(4th informal meeting) Preparatory Committee for the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, Third Session

Good morning, good morning everybody. Welcome to our third day of deliberations. I now call to order the fourth informal meeting of the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development to continue with the consideration of the zero draft outcome document of the Conference. Before giving the floor to the first speaker, I kindly remind delegations to observe time limits of seven minutes for delegations speaking on behalf of groups and four minutes for states speaking in their national capacity, as well as other speakers. We reserve the right to adjust time limits as necessary in case of a long list of speakers. In order to keep track of time, a countdown clock will be visible on the screen to alert speakers when it is time to conclude their statements. As necessary, the microphone will be automatically deactivated when the time limit has elapsed. Speakers on behalf of groups should inform the Secretariat in order to be given precedence in the order of speakers. We shall continue from where we left off yesterday. We didn't complete the list of speakers. We now continue hearing the comments on the section on, quote, domestic and international private business and finance, end quote. Those are paragraphs 33 to 36. Paragraphs 33 to 36. Request the secretary to put up the texts. Thank you very much. When we concluded yesterday, we confirmed that the first three speakers will be ICC, IFAD, and then UNDP. I give the floor to the first speaker from ICC. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. We appreciate the opportunity for business and stakeholders to engage actively in this process. The section on domestic and international private business and finance is of particular importance to ICC and the global business community. It provides a strong foundation and reflects many of our priorities, but, but behind everything, there needs to be a change in what makes private sector financing profitable and to align the profit motive with sustainable development objectives and with the protection of nature and the planet. We see the following three priorities in this regard, first, we strongly support efforts aimed at creating robust domestic enabling environments, the zero draft rightly emphasizes, emphasizes the importance of such environments and we suggest that this focus be expanded to better reflect the need for comprehensive domestic policy frameworks. starting with clear development environmental targets, robust investment protection laws, but also encompassing sound permitting and regulatory process, strong off-take markets and appropriate incentives. We see an opportunity for such investment roadmaps to be built into countries, new national determined contributions to be submitted this year. In this way, governments can provide the needed clarity, predictability and confidence to private investors. Second, on blended finance, We will, we welcome current efforts and initiatives and aimed at scaling planet finance, but it's important to add some, some, some important points here, a currently developed fi- bank finance for clean energy only mobilizes 1.3 times the amount of private investments, which is far from sufficient. There needs to be a stronger focus on equity investment, but also early stage MDB financing to enable private investment, for example, in critical sustainable infrastructure. We would like to see development banks to move from being guarantors to become real catalysts for private capital. This really requires significant shift in MDB investments and also risk taking. We support the proposals made yesterday by some member states for a focus paragraph on this priority. Finally, on Prudential Regulation, evidence is increasing that long-standing rules and practices on country risks assessment may be an inhibitor for the flow to the flow of development finance from private sources in emerging developing economies. Two areas are of particular importance here, MDB guarantees. Guarantees can be a catalyst in attracting private capital to emerging markets by mitigating residual risks. But the problem we have today is that under Basel III, while they do reduce the risk to investors, they do not lead to reduction of regulatory capital charges, limiting the attractiveness for banks. We encourage engagement with the Basel Committee, national and regional regulators on how we can ensure greater regulatory capital relief for projects that are benefiting from MDB guarantees. On sovereign ratings. While there are views that ratings agencies should adjust their methodologies regarding the treatments of sovereigns, we believe that the more effective area of focus would be on how ratings are applied under prevailing capital adequacy rules. We would like to see FFd4 support a call to the Bank for International Settlements to review and refine Basel III framework and establish a mechanism to end the automatic increase in regulatory capital charges for existing assets. in instances of sovereign downgrades, introducing a scaling factor to provide enhanced capital treatment for critical sustainable infrastructure projects that meet recognized international standards could also have significant potential to accelerate the supply of sustainable finance in developing economies.

I thank you.

I thank the representative of the International Chamber of Commerce. I now give the speaker, the floor to the representative of the IFAT.

Thank you, Chair. We commend the co-facilitators for their diligent efforts in drafting the zero draft of the outcome document. We particularly appreciate the inclusion of concrete actions on remittances such as reducing transaction costs, promoting digital solution, enhancing competition and transparency, harmonizing regulatory frameworks, and strengthening data collection. The measures are essential for optimizing the development potential of remittances. While the zero draft recognized the importance of remittances, it does not sufficiently emphasize the transformative role in development. Beyond their financial value, remittances are a key driver of financial inclusion and economic resilience, particularly in rural and underserved areas where they have the greatest impact. Strengthening the outcome document with more explicit focus on these dimensions would ensure that remittances are not merely seen as capital flows, but as strategic assets for sustainable development. The Addis Ababa Action Plan agenda already underscores the crucial role of remittances, and since its adoption, this recognition has been further reinforced through various UN resolutions and international frameworks, notably the establishment of the International Day of Family Remittances in 2018, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, and multiple UN resolutions on migration and development have acknowledged the powerful role of remittances in advancing financial inclusion and economic stability. The outcome document should explicitly align this and build upon these existing commitments. To fully harness remittances as a development tool, the outcome document should include action-oriented measures that leverage the complementary roles of both public and private sectors. This includes fostering policies and investment frameworks that not only enhance access to remittances, but also promote their effective use in achieving the SDGs. Examples of those are the inclusion of remittances in national financial inclusion or rural transformation strategies and to the private sector incentives to develop basic financial products bridging remittances with savings, credit or insurance, for instance. Regarding diaspora investment, we recommend placing it under private capital mobilization for sustainable development impact. Unlike foreign direct investment, diaspora investments are not formally recorded in national balance of payment accounts. Classifying them appropriately will help highlighting the distinct role in economic development and facilitate policies that optimize their contribution. Finally, co-chair, migrants remittances and diaspora investments provide an extraordinary opportunity for rural communities to build climate resilience and break the cycle of climate-induced forced migration. This aspect is critical and should not be overlooked in the outcome document. Incorporating this perspective will reinforce the role of remittances as a catalyst for climate adaptation, particularly for vulnerable communities. I thank you.

I thank the representative of IFAD. I now give the floor to the representative of UNDP, who will be followed by the representative of IBON International. UNDP, you have the floor.

Thank you. Thank you, Chair. We support especially the paragraph 36 and 36B on the call on private entities to mainstream impact into their management practices and governance and to actively measure it. And we appreciate the call on standard setters and agencies to harmonize voluntary impact standards and terminology. And we indeed as UNDP partnered with International Standards Organization, ISO, and launched the first ever guidelines for the STGs in September last year, which will be the first ever management system standards for the STGs early 2026. And this is very much in line with what has been said by India, Cuba, Indonesia, for example, yesterday, because the disclosure and reporting requirements does not fit all the countries. But since these are management system standards, This will come with the capacity building efforts, again provided by and planned by UNDP and ISO together, will help extremely to developing countries and organizations in developing countries to get ready for any disclosure and reporting requirements. We also think that and believe that it needs to be consequential for businesses such as removing subsidies and price carbon market, then financial markets will price it with the right information. Thank you.

I thank the representative of UNDP. I now give the floor to the representative of IBON International, who will be followed by representative from Standard Chartered Bank. IBON.

Thank you, Chair. I'm Rodolfo Lahoy from IBON International and the Civil Society FFD Mechanism. From the civil society side, of course, we think that FFD4 could reinforce the role of the UN. in economic governance by establishing normative and actionable proposals to rethink the prevalent private finance first approach. For this reason, it is key for us to strengthen the FFD4 process and to uphold transparency and inclusiveness for CSOs amid foreseen restrictions in the negotiation roadmap. We look forward to clarity by this Friday on CSO participation and access to the negotiations across the entire process our full engagement. Secondly, we note an appetite to standardize blended finance from the ministerial segment and even in paragraph 35. We think our actions on blending should be based on a clear view on whether it is a reliable tool for the development in the global south. This is amid issues of unclear development outcomes and the lack of financial additionality, which require, we think, transparent and inclusive discussion. Thus, we propose to replace the first sentence of 35D with the following, we will establish a UN intergovernmental process to review the sustainable development outcomes, fiscal labor, and human rights impacts of blended finance and other financing instruments. to leverage private finance as well as public private partnerships and the corresponding deletion of 35F. The set review should provide the basis to identify the appropriate policy toolkit to regulate private finance in the public interest. Lastly, regulation requires southern policy space to decide which private actors are apt for our contexts, our strategies, and our industrial and agricultural transformation. There is no one-size-fits-all, as noted by Cuba yesterday. Thus, we propose the line, we support the advancement of sustainable industrial policy in developing countries as a basis for notions of impact. to replace the first two sentences of 36A. We also propose revising 35A with, and I quote, "aligning appropriate and demand-driven FDI with national development priorities." Lastly, we recommend the deletion of 34E and 35GHI because we are concerned with the expansion of MDB roles in catalyzing capital and projects amid outstanding issues of harms. the prevalent trend of resource extraction today and the diversion of scarce public resources in their existing approaches that are promoted by major MDBs. Thank you for your attention.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to representative from Standard Chartered Bank who will be followed by the representative from Development Alternatives with a New Dawn. Standard Chartered Bank, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm speaking on behalf of the Global Investors for Sustainable Development Alliance, chartered by the UN Secretary General, the GISD Alliance brings together 30 private sector leaders from across industries in the globe to advocate for policy reforms necessary to mobilize private capital and support of the sustainable development goals. We commend the facilitators, the co-facilitators for the process they have run to date. The zero draft reflects substantive improvements from the elements paper in terms of the specificity and focus of the recommendations and responsive to the feedback offered during the second preparatory committee. In section 35, we commend all the recommendations in that section and hope that they will be carried through to the final outcome document. I would offer the following specific feedback. On section 35F on blended finance, we strongly support calls for standardization of blended finance and recommend including additional examples of innovative instruments such as aggregated platforms for blended finance and a mention of interoperability of such platforms. On section 35H on MDBs, we strongly support references to pools of catalytic capital with standardized access requirements and scaling of guarantees. We would recommend including a specific mention of consideration of originate to distribute and securitization and implementation of the G20 capital adequacy framework recommendations. would also be strengthened by acknowledgement of the critical role of regional development banks such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the African Development Bank as incubators of innovation in this space. Section 35J on foreign exchange risk could be strengthened by a reference to broader range of stakeholders rather than just DFIs to include private sector actors and existing platforms for currency hedging. Although 35G Section 35G includes a reference to local currency lending. It would also be helpful to mention that in 35J given the critical role of increased currency lending to respond to foreign exchange risk. Section 35K would be strengthened by more specific reference to potential regulation to include the Basel III capital requirements that unintentionally disincentivize investment in sustainable infrastructure in emerging markets. And also mention reforms to allow for the differentiated treatment of infrastructure as an asset class, as this would unlock significant additional investment by reducing some of the capital requirements that unintentionally disincentivize such investment. And on 35L, we support calls for release of disaggregated data from the GEMS database, as we believe this would help support and alleviate some of the concerns regarding overestimation of the risk by credit rating agencies and other actors of such investments. In closing, we believe that FFD4 represents a unique opportunity to forge a new model of public-private partnership, and we appreciate the extent to which this process has been open to hearing the voice of the private sector in the consideration of the reforms that are going to be put forward. The GISD Alliance looks forward to continuing to work with our partners at the International Chamber of Commerce as co-conveners of the International Business Forum at FFD4 and hope to be able to use that as an opportunity to bring a broad range of stakeholders together in a productive convening that will hopefully stand alongside the broader program of FFD4 and help make Seville a success. Thank you very much for your time.

I thank the representative of Standard Chartered. I'll give the floor to the representative from Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era, followed, who will be followed by a representative for Principles for Responsible Investment. Dawn, you have the floor.

Thank you, Chairman. We'd like to reiterate our deep concern about the new closed-door modality of this process from March, as we explained in our our text, we hope that we will reverse this anti democratic move, which will mean that these negotiations respond even less to the interests of our peoples in our territories of the global south. Today, the sections of the zero draft on private finance do not guarantee any form of accountability from the private sector in terms of human rights, and they only include gender tokenistically turning investments into care, public services and the SDGs into business opportunities rather than rights. Even worse, they entrench false solutions of financialisation, handing over management of sustainable finances to the World Bank, which shows scant signs of democratic governance, and it worsens this in terms of extractive practices. Women in the Global South don't need more loans. We need bold redistributive measures to deconcentrate private economic power, which jeopardizes democratic governance, even within this very forum, while exempting the private sector from any form of responsibility in terms of sustaining life on the planet. For this chapter, then, we would like to see explicit language which means that Private sector investments are subject to minimum human rights, environment and decent work standards. Prioritising investment geared towards local development strategies, industrialisation, and this should be led by local stakeholders rather than international, multinational and financial interests. We need to see a strengthening of the national financial sector, ensuring that profits are reinvested at local level with capital controls, To shield countries from short term speculative investments, we need to explicitly disincentivise these off blended finances. This isn't appropriate for all sectors. That disincentive needs to be explicit. There needs to be this and areas such as social security, education and health need to be shielded from it, as here there are proven negative health effects on equality. and we need to strengthen the public and universal provision of these services. We also need to strengthen language on harmonisation and interoperability, but we also need to ensure that sustainable... However, the useful impact of the private sector in sustainable development, the impact of this needs continues to be scarce and this... therefore would lead us to call for the elimination of Article 34. We need to redesign these mechanisms within the UN otherwise we risk seeing further debt distress for development. So we would call for the removal of sub-paragraphs c and e in particular from this section as we believe that these statements are questionable and could have detrimental human rights impact. We also believe that green, blue and gender bonds should not be used because these can create perverse incentives whereby investment is geared towards profit rather than necessarily development itself. Thank you.

