General Assembly: Intergovernmental negotiations on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council - Informal meeting of the plenary, 80th session

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. I call to order the 5th informal meeting of the Plenary on the question of equitable representation on an increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council. My fellow co-chair and I would like to extend a warm welcome to all of you. We would like to thank all delegations for their active and constructive participation during the IGN Plenary on 20 February. We would also like to express our gratitude to delegations for their participation during the informal, informal discussion, the Taxol Talks, As indicated in our letter dated 7 April, this meeting will focus on a cluster discussion on the question of the veto with the following guiding questions to facilitate discussion and reflection. These questions are intended to facilitate discussion and reflection. They are not meant to limit the scope of interventions. So here are the questions. Given that proposals have been made to create a new category of permanent members without veto rights, how might concerns about a 2-tiered permanent membership be addressed? Given that proposals have been made to extend full veto rights to any new permanent members on an equal footing with the current P5, what conditions, if any, should govern such extension? Could limitations to the use of the veto serve as a basis for broader consensus on veto reform? If so, would there be differentiation between current and possible new members holding that prerogative, and what parameters or limitations might be appropriate, ranging from voluntary restraint to a qualifying mechanism? And what form should a possible qualifying mechanism take, for example, a requirement for concurrency across regional groups, an obligation on the vetoing member to provide a formal justification, or a higher, higher approval threshold before a veto can be cast? How might such a mechanism be designed to balance the prerogatives of permanent members with the broader accountability of the Security Council to the membership as a whole? Delegations were invited to inscribe on the list of speakers via e-delegate and a live link to the list of speakers was circulated to all delegations. At this stage, any delegation who wishes to be addressed— added, sorry, to the existing list of speakers should inform the Secretariat's table. Any delegation wishing to speak on behalf of a group of states should inform the Secretariat in order to be given priority. The co-chairs also encouraged delegations to adhere to the time limits we have established. Statements delivered on behalf of a group of states will be limited to 5 minutes, and national statements will be limited to 3 minutes. To assist speakers with the time management, we have projected the on-screen timer on the screens. We encourage delegations to listen to each other, engage constructively, and seek areas of convergence in our meetings. In that light, we invite delegations to focus their intervention on any evolution in their positions, including new elements they might wish to highlight. Once the list of speakers is exhausted, we will hold an interactive discussion on the question of the veto and allow for member states and groups of states to respond to views and proposals put, put forth during the meetings in a closed meeting without webcast. Before we begin, I would like to remind members that delegations are encouraged to email a copy of their statements to estatements@un.org for the publication on the repository website as well as to facilitate interpretation. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Brazil.

Good morning, distinguished co-chairs, colleagues. I have the honor to deliver these remarks on behalf of the G4— India, Germany, Japan, and my country, Brazil. Before I address the issue at schedule for today, let me state that the G4 welcomes the recent submission of the African model. Today, Once again, we must repeat ourselves. It is urgent to move away from theoretical discussions framed on the 5 clusters and finally move towards concrete action in the IGN. This means timely development of a consolidated model based on the models presented by member states. This is what we agreed in the Pact for the Future. And one key purpose of such agreement was and remains to both avoid drawing up any document that favours any specific position and facilitate actual negotiations among delegations based on models presented thus far. The consolidated model must be a precursor to text-based negotiations. Proposals not presented by Member States may be helpful at a later stage of text-based negotiations. The time for bridging proposals is not during formulation of the consolidated model, but, if needed, during text-based negotiations. Such negotiations must commence, finally, at the earliest, without fail. Dear Co-Chairs, colleagues, the G4 position on the veto is well established. New permanent members should, as a principle, have the same responsibilities and obligations as current ones. In this regard, our position and that of the African Group are aligned. At the same time, in order to show openness and flexibility on this issue so as to foster constructive negotiations, the G4 proposes that new permanent members would not exercise the veto until a decision on the matter is reached during a 5— a 15-year review. The challenges intrinsic to the veto, and their implications on the Council's ability to act, must not serve as a pretext to perpetuate its obsolete composition and to suggest proposals that would further entrench existing inaccuracies favoring the permanent members. Any model limiting reform only to the non-permanent category, in whatever shape or form, would leave the current fundamental imbalance in power and the underrepresentation and non-representation of different regions and groups intact. It is the expansion in both categories that will meaningfully alter the power dynamics within the Council and make it truly more democratic and accountable, which in turn could also increase the chances of exploring newer approaches to veto seriously. This holds true even in a scenario wherein the new permanent members do not exercise it before a review is completed, as advocated by the G4. We have recently heard arguments based on the equality of states in favor of ideas that, in fact, mean expanding the non-permanent category only. An expansion of the non-permanent category only Category, in whatever form or shape, constitutes an insufficient solution to the structural imbalances currently existing within the Council and significantly diminish the chances of exploring newer approaches to veto seriously. In any case, the 2 issues— veto and category— and all the others pertaining to the 5 clusters will only begin to be resolved if we work on a consolidated model that is based on the models presented by member states. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Italy.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. President. Distinguished co-chairs, I make this statement on behalf of Uniting for Consensus. I wish to thank you for convening this meeting of the IGN on an issue at the centre of the Security Council reform, the question of the veto, one of the 5 interconnected clusters identified by the General Assembly decision that established the IGN 62/557. As we saw on numerous occasions, the veto deeply affects the efficiency of the Security Council. Paralyzing its capacity to fulfill its mandate. That the mandate to preserve international peace and security as outlined by the UN Charter. The veto runs counter to the principles of democracy, accountability, efficiency, and sovereign equality between states. The UFC position is simple and consistent. While firmly advocating for the outright suppression of the veto, as its misuse and abuse are the root cause of many of the Council's shortcomings, UFC acknowledges the complexities involved in this matter. Although the vast majority of the UN membership agrees on ideally abolishing the veto, which is an anachronistic tool, this requires that the 5 permanent members be willing to relinquish their prerogative and agree to the corresponding UN Charter amendment. For the time being, since this amendment seems unattainable in the short term, we call for immediate, pragmatic, and tangible actions to address how to best limit the use and the abuse of the veto, which is both feasible and already reflected in the practice of certain Council members. UFC is of the strong view that the P-5 should not use or abuse the veto in specific circumstances, such as but not limited to mass atrocities and war crimes, in line with the existing initiatives supported by a majority of the UN membership, including the Franco-Mexican initiative and the ACT Code of Conduct. UFC is open to discuss how this initiative— how these immediate measures, which are currently implemented on a voluntary basis, could be formalized or codified in the context of a broader Security Council reform. While it exists, the veto should be at least subject to accountability. And in this regard, we commend the 2022 veto initiative to enhance transparency and accountability by requiring the General Assembly to convene and scrutinize instances where a veto is exercised. Similarly, we note that the resolution on the revitalization reaffirmed the need to fully implement and adhere to all provisions of the Charter of the UN as they relate to the decision-making process in the Security Council, including Article 27.3 of the Charter. Moreover, we would like to stress that the threat of the use of the veto also influences negatively the decision-making process and shifts balances in the Security Council. Notably, it is often exercised in particularly delicate and critical moments, leaving the UN without the necessary tools to act. While permanent seats and their current prerogatives respond to a specific historical context, any reform to the Council should not undermine our collective security framework. With devastating consequences, particularly when civilians are at risk. UFC continues to believe that the issue of the veto can be addressed in a more democratic manner by strengthening the role and increasing the number of elected members, thereby shifting the decision-making balance in their favour. Any reform should improve rather than weaken the Council's capacity to act swiftly and in line with its mandate to effectively respond to the urgent needs of those it is meant to protect. In this spirit, we stand ready to continue engaging constructively with all Member States and the negotiating groups to advance a balanced and pragmatic reform, guided by a shared sense of responsibility and a firm commitment to multilateralism. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Italy and I give the floor to Liechtenstein. Thank you, co-chairs.

