6th Meeting - 1st Session Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems 2025

Thank you very much. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, at this moment we have one more request for the floor. We have two requests for the floor now. We have Stop Killer Robots and IHL-YI. Let me first pass the floor to the representative of Stop Killer Robots. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. Stop Killer Robots welcomes the constructive format of discussions and contributions on the draft rolling text this week. One key element of meaningful human control that is not sufficiently prominent in the current text is a requirement for the users of a system to adequately understand how a system's they are using functions and what it effects will be in the context of use. We lack a functional understanding of what a system will select and engage in any given operational environment. We encourage states to bring this out more clearly in box four as an overarching rule that some of the other elements here can contribute to. We would also like to again highlight the issue of bias. Box four groups together two very different sorts of bias which must be separated out. The first is automation bias, which raises the risk of nominal human decision-making in the use of force and is a challenge to meaningful human control. The second is what the text highlights as harmful bias in data sets or capabilities more generally, referring to the risks of technologies reproducing the biases and discriminations against certain people and groups that exist in our societies. including sexism, racism, and ableism. Racialized and historically marginalized people are already being disproportionately harmed by automated decision-making processes in different spheres. Tasking biased technologies to make determinations related to life or death would be a grave mistake, and bias is not something that can be eliminated. The issue of harmful bias is framed in the rolling text as almost exclusively a concern for anti-personal autonomous weapon systems. We therefore call on States once again to consider this category of systems, the particular ethical and legal concerns they raise, and the rules that should be applied to them as a specific issue in their discussions. and reiterate our recommendation that such systems should be prohibited as part of a legally binding instrument. Thank you, Chair.

Let me thank the distinguished representative from Kenya, Robert. I have now two more requests. I have IHLYI and Finland. But first, IHLYI, sorry.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. The International Humanitarian Law and Youth Initiative was founded in 2018 by a group of dedicated young professionals. It was established with the vision of creating a digital space for youth engagement on issues of international humanitarian law with a core focus on the MENA region. We welcome the progress made in the discussions and express our support for the observations presented by the ICRC, particularly regarding the need to clarify the concept of lethality and to ensure that any developments in this field remain fully aligned with the principles of IHL. However, we wish to highlight several concerns and additional elements that should be incorporated into the text. About section 4, it should mandate that states conduct a comprehensive legal and ethical review before developing, acquiring, or deploying any lethal autonomous weapon systems in line with Article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. We also call for the establishment of an independent international review mechanism to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law. In section 4, paragraph 3, the text must explicitly address the impacts of laws on fundamental human rights, including the right to life, the prohibition of inhuman treatment, and the protection of civilians in armed conflict. It should also include clear prohibition on the use of lethal autonomous weapon system for law enforcement, crowd control, or other international security operations as their deployment outside armed conflict raise serious risks of human rights violations. Section five rightly emphasize human accountability in all decisions regarding lethal autonomous weapon systems. The accountability must be more than theoretical, while the text calls for responsibility through the lifecycle of lethal autonomous weapons systems in section 4, paragraph 3. It lacks concrete enforcement mechanism. We urge the inclusion of independent oversight bodies, transparent reporting obligation, and penalties for violations. Second, AI-driven decision-making pose risks to accountability. Although Section 5, paragraph 2 states that responsibility cannot be transferred to machines, it does not explicitly prohibit AI from making autonomous targeting decisions. This must be clearly addressed to prevent accountability gaps. Finally, stronger preventive legal measures are needed. Section 5, paragraph 6, calls for legislative steps, but does not require States to adopt national laws regulating or prohibiting lethal autonomous weapons systems. Clear legal frameworks aligned with international humanitarian law are essential. We propose explicit obligation for states to retain full legal responsibility, establish independent oversight, and introduce penal sanction for violations. Strengthening Section 5 is crucial to ensuring that accountability is not just a principle, but a legal obligation. Moreover, the current provisions addressing harmful bias in AI are insufficient. While the text mentions the need to address bias, it does not establish binding mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability in AI training and deployment. We propose the creation of an independent international review mechanism to assess datasets and algorithms used in lethal autonomous weapon systems, ensuring that they do not disproportionately target specific groups. Mr. Chair, finally, the International Humanitarian Law Youth Initiative strongly supports calls to move beyond the mere collection of elements and toward the negotiation of a legally binding instrument regulating or prohibiting lethal autonomous weapon systems. Without a clear and enforceable legal framework, this discussion risks remaining purely theoretical while the rapid development of autonomous weapons continues unchecked. The International Humanitarian Law Youth Initiative underscores that any discussion on lethal autonomous weapons systems must be firmly rooted in the principle of protecting human life above all else. We urge all states to take concrete steps to prevent the proliferation of these systems without robust legal safeguards and to ensure that decisions involving the use of force remain under direct and meaningful human control. Thank you.

Let me thank you for your comments and suggestions. Next on my list is Finland, to be followed by Portugal. Let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Finland. You have the floor.