I thank the representative of Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era. And I'll give the floor to the representatives of Principles for Responsible Investment, who will be followed by the representative for International Trade Union Confederation. PRI, the floor is yours. So Mike, please, interpreters.

Thank you, Chair. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, the UN-supported Principles for Responsible Investment, or PRI, was conceived nearly 20 years ago under the leadership of former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. PRI has grown from 20 investors to more than 5,000, and it continues to work with its international network of signatories to put the six principles for responsible investment into practice. The PRI acts in the long-term interest of the signatories, of the financial markets and economies in which they operate, and ultimately of the environment and society as a whole. We would like to thank the co-facilitators for the Zero Draft. PRI welcomes the Zero Draft's recognition that more needs to be done to align business models and investment strategies with sustainable development impact. PRI is preparing an analysis of the Zero Draft, which we will share with member states in early March. Today, I will share two of our recommendations that pertain to paragraph 36 of the zero draft. First, we recommend member states that are planning a national transition to a people-centered, environmentally sustainable economy adopt a whole of government approach that effectively embeds sustainability into a broad set of economic and financial policies, ensuring the pursuit of economic growth and financial returns is aligned with national and international sustainability goals. Effective policy frameworks that enhance the resilience and stability of financial and economic systems, improve market efficiency, address salient sustainability issues, and safeguard financial returns help responsible investors fulfill their duties and obligations. They also enable private finance to play a greater role in achieving national and international sustainability goals. Second, we recommend member states that are committed to sustainable development ensure key sustainability features in corporate and financial policies and regulations such as disclosures, duties and responsibilities, stewardship, sustainability classification instruments, and due diligence are in place and interoperable across capital markets. To maximize the impact.

Of private finance and investments, member states that are committed to sustainable development should seek to not.

Only enable more financing for developing countries, but also to address the obstacles to better sustainability outcomes in investments. This includes ensuring investors can confidently set and pursue commitments to achieve positive sustainability outcomes across all asset classes in line with their duties and obligations. We thank you for the opportunity to contribute to the third session of the Preparatory Committee and offer our full support for the FFD4 process. The PRI has experience contributing to public policy on sustainable finance and responsible investment across multiple markets and stands ready to support the work of the UN and its member states further. Thank you.

I thank the representative of PRI. And now I'll give the floor to the representative of International Trade Union Confederation, who will be followed by the representative of Virginia Glider Sleeve International Fund. International Trade Union Confederation, you have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. I represent the International Trade Union Confederation indeed, which represents almost 200 million workers worldwide, and I speak here today on behalf of the FFD CSO mechanism. In our view, the FFD4 conference is a unique opportunity to regulate private finance in development and align it with the SDGs, including SDG8 on decent work. The reason why we call for regulation is simple. In the absence of adequate safeguards, private finance often subordinates development commitments to commercial interests. Unfortunately, the zero draft misses opportunity for regulation as it falls short of balancing incentives and regulating private finance. If we want private finance to boost the SDGs, we need bold regulatory frameworks to ensure that private investments comply with ILO standards on decent work, responsible business conduct, and due diligence, ensuring the respect of human and labor rights along the entire supply chain through independent monitoring and redress mechanisms. Moreover, It is imperative that the FFD4 outcome document includes a strong commitment to move towards the adoption of a binding UN treaty on multinationals and human rights. If private business activity, investment and innovation are to be major drivers of sustainable development and economic growth, this must necessarily be through the creation of decent jobs in line with the ILO Decent Work Agenda. In conclusion, we call on UN member states to be much more ambitious in aligning private finance with the public development objective, with member states development objectives. We all want private finance to make a difference for development, but in order to do that, we must stop looking at private finance as a silver bullet and frame its contribution to public development plans and priorities based on democratic ownership, public interest, and alignment with the SDGs. Thank you.

I thank the representative of International Trade Union Confederation. I now give the floor to the representative of Virginian Glider Sleeve International Fund, who will be followed by the representative from GRI.

Thank you, Chair. I'm speaking on behalf of Virginia Gildersleeve International Fund and the NGO Committee on Financing for Development, for which I serve as chair. Leveraging private sector engagement to bridge the SDG investment gap requires development policies and financial frameworks to be intentionally designed to prioritize those most at risk of being left behind. This is not just a matter of economic efficiency, it is a matter of equity and justice. The draft effectively highlights financial inclusion, but it should also address critical barriers such as affordability, connectivity gaps, and regulatory constraints that disproportionately limit access for women, MSMEs, and informal workers, while prioritizing scaling digital public infrastructure for inclusive, right-based fintech solutions. We propose the following edits and additions. Regarding paragraph 34A, innovative financing mechanisms like sustainability linked bonds and development oriented venture capital must directly benefit vulnerable communities, requiring strong regulatory frameworks and risk management. Therefore, we propose adding strong safeguards to ensure inclusivity, accessibility and direct impact on vulnerable communities. In 34B, in line four, add protection of intellectual property rights and in line five, ensuring these measures accessible and beneficial to women and marginalized communities, particularly women entrepreneurs and women-led enterprises. Regarding 34, migrant cash transfer sustaining families and businesses must be protected through fair, transparent policies that reduce remittance costs and ensure gender disaggregated data collection. We recommend adding strengthening consumer protection for migrant workers and ensuring gender disaggregated data collection to track challenges faced by women in remittance transfers. Regarding 34F, domestic financial sector reforms must prioritize inclusivity and expand equitable access to financial services, credit and investment opportunities, especially for women-led businesses and MSMEs. We recommend adding, recognizing the gender gap in financial access, we will promote policies and initiatives that expand financing for women-owned MSMEs. In 35F, add that financial mechanisms are designed to be accessible to SMEs, cooperatives, and social enterprises. Replace the last wording in 35G with decent, inclusive and equitable jobs or broad-based resilient growth. In 35H, add ensuring these guarantees are accessible to small-scale enterprises and community-driven initiatives. To 36A, add ensuring financial products are tailored to the needs of underserved populations. We will submit the rationale for the proposed edits to the zero draft and the rationale for them in writing. Thank you.

Thank the representative of Virginia, Gilda Sleeve International Fund. And now give the floor to the representative of GRI, who will be followed by the representative of Morningstar Sustain Analytics, GRI.

Thank you, Chair. Dear delegates of the third preparatory committee session for the fourth international conference on finance for development. On behalf of a coalition of 12 organizations, B Lab, Capital Coalition, CDP, Danish Institute for Human Rights, GRI, SCI Impact, ITUC, SVI International, SHIFT, Uni Global Union, and World Benchmarking Alliance, we're engaged in sustainable finance and corporate reporting. I thank you for the opportunity to share our views. We heard multiple delegations stress the point during the opening session on Monday that the need for renewed global finance framework is urgent, and we agree. For this to happen, we urge Member States to uphold the ambitions of the zero draft's sustainable business and finance legislation provisions in paragraph 36 in the final outcome document. Paragraph 36 promotes an interoperable corporate reporting system for sustainability disclosure based on the concept of double materiality, specifically in sections 36 and 36. By considering both business impacts on the economy, environment and people, as well as how sustainability related financial risks This approach provides investors, governments, and stakeholders with the necessary information to guide capital allocation and policy decisions. It therefore also operationalizes other provisions in the zero draft, including the call in 35D for blended finance initiatives focused on impacts and 35I's call for improving the availability of quality accessibility of data to support those investments in developing countries. The zero draft's proposed position into national law of two complementary standards, the ISSB standards focus on investor risk and opportunities and the GRI standards focus on impacts, allow governments to act swiftly given these standards are already widely implemented around the globe and can be easily complemented with national, specific national requirements. This kind of harmonized reporting system reduces fragmentation, complexity, and costs for companies while creating a level playing field for businesses. In turn, it attracts private capital for sustainability priorities, it strengthens corporate contribution to the UN framework implementation, and helps governments achieve their development goals. In closing, we strongly support the zero draft's inclusion of a comprehensive sustainability reporting system and call on member states to retain sections 36D and E, including double materiality based reporting, the simultaneous transposition of the ISB and GRI standards, and a roadmap for taxonomy interoperability. This makes sustainability reporting a key tool in reducing the $4.3 trillion deficit in developing finance. Thank you for the opportunity to be here and be part of this session.

I thank the representative of GRI. I now give the floor to the representative of Morningstar Sustainalytics, who will be followed by the representative from World Benchmarking Alliance. Morningstar Sustainalytics, Flore ****.

Esteemed delegates, these United Nations, it's a pleasure to be here, private sector, and we implore more private sector engagement in this important process. At Morningstar, we serve institutional clients worth trillions with assets under management. Through Sustainalytics, we have the sustainability rankings of 15,000 of the top companies. And we also provide second party opinion for sustainability linked bonds. For those in the room that read the Financial Times, if you go to the back of the Financial Times, all of that data comes from Morningstar. So we're here as an honest broker of sorts. with three messages. The first is to give you an idea about precisely how investors and companies are thinking about this process. They are engaged, they do have some skin in the game, but they also look at the SDGs as it's a bit of a challenge for them to look at the utility of them in terms of the operations, but also the investment. So if you're an investor looking at the SDGs, sometimes it's a bit awkward, a bit of a square in a circle place, but what they do look at more and more is ESG data. Call it what you will, we're not going to politicize it, that's not of interest here, but ESG data really is just simply company metrics that are used to de-risk operations, financial decisions, and also provide opportunities. How they're also thinking, of course, is they're looking primarily at local regulations, but they're also overlaying that with international frameworks. So if you're thinking about that, they are looking from both sides now. Another key message is we're interested to create space between investors, companies, and your governments, but more so with these United Nations, of course, in these types of forums. And this outcome document is a key way forward in doing that, which we very much support. We have resounding support for paragraph 35, especially the opening section. However, there's a common theme through it, 35 and 36, where we think, or we know that there's a need to differentiate every time you mention private sector between investors and corporations. Corporations, especially MNCs, multinational corporations, they are the ones significantly contributing to LDC's development right now. And you have emerging market companies that are going across border, what we call South-South cooperation. They're the ones that are genuinely driving a lot of growth along with your government policies. And that is important to very much recognize. And we're going to be submitting, of course, in writing ways to do that to add. There's also areas in here when we look at 36E, we consider the ISSB. So what's happening is you have standards that the governments are looking at ISSB standards. not so much as a burden, but very much as a lighthouse. They localize it, and that is happening. And then when they look at GRI, so we've assessed many of the companies that we look at, most companies are actually using GRI data, and that is most of interest to investors when they're looking at the sustainability credibility of companies. That is important. And then now something else we would add is just the interoperability. There should be a clause in here and we will add it on interoperability between ESG data and again, call it what you will and the SDGs. There has to be some way. Now, the third point is we're asking you to lean on us. We will be in Seville. We will be bringing institutional investors with us. We also hear that there's been a call for instruments. And we are working on instruments, this types of policy, these forums, you set the direction. And then what we do is we as the market, we fill that in with respective instruments. We will work with you in that regard. The final point is we had the largest group here recommend when we hear you, when you are asking for increased partnerships with investors and information. That also rings true with something that Kofi Annan said in these very chambers 20 years ago, that knowledge is power. and information is liberating. Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you for your interventions and active participation in private sector. We just want to note that we do not permit advertising in the UN, so if you could just put down that sign, I would appreciate it. All right, my next speaker is coming from World Benchmarking Alliance. will be followed by a representative from FAO. Thank you.

Thank you, Chair. I represent the World Benchmarking Alliance. We welcome the comprehensive focus on private finance and real economy companies in the zero draft, as our global agendas cannot be achieved without the contribution of business. But for business to deliver in line with these agendas, it needs clarity of its responsibility. Our assessments show that the promises made 10 years ago in Addis remain largely unfulfilled. One reason is that Addis didn't define the responsibility of companies and financial institutions. The FFD4 is an opportunity to correct that. The UN can create the required clarity by defining the responsibility of business in contribution to UN frameworks. And you have done it before. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights have transformed responsible business conduct. Companies that have integrated UN GPs are more resilient and sustainable in the long term. FFD4 can create the same clarity of what business should do to prevent climate change, halt biodiversity loss, pay the living wage and foster inclusive finance. We therefore suggest strengthening the language in paragraph 36c requesting that Member States define the responsibilities of the private sector, with a focus on large and multinational companies, in their contribution to current and future UN frameworks that deal with social, climate and nature related issues relevant to businesses. Defining responsibility will take inspiration from the protect, respect and remedy framework underpinning the UN guiding principles on business and human rights. That will strengthen the accountability of companies and financial institutions to contribute towards the national implementation of those frameworks through sustainable investment, innovation and responsible business conduct. To conclude, defining business responsibility will help us strengthen accountability of business. That will make the impact that companies have on people and the planet consequential to their success, helping them to transform.

I thank the representative of World Benchmarking Alliance. And now I invite the representative from FAO, who will be followed by the last speaker who will be representative from Nigeria.

