4th Meeting, 2nd Session of the Intergovernmental Working Group on Older Persons (IGWG)

o ejercicio, en igualdad de condiciones con las demás personas, de todos los derechos humanos y libertades fundamentales. Las definiciones desarrolladas en este contexto deberán reflejar las manifestaciones particulares de discriminación relacionadas con la edad avanzada. deberán abarcar tanto la discriminación directa como la indirecta, considerar tanto el propósito como el efecto discriminatorio y reconocer las formas múltiples e intersectoriales de discriminación. La experiencia del envejecimiento suele situarse en la intersección de género, discapacidad, raza, etnia, estatus socioeconómico, migración, desplazamiento y muchas otras características. También deberán reconocer que las barreras para el disfrute de los derechos humanos en la vejez suelen ser acumulativas. La desigualdad a los 70 u 80 años no necesariamente comienzan a esa edad. Pueden deberse a la acumulación de discriminación, pobreza, pausas en estudios, responsabilidades de cuidado no remunerados. u otra forma de exclusión a lo largo de la vida. También invito al grupo de trabajo a considerar cuidadosamente una distinción adicional. La discriminación por edad y el edadismo están estrechamente relacionados, pero no son idénticos. El informe temático de mi sucesora, publicado el 2021, Se dedicó específicamente al edadismo y la discriminación relacionada con la edad, su prevalencia, causas, manifestaciones y mecanismos de protección existentes. En mi propio informe sobre laguna de datos, definí el edadismo en línea con la concepción ampliamente aceptada como estereotipar o discriminar a individuos o grupos por la edad. También

Excellencies, distinguished participants, I declare open the fourth meeting of the second session of the Inter-Governmental Working Group on the Human Rights of Older Persons. This morning, we will resume our plenary discussions under item 4 for a discussion on definitions to be included in a future legally binding instrument on the human rights of older persons.

Distinguished delegates, in this second segment, we address issues that may seem simple, but carry a great responsibility: what it means to get old, and who do we wish to protect, and how to translate the complexity of human life into the precise language of law. Various delegations have expressed reservations, given a definition of older persons based only on age. And we share that concern. Age cannot be measured in years, but likewise, it may respond to mathematical measurements. However, dignity cannot be measured in numbers. A figure can tell us how long a person has been alive. It cannot tell us how they have lived, what difficulties they have had to face, what rights have been denied, what protection the person needs. Ageing is not a uniform experience. We do not all get old the same way, in the same circumstances, with the same opportunities. And our goal is not merely finding a figure that allows us to define, but rather principles that allow us to protect. We are speaking of dignity, definition, vulnerability, and we must recall that we're building a legal instrument, not a declaration of good intentions. The definition, if it is not clear, it will not be useful. Protection with uncertainty may turn into an empty promise. We do not need to agree on everything to start making progress. We need something more important. We need to be ready to listen to each other, recognize differences, and we need determination to find what unites us. I call on you to identify convergences and, in constructive spirit, examine those. What we're doing today will be defining the rights that we defend tomorrow. And we have a responsibility not just to define who is an elder person, but also make sure that no elder person is left outside of the protection that we're building. Thank you.

Now, we'll give you the floor to Ms. Kornfeld-Mate, who will deliver kickoff remarks. This is going to be by video now. Thank you.

Thank you. The rights of older persons We've been working on human rights of older persons for many years, before this mandate appeared. And when I had the mandate of the Independent Expert on the Injunction to all Human Rights of Elder Persons, sought to promote a rights-based battle to older persons, approach to older persons, we still had to demonstrate that older persons' experiences were not just a matter of well-being, demographics, or social policy, but also a human rights issue. The debate has shifted to a truly historic and defining moment. We need to ask whether it is necessary to have an international legally binding instrument, how it should be developed. We're living through historic moments. Ladies and gentlemen, definitions are a very suitable starting point for this work. They're not just a matter of legal technique, they determine who is recognized by law, who is protected, and they can determine who remains invisible. During my tenure, one question kept coming up over and over: Who is an older person? And I would say that the answer is simpler and more complex than setting an age threshold. In my report on data gaps, I noted that definitions of old age determine how data are collected, needs are assessed, and responsibilities are designed. However, old age and older people are often defined for legal, political, and statistical purposes purely in terms of chronological age. This approach has significant limitations. Age is a social construct. Definitions based solely on chronological age do not adequately capture the diversity of life trajectories. A person who has experienced conflict, displacement, deprivation, incarceration, or other adverse circumstances may experience the biological or social dimensions of aging very differently. and sometimes much earlier than another person of the same chronological age. Furthermore, older people are not a homogeneous population. They differ considerably in terms of age, health status, abilities, socio-economic conditions, living conditions, level of participation and the support they need. and I've stressed on several occasions during my term of office that older persons are among the most heterogeneous groups in our societies. My report on emergencies has highlighted this particular problem. In an emergency, a purely digital conception of age may not identify real risk factors and needs. Responses should therefore be guided by specific needs and individual circumstances, rather than predetermined age thresholds. Therefore, I do not believe that chronological age can be the determining factor for the purposes of a future instrument. Of course, in certain circumstances, there are age thresholds. Historically and administratively, they've been associated with retirement, pension rights, and social protection. These have helped to organize the transition from a period of participation in paid employment to accessing income supports later in life. However, we must be very cautious before translating this administrative logic into a human rights treaty. The traditional distinction between a working age population considered economically active and a population of older persons considered inactive is based on assumptions. It runs the risk of associating retirement with withdrawal from social life, with dependence, passivity, and the notion of burden. And yet, reaching retirement age does not make a person inactive. Older persons continue to work, including in the informal economy. They take care of their partners, children and grandchildren. They support their families and communities. They volunteer. They participate in political and cultural life. They pass on their knowledge and experiences. Some remain in paid employment well beyond the legal retirement age. Others may need significant support. Most will go through different forms of contribution and support throughout their lives.

For technical reasons, the Secretariat will continue reading the opening statement on behalf of Professor Rosa Cornfield-Mate.

My report on data gaps addresses precisely this. In many countries, labour statistics stop disaggregating indicators after the age of 65. They also do not distinguish between different cohorts within the older population. Age categories should reflect the heterogeneity of this population by distinguishing between older persons, the very old, and the extremely old, who have different needs and capacities. They should be fine enough to take into account the relative nature of age in different contexts, since age is a social construct and persons who have experienced wars, conflict, or natural disasters cannot be assessed against the indicators of healthy aging used in more favored societies. The same report warned against indicators such as the old age dependency ratio, which assumes that any person over a certain age is economically dependent. Data portraying older persons as passive recipients of benefits feed and perpetuate stereotypes. Thus, classifications are important. Presenting older persons as a single category for statistical purposes can reproduce social assumptions about older persons and reinforce ageist attitudes. This concern is not new. More than a half century ago, Simone de Beauvoir, in her major work, Old Age, already highlighted the relationship between the value placed on a person and perceptions of his or her economic productivity when she wrote, "Society cares about the individual only to the extent that the person is profitable." This phrase is brutal. But the challenges it poses are still remarkably timely. If we define old age explicitly or implicitly as the moment when a person ceases to be productive, we will run the risk of entrenching precisely this conception in our institutions and in the long term in our law. The challenge for this working group will be to find the right balance between legal certainty and inclusive protection of the human rights of older persons. Establishing a universal chronological threshold as an exclusive condition for access to human rights protection implies excluding people whose experience of old age does not correspond to that threshold. Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, allow me to turn to a second essential definition: ageism. I believe that the Working Group can build on the international human rights law as it exists Here, a number of human rights treaties provide a useful source of inspiration. They define discrimination as any distinction, exclusion, or restriction based on a particular ground that has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human rights and fundamental freedoms. Definitions developed in this context should reflect the particular manifestations of discrimination related to older age. They should encompass both direct and indirect discrimination, consider both the purpose and the discriminatory effect, and recognize multiple and intersectional forms of discrimination. The experience of aging often sits at the intersection of gender, disability, race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, migration, displacement, and many other characteristics. They must also recognize that barriers to the enjoyment of human rights in old age are often cumulative. Inequalities at age 70 or 80 do not necessarily begin at that age. They may arise from the accumulation of discrimination, poverty, study breaks, unpaid care responsibilities, or other forms of exclusion throughout life. I call on the working group carefully to consider an additional distinction: age discrimination and ageism are closely related, but they're not identical. My successor's thematic report published in 2021 was specifically dedicated to ageism and age-related discrimination, to its prevalence, causes, manifestations, and existing protection mechanisms. In my own report on data gaps, Ageism is defined in line with the widely accepted conception as stereotyping and or discriminating against individuals or groups on the basis of age. It also highlights a particularly troubling aspect of ageism, its pervasiveness and social acceptance. This distinction has important implications for a future legally binding instrument. The prohibition of discrimination on the basis of age refers to acts, norms, or practices that lead to unequal treatment or the unequal enjoyment of human rights. But ageism goes further. It forces us to address the systematic stereotypes, biases, attitudes, and institutional assumptions that normalise this unequal treatment. Stereotypes, prejudices, and assumptions are not harmless. They influence laws, budgets, institutions, medical and employment decisions, and even family relationships. This is why I believe that the future instrument should explicitly address both age discrimination and ageism. Ladies and gentlemen, what should still be defined in a legally binding instrument dedicated to the promotion and protection of all human rights of older persons. It should define the concepts for which a definition provides legal certainty, when there is a real risk of restrictive interpretation or when an already known concept is of particular importance for the enjoyment of human rights by older persons. It is necessary to maintain consistency with current international human rights law. where the established terminology already guarantees the effective enjoyment of human rights by older persons. It is also necessary to complete and develop this legal framework when it does not yet fully reflect the lived reality of older persons or where protection gaps persist. This was one of the conclusions of my 2016 Global Report, 10 years later, it is still no longer just a matter of documenting these gaps. This working group now has the opportunity to fill them. Let me leave you with a very simple test to evaluate the definitions that you are going to analyse. Does this definition make older people more visible as rights holders in all their diversity? Or does it create a new frontier beyond which some of them will disappear? Does it recognize the autonomy, capacity to act, and contribution of older persons, or does it unintentionally reproduce cases of vulnerability and capacity, passivity, and dependence? And does it provide enough precision for equality to be fully effective while remaining flexible enough to protect the extraordinary diversity of lived experiences of older adults? If we can answer these questions correctly, we will have laid a solid foundation for a new legally binding instrument that is truly capable of promoting and protecting all the human rights of older persons. Having lived through a time when it was still difficult to place the human rights of older persons firmly on the international agenda, it is difficult for me to state how significant it is to see this working group today involved in the concrete elaboration of a legally binding instrument. I would like to conclude by thanking Khaled Hassen for his continued support throughout my mandate, without which I would not have been able to achieve what I did. Thank you.

Thank you, Mrs. Cornfeld-Mate, for your contribution, for your statement and compromise on this process. Distinguished delegates, Allow me to share with you a concern, a serious concern, and one that goes to the very heart of what we are trying to accomplish together. I'm deeply concerned by the absence of so many countries for this process, not because they lack of interest, not because they lack of commitment, but perhaps Because they lack something that others take for granted: the resources, the personnel, and the capacity to be present in every room, at every meeting, on every occasion. And that should concern all of us. For this reason, today I am sending letters to the chairs of all regional groups, urging them to encourage the active participation of their members, even if that participation can only take place virtually. And I also ask for your help to encourage other Member States to participate, because participation should not be a privilege reserved for those who can afford it. And let me be clear: we cannot claim to be building a universal instrument if the voices shaping it are not really universal. We cannot speak in the name of all nations if only a handful have the opportunity to speak. And we cannot call a process inclusive simply because its doors are open if so many countries lack the means to walk through them. Distinguished delegates, some nations have delegations of dozens of diplomats. Others have only a handful of people trying to cover the entire United Nations agenda. But the size of a delegation must never determine the weight of a nation’s voice. A country's contribution is not measured by the number of chairs it can fill, but by the dignity of the people it represents. And surely, if this one process in which dignity must prevail over power, this is the one. We are here to elaborate a legally binding instrument to protect the rights of older persons. Older persons do not belong only to the wealthy nations. They not growth only in powerful countries. Their rights do not become less important because their governments have smaller delegations. And their futures must not be decided only by those who have the resources to be present. That would not be inclusion. That would be an equally camouflaged procedure. I say this with the greatest respect, but also with the deepest conviction. This process must not become an instrument written by the powerful for the rest of the world. It must become an instrument written by the world for the world. Our responsibility is not merely to keep the doors open. Our responsibility is to make sure that every nation has a genuine opportunity to enter. Because in the end, the legitimacy of what we produce will depend not only on the strength of its provision, but on the breadth of the voices that helped written them. And let history record that when we gather to defend the dignity of older persons, we did not forget the dignity and equality of nations. Let us not allow the geography of power to become the geography of rights. Having said so, I now open the floor for interactive discussions. Thank you. I give the floor to distinguished representative of Mexico. Mexico, tiene la palabra.