Dear colleagues, I'm speaking today on behalf of a cross-regional group of 15 member states: Austria, Bulgaria, Cabo Verde, Estonia, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Mexico, Norway, Samoa, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, and my own country, Liechtenstein. On the 27th of March, we wrote to all members, the President of the GA and the SG, to put forward a draft resolution on the implementation of Article 27 of the UN Charter. This draft is meant as a basis for consultations with the membership, a process the authors have begun immediately after circulation of the draft resolution. We wish to thank many of you for the strong expressions expressions of interest and overall positive reception we have received from the membership so far. Given that today we speak in the format of the IGN, let me in the first instance emphasize that this draft, as it says in its final preamble paragraph, does not itself constitute Security Council reform and does not therefore fall within the purview of the IGN. We note in this respect that the working methods of the Council remained— remain governed by the Security Council and that it is the working methods of a future Council that fall under the purview of this process. Nevertheless, we see the obvious relevance of our initiative to the topic that the co-chairs have requested us to discuss today and acknowledge in particular that Para 69 of the Pact for the Future, which the resolution seeks to implement, was facilitated and negotiated within the IGN. In this respect, we wish to briefly lay out the purpose of our text and are grateful for this opportunity for an exchange. Over recent years, we have witnessed significantly increased calls from the membership both inside and outside the Council for the proper application of Article 27 in line with the original intent of the UN Charter. This is why the Pact for the Future that was adopted by consensus in September '24 included language deciding to, I quote, fully implement and adhere to all provisions of the Charter of the United Nations as they relate to the decision-making process in the Security Council, including Article 27 of the Charter, end of quote. Our draft text aims to act on that commitment within the responsibilities of the General Assembly by clarifying the meaning of relevant terms within in the article and to thus assist the Council in ensuring transparency and consistency in its relevant practice. The text reaffirming the Pact does 3 things. First, it puts forward 2 categories of acts that we have seen are common to calls to operationalize the party to dispute term contained in Article 27. These are the threat or use of armed force in violation of Article 2 of the Charter and a competing territorial claim with another state. In our view, there are other possible circumstances in which a state may be a party to a dispute for the purpose of Article 27, but having reviewed the practice to date, we believe these categories capture the core of the minimum standard in which the membership as a whole wishes to see this provision operationalized. Second, it invites members of the Council who are themselves tasked with ensuring implementation of Article 27, to put on record their positions with regard to determined party to a dispute. We do this not only in furtherance of the overall goal of transparency. We also wish to acknowledge that given that the Security Council is ultimately responsible for the implementation of Article 27, its members should have the opportunity to clarify their positions regarding this provision on the record. Third and finally, the resolution invites the Council to create a special report when the party-to-dispute clause in accordance with Article 27 is invoked in the proceedings of the Council. This para aims to create an incontrovertible record of the invocation of the party-to-dispute provision, as has been done successfully with respect to the veto in the framework of Resolution 76262. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties makes clear that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it. As such, the same act of consent that binds states to a treaty enables them to participate in its interpretation. Thus, even for states that are not at present in a position to apply Article 27 themselves in the Council, we are still bound by our continuing obligations under the article and have collective ownership of its interpretation. In this respect, the draft resolution does not create any obligations on member states that we do not already have. Indeed, it does not itself create a mandate. Instead, it is meant to provide clarity on one of the most important procedural provisions of the Charter in line with a clear call from member states and from a consensus agreement. It stays in line with the responsibilities of the GA in Article 10 of the UN Charter in clarifying the obligations of states. States under the Charter. It helps each of us live up to them, but also to create reasonable expectations of the proceedings of the Council. We look forward to working with all member states through an inclusive process in the hope that we can adopt our text for the good of our organization and for the people that we serve. I thank you. I thank the distinguished

representative of Liechtenstein, and I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Sierra Leone. Thank you, distinguished co-chair. Distinguished

co-chairs, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, I have the honor to deliver this statement on behalf of the African member states. I thank you for convening this important discussion on the cluster relating to the veto. This debate provides member states with another opportunity to reflect, On the impact of the use of the veto on the functioning, credibility, and effectiveness of the Security Council. The ongoing and emerging conflicts, crises, and threats before us underscore the urgency of Security Council reform. Too often, divisions among permanent members, including through the use or threat of the veto, have constrained the Council's ability to respond in a timely, balanced, and effective manner to situations threatening international peace and security. This reality calls for sober reflection and renewed commitment to a Council that is more representative, more accountable, and better equipped to discharge its mandate under the Charter. Africa has listened carefully to the views of other member states. We are mindful that some continue to call for the abolition of the veto, while others oppose its extension. Yet, amid current geopolitical tensions and multiple crises across regions, what is required is a principled and coherent approach rooted in fairness, sovereign equality, and the need to strengthen effective multilateralism. Distinguished co-chairs, The African permanent members must enjoy the same prerogatives and responsibilities as existing permanent members, including the veto, as a matter of common justice and fairness. To deny African permanent members the same prerogatives would create an unacceptable new category of permanent membership, one that is permanent in name but unequal in practice. That outcome would not correct the historical injustice, it would merely reconfigure and preserve it. Accordingly, Africa does not support intermediate, intermediary, or transitional approaches that seek to defer or dilute discussion of the veto, nor do we believe that the issue of the veto can be postponed until after agreement is reached on the arrangement of the Council. The question of the veto is integral to the overall reform package and must be addressed as such. Distinguished co-chairs, with regards to Article 27 of the UN Charter, and in particular the requirement that the party to a dispute shall abstain from voting, our view is that the Charter already provides clear guidance. The article states that, and I quote, decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of 9 members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members, provided that in decisions under Chapter 6 and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. End of quote. The issue before us is therefore less one of textual ambiguity than of faithful implementation. The authority and credibility of the Security Council depend in part on consistent observance of the Charter provisions governing its decision-making. In this regard, we recall the commitment in the Pact for the Future to fully comply with and implement all relevant provisions of the Charter relating to decision-making in the Security Council, including Article 27, paragraph 3. That commitment should now be translated into practice. The application of Article 27 should not remain merely aspirational. It should be approached seriously, consistently, and in good faith. We also believe that reflection on the implementation of Article 27, as well as on the responsible use of the veto, need not be confined to the IGN process. Certain aspects of practice, accountability, and political commitment may also be advanced through broader deliberations and initiatives, provided such efforts remain without prejudice to the IGN process, General Assembly Decision 62/557, and the Common African Position. Distinguished Co-Chairs, on the limitation and responsible use of the veto, we recall General Assembly Resolution 76/262 and other relevant initiatives. In our view, such initiatives do not replace comprehensive reform nor do they alter established positions within the IGN. At the same time, they may contribute to greater transparency, accountability, and restraint in the use of the veto. From the African perspective, the responsible and restrained use of the veto can help strengthen the credibility and moral authority of the Security Council. It can support more timely action in the face of grave crisis, ending atrocities, and help ensure that exceptional power is exercised with commensurate responsibility in a manner consistent with the Charter and international law. Let me conclude, distinguished co-chairs, by underscoring that all 5 clusters of the Security Council reform remain interlinked. The veto is not a peripheral question. It goes to the heart of the legitimacy, representativeness, and effectiveness of a reformed Council. Africa remains committed to engaging constructively in this process on the basis of the common African position with a view to achieving a Council that is more just, more democratic, and more responsive to the realities of our time. I thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of Sierra

Leone, and I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Saint Lucia. Thank you, distinguished co-chairs, distinguished colleagues. Good

morning. The L69 group speaks today on the question of the veto. We do so with clarity of conviction and with the recognition of the weight this subject carries, not merely as a procedural matter within these negotiations, but as a question that goes to the very heart of the Security Council's legitimacy, its equity, and its fitness for purpose in the 21st century. Let us be direct. The veto is, in its present configuration, among the most consequential expressions of inequality in the international system. It concentrates decisive power in 5 states, selected by the accidents of history and the balance of forces in 1945, and it denies the vast majority of the world's nations any meaningful check on that power. The L-69 Group represents developing countries from Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Small Island Developing States. Our regions constitute the preponderance of the United Nations membership. They occupy the majority of the Security Council's agenda, and they have for 80 years been structurally excluded from the permanent membership that holds the veto. That exclusion is not a technicality; it is standing injustice by stated intent. The L69 Group's position on the veto is unambiguous. We believe it should be abolished. The veto is fundamentally incompatible with the principles of sovereign equality that underpin the Charter of the United Nations. A council empowered to act on behalf of all humanity cannot do so credibly when its most consequential decisions can be blocked by a single state acting in its own interest. We hold this position honestly and without equivocation, but we are also realists operating within the constraints of what the present moment makes possible. Charter amendments require the concurrence of the permanent members themselves. Abolition is the right answer. It is not the answer immediately within reach. And so we engage these negotiations with a second firm conviction that so long as the veto exists, any expansion of permanent membership must extend the same rights and privileges to new permanent members as those enjoyed by the existing 5. On this count, Our views are fully aligned with the common African position. This is not a concession to the logic of the veto; it is a refusal to compound its inequity. To create new permanent members without the veto would be to establish a two-tier permanence, a hierarchy within a hierarchy, and to entrench a structural. Subordination of the newly admitted against the original 5. This would be tantamount to compounding the existing inequities. The L69 will not accept a reform that offers equity in form while denying it in substance. If permanent membership means anything, it must mean the same thing for all who hold it. Co-chairs, We are deeply attentive to how the veto functions in practice, and the record is troubling. The veto has been used and threatened in circumstances where the Security Council's inaction has come at catastrophic human cost. The people in conflict regions have watched the Council's primary responsibility for peace and security rendered inoperable by the exercise or the threat to exercise veto. This is not an abstract institutional concern. It is a living reality for millions of people whose fate is bound in a mechanism designed not for their protection, but for the preservation and perpetuation of great power prerogatives. The L69 notes with interest the ongoing discussions around restricting the use of the veto. We are supportive of the measures that constrain the arbitrary exercise of the veto and those that move the Council towards greater accountability and transparency in its decision-making. These measures represent meaningful progress in the direction of a more just and Responsive Council. Co-chairs, the group— this group was founded on a single animating conviction: that the Security Council as presently constituted does not reflect the world as it is, and that a reformed Council, one that is more representative, more equitable, more effective, is both possible and essential. The question of the veto sits at the center of that conviction. We cannot have a genuinely reformed Council if the architecture of the permanent privilege remains unchanged. Let us not be swayed by arguments of equality of states and deny expansion in the permanent category. On that path lies further empowerment of the P5 and further inequality in in the Security Council. We look forward to a substantive and honest engagement in this section— in this session. The L69 Group remains committed to text-based negotiation as the only pathway to outcomes that are durable and credible. We call on Member States to approach this question with the seriousness the moment demands and with an openness to positions that may challenge the comfortable assumption of the status quo. The world is watching these negotiations. It deserves better than what the current Council, with its unreformed veto power, has been able to deliver. Thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of Saint Lucia, and I give

