity. Many of them are webcast, not all of them sometimes, but I think in more recent practice, many of them. We have seen that, for example, someone brings a topic to kind of test before maybe you raise it in the Security Council, something similar on cross-cutting. So it's a unique kind of informal gathering of the Security Council. That brings me to the end, and I wasn't very good with time because we don't have that much time for questions, but I think maybe some.

Thank you so much for that practical and insightful presentation.

I personally learned a lot, so thank you so much. So we'll now take questions from the floor so we can follow the same approach as in previous blocks. So we can take a set of three questions. So if you have any questions, please don't hesitate to raise your hand. We'll give you the floor and please remember to briefly introduce yourself before you speak.

Thank you.

Yes, please go ahead.

Hi, good. Good afternoon. Um my name is Chris Tam from the mission of Trinidad and Tobago. Thank you very much for convening these important session and for the information. I had a question concerning the invitation to host civil society or an NGO to brief the council particularly if it may be a sensitive type. and sensitive conflicts, what role would the secretariat play in terms of or what type of meeting would that be and what role would the secretariat play in working with the say the president of the council at that time in protecting or safeguarding that brief from any sort of reprisal. Thank you.

Thank you so much. I have one other question. Please go ahead.

Thank you so much for organizing this training with us today. My name is Sophie Grundin, and I am with the Mission of Liberia. So I have two questions. And the first one is, how quickly can the Council gather an emergency session? What is the minimum requirement for that? And linked to that, what determines when it should be scheduled? In essence, how is the urgency assessed? Thank you so much.

Perfect. Thank you so much for your question. Is there any other question from the room? No, perfect. So perhaps I try on.

Thank you very much. On the question of invitation of civil society briefers, and what the roles of the secretariat, and you already mentioned the risk of reprisals. So, civil society briefers can be invited and are, it's a practice of the Security Council, and many Council members really view them as a very important additional perspective that is different from, you know, what they usually hear or what they would hear from the secretariat. And So that happens regularly, I would say. And also, if we look at the statistics, really a drastic increase over the past couple of years. It comes with a responsibility for the presidency, because the protection at the end of the day is the decision of a presidency. Reprisals, that means, you know, someone, you have a different perspective, and maybe this perspective that this civil society briefer will present is not in line with a government that is concerned, and so we have seen cases, and so this is what I mean with the responsibility of when inviting. So how the civil society briefer are invited under Rule 39, that's kind of individuals who are considered that they can contribute something to a discussion. There is theoretically also a procedural vote if someone could object. So the procedural vote is any decision that the President of the Council takes by gaveling, there is a chance to object. So it's not that you can at any time just call for a procedural vote, you can only challenge decisions of the presidency. So theoretically this could also happen, but that's not the main part of your question. So the Secretariat assists, and our colleagues from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, will work with you, one of my colleagues in my team, Focal Point, and then also bring you together with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. to kind of provide you with best practices, help you to do the risk assessment where it's possible to see, you know, it really depends. I mean, not everyone faces that risks, but some, it is a very important consideration. So You will be in a position, um, or under the obligation to really take that seriously. That's why many times we say maybe less is more so that you can do it, um, properly. to consider these different risks, what it means for that individual. And I think the first one really starts with making sure that the person you invite understands what he or she gets himself or herself into. You have all been in the Security Council Chamber and you see it's huge, the screen, if you brief, for example, by VTC or they see you. what it means, it is on Web TV, it will be there forever. So that is one of the part that from our side, we always encourage, you know, give you some practical tips. And then the kind of mitigating measures would also our colleagues in human rights would help you to, or kind of manage this or possible risk. There are cases where maybe it's not worth, you know, and then maybe there are other ways to bring these voices to the Security Council. Maybe you can talk to a civil society briefer and tell their story in your statement. Or so what we have had in the past does not seem to be acceptable to all council members that you would not disclose the name. This is expected. They want to see and know who is there, like the function, not displayed on the screen, but, you know, among council members that they know who this is with some background. And also not to kind of say, okay, I don't disclose my face or that, um, we've seen that in the past, but that we would advise against. Maybe if that's necessary, then, as I said, maybe it's not worth the risk. So that's a little bit, but of course, it's always a case by case consideration. And we are always happy to work with the presidencies to make sure that they can navigate these sensitivities in this regard, because as I said at the very beginning, it is considered by many a very important additional perspective. on emergency sessions. I think we, since we have the liquidity crisis and, you know, less teams, we set eight hours. But we have had cases, if really something big happens, and it is some heads up So I wouldn't be too strict about it. It's something big, if we get a heads up, we have managed to do it in less time. The important thing is that we have that heads up and conversation. Who decides about the urgency, when is an emergency meeting an emergency meeting? There is no such thing as emergency meeting if you request for one, you say maybe, you know, because the situation seems urgent to you as a requester. But we do not weigh in and say, no, no, no, no, this is not really urgent. And so of course you will hear that because you consult with the presidency and they say maybe really for that, why not on Monday or, but there's no from our side like saying this is emergency, this is not emergency. Yeah. I think there's one.