Mexico has the floor.

Thank you, Chair Rapporteur. The definitions must identify state obligations and facilitate the implementation of the instrument, avoiding differences between national legislations giving rise to protection gaps. Concerning older persons, the definition should recognize them as rights holders. They have dignity as persons, and we should move away from looking at them as recipients of assistance. In Mexico, we consider an older person someone who is 60 years or older in accordance with our law on the older persons and in accordance with the definition of the Inter-American Convention on the Protection of the Human Rights of Older Persons. We understand the reasoning that this definition should not be restrictive to a certain age, and we are prepared to look into a definition that considers that people who suffer from or are at the risk of suffering from ageism or are in situations of vulnerability because of aging. We think it's important that this definition should not interfere with the scope of the instrument and its effective implementation. Concerning age-based discrimination, we propose that we include all distinctions, restrictions, exclusions based on age which have as an effect cancelling out the recognition or enjoyment or exercise of human rights in conditions of equality, considering their multiple and cross-sectional manifestations. This approach is in our federal law to prevent and eliminate discrimination, and it follows the intention, looks into the intention of the behavior as well. The instrument should recognize explicitly ageism stereotypes. and discriminatory practices and prejudices related to age in institutional, interpersonal, and social spheres. Lastly, we would point to the definitions placed in the Inter-American Convention on the Protection of Human Rights, and we would welcome them being considered in this text as palliative care, abandonment, active and healthy aging, ill-treatment, negligence, inter alia. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much, distinguished representative of Mexico. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Uruguay.

Thank you, Chair, Rapporteur, and good morning, everyone. On this occasion, we would like to refer to some concepts that we think are particularly relevant for the future convention, without prejudice to others that we also think deserve careful consideration as negotiations move forward. We think it's necessary to determine what terms are required in the definition specifically and how we could ensure that we have legal consistency and avoid unnecessary duplications. As for older persons, it is important to have a clear concept, which at the same time takes into account the multiplicity of the aspects of aging. The Inter-American Convention establishes 60 years of age as a date of reference. It goes on to those above 60. This definition would benefit from a clear definition, making distinctions between different legal systems with the common factor that there should not be any excessive emphasis on any in the future implementation. It's important to preserve most favorable standards without necessarily looking at the chronological age and linking that to lack of autonomy or dependence. The Inter-American Convention also provides a relevant legal basis when it comes to understanding any distinction, restriction, or inclusion based on age whose effects would recognize -- cancel out the recognition or enjoyment of human rights on equal conditions in the social or private spheres. On the basis of these precedents, we could look at the advisability of explicitly recognizing implicit or indirect discrimination, and we could take as a reference the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. In line with this, we believe that the treatment of ageism in the future convention should also take into account social prejudices concerning, for instance, discriminatory practices that may arrive in social practices, institutions, and public policies, linking old age with a loss of autonomy and dependence, et cetera. We think there should be a similar approach as that taken in the Inter-American Convention because of, for example, general observation number six of the rights of persons with disabilities, which draws a distinction between the competition between different factors and also to look at exclusion. Another fundamental concept is autonomy in accordance with the older person's ability to take decisions. draw up life plans, it's important to look at legal capacity and the provisions for taking decisions. There should not be restrictions on rights yet, and there should be respect for the will and the informed consent practice. We think that we should distinguish care from long-term practices. There are community and residential and home solutions. We should also consider a concept of palliative care, taking into account health, freedom from suffering, and freedom of older persons. Lastly, in the area of violence and abandonment, we believe that the Inter-American Convention can relevant, as well as the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which establishes broad guarantees of protection from exploitation and abuse. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Uruguay.

I now give the floor to Spain.

Spain would like to thank the statements already presented and talk about And with respect to the future convention of the United Nations on older persons, the future convention requires a clear legal category to protect older persons from ageism and other specific violations. We do not believe it is important to have a wording which is inspired by the Inter-American Convention and the recommendation. It is rather important to have these as an inspiration for us. that provides for an inclusive and open rule, which functions as a threshold, which provides a common framework of protection, and which allows the State Party to use chronological criteria whenever they're compatible with the principles and obligations of the Convention, which does not subject the condition of a person to their vulnerability in disability or dependence, and which provides for a safeguard of general protection in the face of age-based discrimination, a definition which is open, limited by the Convention itself, and accompanied by guarantees of autonomy, diversity and non-discrimination, gives more security and protection than other alternatives. Age should not be used to reduce rights. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Spain.

Representative of the United Kingdom, you have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. The United Kingdom welcomes this opportunity to offer further reflections on the conceptual basis and scope of a possible new instrument. We remain open in principle to a multilateral instrument dedicated to the human rights of older persons, and we will engage constructively to ensure that any outcome is clear, effective, and firmly grounded in international human rights law. Firstly, any definitions included in a future treaty will require careful consideration. They should be sufficiently precise to provide legal clarity while avoiding language that is unduly prescriptive, exclusionary, or liable to become outdated. In particular, definitions should recognize the diversity of older persons and be consistent with established terminology across the international human rights framework. Second, we should remain clear about the nature of human rights obligations. Human rights establish legal obligations on states in relation to individuals. A new treaty should therefore focus on clarifying the obligations of states to respect, protect and promote the rights of all persons, including through appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures. Families, communities, service providers and other actors may play an important role, but they are not bearers of international human rights. Third, the United Kingdom underlines the universal nature of human rights. All the persons are already right holders, and the rights recognised under international human rights law apply equally to them. While implementation may take account of different legal systems and national circumstances, the content of human rights is not contingent on national, cultural, or regional particularities. Any new instrument should reinforce rather than qualify this principle. Fourth, we would suggest a tightly defined scope. The text should not become unwieldy, duplicative, or unrealistic for states to implement. Finally, when new concepts or definitions are proposed, their intended scope, legal basis, and relationship to existing rights should be clearly explained. This will be essential if the instrument is to provide genuine legal clarity and practical value. I thank you.

Thank you, distinguished representative of the United Kingdom. I give the floor to the representative of the Gulf Cooperation Council. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair.

It is my honor to be delivering this statement on behalf of the GCC. We would like to thank the coordinators who have helped to consider definitions on which the instrument should be based. Member States of GCC think it's important to have clear and consistent definitions which take into account different avenues and the specificities, geographically speaking, by ensuring enhanced protection of older persons. With respect to the practical definition, we propose the age of 65 as being a reference age by making it possible to set a lower age on the basis of national circumstances and legislation. We think it is important for this definition not to compromise established guarantees and protection. There should not be a lumping together of this age or the retirement age or an age after which one has access to certain benefits, it being understood that if you on the basis of the idea that you lose some legal rights. There should be protection while respecting diversity of capacities of older persons, their needs, their wishes, and their participation. Chair, our Member States attach importance and priority to defining the concept of the family and alternative family as a part of the care and support factors, taking into account national legislation, family relationships, and societal values. We propose that the definition of the alternative family takes into account the measures taken and the services provided to older persons who do not have any family and taking into account national criteria while respecting the wishes of older persons when it comes to their right to choose and the monitoring of the bodies involved. We think it's important to define age-based discrimination and ageism, including exclusion and the constraints that prevent one from enjoying benefits on an equal footing, recognizing the difference between this and the support measures required when there's a need for real equality. We think it's important to define the concepts of ill-treatment. We hope that the definitions will be consensus-based and that these concepts will make it possible to ensure legal certainty, thus ensuring autonomy and respect for older persons. Thank you.

Thank you, distinguished representative of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

I now give the floor to Guatemala.

Thank you very much, Chair. We think it's important to have definitions be clear. Conceptual clarity will help to apply the implementation of articles. For this reason, we think that the Inter-American Convention gives us a reference point for the changes that occur through aging and also the social dimension. These functions can contribute to the discussions on the future instrument. The definition of an older person requires considering the diversity of experiences and contexts to come up with a uniform concept of independence. It's also important to talk about the need for support in accordance with respect for the individual. Also, age-based discrimination has another aspect to look at its manifestations. The World Health Organization has explained ageism using three related dimensions, prejudices and discriminatory behavior of society, et cetera. This distinction takes into account attitudes and practices which limit decision-making opportunities. Also, it's important to recognize situations which may compound matters such as gender discrimination and multiple cross-sectional discrimination in general. Also, it's important to recognize the right to autonomy and dignity in the exercise of the rights of older persons, and definitions should be analyzed in depth because they can have an extensive interpretation. It's important to be very cautious when looking at terminology that's used and to talk about references to life plans and the scope of interpretation thereof. This can give rise to interpretations that require an analysis of compatibility with national legal frameworks, like other references such as informed consent, long-term care, and palliative care. My delegation shares the position of other delegations as to the need to have discussions of controversial issues to help us to reach a consensus. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much, distinguished representative of Guatemala. I now call on Serbia.

Good morning, Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen. According to the sources of international law, sovereign states are free to craft bespoke definitions for any term they choose during the drafting and negotiation phase, provided only that those definitions do not violate jus cogens or peremptory norms of international law. Definitions in international treaties are important not only for specifying the subject matter of a given agreement, but also for the fact that particular terms help to understand the legal instrument in its essence. Furthermore, if treaty defines a common word for the specialized way, that definition overrides general customary international law or domestic law for the parties to that specific agreement. Certain terms within the field of human rights law have already been defined. For instance, the World Health Organization has specified ageism as a stereotype how we think, prejudice how we feel, and discrimination how we act directed toward others or ourselves based on age. It has also defined terms such as healthy aging or active aging. Naturally, most terms still require clarifications. For example, substantive equality, independence and autonomy, empowerment, inclusivity, universal design, intersectionality, meaning gender, disability, poverty, rural-urban context. In accordance with the Inter-American Convention on Protection of the Human Rights of Older Persons of 2015, longevity, one more important term, is addressed not as a stand-alone right, but as a demographic and human reality that shapes how states must guarantee dignity, autonomy, and non-discrimination throughout an extended life course. This regional legal instrument also stipulates terms of ageism, active aging, and healthy aging extensively than the World Health Organization, and this fact should be taken into account in the process of codification of universal rights of older persons together with the definitions from the protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on and on older persons in Africa from 2016. Defining older person individually or older persons as a population group is challenging, but the mention to regional legal instruments could be useful for further development of this term or terms and their global recognition. It is especially relevant for the context of interpretation of this agreement, when along with the preamble and pursuant to Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its subject and purpose. Mr. Chair, rapporteur, let me just add, I know that my time is expired, but I would like to say something connected with yesterday discussion and preamble and definitions, because they are connected very much, and they are connected in terms of interpretation. I'm saying this for in a sense that if Secretariat is planning some activities after this session, then it should be taken into account that co-facilitators who are engaged in preamble drafting and definitions drafting could work very fast in order to prepare others for further activity. So please take this into account, and we would appreciate this as a co-facilitator very much. Thank you.

Thank you. I now give the floor to the.

Distinguished representative of Chile.

Thank you very much, and good morning, colleagues. As we have said, we believe that it is indispensable for this future legally binding instrument to be drawn up on the basis of these standards and basis of existing human rights. It is important to have these frameworks when we delimit the definitions in the treaty to allow us to reach consensus on substantive points. Against this backdrop, we believe that older persons should be defined as a person of 60 years or over, without prejudice to national legislation establishing a lower criterion or older for instance, 65. This is something that's enshrined in the Inter-American Convention, and it helps to have a minimal common standard avoiding discrimination and inequality in protection. Also, age-based discrimination in old age should be defined in a broad way, which takes into account all distinctions, exclusions, or restrictions based on age, which may be aimed at or resulting in undermining or cancelling out the enjoyment on equal conditions of human rights and fundamental freedoms for older persons. It should encompass both direct and indirect discrimination and consider its effects on various aspects of life. Also, we believe that the document should contain clear criterion, such as aging, old age, comprehensive care, a healthy, active older person with independence, multiple or cross-sectional discrimination, violence, et cetera, with special reference to the financial and heritage aspects, abandonment, the palliative care, replacement care, et cetera, as well as independence. Definitions should be compatible with the human rights-based approach. In particular, the concept of support and care should not be considered as a loss of autonomy automatically or legal capacity. Lastly, the definition of multiple and cross-sectional discrimination should recognize the interplay of various factors of discrimination which come into an open listing. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much, Chile. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Brazil.