the floor to the distinguished representative of Denmark. Tak, Sel. It is Finland speaking on behalf of the Nordic countries this

time, then on behalf of Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and my own country, Finland. We thank you, co-chairs, for your continuing excellent leadership in guiding our work towards a reformed Security Council. In the Pact for the Future, we agreed to support credible, timely, and decisive action by the Security Council in the exercise of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, which it does on our behalf as stated in the Charter. We are all aware of the reasons why the veto became part of the UN Charter. But it is also a fact that far too often the misuse of veto prevents the Council from acting even in the most devastating conflict situations around the world or in early efforts to prevent them. As recently as last week, we witnessed the use of veto blocking the adoption of a draft resolution that addressed the situation in the Strait of Hormuz. Without going into the details, we noted that the situation it sought to address has widespread global consequences as we speak. Co-chairs, the veto should not stand in the way when decisive action is needed to maintain international peace and security. The Nordic countries maintain that the reform of the Security Council should result in less veto, not more. Following this objective, the Nordic countries have consistently supported initiatives aimed at limiting the use of veto, and we continue to support furthering our considerations on how to limit the scope of the veto. Now, to ensure that the veto does not hinder the Council from taking action in the face of atrocities, we have signed the ACT Code of Conduct and support the French-Mexican Declaration on suspension of veto powers in cases of mass atrocities. We continue to urge all member states, particularly permanent members, to join us. The Nordic countries also advocate for transparency and accountability when the veto is used. We strongly support the veto initiative, which allows the broader UN membership to have a dialogue on the issues covered in the vetoed resolution. In the Pact for the Future, we unanimously agreed to enhance ways in which the GA can contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, in particular by taking action in accordance with the Charter of the UN. The Nordic countries are supportive of strengthening the role of the Assembly and remain committed to explore new ways of doing so, especially in situations where the Council is unable to act. The Nordic countries continue to call for full implementation and adherence to all provisions of the Charter, including ensuring the consistent application of Article 27. It is imperative that the members of the Security Council themselves abide by the UN Charter, including their obligation to abstain from voting on decisions falling within Article 27 and in which they are party to the dispute. In this spirit, we welcome initiatives that bring attention to this obligation. Co-chairs, it is important to consider the ways the veto has been used in the past and continue the efforts to limit its use now. But it is equally important to address through this IGN process how veto would affect the future work of an enlarged council. As in the past, the Nordic countries support expanding the membership of the council in both permanent and non-permanent categories. We also remain open to all ideas that can break the current impasse and lead to finding a middle ground. While we hear that aspiration— the aspirations of some to exercise equal rights as the current member— as the current permanent members. We are concerned that this would result in further paralysis of the Council, and we stress the need to rethink veto as it currently stands. We had heard over the years of the IGN process many ideas in this regard, and we are ready to discuss more in detail the practicalities involved in these options. Finally, by now we know where we all stand and we all know what the positions are. Continuing like this will not lead to a change. In addition to new ideas, we should also be able to discuss spaces for compromise for the benefit of the whole membership. Otherwise, the reform will not take place at all. The Nordic countries emphasize that permanent membership in the Security Council is a responsibility, not a prerogative. We encourage reimagining the decision-making in the enlarged Council, not on the basis of prerogatives, but rather based on our collective desire to have a UN Security Council that is capable to take credible, timely, and decisive action when international peace and security are threatened. I thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of Finland, and I give the floor

to the distinguished representative of Guyana. Thank you, distinguished co-chairs. I have the honor to deliver this statement on behalf

of the 14 member states of the Caribbean Community, CARICOM. CARICOM reiterates our sincere gratitude to you for for the manner in which you have conducted the work of the IGN, including these structured dialogues that allow us to place on record our views on this critically important issue, as well as the informal discussions that provide space for frank, open exchanges that are often key to driving progress. We have taken note of the co-chairs' 7th April letter, providing guidance for today's discussion. That is, our focus on the question of the veto. We have also noted the circulation of the African model and look forward to a fruitful discussion of its elements in the coming week. Co-chairs, colleagues, turning to the topic of today's discussion, allow me to share the following. First, I'm certain that I will face no pushback in asserting that there is broad consensus in the IGN that reform of the Security Council is both long overdue and increasingly urgent. Additionally, that broad consensus extends to the view that a key source of the Council's inability to effectively respond to the challenges to peace and security lies in the use— more so, the overuse— of the veto. Second, I take this opportunity to reiterate, as we did during the presentation of our regional model, CARICOM's position on the veto. That is, that the veto be abolished. However, in acknowledging the unlikelihood of its full abolition, we propose that if it is retained, new permanent members must also have the right to use the veto. There cannot be a system of two-tiered permanent membership with respect to the privileges afforded to those endowed with this distinction and hallowed responsibility. Third, while we stress the importance of fairness in the application of the right to the veto, we equally emphasize that there must be responsible use of the veto. Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter, it must not be a tool for the furtherance of any state's self-interest while simultaneously hindering progress towards peace. We are vehemently supportive of efforts to limit its use in situations that constitute a threat to the peace, an act of aggression, or other breach of peace. pursuant to Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Moreover, we add our collective voice in support of the principle that the veto should not be used when the Council is addressing matters involving the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. That is, the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. Fourth, there must be some measure of accountability for the use of the veto. In this regard, there must be a continuation of the requirement to convene a debate of the General Assembly once a veto is exercised. Permanent members casting a veto should take part in that debate and explain the reason for their use of the veto. Co-chairs, the data is clear. The use of the veto is an impediment to the cause of the maintenance of international peace and security. In 2024 alone, we witnessed a record level of blocked resolutions. It was the year of the fewest adopted resolutions in recent Security Council history and the most vetoes since the Cold War. However, what we cannot measure are those instances in which just the threat of the veto has stopped the proposal of resolutions or watered down them beyond the point of impact. In many ongoing situations where there is need for urgent and sustained action and attention, it is clear that some permanent members have no aversion to using their veto power either to shield their own actions or in defense of allies. This situation has not just resulted in a failure to address breaches of international law, including international humanitarian law, but has done incalculable damage to the reputation of the United Nations and to the cause of multilateralism. CARICOM reaffirms our commitment to achieving early and urgent reform of the Security Council, and will continue to actively engage with all Member States in this process. I thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of Guyana, and I give the floor to the distinguished

representative of Belgium. Mr. Chair, Madam Chair, I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the Benelux countries,

the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and my own country, Belgium. At the outset, we thank the co-chairs for their continued leadership and efforts to guide us toward greater convergence. Today, we discuss the question of the veto, which is indeed a matter of great importance. For this plenary IGN meeting, the Benelux countries will focus on 3 points, drawing on the guiding questions shared by the co-chairs. First, the Benelux countries wish to highlight that the question of the veto is central to any discussion on Security Council reform. The Benelux countries are concerned by its increased use in recent years, which has at times prevented the Council from effectively carrying out its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. We are among the large and growing number of member states that support limitations on the use of the veto. In this regard, we fully endorse the joint French-Mexican political statement on the voluntary suspension of the veto in cases of mass atrocities, as well as the Code of Conduct of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group, which seeks to ensure that the veto is not used in situations involving genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. We further underscore the importance of strict adherence to Article 27 of the UN Charter, which requires a member state that is a party to a dispute to abstain from voting. In this regard, we express our support for the draft resolution on the implementation of Article 27 that was recently, recently presented by a cross-regional core group of member states led by Liechtenstein, which seeks to strengthen compliance with this important Charter obligation. Second, the Benelux countries, mindful of the parameters set out in the Pact for the Future, are cautious about the potential negative impact that additional vetoes, especially under the current modalities, could have on the effectiveness and efficiency of the Council. We believe that any consideration of extending veto prerogatives should be approached with the utmost care. This particularly in light of the need to ensure that the Council is able to effectively carry out its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Benelux would be interested in further exploring avenues for limiting the use of the veto as a basis for broader consensus on veto reform. This could, inter alia, include the codification of a code of conduct for the voluntary limitation of the use of the veto, as well as the consideration of a qualifying mechanism. Third, the Benelux countries reiterate that the General Assembly should play a more proactive role when the Security Council fails to act due to the use of the veto, in order to enhance accountability and building on the landmark veto initiative debates and the emergency special sessions convened over recent years. Mr. Chair, Madam Chair, the Benelux countries remain fully committed to a reform that makes the Security Council more inclusive, representative, transparent, accountable, legitimate, and effective. You can count on our constructive engagement as we continue this important work. I thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of Belgium. I now give the floor to the Kingdom of Bahrain.