In the frame of this section of the document, we would like to flag the critical role that a range of innovative financial instruments can play and have to play in raising capital and enhancing investments directed at rural and financially underserved actors. enabling more ambitious, complex and longer term interventions that hold significant transformative potential for agri-food systems. Among such instruments, of course, we have to mention banded finance transactions, green bonds and partial credit guarantees. There is a need for far greater amounts of concessional finance to de-risk investments directed at agri-food systems, which can encourage private commercial capital to mobilize its resources towards projects that can generate positive socioeconomic environmental impacts for and in such systems with concrete associated benefits for low income and marginalized individuals. So with that being said, we will also like to see and to impart the message that developing financial markets for agri-food systems does not happen in a vacuum. Not all risks can be addressed by innovative financial solutions. We need increased holistic, increased harmonized approaches from donors, multilateral development banks, development finance institutions, and of course national governments. And this of course is especially true and applies to low income countries where weak enabling environments contribute and keep contributing to high risk registered at national level, which raises the cost of capital and makes it difficult for innovations to scale, which highlights again the critical need for concessional finance. We hope that these messages can be better reflected throughout this section of the draft. Thanks a lot.

I thank the representative of FAO. I now recognize the representative of Nigeria. And I'd invite stakeholders, member states to make a request for the next session, which will be international development cooperation, the whole chapter. You have the floor.

Thank you very much, Mr. Co-Facilitator, for giving us the floor. I will crave your indulgence if you permit me to make an intervention on Article 30, paragraph 30 of subparagraph F of the zero draft. We would have wanted to take the floor yesterday, but something happened and we had to relinquish our So if you permit me, I would start by aligning with the statement of G77 and China delivered by the delegate of Angola and the statement by the Africa group delivered by the delegate of Ghana. We particularly echo the proposal of the Africa group to strengthen paragraph 30, sub paragraph F of the zero draft dealing with beneficial ownership transparency to include actionable recommendations that will curb illicit financial flows, improve tax revenue and facilitate the identification, recovery and return of stolen assets. Nigeria believes that the reference to beneficial ownership transparency should not only underscore the need for member states to collect and maintain credible information on beneficial owners of legal persons and legal arrangements through appropriate registry or alternative mechanisms, but should also highlight the necessity to provide domestic and foreign competent authorities, including tax administrations, access to this information to facilitate the achievement of the larger objectives of financing for development. Additionally, such reference should encourage a system for verification of beneficial ownership information and the role of United Nations in promoting compliance. It is important to recall that the General Assembly adopted a political declaration as the outcome document of the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Corruption on June 2nd, 2021. In that declaration, member states met commitments to strengthen international cooperation and take measures to enhance beneficial ownership transparency by ensuring that beneficial ownership information is available and accessible to competent authorities, including through appropriate registries. Following the declaration, which was adopted by consensus, two resolutions of the conference of state parties to the United Nations convention against corruption titled enhancing the use of beneficial ownership information to facilitate the identification, recovery and return of stolen assets, we adopted during the ninth session. of cops in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt in 2021, talking specifically about resolution 9/7 and the 10th session of cops in Atlanta in 2023, talking about resolution 10/6. The two resolutions build upon and reaffirm the youngest political outcome document. It is important to mention that these two resolutions were adopted by consensus. Mr. Chair, we have another important opportunity with this process to consolidate on these vital successes. Nigeria strongly believes that the language in paragraph 30, subparagraph f, should be further strengthened to include the establishment of a working group to design a global beneficial ownership registry covering a wide range of assets, including beneficial ownership information of legal persons and legal arrangement. With your kind permission, Mr. Chair, we will submit language proposal to the secretariat. Thank you very much.

I thank the representative of Nigeria. We have heard the last speaker in this session. I do want to encourage member states stakeholders to send in your written submissions for those who committed to do so. Do not hold them until the end of the week. Preferably, we would want to receive them now so that we start looking at them very carefully. With that said, I want to thank you all for your very rich submissions for this session. and have the distinct pleasure of handing over the next session to be chaired by my fellow co-facilitator, Ambassador Alicia of Mexico. Ambassador.

Good morning, distinguished delegates. We will now begin the reading of section 2.C on international development cooperation, and I invite

that all of you that for the next chapters onwards, comments will be given on the whole chapter with extra time allotted.

For groups, it will be seven minutes, for countries, four minutes.

And I understand that Pakistan will be speaking for G77 and China. And with that, I give the floor to Pakistan, speaking on behalf of the G77 and China. You have the floor, followed by Palau and then Saudi Arabia.

Thank you, co-facilitators. I have the honor to deliver these remarks on behalf of the G77 and China. On paragraph 37 in the preamble, we require recognition that North-South cooperation remains the main channel of international development cooperation. The fact that the target for developed countries to provide 0.7% of GNI in ODA has not been met once by all since its formal approval. Recognition of the trillions owed to developing countries in terms of unmet ODA commitments. and concerns about the shift of ODA towards humanitarian and crisis situations. We also require a recognition that International Development Corporation plays a unique, indispensable, and transformative role in financing development. The subsection of paragraph 38 needs to be completely reformulated to make clear the differentiation between developing and developed countries. Hence, paragraph 38 should call on developed countries to scale up and achieve their ODA commitments of 0.7%. 38 should be strengthened to call on developed countries yet to do so to set concrete and binding timeframes for achieving ODA targets. We regret that the G77 proposal for a multilateral process for defining the parameters and objectives of ODA has not been incorporated and would request for its inclusion in the REV1. We also propose a standalone commitment in the ODA section to provide and mobilize additional grant-based or highly concessional finance for sustainable development. We request the deletion of 38D, as the group believes ODA should not be utilized for humanitarian issues and we believe that the commitment justifies double counting. On the South-South cooperation subsection, we request for an inclusion of a chapeau paragraph reaffirming the principles of South-South cooperation as was also done in the Addis Ababa action agenda. On the MDB section, we request that the language be made direct and implementable, Hence, throughout the sub paragraphs, we request the replacement of the phrase work through the MDB executive boards with direct commitments. On the financing for climate biodiversity and ecosystem section, the group reiterates its position that climate finance should be new and additional to ODA as it is conceptually and legally different and must not be double counted and this must be included in the chapeau. Para 39 and its subsections require rephrasing. In the chapeau, we must refer to the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement. Moreover, we reject the reference to our commitments on climate finance. Climate finance is an obligation of developed countries and ODA should not be restricted to one purpose as developing countries have other legitimate development priorities and needs. We are concerned that the only action in subparagraph is encouraging developing countries to make contributions. A shifting on the burden on developing countries is not acceptable. We are deeply concerned that the entire section contains no reference to provision of finance when we know that this is a standard formulation under the UNFCCC. In subparagraph, we again see a rewriting of the loss and damage decisions. it must be developed countries which must urgently scale up their contributions to the fund. The reference to ocean and mountain economies in subparagraph d is unclear. Moreover, we do not believe this paragraph has to be limited to only some category of developing countries. On subparagraph e, we continue to have concerns about infringing on mandates of funds under the UNFCCC. We have significant concerns on the references to eligibility criteria, to consolidating climate and environment finance initiatives, and the reference to donor countries. We also propose a standalone action on advancing measures to ensure additionality of climate finance. We broadly support the provisions in the development effectiveness section and propose that in paragraph 40b, we may strengthen the language by changing invite to call on. We support the reference to prioritizing core contributions. We would also like to add a sixth element calling on development partners to channel a larger proportion of financing through recipient government budgets, either as general or sectoral budget support. On the development cooperation architecture, we look favorably on the proposal for a strengthened development cooperation forum. However, in 41b, we must refer to the norm setting and decision making role of the UN as well. We possess reservations on the proposal for the SG to convene expert technical discussions focused on coherent financing of development, climate and humanitarian needs and request its deletion. Lastly, we do not support referencing non-inclusive forums and hence request the deletion of the reference to TOS-T. in paragraph 41C, sub-paragraph 2. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan, and now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Palau in representation of AOSIS, then to Vanuatu,

on behalf of the P seats, and then Malawi on LDCs.

So please, Palau, you have the floor.

Thank you, Madam co-facilitator. Good day, colleagues. So Palau will be speaking on behalf of 38 of its member states of the Alliance of Small Island States. We'd like to express appreciation for the co-facilitators for their attempts at these powers. AEOSIS will be providing a detailed submission with edits and insertions from our member states that we need to see reflected in their entirety in the next iteration of text. Colleagues, if international trade is the engine for development, the provision of international public finance to developing countries is the fuel. For para 37, Um, AOSIS would like to request for the co-facilitators to have further clarity on the sources behind the statement that talks about the shifting of allocations. And so we request that clarification from the co-facilitators. Um, throughout as well the text, we would want to ensure that any reference, um, to the mobilization of finance must also be preceded by the provision of finance. In addition to that, the use of the term international financial architecture should be also used instead of development corporation architecture. Going on to paragraph 38 and throughout the text, we need to see clearly who in the international community is speaking to in relation to the urgings and the calls to action and the commitments, as well as who are the intended beneficiaries. ODA commitments are the responsibility of developed countries for the benefit of developing countries, in particular for SIDS. There are also commitments made under other international regimes, seeking to address, amongst other things, global environmental challenges, which require the principle of additionality to be applied in the provision and mobilization of such finance. This principle is quite simple. There needs to be additional finance to the baseline development finance to address the incremental and full cost to tackle environmental challenges such as ocean conservation, biodiversity loss, and climate change. On the subparagraphs under paragraph 38, EOSIS is asking for the inclusion of a 38a pre-paragraph that recognizes the crucial role that ODA plays for developing countries in achieving their development objectives, as well as the fact that ODA is still one of the largest sources of external financing for a number of countries, including SIDS. For 38, sorry, for 38d bis, The paragraph which invites the IFIs, we would want an inclusion of a paragraph which incorporates multidimensional vulnerability including through the use of the MVI as a complement to the practices and policies to inform their practices and policies as IFIs. Colleagues, SIDS are tired of being the poster children for the reform of the international financial architecture. which we are not allowed to access its concessional finance. We cannot continue this going forward. As it relates to 38L, we would want to include a new paragraph, 38L bis, which welcomes the World Bank's evolution roadmap for its proposals to include vulnerability as a criterion for accessing finance. In the context of the 38 and just under 38J, we would need to see that the international community decides to not to use complementary measures as opposed to consider to use that go beyond GDP. As it relates to going to the financing for climate biodiversity and ecosystems, We need to see clear paragraphs that first of all acknowledge the primacy of relevant international regimes for the areas of competence such as climate, biodiversity and the law of the sea, as well as the reaffirmation of the respective finance commitments and obligations of developed countries. And we'll ask for there to be separate new paragraphs in the context of first climate change, a separate new paragraph for the international regime on biodiversity, and then another separate paragraph on ocean governance. And this is a similar formulation that was done in Addis. Last but surely not least is that there is clearly missing a paragraph and a set of paragraphs that rearticulate and reaffirm the special case that SIDS have for sustainable development. And we need to see the reaffirmation of the new commitments that are made under ABAS that follows through with the other SIDS outcome documents be reiterated in the context of its own special paragraph for small island developing states, given our special case. And lastly, we would want an urging of developed countries to fulfill all their various multilateral environmental finance commitments under the different regimes that are directed to SIDS. And so we'll be providing the detailed text to you in order to save time. Thanks a lot, Madam co-facilitator. Thanks a lot to you.

And I want to give the floor now to Vanuatu speaking on behalf of SIDS, and then Malawi LDCs, followed by Saudi Arabia. Thank you, Madam co-facilitator.

Since it's my first time to

take the floor, I wish to commend the co-facilitators for the zero drafts as basis for moving this agenda forward. We align with statements made by T77 and China and Palau on behalf of AOSIS and just wanting to make very general comments on this particular chapter. Firstly, we support the call for development partners to commit to the target of 0.7 percent of ODA and at least 0.2 percent of ODA to LDCs. allocated with a clear focus on long-term sustainable development that is aligned with priorities and needs of SIDS and ensuring that it's predictable, flexible, and climate responsive development assistance. This includes directing ODA via national systems and processes, including national budgets. Additionally, second point that we urge international financial institutions to simplify access procedures for SIDS, in particular Pacific Island nations, to enable faster disbursement and uptake of funds for resilience building and sustainable development. And lastly, when it comes to paragraphs related to climate change and biodiversity in particular, With respects to loss and damage finance, we have the view that that must be new, additional and non-debt creating for SIDS. And particularly, we call for the operationalization of a dedicated blue finance window under multilateral climate and biodiversity funds, and especially recognizing the role of ocean economies in SIDS in few of our large ocean space and the potential it has for development, sustainable development and resilience building for the Pacific Island nations. I thank you, Madam co-facilitator, and we'll be forwarding our more specific comments to your team. Thank you.

Thank you, Vanuatu. And I want to give the floor now to Malawi on behalf of LDCs, and then, as I said, to Saudi Arabia and then the European Union.

Malawi, are you ready?