Thank you. Mr. Chair, as a late comment to the contents of the fourth box, We have heard several excellent development inputs, for instance from Sweden, Norway and USA to mention some. Also, we would like to highlight our support for the French proposal to change the formulation properly understood to sufficiently understood in para 3 and to replace reliable expectation with appropriate knowledge in para 5. Furthermore, in practice, complex high-tech weapon systems such as LOS require constant fine-tuning during the operational phase of the life cycle, both in hardware and software. This is required in model parameters and particularly in sensor calibration. In that sense, focusing only to data bias is oversimplifying and therefore somewhat misleading. Data bias is just one source for technical unaccuracy, which becomes emphasized especially in the development phase. Therefore, we propose different wording to paragraph 6 as "Conduct frequent assessment and testing that laws remain technically in tune." Thank you.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Finland for sharing his views and making proposals. Next on my list is Portugal. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation wishes to express our support for the overall text without prejudice of some possible streamlining. We underline the importance of the references to human control throughout the entire cycle of laws and the need to conduct legal reviews of the systems in order to ensure compliance with IHL. We support the proposals and comments raised by the ICRC, Norway, Austria, and many others relating to the legal nature of the obligation of states to determine whether the employment of laws would be prohibited by international law as well to conduct legal reviews under article 36. In this context, the term "should" used in the chapeau seems to be inadequate and could be substituted by "must". We also would like to support the proposal advanced by Mozambique, relating to the possibility of including language concerning cybersecurity against hacking or data spoofing in this section. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Portugal for sharing the views of his delegation and for making proposals. We have come at the end of the speakers list. So this is the moment if you want to react to any of your colleagues. If not, then I will make a few remarks wrapping up our discussion on box 4 before we move to box 5. My takeaway from the discussion on box 4 is that there's on the one hand very broad support for the proposals, but there are also numerous suggestions for further improvement, and I think we can do some work with that. I see Bangladesh, would you like to take the floor? Yes, of course, go ahead, you have the floor, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor. As outlined in paragraph 6A of box 3, ensuring predictability, reliability, traceability, and explainability is imperative for lethal autonomous weapon systems relying on AI-empowered components in their decision-making process. Mr. Chair, we think that bias in general pose a challenge to achieving these goals. While some biases may appear harmless in certain contexts, they can lead to unintended and disproportionate consequences in different operational environments. This may lead to compromising compliance with IHL. Therefore, Bangladesh firmly believes that all forms of bias, whether perceived as harmful by some or not so much by others, should be at least identified and assessed as much as possible at the earliest stage. In this regard, Bangladesh has the following proposals concerning Box 4. In paragraph 6, we propose replacing harmful bias with all forms of unintended bias. Given that bias in AI systems may not always be recognizable as harmful immediately, a broader definition strengthens preventive safeguards. Similarly, in paragraph 7, we propose replacing harmful bias with all forms of unintended bias. This will again ensure addressing all potential sources of distortion, irrespective of their perceived severity and consequences. Secondly, we propose positioning paragraph six to focus on the biases deriving from the data used to train the algorithms, and positioning paragraph seven to focus on the algorithmic systemic and systematic bias, including but not limited to automation bias. Finally, regarding paragraph 7, Bangladesh further proposes the following phrasing, quote, "Implement measures to address all forms of unintended bias across the entire autonomous decision-making pipeline of laws, including but not limited to learning algorithms, software design, and computing hardware, ensuring compliance with IHL." Mr. Chair, as a machine cannot be held accountable, we urge the inclusion of stronger safeguards to address all forms of systemic or systematic unintended bias throughout the whole laws lifecycle. Bangladesh emphasizes that addressing bias at every stage of research, design, development, and deployment of laws is critical for upholding IHL. We will share our proposals with you in writing. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Bangladesh for sharing the views of his delegation and making proposals. Indeed, it is highly appreciated if you could share your proposals in writing so we can take them into due consideration. Let me look around the room once more whether there is any further appetite for delivering comments and making proposals. No? Okay, then we wrap up with regard to box number four. As I was already stating, my impression is that in general there's broad support for the text in box four, but also numerous proposals for further improving the text, and we will look into that. especially with regard to streamlining. Proposals have been made with regard to powers one and four and three and five. So we will see to come up with some proposals on that. Furthermore, we had indeed some pertinent points with regards to the verbs that have been used, because if it's already a standing obligation, then it is, of course, not appropriate to use "should." So we will have to fix that, I think. But that doesn't seem to be that difficult. And there was, of course, also There were two proposals for inserting new text with regard to developing the positive effects of artificial intelligence, that they should not be unduly hampered. And there was a proposal from Belgium, supported by a number of delegations, with regard to diversion. I think this more or less sums up our discussion, apart, of course, from a good old friend that has been discussed very intensively already in the past, that is the topic of bias, harmful or unintended, and indeed at least two, but there was also one delegation splitting it up in three different types of bias being So we will look into the possibilities to reflect that in the text as far as it contributes to narrowing down still existing divergences. This is about box number four. We now move to box number five, and already we had When we discussed box number three, I think some references were made to box number five, to what we have to do in order to indeed make sure that accountability and responsibility is achieved. As key issues, and I talk that on the basis of the informal consultations and of the written comments we have received, I have three points identified, but no doubt there will be more, but those were the three that were most pressing. One is traceability. Some delegations have asked for clarification on traceability. We have already had some discussions on it. For some, this is an important addition that emphasizes the potential complexity of command and control structures, while for others it's superfluous. With regard to accountability and responsibility, we have heard concerns over the perception that these two terms were used interchangeably, and we have received two requests to retain both. In addition, some have requested for the text to explicitly refer to and to retain both state and individual responsibility. We have also references to the responsibilities of parties to the conflict. With regard to redress mechanisms, there seems to be general support for the inclusion of oversight and investigative and redressal mechanisms. Several delegations in their proposals have insisted that it must be made clearer that these are to be executed at a national and not at the international level and specific to the development and use of laws. On the other hand, some have raised concerns with regard to whether the Group has the mandate to formulate text with regard to internal mechanisms and affairs related to national level regulations. So these were just three and no doubt there will be more and I am open to listen to that and I would now like to invite you to take the floor to share your views and comments with regard to the text at this moment in box number five regarding responsibility and accountability. Yes, I recognize the distinguished representative of Pakistan. Thank you for opening the discussion. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. I will try to kick start some of the conversations around these issues, specifically on two elements in this box to start with. Firstly, when we see the contents of this box, we recognize that the responsibility and accountability should remain with humans. It's very clearly reflected. Then in paragraph three, the fact that state must ensure individual responsibility is further reaffirmed. But what is missing from this box is the responsibility, the international responsibility of a state per se. And that is a conversations that we have had in the past. For instance, in 2022 GGE report in paragraph 19, where we agreed that every international wrongful act of a state, including those involving laws, entails international responsibility of that state in accordance with international law. We think that that principle should be included in this box and we should see how we can further clarify or further expand that chain of thought. Secondly, I'd like to offer a few comments on the chain of human command and control. And what you referred in your opening remarks, that this has been one of the issues where there are some differences. For some, the use of word traceable may appear superfluous, if I may use that word. But for us, it's essential. When we see laws, we see that by design, they often rely on sophisticated algorithms, machine learning. and automated decision logic. So when we look at the traditional command chains, which are normally traceable, they do not capture these autonomous elements in a way that could ensure clarity of who made those critical decisions. And since those questions have risen, that's why there is a need to specify very clearly that traceable chain of human command and control is needed in case of loss. It's not simply a matter of hierarchy on a paper. It means proactively designing technical means, for instance, data logs, reporting systems, to verify who issued what instructions and how the system interpreted those instructions while running on those algorithms. That will be all for now. Thank you.