It is my pleasure to deliver this statement on behalf of the Arab Group. We express our appreciation

to His Excellency Ambassador Tarek Al-Banai, Permanent Representative of the State of Kuwait, and Her Excellency Ambassador Liz Van Heren, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, for their laudable management of the IGN deliberations and for preserving the momentum of these very important negotiations. Distinguished co-chairs, the Arab Group stresses that the issue of the veto is closely linked to the issue of just representation. Any attempt to tackle it, therefore, must be based on the principle of equality amongst members and must address the structural imbalances within the composition of the Council. As for proposals to establish a new category of permanent members without the right to the veto, we consider that this approach raises serious concerns on the entrenchment of a two-tiered hierarchy within the permanent membership category. To address such concerns, we reiterate that any expansion within the permanent membership. Must be based on full equality of rights and privileges so as to prevent the entrenchment of long-term imbalances. As for the extension of the right of the veto to new permanent members, we consider that if the veto is to remain, the principle of equality requires that new permanent members acquire the same privileges, including the right to the veto. We consider that this extension must be made within a comprehensive and balanced reform that takes into account the responsibilities of the Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, so as to at the same time prevent any reduction of its effectiveness. As for constraints on the use of veto as a basis for broader consensus, the Arab Group considers that that regulating the use of the veto may constitute a prelude to broader consensus, provided that that be based on the principle of non-discrimination between current and new permanent members. In this regard, we might. Consider accountability and transparency measures, measures such as voluntary restraint of the use of veto in under certain circumstances, namely when violations are committed and when those lead to the undermining of international peace and security and curtail the credibility of the Council and its ability to shoulder its responsibilities. Responsibilities. As for qualifying mechanisms, the Arab Group considers that any mechanism of such sort must strike a delicate balance between the prerogatives of permanent members and the accountability of the member— of the Council before the wider membership. In this regard, we may consider a number of options, including a commitment to provide a written formal justification of the use of the veto, or considering other structural mechanisms that strengthen accountability, such as, um, the condition of a greater concurrence within the Council or within regional groups, without any prejudice to the functions of the Council. Distinguished co-chairs, we stress that any discussion on the right of the veto must not be be separated from our discussion on inequitable representation. The Arab group, despite its demographic and political weight, remains without any permanent representation within the Council. Any genuine reform, therefore, must ensure a permanent Arab representation with all necessary prerogatives in addition to adequate representation within the non-permanent memberships. The goal of the reform within the Council is not confined to the redistribution of seats, but rather seeks to strike a balance within its composition to enhance its effectiveness and credibility. We stress our commitment to constructively contribute to these negotiations to pave the way for consensus so as to reflect the aspirations of the international community. I thank the representative of the Kingdom of Bahrain. To the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea. Thank you, co-chairs. Allow me to begin

by reaffirming my delegation's support for your role as able co-chairs.

The Republic of Korea aligns itself with the statement made by the Permanent representative of Italy on behalf of the Unifying for Consensus Group. I would now like to add a few points in my national capacity. At the outset, I wish to recall in September 2024, our leaders adopted the Pact for the Future, establishing clear and common principles in Action 39 for reformed Security Council. detailing that it must be more efficient, effective, representative, democratic, and accountable. First, expanding the veto— expanding the veto fundamentally contradicts the principle of an effective and efficient council. From 1946 through the end of 2025, the veto was wielded 310 times. many times. Decades of practice demonstrate that a single veto is enough to prevent the Council from effectively fulfilling its primary mandate. Increasing the number of veto-improwing members will not neutralize existing ones. It will simply institutionalize further paralysis of the Security Council. Second, The expansion of the veto is difficult to reconcile with the principles of an accountable, representative, and democratic Council. By its very nature, the veto is a prerogative that may limit the transparency and accountability expected by the wider membership. True accountability cannot rely on the voluntary stand of a few states. Third, expanding the veto runs counter to the prevailing global trends among the vast majority of member states toward restricting, restricting the use of the veto. We have seen broad support for veto restraint, as demonstrated by the consensus adoption of Liechtenstein-led Resolution 76/262, widely known as the Veto Initiative. In addition, initiatives calling for voluntary veto restraint in the cases, in the cases of mass atrocities, namely the ACT Code of Conduct and the French-Mexico Political Declaration. As a staunch supporter of such collective efforts, the Republic of Korea firmly believes that The broad international support for these mechanisms reflect a clear UN-wide recognition that the veto must be restrained, not expanded. Thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea. May I give the floor now to the distinguished

representative of France. Permanent members to hinder the Security Council in its efforts to support security in the Strait of Hormuz on the

7th of April. In this situation, as in so many others, France regrets the increasing use of the veto, which has reached levels never before seen since the end of the Cold War. More vetoes have been used in the past decade, 2016 to 2025, than in the previous 25 years, from 1991 to 2015, with a clear acceleration since 2022. Ladies and gentlemen, co-chairs, France's position on the veto in the context of Security Council reform is clear. We consider that it is legitimate that candidates for a permanent member seat ask for all of the prerogatives associated with that status, including the veto. At the same time, France considers that the veto is not a privilege, but a particular responsibility. Abusive use of it harms the effectiveness of the Security Council and the full exercise of the mandate entrusted to it by the United Nations Charter, namely the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. What we are proposing is simple. It's not an abolition of the veto, even a partial one. It does not involve modifying the United Nations Charter or taking away from anyone prerogatives that are granted to them by that text. What we are calling for, together with Mexico since 2015, is a collective and voluntary suspension of the use of the veto in the Security Council of the United Nations in the case of mass atrocities. That is to say, in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crime and large-scale war crimes. In such situations, the inability of the Security Council to act weakens the moral and political authority of the United Nations and increases mistrust of the multilateral system. Ladies and gentlemen, co-chairs, our initiative does not aim to replace reform of the Security Council, which is essential. In the immediate term, it aims to generate a political commitment through which each of the permanent members would commit to not using their veto right in the face of mass atrocities. This would thus allow the Security Council to act decisively and in an appropriate timeframe. To conclude, France considers that this initiative comes in response to a significant expectation by member states, as we see from the 107 supporters that have signed up since it was launched, and we invite all of those that have not not yet done so, in particular the permanent members, but all member states in fact, to join our initiative, which can be done through a simple note verbale. Support would send a strong message in favor of action-oriented multilateralism, and it would help achieve concrete results for the peoples of the planet. Thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of France. And I now give the floor to the distinguished representative

of Egypt. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you for your letter dated 7th of April and for the guiding questions that aim to advance our

discussion on one of the most sensitive and consequential elements of the reform process: the question of the veto. The question of the veto cannot be addressed in isolation from the broader objective of achieving a comprehensive, just, and lasting reform of the United Nations Security Council. At its core, the current configuration, including the veto, reflects historical realities that no longer correspond respond to today's geopolitical landscape, particularly the underrepresentation of Africa on the Council and its total lack of representation in the Permanent Category. Egypt aligns itself with the statements delivered by Sierra Leone on behalf of the African Group and by Bahrain on behalf of the Arab Group and wishes to add the following remarks. On the first question regarding proposals for new permanent members without veto rights, Egypt considers that this approach risks institutionalizing and normalizing inequality within the Council. The creation of a second class of permanent membership would contradict the very principle of sovereign equality of states. From our perspective, Any expansion in the permanent category must ensure full parity in rights and responsibilities. Anything short of that would not— would perpetuate existing imbalances in a new form. Second, concerning the extension of veto rights to new permanent members, Egypt reiterated their principal position just spelled out and pronounced by the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone and others, that as long as the veto exists, it must be extended to all permanent members, both current and new. However, we also stress that the veto, by its very nature, is inherently inconsistent with the principles of transparency, accountability, and democratic decision-making. Ideally, it should be abolished. Yet, in the absence of consensus on its elimination, its extension becomes a matter of equity and common justice. Third, Egypt sees merit in the possible limitations on the use of the veto and in mechanisms that could enhance accountability and mitigate abuse by current permanent members. Initiatives such as voluntary restraint, particularly in situations involving mass atrocities and genocides, could be useful. However, such measures must not be used as a permanent remedy to the question of veto, or as a pretext for inaction or postponement of this question. Co-chairs, ultimately, the question before us which these negotiations are concerned with in accordance with its founding mandate, is not how to regulate the veto or limit its use, but rather how to ensure that a reformed Security Council is more democratic, more representative, more accountable, and more responsive to the needs of the entire membership, including through addressing the fundamental aberration to the Charter that is the veto in a comprehensive, and just manner once and for all. I thank you. أشكر ممثل جمهورية مصر العربية المواقع. And I now give the floor to the distinguished representative. I thank the distinguished