Co-facilitators, I'm delivering this intervention on behalf of the Least Developed Countries Group. We are happy to see the elaborated section 2C on international development cooperation in the zero draft, which recognizes the critical role of development assistance in supporting LDC's efforts to achieve the SDGs. However, it fails to recognize the unmet commitment and the pressures which those unmet commitments create on developing countries, in particular, LDCs. We suggest referring to the responsibility of meeting the set targets on ODA. We would like to take this opportunity to highly appreciate the developed countries for providing development assistance which significantly contributes to advancing the SDGs in LDCs, as well as supplementing our limited domestic resources. We appreciate the inclusion of a number of key priorities for developing countries and LDCs. We also underline that certain areas in the text need to be further strengthened. The reaffirmation of the 0.7% ODA GNI target for developed countries and the 0.2% sub-target for the LDCs in para 38A is critical. We strongly support retaining these benchmarks, which align with the Doha Programme of Action. We propose a binding deadline for developed countries to submit concrete plans to meet these targets. However, we strongly suggest that the action must refer to developed countries for the fulfillment of these targets in a timely and predictable manner. Commitment to increase the share of budget supporting ODA is vitally important. LDCs would like to see this outcome document emphasizing channeling a more substantial share of ODA towards budget support to enhance alignment with national development strategies, improve service delivery, and build resilience. We note that a significant portion of ODA growth has been driven by humanitarian aid and in donor refugee costs. These costs should be additional to long-term development initiatives. We therefore call for doubling the share of budget support in total ODA by 2030. The outcome document should call for an increase in the grant element, including in ODA that is channeled through multilateral agencies. It is concerning that the share of grants to LDCs has declined from the peaks seen in the 2000s. As recommended by the 1978 DAC recommendation on terms and the OECD legal instruments conditions of aid, at least 90% of ODA to LDCs should have a grant element. While not all DAC members comply to this recommendation, it is important that ODA to LDCs should be essentially in the form of grants. We propose to use language urging increase in grant assistance to the LDCs. Significant increase in highly concessional finance is necessary for sustainable development in LDCs. We urge for target-based channeling of more concessional finance to LDCs from the MDBs. We also appreciate the reference to considering using complementary measures of progress that go beyond GDP, including the multidimensional vulnerability index, which is vitally important. We call on developed countries to commit to rechanneling at least $100 billion special drawing rights allocation for LDCs at concessional terms. We strongly urge for climate finance to be new and additional. We are disappointed at the minimal climate finance channel to LDCs so far. Therefore, the recognition of adaptation finance gaps in para 39d and calls to simplify access to climate funds in para 39e are essential. Retaining language on the loss and damage fund operationalization in para 39C remains a priority for LDCs that are facing existential climate threats. The emphasis on country ownership, reduced fragmentation, and alignment with national strategies in para 40 mirrors LDCs demands under the Doha Program of Action. Commitments to implement the G20 capital adequacy framework reforms and expand local currency lending in para 38 are positive steps. We support the call to enhance the impact and quality of South-South and triangular cooperation. However, we want to see that South-South cooperation will tailor its support to LDCs. We propose strong reflection on human capacity development through scholarships and training programs to promote STEM education in LDCs. The accountability framework needs to be further strengthened. We are happy to see the draft proposal of strengthened development cooperation framework under the ECOSOC annualized to regularly monitor ODA and other commitments in the area of partnerships. We strongly support to mainstream the dialogue and discussion on development cooperation through DCF for enhancing monitoring and accountability parameters and guidelines. The current draft provides a strong foundation for negotiations. The recommendations that we put forward would operationalize our collective vision of a reinvigorated partnership. We stand ready to engage constructively to strengthen this section. Thank you very much, co-facilitators.

Thank you, Malagui. And Saudi Arabia, would you allow me to first give the floor to the European Union so as to finish the groups, the regional groups, please, and specific groups. So I only have the European Union, and then Saudi Arabia will be speaking afterwards. European Union, you have the floor.

Thank you, Excellency, and good morning, colleagues. So I will try to be expedient with our comments, and we have quite a few edits and suggestions and questions, which we will forward to you in writing. To start with paragraph 37, we would like to further discuss we have some requests for clarification on certain aspects of this paragraph relevant for the trends, objectives and approaches in development cooperation, including on the evidence that is used in support of some of the claims of the paragraph. We should acknowledge that the purpose of development cooperation is and remains to achieve the SDGs and to reduce, in the long term, eradicate poverty. So we would recommend to refocus the wording in this paragraph on enhancing that rather than to reevaluate as such, and this would allow us to focus on improvements and concrete actions rather than reevaluations and self-reflections without an action orientation. We would also like to underline in this paragraph the catalytic role that ODA can play in leveraging other sources of financing. In paragraph 38, the chapeau, we would suggest to refer explicitly to where we have figures to what they correspond to. So in this case, the figure that is cited refers to the DAC countries, ODA specifically. And we would suggest to add that we would also ask to amend the reference to capital constraints, it's an over generalization and there are many reasons for lending being, uh, below capacity. On paragraph 38a, nuances can be important on how things are phrased, and I know that you are aiming to stay away from agreed language, but we would, in this instance, refer to the Pact for the Future paragraph 4c, which could be helpful, as we already had long discussions over this issue there. In 38b, referring to new timeframes, again, the nuances are important, and we would want to avoid implying that we would -- the time frames that already exist that we would be changing those. Paragraph 38C, similarly, the nuances in this are important, especially with regard to any new commitments in allocation or level, and we understand that we have to be realistic in what we promise in terms of what's the today's context across the world. Similarly, 38D again would need some adjustments. We have some alternative language also to suggest on working across the humanitarian development peace nexus, and we'll provide that to you in the vein of strengthening the provision of quality financing and aid effectiveness. In paragraph 38d, we would suggest addition reference to TOS-D, which can add value to better monitoring and reporting of South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation. We have a number of comments on 38g, and the kind of cross-cutting comment there is that which we're considering in the group, so we don't have any final suggestions, but we're tying with how the phrasing in relation to calling upon MDB boards. We know that this has been a long discussion in other contexts as well, whether we work through, whether -- so we appreciate the efforts of the co-facilitators in finding a way to phrase that, but I think this is something that we will still need to discuss. We have a new 38D bis on gender equality and tracking that in relation to ODA. Paragraph 39, I'm just going to make a very general remark that it's important that this language on climate finance remains consistent with the different outcomes and decisions taken at the COP. So we will have a significant number of suggestions there, and we will be in the paragraph 39 suggesting new paragraphs. one on disaster risk reduction, another one to strengthen the engagement of MDBs and climate and biodiversity finance, and one on making best use of circular economy and sustainable and inclusive bioeconomy. In paragraph 40, we would like to reinforce language on reinforcing the global partnership for effective development cooperation, as well as in 40A and 40C, strengthen language on localization of SDGs and the role of local actors. And we have a new 40C bis to propose on calling upon beneficiaries to work on transparency, accountability, and good governance. Finally, on paragraph 41, again, we would like to strengthen the language on local and regional actors and include a reference to NCDs. In 41b, focus on cooperation and synergies to end avoiding duplication. And in 41c or in 41, we would appreciate a more broad discussion on the role of the DCF And this is -- so we won't propose language as such, but we would appreciate a discussion on what the foreseen role and functions would be. And again, we have a suggestion to refer to TOSTI, which can add value across severe outcomes and monitoring their follow-up. And we would also support the more streamlined methods of reporting based on SDG targets.

Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of the European.

Union, and I now give the floor to Saudi Arabia, followed by Morocco on behalf of the MIX. Saudi Arabia, you have the floor.

Thank you, Madam co-facilitator. On paragraph 37, we request to change climate-induced disasters and crises to.

Food and energy insecurity, disasters and climate change. In 38C, in the South-South and triangular cooperation, we request to remove the phrase, including by increasing the share of budget support in ODA. In 38E, we request to change the word, we commit to, we strive, and ending the sentence with with the phrase on a voluntary basis. We also request adding another sentence and I quote, to further strengthen South-South cooperation, we request, we recognize the importance of regional financing mechanism that facilitate cross-border investment, resource mobilization and knowledge sharing among developing economies.

Strengthening these mechanisms.

Will help ensure that South-South cooperation is more sustainable, demand-driven and aligned with national development priorities." End quote. In 38F, we request to end the sentence with "as appropriate." Also, we request to add a sentence, and I quote, "We emphasize the need to enhance knowledge sharing initiatives through regional platforms that allow countries to exchange best practices.

Innovative financing models, and technical expertise in sustainable development.

Strengthening these networks will support more effective coordination and capacity building across developing nations." End quote. In 38G, we have to ensure adherence to specific mandate and governance structures of each MDB and all decision to be within their respective boards. Also, in the last sentence of the same paragraph, we request to replace the word implement with work toward the implementation. In 38H, we request to add a new sentence and I quote, "These instruments should respect the reserve asset character and status of the resulting SDR denominated claims and ensure their liquidity," end quote. In 38K, with regards to the impact measurement frameworks, we ask to replace the word standardized with interoperable and delete the sentence, negative impacts and ensuring adherence to social environmental safeguards in all operations. As this presumes that banks are not following their own ESS policies. In paragraph 39, we stress on that we need to fully, to be fully aligned with the COP29 outcome decision on NCQG.

We also.

We are also concerned that the entire section contains no reference to provision.

Of finance when we know that this is a standard formulation under the UNFCCC. In paragraph 39C, this should be aligned with UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement and their provisions and principles. In 39D, we stress on the deletion of carbon finance. In 39E, we request to end the point with and those administered by MDBs.

In paragraph-- I thank the distinguished representative of Saudi Arabia, and I now give the floor to.

Morocco on behalf of the MIX, followed by South Africa and then Guatemala.

Thank you, Madam co-facilitator. I have the honor to deliver this intervention on behalf of the like-minded group of countries for middle-income countries composed of Armenia, Belarus, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Mexico, Namibia, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Uruguay, and my own country, Morocco. The action, this action area on international development cooperation is of utmost importance for the LMG mix. In this regard, we would like to advance the following preliminary comment on its content. On paragraph 37, under the subtitle official development assistance, we expect that the document will reflect the persistent relevance of ODA for an important number of middle-income countries. We would like then to suggest the following. We acknowledge that ODA and other concessional finance are still important for a number of middle-income countries. Under ODA as well, we would like to emphasis on enhancing the flexibility, adequacy, and predictability of ODA allocation to enable the multilateral system to effectively deliver on sustainable development. This includes ensuring that ODA remains stable, responsive to evolving needs, reducing earmarking to allow greater alignment with recipient countries priorities. Third, we would like to have a specific paragraph on the elaboration of a specific interagency comprehensive system-wide response plan for middle-income countries under this section, drafted in an implementation-oriented manner with a specific timeline and scope, rather than a limited reference to welcoming the call for its advancement. The system-wide strategy should also inform the elaboration of a long-term programme of work to support middle-income countries. We will provide specific language on this point. Hence, paragraph 10 of the preamble section shall only focus on the specific needs of MICs and the need to provide tailored support to middle-income countries in a manner that addresses their specific challenges while mindful of their diversity, as agreed in the QCPR 2024. On beyond GDP, under paragraph J, we believe that FF4 should send a strong political call to urgently advance on the mandate agreed on the Pact for the Future for initiating the process to develop measures of progress on sustainable development that go beyond GDP. We will also provide specific language in this regard. Under the same paragraph, while we appreciate the reference to the mandate of the Pact for the Future regarding the MDBs, We think that the language there should benefit from a clarification on the way forward on the role given to the MDBs with a specific timeline, approach, and linkages to the upcoming intergovernmental process on measures that go beyond gross domestic product. And we will also be drafting language and submitting to your co-facilitators.

Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Morocco speaking on behalf of the MIX. And now I give the floor to South Africa, followed by Guatemala and by Yemen.

Thank you, Ambassador. I couldn't say it better than Palau. ODA is the, the fuel for, for the engine that we, we're trying to create here, and also, uh, exceptionally, we'd like to align ourselves with the statement made by the LDCs as well. Uh, now we'd like to propose the following additional points on the section on ODA. Uh, one is a reaffirmation of the importance of ODA as a key component of international development cooperation. Two, a commitment to align ODA with the 2030 Agenda it's not clear why we only call on other sources of finance to align, but not ODA a commitment to increase grants or non debt creating finance and highly concessional finance a commitment that ODA commitments must not be counted as climate finance commitments, as these were made for different purposes A call urging the OECD DAC to reconsider its definition of ODA. Currently, the definition overstates contributions by including items that are not strictly ODA. A language suggestion would be we emphasize the importance of precise measurement of ODA, including the exclusion of components such as refugee costs, debt relief, imputed student costs, and private sector instruments to ensure credible and reliable reporting for informed decision making, resource allocation, and progress monitoring. A further commitment to transparency in the reporting of ODA by countries because it's unclear what's counted as ODA. A further bullet would be a commitment reaffirming that TOST will not replace ODA, which will remain the key measure for donor effort by the OECD DAC. We'd also like to see a commitment to use beyond GDP measures to inform access to development cooperation, including grants. This is stated in J in the MDB section, but it should apply to ODA as well. We have language to submit in this regard. On 38J, beyond GDP should also inform access to grants. We'd like to see a bullet saying that we emphasize that loans must be accompanied by complementary support, that is a grant component, technical assistance, capacity building and skills transfer in order to ensure sustainability. We strongly recommend that paragraph 39 on financing for climate, biodiversity and ecosystems form a separate section of the document. That is, that it is not a subcomponent of international development cooperation. This would be to emphasize that new challenges must receive new financing and not be drawn by old ODA commitments or envelopes. Climate finance cannot be seen as a subcomponent of international development cooperation. On 39, if the consolidation of existing climate and environmental finance initiatives should not impact those funds established under the UNFCCC, we will propose language in that regard. On 39, we'd like to see a new bullet. which says we need to see a goal inserted and a measurement for new money for climate finance. Currently, donors and financing countries are shifting funds from existing envelopes to meet climate pledges. This undermines the ability to meet existing development challenges. On paragraph 40c, We would like to see a goal here on promoting local procurement, for example doubling the value of contracts awarded to local suppliers. EU specific data indicates that only 13 of contracts went to local providers, despite decades of lobbying to increase tied aid. Thank you very much.

