1st Meeting - 1st Session Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems 2025
Meetings & Events
Date: 3 March 2025
Language: English
Transcript: https://transcripts.un.org/en/asset/k1m/k1m47uj6uv
Transcripts available through this tool are created by using automatic speech recognition and are not official records nor official documents of the United Nations. Official records and official documents are available on the Official Document System of the United Nations.

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Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [0:02]:

okay we start excellency distinguished delegates as chair of the 2025 group of governmental experts on lethal autonomous weapon systems i would like to welcome you to the first session of the group in 2025. i also take this opportunity to reiterate my appreciation for the confidence placed in me by all high contracting parties to carry out this task. I am eager to continue engaging with you on this important topic in an open, transparent, inclusive and constructive manner, encountering your full support in this regard. I would like to take this opportunity to welcome to our meeting the delegates who are joining us this week through the CCW sponsorship programme. And I would also like to welcome Trinidad and Tobago, for whom it's the first time attending a meeting of the CCW as a high contracting party. The state succession is proof of the continued commitment to upholding and furthering the respect for international humanitarian law and working towards our common disarmament efforts. The CCW, as a key instrument of international humanitarian law, continues to hold significant importance in protecting civilians, affirming the importance of humanitarian disarmament, promoting international norms and a humanitarian law culture, facilitating discussions on the appropriate regulation of new weapons technologies, and encouraging international cooperation and assistance. We need it now more than ever. Let me turn to the agenda and provisional programme of work, which have been issued as official documents, and have been circulated by the CCW Implementation Support Unit. The documents are also available on the 2025 GGE on Laws webpage of UNODC Meetings Place. It's my intention to follow the order of the agenda items with a view to get to the substantive work as soon as possible in light of the limited time we have available. Agenda item one, opening of the meeting. You will recall that the 2023 meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW decided that the GGE is to pursue the following mandate. In the context of the objectives and purpose of the Convention, the group is to further consider and formulate, by consensus, a set of elements of an instrument without prejudging its nature and other possible measures to address emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems, taking into account the example of existing protocols within the Convention, proposals presented by High Contracting Parties and other options related to the normative and operational framework on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems, building upon the recommendations and conclusions of the Group and bringing in expertise on legal, military and technological aspects, as contained in power 20 of the final report of that meeting, document CCW/MSP/2023/7. The annual meeting of the high contracting parties to the CCW, the 2024 annual meeting of the high contracting parties to the CCW recalled this decision, as reflected in paragraph 23 of the final report of that meeting, document CCW/MSP/2024/7. That meeting also decided that the GGE would meet for a duration of 10 days in 2025, from 3 to 7 March and from 1 to 5 September, as reflected in paragraph 28c of its final report. In accordance with the decision by the 2024 meeting of the High Contracting Parties and by the powers conferred to me by the High Contracting Parties, I now declare open the first session of the 2025 CCW Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, we have been entrusted with a very important task. The meeting of the High Contracting Parties has mandated this group to further consider and formulate by consensus a set of elements of an instrument without prejudging its nature and other possible measures to address emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems. And while our mandate is to submit a report to the seventh review conference in 2026, We have also been tasked with completing our work as soon as possible and preferably before the end of 2025, less than 10 months and only 10 meeting days from now. The urgency of our work cannot be overstated and we must act decisively and with a cooperative and flexible spirit. For this, we must focus on identifying where our differences on substance still lie, find a way to narrow those gaps and build on the convergences which I have seen growing over the last few months. With that in mind, I also want to strongly appeal to all delegations to focus their interventions this week and going forward only on the substance of the matter under discussion. I thank you in advance for your cooperation. Before proceeding to the next agenda item, I would like to ask the Secretariat to play a video message by the United Nations Under Secretary General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, addressed to the Group.


UNODA · USG and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs · Izumi Nakamitsu [6:28]:

Excellencies, distinguished delegates, I am pleased to send my greetings to the first session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Let me begin by expressing my deep appreciation to Ambassador Robert Indenbosch of the Kingdom of the Netherlands for his continued commitment and dedication as Chair of the Group. Under his skilled leadership, this group has been able to make substantial progress. I am optimistic that you will be able to reach a constructive outcome under his able stewardship. The gravity of your work in the GGE cannot be overstated. The rapid advancement and integration of new technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems demands our immediate and unwavering attention. This was also recognized in the Path for the Future, in which Member States decided to urgently advance the discussions on laws through the GGE with the aim to develop an instrument without prejudging its nature and other possible measures. I commend this decision and your continued commitment to this issue. With your current mandate, you have all the necessary tools at your disposal to fulfill this aim and achieve the necessary progress. The mandate adopted by the 2023 meeting of the High Contracting Parties paves the way towards the adoption of such an international instrument, which will set concrete prohibitions and regulations on the development, deployment, and use of laws. I am particularly encouraged by the concrete work that has taken place on the basis of the rolling text and applaud you for working together to find common ground. This cooperative spirit will be essential as we navigate the path ahead. Achieving agreement on possible elements of an instrument will not be easy. But it is not impossible. Finding common ground will require flexibility and open-mindedness. Only a shared sense of collaboration will allow you to develop a framework that balances the security needs of states with the necessary legal, humanitarian, and ethical imperatives and considerations of our shared humanity. The unregulated development and use of lethal autonomous weapon systems holds many risks, including humanitarian, legal, security, technological and ethical. It has the potential to exacerbate existing tensions, uncertainty and instability, and could lead to a general erosion of trust. It is in this context that it is more important than ever for us to engage in constructive dialogue and cooperative action. We must work together to build trust and prevent the further destabilization of the international security landscape. Despite the challenges we face, I believe there is reason for hope. The very fact that you are here today Engaging in these important discussions is a testament to your collective commitment to make progress on this issue. Your deliberations here could pave the way to shape the future of warfare in the way that upholds the principles of international humanitarian law, human rights and humanity. Excellencies, dear colleagues, the mandate of the GGE calls on you to submit a report to the seventh review conference of the CCW scheduled to take place in 2026. It also asks that you complete the work as soon as possible, preferably before the end of 2025. I wish you success in your efforts to heed this call and to advance your work on the rolling text with urgency. I wish you a successful meeting.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [11:24]:

On behalf of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW and all the participants in the work of this GGE, I thank the Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs for her message of encouragement and support. Agenda item two, adoption of the agenda. I now invite you to consider item two of the provisional agenda titled Adoption of the Agenda. The provisional agenda has been issued as document CCW/GGE.1/2025/1 and was circulated by the CCW Implementation Support Unit via e-mail on Tuesday, the 28th of January, 2025. The document is also available on the 2025 GE GE on Law's webpage of UNODC meetings place. As you may further recall, the first three agenda items are dedicated to the usual procedural and organizational matters. Under item four on the organization of the work of the group, I will explain in more detail how I plan to organize our discussions this week. Agenda item five, Our main substantive agenda item reflects our current mandate and will contain the core of our substantive work. In light of the need to concentrate on the rolling text, and more in particular on addressing the still existing divergences with regard to the draft elements, I would like to request delegations to refrain from making general statements. During our 2024 sessions, we already had two rounds of general debate, and I dare say the national positions are well known across the room. In order for us to make substantive progress during this week, I propose we try to complete a full reading of the text no later than Wednesday afternoon, in order to have the opportunity to do some further work on the boxes one, three, and four on Thursday and Friday. Under agenda item six on other matters, I will give the opportunity to delegations to express themselves on any issue which may not have been addressed under other agenda items. Agenda item seven is dedicated to the adoption of the report. As you remember, a decision was taken last year to reintroduce this item on the agenda with a view to best reflect the agenda for the entirety of our work. However, In accordance with the mandate, the group will only submit a report to the seventh review conference, which is scheduled to take place in 2026, read paragraph 20 of the final report of the 2023 meeting of the High Contracting Parties, CCW/MSP/2023/7. We will therefore not negotiate and adopt a report this year under agenda item seven during the current session. However, as I said at our session last August, I am keenly aware that we cannot delay the task of reaching agreement on a report until the final day of our mandate. For that reason, I introduced the rolling text with the aim to move towards finding provisional consensus on specific formulations regarding a set of elements for an instrument without prejudging its nature or other possible measures. With the understanding that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, I urge all of you to approach this process with a constructive spirit, working step by step towards such a provisional consensus. Under agenda item eight, closing of the meeting, I will close the first 2025 session of the Group. Before we adopt the agenda, is there any delegation wishing to take the floor at this stage? I do not see any other, I do not see any request for the floor and I would now like to invite the group to adopt the agenda as contained in document CCW/GGE.1/2025/1. Thank you, the agenda is adopted. Agenda item three. Confirmation of the rules of procedure. We now move on to agenda item three, confirmation of the rules of procedure. And under this agenda item, I would like to remind the group that the sixth review conference decided that the rules of procedure of the review conference shall apply mutatis mutandis to the group. Read CCW/CONF.6/11 decision one para 40. The rules of procedure can be found in document CCW/CONF.5/4 as well as on the webpage of this meeting. Given that the group confirmed its rules of procedure during our first session in March, I would like to propose now to move on to agenda item four of our agenda. with the understanding that I intend to conduct the meeting as I conducted the meetings of the group in 2024, after having heard views of delegations with regard to their expectations. I see the Russian Federation. You have the floor.


Russian Federation [17:12]:

Distinguished Chairman, We are very happy to see you and all the delegations at this meeting of the governmental group of experts on laws. The Russian Federation would like to confirm her readiness to provide you with all necessary cooperation in the course of the work of the group with a view to its having the possibility of producing productive and substantive results. Distinguished Chairman, in the course of 2024, we continued to hold discussions on a series of aspects related to the rules of procedure and the implementation of the rules of procedure. on the basis of which this group of governmental experts works. In the course of this session, we should once again like to draw the attention of delegations to the question of Chapter 10 of the rules of procedure, which concerns the participation of non governmental organisations and entities, including regional intergovernmental and non governmental organisations. This question is one which we discussed in some detail at the meetings in 2023 and 2024 and also in the course of the annual conference on Additional Protocols II and V. We hope that it is not necessary to remind anyone of the discussions that took place at the time. The main thing is that, despite all the efforts made by participants and indeed the Bureau, a decision acceptable to everybody which would have made it possible to settle this problem with over the long term has, as previously, not been taken. Therefore, this problem is still topical, it's still there, and it requires from Member States decisive action to get us out of the existing situation. We would like to reiterate that the position of the Russian Federation on this question has not undergone any change. As before, we believe that Chapter 10 of the Rules of Procedure does not provide non governmental organisations or others with the automatic right to speak at official plenary meetings under this convention.

Furthermore.