Thank you, Mrs. Chair. The definition, the context of the future legally binding instrument should establish the key concepts needed to ensure legal clarity. consistent interpretation, and effective implementation. This should include, among others, the definition of older person, age discrimination, care, and violence against the older persons. At the same time, the definitions should reflect the diversity of aging experience across different social and cultural contexts. It is also important to establish the relationship between autonomy, independence, and accessibility. Autonomy means that individual must be able to express their real and participating in the decisions concerning their own lives. Independence relates to the condition necessary to carry out activities and organize their life with whatever support may be required. Accessibility, in turn, requires that spaces, services, information, and forms of communication can be used by people with different needs. This includes removing architectural barriers, as well as addressing digital, communication, institutional, and attitudinal barriers. Information must be available in understandable formats, and services must be designed to ensure that older persons can access them on an equal basis with others. Accessibility must be incorporated from the outside. in the development of policies and services rather than treat merely as subsequent adaptations. The concept of care also deserves particular attention. Care should be understood as part of a guarantee of rights, encompassing the rights to receive adequate care, to care for others, and to care for oneself. Definitions must avoid acquiring the provision of support with the removal of older person decision making power. By providing conceptual clarity and practical guidance, the instrument can support laws and policies that protect dignity without unduly restricting individual freedom. An intercultural perspective is essential to ensure that the instrument takes into account different understanding and experience of aging. In this regard, the definition of older person should be inclusive and not really rely exclusively on chronological age. This section needs to be sufficiently clear and precise to guide implementation of the instrument. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, distinguished representative of Brazil. I give the floor to distinguished representative of Egypt. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

Good morning, everyone.

Mr. Chair, we consider older persons as rights holders under existing body of international human rights law conventions. And in this regard, I wish to weigh in on the age discussion and respectfully disagree with the notion that age is merely a social construct. While societies may attach different meanings and expectations to age, Age itself is an objective and legally recognized characteristic under international human rights law. Numerous international instruments rely on age-based distinction to protect rights holders and identify duty bearers. The Convention on the Rights of the Child defines a child as every human being below the age of 18 years. establishing specific protections linked to age. Likewise, international law recognizes minimum ages for participation in armed conflict, marriage, employment, criminal responsibility, and political participation. If age was purely a social construct, these protections would lose their legal certainty and effectiveness. A 10-year-old child is entitled to protection from labor exploitation not because society perceives them as young, but because international law recognizes their age-based vulnerability. Similarly, an objective age threshold should be our guiding beacon in defining older persons, while allowing flexibility for states to specify that age according to their national context. Human rights law, therefore, recognizes that age may have social dimension, but it's not a social construct. It's a legally relevant and objectively ascertainable characteristic that serves as a basis for protection, accountability, and effective enjoyment of human rights. We expect that when we are discussing legally binding instrument and definition, defining an age threshold should be carefully addressed. Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

Thank you, distinguished representative of Egypt. Distinguished representative of Australia, you have the floor.

Distinguished delegates and representatives of civil society, Australia urges the working group to use its discussion to advance clear, rights-based definitions of older persons, ageism, and age discrimination. These definitions must serve the Convention's central purpose. recognising older persons as right holders entitled to the full enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms. Unsurprisingly, with other delegates, Australia considers that ageism must be defined separately from age discrimination. Ageism encompasses stereotypes and prejudice concerning a person or a group based on age or a perceived age. Recognising ageism as a distinct concept is essential because stereotypes and prejudice cause real harm, even where legal thresholds for discrimination are not met. Australia supports a clear, flexible definition of older persons that remains responsive to national circumstances. As we heard this morning from the independent expert, a single mandatory age threshold would be arbitrary and risk entrenching assumptions about capacity and dependency. The Convention must instead affirm the autonomy, legal capacity, and full participation of older persons. The definition must also recognize the diverse life trajectories and cultural understandings of older age. It must protect every person from age-related discrimination without treating older persons as a single group or as passive recipients of care. The definition of age discrimination should include any distinction, exclusion, restriction, preference, or other differential treatment based on age, age-related characteristics, or characteristics attributed to people of a particular age, where the purpose or effect is to impair the equality or enjoyment of human rights. Taken together, these definitions provide a practical and principled basis for agreement. Thank you very much for listening to my intervention.

Thank you, distinguished representative of Australia. I have mentioned Austria, but in any case, thank you for the Austrian delegation to that we're calling from Australia. Please go ahead, distinguished representative of Austria.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. If the preamble is the table of contents of a future convention, definitions are the doorway through which its protections become accessible. The wording determines not only how we understand key concepts, but also which situations the convention can address. A doorway that is too narrow risks leaving people facing age-related barriers outside. Consider a 62-year-old person excluded from a sports class simply because the instructor assumes they are too old to participate. A fixed age threshold of 65 could leave that person outside the Convention's specific protection. Protection against age-based discrimination should not simply begin on an arbitrary birthday. This is why Austria favors a flexible, contextual understanding of older age combined with sufficient legal certainty. Existing guidance already points in this direction. The Council of Europe's recommendation from 2014 and OHCHR's 2021 analytical update highlight the importance of social context and age-related barriers without ruling out age thresholds for specific purposes. We should also distinguish carefully between ageism and age discrimination. Ageism encompasses stereotypes, prejudice and discriminatory practices. Discrimination concerns treatment that impairs the equal enjoyment of rights. Definitions must cover direct and indirect discrimination and take account of multiple and intersectional discrimination, including where age intersects with gender or disability. Not every age-related distinction is automatically unlawful. Differences in treatment must be assessed against established equality principles, including objective and reasonable justification and proportionality. We should also consider whether established concepts, such as reasonable accommodation and universal design, can inform our work while carefully examining the application in this instrument and preserving existing standards. Above all, definitions must reflect the diversity, agency, and autonomy of older persons, not reduce them to frailty or dependency. Our aim should be a convention that is clear enough to implement and flexible enough to remain effective as societies evolve.

Thank you.

Thank you, distinguished representative of Austria.

I call on Paraguay.

Thank you. Overall, we believe that the establishment of clear and precise definitions is a fundamental element in ensuring legal coherence and the effective application of future instruments. We would like to welcome the contributions already made, which are useful in guiding our reflection and being incorporated in future instruments. In this context, we point to Paraguay's experience with the recent law on pensions and older persons, which has age as a criterion and specific criteria for vulnerable persons.

Excuse me, I was just going to say that, and when the interpreter will tell me, if you could please slow down your statement, because, i mean, they cannot catch you up. Thank you. Okay, I'm sorry.

In.

This context, we would like to point to Paraguay's experience with the recent adoption of the law on the universal pension for older adults, which establishes age as a criterion for benefiting from it and specific criteria for vulnerable groups. While experience shows how the experience of a number can contribute to simplifying administrative procedures and identifying beneficiaries, as well as favouring more efficient implementation of public policies for social protection, we understand that it may not fully capture the diversity and complexity of experiences and circumstances that characterise ageing and the importance of the various dimensions beyond exclusively chronological ones. Likewise, we believe it is important to pay particular attention to the concepts in international law, given regional experiences, especially the Inter-American Convention on the Protection of the Human Rights of Older Persons. We believe it is important to have a definition of age discrimination in old age, which allows us to address both distinctions that aim to undermine the exercise of human rights and those that produce such an effect in line with existing international standards. Likewise, we consider it relevant to pay particular attention to the definition of palliative care from a comprehensive perspective that contemplates the physical, psychological, social, and spiritual needs of old persons and the support of their families and caregivers. Finally, we believe it is important to avoid excessively prescriptive definitions of concepts that may admit of different interpretations, ensuring that their scope is understood in the light of the goal and purpose of the future Convention. In short, definitions should contribute to legal certainty and facilitate effective implementation, respecting different legal systems and national particularities. Thank you.

Thank you.

Thank you, Paraguay.

The United Arab.

Emirates, you have the floor.

Thank you, Chairperson and rapporteur. My delegation expresses thanks to you for your efforts in guiding the work of this working group. Under the definitions, and particularly the definition of older persons, we must take into account the United Nations framework. The definition must incorporate all of the elements that make up this category of age. An older person is not simply a person who is aged 60 or over under existing international standards. We're not speaking of a number here, but of a category of persons affected in terms of health and possibilities for participating in society. But this category is crucial in enriching families. The category must be set aside from issues of dependency or capacity. We must focus on the needs, on the ability to enrich society. Older persons maintain family cohesion and are an intergenerational link. They participate in volunteering and caring for family members and then economic activities with an important role. Thus, the definition must take into account important matters such as wisdom, experience, and ongoing contributions. We must not limit ourselves to classical definitions of figures. We must be more comprehensive. Thank you.

Thank you, distinguished representative of the United Arab Emirates. And I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Japan. You have the floor.

Chair, in response to the guiding questions regarding the definition of older persons, my delegation would like to share its views. First, regarding the scope of older persons, Japan believe it is crucial to consider domestic circumstances, such as legal framework and social backgrounds. Consequently, as mentioned in the kickoff marks, establishing a uniform chronological age limit may not be the most practical approach to ensuring inclusive protection. Furthermore, to ensure the long-term universality and effectiveness of an instrument intended to endure for decades, a pragmatic approach would be to incorporate flexibility into the definition, thereby leaving sufficient room for national implementation. In this regard, the CRPD serves a very useful reference. By adopting a flexible concept rather than a rigid definition of disability, it allows State Parties a responsible degree of latitude in its interpretation, which could provide us with valuable guidance. Specifically speaking, CRPD states that persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual, or sensory impairments. Such formulation is sufficiently broad to allow for appropriate interpretation by individual states. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, distinguished representative of Japan. I give the floor to distinguished representative of the Holy See.

Thank you, Mr. Chair Rapporteur. The delegation of the Holy See considers that definitions should be formulated so as to ensure legal certainty and coherence with the existing body of universally agreed international law. Where proposed terminology admits differing interpretations, careful examination by states should ensure that the wording accurately reflects the scope of the rights and obligations they intend to establish. The term older person should not equate age with illness, dependency, or an incapacity. Any chronological and objective threshold warrants careful consideration, taking account of national circumstances and preserving more favorable protection. The instrument must protect older persons who cannot readily communicate their needs or defend their interests. Their entitlement to protection and appropriate care cannot depend on their ability to request assistance, participate, or reciprocate. While the expression age-based discrimination is not internationally agreed, the delegation of the Holy See suggests that instead of creating new language, the future legal instrument should draw upon established treaty formulations concerning distinctions, exclusions, or restrictions based on age whose purpose or effect is to impair the equal enjoyment of human rights. Palliative care merits a precise definition, encompassing relief of pain and suffering, attention to physical, psychological, social, emotional, and spiritual needs, and appropriate human accompaniment. It should include support for families and caregivers and continuity of care throughout serious illness, including chronic and degenerative conditions. The definition must reflect respect for life until its natural conclusion, with death in no way intended or sought. Forgoing disproportionate treatment must remain distinct from intentionally causing death and must never entail abandonment. Regarding autonomy, the delegation of the Holy See recognizes the importance of of enabling older persons to act, make informed decisions, and maintain the greatest possible independence. Autonomy should safeguard dignity and freedom within the relationships that sustain human life, with family, with community, and in its transcendent dimension, with God. Autonomy is not a declaration of independence from one another. Even islands form an archipelago, connected by a sea of relationships and reciprocal responsibilities. Freedom, therefore, finds its fullest expression when exercised responsibly with due regard for oneself and others. Respect for autonomy should not mean treating self-determination as absolute, nor should it be taken to imply that every individual preference constitutes a right. Any proposed definition should preserve this relational understanding of autonomy while respecting the dignity and rights of all persons. Thank you, Mr. Chair Rapporteur.

Ecuador, please.

Thank you, Chairperson. My delegation welcomes the presentations that have opened this segment and agrees that the definitions will determine the scope of the future treaty and with it, of course, the legal certainty with which it can be applied, taking into account that they are consistent with existing treaties, so that the future instrument strengthens and does not fragment the framework for the protection of older persons. With respect to the notion of ‘older person’, the instrument requires a common reference that provides certainty to States and rights holders. In this regard, the Inter-American Convention on the Protection of the Human Rights of Older Persons offers a proven formula, which combines a reference threshold with a limited national margin. In any event, we clarify that this reference should not prevent protection against discrimination from also extending to those who suffer discrimination on account of a perceived or attributed age even before reaching the threshold to be determined in a treaty. Likewise, the definition of discrimination on the basis of age should encompass any distinction, exclusion, or restriction that has the purpose or effect of impairing the enjoyment of human rights on an equal basis. In turn, such a definition should expressly include multiple and intersectional discrimination in which age converges with factors such as gender, disability, membership of indigenous and Afro-descended peoples, or situations of human mobility. On the other hand, in addition to these two definitions, the instrument should define notions of usefulness for its proper application, such as abandonment, support for decision-making, care, discrimination based on age, abuse, negligence, or violence, amongst others. Since some concepts are particularly complex, their content may be clarified in the course of negotiations on the basis of the universal and regional ACQs. On the other hand, we would like to raise a terminological issue in Spanish, the expression "personalidad". "older persons" used in official documents of the United Nations is imprecise, since all persons have an age. On the other hand, the expression "older persons", already used by the Inter-American Convention and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, better reflects inherent dignity and the specificity of their situation. We therefore request the Chair Rapporteur and the Secretary that the future instruments and documents of this Working Group use the expression "older persons" (persons, personas mayores). when using Spanish, as well as translating or interpreting it into that language. In conclusion, Chairperson, my delegation would like to point out these considerations are preliminary in nature, so that they will be complemented in the future by taking into account the positions expressed by States and other relevant stakeholders during this meeting. I thank you.