representative. Muchas gracias. Thank you very much, Mr. Co-chair, and my thanks to both of you for all of your work. Thank you very much for everything

that you are doing. We very much value it. For our part, we align with the statement delivered by Italy on behalf of United for Consensus, the group that we belong to, and I'm going to add a few thoughts in my national capacity in which I will also try to follow the advice and the appeal issued by the distinguished Ambassador of the Netherlands that we also among ourselves try to find points of convergence and subjects where we can move together on the subjects that we're discussing in this meeting. For Spain, something that's very important that many of the regional groups and some delegations have mentioned is the way in which the veto affects the efficiency, effectiveness, and legitimacy of the Council. Some delegations have already referred to a very important point, which is that simply the threat of the use of the veto can slow down or obstruct the work of the Council, and using the veto then leads to paralysis. And all of this also affects the legitimacy of the Security Council at a time when, as we know, we are going through very complicated times when there is a great deal of questioning of multilateral institutions and so on and so forth. And so we believe that this item is very important. That point is very important. And we can also see that there are other delegations in groups that agree to the same. So in our view, this is a totally anachronistic tool at this point in our history. It gives totally disproportionate power to the permanent members. I would also like to refer to the initiative put forward by Liechtenstein on Article 27 of the Charter. Spain is one of the countries that has supported that from the very beginning, and we think that it's very important As other groups and other states have also said in the course of the discussions today, it's very important that the Charter be complied with in full and that we also have a commitment that an implementation of the commitments we made in the Pact for the Future. We believe that that initiative could provide very important elements of transparency and accountability. And my final point would refer to an argument that has been used. By some delegations in today's meeting and in other meetings that we've had on the question of the veto, and that is the question of justice. For us, we really don't think that keeping the veto is a question of justice. On the contrary, if we really want just reform of the Security Council, we need then to work for a Security Council that is much more representative, that is much more legitimate and much more democratic. And therefore, in order to achieve that, the abolition of the veto and the restricted use of the veto in the current circumstances is important. Thank you very much. I thank the distinguished representative of Spain, and I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Türkiye. Thank

you, co-chair. I thank you for convening this meeting of the IGN dedicated to the question of the veto, a matter that lies at the

very heart of Security Council reform and is an intrinsic component of the 5 clusters. Turkey fully aligns itself with the statement delivered by the distinguished Permanent Representative of Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus Group. I would also like to make the following remarks in my national capacity. Distinguished co-chairs, Turkey has long maintained that the current composition of and working methods of the Security Council no longer reflects today's geopolitical realities. The veto in particular stands out as one of the most significant factors limiting the Council's credibility, effectiveness, and representativeness. In principle, Turkey considers the veto to be an outdated historical relic that sits uneasily with the principles of sovereign equality, democracy, and accountability enshrined in the UN Charter. Its use, including the threat of use, has at times prevented the Council from acting decisively in the face of humanitarian catastrophes and threats to international peace and security. This is weakening the confidence in the multilateral system and undermining the crucial work of the Council. Ideally, the veto should be abolished. In the absence of a realistic prospect for the consent of those holding this prerogative to relinquish it, Turkey believes that member states must work collectively on practical measures to restrain the use of veto and enhance accountability. In this vein, Turkey has consistently supported initiatives aimed at limiting the use of veto in circumstances involving genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Such voluntary commitments are important steps towards a more responsible exercise of the veto and reflect the expectations of the broader membership. Turkey is ready to engage constructively in discussions on how these efforts can be consolidated, strengthened, or further institutionalized. We also attach importance to greater transparency and accountability in the use of veto. We therefore welcome GA decision 76. Widely known as the veto initiative. This initiative strengthens the role of the General Assembly and reinforces the principle that the wider membership should be able to scrutinize the Council's actions or inaction when the veto is exercised. We also consistently stress the importance of fully respecting and implementing the Charter, including Article 27, in the Council's decision-making process. Equally, we believe that any discussion on the veto cannot be separated from broader questions of representation and working methods. In this regard, Turkey continues to advocate for strengthening the role and number of elected members in order to balance the concentration of power associated with permanent members and the veto. Distinguished Co-Chairs, Security Council reform should strengthen, not diminish, our collective ability to maintain international peace and security. It should enhance the Council's legitimacy, effectiveness, and representativeness while remaining faithful to the principles and purposes of the Charter. Turkey remains firmly committed to a comprehensive, transparent, and inclusive reform process. We stand ready to continue engaging constructively with all member states and negotiating groups to advance a balanced and realistic reform that can garner the broad all this possible support. Thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of Türkiye for his statement, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative

of Colombia. Co-facilitators, colleagues, I'd like to take this opportunity to commend your work as co-facilitators and for the efforts that you are making

to generate dialogue. Colombia also aligns with the statement by the Permanent Representative of Italy on behalf of United for Consensus, and I would like to make the following statement in my national capacity. The position of Colombia has been one of principle and it has been consistent since the Charter was negotiated in San Francisco. We do not support The veto nor the allocation of permanent members in the Security Council as it runs counter to the principle of sovereign equality of states. We understood at the time that the world needed this organization and that this was the compromise that we had to take on in order to save coming generations from the scourge of war. Today, nevertheless, we are discussing a vision for the future of the United Nations in light of something that is obvious, which is that the veto is the institutional arrangement that most affects the organization's ability to fulfill its functions of preserving international peace and security. And therefore, co-facilitators, the position of my country remains firm today. We were already skeptical 80 years ago, but now we are fully convinced that more vetoes will mean more paralysis and less trust in this organization. For my country, it is hard to understand that the Council cannot find consensus to face— to act in the face of the high levels of cruelty and barbarity, and it is unacceptable that with a negative vote from a permanent member, the organization is not able to act in the face of mass atrocities or crimes against humanity, even when it is affirmed that the veto is not a power or a privilege, but rather a responsibility. Regarding the reform needed to overcome this situation, we recognize the difficulties in achieving the ideal scenario, which would be its abolition. We stress the value of provisional initiatives to limit its use, such as those promoted by Mexico and France, and in order to encourage accountability, such as the one led by Liechtenstein and adopted by the General Assembly. Co-facilitators, Colombia has called for progress in these negotiations with a sincere spirit of compromise, building on the common interests we have in improving the efficiency, effectiveness, democracy, and accountability of the Council. None of these objectives can be achieved by expanding the veto. My country remains committed to this process. We are open to hearing proposals and we stand ready to contribute achieving a reform that will achieve the broadest possible political support rooted in a spirit of accountability and commitment by all members. Thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of Colombia and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Indonesia. Thank you,

co-chairs. I thank you for convening this focused discussion. On the question of veto as we strive to translate the IGN process into tangible

progress. Indonesia regrets the Council's continued inability to effectively fulfill its mandate, as evidenced by the paralysis and deadlock on various draft resolutions. The demand for a decisive and agile Council has never been more urgent. In this regard, any deliberation on the question of veto should aim to increase the democratic nature of the Council and its accountability to wider UN membership. Indonesia wishes to highlight the following points. First, regulating the veto is a necessary transitional step towards eventual abolition of the veto. Limitations to its use must serve as the basis for broader consensus. We welcome the discussion on developing a robust qualifying mechanism to balance the prerogative of permanent members with the Council's accountability to the General Assembly. This should include strengthening the obligation on the vetoing member to provide a formal transparent justification to the membership at large. Second, we must ensure that any reform efforts align with equitable geographic representation. Any discussions on the two-tiered permanent membership must be designed to dilute, not reinforce, the current concentration of power. We cannot support a reform that merely expands the number of members without enhancing the Council's overall representative legitimacy and operational effectiveness. Finally, the importance of flexibility and building on convergence. We must remain constructive to innovative ideas and demonstrate political wisdom and look beyond rigid positions. Indonesia welcomes any discussions that keeps the momentum of the reform alive, including on recent initiatives to address the current lack of implementation of Article 27. Indonesia stands ready to engage with proposals on regulations of the COFITO as a catalyst for a more representative and and functional Council. Co-chairs, the call for a Council that reflects the complexities of the 21st century can no longer be ignored. As we navigate this path towards reform, rest assured of Indonesia's commitment towards a Council that delivers on its promise of peace for all. I thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of Indonesia, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative I would like to thank you, both of

you co-chairs, for convening this session, a very important discussion. At the outset, I would like to align my delegation