Any activity of such organisations or bodies as observers, including the provision of working documents, is something that should be strictly limited to matters within their competence and be directed at making a constructive and positive contribution to the work of Member States. They should not be aimed at politicising it or undermining the work done by or efforts put in by Member States. The Russian Federation is interested in the work of NGOs in the Governmental Group of Experts. We believe that their technical and legal expertise can be helpful to the Group in discharging its mandate and helping us come to appropriate conclusions and recommendations. Taking this into account and the nature of the governmental group of experts, we should once again like to propose the following compromise achieved at the session of the group in 2024 and about which you, Chairman, already spoke. we are ready to confirm the rules of procedure only on the understanding that non governmental entities and this includes regional intergovernmental organisations and non governmental organisations mentioned in chapter ten of the rules of procedure can be present at the meetings can submit working documents and may speak strictly on matters related to their competence in a non politicised manner. No accusations should be made to Member States. This refers to working documents and to statements made in the plenary session. If this approach is not respected, then a decision on the confirmation of the rules of procedure, which is to be taken now, would lose its effect, lose its force, and this question would have to be considered once more by the group. This understanding does not set a precedent for the future activity of the Group of Experts or the Convention as a whole, and it is something that refers specifically to this Group. This will be exclusively targeted for this session. and will not set a precedent for future work to be done or meetings to be held under the Convention. We believe that seeking an optimal solution to the problem related to chapter 10 of the rules of procedure should be continued by Member States at this group of governmental experts and in the intersessional period. Thank you very much for your attention.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [24:22]:

I would like to thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation for his intervention and for sharing his views with regard to the conduct of the meeting and the interpretation of the rules of procedure. I take note of the remarks made by the distinguished delegate of the Russian Federation and let me assure him that I intend to chair this meeting with a clear eye on having a substantial technical debate with the aim of making concrete progress and exercising the powers conferred upon me under the rules of procedure while upholding the rights of delegations. It is so decided. Agenda item four. On the agenda item four, organization of the work of the Group of Governmental Experts, allow me now to briefly go over the main aspects of the organization of the work of the GGE for this week. I would like to remind delegations that the meeting is being broadcast live on UN Web TV, which allows viewers to follow the proceedings remotely in all six UN official languages. The link to the live broadcast has been made available on the 2025 GGE on Laws webpage of UNODA Meetings Place. The video recording will also be available on the website of UN Web TV shortly after the meeting ends. All relevant information on the session and relevant documents, including working papers and conference room papers, will also be shared on the GGE on Laws UNODA Meetings Place webpage. Please note that statements will be posted on the meeting webpage only if they have been submitted to the CCW ISU. Therefore, if your delegation wishes to have its intervention made available online, kindly submit it to ccw@un.org. I would also like to remind delegations of the possibility to send their statements to speeches at un.org prior to their delivery, as this will be important for the crucial work of the interpretation services. In addition, I kindly remind delegations to intervene at a reasonable speed in order to facilitate the work of the interpreters, especially once we are in an interactive debate and reacting to each other's statements And there will now be, not be available written text to circulate before to the interpreters. Additionally, a fully automated speech to text, fast service will be provided so that text of the procedures, proceedings can be found on Indigo following the conclusion of the meeting each day. This is a machine generated text and does not constitute an official record of the meeting, nor is it checked for accuracy by the Secretariat. With that, I wish to turn now to the organization of the substantive part of this meeting. For this group to fulfill its mandate in the timeframe provided, it's now absolutely imperative that we work ambitiously with the aim to further narrow down our differences, for which I count on your continued constructive engagement during the sessions and in the inter-sessional periods. Following our second 2024 formal session in August last year, the CCW ISU circulated the chairperson's summary of our discussions via e-mail on the 3rd of October 2024, which is also available as a working paper number 11. By submitting this summary, I wanted to capture my understanding of the work carried out during our second 2024 session. and to maintain an informal record of proceedings to help inform the work of the group this year. On the 14th of November, 2024, in the margins of the meeting of the high contracting parties to the CCW, I convened an in-person informal intercessional consultation for CCW high contracting parties. The session provided me with the opportunity to introduce the friends of the chair who are supporting me in the important task of advancing the work on the rolling text. I would like to take this opportunity to express my deep gratitude to the friends of the chair for their commitment and involvement in the process. Their work thus far has been invaluable and I will continue to count on their support. In the lead up to this formal, to this first formal session of the year, I also held a set of virtual intercessional informal consultations on the revised rolling text to optimally prepare us for the work ahead. The first session was held under my responsibility and focused on box one of the rolling text related to the characterization. The second was held on the responsibility of Claudio Leopoldino, Brazil, and Reto Wallimann, Switzerland, and focused on boxes three and four of the rolling text, while the third session was held on the responsibility of Claudia Henfrey, Australia, and Hope Rice, Philippines, and focused on boxes two and five of the rolling text. In addition, the Friends and I also invited observers to a virtual informal consultation to share their initial feedback on the main areas of convergence and divergence and to listen to their inputs on the rolling text. I believe the informal consultations serve to enhance our understanding of where we may be able to find common ground as well as what the main areas of convergence are. and which will require further discussions. I am sure that the week ahead of us, combined with the constructive approach shown by all delegations so far, will provide us with the opportunity to continue moving forward. Let me once more recall that it is this group's responsibility to deliver on its mandate. to use the time allocated wisely to ensure we indeed consider and formulate by consensus a set of elements of an instrument. And I believe that the discussions we had last year and during the intercessional period show that we are coming closer to finding agreement on the proposed elements contained in the rolling text. It is my intention to use the rolling text as a basis for our discussions during this session. with a view to using it as a foundation for our final report. As such, the text will continue to be amended and revised over the course of our work. This, of course, does not mean that I will not be listening to broader statements as required, or that anything that is not mentioned in the rolling text has been excluded from the deliberations. I will take a flexible approach depending on the flow of the discussions. So I kindly ask these delegations to, as much as possible, prepare to engage actively and interactively to avoid losing too much time from our formal session. I count on your cooperation and active engagement. Let me now turn to agenda five and once more remind you of our mandate. to further consider and formulate by consensus a set of elements of an instrument without prejudging its nature and other possible measures to address emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems, taking into account the example of existing protocols within the Convention, proposals presented by High Contracting Parties and other options related to the normative and operational framework on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems, building upon the recommendations and conclusions of the Group and bringing in expertise on legal, military and technological aspects. Turning to agenda item five, I would like to begin our substantive exchanges without further delay. As I see our work this year as an extension of the work done throughout 2024, and in order to optimally use the time, I intend to forego general statements and turn straight to the first box of the rolling text. Should your delegation nonetheless wish to provide general remarks, I kindly request that this be indicated. at the start of the intervention and ask that these be kept to a maximum of three minutes or five minutes if speaking on behalf of a group of states. I also kindly ask all delegations to focus their interventions on the matter at hand and refrain from making political statements that are unrelated to substance matter or outside of this group's mandate. With that, I will now turn to the first box of the rolling text. Has it been on the screen? Yes. The working characterization remains one of the more firmly debated parts of the rolling text. And from our informal consultations, I see the following main issues. The issue of lethality. This, of course, is a longstanding issue. While some in the room stressed the importance to retain this term, arguing that it is not only in the name of the group but clearly framed in its mandate, those advocating against the inclusion of lethal argue that the group's understanding has evolved over years and that lethality is not a term that is found in IHL or an intrinsic function of a weapon system. On this, I ask delegations to not only reiterate their position, but to also consider the position of other delegations and possible solutions, including whether a further clarification not being another footnote of this term to avoid unnecessarily broadening or narrowing down the scope of the system under discussion may offer a solution. The second issue is the cumulative nature of the listed tasks. Divergences remain on the question of whether the tasks identify, select and/or engage should be seen as cumulative or not. The formulation and/or was proposed to be a compromise. However, this continues to be a bone of contention. with some requesting for this to be fully cumulative to avoid broadening the scope, while others cautioning that such an approach would exclude vast parts of the types of systems where the future instrument should cover, in their view. Third issue, the human element. The human element and ways to reflect the interaction between the human and the weapon system continues to be at the core of the discussions and is a question that goes far beyond this box. In the case of the characterisation, it will be important for delegations to discuss in more detail, one, the need to better qualify the type of intervention, that is, a human user, an operator, or within a chain of command and control, as well as, two, The temporal framing of the autonomous process, that is, during the execution of these tasks, further human intervention or after activation, to quote some of the proposals. The current text contains compromise proposals, including to address the question during which time frame the autonomous process takes place. We will have to continue searching for middle ground solution to better specify when the human intervention takes place. And last but not least, the issue of integration of several components. I've had some concerns with regard to the word integrated, as some see a risk of implying all technical, technological components need to be integrated in one physical system in order to qualify as a loss under the characterization. When in practice, this might not always be the case, as several objects may be connected to constitute the laws, and the present text tries to capture that possibility. With this, I would now like to hear from you, and I encourage you not only to reiterate your positions, but also to try to engage with others and address or suggest possible compromise solutions. The floor is open. I recognize the distinguished representative of Ireland, and I'm very grateful for him for breaking the ice. You have the floor.


Ireland [38:50]:

Thank you. Thank you, Chair. And I first want to thank you for your efforts throughout the intersessional period, which have allowed us to hit the ground running this week. And I assure you of my delegation's full support. Since we're not holding a general debate, with your indulgence, I'll make a few remarks of a general nature before sharing comments on box one. Regarding the rolling text as a whole, in general, we believe it is moving in a good direction, both in terms of structure and content. I just want to make a few remarks on a few key principles that we believe we should keep in mind at this stage of our work. The first is that we're discussing elements of a possible instrument. We are not negotiating the instrument itself. Therefore, it's important that we maintain a broad understanding throughout the text and that we keep elements supported by high contracting parties on the table. We'll be during the negotiations themselves, or we can then pair them down if necessary in certain areas. But for now, it is essential we keep these options open to not unnecessarily hamstring our future efforts. Second, we welcome the reference to context appropriate human control and judgment throughout the text. This is a fundamental concept underpinning our work. and we would support including meaningful human control to again emphasize the centrality of the human element. Finally, we reiterate the urgency of the UGE's work and the importance for it to deliver results. We have seen developments in science and technology, in particular in artificial intelligence over the last year that have only rendered our work more pertinent and urgent. We remind high contracting parties of the aspiration to conclude our work by 2025 as included in the mandate, And we reiterate that human beings must retain control over the use of force and that decisions of life and death cannot be delegated to algorithms. We must take swift and decisive action to this end. Turning to box one on characterizations. Again, we see this as a key section heading in the right direction. As I mentioned, it's important to maintain a broad scope of characterization of autonomous weapon systems. Currently, the scope is unnecessarily limited in at least two ways. First is the lethal issue. We reiterate that if the term is going to stay in the text, that it requires a clarification clause. We would suggest to follow the suggestion put forward by the ICRC in this respect and to use that language as a basis for further discussion. We're not convinced by the argument that we must retain the term because it is in the mandate. The original law's mandate terminology was developed almost 10 years ago, and our thinking and collective understanding has evolved considerably since then. Dropping the lethal term or at least clarifying what is meant by it so that we do not exclude potential IHL implications regarding objects or other non-lethal situations, including causing injury, is a logical next step. The second issue is with regard to the cumulative characterization and the inclusion or not of and/or as you referenced earlier. We join delegations that have argued that it should be retained. If we follow the cumulative definition, we risk excluding a whole range of systems that should be under consideration. That is precisely why we have the exclusion paragraph, where we can identify systems at a later stage that we agree should not fall under the general characterization. Finally, we believe that the important concept of nominal human input is missing from this version. We would like to see stronger references to human control and judgment more broadly. As it reads now in section one, intervention by a human user is too vague and can be construed as meaning minimal or cursory human involvement, creating a loophole where a wide range of autonomous weapon systems could fall through the cracks. A potential solution for the nominal human input issue could be to insert meaningful before the word intervention, but we're open to other suggestions on how to resolve this potential loophole. I'll leave it there for now. Thank you very much, Chair.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [42:45]:

I would like to thank the distinguished delegate from Ireland, not only for commenting but also for proposing concrete solutions for issues he considers necessary to be addressed. Next on my list is Brazil. Let me pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Brazil. Sir, you have the floor.