Thank you, distinguished representative of Ecuador. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Belgium. Please, you have the floor.

Thank you, Chair Rapporteur.

Belgium is favourable to this possibility of discussing The possibilities for strengthening international protection of the human rights of older persons, we believe that any future instrument, legally binding instrument, on the human rights of older persons must be based on international human rights law and fully in line with it, and with regional relevant instruments. On this segment of the session on definitions, Belgium emphasizes the importance of the principles of equality, non-discrimination, and participation. Firstly, prohibiting discrimination remains a basic principle of international human rights law and an essential element in protection of the rights of older persons. Any future treaty must therefore reflect an intersectional approach, while recognizing that older persons may throughout their lives face multiple intersecting forms of discrimination based inter alia on ethnic origin, age, disability, religion, socio-economic situation, political opinions and other features. Such an approach is crucial to ensure full enjoyment of human rights of older persons. Belgium also emphasizes the importance of systematically mainstreaming the gender perspective in the work of the working group and in any future process for developing standards. Particular attention must be given to alignment with international instruments on human rights. such as the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, as well as full application of their provisions in the context of ageing. Finally, Belgium reiterates the importance of significant and effective participation by persons, organisations representing them, and civil society as a whole in this process. Thank you.

Thank you, distinguished representative of Peru. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Algeria. You have the floor.

Mr. Chair, the Algerian delegation wishes to share its observation on the key terms that will structure the future instrument. The definition exercise is delicate yet crucial. It must guide the interpretation of the treaty without creating rigidities. and suited to local realities. On this basis, our delegation would like to highlight three points. First, regarding the notion of older person, Algeria reiterates its position: there is no universal definition of the age marking the onset of old age. Demographic, socio-economic and cultural criteria vary considerably from one region to another and from one country to another. Consequently, it is the sovereign prerogative to each state to determine this threshold based on its national context. Second, regarding definition related to discrimination and ageism, the future instrument must clearly target the barriers and stereotypes that hinder the full participation of older persons, while distinguishing unjustified discrimination from legitimate social protection and preferential measures established by public authorities. Finally, Mr. Chair, we must approach with utmost caution any attempt to introduce vague definitions or normative concepts that would contradict the national protection and family solidarity regimes deeply rooted in our societies, and which risk imposing disproportionate burden on developing countries. I thank you.

Thank you, distinguished representative of Algeria. I give the floor to distinguished representative of Germany. The floor.

Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor, and I welcome your guidance again. And let me share a few reflections we had on the cluster definition, since we've taken the floor now for the third time, I try to be brief. As concluded by the open-ended working group, the principle of non-discrimination, especially the ban on age discrimination and ageism in the field of human rights, must be the core principle of a new legally binding instrument and be reflected in the definitions. What is age discrimination and what is ageism in this context? And this includes also talking about intersecting forms of discriminations. such as gender and age, disability and age. This is pivotal since only very few UN instruments explicitly ban discrimination based on age. However, we must be careful in the drafting to ensure that age limits which means unequal treatment of different ages, which are reasonable and justified, may still apply. It was pointed out before, for example, we have a possibility of collecting a pension at a certain age. We also have minimum age limits regarding voting rights, acquisition of a driving's license, or for continuing in certain professions. In our general statement, we pointed out that we start to need deliberations on the terms of older persons now. There is no universally agreed definition who would fall under the protection of this new instrument. And we fully agree with your statement and the input by Rosa Kornfeld-Matte at today's opening, that a simple number will not be the solution. Due to the fact that longevity is a development that is continuing, and we are not simply adding years to life, but life to years, which means the span in life in good health is also increasing, we do not think that setting a set age limit will be very useful to the interpretation of the Convention. Some ideas on how to tackle this could be drawn from CRPD. This Convention found a very elegant and sustainable way of dealing with this challenge. In doing this, we must be fully aware of the different speeds in population ageing and conditions for long and healthy lives in the different world regions. Definitions should be limited to new terminology. Older persons are covered by all other human rights treaties applicable to adults. Thus, terminology which also appears in other universal treaties should not be redefined to avoid confusion. And for clarity reasons, where definitions already exist, reference to these treaties should be included in the new instrument. This means that this part also must remain open for deliberations till we have agreed on the content of the treaty, because then we can evaluate what definitions we really need in the end. Thank you so much for your attention.

Thank you, distinguished representative of Germany. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of The Gambia.

Thank you, Mr. President. As reflected in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, treaty terms are interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms in their context and in the light of the treaty's objects and purpose. Therefore, this definition section will be an important feature of the future legally binding instrument and should be given appropriate attention in view of its universal application and diversity of the rights holders it seeks to protect. As we consider this question, we should take into account the different approaches already taken at national and regional levels. For instance, on the question of the definition of an older person, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights and the Rights of Older Persons defines an older person as someone aged 60 and above. Other regions may have different age thresholds. Therefore, this raises the question of whether it is necessary for a common age to be established for the future instrument, and if so, whether the same age would be appropriate across all regions. Whatever approach we take, The definition should recognize older persons as holders of rights, whilst allowing the instrument to respond to the different circumstances in which older persons live. More broadly, not every term used in the instrument will require a separate definition. Where a concept can clearly be understood in the context of the instrument as a whole, we should consider whether a definition is necessary so as to avoid creating ambiguity and undermining consensus. The Gambia also reiterates that definition should be consistent with existing body of international human rights law, with the over-aging aim of empowering older persons and addressing discriminatory practices against them. However, given the different regional, cultural, religious, and national context in which the future legally binding instrument will be applied, we should consider carefully where a specific definition is needed to provide legal clarity and can contribute to effective implementation of the instrument. Finally, Mr. Chairperson, whatever approach we take, the definition should provide legal certainty to duty bearers and adequately protect the rights of older persons and safeguard their dignity.

Thank you.

Thank you, distinguished representative of The Gambia. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Turkmenistan.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Clear and carefully formulated definitions are essential to ensuring legal certainty, consistent interpretation, and effective implementation of the future legal binding instrument. Yet, legal precision should not come at the expense of flexibility. Definitions must also reflect the diversity of older persons and the different demographic, social, and legal context of states. Against this background, Turkey would favor avoiding a single, rigid chronological threshold in defining an older person. Although chronological age may serve legitimate administrative and policy purposes at the national level, it doesn't necessarily capture the diversity of circumstances and experiences associated with aging. Striking an appropriate balance between flexibility and legal certainty is therefore crucial to ensuring that the scope of protection remains clear and inclusive. Another area requiring particular attention is the formulation of concepts relating to age-based discrimination and ageism. Terminology concerning direct and indirect discrimination should be consistent with established international human rights standards. Similarly, concepts such as autonomy, independence, legal capacity, and supported decision-making deserve careful consideration. While closely related, these concepts carry distinct legal implications, particularly regarding the ability of older persons to exercise their rights and make decisions affecting their lives. Drawing, wherever appropriate, upon established terminology in existing international human rights treaties will help prevent unnecessary ambiguity or overlapping definitions. Equally important is avoiding definitions that portray older persons as a homogeneous or inherently dependent group. Instead, the language of the future instrument should reflect their diversity and fully respect their inherent dignity, autonomy, and individual preferences. Turkey stands ready to engage constructively in developing definitions that combine inclusiveness, legal precision, and adaptability to different national contexts. I thank you.

Thank you. Now we give it to the floor distinguished representative of Qatar.

Thank you, Chair. I associate myself with the GCC statement. We have to be clear and accurate and ensure we have common denominators, taking into account the contexts and circumstances involved, as well as the disparity of needs within this group. With respect to the definition of age, we should draw upon the existing conventions and also state in our text that any form of discrimination, anything that prevents the exercise of all rights is to be prohibited, and measures should be introduced to ensure equality and take into account differences based on objective criteria. With respect to the second theme, the definitions should be based on requisite concepts. And to clarify the commitment to be undertaken by states in future, and to ensure that there is proper implementation while showing respect for national legislation. In this framework, we can adopt concepts relating to access, easy access, and the need to draw inspiration from existing legal texts and avoid re-establishing old existing concepts that already exist but are not relevant. Thank you very much.

To guarantee normative clarity for the future international instrument, the definitions must be reflected in a way that allows States sufficient flexibility to adapt the concepts to their national contexts and their respective national laws. concepts. This means that our delegation is in favor of flexible definitions, which are contextual in nature, but also we would stress the need for definitions with normative clarity, flexibility, consistent with the concept of state sovereignty and the need to reflect national and cultural diversity and different legal systems. These are elements that have been requested by a number of states. in both sessions of the working group's work. In our view, we understand that the future international instrument should define the following categories. This is not an exhaustive list, but I think it could provide us with a good basis for our discussions on the basis of a specific definition. First of all, aging. Secondly, older person. Third, age-based discrimination; four, autonomy; five, care; six, abandonment; seven, support systems; eight, reasonable accommodation; and nine, self-regulation of future protection. Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you, distinguished representative of Cuba.

The representative of Iran, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Iran wishes to offer a few observations regarding the definition to be considered in the future instrument. First, we believe that the definition of an older person should be sufficiently flexible to reflect different national, demographic, social, and cultural circumstances. A single universal age threshold may not adequately reflect the diversity of national legal system and policies. At the same time, such flexibility should not lead to arbitrary discrimination or unjustified exclusion from protection. Second, older age should not be adequate with disability, illness, or incapacity. Older persons are a diverse group with different abilities, needs to--needs and contribution. The future instrument should recognize this diversity and remain consistent with existing international human rights instruments. Third, the definition of age-based discrimination should be sufficiently comprehensive to address both direct and indirect discrimination across different areas of life, while allowing appropriate measures to meet the specific needs of older person. Finally, where definition related to care, support, and autonomy are considered necessary, they should recognize the rule of families and communities with respecting the dignity, autonomy, and wishes of older person and maintaining their responsibilities of states. In our view, definition should be clear, concise, and limited to those necessary for the effective implementation of the future instrument.

Thank you, Mr. Thank you, distinguished representative. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Canada. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. As I did not take the floor yesterday, I would like to briefly echo and express appreciation for your remarks at the close of the session. It feels indeed that we have crossed an important threshold that are now genuinely engaged in the substantive articulation of this new and important instrument. On the definition of older persons, Canada agrees with the comments from the former Special Rapporteur and several other delegations that older age is not solely a chronological concept, and that the experience of aging is shaped by a range of social, economic, cultural, and personal factors. We therefore see value in the instrument reflecting the contextual nature of aging. At the same time, we would caution against an approach that is entirely contextual in all circumstances. As a legal instrument, the Convention needs to support clarity, predictability, and effective implementation. In practice, a definition that is too open-ended may create challenges for the consistent application of rights. Rights that are unclear or difficult to operationalize will, in practice, be more difficult for rights holders to enjoy. In this regard, Canada appreciated several of the observations made today. I'm thinking here of Spain, Austria, and Germany, amongst others. Age-based thresholds can, in some contexts, provide a practical and effective means of delivering services and applying standards. Indeed, within Canada, there is no single legal definition of an older person, and different legislative and policy contexts employ different approaches depending on their purpose, as does our statistical collection. We therefore see value in continuing to discuss how the convention can reflect the realities of aging while also providing sufficient clarity to support effective implementation and the enjoyment of rights in practice. With respect to the terms ageism and age discrimination, other definitions, Canada notes that international human rights instruments have previously confronted similar drafting questions. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, CEDAW, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities both address not only discrimination itself, but also the stereotypes, prejudices, and social attitudes that can contribute to discriminatory outcomes. We therefore believe that these instruments can provide us with useful guidance as we consider how best to define these concepts, and, as importantly, what types of obligations are most effective in addressing each of those different types of content. concepts within the present convention. Thank you.