I would like to thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan for sharing the views from his delegation and further explaining positions. Next on my list is the US. Madam, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Our delegation sees a lot of value in box 5. But we wanted to propose a number of edits to consolidate and streamline, and then at the end, add new content that we think would be helpful to build out this box. Before starting on the specific edits, I did want to lay out the sort of three main purposes of this section as we see it, because I think you'll see that our edits then track the three purposes. So the first purpose for us is to reaffirm the applicability of established legal principles of responsibility in relation to the use of laws in armed conflict. So that's what we see box one as doing. Second, we think this section can be useful for states in elements of an instrument if they articulate general measures that help ensure accountability. And then third, what we'll propose adding is an articulation of specific measures related to laws that can help strengthen accountability for their use. So moving now to paragraph 1, before starting with the language that you included, Chair, we would recommend adding an additional sentence at the beginning of this paragraph that's drawn from paragraph 17B of the 2019 report. And that is, IHL imposes obligations on states parties to armed conflict, and individuals, not machines. We think that's a useful predicate for the sentence and text that you have that follows. We would then propose line edits to the language that you had to focus it more on IHL. So I can read out the full text first and then walk through some explanations for the changes. So our text would read, after the additional sentence that I just noted, "States, parties to a conflict, and individuals at all times remain responsible in accordance with applicable international humanitarian law for their decisions with regard to the use of laws in armed conflict." Now, as I noted, we think these changes are more precise and better focus on IHL. They also track agreed language. For example, we would delete "and accountable" after "responsible" because persons are legally responsible regardless of whether they are actually held accountable. So we think it's important to frame it in this way. We also added specific reference to IHL, not just international law in general. And at the end, we would like to refer to not just with regard to laws, but with regard to the use of laws in armed conflict to focus more on what we're talking about in the CCW context. And one final point on paragraph one. We wanted to add there before decisions to make clear that the decisions that we're talking about are a state's own decisions and that states are not responsible for the decisions of other states or other parties. Now moving on to paragraph two, we do recognize, Chair, that this provision is partially drawn from Guiding Principle B. but we find the language too vague to be useful as an element of an instrument for states to adopt and operationalize. So we would recommend deleting it in this box five, although we could explore considering whether there's another section of the instrument where this concept is more appropriate, such as a purpose or preambular section. Now moving on to paragraph three. Again, we acknowledge that the language in paragraph three is similar to the language in guiding principle D. But again, we don't quite think the framing of a guiding principle works in elements of an instrument for states to adopt, particularly when the phrase "states must ensure" was added at the beginning of that otherwise agreed language. We also see paragraphs three through six as really kind of overlapping and related to each other. And so our proposal would be to combine them into actually one paragraph. And that helps ensure that each point is framed correctly to distinguish between rules and principles on the one hand, and then measures to implement or strengthen accountability on the other hand. So I can go ahead and read out what our consolidated replacement for paragraphs three through six would be. Chair, I believe we've already sent this to your staff. And for others, this is drawn very closely from Article 6.1 of the draft articles proposal. So if you can't quite take it all down, please refer to the Article 6 of the draft articles. So the language, again, replacing all of paragraphs 3 through 6 would read, "States must ensure individual accountability for their use of laws in accordance with their obligations under IHL. Appropriate steps to ensure individual accountability may include, A, the operation of laws within a responsible chain of human command and control, B, effective internal mechanisms for the reporting and investigation of incidents that may involve violations of IHL, and C, corrective actions, including the imposition of penal or administrative sanctions to prevent and suppress violations of IHL. So again, we think this generally takes the concepts that you had in paragraphs three through six, but combines them in a clearer way. Just a few notes on some of the reasons that we made particular edits. The chair's text had a reference to operating systems within a traceable and responsible chain of human command and control. And in our delegation's view, the use of traceable to modify the responsible chain of command is not clear and it's novel and not really how we typically use that term. We also didn't think that accountability across the entire life cycle made sense as we're really not aware of similar state practice with regard to existing weapons, non-laws. In our view, accountability primarily relates to the use of weapons. So we would focus on use. Finally, we didn't agree with the reference to national law in paragraph three, as compliance with national law is not a requirement of international law. So as I read, our proposal then lists three steps that states can actually take and operationalize in their system to ensure accountability, drawing on the language in the chair's draft. Now, these are general steps that states already do take with respect to IHL implementation with regard to any and all types of weapons. The thing we think it's important to add at the end with new language is about accountability measures that are specific to laws that might not be relevant with the case of other weapons. So what we would propose to add at the end of the language here is language that goes beyond these general measures and is more tailored to laws and what makes them unique. So again, I'll read out the language we propose to add, but this is drawn from Article 6.2 of our draft articles proposal. So hopefully it's easy for colleagues to refer to it there. So our new proposed paragraph, the chapeau would say, to promote human responsibility and accountability in the use of laws and to mitigate the risk of unintended engagements, states should provide with respect to their laws, A, readily understandable human machine interfaces and controls. B, guidance, e.g., policies, doctrine, and procedures consistent with applicable IHL for personnel regarding the proper use of laws. C, training of personnel to understand such guidance and the capabilities and limitations of the law's autonomous functions in the anticipated circumstances of its use. And D, appropriate rules of engagement or other directives or orders circumscribing the use of the weapon system in military operations consistent with applicable IHL. So again, just I know that was a lot of text, but back to the framing, putting the general principle, legal principle at the top. Then general measures that promote accountability that relate to all weapons systems and that states already implement in their own IHL systems. And then a third bucket that talks about accountability measures specific to laws. Thank you.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of the United States for sharing the positions of her delegation and for making proposals. Next on my list is Ukraine, to be followed by the Russian Federation. Let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Ukraine. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be shortly. In Ukrainian delegation opinion, we agree with this context in general regarding Chapter 5. My proposal is to improve paragraph 3 with including additional sentence regarding responsible human decision-making and then control and command.

Decision-making, it's very important, in my opinion. Thank you.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Ukraine for sharing the positions of his delegation. Next on my list is the Russian Federation, to be followed by Ireland. But first, the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation. You have.