Brazil [43:09]:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My delegation is grateful to you and to your team for preparing this revised rolling text. We believe that it captures the majority of the concerns that were expressed at last year's sessions and offers creative and elegant solutions to the few important remaining areas of disagreement. Brazil believes that the revised rolling text is a solid basis for our efforts and for any future negotiations on the subject. The sections are well structured and some of them are almost ready for adoption, while others would only need minor improvements and fine tuning. As a consequence, my delegation hopes that the text will remain largely as it stands and that any proposals to strike out language should be thoroughly justified and coupled with alternative formulations to reflect the concerns that they address. My delegation will now offer some contributions regarding box one, in which my delegation supports the characterization of autonomous weapons systems contained therein. We are particularly attached to the formulation proposed for the critical functions which avoid the cumulative relationship between target identification and selection through the use of the expression and/or between the two. From our informal consultations earlier this year, however, we understand that some delegations would prefer to remove the or' from this list of critical functions, which would reintroduce the problem of cumulativity. We have not heard any clear explanation for the reasons for this proposed change. which we fear might open the door for the -- to the exclusion of weapon systems that allow for a perfunctory human involvement in the target identification, thereby compromising human control at its core. Turning now to the issue of lethality, we reiterate that the inclusion of the word lethal and the characterization is not only unnecessary but risks unduly restricting the scope of the characterization and of any future negotiation processes that use it as a basis for the definition of autonomous weapon systems. This is even more concerning due to the fact that there is no definition of lethality in international humanitarian law and that there are clearly different understandings of the term among delegations. which all but ensures uneven implementation and conflicts in interpretation in the future. Therefore, Brazil believes that the term, if the term lethal is to be retained, it should be clearly defined, preferably in a separate paragraph, in order to avoid excessively complicating the characterization itself. In this regard, we support the definition of lethality proposed by the ICRC, which defines the word lethal as the ability to cause injury or death to one or more persons and cause damage, destruction or neutralization of one or more objects. I thank you, Mr. Chair.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [46:23]:

I would like to thank the distinguished representative of Brazil for sharing his views and comments. Next on my list is Sweden to be followed by Pakistan, but let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Sweden. You have the floor.


Sweden [46:40]:

Thank you very much, Chair.

And I, like all colleagues, in thanking you and your team for all the hard efforts. and as well to the friends of the chair who have taken the time and graciously helping you out in your tasks. We also found the intersessional period very constructive. The informal discussions have been very good, leading us in a good way forward. To begin with, we wish to express support for the rolling text as it stands. We believe that It reflects discussions in the group, captures emerging consensus and brings us closer to achieving our mandate. As regards to square one or box one, Sweden considers that these paras are fit for purpose for this stage in our work. This characterization demonstrates, together with the text as a whole, that our discussions have matured and can progress and that the CCW remains the appropriate forum for this topic. And I think it's important that we all focus on the text in front of us that you have presented. And I would plead to delegations to focus on the text as well and to present suggestions that brings us closer to a consensus rather than presenting text which we know will divide us. That's our starting point going into these discussions. Thank you very much, Chair.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [48:13]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative from Sweden for sharing his views and comments. Next on my list is Pakistan, to be followed by Turkey, Chile, Cuba, Holy See and USA. But let me now first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Pakistan. You have the floor.


Pakistan [48:36]:

Thank you very much, Ambassador. Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor and for the very valuable work that you and your team are doing. Our appreciation to the CCW team and as well to the friends of the Chair for their very positive work. We tend to agree with your approach of having very text-based discussions, and we will follow that spirit indeed. and indeed in my intervention. So before going to for the block one, just very briefly two parameters that I wish to share. Just to remind ourselves that the task before us is that we are not yet negotiating a legal instrument. We are engaged in a crucial process of developing set of elements, a foundation that our future negotiators could build upon and I think this distinction matters because it should guide our approach. And accordingly, our priority must be to capture the full range of essential elements, and that will inform and shape the future legal framework. Nothing should be lost, nothing should be prematurely discarded, and indeed we must take a broad, inclusive and a forward thinking approach and basically developing a comprehensive menu of elements from which the future instrument could evolve. Now on box one, the question how we categorize law is undoubtedly important and one recalls that a substantive amount of time was spread on it in the last GGE. We must ensure that in the last session of the GGE and we must ensure that our definition serves the broader purpose of the work rather than restricting it. We have, as I said, spent a considerable amount of time discussing definition, but the challenge lies not in formulating a language of definition as such, rather than it lies in addressing the risks that they pose, the limits that must be placed on the use of these weapons and the principles that must govern their development. A definition that is too narrow and one that captures only the theoretical systems that may never be developed will not serve us. If we define laws in such a way that only system with full autonomy in all function and all stages of operation qualify, then we risk regulating something that may never exist. Uh, while leaving actual system with autonomous targeting and engagement capabilities outside the scope of our work, and I tend to agree with, with my Brazilian colleague on the subject of lethality. this discussion would only drag us to an indefinite debates and back and forth exchange. And he referred to the international humanitarian law. I recall in a certain instance few years back where the subject of lethality came up within human rights laws as well. And indeed under the ICCPR where the discussion was that how certain weapons though seemingly very innocuous can be very lethal. For example, a small pellet gun which if it hits the body would cause a minor abrasion, but if it hits the eyes, if the pellet hits the eyes, then it risks blinding the victim. So in a way, the lethality is a functional norm and a very small innocuous piece of weapon system can be very lethal if it if it hits the very sensitive part of the body like the eyes, and in that instance we debated that how this even a very small pellet gun could be very lethal. So I think the lethality definition would only drag us further and I agree that the ICRC's definition should be a very good formulation for us to work through. But basically, we need to work on an approach that is broad, practical, and technology proof. As Pakistan has consistently maintained, we need to have a capability-based and a functional approach, one that focuses on autonomy in critical functions such as target selection and engagement, ensures that our work remains, and basically, we need to ensure that our works remain relevant and adaptable to future developments. The text that you have so painstakingly worked out, Ambassador, reflects a balanced compromise which we need to build further on in the spirit of flexible positive engagement, and this is what our delegation's approach would be throughout. Thank you.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [53:48]:

Let me thank the distinguished delegate from Pakistan and also for reminding us of autonomy as a spectrum of discussion we had earlier. Looking at my list, the next on my list is Turkey to be followed by Chile and Cuba, but let me first pass the floor to Turkey. You have the floor.


Türkiye [54:09]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

At the outset, we would like to express

our sincere appreciation for your dedication and leadership in chairing the DG on those for a second consecutive year. We acknowledge and commend your efforts in updating the rolling text to facilitate consensus building.

Please be assured of my country's full commitment to engaging constructively in the forthcoming deliberations.

We reaffirmed that the CCW remains the most appropriate and legitimate forum for addressing the challenges posed by emerging technologies on laws, given its extensive technical, military and diplomatic expertise. Its legitimacy was also confirmed in the Pact for the Future and relevant UN First Committee resolutions. In this regard, we emphasize the importance of avoiding the establishment of parallel and potentially competing processes,

which could fragment ongoing efforts.

Instead, all initiatives should be complementary and aligned with the CCW framework. We find the characterization of the lethal autonomous weapons systems in the rolling text to be acceptable. We prefer to follow cumulative approach. However, we underscore the necessity of

reaching broad agreement on the characterization and definition of laws before preemptively forwarding the use of some weapons capabilities.

Development of a legally binding document in the absence of a clearly agreed definition will not serve its intended purpose and might be abused.

Thank you very much.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [55:45]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative from Turkey for his intervention. Next on my list is Chile, to be followed by Cuba and the Holy See. But first, Chile, you have the floor, sir.


Chile [56:00]:

Thank you, Chairman. To begin with, my delegation would like to thank you for your efforts and thank your team as well. We wish you full success in concluding your work in this session. We fully endorse what has been stated by Ireland concerning the issue of significant human control. We believe that this is extremely important and that this clarification needs to be made because the way in which this is drafted at the moment in the text proposed does leave room for legal interpretations being made that might be inappropriate. Furthermore, as far as the concept of lethality goes, we think we need further clarification on this, and we agree with what Brazil has suggested and I think what was endorsed by Pakistan. We think the lethality definition of the ICRC is what we should be using, because we think that would help us to move our own discussions forward. Thank you.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [57:09]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Chile for her intervention. Next on my list is Cuba, to be followed by the Holy See and the United States. But first, Cuba. You have the floor.


Cuba [57:25]:

Thank you, Chairman. We are grateful to you and to the friends of the Chairman for submitting this, and we're very grateful also for all the efforts you've made over the years with the GGE. We welcome the renewed mandate of the group on laws, we believe that we should be able to make progress. be focusing the work we do on trying to get to a rolling text which is balanced for our country however we must look at a legally binding instrument prohibiting laws and regulating semi-autonomous weapons needs to be taken in mind we've been participating in discussions on the various elements which might affect the instrument over the years, but there have been other instruments in disarmament which do not have a consensus on conceptualisation, for example. There have been difficulties with the Convention on Conventional Weapons. We feel that in this group of experts, We think that when we are dealing with characterisation and definition in box 1, we should consider totally autonomous weapons and the semi autonomous ones. The latter, for us, are those which are supervised or intervened in by a human user in, for example, targeting or identifying a target. We know that military drones are already being used and we think they should be looked at as semi autonomous weapons. They need and weapons like them need to be effectively regulated. Human involvement in decisions on the use of force and in target selection problems and other issues do raise issues. We think that human intervention and monitoring should be at the heart of characterisation of these systems. It is important in determining whether they should or can be used in the first place and in regulating their use at the second stage. Thank you.


Holy See [1:00:14]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. At the outset, allow me to thank you for all the preparatory work that you have done in advance of this first session of the 2025 Group of Governmental Experts, together with the Friends of Chair, Australia, Brazil, the Philippines, and Switzerland. Mr. Chair, autonomous weapon systems, which are capable of identifying and attacking targets without direct human intervention, are a cause for grave ethical concern. because they lack the unique human capacity for moral judgment and ethical decision making. Without adequate, meaningful and consistent human control, the weaponization of AI could also become highly problematic and pose an existential risk. For these reasons, the Holy See has called for reconsideration of the development of these weapons and a ban on their use because no machine should ever choose to take the life of a human being. Mr. Chair, with regard to the revised rolling text that you have provided, My delegation supports your approach of identifying those systems that are wholly or partially incompatible with IHL and other existing international obligations. This could indeed contribute to an appropriate characterization of the systems under consideration and help to establish prohibitions and restrictions accordingly. While we seek to accomplish such tasks, it is of paramount importance to take into account broader ethical considerations. Thus, for my delegation, not allowing the weapon systems to decide autonomously whether to hit human beings is indeed one of the fundamental overarching ethical issues that sits right at the heart of this GGE. Mr. Chair, the targeting of human beings cannot be entrusted to statistical approximations performed by algorithms. In order to protect the dignity and sacredness of human life, It is necessary to ensure and safeguard a space for proper human control over the choices made by artificial intelligence programs. Human dignity itself depends on it. It should be recalled that these machines would only operate in a simulation of reality and of human behavior without truly capturing all its aspects. In fact, reality is multidimensional and only human agency and acumen can take into account its incalculable dimensions and fully grasp its real implications. Similarly, only the human heart can reveal the meaning of our existence. In order to address the above-mentioned ethical concerns and to avoid legal ambiguity regarding accountability, my delegation would like to see a clear and specific prohibition in the rolling text on the use of autonomous weapon systems that target human beings or whose use can be expected to cause accidental human casualties. Mr. Chair, the Holy See appreciates the references in the rolling text to the principles of humanity, appropriate control, and human judgment. Over the next few days, my delegation stands ready to engage in constructive discussions guided by a sense of urgency. The rolling text contains a skeleton structure and a number of elements that could form a basis for negotiation on a legally binding instrument. These negotiations could refine the prohibitions and regulations that you have outlined, Inter alia, by adding some ethical concerns that should be universally shared and are fundamental to humanity, such as the prohibition of anti—personal autonomous weapons. Thank you, Mr. Chair.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [1:03:49]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of the Holy See for his intervention. Next on my list is the United States to be followed by Mexico, Switzerland, Denmark, Finland and Argentina. But first, the US. You have the floor, sir.