Thank you, distinguished representative of Canada. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Pakistan. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, rapporteur. On definition, Pakistan favours economy and precision. In this regard, we would like to make some a few points. Definitions: one, should be practical and included only where needed. We should not aim for an exhaustive list. Beyond what is indispensable, terms are best understood in the context of existing international human rights law instruments. Second, we agree with the distinguished delegate of Germany and others that there should be flexibility in defining older person. The definition should be inclusive, allowing for national legislation and circumstances, rather than fixing a rigid threshold. However, like Egypt, we do not believe that age is a social construct. age is a fact of life, and the definition should rest on it while leaving states room to apply it in their own particular context. Third, age discrimination should be defined in line with the core human rights treaties. It should mean any distinction, exclusion, or restriction based on age that has the effect of impairing or nullifying the enjoyment of human rights by older persons on an equal basis with others. We do not support and open-ended or novel formulations which lack an agreed definition or meaning. Four, should the text refer to reasonable accommodation, it should carry the qualification of disproportionate or undue burden, as in the CRPD. Five, where palliative care is defined, it should follow WHO's established definition. And now finally, Chair, to respond to a few points which were raised in the room earlier on autonomy and independence, we fully support the principle that older persons should take part in decisions that affect their lives, including on their care, property, family, and community life, with the support of their families and communities. But this is best conveyed, in our view, through the substantive provisions of the instrument, and not through stand-alone definitions which risk codifying positions that do not command consensus. Those terms cannot be and should not be read in isolation from the inherent right to life, protected under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, nor should a definition introduce what no agreed instrument recognizes. We also heard that human rights do not depend on national, religious, cultural, or societal values. Universality, in our view, is not a question here. We uphold universality. But the Vienna Declaration, agreed by consensus, is equally clear that national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural, and religious backgrounds must be borne in Finally, Chair, a procedural point. We have all come here, all of us, to define a new treaty, and we wish all of us to be engaged in a constructive discussion. We value the contributions in this regard that have been made already, whether by individual delegations or drawn from regional experience, but they are inputs, in our view. And no single proposal or regional instrument can serve as the basis of our work. That basis must emerge from the views of all the Member States. We understand that a call for input from Member States will be issued in the weeks ahead, and we welcome it. We look forward to the Bureau and the co-facilitators engaging closely with all the delegations and with relevant stakeholders, including the older persons themselves, and reflecting their views in the draft proposals to be considered by this body. Thank you.

Thank you, distinguished representative of Pakistan. I’d like to give the floor to the distinguished representative of India.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. My delegation believes that carefully crafted definitions are integral to the normative foundations of any human rights treaty. In this backdrop, we would like to elucidate the definitions proposed by India in the draft text of the Convention on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights of Older Persons for consideration by the Intergovernmental Working Group on the Human Rights of Older Persons. We wish to propose the following definitions. Firstly, we propose that older persons may be defined, may be used to refer a person aged 60 years or above without prejudice to the adoption or maintenance by a State Party of a lower age threshold for the protection or enjoyment of particular rights under its domestic law. States should have the flexibility to define older persons based on domestic policy considerations. India uses the term senior citizens for older persons, and this refers to individuals above the age of 60 years. Secondly, age discrimination may be defined as any distinction, exclusion, or restriction based on age that has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise on an equal basis with others of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Thirdly, care and support may be defined as assistance and services, whether provided in the home, in the community, or in institutional settings that enable older persons to maintain their dignity, autonomy, health, participation, and quality of life. Fourthly, informal caregiver may be defined as a person who provides care or support outside a formal employment relationship, including a family member or other person providing such care without professional remuneration. Fifthly, we believe that it is important to define progressive realization as a framework for the realization of rights of older persons. Progressive realization in this context may be defined as the obligation to take deliberate, concrete, and targeted steps to the maximum of available resources towards the full realization of rights for which international law recognizes progressive implementation. Sixthly, we believe that the concept of Reasonable accommodation is important to recognize the human rights of older persons. Reasonable accommodation in this context may be defined as necessary and appropriate modifications and adjustments, where needed in a particular case, that do not impose a disproportionate or undue burden to ensure that older persons enjoy or exercise all human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis with others. Seventhly, the creation of a fund for the global care of older persons is a fundamental aspect of the Indian draft. Fund in this context is defined as a global fund for dignified aging and care systems established under the convention. The proposed fund seeks to support the implementation of this convention. The fund shall provide financial support for programs and projects that directly advance the enjoyment of the rights of older persons, with particular attention to states and communities facing substantial resource constraints. The funds may support, inter alia, a, the expansion of accessible and affordable healthcare and geriatric services, b, the development of home-based, community-based, and long-term care systems, C, social protection initiatives and measures addressing poverty and economic insecurity among older persons. D, accessible housing, transport, and age-friendly public infrastructure. E, access to assistive technologies and meaningful digital inclusion. F, support for family and informal caregivers. G, the development of sustainable care systems and the care workforce. And H, international cooperation programs relating to the fair and ethical mobility of care workers. We urge States to engage with the draft shared by India to create a strong rights-based ILBI for protecting and safeguarding the human rights of older persons. Thank you.

Thank you, distinguished representative of India. Just for a matter of clarification, there's not any draft here. We are doing that. I'll now give the floor to distinguished representative of Israel. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. Israel welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the deliberations of the working group on the definitions to be included in the legally binding instrument on the human rights of older persons, and is pleased to share the following views. Definitions play a crucial role in international law treaties.

Excuse me, the interpreters are saying if you can Closer to the microphone, please. Thank you.

Yes, is that better? Okay. Definitions play a crucial role in international law treaties and instruments. By determining the scope of application of a treaty, the protection afforded by the treaty and the content of the obligation is established. It establishes, they promote legal certainty, ensure consistent interpretation and implementation by state parties. and guide the work of the bodies entrusted with its monitoring. In the context of the present instrument, carefully formulated definitions are of particular importance, as they will determine who is protected under the instrument and the nature of the conduct it seeks to address. In this regard, Israel underscores the importance of developing definitions that are sufficiently clear, while also sufficiently flexible to allow for their implementation in different national contexts in a manner consistent with the object and purpose the instrument and with the existing international human rights treaty framework. At the basis of the instrument, and key part of the deliberation, should be the drafting of a definition of the term "older person" for the purpose of this instrument. Israel recognizes the complexity inherent in defining this term. Such definition raises a number of challenges, including how social and functional characteristics or additional distinctions that may be relevant in different contexts, such as employment, retirement, and social rights, should be taken into account alongside the chronological factor. Each of these considerations may entail distinct implications of the scope of protection afforded by the instrument. In view of the different stages across a broad spectrum of older age and the broad diversity of the older population, one possible approach could be the deliberation of flexible and modular concepts, allowing differentiated definitions for different purposes, notwithstanding the drawbacks of refraining from a uniform age threshold. In this sense, for example, the national legislation of the State of Israel reflects a variety of age thresholds for different purposes. Israel further considers that in order for the instrument to reflect the particular circumstances of older persons' lives, as well as their vulnerability, and to constitute an up-to-date statement of international human rights law, we should consider the definitions of age discrimination and ageism. With regards to age-based discrimination or ageism, Israel considers that the definition should address the various manifestations of stereotypes and discriminations, including inter alia discrimination before the law, as well as exclusion from full participation in decision-making processes affecting their lives. Israel looks forward to continuing to engage constructively with Member States and all relevant stakeholders in the meaningful work of the Working Group in this respect. Thank you.

Thank you, and I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Colombia.

I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Colombia.

Thank you, Chair Rapporteur. Colombia will refer to the two questions relating to the guiding questions on definitions. On the definition of older person, Colombia believes that the treaty should provide a common protection standard with the requisite flexibility to adapt to national contexts. We propose that we take as a reference point the age of 60 years or above without prejudice to having specific thresholds established by domestic legislation, as long as this does not apply unjustified restrictions on the scope of the protection provided by the treaty. Also, the definition should recognize that aging is a diverse and dynamic process, and it should avoid homogeneous or exclusively chronological approaches. Age-based discrimination, Colombia believes that it should be defined as any distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference based on age, which is aimed at or results in canceling out, undermining, or limiting recognition for enjoyment of an exercise of on conditions of equality, human rights, and fundamental freedoms for older persons. This definition should cover both direct and indirect forms of discrimination. as well as prejudices, stereotypes, and ageist practices that continue to be barriers for the exercise of rights. Concerning other concepts that require a definition, Colombia believes that the future instrument would benefit from conceptual progress already developed in specialized instruments, and in particular, the Inter-American Convention on the Protection of the Human Rights of Older Persons. which provides useful reference points for the discussion underway. In this context, it might be useful to consider definitions of aging as a process that goes on throughout one's life and old age, which is a stage in this progression. Active and healthy aging, autonomy and independence, support and care systems, long-term care, and palliative care. accessibility and comprehensive care services, and the forms of violation of rights that particularly impact older persons, such as abandonment, ill-treatment, and negligence. Thank you.

Thank you, distinguished representative of Colombia.

Distinguished representative of Jordan, you have the floor.

Definitions should provide a clear basis for protection. Jordan's care regulations use age 60 as a reference that can inform our discussion. We will note that other delegation wanted to be more flexible. However, coverage under the instrument should be distinguished from eligibility for particular services. Enjoyment of rights should not depend on needing care, and broader national protection should be preserved. Drawing on the terminology in Jordanian legislation, the definition of age discrimination should cover measures or practices that deny or restrict older persons' enjoyment of rights because of their age, whether directly or indirectly. It should also distinguish such discrimination from measures designed to remove barriers and meet their particular needs. Clear language is equally necessary to identify neglect and financial exploitation. The proposed definitions could cover failure to provide essential care where duty exists, and misuse of an older person's money or property through deception or undue influence. Freely choosing to assist a relative is different from being deprived of control over one's resources. Respect for that choice also requires a clear understanding of free and informed consent. This should involve understandable information about the proposed services or intervention, its implications, and available choices, with appropriate communication support and an opportunity to ask questions and express a decision. Age alone should not be treated as an inability to decide. Care definitions should reflect the setting in which support is provided. Long-term care may be delivered at home, in the communities, or in a residential setting. Clear terminology would help ensure that protection reaches each of these settings. Our aim is definitions that make rights easier to understand and protection easier to apply. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, distinguished representative of Germany. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Saudi Arabia.

You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. The Kingdom reaffirms the contents of its our statement during the first session and earlier statements as well. Saudi Arabia considers that the wording should be consensus-based, clear and precise, ruling out concepts which do not enjoy a consensus, and there should be an attempt to ensure consistency in the use of terms in this text with human rights texts that have already been adopted and which are in force. us to arrive at a text which allows us to truly promote and strengthen the rights of older persons. Our Kingdom believes that definitions should be precise, as well as they should include an age threshold for certain purposes. In Saudi Arabia, older persons are those who are over 60 years of age. This can help in statistics, the analysis of indicators and comparisons, we think that reaching this age does not mean that one no longer has any abilities or has any particular need for protection. As for other terms or definitions, we believe that dependence and long-term protection and social care and exclusion, all of these concepts must be defined drawing inspiration from international relevant texts. And they should be adjusted to older brackets of age and also take into account the rights of persons with disabilities and others.

The representative of the German Institute for Human Rights.

Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor. Excellencies, colleagues and friends, I'm happy to add my voice to the segment on definition as a representative of the German Institute for Human Rights. As many already pointed out, this segment is more than relevant, and we should build on existing definitions, but must also acknowledge that not everything has already been defined. I will build on reports of the mandate of the independent expert, which I had the honor to serve for six years. Ageism and age discrimination. The mandate defines ageism as a stereotype, prejudice, and/or discriminatory action or practice against older persons that are based on their chronological age or on a perception that the person is old. According to WHO, Ageism is also defined as a combination of stereotypes, prejudice, discrimination towards others or oneself based on age. I would also like to bring to your attention that ageism was agreed in the resolution October 8, resolution A/HRC/RAIS/48/313 from October 2021. as a widely prevalent and prejudicial attitude that may rest on the assumption that neglect of and discrimination against older persons are acceptable, and ageism is the common source of the justification for and the driving force behind age discrimination. Under international law, human rights law, discrimination is defined as any distinction, exclusion, or restriction that has the purpose or effect Of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise on an equal basis with others of human rights and the fundamental freedoms in any field. Age discrimination applies to limits imposed to internationally agreed human rights on the basis of the age of the individual or group of individuals. National human rights law lacks a clear and comprehensive prohibition of age discrimination, but the prohibition of age discrimination on the grounds of other status has been interpreted as applying to age. Violence against older persons. There is still no globally accepted definition of elder abuse or abuse against older persons. Studies worldwide use different terms to address the topic. Such terms include elder abuse, violence against older persons, elder maltreatment, abuse and exploitation of older people. Most definitions recognize five forms of abuse of older persons: physical abuse, psychological or emotional abuse, sexual abuse, financial or material abuse, and neglect. I also recognized an additional form, namely the speech against older persons, hate speech against older persons. I thank you.

Thank you. Distinguished representative of Greece, you have the floor.