To... Thank you, Chairman. With respect to box 5, overall, we don't have too many problems with the text that you've proposed. I think the provisions there now in box 5, they are justified and they reflect many aspects that we've discussed in this GGE. I think you really have done a good job in striking a balance between various national positions, positions of delegations, and building a text in a mutually all-round acceptable tone. Now, my main remark is to do with paragraph 5. which concerns various kinds of internal procedures and internal processes within member states. The Russian Federation has adopted a consistent position when it comes to saying that it would not be wise to predefine national internal procedures of states parties when it comes to providing control over such weapons systems, moreover, any kinds of measures for investigating situations regarding such weapons systems, accountability or documentation when it comes to incidents involving such systems. These are internal procedures for every State Party. Again, in terms of international law, every state party bears international responsibility for complying with its international obligations, including when it comes to implementing those commitments at a national level. Therefore, in view of that accountability or responsibility, we do not think that paragraph 5 should be in this document and we propose deleting it entirely and leave those procedures purely to the discretion of the States Parties themselves as an internal matter for themselves. Now, with respect to the other paragraphs, we've got a few maybe stylistic amendments that we might make. in para 3, for example, we would prefer to delete the word traceable and just leave responsible chain of human command and control. we don't really get what traceable really means here. We still don't really understand the concept regarding provision of traceability when it comes to the functioning of such weapons systems. We've heard certain explanations from the delegations that have promoted that concept. but they haven't convinced us that in the text that it's worth leaving that wording to do with that traceability concept in the form that it's presented currently. Now, if those in favor of that concept are ready to give, you know, a more fleshed out wording that will really shed light on the specific meaning of all those terms, we would certainly welcome that so that we could understand it better. We would be ready to work with them and consider it. But the way it's presented right now, we're basically, you've got, or there is no, there's no, there's a code here, but without being able to decipher it, we just seem to have, you know, We do not think it would be prudent to use such words or such phrases which have not really been properly deciphered and which only, we think, create grounds for subsequent interpretation. On paragraph 6, we would prefer to change "legislative" to "legal". Because when it comes to, if we talk of legislative or legislative measures, for us, again, that falls within, that's more an internal procedure. These are more an internal affair for each state party. So we think legal, however, that fully captures the sense that that wording is trying to convey. and is more than able to convey the same idea that you've included here in paragraph 6, Mr. Chairman. What's more, we'd also like to state our categorical rejection of any references in that paragraph to criminal or penal or administrative sanctions. Again, this is an internal matter for each state party to decide and should remain the discretion of the state parties themselves. We see no added value when it comes to that reference, to that wording in this document. Again, that can all just be left. to the prerogative of the members of the States Parties themselves. I thank you.

I would like to thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation for sharing the views of his delegation and for making proposals. Next on my list is Ireland, to be followed by the University of Utrecht and Mexico. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Ireland. You have the floor, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Regarding box 5, we very much welcome this section and support it in general, and we'll just make a few suggestions. Again, in paragraph 1, and apologies for being repetitive, we suggest the insertion of "development and use of" before "laws" for the reasons already outlined earlier this week. As a general comment, we think paragraphs 1 and 2 are similar and probably could be combined while maintaining all the relevant concepts contained therein. And we could have a think about what that might look like. But if they're not combined, then we think the final sentence of paragraph two about the entire life cycle might fit better at the end of the first paragraph, which is of a more general nature. We also think we could reorder the sentence in paragraph one for the benefit of readability and clarity. And it could read, quote, States must ensure that with regards to development and use of laws, humans remain responsible and accountable for decisions at all times in line with applicable international law. And we're happy to send that to you in writing. We also observe, like the US, Though without a specific suggestion that national law is also used in paragraph 3 alongside international law and not in paragraph 1, and we wanted to highlight that for consistency. And I think we also could probably support the US suggestion in paragraph 1 to add IHL imposes obligations on states, parties to armed conflict, and individuals, not machines, which seems to us to strengthen this paragraph. We note that responsibility and accountability are used interchangeably in paragraphs 2 and 3, and we think in most cases we can use both responsibility and accountability. And we welcome the reference to traceability here, which is a key concept necessary to ensure accountability, as a delegate from Pakistan just explained earlier. And we can also look at how this concept might be further fleshed out. paragraph 4, we suggest to insert "human" before "responsibility", so it would read "States must ensure individual human responsibility", and that, again, is in order to reiterate the importance of the human element in this context. Lastly, we welcome the investigative and redress language in paragraph 5. We think it can benefit from a couple clarifications. We think the word "internal" could be changed to "national", but we're flexible and also note other suggestions such as "domestic". And in order to clarify which incidents we are referring to, we suggest including a line stating "in relation to the development and use of laws" at the end of the first sentence. And with that fix, we might not need the final sentence, which currently to us seems a little unclear. I'll leave it there. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Ireland for his remarks and suggestions made and indeed we would appreciate to receive the text in writing, the proposals you have made. Next on my list is the University of Utrecht to be followed by Mexico, but let me first pass the floor to the Utrecht University. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. I speak in my capacity as an assistant professor of international law at Utrecht University. My work focuses on the legitimacy of military operations in increasingly autonomous warfare, which prominently features notions of accountability and responsibility. I'm pleased to see this box in the text as I echo sentiments voiced by several delegations this week, linking the conceptualization of context-appropriate human control and judgment not only to compliance with legal obligations during their use, but also to issues of apportioning responsibility and accountability afterward. It is my view that the text would benefit from greater conceptual clarity and consistency in terminology, and this echoes some of the interventions that have been made thus far. While these terms have long been debated within this forum, it's my hope that the suggestions I make in the spirit of fostering coherence in the text's meaning may help resolve some existing tensions. I have two main recommendations in this regard. The first is to include a clear understanding of those terms, responsibility and accountability, in the text. These terms are not interchangeable synonyms, though at times this is implied within the text. On responsibility, I suggest specifying that this is meant in a legal sense. Scholarship referred to in my written comments to the chair details what aspects exist under various legal frameworks, for example, state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, international criminal responsibility for war crimes, and opportunities for investigating IHL violations involving AWS. On accountability, I encourage delegations to adopt a broad understanding of this term, encapsulating certain legal avenues, but also, more importantly, wider understandings that may help achieve the goals outlined in other sections of the text and make it more cohesive as a whole. In my written submission, I make reference to scholarship that may be helpful in this regard. The second recommendation is to ensure, then, alignment and consistency of these key terms throughout the text. I will now make a few language-specific suggestions in line with these recommendations. First, in paragraph 1, I suggest the following rewording: "States must ensure that humans at all times remain responsible, in accordance with applicable international law, and accountable for decisions with regards to development and use of laws." This reflects the legal understandings of responsible and accountable as related to broader avenues states can choose regarding their decisions. I encourage adding the use of before laws for alignment with other boxes and discussion this week. Paragraph two implies the intended meaning aims to outline a way to both hold entities or individuals to account and assign legal responsibility for decisions on the use of laws. Another issue here is the term responsibility is preceded by human in a way no other instance in the text is, creating confusion. I therefore suggest the following wording. States must ensure that humans remain responsible for decisions regarding the use of laws, since accountability and responsibility cannot be transferred to machines. The rest of the text can stay as is. Paragraph three, as noted by other delegations, conflates legal notions of responsibility with notions of wider accountability. Both are important here, but for clarity, I suggest the following. States must establish accountability mechanisms across the entire life cycle of laws to ensure compliance with applicable international and national law, including through the operation of such systems within an accountable chain of human command and control. This language echoes that of mechanisms as mentioned in paragraph five. A recommendation to change, ensure to establish here regarding these mechanisms across the life cycle will encourage compliance. In paragraph four, I suggest replacing responsibility with accountability, allowing for additional avenues falling short of criminal or legal recourse. in cases that IHL requires, given that not every violation of IHL implicates individual criminal responsibility. With this approach, States have a wide margin to ensure compliance with obligations under IHL on a case-by-case basis. Read in tandem with paragraph 5, it reflects the meaning delegations have started to craft within this text. Paragraph five starts identifying mechanisms states might use to ensure broader accountability. The oversight mentioned, for example, echoes a role for various actors to hold states to account when allegations of IHL violations arise. Read in tandem with changes to paragraph four, this gives direction to states about the mechanisms that must be established. The textual suggestions here are to add in the word accountability before mechanisms. to be more explicit and to change development, deployment, and operation to development and use to align with the rest of the text and discussions this week. Finally, paragraph six, as noted, is not specific to laws and arguably reflects existing state obligations. I therefore suggest adding in in the development and use of laws at the beginning to specify the relationship and the small minor change to change the word it's to their in relations to states to align this paragraph with the rest of the text. I thank you, Chair.