with the statement delivered by the distinguished Permanent Representative of Italy, on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus Group. Together with a large majority of member states, we firmly believe that the paralysis that we see often at the Security Council leading to inaction on crucial matters related to international peace and security stems from the misuse or abuse of the veto power by the permanent members. This point of view is widely shared even outside the UN, in the think tanks, academia, media, and civil society. And there is an overwhelming sentiment against the veto and how actually this privilege is anachronistic today, along with the permanent membership. Yet co-chairs' proposals to expand veto-wielding members persist. So how can this dichotomy be defended? We believe that the problem cannot be the solution. Pakistan's policy position remains clear and consistent. The veto should either be abolished or, at a minimum, its use by the current permanent members severely restricted. Any expansion of the veto or addition of new individual permanent members is firmly opposed by us, as more vetoes would only aggravate the problem that we are facing. And this is a position of principle. However, we also realize that the power of veto remains a reality of the Charter, and the P5 are largely united in preserving this privilege and would resist any dilution. Pakistan therefore supports efforts to enhance accountability and transparency in the use of the veto, including existing mechanisms enabling the General Assembly to review and debate its use. We believe that such initiatives are designed to reinvigorate the charter functions of the General Assembly and not impinge upon the IGN's consideration of Security Council reform. Colleagues, the recent pattern of veto use in the Security Council merits a reality check. Notwithstanding the veto initiative, the frequency of vetoes has risen. This trend reinforces the need to explore measures that can increase the political cost of the veto within and outside the Council. Moreover, we all know that veto is primarily the power to block decisions of the Council, and we need to address and balance this blocking power through more democratic means. In our view, the most realistic way to raise the political cost of veto and to counterbalance its blocking power is not by creating new vetoes, but by increasing the number of elected members of the Security Council. Increased number of elected members will tilt the balance away from the permanent members. We can agree this is, this is the reality, not the counterintuitive claim by some, primarily the aspirants, that increasing the number of elected members will not lead to rebalancing of the Council. Accordingly, co-chairs, in a reformed Council with more elected members, the burden of vetoing a resolution will increase markedly, as it would be countering the wishes and positions of an even higher number of members with affirmative votes in favor of a resolution. Keeping the current ratio 16 affirmative votes would be required in a council of, say, 26. We can agree on a higher ratio, say 17 or 18 affirmative votes that would be required. And this is how the veto's blocking power can be balanced, not through another undemocratic veto, but through through the collective weight of non-permanent members. When a permanent member blocks action that was backed by a broad majority, the veto becomes more isolated and harder to justify, increasing accountability and its reputational cost. Co-chairs, the power of veto also empowers the permanent members to influence the outcome of Council's decisions once they are aligned on a certain issue. So they only need to persuade 4 other members to get a resolution adopted. But by enhancing the number of affirmative votes through elected members, the power of the permanent members to influence decisions will be reduced. as it would now be required to bring a greater number of members on board, thereby enhancing broader representation. Now, as compared to all these options, imagine a council of 11 to 13 permanent members and the ensuing chaos in decision-making and the effectiveness of the Security Council. Colleagues, another collective interests is to reach an understanding as part of a reformed Council that would require the concurrence of all members of a region for adoption of any resolution related to that region. This would, on one hand, raise the political cost of casting a veto on any situation related to that region. And on the other hand, even more importantly, this will strengthen the regional ownership in decision-making. It could be of particular interest to regional groups such as Africa that is increasingly asserting a regional perspective through representatives, through its representatives on the Council, and which is fundamentally different from the pursuit of individual interests and privileges by others. And we think such an arrangement can also apply to the Arab Group. Co-chairs, I would like to conclude by saying that the Security Council reform must be comprehensive and addressed as a single undertaking, including the question of veto, which is inextricably linked to the other 4 clusters of reform. We oppose deferring this issue or addressing it in isolation. And we have repeatedly heard from colleagues since this morning the emphasis on some of the core and agreed principles like democracy, representation, accountability, effectiveness, and transparency as the foundation for Security Council reform. The veto, in our view, runs counter to each one of those principles. We must seriously reflect on this contradiction. That is why we say that if we want a reform for all, there must be no privilege for anyone. I thank you. Thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Germany. Thank you, distinguished

co-chairs. Germany aligns itself with the statement that has been delivered by Brazil on behalf of the Group of 4. I would like to add

a few additional points in national capacity. First in here, I would like to echo some of the statements that have been made this morning and many others in previous sessions on the same topic. We understand concerns about creating different categories of permanent membership, one without veto rights, one with. We agree that no reform should create a second class of permanent members. In principle, new member— new permanent members should carry the same responsibilities and the same obligations as the current ones. At the same time, we believe the issue must be handled with realism and this topic should not be used as a pretext to block the urgently needed reform of the Security Council. We therefore have proposed in the past an interim arrangement and it has been referenced by my colleague from Brazil. New permanent members should not exercise the veto right until a decision on the matter has been taken during a review which should take place 15 years after a successful reform. Second, we remain convinced that any discussion of veto rights must be part— must be part of a broader reform package, a package that improves both the Council's representativeness and its ability to act. This being said, a discussion on how to limit use of the veto could help build wider consensus around such a comprehensive package. Limitation to the veto rights can contribute to safeguarding the Council's effectiveness once new permanent members are added to the Security Council. At the same time, we believe it is instructive to look at the reality in the Security Council as it is today. Only 2 out of 5 current permanent members have not exercised their veto power since 1989, and this shows we believe that permanent membership, current and future, does not necessarily require a regular use of the veto power. Third, on veto restraint, Germany strongly supports the French-Mexican initiative on veto restraint in case of mass atrocity. We also support the ACT Group's Code of Conduct. These initiatives promote restraint, responsibility, and accountability in the face of crimes against humanity. Finally, we kindly remind that there is already an important restriction of the veto right in the Charter. According to Article 27, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting under certain circumstances. We are in favor of considering steps to clarify the application of this provision. Chairs, in conclusion, for us the goal remains to strengthen the Council's credibility and effectiveness. In this context, yes, the veto question is important and yes, it needs to be addressed, but asking to clarify it first would mean putting the carriage before the horse. What we need now is a movement towards a consolidated model based on the many inputs of member states in the past 2 years, and this is where we believe we must move forward now. Thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of Germany, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Switzerland. Merci, Madame. Thank you,

co-chairs. Switzerland thanks you for having convened this meeting. We welcome the sustained commitment shown by member states to bring

about a comprehensive reform of the Security Council. Aiming to make it more representative, more effective, and more legitimate. Veto power is at the heart of this ambition. The use of the veto is not a simple procedural challenge, but it is a governance one. Institutions are not weakened by their rules, but rather by practices which decouple power from responsibility. Consequently, the veto must not be understood as a privilege, but rather as a unique responsibility in the maintenance of of international peace and security. Allow me, consequently, to emphasize the initiatives which aim to better oversee and manage the use of the veto. Firstly, Switzerland actively supports voluntary commitments aiming to restrict the use of the veto, particularly in situations involving a genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. As coordinator of the ACT Group, Switzerland promotes the implementation of the ACT Code of conduct regarding Security Council action against atrocities. More than two-thirds of Member States have already approved this effort. We call upon those that have not yet done so to join that effort. Switzerland also reaffirms its support for the Franco-Mexican initiative on the suspension of the veto in cases of mass atrocities. In support of these efforts, we supported the study Living with the Veto. This was published by Security Council Report. It analyses the effects of the veto and proposes additional measures to limit the use of the veto and to promote the more responsible use of it. We encourage delegations to draw inspiration from the conclusions of this study as they examine practical ways forward to forge ahead with our goals. Switzerland attaches particular importance to the compliance with the Charter and to the smooth functioning of the Council. In this connection, we underscore the importance of Article 27 Against that backdrop, we align ourselves with the statement made by Liechtenstein. We support the draft resolution which aims to strengthen the implementation of it. This is crucial to guarantee that the Council is able to act, including when one of its members is party to a dispute. These efforts serve to bolster the Council's ability to act and to discharge its mandate. By way of conclusion, I wish to say that the guiding questions put forward by the co-chairs are vital. They must be examined in depth in view of concrete proposals. Switzerland is convinced that solutions do exist. These solutions, if they are to come to pass, require transparent dialogue and text-based negotiations. The veto is not supposed to be a right to put up a stumbling block, but rather a responsible ultimate tool for decision-making and the use of responsibility in there. It should be exercised to protect international peace as part of collective responsibility. It is the respect of a balance between realism and what is ideal rooted in the Charter, and we must preserve that balance and be responsible and measured. Thank you. Thank you, Switzerland, for her statement. And I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Kenya. Co-chairs, Kenya aligns itself to the statement by

the representative of Sierra Leone on behalf of the African I would like to make a few thoughts on our national capacity.