Thank you to the distinguished representative of South Africa. And now I need the floor, I give the floor to Guatemala, followed by Germany and then Argentina.

Guatemala, you have the floor.

Very good morning. Thank you very much, Madam co-facilitator, for giving me the floor. Guatemala would like to rely on the statement delivered by the Group of 77 and China and the group of like-minded middle-income countries. we would like first of all to thank the co facilitators for integrating the importance of south south and triangular cooperation as well as progress in bolstering it as well as to measuring the impact thereof vis vis development thirty eight subparagraph j on complementary measures of progress that go beyond gross domestic product well guatemala believes it's important to take into account commitments to incorporate multidimensional measurements which are complementary to assess social, economic and other forms of progress, including environmental progress. We also believe that these metrics should apply not just to financing when it is concessional in nature, but also this should be a criterion for the allocation of official development assistance. I'd like to move on now. to thirty nine a where guatemala would like to highlight that climate financing should abide by commitments entered into and guarantee equitable access to resources for adaptation mitigation to climate change in developing countries. the document should reflect more tangible actions and more measurable ways of ensuring accountability to guarantee that we can mobilise at least $0.3 billion per year in $1.3 trillion per year, excuse me, by 2035. In addition, in terms of paragraph 40, we think it's positive that there is consensus about the revitalisation of the development efficiency, effectiveness rather agenda. We therefore would call for similar commitments to be forthcoming to match this consensus in terms of indicators and follow up for the development effectiveness agenda, complementing efforts already being deployed elsewhere. Our delegation will continue to actively participate in discussions in this forum and I'd like to thank you for allowing us this chance to speak.

I thank the distinguished representative of Guatemala. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Yemen.

Thank you, co-chair. Yemen aligns itself with the Group of 77 and China and the LDC, and we offer the following specific comments. On Article 37, we request a new paragraph recognizing the North-South cooperation as main channel of development cooperation as indicated by G77 China. But the historical context of unmet O27 commitment and accumulated deficit of ODA should be mentioned in paragraph 37. And in the opening text, we request strengthening the language beyond fundamental rule, delete reference to complementing efforts as it diminishes ODA importance, add binding commitment for development cooperation. In paragraph 37 on challenges, we request deletion of shift in allocation as it legitimized declining long-term investment, add concrete reference to predictable funding mechanism, and include specific measures for improving effectiveness. In paragraph 37 on effectiveness, we support reference to fragmentation, but it needs more specifications. We request addition of country ownership principles and add reference to using and referencing Uh, the strengthening of country systems. On Article 38, we support the recognition of insufficient development cooperation, but we request addition specific timelines. and clarity in accountability mechanism. In paragraph 38A, it needs to be reformulated to focus specifically on developed countries obligations. We strongly support the other commitments here, but we request binding timeframes and for implementation and include specific interim benchmark monitoring and reporting requirement. On paragraph 38B, we need to strengthen the language beyond appreciate, add requirement, we need to add requirement for binding time frames for developed countries and include the accountability as well here. In paragraph 38C, add reference to multilateral process for defining ODA parameters and include standalone commitment for grant based financing and supporting the country level programming focus. Also, we request the minimum percentage for budget support. On 38D, we agree with the G77 and what they proposed that humanitarian shouldn't be mentioned here, but what we call as Yemen, it should be a separate paragraph and an additional paragraph in its own. And we propose the reference to be humanitarian development peace nexus. This is a different concept and approach. So we request to be added in a different paragraph. we agree that ODA should not be diverted to humanitarian assistance and the current text enables double counting and it undermines the development focus on ODA. On article 39 on the climate finance for paragraph, we request explicit reference to UNFCCC and Paris Agreement and clear statement that the climate must be new and additional order. In paragraph 39A, we align fully with the COP29 NCQG decision and we request deleting language encouraging developing countries contribution and to add clear reference to developed countries obligations. In paragraph 39C, revised language on loss and damage fund and specified developed countries obligation to scale up contributions. In paragraph 39 expand the scope to all developed countries and concrete support mechanism. In paragraph 39 delete reference infringing on UN FCCC fund mandate and remove reference to eligibility criteria. Thank you very much.

I thank the distinguished representative of Yemen. now i give the floor to the distinguished representative of argentina followed by the distinguished representative of cuba.

Thank you very much co facilitator. first of all for paragraph thirty seven the delegation of argentina believes that we should strike out the mention of the twenty thirty agenda to avoid any overlap for this matter which is already discussed in other fora because we don't believe it's relevant to financing for development generally. The 2030 Agenda in this sense is giving the whole paragraph a restrictive meaning. Paragraph 38 South South and triangular cooperation are mentioned correctly as being complementary rather than substituting north-south cooperation. In addition, we believe that this is That's very important to point out. Argentina would also note with pleasure that South-South and triangular cooperation are a subtitle, as it's understood that this gives relevance to this matter. We also believe it's important to include multi-stakeholder groups in this process. We should therefore not avoid referencing developed countries and their important role in development, including their potential role in terms of triangular cooperation. Similarly, subsection as it is drafted could be replaced with a new in paragraph 64. We also believe that Argentina does not forget the role of creditors here but we shouldn't forget the commitments already entered into by developed countries as providers of oda thirty eight j we believe it's important that the mention of measures of progress which go beyond gdp should be removed from this subsection on multilateral development banks and the system of public development banks because we believe that the discussion of metrics which go above and beyond GDP for the measurement of development is a discussion which exceeds the scope of concessional financing. Indeed, these goals are important for non-concessional financing too, in various forms of international development for financing such as South-South, triangular cooperation, technology transfer, ODA and others besides. Because of this, we believe it's very important that our discussions don't only hew to multilateral development banks and concessional financing. We think that the text should also cover other topics. Finally, we believe that we need to create an within paragraph 38, a new subparagraph about binding access, binding commitments for access in general. 39, Argentina reserves on comment on this section while we await our national instructions. However, preliminary, we believe that we shouldn't try and limit assistance for development merely to climate affairs, there also are legitimate priorities which may not relate to that for development. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Argentina. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Cuba, to be followed by the distinguished representative of Lesotho.

Thank you, co-facilitator, and good morning, colleagues. Well, in this section we have a couple of comments, of course we align our, our, uh, statement with those already made by the G77 and China and EOSIS, uh, regarding, uh, paragraph 38, uh, subparagraph A, uh, and B, we, we believe that, um, there should be clear, uh, commitments of developing coun- of developed countries to fulfill their respective commitments on, uh, ODA, we will provide, uh, language in that regard in due time. we support the deletion of paragraph thirty eight d in our view this section should tackle international development cooperation which should emphasise long term sustainable development goals rather than humanitarian aid which is typically a short term response to emergencies of course humanitarian needs are important developing countries know that all too well but nonetheless this is an international development cooperation discussion. And we believe that there are different frameworks and settings to address the issue of humanitarian needs, as important as they certainly are. Similarly, by including the commitment on humanitarian aid in this section, we believe that we take the risk of blurring the distinction between emergency relief and development assistance. Financing for humanitarian emergencies is different and should remain different from development finance. So we believe that this section should focus on scaling up financial support and addressing the root causes of poverty and inequality. When it comes to the proposal made by the G77 and China to initiate a transparent and inclusive multilateral process under the auspices of the UN for agreeing on a common understanding of parameters and objectives of ODA flows, we believe this is a paramount objective of this section. Similarly, on South South and triangular cooperation, we propose to include as a chapeau to E and F the language of paragraph 56 of Addis that recognises the principles of South South cooperation. 39, we insist on replacing the phrase, the Paris Agreement, with its Paris Agreement to clarify that the Paris Agreement is an integral part of the UNFCCC. This modification will enhance clarity and in this international context regarding financing, we need clarity more than ever. The language proposing PP in paragraph 39A is not acceptable for us. We propose the alternative as presented by EOSIS. In paragraph, sorry, paragraph 39B, we would propose to replace strengthened by reformed international financial architecture because that is one of the goals that we are fighting for. In paragraph 41, we request the deletion of the last portion. We require more clarity on this proposal, as well as on the rest of the proposal contained in the text. It is important to hear from the co-facilitators regarding the rationale behind these concrete initiatives. In our view, development finance is distinct from climate finance. I think other colleagues have already explained why we do not like that mixing, as important as they are. in their own capacity. In paragraph 41, see subparagraph II, we propose to stop the paragraph after the statistical commission. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Lesotho, to be followed by the distinguished representative of Japan.

Thank you, co-facilitator. Since this is the first time the Kingdom of Lesotho is taking the floor, we would like to join others in commending the co-facilitators for having compiled a good zero draft which forms a good foundation for our discussions this week. In alignment with comments delivered by G77 and the LDCs group, we would like to make the following brief comments on paragraph 39 on national capacity. It will be recalled that during the previous PrepCom, We emphasize the need for prioritization of climate finance to vulnerable countries in the outcome document. In addition to that, we'd like to highlight that as developing countries, we always push for grant-based funding for climate action and encourage that those funds should be channeled through the UNFCCC financial mechanisms such as Green Climate Fund, JAF, LDCF. We therefore recommend that in 39D, we qualify the climate finance to read grant-based climate finance. Additionally, noting that there are sometimes barriers for least developed countries to access climate funds due to high access requirements, we would encourage this section of the draft to emphasize the simplification of access requirements for climate funding for.

LDCs.

Lastly, we are against the use of insurance for climate action because we see it as a strategy to shift the responsibility of developed countries to provide financial resources to developing countries. We will be sending in the detailed written text.

I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Lesotho. Now I would like to give the floor to the distinguished representative of Japan to be followed by the distinguished representative of Russian Federation.

Thank you, Chair.

Let me begin with on paragraph 38. We propose adding the following word, given that non-traditional donors through South-South cooperation and the private sector are increasingly playing a prominent role in supporting developing countries, we should welcome a further expansion of their role in development financing. Next, on 38C, we suggest replacing commit with strive, and the idea of developing an indicator should be elaborated, we understand that there is no such discussions at the DAC. On 38E, ODA alone is insufficient to achieve the SDGs, emerging country cooperation is crucial. In this sense, as for South-South and triangular cooperation, we should aim for a more in-depth statement without retreating from the Buenos Aires outcome in 2019. By sharing experiences, fostering mutual learning, and providing financial resources aligned with recipient priorities, we enhance knowledge for supporting countries and build recipient capacity. On 38F, Monitoring and reporting should be considered not as an end in themselves, but as means to support the evidence base and learning of triangular cooperation. Mentioning the instrumental values of monitoring and reporting, including contributions to better performance, is useful. On 38, the individual policies and governance of MDBs should be discussed and decided by the boards of directors. which are made-up of the member countries of each institution, so language that prejudges the outcome of discussions should be avoided. Action 49A of the Pact of the Future merely outlines a general direction for future IDA replenishments, but does not explicitly mention the further replenishment of concessional resources in general. As replenishing concessional resources such as IDA, SDFF, FDF is a board-level discussion, preemptive language should be avoided. On 38H, while Japan supports SDRE channeling through MDBs, a minimum number of participating countries is prerequisite for its launch. It is necessary not only to meet the number of countries, but also to satisfy various factors such as sufficient economic scale, and this discussion should not be conducted too quickly within the short deadline of 2025. On 38J, the use of concessional funds should be limited for low income countries and vulnerable middle income countries facing global challenges such as climate change and pandemics, not projects with positive externalities. Furthermore, as this sentence reiterates the call made in the Pact for the Future for MDBs, this sentence should be aligned with the original sentence as a pact. On 39. As climate and biodiversity are separate matters, we propose deleting in the same vein from this paragraph. On 39D, although we recognize the need for climate finance for developing countries, climate finance should be considered globally since the commitment of sufficient finance to developing countries alone will not solve global problems. Careful description should be made. On 40, We believe that development effectiveness should be carefully monitored from the perspective of quality as well. Therefore, we propose to add in terms of ensuring the quality of the effectiveness at the end of this paragraph. On 40A, mutual accountability is one of the key principles of development effectiveness. It acknowledges that effective development requires not only commitments of development partners, but also those of developing countries. Thus, it is important to have more balanced view in the following bullets and discuss the role of responsibilities of developing countries. And 40B, technology and knowledge transfer should be voluntarily in mutually agreed terms. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Japan. I would like to give the floor to the distinguished representative of Russian Federation to be followed by the distinguished representative of Zimbabwe.

Thank you, co-facilitator. For 37, we propose the reevaluation of the practice of international development cooperation. We say that is not appropriate. The goal of international development cooperation remains relevant and still has not been attained. We should talk about improving practices and approaches, strengthening cooperation, taking into account the needs for mobilization of efforts to carry out existing obligations.

As mentioned by a number of other delegations, the document.

Overall should be focused on action and should not be similar to yearly reports of interagency and task forces groups for financing of development in '37 and the beginning of '38. We believe that that should be followed for the rest of the document as well. As for 38C, we need more explanation about the new indicators and goals that should be developed for sustainable development. As for the MGBs, we need to clarify that these solutions should not override existing mandates and should not be detrimental to sustainability. As for 38G, as mentioned in the Pact for the Future, this document was not unanimously supported, so we would like to see it deleted from the document. As for 38K, there is a reference to inappropriate standards and frameworks, and we also would like to delete that. As for the climate financing and ecosystem financing section, For discussion of these issues, there are already specialized multilateral platforms that exist.