Is there a question? Sorry. Yes, okay. We're five minutes over time. So, maybe we can take the question and we close the the session after that. Thank you.

Thank you very much for your indulgence. Uh director, good afternoon. Um presidential statements. Are they necessarily failed resolutions? Or when do when does the president's When do presidents come up with statements? What has been the practice? Because we see that sometimes they have them, sometimes they don't. So what has been the practice around statements? Thank you.

Thank you. No, I wouldn't say at all that these are failed resolutions. Presidential statements, resolutions are decisions of the Security Council. I always give this example. For example, in Mali, the mandate of the then mission MINUSMA was extended in June, and then there was a coup d'etat in August. And then the question was, should this mission now support the transitional authorities And that's something that was decided or the mission was mandated through when the Council adopted a PRSD. I think both is a decision on whether it's a PRSD or whether it's a resolution. And I think that mandates, sorry, that example shows that PRSD was also for, in order, for example, the committees for the budget is considered as a decision. The main difference is the way PRST's presidential statements, they are adopted by consensus, and the resolutions are voted upon. So that's one of the things. Of course, I don't know if I just look at my colleague if there's any other difference.

No, I Oh, testing. I would not say, I mean, there's even, as Claudia was mentioning, there's even a higher bar for PRSTs to be adopted, which is consensus, so they would definitely not be failed resolutions, and the charter And the rules don't speak about, they speak about Council decisions, they don't specify any hierarchy between resolutions and presidential statements. So in that sense, it's very much sometimes a matter of practice. In response to your question, when are PRSTs chosen, there could be a practice in a certain item to adopt PRSTs as opposed to resolutions, and the Council continues in that respect. But as Claudia also mentioned, a mandate, for example, for a mission or even some aspects, some other, in addition to political declarations, but mandates can even come for PRSTs themselves. And the other difference is that PRSTs are not voted upon. They are adopted in the chamber. Before that, there is a circulation by e-mail for a non-objection procedure. If there is no objection, there is a formal meeting which is held. No vote is taken, so it's a consensus document. Sometimes they're read out into the record, other times the President just says the document number, President of the Council, and it's considered adopted.

Maybe just to add, there are also certain mandates. UNOWAS, for example, and UNOCA, this is These two regional offices, their mandate is by exchange of letter.

Perfect. Well, thank you so much. That brings us to the end of session one. Before we close, please allow me to thank once again.

Claudia and her team for joining us today and for the example presentation. I would like to thank all of you for your engagement and your participation throughout this morning. We will now break for lunch. We look forward to welcome you back in the same room at 3 p.m. for session two. And this session will shift the focus to the mechanics of the Security Council in action. So we encourage to use the time to connect with our speakers and fellow delegates if deemed appropriate. So thank you so much and see you at 3 p.m.

Thank you.