The veto is a structural feature of the Security Council designed to keep the major powers engaged in the multilateral system and prevent decisions that could trigger direct confrontation among them. Article 27 requires that the Council members party to a dispute abstain from voting on decisions under Chapter 6. Yet practice has diverged sharply from principle. The veto has often been used to protect narrow national interests rather than to uphold collective security. When wielded, the Council cannot act and civilian populations bear the heaviest costs. The Council's paralysis erodes global confidence in the Council and weakens the broader UN peace and security architecture. How then can the veto be exercised responsibly? The question of the veto is intricately linked to the discussions on the categories of membership, particularly its expansion. The common African position fundamentally opposes the veto. However, if it is to be retained, it ought to be extended to all new permanent members. Kenya fully supports this position. Additionally, Kenya encourages regretting its use if it is retained. We view it through 2 interrelated and mutually reinforcing lenses, the procedural and the structural, that serve as a basis for responsible use of the veto. The procedural dimension relates to its use within the existing chapter framework— charter framework. Kenya proposes the idea of constructive veto. Any state exercising this privilege should put forward a credible alternative proposal that can command the Council's support. This could not only improve the Council's practice but also strengthen its legitimacy. In the permanent category with all rights extended and an increase in the number of non-permanent member seats. As long as decisions affecting African lives can be vetoed without African voices in the room, the legitimacy and fairness of the Council remain fundamentally compromised. Further, the G8 must continue to serve as a check In cases of mass atrocities such as genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. Co-chairs, Kenya discourages the use of the veto to shield parties from accountability or to obstruct action in situations of mass suffering. The veto must not be an instrument of impunity or geopolitical rivalry. it must be exercised in a manner that supports rather than obstructs the Council's primacy responsibility, maintaining international peace and security and ensuring that multilateralism delivers for all. I thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of Kenya for his statement, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Japan. Thank you, co-chairs. Japan fully

aligns with Brazil's statement on behalf of the G4. I will make additional remarks in my national capacity. As set out in the Pact for the Future,

it is imperative to intensify efforts to reach an agreement on the future of the veto, including discussions on limiting its scope and use. From this perspective, Japan reaffirms that the French-Mexican initiative and ACT Group's Code of Conduct are valuable efforts as immediate measures that do not require amending the UN Charter. These initiatives are not, however, supported by all permanent members of the Council. Japan therefore continues to urge all permanent members who have not done so to commit to voluntary restraint on the use of veto without delay and to implement this commitment accordingly. Japan also reiterates the need to fully implement and adhere to all provisions of the Charter as they relate to the decision-making process in the Council, including Article 27, paragraph 3, as stated in the Pact for the Future. Despite all these initiatives, a more fundamental issue is the need for a solution to the existing imbalance within the Council In terms of the veto, Japan as a G4 member takes the position that new permanent members should, as a principle, have the same responsibilities and obligations as current permanent members. In this regard, Japan reiterates that G4 shares the same position as the African Group in that the veto should be made available to the new permanent members so long as it exists. On this basis, In this case, the G4 takes the position that the new permanent members shall not exercise the veto until a decision on the matter has been taken during a review to be held 15 years after the coming into force of the reform. This is to offer flexibility while maintaining the principle in order to resolve issues surrounding the veto from a practical perspective and allow for constructive negotiation. As emphasized in the G4 statement, expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories is essential to make the Council truly more democratic and accountable. This could also increase the chances of exploring newer approaches to the veto seriously. On the occasion of this 80th session, we must make concrete progress on developing a consolidated model Japan remains committed to contributing constructively to this end. I thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of Japan for his statement, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Argentina. Muchas gracias, señor. Thank

you very much, Madam Co-chair. Argentina wishes to begin by thanking you for the convening of this new IGN meeting on Security Council reform. We wish

to begin by stating that Argentina aligns itself with the statement made by Italy on behalf of Uniting for Consensus. And now we wish to make the following points in our national capacity. As a founding member of the United Nations, Argentina has remained consistent in its position on the veto. Its very existence. This prerogative was crafted in a unique historical context. It has over time proven to be incompatible with the principles of the sovereign equality of states and with the democratic and efficient functioning of the multilateral system. Indeed, experience acquired over decades lays bare the fact that the veto is a tool which, far from bolstering the Security Council's capacity for action undermines that capacity. Its use, and even the mere threat of its use, dictates the course of negotiation processes and distorts balances between Council members. Furthermore, it is paradoxical to note that the veto tends to be used most frequently precisely in times when crises are at their peak, times when the Council must act more quickly and more efficiently to maintain international peace. peace and security. Under these circumstances, the very credibility of the Council itself is undermined, as well as that of the collective security system as a whole. Argentina is fully cognizant of the fact that the inherent complexities of this issue cannot hinder progress with concrete measures designed to restrict the use of the veto. With that in mind, my country has acceded to the Franco-Mexican initiative Which promotes the non-use of the veto in situations of mass atrocities. We believe that moving further in this direction is a substantive and necessary step forward. Elsewhere, Argentina wishes to underscore the importance of full compliance with the second part of Article 27.3 of the UN Charter. As such, we appeal to Member States to promote its application in situations set forth in Chapter 6 of the Charter or in Article 53, Para 3. It is appropriate to underscore, Co-Chairs, that the last time that a state abstained from participating in a vote because it was party to a dispute was in 1960, and that state was precisely Argentina. This precedent demonstrates that the provisions of the Charter provide valuable tools that must be used more actively and systematically. As such, Argentina urges member states to make use of all the tools provided for in the United Nations Charter to improve the functioning of the Security Council, as well as to ensure more balanced decision-making and to preserve the legitimacy of the multilateral system. Finally, my delegation reiterates its commitment to comprehensive reform of the Security Council. This reform must make it more representative, transparent, transparent, democratic, and effective without that reform involving the extending of privileges such as the veto to new members. On the contrary, any reform must move towards limiting and ultimately eradicating those mechanisms which hinder collective action to bring about peace. Thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of Argentina for his statement, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation. Distinguished

co-chairs, Russia welcomes the convening of another informal meeting of the General Assembly within the framework of the intergovernmental negotiations on Security

Council reform. We consistently emphasize the unique nature and sole legitimacy of this platform for considering all aspects of reform. Today's topic, the veto right, is one of the most thorny and widely debated issues in the reform process. It is the subject of separate side events and informal discussions. High-profile coalitions have been formed and initiatives have been proposed to limit the use of this right in the Security Council. The logic being pursued by the proponents of these initiatives is clear. It is largely aimed at a broad audience which can easily and conveniently be persuaded that all of the United Nations' problems stem from the permanent members who are allegedly obstructing the settlement of conflict situations. A simplified narrative is being created and promoted that it is the P5 or certain members that are blocking compromise within the council and undermining its legitimacy. I would like once again to assure you that this sort of reasoning is erroneous and detached from reality. It is well known in professional diplomatic circles that the veto mechanism is the cornerstone of the functioning of the United Nations. Its emergence was the result of lessons that were learned from the practice of the League of Nations. Without this right, the organization would inevitably meet the same fate. It is difficult to imagine that the UN, particularly during the Cold War or in today's turbulent times, could have survived even a single decade without this balancing mechanism. Forcing a limitation of it is unrealistic. We need to acknowledge this and move on. The added value of initiatives on the voluntary restriction or restraint of the veto is also fairly dubious. Behind the noble veneer of preventing genocide and crimes against humanity lies a divergence in interpretations of various international events, their causes, and also the possible consequences of decisions that were taken. We don't need to look very far to find examples. For example, in 2011, no veto was used with regard to Libya. A military operation was carried out and it is now absolutely clear that that led not only to the collapse of Libyan statehood but also to the destabilization of half of the African continent. This is a classic example of an expansive interpretation of a Security Council resolution. And it being used as a cover for self-serving political objectives. In such cases, the use of the veto is the only way to prevent the adoption of decisions that not only undermine the authority of the Security Council, but which are also capable of harming international peace and security and further exacerbating disagreements in a given region and ultimately harming ordinary people. It was precisely on this basis that we decided jointly with China to block a one-sided draft Security Council resolution on the Strait of Hormuz on the 7th of April, which failed to take into account the root causes of the conflict and whose adoption implicitly would have legalized the use of force against Iran. It's no secret that Western members of the Security Council often view its decisions as a punitive instrument against undesirable states regardless of the ostensibly noble pretexts under which they are advanced. Western delegations frequently introduce intrusive politicized drafts replete with didactic overtones whose sole purpose is to protect the geopolitical interests of the former colonial countries and to impose Western models of development on other states. We cannot allow the UN Security Council to be used for such ignoble, overtly neocolonial purposes. Therefore, we stand ready to use the veto without hesitation when it comes to defending international law and state sovereignty against arbitrary action and pressure, and also to restoring justice. We are also always prepared to openly the reasons that have led us to do so. Russia consistently seeks to resolve all disagreements before a vote. As statistics on the adoption of resolutions show, the Council manages to reach agreement in the overwhelming majority of cases. The threat of the use of the veto plays an important role in this, encouraging delegations to work on the text, propose amendments where necessary, necessary and to put forward alternative proposals. That is, to do everything that makes up the essence of multilateral diplomacy and the foundations of a multipolar world in which every Council member's vote matters. In this way, the veto encourages Council members to act responsibly, taking into account the views of others, regardless of geopolitical differences. And of course, the veto is a measure of last resort. When other options have been exhausted. In other words, the veto is not a privilege. It is rather an inalienable instrument for achieving consent and agreement in the Security Council. We are convinced that it is not the veto itself that should be criticized, but rather the unwillingness of certain Council members to listen to and take into account the views of others and to find compromise and balanced solutions. We regularly encounter situations in which Western delegations submit for a vote drafts that they know to be unacceptable as they are well aware in advance. In conclusion, co-chairs, we believe that another aspect of the veto issue should be substantively examined, namely the use by Western countries and their satellites of the so-called hidden veto whereby in many situations by virtue of their overrepresentation in the council they simply prevent their opponents from securing the number of votes required for the adoption of a Security Council resolution. We expect that this unseemly situation will be rectified in the course of Security Council reform, which should increase the proportional representation on the Council of developing countries from Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Thank you very much. I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation for his statement, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico. Thank you very much indeed,