United States of America [1:04:05]:

Thank you, Chair, and good morning, colleagues. Mr. Chairman, we'd like to begin by thanking you and the friends of the chair for all of the progress that you've made over the last several months on this new text, which we think creates a very good basis for our work moving forward. We're talking now about the first box. I think it's important to understand that I think where we are at this point in the document is we're trying to create the anchor for the rest of the document. We're trying to accomplish a number of different things with this characteristic section, including trying to orient the scope of the instrument. So before we get into this particular box, we did want to suggest that because some delegations have expressed concerns about the scope of the set of elements, including that the instrument might be viewed as regulating domestic law enforcement activities. And we've heard proposals to define laws in terms of military weapons. That one way to get at this might be to consider a box zero that could appear before box number one that would that would orient this around the purposes of the CCW. And so just as food for thought, a scoping box could include a sentence that would read this set of elements has been developed and has tended to apply within the framework of the CCW. That's just a thought on how to create an anchor within the convention that would then be viewed as animating the rest of the text. Mr. Chairman, I know you've heard us say this before, but for the benefit of the room, we would recommend that we go beyond Roman numerals. I know this is ambitious, but if we could include in addition to Roman numerals some sort of title for each of these sections, I think it would begin to look more like an instrument. And so here, This may be bold, but including after Roman numeral one, the word characterization as a way to make clear that this is what that particular section addresses. And a few general thoughts on the importance of characterization. I think you've heard us say, we said it last year, that it is critically important that our group make progress on characterization. An instrument will not be useful without a common understanding of the types of systems it applies to. An effective instrument will depend on an understanding about what is different about laws from other types of weapon systems that may warrant clarification under IHL or additional measures to strengthen the implementation of IHL. From our perspective, we see laws as different from other systems because once activated, they can identify, select, and engage targets. with lethal force without further intervention by an operator. These are systems that currently exist. They're not illegal, but they warrant different measures to implement IHL in their use. And we see this as our fundamental task. So with that said, we did want to offer some reactions to the language that you've presented in your latest text. I think with respect to the second sentence we understand and don't have any particular comments on that sentence, but we do have a variety of suggestions to make on the first sentence. I'll read these suggested edits and then I was going to spend a few minutes just explaining the rationale behind them. So we would propose after the reference to technological components, to include in a parenthetical some short example of the types of components that we're talking about. I think from our perspective, adding something that reads, e.g., sensors, software could be that fix. We also, and this I think picks up on suggestion about really trying to focus and understand better the capability based and functional approach that we're trying to accomplish here. I think our colleague from Pakistan mentioned that adding that is designed or used and striking enable the system to identify, we would suggest deleting and or and then add after target with lethal force. And then after the comma, without intervention, we would propose striking a human user and replacing it with an operator. Those are the edits, but if with your indulgence, I can spend a few minutes just explaining this in a little bit more detail. With respect to that is designed to, I think for us this is a suggestion that is inspired by the way existing CCW protocols have approached the problem of solving scope. I think if, and I won't read all of them to you, but if you look at the definitions in protocols two, three, and four, what you'll see is that the word designed is typically included in definitions of weapons that are subject that are the subject of the instrument. And so here we think adding design to would make the definition more clear and better able to administer and more consistent. And I think it does further the thought that our colleague from Pakistan suggested that makes it clear that this is a capability based and a functional approach. I think "or used" also brings with it the reality that there may be certain systems that even if they aren't designed, that they could be used in this way. And so in that way, it does broaden the scope to get at what, if I'm understanding it, was viewed as the more functional aspect of that problem. The deletion of "and/or" before "identify" The GG has already found consensus in this more cumulative formulation. I think for us here, the and/or seems to indicate that identification and selection are not essential characteristics, that they're interchangeable. We don't see the characteristics as being interchangeable. We believe that they're both essential characteristics, and so we think it's important for both of them to be retained. On replacing the phrase human user with operator, first, no IHL instrument refers to human user rather than user. In every IHL instrument, it's understood that persons being referred to are human beings. And we think that by adding the word human, we imply that there is a category of non-human users of laws, which we fundamentally reject. We also don't want to imply that such a category exists in other IHL instruments. Second, we believe that operator is the better term here because we're trying to refer to a specific aspect of the operation of the system. In a combat operation, there might be different persons who could be characterized as using a system. For example, a system might be deployed across an area of land that constitutes a military objective, like a strategic mountain pass. The system would have an operator who deployed and activated the system, but other persons might be characterized as using the system in the sense of relying on the systems during combat operations. These users of the system are not the ones who intervene in its operation, but their lack of intervention does not render the system autonomous. On lethality, we recognize that there are differences among delegations on whether lethality should be a characteristic. And the GGE needs to work from the guidance given to the CCW high contracting parties, which includes this element. Therefore, unless there is consensus at the GGE to recommend that the high contracting parties omit the term lethal, we believe that the GGE has no authority to exclude this element. Now, we noted the suggestion made by our Brazilian colleague about including something that might be clarifying on this point. and there have been references to the ICR definition of lethality. I think we would suggest that one way to get at this would be to include after paragraph 101 bis that could read lethal force is force that is capable of resulting in death. The fact that laws can be used in circumstances that do not result in death, such as to destroy objects or to cause injury, does not exclude it from its characterization. And that we think would be a way to get at the concern that we think animates the focus on lethality. This would acknowledge that these types of weapon systems can also be used in non-lethal operations and that they wouldn't be excluded for that reason. Chair, I think we'll stop at this point. We have a number of other thoughts that we may come back to, but we are eager to hear from others at this point. Thank you.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [1:14:12]:

I, I would like to thank the distinguished delegate from the US, um, not only for coming up with proposals, but indeed also elaborating, uh, why this could be… done in a different way, because this also provides opportunities to other delegations to react to those proposals, knowing where they come from and what he intends to achieve with it. So many thanks for that, and the floor remains open for you also to come back later on if you feel a need to react to the reactions again from the floor. Next on my list is Mexico, to be followed by Switzerland and Denmark, but first let me pass floor to Mexico. So you have the floor.


Mexico [1:14:59]:

Yes, thank you very much, Chairman, and good day to everybody. To begin with, I'd like to congratulate you on your position, and I'd also like to pay tribute to the way in which you've been organising our work. You've clearly aimed at achieving specific results, and that's something we appreciate. We think this is particularly important at a time when the world is seeing technological development advance at an exponential speed, and we can already see this kind of weapon being used in the field in conflicts which are underway today. Furthermore, they will have a major effect on how war develops in the future. We are grateful for the presentation of the rolling text, which is going to be used to guide our discussions. throughout this week, as we understand it. We regret that other activities have made it impossible for my delegation to participate in all the informal consultations, but we nonetheless consider this rolling text as a good foundation on which to build and very helpful after many years of discussion, we are finally getting into details, elements which might help us to develop a normative framework. As to the specific issue of characterization, we have the following comments we should like to make. Autonomy is a functionality that operates on several aspects at various levels and can occur in various types of weapons with varying potential. We therefore appreciate that characterization in the rolling text is being used in a, shall I say, technologically agnostic way and its function focusing on the autonomous functionality and including the issue of no intervention of the human user in execution of the tasks the weapon is entrusted with. We would like to clarify, however, that without a definition on technical characteristics and this is something which has been used in the past that does not prevent us from regulating weapons based on their effects. It seems to us positive that the approach has recognised that a lethal autonomous weapon system can have various components and integrate a combination of one or more weapons. That obviously means that there are complications when it comes to the way the weapons work and what they are used for, and of course it means there is a diversity of components as well. My delegation would also like to make it clear that the term engage in English is something that we understand as being a wide-ranging action with the inclusion, of course, of force. We heard the delegation of the United States, for example, using engage with lethal force. If you want a distinction, then perhaps you would use select, engage or use of force so that there's absolutely no doubt about what you're referring to. Other specific comments on the text, we recognise that the issue of intervention by human user is a generic term. probably will be necessary, we would imagine, to have much more precise language in a regulatory framework. From Mexico's point of view, we think significant human control is an implicit condition for the implementation of the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law and of essential provisions of international human rights law too. Nonetheless, We take into account the differences which exist between delegations on that particular point, as we stipulated earlier. Before we get into conceptual discussions, we think the most constructive way of giving substance to the human element would be through the development of prohibitions and regulations, which would give meaning to the point about human intervention. so that weapon systems do not explicitly operate independently from the involvement of human decision making in respect of critical functionalities. Another point that my delegation would like to raise is that of lethality, as several other delegations have already done on this particular term. We do not consider that an appropriate characteristic to describe an autonomous weapons system, and we do not find a justification under international law for that. The reasons which have been given and which we've heard, well my delegation is in agreement with exploring the definition used by the International Committee of the Red Cross. We have also listened with interest to the proposal for an Article 1bis, which I think was recently made just now by the delegation of the United States. We would have to look at that and analyse it in detail, obviously, but it seems to us to be a reasonable suggestion. It seems to make sense, given the wide range of possible effects of the use of such a weapon, they would not be limited to lethality. They would not be justified legally either, but in practice it would be virtually impossible not to take them into account. Lastly, my delegation would like to refer briefly to the second paragraph in this box. From the point of view of my delegation, a clause like this would make sense if the characterisation were centred on technological description. However, with the characterisation which we have here, which is technologically agnostic, as I said, its main focus is the lack of intervention by a human user in the execution of the tasks. it does make the point that there could be potential modification of the characterisation and the possible exclusion of certain types of systems. So this second paragraph is really looking more at procedural aspects of future negotiation. The characteristics we're looking at here now could be modified, and that's what makes me think it looks like elements to possibly be included in a future characterization rather than an exception to the characterization given here and now in paragraph one. That refers to the possibility of there being weapon systems which do not involve intervention by human user. That at least is how we read the meaning and the status of paragraph two in box one. That concludes Mexico's comments for the moment. Thank you.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [1:22:34]:

I would like to thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for his intervention and suggestions. Next on my list is Switzerland to be followed by Denmark and Finland, but let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Switzerland. You have the floor.


Switzerland [1:22:49]:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and I would like to begin by expressing our sincere appreciation for your leadership and the dedication of your team. We approach this session and the remainder of the GGE's mandate with a sense of urgency, as you pointed out, Mr. Chair, yourself this morning. Let me reiterate that we appreciate that the rolling text already contains key elements that should form the GGE's outcome and also outlines the very elements, the building blocks for a future instrument. The text notably contains pragmatic and implementable measures that can help preserve human control needed and in order to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law and to address the ethical, legal and operational challenges posed by those systems. While progress on the rolling text has been positive, at the same time we acknowledge that there are still some differences in the views among states on very critical aspects. If we see the need to further work on the text and its elements, we think the structure and the logic and the granularity of the text should be preserved. More specifically now on box one, this is in very good shape, describing really what makes autonomous weapon systems special. Our goal this week should be to overcome remaining differences in that part, keeping in mind the relationship between the characterization and the other boxes further down. This is a key point I will touch a number of times in my intervention here. I think we would, at this stage, just focus on the overall scope of the text and notably the cumulative approach and the lethality issue, if you allow, and come back to other points perhaps later. On the cumulative approach, of course, inherently, box one is the basis of all our work. It is the anchor, as the US delegation put it. It's the starting point for everything that basically comes out of this three-year mandate. And accordingly, like many other delegations, we would be very skeptical if everything that comes out of our work would be restricted to a narrow scope. Notably, if we had a scope that is based on a cumulative definition and the limitation to lethal systems, this is a point we feel very strongly about. We would really be concerned if the GGE would foot its work on a characterization that would cover only certain systems, for instance, only systems that identify and select and engage targets. Because if we do so, we think we remove a lot of very relevant systems from the outside. And this would probably, it's probably not even the intention behind such proposals to kind of chop off on all sides the very work that we're doing in this room. We believe it's perhaps rather aimed at what we're going to regulate. And this is why, and that's our proposal for the way forward, that we deal with that type of fine tuning in the latter parts of the text. Not everything has to be sorted in the first box. The first box we see as the overall scope of what we are dealing with. A cumulative approach would be, in our view, all the more problematic if, at the same time, we then would push for only lethal systems, potentially even only anti-personnel systems. Then we would then really cut off a great number of important legal and humanitarian questions from our work, because, as others have said, many rules and prohibitions of IHL apply to the uses of means and methods of warfare against both persons and objects, and that's also the case within the CCW. And in its protocols, so we think we have to be really careful. If there are good reasons to distinguish between different uses of autonomous weapon systems, for instance, between anti-personnel, anti-material, we think this should be dealt with, this should be reflected in the letter boxes, in the operative parts of the instrument and not in the definition. Because if we did so, we would be concerned that we deviated our work from addressing IHL in its entirety. That's a key point for our delegation. Like others, maybe a possible solution on the lethality issue is to add another paragraph. In the past, we had a footnote, but I think it would be good to have a one base or a new paragraph three. where we explained that, uh, if the, if the term lethal needs to be retained, I mean, that's, that's, that's something that is up to discussion, at least in the view of our delegations, not necessarily needed, but we hear other delegations insist on it and maybe one way forward would really be to… to go in the direction of what the ICC has proposed in Brazil and others have supported to really look at how the term lethal is understood to cause injury to or death of one or more persons and damage to or destruction or neutralization of one or more aspects. So we really hope we can resolve these two critical parts in box one. Of course, knowing that we will maybe have to go back and forth. Compartmentalization is a good way forward, but we might have to come back as we work on other boxes and look at box one again. So we think really a comprehensive characterization is key, and then look at the rest when we deal with prohibitions, limitations, restrictions, et cetera, and be more specific in those parts of the text. And I think I'll leave it at that and come back to other points later on. Thank you.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [1:29:21]:

Uh, thank you. And of course, you are, uh, you can always come back later with further remarks, um, much appreciated. Next on my list is, um, Denmark to be followed by Finland and Argentina. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Denmark. So you have the floor.


Denmark [1:29:38]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you. and your team for your effort in providing the rolling text, which we believe presents a good platform for the continuous work of this group. With regard to box one, we agree that elements of the text can be further clarified, but we also believe the text constitutes a productive compromise and.

Base for the work ahead.

At this point in time, Denmark would therefore like to express overall support for the text in box one, especially the inclusion of the second paragraph. Thank you, Mr. Chair.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [1:30:17]:

Thank you for sharing your views. Next on my list is Finland, to be followed by Argentina, Canada, and the UK. But first, let me pass it forward to the distinguished representative of Finland. You have the floor.


Finland [1:30:34]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. First, I'd like to also thank the Chair and your team for the rolling text, which we find that's a functional base going forward with our discussions. It includes many functional elements and overall we can remain flexible with most of the formulations within the rolling text. We could live with the characterisation box one as it is. And in particular, we are very pleased that the list of exclusions was removed from the rolling text, since we don't see how that could possibly stand the test of time. And also formulating the specific list of exclusions could hamper the overall process to find consensus. But when it comes to lethality, we still don't consider it to be qualification that needs to be included in the characterization. There is no clear reason to exclude less than lethal weapons from the discussion, as many delegations have pointed out today. Lethality is not a defining feature of any weapon system, autonomous or otherwise. An instrument that is intended to cause less than lethal injuries to persons or harm to objects is nonetheless a weapon. And IEHL on the other hand supports including also less than lethal weapons in the discussion. In addition, we would also prefer the formulation of identify, select and engage as a more unambiguous wording instead of the current and or. We also positively look to the US suggestion to add this, which is designed to enable formulation before the list of these tasks. And lastly, we would suggest to formulate the without intervention part to be without further intervention by a human user. Thank you.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [1:32:52]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Finland for her intervention. Next on my list is Argentina, to be followed by Canada, UK and El Salvador, but let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Argentina. You have the floor.


Argentina [1:33:11]:

Thank you very much, Chairman. To begin with, I thank you for all your efforts and extend my thanks to the facilitators in preparing this proposal, which we think is a sincere effort to bring divergent positions closer together. We hope it brings us closer to a consensus, and that before the next review conference on Section 1, we consider that the distinction between lethal and non-lethal systems should be maintained and therefore we would prefer the word lethal to be kept in accordance with the group's mandate. We think we should be basing ourselves on the capacity to produce certain effects. An autonomous system may not cause them on its own or without being with another system. As we understand it, What we're trying to do here is to limit the harm caused by systems or weapons without any intervention by a human user, and that's the differentiation. Here, we think that the Brazilian proposal to maintain the term while adding a definition similar to that of the International Red Cross or something similar to what was suggested by the USA are valuable steps towards helping us to reach a compromise and consensus agreement. We support the second paragraph, but we do think the reference to technological neutrality would be a good idea to retain. Thank you very much.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [1:34:42]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Argentina for his intervention. Next on my list is Canada, to be followed by the UK, El Salvador and China, but first Canada. You have the floor.


Canada [1:34:53]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. At the onset, we wish to congratulate you and your team for the structure of our work, and you can, of course, count on my delegation's full support. We would also like to thank you for the three consultation sessions that you organized earlier this year, which my delegation found to be very useful. We agree with other delegations on the reminder that the rolling text that we are looking at represents elements of an instrument and not an instrument itself. Turning to box number one, characterization, my delegation believes we have a good foundation in place and would like to offer a few comments on the three aspects which you have pointed out. On lethality, my delegation believes that further defining lethality would be useful and that the ICRC definition could be a good workable solution for everyone. On the issue of and versus or, we support using the cumulative approach by retaining the term and, otherwise we do risk including too broad of a scope. And finally, on the human element, we support the term appropriate involvement of a human operator. Alternatively, we would also be okay with intervention of a human operator, and we interpret the term as not seeding the concepts of accountability and responsibility of the human. I thank you.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [1:36:24]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Canada for his intervention and suggestions. Next on my list is the UK, to be followed by El Salvador, China and Austria. But first, the UK. You have the floor.


United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [1:36:38]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

And I'd just like to add the UK's voice to all of the thanks to you for the introduction of the rolling text process and the friends of the chair process.

Which will seek to facilitate our discussions and move them forward positively.

Moving to box one, I think this characterisation, I think the UK can accept the characterisation as it's currently written, but I'd like to address a couple of the issues that have been raised this morning. We recognise that there are difficulties on the term lethal or lethality in this context and so therefore if it assisted with our discussions we would be content with some sort of reference or qualification of either the term lethal or the term lethal force, whether it be in a footnote or an additional paragraph. Also in response to some of the comments about whether to use the term user or operator, I think unless it was demonstrated that there was an agreed legal definition of either phrase, the UK would be content with either user or operator in this context.

Thank you.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [1:37:53]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of the UK for sharing his views and also his flexibility. Next on my list is El Salvador, to be followed by China, Austria and France, but first let me pass the floor to El Salvador. You have the floor.


El Salvador [1:38:11]:

Thank you very much, Chairman. To start with, Please accept the appreciation of my delegation for your leadership and for the work which has been achieved by you and your team and the group of Friends of the Chair on preparing this new proposed text. My delegation believes that it is an excellent basis for further discussion and I think we are moving in the right direction. Therefore, I wish you further success. My country, which is part of a group of 16 countries which have been emphasising the importance of making headway on the adoption of a legally binding instrument and having provided a draft of Protocol 6 at previous sessions of the group, I would like to say that we consider that your proposed text brings together many elements which are related very closely to the proposal we made. Having said that, I would echo what has been said by other delegations, that being that we should stick within our mandate and agree by consensus on instruments without defining their nature. I say this because it is important for us to have a legally binding instrument, but at the moment we think we should be focusing only on the elements, which is what we're meant to be doing. On box one specifically, I'll keep it brief because my statement going to repeat to a certain extent what has been said by other delegations. We consider that the term lethal limits the scope of autonomous weapons systems, and this is something we have put on record at previous sessions of the group. As far as we are concerned, our preference would be for this to be removed, but we know this causes complications for some other delegations. Because of that, and taking a flexible attitude to the matter in order to help us reach consensus, we believe that that what has been said by delegations such as Ireland, Brazil, Chile and others could be a valid solution for dealing with our concern. We support the possibility of including a paragraph on lethality, therefore, which would take into account the words used by the ICRC. Lastly, we share Ireland's concern about the words 'intervention by a human user'. We would propose the addition of the words 'appropriate' or 'meaningful', because as it's drafted at the moment, this text leaves a lot of doubt and uncertainty, and we would rather have much more precision and much more clarity as to what we understand by intervention by a human user. In conclusion, Chairman, we would like to reiterate the support of the El Salvador delegation to you, which will remain unflinching throughout your time in that seat. Thank you.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [1:41:13]:

I would like to thank the distinguished representative of El Salvador for his comments, suggestions, and kind words to the Chair. Next on my list is China, to be followed by Austria, France, and Australia, but first China. Madam, you have the floor.


China [1:41:31]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, the Chinese delegation thank you for promoting the process of the GGE. We thank the Secretariat and the Friends of the Chair for your work. China would like to join you and other parties to promote the process of the group and reach consensus. Concerning definition and characterization of the work, China always believes that we understand the need to reach consensus on definition and create favorable conditions for formulating a legally binding international instrument. In the short run, when it is difficult to reach consensus, then parties can, through consensus on the characteristics of laws, define the scope for follow-up work. However, this should not prejudge the work of the future legal instrument when it concerns the definition and description of the characteristics of the system. China is of the view that the rolling text, the part concerning characteristics, can provide a good condition for our work in the future. Now, a few specific points. Concerning the scope of discussion, the mandate of the group is to discuss laws within the framework of CCW. It should further define the scope of discussion within the framework of CCW. Lethality is a core component of laws. So discussion of laws cannot be isolated from lethality. Confusing laws and autonomous weapon system and non-lethal weapon systems, This can only complicate the issue and expand the issue. China is of the view that in the text, the term "liability" should be written, should be reflected. Now the second point concerning autonomy. Autonomous function shows in many links of the chain of the weapon system. The crucial chain, the crucial link is the autonomous function in the killing stage. This might lead to such a result that is in the operation, in the process of the operation. in terms of judgment, decision making, action to be taken, and other key stages, the intention and the results are not in line or even contrary to the intention of human beings. Therefore, China support focusing on the element of autonomy in the killing chain. We are of the view that the autonomous nature of weapons must have the following characteristics. One, at the same time it can identify, execute, identification, decision making, and execution, it should have this closed loop capability, including all the three key stages. Second, There's no need for sustained human intervention in the course of the three key stages. And third, through learning, it can improve its own capability and decision-making capability, and in line with the dynamics of the battlefield, make a dynamic adjustment. It should be emphasized that autonomy mainly manifests in the weapon system without human intervention. Based on the background, the landscape, it makes autonomously decisions. Therefore, when defining laws, we cannot ignore environment, the key factor. Now the third point, we still suggest that we should identify which weapon systems do not fall into the category of laws, we did propose the inclusion of exclusion phrases. That is to say, the weapon systems where there was no contention or which was regulated through other international instruments can be excluded from the scope of laws. For example, it can include remote control, program automatic control, and other weapon systems, and also semi-autonomous weapon systems. or weapon systems that are engaged in non-destructive operations. It should be emphasized that to identify that some weapon systems do not fall into the category of laws, this does not mean that these weapon systems are not regulated. Relevant treaties and international humanitarian law still apply to them. China is ready to Uh, discuss with all parties concerning how to appropriately define the characteristics of loss. Thank you.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [1:48:13]:

I would like to thank the distinguished representative of China for her intervention and comments. Let me now look at the list. Next on the list is Austria, to be followed by France, Australia and the Dominican Republic. But let me first pass the floor to Austria. So we have the floor.