Let me thank the distinguished representative from the University of Utrecht for making proposals And next on my list is Mexico, to be followed by Australia. But first, let me pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico. You have the floor.

Thank you. Sorry for arriving late, but I was told to cover another meeting at 3:00. So with your authorization, may I make some comments on part four and then go to part five? Thank you so much. So I think with regard to part four, what Mexico would prefer is to be clear of distinguishing those that are obligations to be referred in the box 12 obligations, and part 4 being more tailored to concrete operationalization measures regarding how to implement the legal weapons reviews. So I think in that sense, we would see that probably the CHAP could refer more explicitly to the legal weapons reviews and how they should be made, with the particularities needed with regard to loss. And from there, I think with regard to paragraph two, for example, I think while agreeing with Norwegian proposal, I think we can draft it in a way that says ensure that throughout the entire life cycle of loss, the context appropriate human controller judgment is evaluated. And I have drafting that I have shared with you on how to make it kind of functional and operational. We agree that in paragraph four, we shouldn't be only concerned with the expected use, but also the process of the weapon, because I think a critical aspect of the weapon is how its algorithms and its automated processes function. And I think here, with regard to biases, I think in previous sessions, we have recognized that there is a whole variety of biases. Some of them, I think, are covered through the prohibitions and regulations that we have established in part three. So for example, the risk of exclusion of human control. and others, but I think here with biases, there are specific ones that need to be referred. With this, the bias with regard to the context of the operation, the bias with regard to the systematization or overconfidence with the system, and biases with regard to discrimination, and specifically with race, gender, or other considerations. And finally, there is the nominal, the bias on the system application. So what we feel is that the bias with regard to the cognitive tendencies can be included in paragraph 5. So we feel that it can say conduct rigorous testing and evaluation in realistic simulated operational environment to prevent unintended cognitive tendencies of humans interacting with the laws, such as automation bias, and to enable a human user on knowing how to operate the system and to have an understanding of the reliable expectation of how this weapon system will perform in an anticipated circumstances. So we feel that it is in this paragraph five that the issue of this bias should be dealt with. And the other biases in paragraph six, it's conduct periodic assessments to detect and make measures to correct or mitigate unintended bias in artificial intelligence capabilities relied upon by laws, including discrimination of race, gender, and other aspects on data sets or misrepresentations of intentionality or context. I think this would cover more broadly what are the biases that we would like to deal with in this section. And now very quickly with regard to section 5, Chair, I think while we support what other delegations and what we have just heard on the precise language to be used throughout the text, I think from our delegation we would also propose paragraph 7B. That specifies that in cases of great breaches of the Geneva Conventions by the use of laws, every state is obliged either to criminally prosecute or extradite an alleged offender. I think this is important both in relation to ensuring that it's not just civil responsibility when there is a violation through the use of laws, which is the interpretation that some academicians have been given, and it is important that in case of grave violations, there is a criminal prosecution. But also, it is a means of recognizing the multi-layered functionality of laws and therefore that the possible responsibility might be derived from these different type of layers that might not necessarily be in the same place. So geographical space. So I think this is the proposal. Thank you.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for stating his positions and for making proposals. Next on my list is Australia, to be followed by France, Switzerland and Italy. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Australia. Madam, you have the floor.

Chair, international law provides clear frameworks regarding state responsibility and individual accountability for violations of IHL. This section needs to be faithful to such frameworks. We would suggest that paragraph one be framed as the principle that humans must at all times remain accountable in accordance with applicable international law for decisions on the use of force. This ought to be uncontroversial in the context of this GGE. When formulating paragraphs on individual accountability, our preference is to focus on the use of laws. States may require flexibility to explore capability development with a view to better understanding emerging technologies and their impacts. From a practical perspective, development should not be included in this paragraph. as you won't know until you test and evaluate a system that it cannot perform in accordance with IHL. It is unclear what legal framework would apply at earlier stages, for example, to commercial developers. We would therefore suggest narrowing the reference to decisions with regard to laws to decisions on the use of force. Chair, with respect to paragraph three, The paragraph opens with a reference to ensuring accountability across the entire life cycle of laws in accordance with applicable international and national law. In our view, this language lacks clarity on the obligations it seeks to impose on states. We query the intent behind this phrase. Insofar as it seeks to impose obligations on civilian developers, We would query the basis of this under international law, noting IHL governs the use of such systems. Well-established principles of state responsibility and individual accountability would apply to any decision to use unlawful weapon systems or weapon systems that have unlawful effects. We would therefore suggest more closely adhering to consensus language in guiding principle D, namely that Accountability for developing, deploying, and using any emerging weapon systems in the framework of the CCW must be ensured in accordance with applicable international law, including through the operation of such systems within a responsible chain of human command and control. Turning then to paragraph four, Chair, we consider this paragraph to be unnecessary. Firstly, a state must, as a matter of IHL, ensure that there are mechanisms and systems in place to ensure individuals are held to account for violations of IHL. However, ensuring individual responsibility goes a step further than this. It is not clear if the intent of this paragraph is directed towards state responsibility or individual accountability. Further, the phrase potential use of laws is problematic, as it is unclear how an individual could be held responsible for a hypothetical outcome. Thirdly, it would be more appropriate to refer to international law here more broadly, rather than IHL. Chair, on paragraph five, it is clear under international law that state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts is well established. and the responsible state is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act. We consider paragraph five to be overly prescriptive in terms of how a state may give effect to its obligation under international law. We would therefore suggest rewording paragraph five as follows. States must ensure effective internal mechanisms for the reporting investigation or review of incidents that may involve violations of IHL. These internal mechanisms should also address incidents related to the use of laws. By including the term "effective," this wording sets a standard for mechanisms to meet, leading to better overall outcomes. For similar reasons, on paragraph 6, we suggest reverting to language put forth at the last GGE, which appeared to attract more consensus. Chair, finally, we have listened with interest to the proposals of the US with respect to this section and see merit in them. We thank you.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Australia for sharing your views, voicing proposals and reacting to the proposals of other delegations. Next on my list is France, to be followed by Switzerland and Italy, but let me first pass the floor to France. Adam, you have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. The French delegation has three comments on this section. In paragraph 1, we believe that it might be useful to add some clarification by referring to guiding principle B from the 2019 GGE report. The term "must" should be maintained in this paragraph because it's more appropriate with regard to the existing obligations under international humanitarian law. So we're talking here about consistency, hence must should be retained. Turning now to paragraph three, here we could add the word responsibility alongside accountability. States must ensure responsibility and accountability so that the two notions appear. We would, however, wish to delete the word "traceable", which is redundant, because this concept is already taken into account in the chain of command. In paragraph 6, we would like to modify "international law" and replace it with the wording "international humanitarian law". The language used here in paragraph 6 is drawn from international humanitarian treaties, and it would therefore be incorrect to extend said language to all branches of international law. Thank you very much.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of France for making proposals. Next on my list is Switzerland, to be followed by Italy, the Republic of Korea, and the United Arab Emirates. But first, the distinguished representative of Switzerland, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I can be very short on this section. We can support it as it stands, but remain open to consider edits that have been proposed by other delegations. In reaction to some comments, we would like to share, however, the following considerations. It is our understanding that many, if not most, instruments on IHL contain provisions on implementation and compliance. And we should do so also in this case. Similar provisions to those now in box 5, notably paragraphs 5 and 6, contain obligations to take legal, administrative, and other measures. including penal sanctions to prevent and suppress prohibited activities by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control. It can be found in many other treaties and protocols, for instance, also in the CCW Amended Protocol II, the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocol I, to name just a few. alongside other IHL and disarmament treaties. The same is true for other implementation measures, such as consultations and cooperations, issuance of military instructions and operating procedures, procedures for settlement of disputes, and so on. For instance, we have such provisions in Protocol V of this Convention. of which we could inspire ourselves to include such provisions. Thank you very much, Chair.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Switzerland for stating the positions of his delegation and making proposals. Next on my list is Italy, to be followed by the Republic of Korea. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Italy. Madam, you have the floor.