Mr. Chairman, I am very happy to take the floor after a national human rights institution which share many of the points just raised. On the definition of older persons, we share the caution expressed by the Chairperson in his opening remarks, as well as by the former independent expert and numerous stakeholders throughout this process regarding rigid formulations. Strict chronological thresholds sit uneasily with the diversity of national legislation and the conditions prevailing in each country. We would therefore favour the introduction of functional elements in the definition, identifying older persons also by reference to the barriers that older age, alone or in combination with other factors, poses to the full and effective enjoyment of their rights. The CRPD offers a valuable source of inspiration in this respect, and I fully agree with Japan and Germany on this point, as the original instruments, for example, at the inter-American level, where a flexible threshold is adopted, as mentioned by colleagues from the region, and at the European level, where perhaps more functional approach is followed in the framework of the Council of Europe, as pointed out by Austria. Age-based discrimination should be defined in the broadest possible terms, covering all its forms, direct and indirect, including multiple and intersecting discrimination. Finally, ageism merits a dedicated definition of its own, capturing the stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination directed at persons on the basis of their age. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, distinguished representative of Greece. Thank you to the floor, distinguished representative of the Commissioner for Human Rights of Poland.

On behalf of the Commissioner for Human Rights of Poland, who holds the mandate of an A status in HRI and also serves on an equality body, I would like to align myself with the statements delivered earlier by and Equinet.

I would like to

underline that clear and universal definitions in the new convention will be essential for its effective and consistent implementation. During today's session, meeting, and earlier, we heard that purely chronological approach to the definition of older age is unlikely to be sufficient. We therefore support an approach inspired by the work of the UN independent expert on the enjoyment of all human rights by older persons, who has emphasized that age is a social construct, and that social, economic, and political context influence whether an individual is considered old. Perceptions of old age also vary across cultures and communities. Such an approach reflects the diversity of aging experiences and provides a stronger human rights framework for the convention. In this regard, we welcome Garop's discussion paper on the scope of the convention, which proposes that the treaty should apply to all persons who are denied or at risk of being denied the full enjoyment of their human rights on an equal basis with others on the basis of their known, perceived, or imputed older age, either alone or in interaction with other grounds or factors. This general definition should be complemented by other key definitions, including ageism in its institutional, interpersonal, and self-directed dimensions. Consideration should also be given to definitions of age-based and intersectional discrimination, including separate definitions of multiple discrimination and intersectionality, as mentioned by several member states during the session. Other persons may experience discrimination based on age in combination with other factors, including gender, disability, indigeneity, sexual orientation, ethnicity, nationality,

or religion.

We support ECOWAS' proposal that multiple discrimination should be defined as an umbrella term covering situations in which a person is discriminated against on more than one ground. Whether additively, cumulatively, or simultaneously, intersectional discrimination should be defined as a specific form in which two or more grounds of discrimination interact in a way that produces a distinct and inseparable form of disadvantage. Finally, I would like, it would be useful to consider including a concept of reasonable accommodation based on Article 2 of CRPD. and adapted to the circumstances of older persons. This could help address barriers arising from age-related impairments and the increasing shift toward digital-only access to services and products. These definitions would provide greater legal certainty regarding States' obligations and strengthen the protection and promotion of the human rights of older persons. Thank you.

Good timing.

You got three seconds.

Thank you. But I mean, for the health of the interpreters, if we can slow down the pace a little bit. Thank you. Now I give the floor to... Thank you. Now I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Australian Human Rights Commission.

Thank you, Chair. The Australian Human Rights Commission supports the adoption of a limited number of core definitions that reflect a human rights approach, recognise diversity, and remain responsive to evolving environments, evidence, and understandings of ageing. First, we support the inclusion of a definition of ageism, noting its significance as a key driver of discrimination and violations of older persons' human rights. We support the World Health Organization's definition of ageism as stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination towards others or oneself based on age. The definition should acknowledge the harmful impacts of ageism on older persons and society. It should also reinforce the importance of a rights-based approach to combating ageism and promoting positive attitudes towards aging and older persons. Second, we support the inclusion of a definition of age discrimination that encompasses direct, indirect, structural, and systemic discrimination based on actual, perceived, or presumed age. The definition should also recognize intersectional and cumulative disadvantage, require reasonable accommodation where necessary, and promote a proactive and preventative approach to eliminating discrimination. The Australian Human Rights Commission currently administers four anti-discrimination laws, including the National Age Discrimination Act 2004, which prohibits direct and indirect discrimination on the basis of age across various areas of public life, including employment and education. Drawing on more than two decades of administering the act, we have identified the following key learnings. First, age discrimination is often experienced alongside other intersecting forms of discrimination, such as disability, race, or gender. Second, the absence of an express duty to provide reasonable accommodation can limit older people's access to age-related adjustments that support equality and inclusion. Third, a reactive framework is insufficient on its own and must be complemented by proactive measures to prevent discrimination. These lessons underscore the importance of ensuring that the Convention not only explicitly defines age discrimination, but also incorporates concepts of intersectionality, reasonable accommodation, and proactive prevention. Thank you.

Thank you. I give the floor to the representative of the National Association of Community Legal Centres.

Thank you, Chair. In relation to definitions, Community Legal Centres Australia supports the position of the Global Alliance for the Rights of Older People, in particular as set out in GAROP's discussion paper number three, the scope of the treaty. We emphasize three points about the definition section. The first, a view shared by many delegations, is that the instrument should include a description or definition of older age or older persons that is flexible and that reflects the social construction of older age, something which has been absolutely substantiated both by extensive social science research and the lived experience of older people. relying solely on a chronological age criterion, even one that permits variation above and below a specific age, will not adequately capture many situations in which discrimination on the basis of older age occurs. That a specific chronological age cannot be used to define older age for all purposes is illustrated by the fact that an Indigenous Australian person is an older person at the age of 50 when it comes to eligibility for access to aged care services, rather than 65, the normal qualifying age. Yet despite being an older person at age 50 for that purpose, this very same person does not qualify for the old age pension until they turn 67. So the same 50-year-old is old for one purpose, but not for another. Equally, a 53-year-old woman who is looking for a job is quite likely to face discrimination on the basis of her age and gender. Once again, she is too old in the eyes of a putative employer, but not yet old enough in the view of government to qualify for the age pension. Accordingly, any definition must protect anyone who experiences discrimination because the discriminator considers them to be too old, regardless of whether or not they have reached a specific age, although chronological age may still be appropriate for certain administrative and statistical purposes. The second issue is ageism. which many others have commented on, as ageism as an underlying cause of many violations of the human rights of older persons needs to be explicitly named and defined in the instrument, and WHO's definition is a useful starting point. Finally, the instrument should include a definition of discrimination on the basis of older age that, among other things, embodies substantive and transformative concepts of equality and non-discrimination. provides that a failure to provide reasonable accommodation or adjustments is a form of age discrimination, and finally, encompasses discrimination based on older age when that also interacts with other grounds of prohibited discrimination, such as race, gender, disability, LGBTIQ status, and other characteristics. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Ana Guedes, for the distinguished representative of Age Platform Europe.

I'm speaking on behalf of Age Platform Europe, the largest regional network bringing together more than 100 organizations of older persons. As founding member of GAROP, we also align with its statement and discussion paper. The definitions and concepts included in the future legally binding instrument should be guided by its fundamental purpose, ensuring the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights by older persons in all their diversity. The Convention should avoid defining older persons through a fixed chronological age threshold. Aging is a lifelong and dynamic process shaped by social, economic, and cultural norms. There is no single age at which people begin to experience ageism or barriers to the enjoyment of their rights on an equal basis with others. The ALBI also needs a definition that is future-proof. We should not define older persons based on today's life expectancy, today's pension age, or today's perceptions of old age, as such a threshold may prove inadequate or irrelevant as societies and populations evolve. As mentioned by the former independent expert this morning, normative assumptions and expectations influence how older persons are perceived and treated and whether they are able to exercise their rights. A chronological threshold, even a flexible one, risks undermining the paradigm shift we are trying to achieve, moving away from age-based assumptions and recognizing the diversity of older persons. It will also considerably narrow the scope of protection, failing to adequately address structural barriers to the equal enjoyment of human rights in old age. Chair, the definition is not simply a legal matter. It has practical consequences for older people seeking to exercise their rights. It is important that it is broad enough to help individuals understand that the real rights violations that they are facing fall under the Convention's protection. Because ageism is so internalized, the definition should also help older persons themselves challenge their own biases and assumptions and support them to detect and report violations and claim the rights. Only an open, functional definition will ensure that the Convention can respond to the lived realities of older persons' lives and the different ways in which ageism affects them. We therefore call for an inclusive and open definition that ensures protection for all persons who experience or are at risk of human rights violations because of their known, perceived, or imputed older age, whether alone or in interaction with other grounds of discrimination. An open, non-chronological definition would not prevent states from using age criteria in their national context where these are appropriate, provided they are consistent with the principles and obligations of the convention. It would, however, avoid making a particular age threshold a defining condition for protection under the convention itself. Ultimately, the definition should serve the purpose of the Convention, not limit it. It should ensure that no one is left without protection simply because they do not meet an arbitrary age threshold. Thank you.

Thank you. Now I give the floor to distinguished representative of Human Rights Watch.

Thank you.

Human Rights Watch would like to comment on suggestions for a chronological age definition of an older person. The question of who the treaty applies to should be guided by what the treaty aims to achieve. The purpose of the treaty, as established in resolution 58/13, is to promote, protect and ensure the full enjoyment of human rights by older persons. Ageism, as others have pointed out, against older persons and older age, is a key driver of human rights violations against older persons. However, there is no single chronological age at which people begin to be subjected to ageism, discriminated against, or denied their rights on the basis of their known, perceived, or imputed older age. Older age and being an older person are also not tied to any specific chronological age. Perceptions of when older age starts and of what constitutes older age are influenced by social and cultural norms and expectations, and vary across social, economic, and cultural contexts. Setting an arbitrary chronological age to define who an older person is and who the treaty should apply to would ignore this social construction of older age and the nature of ageism. It would also risk excluding people below that age who are denied or at risk of being denied their rights or of being discriminated against because of their known, perceived, or imputed older age. A chronological age definition would therefore undermine the treaty's purpose. To achieve its purpose, the treaty should apply to all people who are denied or at risk of being denied the full enjoyment of their human rights and of being subjected to ageism and age discrimination on the basis of their known, perceived, or imputed older age, whether alone or in combination with other grounds. Thank you.

Thank you. I give the floor to the representative of the International Federation on Ageing.

Thank you, Chair. The International Federation on Ageing considers that clear and inclusive definitions will be essential to the effectiveness of the future Convention. Ageing is a universal and lifelong process, but older persons are not a homogenous group. Our situations, capacities, needs, and contributions vary considerably across countries, communities, and individuals. We therefore encourage the working group to avoid definitions based exclusively on chronological age or assumptions of vulnerability, dependency, or declining capacity. Definitions should recognise the diversity of experiences in later life and the intersection of age with gender, disability, socio-economic status, and other circumstances. Particular attention should be given to defining ageism, age-based discrimination, and multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination, ensuring that these concepts can be translated into effective legal protection. IFA believes that definitions must be sufficiently clear to guide implementation while remaining flexible enough to respect different national contexts. Our goal should be to be language that protects rights without reinforcing stereotypes. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you. I give the floor to the International Network for the Prevention of Elder Abuse.

Thank you, Chair. Clarifying the purpose and scope of the instrument will clarify who the instrument applies to and whether it responds effectively to the realities of ageism and human rights violations in older age. Older age, as my colleagues have said, is socially constructed and cannot be reduced to one universal chronological threshold. Older age is perceived, self-perceived, or treated differently across countries, communities, and social, economic, and cultural contexts. A rigid age limit risks excluding people who may in fact experience ageism, discrimination, or denial of rights because of their actual, perceived, or imputed older age. The scope should extend to all persons who are subjected to violations on the basis of older age. It should cover discrimination based on known, perceived, or imputed older age, whether it occurs alone or with intersecting with other grounds. Discrimination may be direct or indirect, individual or systemic, and may accumulate across the life course. Laws, policies, and practices can produce unequal outcomes for older persons, even when no individual act of discrimination is apparent. Definitions should be clear, consistent, and sufficiently broad to support implementation. Key concepts should include ageism, discrimination on the basis of older age, multiple intersectional discrimination, violence, abuse, and neglect, autonomy and independence, accessibility, and reasonable accommodation in line with international human rights law and the lived realities of older persons. The scope should apply across all areas of life. It must address public and private settings, including families and communities, health and long-term care services, workplaces, social protection systems, financial and digital services, humanitarian emergencies, and institutional settings. Definitions must not create new barriers or narrow existing protections. They should align with the Convention's object and purpose. the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights by older persons. We therefore urge the working group to adopt an inclusive, functional, and context-sensitive approach that recognizes intersectional and cumulative discrimination, ensuring protection and remedy wherever ageism and older-based discrimination occurs. I thank you.