This should be deleted as an entire section.

As for 40C, we should include a condemnation of UCMs which hinder the delivery of international assistance. 41A and further on in the text, the new concept of national platforms, including the UN, MDBs, and other factors, require further clarity. We believe that instead this should be used in the term country-led national platforms, which was agreed in paragraph nine of the Addis Ababa Program of Action. 41B, we believe the paragraph should not be focused on strengthening dialogue and cooperation for development based on UN-led processes. These processes have rules of procedure, modalities and mandates that indicate how they should work. And participation of all appropriate stakeholders is neither universal nor obligatory. Paragraph 41C, from procedural point of view, there is the sub paragraphs that are a bit too long and onerous to read.

In addition, in terms of the content.

It would be more appropriate in the section on further actions to be taken. We also would like these to focus to be in line with the mandate of the forum, Development Cooperation Forum.

Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Russian Federation. Now I would like to give the floor to the distinguished representative of Zimbabwe to be followed by the distinguished representative of Jamaica.

Thank you, thank you, Chair. My delegation aligns itself with the comments delivered by the G77 and China and African group. And I would like to share the following comments in my national capacity. Firstly, we welcome the highlight in paragraph 38 that official development assistance still falls short of the 0.7% of gross national income target. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda of 2015 reaffirmed the need for predictable financing. Transparent reporting and independent monitoring are crucial to ensuring ODA delivers tangible development outcomes. Secondly, country ownership must be at the core of development cooperation. As emphasized in the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness of 2005, and Agenda for Action of 2008. However, most donor-driven projects continue to undermine national priorities. Development assistance should align with recipient countries' socioeconomic contexts, ensuring effective involvement of local stakeholders in decision-making. Thirdly, multilateral development banks, MDBs, and public development banks MDBs must be reformed to provide more concessional financing and reduce excessive debt burdens. Recent proposals such as the Bridgetown Initiative highlight the urgency of modernizing MDBs for greater flexibility and efficiency in development finance. Simplifying access to funds will particularly benefit small and less institutionalized nations. Fourthly, but not least, climate financing must be additional to ODA and not a reallocation of existing aid. The Baku agreement at COP29 set a new climate finance goal with developed countries pledging to mobilize at least $300 billion annually by 2035 to support developing nations. However, this figure falls short of the estimated $1.3 trillion needed annually by 2030, highlighting a significant financial gap. Clear tracking mechanisms and transparent funding are essential to ensure that finance for adaptation and loss and damage does not detract from poverty eradication efforts. Finally, my delegation wishes to highlight that the aspect of a well-resourced United Nations system in the development cooperation architecture is missing. The UN cannot fulfill its convening mandate when inadequately resourced. This element was agreed on in the Addis Ababa action agenda and its absence would represent regression in our commitment to a strong, effective United Nations. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Zimbabwe. Now I would like to give the floor to the distinguished representative of Jamaica to be followed by the distinguished representative of United Republic of Tanzania.

Thank you, Mr. co-facilitator. Jamaica aligns with the statements delivered by the G77 and China, AOSIS, and the LMG mix. Jamaica wishes to highlight the fact that concessional financing as part of development cooperation is often inaccessible to some developing countries because they fail to meet eligibility criteria despite being highly vulnerable to natural disasters, the effects of climate change, exogenous shocks, and global crises.

Which erode developmental progress and financial stability. We therefore wish to reiterate the.

Need for MDBs to take into account the structural and environmental vulnerabilities of SIDS in this regard. In addition, with respect to paragraph 38, Jamaica is of the view that lender terms should not only include longer loan tenors, but should also include lower interest rates for a more sustainable benefit. We are also supportive of strengthening the capacity of MDBs to issue local currency bonds. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Zambia. Now I would like to give the floor to the distinguished representative of United Republic of Tanzania, to be followed by the distinguished representative of the United States.

Thank you. Thank you, co-facilitators. First of all, we'd like to align with this statement delivered by G77 China, Afghan group, and LDCs. We'd like to add a few comments on this section. And first of all, on On paragraph 37, Madam co-facilitator, the paragraph should more clearly reflect that multilateral efforts are failing to adequately address critical global challenges, including the climate crisis, persistent poverty, and inequality. This failure is largely due to the gradual retreat from multilateralism observed globally. In addition, it is important to indicate a key reason for failures of international cooperation, which is extremely economic inequality as identified intensified by the global unilateral thinking. Madam co-facilitator, on paragraph 38, we would like to, on subsection I, we would like to propose to replace the words, we will work through the MDBs, executive boards, with core on MDBs. So that the paragraph reads, we call on MDVs to improve lending terms dash, dash, dash, then the next section, uh, I mean next sentence should read, we call on, uh, we also call on MDVs and then it continues that way. Uh, this adjustment, madam co-facilitator, ensures a direct call to action for MDVs to, to enhance lending terms and expand low currency products, both for, uh, of which. critical for developing countries facing debt distress and country volatility. Madam Facilitator, on paragraph 39, we have also two additions. Number one, we would like to add c bis. which we read, we commit to simplifying access to climate finance for developing countries, including direct financing channels for vulnerable communities and local governments to ensure resources reach those most affected by climate impacts. This addition, Madam co-facilitator, aligns with the Paris Agreement, which emphasizes the need for adequate, predictable, and accessible climate finance to support developing countries in meeting their climate goals. Second, Madam facilitator, we would like to propose additional paragraph 39, of course, gonna be 39 EBs, which will read, we will prioritize long-term flexible concession and grant-based climate finance to support a just and adequate transition, including clean cooking energy. This, this additional Madam co-facilitator highlights the need to reduce the debt burden of high borrowing costs. associated with the climate-related projects in developing countries. I thank you very much.

I thank the distinguished representative of the United Republic of Tanzania. Now, I would like to give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States, to be followed by the distinguished representative of Armenia.

Thank you. On paragraph 38, the United States has not committed to the UN ODA target and cannot make commitments to increasing official provider funding. This document must continue to reflect country ownership of the development process and the primacy of domestic policies, governance, and resources in advancing development aims. We appreciate the acknowledgement that MDB decisions must go through their executive boards. However, decisions about multilateral development bank resources, financing terms, instruments, and allocation are the purview of the respective governance bodies of each MDB and cannot be decided through FFD4. The document could, however, invite independent organizations to determine how they can best contribute to FFD's objectives. On paragraph 39, we cannot accept the section on financing for climate, biodiversity, and ecosystems as drafted and would require significant changes to be able to agree to it. The United States reserves on other references to climate change, biodiversity, and green financing throughout the document. Further, we cannot ensure things like the use of debt swaps, which are subject to each member state's policies. In paragraph 40, we agree with the importance of increasing development effectiveness. We believe provider is a more accurate word than donor for the channels mentioned in this paragraph and would request this change. This paragraph seems to suggest that all development cooperation should flow through government budgets. We believe this paragraph should instead stress transparency as a core tenet of effectiveness, which is critical to successful mutual accountability. We request this important principle be added. Finally, some of these suggestions in 40 are not practical for all countries. For example, the United States and others have committed to striving to provide multi-year programs, but US Congress approves funding on an annual basis. Therefore, implementing 40 would not be possible for us. In paragraph 41, we have concerns about the proposed role of the DCF and the characterization of the relationship between different multilateral bodies in this paragraph. Since countries do not directly report data to SDG 17.3.1, but report through intermediaries, UNCTAD and OECD, which own the data, this proposal appears to contravene the UN Statistical Committee's agreement. We request clarification of the proposed roles of all of these actors. Second, the proposals here appear to duplicate the monitoring requested of the interagency task force in paragraph 65. The proliferation of platforms increases transaction costs for development, especially for recipient countries. And this appears to far exceed proposals for monitoring of other streams of finance. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of the United States. Now I'd like to give the floor to the distinguished representative of Armenia, to be followed by the distinguished representative of Burkina Faso.

Thank you, Chair. Armenia aligns itself with the statement delivered by Morocco on behalf of LMG Mix and would like to add a few comments on our national capacity. The current global and regional crisis caused by conflicts, natural and human induced disasters, underscore the need for taking into account the humanitarian situations in international development cooperation. ensuring that immediate needs of the most vulnerable are met while building the foundation for long term sustainability and resilience. Therefore, we would like to support paragraph 38 on the need to scale up assistance for humanitarian emergencies and needs without impacting commitments to development assistance for long term sustainable development. We also believe that this language can be further strengthened, bringing the humanitarian development peace nexus into consideration and bridging emergency response with sustainable development efforts where needed. We support the strengthening of the language on paragraph 39 in regards to the scale of financing for climate, biodiversity and ecosystems. We also suggest an amendment to the first sentence of the paragraph, which is to add after biodiversity finance the following, to ensure that the living in harmony with nature 2050 vision for biodiversity remains within reach. For paragraph 39B, after the phrase creating instruments, we would like to add the following amendment, including innovative financial mechanisms such as debt for climate and debt for environment swaps. We believe that this will contribute to the objective of achieving just and equitable transitions, biodiversity conservation and restoration. We would like to also support the paragraph 39C on urgently scaling up contributions to the loss and damage fund. Additional amendments to this section will be provided in writing. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Romania. I would like to give the floor to the distinguished representative of Burkina Faso, to be followed by the distinguished representative of Cabo Verde.

Thank you, co-facilitator. Burkina Faso fully aligns with the statement delivered by the G77 and China, the African Group and the LDC Group, and we appreciate the high quality of the draft, which is a good foundation which we should further strengthen to fully reflect the realities and priorities of developing countries, especially LDCs. Ladies and gentlemen, international cooperation, as clearly stated in the G77 statement, is a vital catalyst for sustainable development. But to ensure that it can truly take up this role, Burkina Faso believes that while we appreciate the reforms in the zero draft, we should draw your attention to the following points. Paragraph 37 of the document highlights the vital importance of international cooperation in achieving the 2030 agenda. Indeed, This is behind a large number of domestic investments in developing countries, and we should call upon LDCs to call upon an increase for the amount of official development assistance between now and 2030 so that we can align this with our national development strategies. Assistance is losing effectiveness because of fragmentation. national capacity and lack of alignment with national priorities. That situation explains is added to by donors reticence in management of these projects, which is even worse in countries facing a deficit. We highlight our concern about the increasing channelling of ODA towards crises and humanitarian situations, and we would therefore underscore that this shouldn't be to the detriment of productive investment and support for production. Paragraph 38 highlights that development cooperation includes both concessional and non-concessional financing. We would highlight the vital importance of having 0.7% 7 of GNI for ODA with 0.37 of that for LDCs countries should take tangible steps to ensure that that can be done predictably. Burkina Faso also welcomes the focus on south south and triangular cooperation. We therefore support the call of the LDCs to ensure that This assistance is specifically tailored to the needs of LDCs. That should serve as a launchpad for genuine emergence. We would highlight, therefore, the importance of developing human capacity, including with scholarships and training programs. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Burkina Faso. I would like to give the floor to the distinguished representative of Cape Verde, to be followed by the distinguished representative of India.

Thank you, Mr. Co-facilitator. We align with the statements delivered on behalf of the IOSCs and wish to reiterate the following. MVI is an important tool for promoting sustainable financing for development and to achieve the SDGs. Traditional measures such as GDP fail to fully capture the scope of SAID's and developing countries' vulnerabilities. We think FFD4 is an important opportunity to highlight the importance of MVI and to express our commitment to its implementation. Therefore, as mentioned by our representative, the representative of IOSIS, considering its importance, We suggest to add a specific paragraph on MVI with the following content. The adoption of the multidimensional vulnerability index by the United Nations General Assembly is a significant milestone. By considering structural vulnerabilities across the three dimensions of sustainable development, economic, environmental, and social, The MVI provides a more accurate tool for assessing the challenges faced by SAICs and developing nations in general. We call on international financial institutions, multilateral development banks, and development partners to use MVI in determining eligibility for development cooperation and financial support. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Cabo Verde. Now I'd like to give the floor to the distinguished representative of India, to be followed by the distinguished representative of Indonesia.

India aligns itself with the G77 and urges the developed countries to honor their ODA commitments in a timely manner, ensuring that allocations align with recipient countries' specific needs, development stage, and national development plans. On the text, we propose the following suggestions. In paragraph 38F, we would like reporting for measuring South-South cooperation to be voluntary as SDG indicator 17.3.1 already covers foreign direct investment, ODA and South-South cooperation as a proportion of gross national income. In paragraph 38, we recommend making a general call to the MDBs, allowing them to determine the relevance of the G20 capital adequacy framework review recommendations based on their mandates and governance structure rather than working through MDB executive boards, as these decisions rest with the MDB executive boards and management. Para 38 may be rephrased as, We encourage countries willing and legally able to explore voluntary channeling of SDRs through MDBs to strengthen MDBs financial capacity to support the SDGs and address global challenges. These instruments should respect the reserve assets character and status of the resulting SDR denominated claims and ensure their liquidity. In para 38K, we propose the following alternative formulation aligned with the G20 roadmap towards better, bigger, and more effective MDBs. We will encourage MDBs to strengthen impact measurement and reporting and align it with the updated visions, including by promoting alignment of results management and measurement systems across the MDBs and the SDGs. On paragraph 39, we would like to reemphasize that a clear distinction between climate finance and development finance is essential to prevent the dilution of resources dedicated to sustainable development. We propose to rephrase the last line of chapeau of para 39 as follows, we reaffirm the commitments to urge developed countries to continue to take the lead in Mobilizing climate finance, we recommend deleting para 39A as the commitments on climate finance were intended for developed countries based on the principle of equity and CBDRRC. The COP29 decision raises a concern as it shifts responsibilities from developed countries to developing countries, which undermines the fundamentals of UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement, diluting the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. In para 39b, we recommend explicitly mentioning mobilization of grant-based and highly concessional finance and not debt. non-debt creating instruments from developed countries. In para 39 and 40B, we will propose additional text in our written comments for improving quality, impact and effectiveness of international cooperation by reducing fragmentation and accelerating the untangling of aid for more stable and predictable concessional financing. In para 40, we suggest rewording the sentence to encourage supporting policy coherence at all levels in accordance with countries' circumstances. We will be submitting a written statement. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of India. Now I would like to give the floor to the distinguished representative of Indonesia to be followed by the distinguished representative of Paraguay.