Thank you, Chair, and thank you for the work you have conducted on this section pertaining to state responsibility and individual accountability.

We have a few minor comments on this text.

First, on para 2, sorry, in para 3, we would like to add.

Individual prior to accountability, and then looking at para 5, we would suggest rewording this para in the way as follows. States must ensure effective internal oversight, investigative and redressal mechanisms of incidents related to the development and employment of.

Laws that may involve violations of IHL, and delete the rest.

This is because the.

Provision of a mechanism of internal control should not necessarily impose the modalities according to which it should be implemented. In our view, it can only refer to specific areas of intervention. Finally, looking at para 6, as pointed out by a few other distinguished delegations.

We would like to delete as well as imposition of panel and administrative sanctions.

The responsibility of imposing criminal sanctions is a due diligence of a state, which has the responsibility also to make it applicable. And I thank you, Chair.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Italy for the comments presented. Next on my list is the Republic of Korea, to be followed by the United Arab Emirates. But first, the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. At the AOSIS, as one of the co-sponsors of the draft articles mentioned by the US delegation, we generally support the changes proposed by the US. However, we would like to offer three points regarding box 5. First, the term "traceable chain of command and control" in paragraph 3 is not only conceptually novel but also impractical from a technical standpoint. The concerns raised by those supporting the inclusion of this term could be adequately addressed through other measures. Second, with regard to paragraph 5 and 6, we believe the verb should be changed from "must" to shoot as these paragraphs concern domestic measures to be implemented. Third, in paragraph six, if one read this paragraph carefully, there is no reference to laws at all. Rather, it addresses the general obligation of states to comply with general international law through internal measures. Therefore, we propose either deleting this paragraph or because it's superfluous or reformulating it in line with the suggestion made by the US delegation. Thank you.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea for his text suggestions. Next on my list is the United Arab Emirates. Let me pass the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Arab Emirates. Madam, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Allow me to address you in Arabic. First of all, I would like to thank all the delegations for their valuable interventions regarding the various boxes 1, 2, 3 and 4. And we had sent our observations regarding boxes 1 and 2 to the Secretariat, and we shall send also observations on boxes 3 and 4 later. And we have some observations pertaining to box 5. We have some observations regarding the various paragraphs of box 5. First of all, point 1, paragraph 1, we hope that humans remain responsible at all times, legally responsible. And we also would like to add traceable and the responsibility that can be archived so that this cannot be referred to laws. Traceability and documentation is also in line with the previous meetings of the GGE regarding the clear mechanism of accountability and responsibility. Regarding paragraph 2, adding meaningful human control is very important, and this should reflect also in a clearer manner observance of international law. Regarding paragraph 3, the sentence should be reformulated so that we can have a chain of human command and control that can be verifiable and also to add also independent verification measures. Such additions should reinforce the principle of a verifiable chain of human command and control that should also be independent. And this will secure transparency, as we have discussed in previous meetings. Regarding paragraph 4, we approve some interventions by other States to change individual responsibility to individual accountability. and to add at the end of the paragraph, "clear mechanisms of prosecution", because this also reflects the previous recommendations of DGE meetings to have a clear legal accountability pertaining to the various violations. Paragraph 5. ensure internal oversight, investigative and redressal mechanisms should be changed to create effective internal oversight, investigative and redressal mechanisms, and also to add accountability mechanisms for operators and users. or those who develop such weapons. We need to have independent oversight mechanisms that are totally independent from the operators and developers. And this should also reflect the fact that all relevant stakeholders should shoulder their responsibilities. Paragraph six, we we would like to add the word "sanction" for any violation of international law, because expanding the sanctions to include persons and companies that develop laws is in line also with the previous recommendations of the various meetings of the GGE. We hope that a paragraph will be added regarding international accountability. It should be formulated as the following: states must report all accidents pertaining to laws that violate international humanitarian law according to the best standards. We should have a reporting mechanism in the case of serious violations, and this is in line with the various recommendations of the GDE pertaining to promoting international cooperation mechanisms. I would like to summarize the points that should be included. Promoting human control, have a clear individual and individual responsibility and responsibility for all the incidents and to have also clear sanctions on the companies and individuals that are involved in the violations. Thank you.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of the United Arab Emirates for her intervention and proposals made. Next on my list is Canada, to be followed by Israel and Japan. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Canada. Sir, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation wanted to weigh in on this section as well. We only have a few brief remarks to make. In paragraph 1, we also support the notion of inclusion of referencing international humanitarian law. And then at the end of the sentence where we say with regards to laws, we would like to suggest with regards to the deployment and use of laws. Again, just minor edits here in paragraph two. On the second sentence where we say this should be considered across the entire lifecycle, we would like to recommend this must. so that we are consistent with the first sentence of the para. On paragraph three, here as well, we would like to remove, as others have suggested, the reference to national law. Moving on to paragraph five, As others have stated, we would also switch must to should at the beginning of this paragraph. And finally in paragraph six, we've identified a few issues for our delegation. Firstly, again, we would say should instead of must. And then where we say appropriate, we would recommend changing to feasible. And we question the second part of the paragraph, to prevent and suppress violations of international law by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control. Our interpretation is that this is not a legal obligation. And we would also suggest changing international law in this sentence as it's too broad to be included here. My delegation has already submitted these changes and recommendations to your team. Thank you.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Australia for giving his comments and for already forwarding the proposals in writing. Next on my list is Israel, to be followed by Japan. Let me pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Israel.