Austria [1:48:30]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Before entering the discussion on the rolling text, we would like to use this opportunity to also share some short general remarks. First and above all, we want to thank you and your team for the continued work on the rolling texts. We consider the new version an improvement and an important step in the right direction. It contains many of the key elements and has the potential to formulate a strong set of elements in line with our mandates. In this regard, we also want to thank the Friends of the Chair for facilitating the intersessional discussions. We particularly appreciate those efforts in the text that try to include examples and formulations from other protocols or from the preamble or part of the CCW, as well as approaches to find common ground and compromises. At the same time, there are, of course, some shortcomings, and we hope we can rectify them in the course of this week's discussion and with the support of other High Contracting Parties. We will expand on this during the discussions, but want to share some key issues already at this point. From our side, we need to stress that regulation of autonomous weapon systems also needs to include the element of human dignity and the ethical considerations that require limitations with regard to the use of autonomy and the use of force. As pointed out before, these issues have been part of our work for many years. We see no reason to waste previous efforts or to abandon this crucial element. This equally applies to aspects related to human rights and several other legal aspects outside of IHL, as well as technology-related impacts. We also see the need To expand several formulations into the development phase and into the overall life cycle. This is required due to the nature and production cycle of these technologies and in order to fully uphold IHL. With regard to a working characterization of laws, it is imperative that such a characterization is formulated in a broad and encompassing way. Excluding weapon systems at this stage through unnecessary thresholds is the wrong approach. It should not be forgotten that a range of weapon systems, while being considered autonomous weapon systems under this characterisation, might fulfil the requirements set out in later parts of the text, for example when it comes to human control. On working methods, we need to stress that we would prefer an inclusive intersessional process that also involves civil society, international organisations and observers, as it has been the practice for many years. Mr. Chair, it is also important to recall developments that have taken place since our meeting in August. Last fall, the General Assembly adopted its second resolution on lethal autonomous weapon systems, which was supported by 166 states. The resolution called up on the GGE laws to fulfill its mandate, preferably by 2025, and high contracting parties to spare no efforts in this regard. It further invited them to take into account the report of the Secretary General, which was published as a result of the 2023 resolution in their work within the CCW. We encourage everyone here today to live up to these two calls. We also want to point to the informal consultations this resolution has set up and which will take place in May. These two days are a great opportunity to link our work with the mandate of the General Assembly and to discuss issues that GELOS cannot or currently does not discuss. Mr. Chair, finally, we want to share some broader considerations concerning our work. We should be all aware that with the introduction of autonomy into weapon systems and the use of force, we will pass a major threshold. Currently, only a few states decide in which way this technology is used and how international humanitarian law will be interpreted in the process of developing and deploying them. Since the effects of these developments will concern and affect all states and existing international law, that we must adapt to such new challenges and developments, international regulation through a legally binding instrument is the appropriate way forward in our view. The CCW is a framework designed to be expanded and enhanced by new legal protocols in face of new technological or methodological developments in warfare. It is exactly this role it has now to fulfil. Now coming to the issue of characterisation, and with apologies for being rather long, on the Characterization in general, it is our view that any characterization needs to be broad. It needs to understand the purpose of, we all need to understand the purpose of characterization, but also consider how it interacts with the rest of the text. A broad characterization helps us with setting out what we are talking about. It is not the place to limit certain weapon systems or exclude them from the instrument. above all we have to keep in mind that weapons could fall under the characterization but comply with the regulation that we are setting out. Usually, and this is the practice in international negotiations, the exclusion phrase comes at the very end and it is usually the last part in discussions on international instruments. We also shared a view of others that we should not work in a cumulative way. We heard arguments why this could be dangerous. We would be interested in explanations why we should use the issue of and or select. There is the problem that some weapon systems could only use one of those two items. We also need to point out that this has been a compromise that was kind of produced during the last discussions on the characterizations in August. So we would require some explanations why we'll go back from this. There is also the problem that a state or an actor could simply separate those two functions by putting them into different instruments or different places and therefore forgo any regulation that is out in this instrument, so it also creates a major loophole. On the lethal, we want to put on record our usual position that lethality is an effect and no characterization. There is also no basis on IHL. We are all aware that we have put this out as in the title of our group, but at the same time, I think many of us are aware on how highly illogical it is to keep this up. We are also open as others to follow the approach that has been at the moment, follow the approach that has been proposed by the ICRC and to have a characterization in the text. We also want to state that we have problems with the integrated approach because this also creates a loophole. It also defies technological developments since in most cases there is a very easy opportunity to separate functions into different systems in different places. So it should be very clear what is operating as a system and not where it is, uh, located and how much it is integrated, um, the way that, that we want to talk about the integrated system, unfortunately, tries to picture something that is most close to a killer robot or other humanized weapon systems. We support the Irish proposal. I think this is a very good idea on the -- to also facilitate the nominal human input problem that we have brought up also in previous discussion. I think this is something to consider. On some of the issues that have been brought forward, the US proposal on a box zero, I think we already had this as a chapeau in our previous texts. In our understanding, this chapeau still exists in the Chair's mind, and I think there should be no problem at bringing it back at some point. The question is only when do we do it? Do we do it now in our negotiations or do we do it in a final text somewhere next year or by the end of 2025, of course. We also want to state that any what text that we produce now should be future proof, functional and technology neutral as has also been stated by Mexico. So we should also not be too detailed on different parts or elements as sensor softwares or other things because this could change also in the future. So this is something that we should avoid. On the issue or on the proposal that we should include a formulation that is designed to, here as we are all people who are presenting ourselves in the CCW as high contracting parties, so we should all know the bad experience that we are having from another protocol where this has created a loophole that is not to be fixed anymore. In any effect, you could characterize then weapon system as something that is not designed to for this purpose. and others have to prove it otherwise. So this is something that creates a massive loophole and it's difficult to fix in hindsight. And finally, we also think the formulation with lethal force is already included in the engaging part. And these are our main comments for the moment, but maybe we will come back when the discussion evolves. Thank you.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [1:57:43]:

Thank you for that. And also referring to another protocol, always indeed good to look at the text and lessons. I keep saying that we tried with the text with regard to an integrated combination of one or more weapons and technical components to cover the situation where different functions are in different places, but altogether it constitutes a lethal autonomous weapon system. So it's clearly not refining, it's not creating a system where only what you would call a killer robot is falling within the scope of the characterization. So let me recognize again what I already said in my opening remarks, we might have to do something on the text because As I stated, the intention is not to narrow it down, but to include also other systems where not all the functions are in one place, as I would call it. We have still an impressive list. Next on my list is France, to be followed by Australia, the Dominican Republic and Singapore. But first, let me pass the floor to France. You have.

The floor.


France [1:59:02]:

Mr. President, like other delegations, I should like to thank you very warmly and thank your facilitators as well for the great efforts that you've been putting into this rolling text. it seems to us too that it's going in the right direction and we think it's a good basis for continuing to identify points of consensus and points of compromise. To get straight into the text and comments on it, we should like to maintain the notion of lethality because we think it's part of the mandate of our GGE. We're flexible on language which would accurately translate this concept and we think apply lethal force proposed by the delegations might be helpful. It was put on the table by several delegations in the informal consultations. On autonomous, I think we should look at the notion of activation and the definition of the framework within which the system is being used before we get on to autonomous. We think addition of the words once activated would indicate when the autonomous nature of the weapon comes into its own and comes into operation. We'd also like to add the word further because without that term, the characterisation could only focus on completely, totally autonomous systems. The term further indicates that human involvement or intervention is necessary upstream for the system to then be able to operate autonomously within the framework indicated. In the execution of these tasks would be fine for us if that made it possible to clearly delineate autonomy to the execution of tasks. We are open, therefore, to discussions with other delegations who have proposed the wording I referred to and those who have supported it. On human intervention, we support without further human intervention within the chain of command and control. That would exclude the question of activation by a victim and would make it possible to focus not only on regular armed forces but other organised armed groups, because they also have a command system, even if they are different in nature and the way they operate from those of regular armed forces. We prefer to keep the 219 language referring to cumulative functions, as mentioned by other delegations. The characterisation should be studied at the moment when we look at a system for regulation and prohibition of small and light weapons, but Until then, we prefer to keep the words and or on the integration of weapon systems. Here it seems to us important, as other delegations have mentioned, that our characterisation can apply to single systems and to combinations of weapons or systems. As proposed, the notion of integrated system with the word combination could focus on a single weapon system or a group of weapon subsystems which function together. Lastly, on this first paragraph, we don't want to exclude dual use items because the use of a civilian item for military purposes is covered by international humanitarian law. On the second paragraph of the characterization, it seems to us essential to keep a general wording so as not to prejudice any future development of systems. This should be a general characterization. Defining systems included or excluded is something that should be done depending on the approach we take to prohibition and regulation. We could also perhaps subsequently move this paragraph so that it can make the point in any part of the text dealing with prohibition and regulation. Thank you.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [2:03:19]:

I should like to thank the French delegation for those comments and for their suggestions as well. I now turn the floor to the delegation of Australia. Please go ahead.


Australia [2:03:31]:

Chair, thank you for giving me the floor and thank you for your tireless efforts leading this GGE. As Australia has said before, the purpose of this discussion is to find and build a shared understanding of the types of weapons that are the subject of this GGE's important discussions. Turning to the rolling text today, Australia supports the use of the term human user and we are pleased to see its inclusion. The word user may encompass operators, commanders, and others responsible for planning, deciding upon, or executing attacks. To that end, we have also heard the US proposal of operator, which we think is also agreeable. We have heard other alternatives on the floor today. Australia would caution against the use of the terms human control or human intervention, as these terms lack clarity, with states attributing different meanings to each. This will not aid us in reaching a shared understanding of the types of weapons system that are under consideration by this GGE. Australia believes a focus on the intervention of a human user is more precise. The other key issue in this section concerns lethality. We know that autonomous weapons, just like conventional weapons, may have a range of effects. Should the GGE wish to retain the reference to lethality in the characterization, we are open to states proposals. In this regard, Australia thinks there is merit in exploring the alternative of including the phrase with lethal force after engage a target. This appeared in the draft articles working paper and was also raised in recent informals. In our view, this proposal strikes a good balance between retaining lethality in line with the GGE mandate and recognising that IHL governs a broad spectrum of effects. We have also heard with interest the view of the US delegation today on a proposed section zero and one bis, which sound promising. Thank you.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [2:05:41]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Australia for her comments and suggestions. Next on my list is the Dominican Republic, to be followed by Singapore, Ukraine, Costa Rica, but first the Dominican Republic. You have the floor.


Dominican Republic [2:05:56]:

Mr. President, to start with, the delegation of the Dominican Republic would like to congratulate you on your work in the GGE. We would also like to recognise the work that has been done in the last series of informal consultations. We support your efforts and those of your team to make a constructive contribution to these discussions. The text proposed, the rolling text, has, I think, moved in a positive direction and we think it is an excellent basis for our further work. Furthermore, we note that the proposed Protocol 6, to which my country is a party, has some points in common with this text. In order to strengthen the first part of the rolling text, I would like to suggest the following elements which are of importance to my delegation. First of all, the need to maintain the concept of significant human intervention on the weapon systems as to lethality. From the point of view of my delegation, the term lethal' is one which should be removed from the characterisation of autonomous weapons. Nonetheless, we are flexible about finding some kind of wording on which we could have the consensus we need, for example the definition proposed by the ICRC. My delegation trusts that this year the group will continue to make headway on complying with its mandate and, in particular, make progress on reaching common positions which will advance our negotiation on a legally binding treaty which prevents lethal autonomous weapons. We count on your leadership to help us move towards tangible results. Thank you, sir.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [2:07:52]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of the Dominican Republic for her intervention. Next on my list is Singapore, to be followed by Uruguay and Costa Rica, but let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Singapore. Sir, you have the floor.