Thank you, co-facilitator. Indonesia aligns itself with the intervention delivered by Pakistan on behalf of the G77 and China, and to add the following points in our national capacity. International development cooperation is vital to achieving the 2030 agenda, particularly for developing countries. However, we see a concerning decline in long-term investments in sustainable development, particularly to developing countries, alongside fragmentation and misalignment with national priorities. ODA remains far below the 0.7% GNI target with declining share reaching developing countries. Commitments from developed countries must be met. It is also crucial to increase ODA for long-term priorities without diverting funds to humanitarian emergencies at the expense of sustainable development. Further, South-South cooperation is growing, but we wish to reiterate our support that it shall complement rather than replace North-South cooperation. To this end, the primary responsibility to mobilize resources through the international development cooperation framework shall still be in the hands of the North. In this regard, we strongly support the input on the reformulation of numbers of paragraph to clearly distinguish between the commitments of developed and developing countries. On effective development cooperation, Indonesia underscores that the FFD4 must set concrete targets to close persistent gaps in international development cooperation. Fragmentation, uncoordinated financing and unpredictable resource flows continue to hinder development impacts. Without stronger commitments to effectiveness, we risk further inefficiencies and failure to mobilize resources at the scale needed to achieve the SDGs. A more effective development cooperation is therefore essential. Additionally, robust monitoring is also crucial to track progress. In this regard, strengthening development cooperation forum and the broader FFD process, as well as leveraging initiatives such as global partnership on effective development cooperation offers us wider opportunities to improve effectiveness of development cooperation and data different reporting on financing flows and its impacts as well as promoting mutual learning. Thank you.

I'd like to thank the

representative of Indonesia very much. And now I turn to the distinguished representative of Paraguay.

Republic of Korea and then Kenya. Paraguay, you have the floor.

Thank you very much, Madam co-facilitator. In terms of financing for the climate, biodiversity and ecosystems, My delegation is convinced that when we refer to financing needs for adaptation, the specific requirements of landlocked developing countries should also be taken into account alongside those of the least developed countries and small island developing states. This is the case because landlocked developing countries are also bearing the brunt of the effects of climate change. These effects have serious repercussions in terms of livelihoods, economies, infrastructures, settlements, and other goods, as has been recognized in the new program of action which we recently adopted, which for the first time included a dedicated priority area on climate change and resilience, recognizing the unique climate vulnerabilities of these countries. Finally, in terms of language on climate financing and the responsibility of developed countries in that connection, We would underscore that the obligation of developed countries to provide funds, not just mobilize them, should be integrated. That would be in keeping with multilateral agreements in UN climate change instruments. Amending or modifying these terms is no small matter, as the current formulation waters down the commitments of developed countries. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Paraguay.

I'll give the floor to the Republic of Korea, followed by Kenya and then Canada.

Republic of Korea, you have the floor.

Thank you, Madam co-facilitator. With regard to paragraph 38a, we fully agree on the need to scale up ODA for LDCs. However, considering the distinct ODA frameworks and specific circumstance of each country, I propose replacing the words agreed with encouraged. Para 38c, we fully support enhancing country led ODA programs. However, it seems not appropriate to specify a particular type of ODA in the context of enhancing development ownership. Therefore, I propose the deletion of the following phrase, including by increasing the share of budget support in ODA. Para 38d, the original text gives us an impression that humanitarian assistance and general development cooperation resources are in competition each other. Therefore, I propose to modify the text following without like this. while noting a need to work collaboratively to move beyond short-term assistance towards contributing to long-term development gains, which is the language used in the QCPR resolution adopted in November 2024. Para 38 G, it is necessary to further clarify what is meant by sustainable pathway. Para 38H, rechanneling of SDR is an example of an innovative financial instrument. Therefore, I propose revising this paragraph to focus on abroad promotion of innovative financial instruments by MDBs rather than solely emphasizing SDR rechanneling. Para 39C, We fully agree with the content of this paragraph. However, I propose starting the sentence with, "We recognize the need," rather than starting with, "We decide." It is to ensure the coherence with paragraph 19 of the COP29 NCQG outcome document. Para 48, we commend that paragraph 48 concisely reflect the core tenets of developing cooperation effectiveness. However, the FFD4 outcome document should build upon the Addis Ababa Action Agenda. In this regard, we propose adding language on strengthening partnership and promoting result orientation as emphasized in the para 58 of Addis Ababa Action Agenda. Thus, our proposal is to add the following to Para 40A. We also recognize that achieving sustainable development require a result-oriented approach to development cooperation, including long-term investments. Furthermore, to achieve effectively the interconnected SDG, In developing countries, we agree on the need to strengthen inclusive development partnerships. Para 40B, three, we believe a revision is necessary considering that expanding multilateral fund is not necessarily the only solution to addressing the fragmentation. The last one, para 41C, three, we would like to present the GPDC forum as a concrete example of sharing.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Kenya, followed by Canada and then Ecuador. Kenya, you have the floor.

Thank you, Madam co-facilitator, and also I would like to also, being the first time we are taking the floor, also to thank the co-facilitators for a good zero draft, which lays a good basis for discussions. I wish also to align our Also to align with all the submissions that have been made by the G77 and China group and also by the Africa group. In terms of my intervention and as a national capacity on para 38, we note that some of the issues that affect the effectiveness of oda as was exemplified under paragraph fifty eight of the addis ababa action agenda need still to be exemplified in this draft as they still hinder effective development cooperation issues like tied aid fragmentation of oda transparency and accountability still persist we therefore recommend recognition of them and for us to reaffirm our stronger commitment to address them. Further, Development Cooperation Forum of the ECOSOC and the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, as mentioned in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, are important platforms for dialogue, but we see that they are weakening over time. We therefore recommend a revitalization of the Development Cooperation Framework to strongly serve its purpose and mandate to follow up and monitor the realization of the commitments under ODA. We support para 38 and further emphasize that humanitarian assistance should be scaled up, especially to countries that host refugee communities, and this should not be construed and counted as ODA. Para 38, in this regard, we are not sure how the MDBs will issue local currency bonds while debt management offices at the country level through their fiscal agents also do this. This may create unnecessary competition and crowd out private investment at the national level. This needs to be left to local players or to be reconsidered or deleted. Para 38J, the projects to be implemented through support from MDBs need to be demand-driven, country-owned, and led to ensure alignment, not just proposed and designed by MDBs and presented to governments for signing. On para 40B, Roman 2, we emphasize that use of national systems and their support in strengthening them where they are weak instead of just establishing parallel systems. Under para 40B, Roman 3, we recommend more of program-based approaches or joint programs to reduce fragmentation to be considered as additional there. In para 41A, there should be a commitment to support the development of INFFs first before committing to strengthen them, as not all countries have INFFs in place. Lastly, para 41C, Roman 2, we recommend reconsideration of inclusion of revitalization of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation and call on the OECD to support it through adequate funding. Since SDG target 5C, 17.15 and 17.16, which is important data source, is usually collected through the Global Partnership and supports voluntary national reviews. I thank you.

Thanks to the distinguished representative of Kenya, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Canada, followed by Ecuador and Egypt.

Canada, you have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. In light of the time restrictions, please note that Canada will submit additional comments on this chapter, which may not fully be expressed here. In 38C, Canada proposes removing the reference to increasing the share of budget support. Also, while we welcome the invitation for the DAC to develop an indicator to measure commitments in this text, this may be challenging as the DAC does not typically set targets. We propose the addition of language S38D bis regarding a commitment to strengthen focus and impact of ODA targeting gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls. Suggested text will be submitted. We request additional information on the pilot project that is referred to in 38F and propose adding a reference to TOS-D as a reporting avenue in this text. Canada welcomes commitments that encourage more provision and transparency from South-South flows. We will continue to encourage non-traditional contributing countries to do so, particularly in climate and biodiversity finance spaces. In 38, Canada does not support a broad call for further capital increases, which should be considered on a case-by-case basis in alignment with the needs of each MDB. We are also aware of commitments related to concessional window replenishments in this text. We welcome the text in 38H. We request clarity on the intention of 38I. At the outset, this idea appears vague and could be interpreted as a general ask for more concessional finance writ large or longer loan tenors that are compensated by higher interest rates, which we would not support. For the reasons expressed in our previous comments in paragraph 22, Canada is concerned with references to additionality in 39. We also request clarity on what is meant by safeguard resources to address persistent and socioeconomic challenges. We suggest removing the sentence from the text or instead recognizing the opportunities to find synergies in addressing climate and socioeconomic challenges. In 39E, we are supportive of a focus on minimizing new funds by using existing initiatives, but suggest the outcome document avoid being prescriptive in directing donor contributions. In 40, Canada proposes including a reference to the Busan Principles of Effective Development Cooperation. We wonder if 40A may unintentionally risk reopening the principles of effective development cooperation. While we recognize the importance of policy coherence, it is not a principle in and of itself. We also believe it to be sufficiently covered in 40. We will submit proposed language for 40, but feel the text could benefit from including commitments from partner countries, namely on continued strengthening of national systems and capacities and on inclusive, transparent, and accountable design of national development plans or INFFs. In 40 we propose including a reference to long-term, core, direct, sustainable, accessible, and flexible funding for local women's rights organizations. With regards to 41, Canada supports leveraging the convening power of the UN to improve dialogue and development cooperation and increase coherence, but we have concerns that creating a monitoring body would be duplicative of existing bodies and increase reporting burden for all. There remains a lack of clarity on the proposed role of the DCF would play and how it may overlap with or be duplicative of roles and responsibilities of fora like the OECD DAC, the GPEDC and TOSD. On references to monitoring effectiveness in 41C, we would emphasize that the GPEDC is by nature an open multi-stakeholder forum to discuss the effectiveness of development cooperation. This body is already co-hosted within the UNDP and we are wary of recreating another monitoring mechanism for effectiveness at the UN. TOSD is equally an important tool to inclusively capture data on support for sustainable development in all its forms from a range of providers and institutions. As such, joint collaboration between DAC, GPEDC, TOSD, and the UN through open dialogue would be beneficial to all while respecting the current mandates, strength, and capacity of the respective organizations.

I thank the distinguished representative of Canada and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Ecuador, followed by Egypt and then Australia.

Thank you very much, Madam Co-Chair. I'd like to turn to paragraph 38j. We believe it's vital that When we refer to complementary measurements such as the MBI, that needs to be presented as a cross cutting measurement which covers the entirety of paragraph 38. We also would appreciate a specific subparagraph about national development banks. We also would suggest the inclusion after in English

access to concessional financing, la frase phrase as ODA to

strengthen the importance of this form of development assistance.

I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt.

Egypt followed by Australia and then Iceland. Egypt, you have the floor.

Thank you, Madam co-facilitator. We align with the statement delivered on behalf of G77 and China and would like to add the following. In paragraph 38B, we would like to go back to the formulations in the elements paper, especially on ODA targets and the proposals of having concrete and binding timeframes for achieving existing ODA targets. We generally see relative improvement in the focus on middle income countries in the zero draft compared to the elements paper, yet this focus has not been explicitly linked to improving their access to concession finance in this entire section, and we would like to see this enhanced, for example, on paragraph 30 AG, where it merely mentions projects with positive externalities in middle income countries. On paragraph 39, we reiterate our strong position that addressing climate and biodiversity finance in this platform contradicts with and duplicates the work of relevant fora. In paragraph 41c, Roman 1, our preliminary position is to ask for the deletion of the proposal for the SG to convene expert technical discussions focused on coherent financing of development, climate and humanitarian needs. as indicated in the G77 and China intervention. Alternatively, in the final part of this paragraph, we would be able to go along with replacing the reference to coherent financing of development, climate and humanitarian needs with policy coherence and mobilizing resources for development, climate and humanitarian needs.

Thank you.