Thank you so much, Chair. Regarding the fifth paragraph, this paragraph exceeds the group's scope of work and also introduces new terms that have not been previously discussed in this forum. For those reasons, we think this paragraph should be omitted. If the paragraph is retained in the text, its practical nature would have been more suitable to "should" rather than "must." Regarding the sixth paragraph, the reference to IHL in this paragraph should be qualified to accommodate the mandate of the group regarding laws. Also, the reference to the different measures should include a qualification of necessity as not all those measures listed in the paragraph will be necessarily required in practice. For these reasons, we suggest writing, I quote: "States must take all appropriate steps, including legislative and other measures, as well as imposition of penal or administrative sanctions as needed, to prevent and suppress violations of international humanitarian law obligations applicable to laws by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control. Finally, we are also open to the interesting suggestions proposed by the United States. Thank you, Chair.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Israel for making proposals and suggestions. Next on my list is Japan, to be followed by India. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Japan. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Japan considers that over the years, the last GGE have accumulated consensus on the issue of responsibility and accountability, and we can generally support box 5. However, some parts are redundant, and we support the proposal by Ireland to streamline paragraph one and two. We also consider that paragraph five and six would merit to be streamlined. Japan supports the proposal by the Republic of Korea and Canada to change must to should. Finally, we welcome the text proposal by the United States based on the draft articles which Japan co-sponsors. I would like to look that into detail. Thank you, Chair.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Japan for viewing the positions of her nation. And next on my list is India. And for the time being, that's the last I have on my list. So if there is any further need to take the floor, please We already recognized Portugal, so first India and then Portugal. Let me pass now the floor to the distinguished representative of India. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. My delegation is broadly supportive of the substance and the language contained in Section 5, and we believe that the provisions regarding responsibility and accountability in this section should flow from the provisions as contained in IHL, which would pertain to the operational use of the weapon system. Therefore, in para 1, we would suggest caveating the language at the end to the use of laws, human responsibility with regards to the use of laws. Secondly, throughout the text, there are several measures that have been recommended for states to ensure accountability and responsibility. We are supportive of these measures, but we wanted to reinforce the idea that these should be within the ambit of states to implement in accordance with national circumstances, policies, and legislative measures. Therefore, we would also support those delegations which suggest replacing the word "should" sorry, which suggest replacing the word "must" with "should" throughout the text of this section. Chair, we are very supportive of the language in paragraph four, which talks about individual responsibility for the employment of means or methods of warfare involving the potential use of laws for states, because we feel this is an important section to address concerns of use of laws in gray zone operations by non-state actors to fix responsibility for states for use of their jurisdiction, for use of laws in violation of IHL. Lastly, we take note of the various internal mechanisms and responsibility and accountability provided under para 5 and 6. These are relating to internal oversight, investigative and redressal mechanisms. We believe these are only amongst a few of several other measures that states could take to ensure responsibility and thus would suggest using the term inter alia in the text to indicate that these are a list of non-exhaustive measures. In paragraph six, we would request that before legislative and other measures, we caveat the text by adding domestic legislative or national legislative and other measures so as to be clear that these are to be implemented by states in accordance with their domestic policies. That's all, Chair. Thank you.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of India. for viewing the positions of her delegation. Next on my list is Portugal, to be followed by Belgium and Austria. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Portugal.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Just a quick intervention to say that we welcome, in general, the text of this section. and that my delegation considers that responsibility for the development and use of laws should be spread throughout the different stages of the system's life cycle, which is something that the text seems to caution, and we welcome that. Like others, we agree with the inclusion of a reference to IHL in paragraph 1. Also, my delegation puts to consideration the opportunity to include reference to the international judicial system in this section as a way of supplementing accountability at an international level. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Portugal for his comments. Next on my list is Belgium, to be followed by Austria. Let me now pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Belgium, so you have the floor.

Chair, with regard to box 5, we would like to add the notion of responsibility for developers and manufacturers in the design and programming stages of the law. We have sent language to you in early August. So we would like to suggest that this notion is also taken up in box 5. Especially this could be added to paragraph 3. And then in paragraph 5, there we would like to ask that the reference to IHL in the third line that may involve violations of IHL, we would like to broaden this to violations of applicable international law and national law.

Thank you. Let me thank the distinguished representative of Belgium for the proposals made. Next on my list is Austria. You have the floor.