Singapore [2:08:08]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Singapore wishes to express our full support for your efforts to steward the important work of this group. We thank you, Chair, for the constructive and consultative manner in which you manage the amendments to the rolling text. We also express our appreciation to the Friends of the Chair in the manner in which they have facilitated the discussions on the rest of the boxes. Singapore notes that the current proposed characterization of laws in section one was formed through extensive consultation with high contracting parties over the past year. We note that some have asked for the word lethal to be deleted in order to expand discussions to other types of autonomous weapons systems. My delegation is of the view that we should prioritize our attention on lethal autonomous weapon systems, systems that pose the greatest risk to human life. We agree with the distinguished delegate from China that lethality is a core component of laws. Removing the word would expand the characterization of such systems. We also echo the comments of the distinguished delegate of the US regarding lethality. and urge States to remain dedicated to the GG's mandate, which was the product of consensus of high contracting parties. We note that the characterization of laws is also phrased with the option identify and/or select and engage a target. During the informal consultations and in this room, there remains significant disagreement over whether the operative terms identify, select, engage should be considered and listed cumulatively. Our view is that all three steps are essential to the characterization of laws. For example, if a weapon system was capable of identifying and engaging a target, but still required a human operator to make a manual selection of which specific target to engage, it should not be considered autonomous. Likewise, if a weapon system could select and engage a target, but still required a human operator to manually interrogate to identify friend or foe, For my delegation, it would also be a stretch to characterize that system as autonomous. Furthermore, we are concerned that the current characterization may be unwieldy and in future governments and militaries will find it practically difficult to classify such systems later on. Turning to paragraph two of section one, our delegation agrees with the proposed language. We recognize this paragraph to be the chair's attempt at what we consider to be the exclusion clause. We therefore agree with the practical utility of this paragraph regarding characterization, which in our view would exclude certain types of systems that have been used uncontroversially, such as air defense and close-in protection systems. Chair, Singapore wishes to reiterate our commitment to contribute constructively to the work of this group with a view to achieving substantive progress. We hope that we will achieve alignment on the elements of an instrument under the current mandate of the group. I thank you, Chair.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [2:11:07]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Singapore for his remarks and suggestions. Next on my list is Uruguay, to be followed by Costa Rica, Norway and Japan. First, the distinguished representative of Uruguay, you have the floor.


Uruguay [2:11:24]:

Thank you, Chairman. We are grateful for the organisation of this work and the presentation of this new version of the rolling document. It seems to us to be a good basis for further progress. As a member of the 16 State Group, I would like to endorse what El Salvador said about its work and about its position on the characterisation. As we've mentioned previously and as many other delegations have said, we think that the definition of autonomous weapons systems should take into account the concept of lethality, but we think the words from the ICRC may be useful in helping us to reach agreement on that. We endorse what has been said by the delegation of Ireland in her statement referring to the phrase human control in the text. This is a fundamental concept in our work and we would support the inclusion of the words significant human control so as to make the human element be placed at the centre. Thank you.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [2:12:32]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Uruguay for her intervention. Next on my list is Costa Rica, to be followed by Norway, Japan and India. First, the floor is to Costa Rica.


Costa Rica [2:12:48]:

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Costa Rica is grateful for the commitment of and work done by all delegations in this discussion, which is of great importance to us. We are a country which has a very strong tradition of peace and demilitarisation, and we therefore feel that any text we negotiate on on arms control and particularly on laws should clearly define the concept of lethality. We support the position taken on this by Chile, Brazil and Ireland, as well as other countries. We think that the recommendations of the ICRC give a good description and we consider that another suggestion might be to expand the characterisation a little or perhaps include this as a footnote. We think that the absence of the reference to international humanitarian law does not mean that we shouldn't take it into account, because we don't want to open the doors to misinterpretation, which may lead to the indiscriminate use of this kind of weapon. Focusing on autonomous weapon systems, lethal or not, is essential to ensure that we comply with international humanitarian law and use the differentiation and proportionality approach. We need to clearly define the responsibility of states in this text in respect of significant humanitarian control and as concerns the results of the use of this kind of weapon. The principle of humanitarian law and its observance in conflict should not be removed when we are talking about such weapon systems. Thank you.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [2:14:28]:

Mr. President, let me thank the distinguished representative of Costa Rica for his intervention. Next on my list is Norway. Let me pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Norway.


Norway [2:14:39]:

Thank you, Mr. President. Let me first commend you for all the work you've done into this updated version of the rolling text. The current iteration of the text is another step in the right direction and a good basis for further negotiations. We think that the current draft is well balanced, well structured and captures many of the converging views expressed in previous sessions. With regard to the characterisation, we think that the current proposal is a good distillation of what has been discussed in previous meetings, as it is neither too broad nor too narrow, allowing necessary flexibility for hopefully future negotiations. In keeping with our general belief that we should ensure a characterisation that is not too reductive or narrow, we tend to think that a cumulative approach listing the tasks that need to be performed for the system to be qualified as LOS might limit the definition too much. Some delegations have provided explanations as to why they prefer to remove "and/or", and that is very useful in understanding the rationale behind arguing for a cumulative approach, but our position is that we would prefer to keep it. Regarding the question of lethality, we are somewhat flexible. We understand that it is important to some delegations to keep lethal. We do, however, agree with those delegations arguing that lethality is essentially an effect of the weapon, that it is not a recognised concept in IHL and that its inclusion could lead to challenges of legal interpretation further down the road and, again, limit the scope of the definition too much. In that sense, we also noted with interest the US proposal to include one best to clarify the term which we will take a look at and we also consider the ICRC proposal as a constructive proposal that could serve as a good basis thank you.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [2:16:39]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Norway next on my list is Japan to be followed by India and the Philippines but first let me pass the floor to Japan so you have the floor.


Japan [2:16:54]:

Well, thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairperson and Ambassador Endem Bush. Japanese delegation continues to appreciate and support the chair's efforts and your team's endeavor. And we are confident that this loading text will be very much useful as a basis for our discussion. My delegation believes that the military use of emerging technologies should be examined in a comprehensive manner with a sufficient understanding of their risks and benefits and taking into account both humanitarian considerations and security perspectives, and such technologies should be, should maintain the principle of human centric. with ensuring reliability and predictability and should be used in a responsible manner. Now, let me make just three comments on this section, box one of this text. Comment number one, regarding lethality. Well, it is very clear that this notion of the lethality is in the mandate of this GGE. So we would like to support the US comment and other delegations' suggestions that we would like to make a suggestion to put with lethal force in this context. And comment number two, well, regarding three important notions of the identification, selection, and engagement. And those three important notion is identified in the quite distinguished some characters of this loads back in this 2019 GG report, paragraph 19A. So we would like to prefer this maintain identify, select and engage a target. And number three, we would like to support the suggestion of the France and we would like to prefer put once activated on this context. So, in a nutshell, this text will, once activated, enable the system to identify, select and engage a target with lethal force without intervention by human users. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [2:19:21]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Japan. for his intervention. Next on my list is India, to be followed by the Philippines, the Republic of Korea and Kazakhstan. But first, let me pass the floor to the ambassador of India, no, to the distinguished delegate of India. You have the floor.


India [2:19:42]:

Good afternoon, Chair. Thank you so much. At the outset, let me, on behalf of our delegation, commend you for your efforts in advancing the work of this group and bringing us closer to a shared understanding on the subject and facilitating the GGE to successfully meet the mandate entrusted to it. We also express our sincere gratitude to the friends of the Chair for their efforts in building consensus over the past few months. Acknowledging the diversity in opinion and understanding on the conception of laws amongst high contracting parties, India endorses the approach adopted by you, Chair, to identify a set of characteristics and build a shared understanding of systems and platforms relevant to these discussions. This would determine the scope of the instrument and is thus the most critical and challenging task ahead. Let me offer some specific comments on the few issues that are remaining contentious on the first section around characterization and share with you our views on these themes. On the question of lethality, my delegation endorses the approach echoed by several delegations here this morning on making sure that the word is in the characterization in accordance with the mandate of the GGE. Lethality, of course, remains a contested term and forms core of the discussions around definitions and characterizations and we believe it is important for us to arrive at a narrow and very specific understanding of lethal in the context of laws. It is our understanding that lethality is a cumulative function of both the characteristics and the effect of the weapon system. This means that for a system to be regulated under this instrument it must specifically be both designed to have a lethal effect and then be used in a manner which has a lethal effect. We have heard similar sentiments expressed by delegations of China and the US and several other delegations and we do believe the design element is important to the characterization. The scope of this instrument is also tied closely to the question of autonomy. In our view, autonomy is a continuum closely linked to the degree of human oversight and control and for the purpose of this instrument, autonomy is relevant in the execution of the critical functions in the kill chain which are identification, selection and engagement done together. If a human is either in or on the loop in the execution of either one or more of these three functions, in our view, the system cannot be understood as being autonomous as understood for the purpose of this instrument. Finally, there are several systems that are already in use for several years that contain a degree of autonomy and exhibit several characteristics of autonomy in their functioning, but do not completely meet the criteria to meet the threshold of laws as we are discussing in the GGE. These include, but are not limited to, uncrewed autonomous platforms, drones, remotely piloted vehicles, and should be excluded from the scope of this instrument, however, As you have proposed, we support the wording in paragraph two without an explicit mention of all the systems. Finally, we would like to reiterate that the scope of the discussion and ensuing regulations and controls under this instrument must be limited to the use and effects of the system and not to the constituent technology and technological inputs. Thank you, Chair. Let me now just offer our specific editorial edits to para one. We would like to introduce the words along with their before technological components. So a lethal autonomous weapon system can be characterized as an integrated combination of weapons along with their technological components that we would like to add once activated, enable the system to identify, select and engage a target. And here we would like to introduce with lethal effect and without human intervention. Thank you, Chair.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [2:23:39]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of India for her remarks. Perhaps also to her and to others, if you have concrete suggestions, please could you also share them electronically with us? That's helpful for further consideration. Let me also repeat again my suggestion, my kind request on behalf of the interpreters not to speak too fast because otherwise it becomes very difficult to get proper interpretation and that would not help us because we all need to understand properly what has been said and that in a multilingual atmosphere, of course. Next on my list is the Philippines, to be followed by the Republic of Korea, Kazakhstan and Portugal. But first, let me pass the floor to the distinguished representative of the Philippines. You have the floor.


Philippines [2:24:32]:

Thank you, Mr Chair.

The Philippines joins previous delegations in thanking you and supporting your approach in these discussions. On some of the points you raised, the Philippines also join other delegations supporting the addition of the definition of lethal in the characterization. And we think that the definition proposed by ICRC is a good basis as a possible solution to the debate on the inclusion or non-inclusion of the term lethal in the characterization of laws. However, this will then make the proposed addition of the terms with lethal force or effect in the main text incompatible. We also join Austria in raising concerns on the use of the term "designed to", pointing out the experience in the loophole in one protocol of this convention. On the issue of the communicative

nature of the listed tasks, identify, select, engage, it is our view that the retention of and/or is important. to ensure that the characterization captures the wide spectrum of autonomy.

We hear the explanations of delegations wishing to remove it.

However, we agree with Norway that this will unnecessarily limit the characterization too much.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [2:25:52]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of the Philippines for his remarks and suggestions. Next on my list is the Republic of Korea, to be followed by Kazakhstan and Portugal, but first the Republic of Korea. You have the floor.