Thank you, and I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Bundesarbeitgemeinschaft der Senioreneinrichtungen.

As proud member of GEROP and Age Platform Europe, we align ourselves with the statements previously delivered by them, and like others, would like to draw attention to GEROP's discussion papers, including the one on definitions, as a basis for the upcoming work. The definitions in this treaty will be crucial in determining its scope and effectiveness. The treaty must ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights by older persons in all their diversity and on an equal basis with others. We believe that the treaty must recognize older age as a social construct and acknowledge that ageism and discrimination related to older age do not begin at any fixed chronological age, as previously said by other speakers. We therefore oppose a chronological age threshold to the scope of the treaty. Such a threshold would risk excluding persons who experience ageism and age-based discrimination before reaching a specified age, reinforcing stereotypes about aging and failing to reflect the diversity of aging experiences. The treaty must protect all persons who experience or are at risk of experiencing ageism, age-based discrimination, or the denial of their rights because of their known, perceived, or imputed older age, whether alone or in combination with other grounds of discrimination. This is essential to ensure that the treaty effectively addresses ageism and age discrimination, including in our own country, where older persons continue to face these challenges in their daily lives. Finally, as mentioned in previous statements, the treaty should also include explicit definitions of ageism and age-based discrimination. We encourage delegates to ensure that the treaty's definitions and scope of application reflect these principles and provide comprehensive protection against ageism and age-based discrimination without a chronological age threshold. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Liberation.

Thank you. Liberation is representing the Centre for Human Rights of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry, during this second IGWG session. For the treaty to define older age numerically would be superficial and run the risk of feeding into social constructions of older age, which may themselves be discriminatory. It would also represent a failure to recognise people’s right to make their own definitions of when they are older, without pressure from state governments, the more powerful communities within a state, or dominance of global north over global south perceptions. A better approach will be to explain to whom the treaty applies, those experiencing discrimination because of others' negative perceptions about their age. Age-based discrimination is treating people less favourably because of their particular age, at individual, structural and Government levels alike. States may define older age chronologically for practical purposes, for example, to decide who is eligible for services designed for older persons. However, when they do so, the age selected runs the risk of being arbitrary. Chronological definitions also fail to take into account that some people experiencing discrimination may, for example, age physically more quickly than others. This is often true for those of us with psychosocial disabilities because of frequently inadequate health care and negative effects of psychiatric drugs. In order to be an up-to-date statement of human rights, the forthcoming treaty should not only draw on current treaties and international documents, but also move beyond the latter, where they may still fall short of full human rights. For example, not fully accord with the UNCRPD articles and rights-based terminology employed within the UNCRPD. When defining older person and age-based discrimination, the treaty should also include a focus on older persons whose other characteristics also receive little or no focus when within existing international documents. Thank you.

Thank you. I give the floor to distinguished representative of Alliance Defending Freedom.

Chair Rapporteur, ADF International appreciates the debate dedicated to the definition of terms in a legally binding instrument. This section of the LBI deserves careful reflection and elaboration, as it contributes significantly to legal clarity and determining the scope of the LBI. We believe that the LBI would greatly benefit from a clear and comprehensive definition of discrimination, as it is one of the core elements of the LBI. It should encompass any distinction, exclusion, or restriction on the basis of age which has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise by older persons on an equal basis with others of all their human rights. On palliative care, given that it is critical to realizing older persons' right to life and health, and that significant gaps exist in providing it with necessary adequacy, we strongly encourage states to define it clearly and, above all, comprehensively. More specifically, the LBI should define palliative care as comprehensive care for older persons facing life-threatening or life-limiting illness. intended not only to prevent and relieve physical symptoms, but also, and most critically, to address the psychological, social, and spiritual needs of older persons, and thereby contribute to improving their quality of life. Any definition of palliative care should take into account older person's environment, including family and community, to ensure that they receive the necessary assistance in supporting older persons in receiving such care. Lastly, we respectfully recommend that States refrain from defining terms that may give rise to significant divergences in interpretation and which are best understood in light of the instrument as a whole. This is important in ensuring greatest possible support for the future LBI and universality of the human rights of older persons. Thank you.

Thank you. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of OCRAE.

Thank you, Chair. I'm speaking again on behalf of OKRA, which is a Belgian organization of older people. I wanted to intervene on the two definitions we need: discrimination at one hand and care at the other hand.

Could the speaker please remove his earpiece?

For discrimination, it's obvious, we can broadly rely on the CRPD and the CEDAW, which covers all discrimination grounds. It gets trickier when we talk about acceptable justifications grounds for age discrimination. Especially in Europe, we see that discrimination on the ground of age is often seen as less problematic compared to other grounds. For example, the directive of the EU against discrimination on the labour market has a separate chapter with permitted justification grounds for discriminations based on age and only for those based on age. UNIA, which is one of the Belgian human rights watchers, came recently to the conclusion, on the basis of an analysis of the Belgian and European jurisprudence, that this largely undermines the right to equal treatment. It's obvious to have certain age limits for, for example, pension entitlements, but this is another thing than enabling employers, public and private, to dump older workers as soon as they reach a certain age, before or even at the statutory pension age. It's always good to keep in mind the recent scientific finding the IMF recently came to, that a 70-year-old today has the same cognitive abilities as a 53-year-old in 2008. is just a figure. And then there's a second thing. In the CRPD, discrimination includes also the refusal of reasonable accommodation. That should also apply to older people who don't identify themselves always as a person with disabilities. And finally, something about the definition of care. as a foundation for the state obligation to guarantee the right to care. We saw a broad agreement in July and nowadays to go further than only the right to health care. Several countries spoke also about the right to palliative care, but there is a risk to narrow this to long-term care in special institutions for older people, and leaving the rest to the family and the local community. We saw this in the already mentioned Inter-American Convention, but also in the African Protocol. While the CRPD has taken exactly the opposite path, first and foremost, the right to special facilities to assist persons with disabilities in their home situation, when we talk about the right to autonomy, independence, inclusion, dignity of older persons, we need to talk about the right to a wide range of services which guarantee that removal to an institution is really the last choice when the other options have been exhausted. Thank you.

Thank you. I'll give you the floor to the distinguished representative of International Disability Alliance. Please, if you could limit your intervention to three minutes. International Disability Alliance, you have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. The International Disability Alliance highlights the relevance of the section on definitions to ensure common understanding of key concepts for a consistent respect and implementation of the human rights of older persons. In this regard, the CAPD is a good model to take into account. Firstly, IDA supports a conceptualization of older persons that is not based on a rigid chronological age threshold, but rather that recognizes that perceptions on older age vary across different societies and cultures, and that the concrete living conditions such as extreme poverty and limited enjoyment of rights, condition those societal perceptions and the lived experience of people. This is very relevant also from a disability perspective, as some persons with disabilities experience an early onset of conditions associated with aging, notably persons with Down syndrome. As it is, the negative impact of ageism on the lives and enjoyment of rights of older persons that needs to be combated, a flexible conceptualization provides with a framework fit for purpose. This leads to a second point, which is that when the CRPD was negotiated, the reflection and debates were not ready to include a clear conceptualization of ableism. This only happened through the thematic study on the impact of ableism in medical and scientific practice, research, and experimentation by the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2019, and later on the CRPD's Committee's General Comment number 8 on the right to employment in 2022. At this stage, I invite states to consider whether clear conceptualizations of ageism and ableism in the future legally binding instrument can prove useful. Thirdly, and in line with the previous points, it is essential to put at the center a comprehensive definition of discrimination on the basis of older age, perceived older age, or imputed older age, either alone or interaction with other grounds or factors, including, of course, disability. also covers all forms of discrimination, including direct, indirect, structural, by association, among others. Finally, any relevant concept enshrined in the CRPD, such as age-appropriate procedural accommodation in the area of access to justice, should build upon CRPD and the practice of the CRPD Committee. Thank you very much for your attention.

Thank you. I give the floor to distinguished representative of the Foundation, Jerome Lejeune.

For.

More than 30 years, the Fondation Jerome Lejeune has been working in the area of medical care and the protection given to persons who have genetic disorders inherited and those affected by This experience helps us to say that we must strengthen the definitions in the future instrument. The words chosen in terms of their dignity will determine the way in which these rights are interpreted, applied, and protected. We think there are two concepts which are mutually exclusive. There's the idea of conditional dignity or subjective dignity, which is attributed to or recognized for people basing on their behavior, their cognitive abilities, et cetera. on the basis of external criteria. This idea of dignity is fluctuating. Dignity is acquired, can be maintained, and can be lost. And it's unequal. There are certain situations that give more dignity than others. Thus, it creates insecurity. The second definition is universal, ontological, universal, inherent to human beings' dignity, regardless of their age, their health, their disability. It is inalienable and unconditional, which means that one can never lose it, nor can one be disassociated from it. It is part of being human. It is egalitarian. It does not have any degrees. It does not provide for a hierarchy, and thus it is providing more security. It is only that definition of this universal ontological definition of dignity that helps to avoid coercion, pressure, and abuse that may lead older people to give up their lives because they feel that they are a burden to their relatives or for society. We are alarmed over any manipulation of notions such as quality of life, autonomy, or what we understand by the word care, which would lead to considering certain types of existence as being less worth living or that could be abridged. And there's a temptation to attach a threshold to age or old age, and that can lead to arbitrariness. Age is not a social construction, as has been said already. Aging can only be measured with a multitude of methodological approaches being applied. For example, people who have trisomy have early aging and other disabilities. So, this calls for care and presence and appropriate care and spiritual support and other types of support against all kinds of pressure. Dignity is not something to be deserved. It cannot be abandoned, it can be lost, and it does not depend on the way others view you or the way society views you. It calls for unconditional, egalitarian, and universal respect, which will be enshrined in the new instrument, I hope. Thank you very much.

Thank you. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of International Association for Hospice and Palliative Care.

Respected Chair, the International Association for Hospice and Palliative Care emphasizes the importance of clear, comprehensive, and internationally informed definitions in the development of this human rights instrument. Given that definitions shape the scope of States' obligations and influence whether people can effectively exercise their rights, we recommend that the Convention include an explicit definition of palliative care, grounded in the established international consensus-based definition. We propose the following language: Palliative care is the active, holistic care of persons of all ages experiencing serious health-related suffering associated with severe illness, particularly those approaching the end of life. It aims to improve quality of life through the prevention and relief of suffering by means of early identification, comprehensive assessment, and treatment of physical, psychological, and spiritual needs, respecting the dignity, autonomy, cultural values, and preferences of the person. We recommend that this definition be understood in accordance with three principles. First, palliative care is holistic and applicable throughout illness. It encompasses the prevention, early identification, assessment, and management of pain and other physical symptoms, as well as psychological, social, and spiritual distress. It is not limited to the final days of life and may be provided alongside disease-modifying treatments according to the person's needs. Second, palliative care protects dignity and autonomy. It supports effective communication and enables individuals to express their preferences and participate in decisions about their care. It affirms life, recognizes dying as a natural process, and neither intends to hasten nor postpone death. Care must respect the cultural and spiritual values of the person and their family. Third, a definition must translate into effective access. Palliative care should be available across health care settings, from community services to specialist teams. States must support its integration into health laws, national health programs, and budgets, ensure access to essential medicines for pain relief, and provide equitable services for all, including children and older persons. A clear definition will help translate the Convention's principle into practical obligations and ensure that no one is left to experience avoidable suffering without appropriate care. I thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Bhatt, for testifying. Representative of Age Well Foundation.

Thank you, Chair. What we name, we can protect. What we leave unnamed, we risk leaving behind. Definitions are not technicalities. They decide who stands inside the circle. So, we ask for three things. First, define care and support broadly. In the Global South, care is provided overwhelmingly by families, mostly by women, mostly unpaid. A definition that sees only institutional care leaves that reality out. What is invisible cannot be counted or supported. Second, name neglect, abandonment, and isolation as harms in their own right. The WHO tells us one in four older persons is socially isolated across the global south. Adult children migrate for work, and older persons are left behind. If our definitions have no word for this, our protections may never reach them. Third, name intersecting disadvantage in plain language. Older women, rural older persons, those in informal sector, those without pension of any kind. Broad phrases like “vulnerable groups” allow each delegation to read it in what way it suits them, while plain words give everyone the same text to stand on. And a word about “older persons” itself: a text that assumes a retirement age, a pension, and a formal job describes only part of the world. The fact is that the Global South older persons work informally until they cannot. Our definition must describe them too. We appreciate the care the core members have taken with these terms. In July, we spoke about the politics of definitions. Today, we offer a simple test for every term on the table. Does it open a door for someone outside or quietly closes one? Let us choose words that open doors. Can we all agree that older women in a village, working informally and caring for a family, will recognize herself in this text? We need to think about it. Thank you.