Thank you for also the text on this box and the consultations we already had. Just a general assessment, I think this is a very important part because as we have stated in previous boxes, one of our main tasks here is to ensure accountability and responsibility is maintained also with the new technologies that we are facing and also in light of the different challenges. So this is crucial. At the same time, we are facing some challenges on our own because we have a lot of text already on this kind of segment from previous reports and from the previous work of the G20 on laws. So we are a little bit in a difficult situation that we have to choose which kind of language we use, which one is the better one, because many of the different languages that we have produced in 2019 and the guiding principles are trying to say the same thing but with different words. And this is a little bit difficult to hear. And at the same time, in many cases, they relate to existing international obligations. And that's why this text is, I have to say, rather difficult to cope with. Going into the text, most of them are must paragraphs, and I think that's good, except for one. But starting from the first para, we would also say that here we need to have the element of development and use. The main reason here is that this para sets out that states must ensure responsibility and accountability in a way that it is maintained, and by saying that they have to ensure it, that would include a procedural element. And this then would also allow for a pre-stage, which would be in the development of these weapon systems. I think it would be, to some extent, and we hear the arguments why this is not necessarily something that we would see under IHL. But it would be a little bit illogical that, um, this would not include development phase and in this, uh, para, we are not setting out any kind of, um, specific obligations for the developers themselves, but as I said at the beginning, it's something that states must ensure how they do this, I think this is open. But it's important to have this element that, um, to some extent, the private sector is included, even if it's over the, uh, U-turn by, uh, the state responsibility, um, in the second para. This is guiding principle B, I think, and you have taken the whole text of it, including the second sentence that reads, "This should be considered across the entire lifecycle of the weapon system." Someone has proposed this already, but probably this sentence would fit better in the first para, taking apart guiding principle B, but I think it's justified in this case. In Para 3, there is also a possibility to include the development element. Once again, it's the states must ensure, so it should be possible. In para 4, we would also support the inclusion of human responsibility. I think it's an interesting addition that was suggested, and also the addition of international law. On para 5, while this is of course a very interesting and important element, this is something that we would rather see with a should, as these are measures on a national basis. And the problem in general is that if we would have a must here, we would develop international law in the framework of the GGE laws. And this brings us to the second point, I think it's also important that we add here a specification that we are talking about the use of laws. So we could add after "involve violations in IHL" in relation to the use of laws. So that's very clear that we are speaking about lethal autonomous weapons systems here and that we are not trying to develop international law in this field. But as long as we use a "should," there is also less of a risk here, but the addition is still relevant. We would also suggest, as others have done, that we use a different word from internal, either domestic or national. I think both are good options. And, yeah, I would leave it as this. With six, there would be some textual changes that could be taken. We could have, for example, a penal and/or instead of just an or. when we talk about imposition of penal or administrative sanctions, because both is, of course, possible. And as a final point, I think it makes some sense, as I have mentioned at the beginning, we are just having, so far we are only having a must paras here. But I think it would make sense to also include some examples, as I've been suggested by the US, that would suggest specific measures that states could take. And this would probably enrich the text and give states more ideas, more possibilities, and also more examples on what they could do to implement this whole section. I thank you.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Austria for his comments and his suggestions. And that brings me to the end of the list. And we have a new request for the floor, this time by the distinguished representative of Lebanon. Sir, you have the floor.

As this is the first time I am taking the floor, I would like to express my sincere appreciation for your efforts in navigating this complex and challenging mission while working towards consensus. I also extend my gratitude to your team and all distinguished delegations actively contributing and engaging in these discussions. My delegation is generally satisfied with the rolling text, however, I would like to offer a few comments on the broader context, not specifically for this box. Firstly, we strongly emphasize the necessity of maintaining human control over autonomous weapons to ensure compliance with IHL, accountability, and responsibility. Equally important is the prohibition of autonomous weapons that cannot be used in accordance with IHL. Such weapons should neither be developed, deployed, nor utilized. Furthermore, we stress the importance of establishing clear rules for all non-prohibited weapons system to guarantee their compliance with IHL. Secondly, I would like to highlight concerns and challenges posed by emerging technologies in this domain, specifically regarding the development of automated weapons and systems operating in collaborative operations and swarming technologies. For example, unlike traditional systems, these technologies enable multiple drones to coordinate, identify, select, and engage multiple targets collectively, rather than operating on a one-to-one basis. In such scenarios, adversaries have little to no ability to defend themselves against such coordinated attacks. The primary concern is that human intervention in these operations is significantly reduced to minimum, if not eliminated altogether, primarily due to the speed and volume of the system involved. This challenge becomes even more critical in communication denied environments, Consequently, this raises serious questions about the compliance of such systems with IHL and broader human rights principles. Lastly, we stress the urgent need to establish concrete measures to prevent the proliferation of lethal autonomous weapons systems, particularly to terrorist groups and criminal organizations. Robust safeguards must be put in place to mitigate the risks of uncontrolled circulations and misuse. And I thank you, Chair.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Lebanon for giving some general and more specific comments. Next on my list is China. Let me pass the floor to the distinguished representative of China.

Madam, you have the floor. We have no interpretation.

Please, if you kindly wait a moment.

Thank you, sir. Apologies. We believe that appropriate addressing of the issue of accountability and responsibility is an important measure to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law with regard to the use of force. China on the whole supports this approach. We have a few detailed proposals of change as follows. The current Para 2 should be the first paragraph of this section so as to provide a keynote or a basic requirement upfront for this section. Secondly, Para 1 and Para 3 have some common scene or some overlapping elements, so they can be merged. Third point, the word traceable in Para 3 is normally used for describing systems. However, The command and control chain is a link where humans and machines interact. So the use of traceable here is not appropriate. We propose its deletion. Fourth point, regarding paragraph 5, it is aimed to ensure effective internal management regarding the possible violation of the incidents which might be impossible violation of IHL. China supports proposals of some delegations. Countries should decide the mechanism to set up in accordance with its own conditions. While minimizing potential misunderstandings, we should achieve the purpose of this paragraph by, we propose, removing or deleting reporting this word. This way, we can still achieve the overall goal of appropriately addressing the possible violations of IHM or the incidents of this nature. The second sentence of para 5, we propose the addition after "incidents" that that may involve violations of IHL. Thank you, sir.

I see no further requests for the floor. I guess that we have exhausted speakers list and I think we're all a bit exhausted. So, and to be honest, I have no further proposals for you to spend the rest of the time other than inform you that my team is working very hard and already for quite some time to make some amendments to the text previously shown on the screen. We think that might increase the level of convergence in the room around certain key elements of the text. But that job is not yet done. So we need some further work. And for that reason, it's quite appropriate that we have finished a little bit earlier. So that we have time indeed to do so, uh, let me now, uh, for one moment, uh, consult internally what our timelines are, uh, with regard to that text. Okay, I have something for you with regard to where we stand. Sorry, delegates. Ambassadors, distinguished delegates, could I please a few more minutes of your attention? What we will do somewhere this afternoon or early evening is circulate a new version of the rolling text with regard to box one. So you can chew on that and then have a discussion on that tomorrow morning. Since everything builds on everything, we continue working on following boxes. My intent is to at least try to have the boxes 134, I think, or 123. So 123. So a little bit about the half of the text to give that a second reading until Friday. So summarizing, tonight we will circulate new text, a new version of the rolling text with regard to box one. We will discuss that tomorrow morning. And in the meantime, we continue working on some changes to boxes two and three, and we will circulate them in the course of tomorrow, hopefully, for further discussion tomorrow and on Friday. So that would put us in a good position to have this week one full reading of the text and a second reading of the text with some amendments that might help bringing more convergence with regard to the rolling text. I hope that is agreeable to all of you. I wish you a pleasant continuation of the afternoon and see you back tomorrow. This meeting at 10 o'clock, this meeting, this meeting stands adjourned.