Republic of Korea [2:26:07]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Before commenting on the text, my delegation would like to express deep gratitude to the Chair and Friends of the Chair for convening informal consultations in January and leading our work. The informal consultations provide an excellent opportunity to warm up our discussions and deepen our collective understanding of each other's view on the rolling text. For the box one, the Republic of Korea would like to highlight three points. First, the Republic of Korea welcomes the chair's efforts in streamlining the characterization of laws by removing footnotes and avoiding unnecessary definition of definitions that previously complicated the text. Second, my delegation aligns with the views expressed by US, Singapore, Japan and others, emphasizing that the three core functions, namely to identify, select and engage, should be understood as a cumulative process with all three elements included in the characterization. Some delegations pointed out that this cumulative approach overly restricts the scope, but conversely, we should avoid overly broadening. Regarding the issue of lethality and cumulative approach, we must recall why the CCW contracting parties agreed to establish the GGE in the first place. This group was created to address a specific set of, or special type of weapon systems that raised our concerns and warranted international expert discussion under the CCW framework. Broadening its scope risk encompassing general weapon systems, which is not the intended purpose of this group. Furthermore, we are afraid that overly broadening the scope may have additional repercussions on our discussions in other sections. Lastly, the Republic of Korea believes that the current text of the section one proposed by the Chair is in good shape and hopes that consensus on this matter can be reached in the near future so that the group can move on to the other sections that address more substantive matters. Thank you.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [2:28:14]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea for his intervention. Next on my list is Kazakhstan, to be followed by Portugal, the Russian Federation, Colombia, Sierra Leone, Germany, Peru, Israel. That is the list as I have so far. Well, we have to see whether we can do that before lunch, but let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Kazakhstan. You have the floor.


Kazakhstan [2:28:41]:

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. First of all, I'd like to reaffirm support of my delegation to the adoption of Protocol 6, the legally binding instrument, which is advocated by Group 16. We consider these discussions and the draft elements as a part of this pre-negotiation work. We also considered it is useful to create box zero, which will reflect the main directions, including ethical considerations, disarmament goals of our work, and compliance with international law, international humanitarian law, international human rights law, in general, in this box zero. With regard to specific section, the box one, as a part of the group 16, advocate for deletion of this word lethal. But as a delegation of Kazakhstan, we could be quite flexible and it is possible to us to keep it in the title and use the explanation in the additional paragraph as proposed by Brazil and many other delegations based on the ICRC language. As an additional option, it is also possible to include language from the preamble of the CCW itself in the box zero. And I can quote, basing themselves on the principle that prohibits the implement in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of the nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. So I think it's simply the same what ICRC proposed. And further on the box zero, we had the exchange on the human user or human operator, but it is human. And our proposal, it is to change and to use the words just without human control or human intervention. in the execution of this task and delete by the user or operator or other word that we will need further to define who is operator, who is user. And I thank you and this is all on the box one and thank you.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [2:31:14]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Kazakhstan for his intervention. Next on my list is Portugal, to be followed by Russian Federation, Colombia, but let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Portugal. You have the floor.


Portugal [2:31:32]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Since the Portuguese delegation is taking the floor for the first time in this session, Allow me to start by formally congratulating you and your team for all the good work carried out during the past year. Significant progress was indeed made by this group under your chairmanship. We recall the UNSG's call for the mandate of this group to be realized as soon as possible, tentatively by the end of 2025, and we hope that we'll be able to deliver on that. Mr. Chair, With your indulgence, I will deliver some brief general comments before turning to the first box. As mentioned in previous sessions, Portugal believes that the discussions should be based on a functional approach and not necessarily just a conceptual focus. In fact, we prefer the existence of concepts around the laws, reality, that are comprehensive or broad enough to be as future proof as possible. given that we are dealing with a growing technology whose future development is particularly unpredictable. Also, we consider it important not to lose sight of other initiatives, such as the summit and the political declaration on responsible military use of artificial intelligence and autonomy, but also the UN resolutions on the use of artificial intelligence and autonomy. In this sense, we believe in the importance of promoting interaction between the debates taking place in different fora. Now turning specifically to Section 1 of the rolling text, Mr Chair, my delegation considers that the description provisionally reached is a good basis for discussions, as shown during the informal consultations. In general, We provide our support to the characterisations as it now stands. When it comes to the issue regarding lethality, we prefer to keep the adjective lethal in text in line with the group's mandate. Like other delegations, we agree with the suggestion of our distinguished colleague from Brazil in order to refer to the definition of lethality provided by the ICRC in a footnote or a new paragraph. Furthermore, we tend to agree that including titles in each section would improve the clarity of the text. I will leave it there for now. Thank you, Mr


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [2:34:13]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Portugal for his kind remarks to the Chair and his suggestions with regard to the text. Next on my list is the Russian Federation, to be followed by Colombia and Sierra Leone. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation.

Sir, you have the floor.


Russian Federation [2:34:48]:

We also would like to offer a number of comments. Thank you, Mr Chairperson. Turning to our list of comments on the document you have proposed, we would like to start with a number of general comments concerning the document as a whole. At the outset, we would like to confirm that we see this document as a foundation for subsequent discussions, and we are fully committed to continuing efforts within the group around this document as you have presented it, which is, in essence, an attempt to bring closer together the positions of the various delegations in order to find a solution based on compromise. We also would like to underscore and draw the attention of delegations to the fact that the mandate of the group is fairly broad. It allows for our work to be somewhat flexible and it is not focused exclusively on considering and formulating a group of elements that together would make up some kind of instrument or tool. Our mandate also includes working on other possible measures related to new technologies in the area of laws, which was noted very correctly by yourself, Mr Chairperson, in the introductory part of the document you presented. We would like to draw your attention to this, given that many delegations have omitted an important part of our mandate, which concerns other measures, and instead have focused exclusively on the creation of a new instrument. In addition, we would also like to draw your attention to the fact that Certain elements of the document that you, esteemed Chairperson, have presented must be considered in interconnection with other elements within the same document. None of the elements can exist in a vacuum. They are all interconnected with other parts of the document and various paragraphs mutually complement each other. Therefore, this document must be considered in all of its entirety, and we consider that the practice of considering individual elements independently of other parts of the document to be somewhat short-sighted. With respect to the proposals from a number of delegations on returning to the head parts of the document that you proposed, our delegation considers that it is not feasible to go back to the header on the basis of the logic that we are not actually working on a specific given instrument on new laws and technologies, but in essence we are attempting to create a substantive foundation for the final report of the group with conclusions and recommendations. This document does not allow headings in that way, it only allows for individual paragraphs, and we believe that it is sufficient to stick to existing practice. Any attempt to focus on subheadings or other secondary aspects will lead us off in the wrong direction, away from compiling the conclusions and recommendations for our group around the topic which has been placed at the centre of our discussions. Now, specifically on box one concerning the working definition or specifications of new technologies of laws and systems based on laws. We fully agree and support with those delegations who underscored the central and extremely vital importance of developing a working definition with regard to such weapons systems. The Russian Federation, from the very beginning of work in this group, has expressed consistently a position on this issue, and we have insisted that the definition should occupy a central position in our discussions, because without a clear understanding of what we are actually talking about, it will be extremely problematic to achieve agreements on other aspects of the functioning and development of such weapons systems. Therefore, we are once again grateful to you, respected Mr. Chairperson, for all of your efforts to develop a single standard reference We also are in agreement with the United States of America delegation on the proposal. This with respect to a clear language that the working definition of a weapon system based on laws should be limited by this scope of the CCW itself, the application of the convention that is. and this language, in our opinion, requires the inclusion directly into the working definition of this component in order that no incorrect interpretations may arise with respect to the scope of this working definition. Moreover, as regards the combination of various different components, within weapon systems. Here we would like to improve slightly the language proposed into earlier. We believe there should be clear indication that we are talking about one or more strike weapon systems. and technological components of a support or auxiliary character. There should not be, however, indication that those components support the execution of the three functions which are indicated subsequently in the text of this definition. We consider that the three functions indicated below must be related to the capabilities of the weapon system as a whole. That is to say that we should not be saying that individual components allow for the execution of those functions, but the entire system together is to have those functions or be able to execute those capabilities. That is to say, the system as a whole in its entirety together with all of the components listed here. Next. with respect to the concept of autonomous. In our opinion, it's unnecessary to have the language indicating that the three functions listed in this working definition must be exercised without interference from a human user. at the stage of executing those military tasks. We believe that the language that a system capable of executing these tasks without intervention by a human user, well, this already implies that the system itself will be executing those tasks without intervention by a human user. at least within the framework of the execution of those tasks. And so the final words, "in the execution of these tasks", appears to us to be superfluous. With respect to the concept of lethality, we agree with those delegations who believe this to be one of the fundamental concepts in the definition of these types of weapon systems in light of the mandate of the group, in light of the fact that we're talking about lethal autonomous weapon systems, and so the concept of lethality must also be taken into account and included, laid out within the working definition. we consider lethality, both to be causing damage to the health of humans and to causing their death. We have taken into account the considerations that were presented by many delegations during the previous session with respect to the definition of this concept. and we attempted to adjust our position in light of those considerations. We remember very well how a very large number of delegations spoke out against the inclusion within the concept of lethality harming or causing damage to facilities. and we stand ready to take into account those considerations. This is why we consider it to be enough, as a minimum, to include in the definition the concept of languages around causing either damage to health or causing the death of people. As regards the second paragraph and the end of that sentence, we agree with the delegations who insist on putting this definition into brackets for certain types of weapons systems for various reasons. We consider it possible at this stage to include into this sentence general language in order to move away from the repeated discussions about what specific weapon systems could be put in those brackets. We believe that at this stage it would be more than enough to simply demarcate the very fact that this working definition does not include certain types of weapons. Without going into detail about which specific weapons and weapon systems we mean, we consider that such an understanding should be very clear as a separate sentence in this paragraph in order to exclude any misinterpretation or ambiguity in subsequent talks about this topic. Going back to the concept of lethality, we would also like to respond to the proposal from the US delegation and indeed a number of other delegations, Western countries, with respect to the application of lethal force. In our opinion, possibly, and we would like to list a number of prudent concerns regarding this language. In this case, once again, we can see an attempt to define lethality using the concept of lethality itself. So defining what is lethality by referring to lethal force, but without actually defining what it is to be lethal. What is lethality? Moreover, the concept itself of the use of force, well, from the viewpoint of law, this is a vague concept. We all remember very well and are fully mindful of the difficulties of defining what is the use of force itself. Around the application of Article 2 of the UN Charter, we have seen a great deal of effort undertaken and we're unlikely to resolve this difficult question ourselves. in the GGE. The introduction of the concept of the use of lethal force would lead us back into that thorny thicket of discussions without any guarantee that we will find a solution that satisfies all parties, and we might only provoke unnecessary misinterpretations in the future by various delegations and readers. We would like to avoid this. We would like the definition to be clear and precise. In conclusion, Mr. Chairperson, we would like to confirm our unchanging position with respect to the proposal to include the language once activated. We do not consider it to be necessary to have this language in the context of this working document. We consider it to be superfluous. And we believe also that it would lead to other new complicated discussions, what we consider to be activated, what is not yet activated, and what that activation is, who indeed conducts that activation. Thank you for your attention.


Netherlands (Kingdom of the) · Chair · Robert Indenbosch [2:51:32]:

I would like to thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation for his extensive comments and suggestions. It's now one o'clock. Uh, we are a little bit beyond one o'clock already, many thanks to the interpreters for that, I hope they allow me just three more remarks, I think we had a very interesting discussion, we still have a number of delegations on the list, I imagine. A number of delegations would also like to react to some of the remarks. Some of them have only reacted to parts of the text, so I think we still have a lot of work to do in the afternoon. From my side, I would say with regard to lethal yes, if to retain, we have to explain. I think that is the summary of the discussion and I think there have already been some suggestions with regard to how to explain that. I think there were some very wise words from the Norwegian delegation, the characterisation It should not be neither too broad nor too narrow, and that is really the heart of the matter we have been discussing this morning. Thank you also for proposing something like a box one piece and a box zero, although box zero should not become the wish box for all the things you might wish to address one way or the other with regard to lethal autonomous weapon systems. Last but not least, it should be future and foolproof. Uh, with those thoughts, I send you off to lunch, looking forward to see you back in the room at three o'clock. Have a, have a great meal. See you later.