Thank you.

I give the floor to the representative of the University of Peace.

Thank you very much, Chair. The Convention on the Rights of the Child says that discrimination shall be prohibited against children who are children up until the age of 18. But there are some children who, at the age of 15, are already carrying out adult activities and someone who is 30 or 40, who is still behaving like a child. With this, I mean that in order to have a definition of an older person, one has to set a certain framework for this. It seems to me that the Inter-American Convention on the Rights of Older Persons does this, because indeed, these are people of 60 years of age without any prejudice to a lower or higher age being set by national legislation. It can be, for instance, 65. So I think it is important to enshrine or to trust national legislation, which knows about their environments, and then they know how to assess whether a person is an older person or not. But I think in an international convention, we have to ensure that we come up with the right wording. Otherwise, a social organization, for example, could not determine a pension if it did not have parameters to be able to provide this benefit. That's my first point. Secondly, we have talked about ageism and prejudice and stereotypes and stigmas. And this has been studied sometimes at a much more domestic level, because it can lead to discrimination. The expression that is given to this ageism varies from one country to another, but here we're talking about age-based discrimination. This can affect a person of 30 years of age who is not allowed to get a job, and also there can be discrimination against an older person. than that age. So I think there is a question of exclusion, distinction, or restriction on the basis of one's older age, and then fundamental freedoms are thereby violated. What I'm trying to say is that there are other definitions that can be included. Mention has been made here of abandonment, ill-treatment, negligence, palliative care. And those are all found covered in the Inter-American Convention for the Protection of the Human Rights of Older Persons. Lastly, I would like to say that legal capacity, which lies at the heart of the convention, and accessibility, which is the backbone of a convention of this type, should also be defined so as in future to avoid a gap? Thank you very much.

Good day, everyone. I'm pleased to address this important topic of definitions on behalf of the International Longevity Centre Canada. Given time constraints, I will only focus on the definition of the expression "older persons." ILC Canada aligns itself with Giarup's discussion paper on the scope of the treaty, which proposes that setting an arbitrary chronological age to define older persons would fail to capture an important segment of the population and would ignore the fact that older age is a social construct defined by cultural and social norms. Indeed, as mentioned by many of the others today, ageism and discrimination against people do not start at a particular age. Taking the Canadian workplace as an example, we know that there are countless instances where workers experience subtle and often overt ageism and discrimination in our country, forcing workers to leave the workforce before they are ready to do so. These people may be 50 years old, 55 years old, 60, in their 60s or even 70s. This is a wide age bracket which the Convention must capture in order to protect everyone who is at risk of ageism and discrimination in various facets of life. And setting a chronological age in the Convention is not, in our view, the way to go. While this proposed approach may diverge from that found in other international instruments regarding older persons, It does not mean that states would be unable to set age criteria in policies and indeed laws. We state this with caution, however. It would have to be made clear that if such age limits were to be imposed, they would have to be reasonable, objective, and possess a legitimate aim in line with human rights instruments such as the UN General Comment 18 on non-discrimination or perhaps local charter of rights. In conclusion, focusing on a specific age in order to trigger the protection of human rights would defeat the Convention's main objective, which is to ensure full enjoyment of human rights on an equal basis for all persons who age. Thank you very much.

Thank you. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Platform, New Technologies and Older Women.

Who protected? Who is protected from what and how? The experience of the CRPD has shown that what equality requires for a particular group may differ from general definitions of discrimination and must be spelled out explicitly. The recognition of the denial of reasonable accommodation as a form of disability discrimination is a clear example. When a treaty does not explicitly name a situation or a group, it often fails to protect them, and this omission suggests that they are less important. We therefore propose: Firstly, old age is socially constructed and its meaning differs across regions and conditions. Protection should apply where people experience the consequences of aging earlier due to poverty, disasters, conflict, disability, or lifelong disadvantage, which disproportionately affect women. Second, the instrument must define ageism, including gendered ageism, as stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination based on on age operate at various levels. It must cover age-graded systems that perpetuate and deepen discrimination that are too often accepted as reasonable. Third, the definition should encompass direct, indirect, and structural discrimination, harassment, hate speech, and the denial of reasonable accommodation. The instrument must explicitly recognize and define multiple and intersecting discrimination and all forms of violence, specifically violence against older women, on grounds including sex, gender, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity, migration status and socio-economic status. Fourth, consistent with, but not limited to, the CEDAW Committee's General Recommendation No. 28, para. 5, gender should be understood as socially constructed identities, attributes, and roles. This is essential for an instrument that addresses the gendered nature of aging and the specific situation of older women. Fifth, the definition of reasonable accommodation must be gender-responsive, reflecting the specific needs of older women, especially their economic and physical conditions, and be complemented by temporary special measures under Article 4 of CEDAW. Sixth, the instrument should define autonomy as the right to make one's own decisions and have them respected, and independence as the ability to act on them within the community. This matters especially for older women, whose decisions are too often made by others. Thank you, Chair.

I think I give you the floor to Disabled Peoples International by video.

Dear Chairs, distinguished members of the Intergovernmental Working Group. On behalf of DPI, Disabled Persons International, and as former member of the drafting body of CRPD, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and as a former.

Chair of the CRPD Committee, we would like to make the following contribution.

As disabled women over 60, we think it is important that the medical model of age needs to be replaced.

By a human rights model of age, just like the CRPD did to disability.

Regarding the article on definitions, we think it is of utmost importance that the CRPD definition of discrimination is adopted, including denial of reasonable accommodation. Denial of reasonable accommodation needs to be defined on the basis of Article 2 CRPD and applied to age.

Historically.

Denial of reasonable accommodation stems from legislation addressing religious discrimination, which is evidence that it is not by nature disability-related.

Thank you. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the European Network of Equality Bodies.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. As EQUINET, the European Network of Equality Bodies, we would like to contribute with two definitions. I will be short, given time constraints. First, ageism and age discrimination. We fully support the GAROP position paper stating that ageism is a key driver of human rights violations against older persons, intersecting with stereotypes and prejudices based on other grounds. Age discrimination should be expressly defined. It should include direct and indirect discrimination, harassment, discrimination by association, segregation, and denial of reasonable accommodation. The prohibition should also cover public advocacy of hatred based on older age, including incitement and hate speech. Second, intersectional and multiple discrimination. As mentioned by the Polish NHRI, an equality body, multiple discrimination should be defined as the umbrella term covering situations in which a person is discriminated against on more than one ground, whether additively, cumulatively, or simultaneously. Intersectional discrimination should be defined as the specific form in which two or more grounds of discriminations, of which age is one, operate and interact with each other at the same time in such a way to be inseparable, producing a distinct and qualitatively different form of disadvantage that cannot be identified by analyzing each ground separately. This definition draws on EU binding legislation, such as the EU binding directives and standards for equality bodies. the innovative recent EU Pay Transparency Directive, and definition of intersectional discrimination at UN level, as elaborated in the CRPD General Comment number 6. A clear definition of intersectional discrimination would give regional and national courts, as well as equality bodies and other competent national authorities, the normative anchor that currently lack to identify, assess, and remedy discrimination at intersection of age and other grounds, and would let the UN lead by example. I would like to thank you for considering our proposals.

Thank you, and thank you for interpreters, making a wonderful job interpreting this fast motion. Now I give the word to Fusako Seki.

I'm Fusako Seki of Kanagawa University. I focus on two terms, older person and age discrimination. First, should this instrument define an older person as anyone aged 60 or 65 and over, or any about any other fixed chronological age? What do you think, all? I believe it should not rely on chronological age, as several delegations, former independent expert Claudio Marra, Gallup, and others have said. Life expectancy differs widely between countries and keeps rising. Chronological age can be a reference point, but no more. But then, should the definition say? I propose using the word "include" as Article 1 of the CRPD does. Older persons include those who have lived a long life and are approaching its final stage. Simple as they are, I believe these two points capture in abstract terms who older persons are. For children, the feature of being in development led to the concept of the best interest of the child. For persons with disabilities, the features of impairments and social barriers led to the concept of reasonable accommodation. Older age has its own features: temporality, as lost time cannot be regained; Continuity, as a life built over decades cannot simply be rebuilt, and merit, meaning recognition of the life lived. From these features, this instrument should derive its own key concept. Second, age discrimination should cover not only exclusion. Older people cannot do this. but also restrictions imposed for your own goods, such as banning all family visits to protect older residents. Age criteria may be used only if reasonable and objective. These features should what must be weighed. I propose defining age discrimination together with criteria for justifying age-based Thank you for giving time to speak. My mother, who's over 80, who's participating, is watching again from Japan. Thank you.

Thank you. Two more to finish. CNS, please.

On behalf of CNS, Development Justice for Older Persons, and She and Rights, I thank you, Chair, for giving me this opportunity to speak. We would urge the Member States to define older persons explicitly, because older persons is not a homogeneous group. Rather, it includes persons of all diversities, myriad lived experiences, and different contexts and realities. Age-wise too, it is a very big spectrum, and their unique and specific needs are also equally diverse. Some older persons, such as persons living with HIV, face accelerated aging. Their chronological age of 50 is equal to 70 years of biological age of those free of the virus. This spectrum must be addressed in the definition of older persons so that we do not exclude anyone from the LBI. We also need to define gender, gender equality, and ending all forms of gender-based violence against older persons. These definitions should be rooted in the already existing and agreed definitions by the member states in other UN processes or UN institutions like UN Women or UNFPA, or the legally binding treaties like CEDAW. More importantly, these definitions should be relevant for women as well as persons of all sexual and gender diversities. I will particularly urge the States to include CEDAW General Recommendation number 41 on dismantling gender stereotypes, prejudices and stigma, and the unequal power relations that sustain them. Fundamental human right to health also needs to be defined so that ages, including gendered ageism and other stereotypical notions, do not exclude older persons in all their diversities from comprehensive health rights, such as sexual health rights. Definitions of gender equality and right to health must state that health and gender rights are indivisible and inseparable, and both are fundamental human rights. LBI should include definition for transgender rights. UNOHCHR defines transgender rights as the fundamental human rights of individuals whose gender identity differs from their birth assigned sex, protected under universal human rights principle without discrimination. I urge States to include this in the LBI. And as our Honorable Chair has so rightly said, let us not allow the geography of power to become the geography of rights, may this also be kept in mind while formulating the definitions. Thank you for your attention.

Thank you. The last but not least, the National Older Women's Network.

It is the view of the National Older Women's Network of Australia that the definition section is possibly.

I'm sorry, Chair, the interpretation services are now concluding.

The interpretation service is finished, so we can go ahead with this last statement.

Thank you, Chair. As I said, it's the view of the National Older Women's Network that the definition section is possibly the most important section of this legally binding instrument. For it is within the definitions that the protections against weasel words, deliberate misconstructions, denial of obligations, ageism, and the continuing isolation and marginalisation of older people must lie. Definitions must be clear and unequivocal. They must leave no room for states to avoid their responsibilities or diminish the rights of older people. The definitions must establish that the human rights of older people sit firmly within the framework of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and existing international human rights instruments, particularly CEDAW, CRPD, and the instruments protecting immigrants and indigenous people. Older people, particularly older women, must be recognised as autonomous individuals entitled to the full enjoyment of the human rights, including dignity, independence, equality, and self-determination. The definition of an older person must not solely rely on a chronological age or be confused with state legislation governing employment, retirement, pensions, or the eligibility for care. In my country, the definition of an older person differs between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people, but such definitions must never determine entitlement to fundamental human rights. The definitions must explicitly confront ageism and the discrimination in all their forms. They must apply to all older people while recognising the cumulative effect discrimination experienced by older women. They must also clearly address violence, coercive control, neglect, abuse, isolation, and abandonment, and the use of physical and chemical restraints. These are serious rights concerns, and depending on their nature and circumstances, may constitute torture or cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment. An older person in a residential care should not be afforded lesser protection from enforced restraint than a person who has been incarcerated. Finally, the definitions must leave no doubt that the responsibility for respecting, protecting, and fulfilling the rights in this convention rest with the states. States cannot avoid their obligations by transferring responsibility to private providers, institutions, or families. We are not developing this Convention simply to reinstate rights that older people should already enjoy. We are developing it because those rights continue to be denied or violated. If the definitions are weak or open to inconvenient interpretation, we risk creating another international agreement that recognises in principle rights while allowing their denial in practice. The definitions must be strong enough to ensure there is no doubt. Thank you.

Thank you, excellencies, distinguished participants. This brings us to the end of this meeting. This afternoon, we'll resume our session at 3:00 PM for the consideration of state obligations. And I'm so sorry for the situation of the interpreters, but I mean, the time was over, and there was no any other way, as you know, that they work in that way all the time, fortunately or unfortunately. Hereby, I declare this meeting is closed.