Thank you. And now Australia, Iceland, and China. The distinguished representative of Australia, you have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. I'll now give concise comments, but will follow up with a written submission. We appreciate the hard work of the COFAX in compiling this chapter. Regarding 38A, we suggest language formulation that is agreed in the 2030 Agenda resolution. It better captures the fact that not all developing countries have committed developed countries have committed to the targets mentioned in the zero draft. On 38, Australia is committed to delivery of ODA through genuine partnerships with stakeholders, including through budget support where appropriate. We would not support language that would commit Australia to undertake certain actions through our ODA program, which is tailored for the unique circumstances of each partner. We are unsure of the meaning of 38D. Perhaps it could be cast more constructively as a call for all to scale up assistance for humanitarian emergencies as well as development assistance. On 38G, we oppose language which supports calls for further capital increases, as this is a matter for MDB shareholders and their boards. The priority should be to encourage increasing lending headroom for within existing resources through MDBs fully implementing the capital adequacy framework recommendations. We support the text encouraging originate to distribute models. On 38h, we suggest rechanneling SDRs through MDBs rather than only through MDBs by countries in a position to do so. On 38i, we oppose calls for MDBs to improve lending terms across the board. MDBs have finite resources and improved lending terms should be targeted to those most in need. We support MDBs scaling up local currency lending. On 38k, we note that MDB mandates go beyond the SDGs, so we suggest adding where appropriate after work towards standardized approaches. Regarding para 39, we cannot support CBDR language that goes beyond the careful formulation of this language in the context of the Paris Agreement. This language conflates CBDR language with sustainable development and poverty. In 39C, we cannot commit to scale up contributions to the fund for responding to loss and damage. Suggest instead to use the word encourage. In 39d, we cannot commit to provide sufficient climate finance as this amount can go beyond our capability. In 39e, the text should not use the phrase, we agree, as that is reserved for instruments with treaty status. Australia opposes concentration of our contributions to climate funds under the UNFCCC since our regional neighbours prefer bilateral climate finance. In 40A, we want to elevate country ownership, not just leadership, to support inclusivity. In 41A, the text should call for GPEDC monitoring of development effectiveness to inform country-led plans and decision-making through country-led platforms. In 41C, part two, we would like the phrase, "support better evidence of development impact," to be followed by the phrase, "leveraging development financing and results data published to the International Aid Transparency Initiative standard." Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Australia, and now Iceland, China, and Switzerland will have the floor. Iceland, you are next.

Thank you, Chair. We appreciate the language in this important section on international development cooperation and ODA. There is no replacement for ODA and grant financing, and there is no financial innovation that can create grants. In this light, the emphasis on ODA GNI targets of 0.7% overall with at least 0.2% to LDCs remains important. In paragraph 38, we would like to suggest a reference to gender equality, both in the context of stepping up efforts to address critical socioeconomic priorities as well as funding levels. An ambitious target for ODA dedicated to gender equality would be constructive, as OECD DAC data indicates that gender equality focused ODA has decreased in recent years. We would like to underscore the recognition made that MDBs have indeed significantly scaled up lending capacity in recent years, including replenishments and balance sheet optimization measures. We encourage a continuation of these efforts. Regarding para 38, While we are positive to the use of complementary measures of progress that go beyond GDP, we must also be mindful that the use of such measures do not diminish our focus on supporting the LDCs. We appreciate the language on MDBs and the system of public development banks. However, we would like to see an even greater emphasis on MDB coordination and cooperation. There is scope for the MDBs to work more and better together, and the text should encourage developments to that end. In order to achieve the impact and scale necessary to address multifaceted development challenges, it is necessary that the MDBs work together as a system. In relation to 38H to the rechanneling of special drawing rights, we question having this paragraph time bound by the end of 2025. Moreover, we also question determining an exact minimum number of countries to contribute to the SDR-based hybrid capital channeling solutions by AFDB and IDB. On para 40, We welcome the section on development effectiveness and note the well justified concern about growing fragmentation and increasing transaction and compliance costs. It is imperative that we work against fragmentation in development cooperation and the emphasis on strengthening national systems is well taken. We would suggest to also mention the importance of strengthening government systems on subnational and municipal level in this regard. In part 40B, we also appreciate that the importance of core contributions to multilateral institutions is well reflected in the text. We would suggest an additional reference to the UN funding compact in this context. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Iceland, and now China, the distinguished representative of that country has the floor, followed by Switzerland and then Colombia. China, you have the floor.

I would like to thank co-facilitator for giving me the floor. International Development Cooperation plays an indispensable role in financing for development in para 37. The text should emphasize that North-South cooperation is the main channel for international development cooperation, clearly states that developed countries have yet to meet the ODA target of 0.5% of their GNI, and expresses concern about the use of funding in the humanitarian rather than the development sphere. and B should explicitly state that developed countries rather than all member states should be requested to meet their ODA commitments and create binding timetables and roadmaps. In terms of 38C, the UN should be the body that monitors the assessing of the fulfillment of ODA commitments, and it is not appropriate to, quote, invite the OECD back to development indicator to measure this commitment." End of quote. Number four, ODA is not the same as humanitarian assistance and the two should not be confused. We propose therefore the deletion of 38D point number five in 38.5. Both parties to South-South cooperation should report as appropriate in accordance with their own capacities. rather than as a mandatory requirement so as not to increase the burden on developing countries. Point number six, with regard to 38i, we propose that it calls on conventional MDBs to strengthen cooperation with new regional and multilateral development banks and provide more support for the operations of the latter in order to increase the availability of funding to developing countries. In the last sentence of paragraph 39, it should be made clear that climate finance is an obligation of developed countries and urge them to honor their commitments effectively to provide and mobilize climate finance for developing countries. At the same time, it should be emphasized that climate finance and finance for biodiversity are new and additional funding to development assistance. Point number eight, in 39A and E, the formulation climate finance should be consistent with that of the decision on new collective quantified goal on climate finance, NCQG, and emphasis should be given to consistency with Article nine of the Paris Agreement. Point number nine, for 39D, we propose that it follows the formulation in the framework convention is Paris Agreement, and the NCQG decision by changing, we commit to ensure that to, we commit to facilitate. There is a wide range of climate finance instruments. It is not a good idea to list individual instruments so as to avoid generalization. We propose the deletion of that, of the bracketed texting that para. Lastly, in 41C Roman I, Development, climate and humanitarian funding should not be confused. In Roman 2, concepts such as total official support for sustainable development, TOSD, and global partnership for effective development cooperation do not enjoy broad consensus among member states. We propose to delete them. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of China. Switzerland, you have the floor and you'll be followed by Colombia and then Honduras.

Thank you, Chair, on para, on para 38 C, we agree on the importance of budget support as an instrument and actually continue to provide, but do not support the idea of introducing a target value as this restricts leeway of donors on paragraph 38 D. 38F, we suggest to include a reference to TOSDI, Total Official Support for Sustainable Development, which has collected data on South-South and triangular

trilateral cooperation since 2019 and whose methodology was revised to match with the UN methodology following the adoption of the UN conceptual framework to measure South-South cooperation.

On para 38, we suggest replacing the phrase, "ensuring

that this does not harden lending terms," with, "preserving MDBs' long-term financial sustainability,"

as this is a prerequisite for being able to offer favorable credit terms. We would like to see the next phrase deleted, which refers to further capital increases. This will be discussed in due course in the governing bodies of the MDBs.

Some points on the section financing for climate, biodiversity and ecosystems on paragraph 39 preamble, we suggest to use the wording from the World Bank mission statement to end extreme poverty and boost shared prosperity on a life livable planet. We propose a new paragraph 39 with a biodiversity finance target referring to the target 19 of the Kunming Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework and will send the corresponding wording proposal. On paragraph 39 on scaling up the loss and damage fund, we would like to see this paragraph replaced with agreed language from Baku paragraph 19 of the CMA decision on the new collective quantified goal. Paragraph 39D, we, this would be a new commitment compared to existing COP and CMA decisions under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. We underscore the critical importance of increasing the mobilization ratio of finance from public sources by 2030 and creating fiscal space in developing countries. But we cannot accept new language like this. We will send to the co-facilitators alternative language taken from paragraph 15 of the CMA decision on the new collective quantified goal from Baku. Paragraph 39e. on pre-approval and post-approval requirements and disbursement processes, et cetera.

We suggest to use

the same language as in the new collective quantified goal decision and will hand in a corresponding proposal. On the section development cooperation architecture and paragraph 41b, standard or norm setting in international development cooperation is in our view not a UN task and we cannot support the proposed wording in that regard. Paragraph 41C, in the phrase on the Secretary General to convene expert technical discussions, we propose to replace the word climate with environment. We do not believe that this should be limited to climate only.

Thank you very much.

Thank you very much, Switzerland. And now Colombia.

You have the floor, followed by Honduras, and then thirdly, Chile. Colombia first, please.

Thank you very much, Madam co-facilitator. Colombia aligns with the statement delivered by Morocco on behalf of the middle-income countries. Because of time limits, we will send our comments in writing, but briefly we would like to first turn to paragraph 38 of the zero draft on concessional financing. This continues to be vital to backing up high-risk initiatives. These resources play a key role in mobilising additional financing from various sources. Nevertheless, its allocation should take into account the specific challenges faced by middle income countries, rather than GDP per capita alone, such as high levels of debt and high costs of capital. It is essential that concessional financing mechanisms reflect a more comprehensive and multidimensional way of assessing this to circumvent these restrictions. South-South cooperation, also paragraph 38, it's important to differentiate international cooperation from concessional financing. South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation are complementary to ODA and also they are governed by different factors, including solidarity, which we believe should apply to all forms of cooperation. Over recent years, South-South cooperation has risen considerably while ODA has stagnated. Making these or presenting these as interchangeable would actually water down commitments for development, especially in private capital flows. Colombia highlights that the zero draft needs to ensure that there's equity and effectiveness for these considerations further. Paragraph 39 recognises the importance of subsidies and other financial instruments in reducing risk to facilitate the flow of private financing in critical sectors where otherwise these financing would not be forthcoming. We believe that these financial tools need to be bolstered to ensure that sustainable development can arise from them. Finally, Colombia welcomes the references In paragraph 41 about moving beyond GDP per capita as an exclusive metric for the granting of concessional financing, many middle income countries face persistent… structural challenges in that connection. We need a more nuanced multidimensional approach for financing and cooperation at international level to ensure that these vulnerabilities are duly taken into account to promote sustainable financing and development. We believe that these elements need to be reflected in the final outcome document so that we can duly reflect the diversity of the realities of developing countries. As previously stated by Morocco in Keeping with what was stated by other delegations, we believe that FFD4 should be a strong political call to make progress with the mandate agreed upon in the Pact for the Future, starting the process of changing measures for sustainability which complement or go above and beyond GDP. Thank you, Madam Co-Facilitator.

Thank you very much, Colombia. I now give the floor to Honduras.

My delegation would like to focus on the importance of ODA, which can help there to be industrialisation and the strengthening of human capital. This is very important for beneficiary countries. first believe that the text should be an instrument promoting greater budgetary support for planning national development, guaranteeing that resources are aligned with industrialisation priorities and poverty and inequality reduction, prioritising needs identified by all countries rather than the objectives from outside stakeholders in terms of resources, especially. The text should also include a recommendation to ensure that the DAC can measure its impact in terms of infrastructure and developing local capacities. We also believe that South-South and triangular cooperation need to be brought out as complementary for exchange of good practice and technology transfer. including the presentation of periodic reports on outcomes and its contribution to strengthening national and industrial capacities. And finally, or rather next, we believe it's important to have a multinational development, to work with multinational development banks so that financing is more accessible and aligned with sustainable development, so that middle-income countries and others are not adversely affected by loans. We believe that placing capital in these banks is necessary so that concessional financing challenges can remain open for there to be national industrialisation, poverty reduction and other areas.

Thank you. It's almost one o'clock. The interpreters have agreed to stay until 1:05, so I'll give the floor right now to the distinguished representative of Chile. You have the floor.

Thank you very much, Madam co-facilitator. Would it be possible for us to postpone our intervention, please?

As you wish.

We will go directly to Tuvalu, and then Chile will be in the afternoon. Thank you. Tuvalu, you have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. Tuvalu align itself with positions presented by AOSIS, PCIT and LDCs, and we also like to add few comments on paragraph 39 in relation to our national capacity. Climate change is not a distant threat for Tuvalu, it's an existential reality. Rising seas and intensifying storms are not future projections, they are eroding our shores and inundating our homes today. This is not hyperbole, it is the lived experience of Aitutapu. Climate change poses a severe threat to SIDS and LDCs, jeopardizing macroeconomic stability and sustainable development. A single climate disaster can erase years of progress, necessitating substantial fiscal outlays for recovery, adaptation, and resilience. We welcome the recognition of the urgent need for scale-up climate finance. However, for SEAD and LDCs, urgency is not enough. Our very existence depends on immediate and substantial financial flows. We need more than commitment, we need action. We need grant-based finance that doesn't shackle us with more debt. We need simplified access to funds, not bureaucratic hurdles that delay critical adaptation projects. We need climate finance that responds to our unique vulnerabilities as ocean and mountain economies, not one-size-fits-all solutions. The Loss and Damage Fund is not charity. It's a matter of climate justice. We urge developed countries to honor their commitments and ensure the fund is adequately capitalized and equitably accessible to those who need it most. Our message is clear. Climate finance is not just about dollars and cents. It's about survival. It's about giving our people a fighting chance to adapt and build resilience. It's about ensuring that seed and LDCs are not left behind in the race against sustainable development and climate change. We call on the international community to stand in solidarity before vulnerable nations. The time for action is now and our future depends on it. I thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Tuvalu, and with this delegation we have just heard the last speaker for this meeting. The Preparatory Committee will meet this afternoon at 3:00 p.m. in this conference room and will hear remaining speakers on the chapter on international development cooperation followed by comments on section 2D, international trade as an engine for development. The meeting is adjourned.