co-chair. Mexico shares the position expressed by Italy on behalf of the Movement Uniting for Consensus, UFC, and we support the statement made by Liechtenstein

on behalf of a group of countries interested in restricting the use of the veto. The veto has in practice become a hindrance to the maintenance and/or restoration of peace. The most recent cases demonstrate how the use of the veto or the threat of its use create paralysis within the Council and limit its ability to respond to gargantuan international security crises. The existence of the veto perpetuates a hierarchy which was established in the discussions at San Francisco in 1945. Today, that hierarchy is difficult to swallow in view of the principle of legal equality between states, accountability, and democracy. That's not to mention the fact it undermines the Council's primary responsibility to maintain, maintain peace and undermines the very credibility of the organization. Extending the privilege of the veto to potential new members of the Council contradicts the need to have a decision-making process which is more efficient and effective in the face of new threats. Mexico continues to question the validity of the veto and reaffirms its staunch support for efforts designed to restrict the veto's use. Particularly in situations which involve mass atrocities, war crimes, and grave violations of international humanitarian law. Moreover, we advocate for the furtherance of the Franco-Mexican initiative for the voluntary restriction of the veto in these cases. We also champion the universal adoption of the ACT Code of Conduct. Moreover, appeal to states that have not yet acceded to these initiatives to do so with the urgency that the issue requires. Moreover, any efforts to restrict the use of the veto must be viewed in the light of the Charter's provisions. Article 27, paragraph 3 establishes the obligation to abstain from voting For parties to a dispute in decisions adopted pursuant to Chapter VI, the effective application of that provision will serve to avoid situations in which the veto prevents the adoption of measures designed to peacefully resolve disputes, including the cessation of hostilities. Mexico sees the phrase party to a dispute as a definition applying to the following cases, in addition to those referred to by Liechtenstein. Cases in which a member of the Council has invoked Article 51 of the Charter against another state, cases in which judicial or arbitral proceedings are ongoing between a member of the Council and another state regarding the same situation, or cases in which substantive military support is being provided to a party to an armed conflict which is on the Council's agenda, inter alia. co-chairs. Mexico reaffirms its commitment to continuing to participate constructively in these discussions with a view to achieving a reform which strengthens the legitimacy, effectiveness, and the democratic nature of the Security Council. Thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for his statement, and I now give the floor to the distinguished I'd like to give the floor to the distinguished representative of Lithuania.

But if Lithuania is not ready, I will— then I will give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom. Thank you, co-chairs. Thank you for convening us today and for your continued efforts to bring member states together in pursuit of Security Council reform. The United Kingdom is clear that the veto

power should be exercised responsibly. Responsibly. We heard many delegations share this perspective in the latest General Assembly debate on the use of the veto. We recognize the gravity and responsibility that accompanies this power and have not exercised our own veto since 1989. The UK has consistently supported initiatives to strengthen transparency and accountability around the use of the veto. We were proud to co-sponsor the General Assembly resolution adopted in 2012 2022, enabling scrutiny over instances where the veto is used. We also remain a committed supporter of the Accountability, Coherence, and Transparency Group's Code of Conduct, through which we have pledged not to vote against a credible draft resolution aimed at preventing or ending a mass atrocity. We continue to encourage other members of the Council, as well as the broader membership, to join this initiative. Colleagues, the UK remains steadfast in its support for a reformed, more representative Council, which will be better placed to respond to today's global challenges. Reform should deliver a Council that is more representative of the world it seeks to serve, while remaining responsive and effective, and benefiting from the perspectives and experience of a broader cross-section of of the UN membership. Thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom for his statement, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Poland. Distinguished co-chairs, thank you for convening

today's meeting and for providing the guiding questions. In response, Poland advocates a democratic and accountable approach to this exercise. While there

is a broad agreement that the Security Council should better reflect contemporary realities and be more representative in its composition, this alone will not resolve its most fundamental shortcomings. The Council's recurring inability to effectively carry out its core mandate— maintaining international peace and security— stems primarily from the use of the veto. Expanding membership without addressing this structural constraint risks creating a larger, yet equally ineffective body. And let me be clear here, we support the inclusive format of the Council, but it is how the Council works, not how it looks, that is our key concern. For this reason, the veto and the use and non-use of the veto are key elements of this reform discussion. It is widely recognized that the veto has repeatedly hindered timely and decisive action. Proposals to extend veto privileges to additional members are difficult to justify. Not only would it move— or risk compounding existing dysfunctions, but it would also be challenging to explain to global public opinion, which demands of us accountability and effectiveness. There is little doubt that the veto will remain, in one way or another, a feature of the system. Its inclusion in 1945 was essential to to securing agreement among the major powers and establishing the current framework. However, the world has changed significantly since then. Expanding the Council does not automatically require replicating the veto. Reform efforts should avoid leveling down by entrenching mechanisms that have already proven problematic. Instead, attention should shift towards limiting the use of the veto, particularly through mechanisms that already exist, but have yet to be fully operationalized, such as the practical implementation of Article 27 of the UN Charter. Truth is, we can mitigate some of the most adverse effects of the veto without formal amendments to the Charter. At the same time, steps that strengthen the role of the non-permanent members deserve support, enhancing their capacity to participate meaningfully in decision-making processes would contribute to a more balanced and inclusive Council. Similarly, greater involvement of the General Assembly, such as the veto initiative, improves transparency and reinforces the legitimacy of the system. Co-chairs, to conclude, let me stress we should focus on achievable measures. This includes leveraging existing legal frameworks and advancing initiatives aimed at restraining the use of the veto. Only through targeted and realistic approach can the Security Council become more effective and responsive to today's challenges. The relevance of not only the Council, but the whole United Nations is at stake. I thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of Poland for his statement, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Austria. Distinguished co-chairs, Excellencies, colleagues. Austria aligns

itself with the statement delivered by Liechtenstein on behalf of the core group of the 27.3 initiative. Excellencies, colleagues, as Austria said

during the general debate on this item in November, the absence of Security Council reform is not a technical issue. It is a political failure that weighs heavily on the credibility of this organization. Our citizens rightly ask why the United Nations so often falls short of its promises. In the face of brutal wars, immense human suffering, and growing humanitarian crises, we cannot afford a council that is paralyzed. We need a council that delivers. Too often, the council remains blocked by the exercise of the veto by a permanent member. This makes it necessary to tackle the effectiveness, effectiveness and efficiency of the council head-on, including through intensified discussions on the question of the veto. The veto must no longer be a shield for impunity or inaction, and it must be a key consideration of reform. The Pact for the Future gives us a political mandate to continue discussions on its limitations, and we must not lose this momentum. Austria fully supports discussions on possible limitations of the veto. Many good suggestions have been made in the past. Such as introducing an override mechanism in the General Assembly, introducing the requirement for 2 or 3 countries to exercise the veto for it to count, or limiting the scope of the veto by restricting its applicability in cases of mass atrocities such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. All these suggestions that have been made in the context of the IGN merit honest consideration and reflection. While we pursue our efforts for reform of the Security Council by reviewing the UN Charter, we must not lose sight of the possibilities for change also within the remits of the current Charter, such as the ACT Code of Conduct and the French-Mexican initiative, which Austria continues to support. Additionally, the veto has never been absolute. The UN Charter foresees a clear limitation for a party to a dispute in Article 27. It sets out an obligatory abstention for a party to a dispute for resolutions tabled in the Security Council under Chapter 6 of the Charter. Building on the commitment made by our world leaders in paragraph 69 of the Pact for the Future, which Austria and Kuwait as then co-chairs of the IGN had the honor to facilitate, Austria supports further action to fully implement Article 27 of the Charter. This is why Austria joined the core group on a General Assembly resolution on the implementation of this article led by Liechtenstein, and we invite all member states to support this initiative. Finally, the veto initiative enshrined in GA Resolution 76262 was an important step to hold permanent members accountable for the exercise of the veto. We fully support that the General Assembly continues to implement and make full use of this initiative as set out in the Pact for the Future. I thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of Austria for his statement, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of China. Thank you, Mr. President. Thank you, Mr. President. Co-chairs, China welcomes

the convening of the 3rd meeting of the IGN on Security Council reform during this session of the General Assembly. We commend the efforts by the

co-chairs. China underscores that the IGN is the sole forum mandated by the General Assembly for discussing matters on Security Council reform. The question of the veto is one of the central topics of the IGN. As the veto power is a central issue in the resolution process and must be addressed as an integral part of a package solution to all 5 clusters of issues, China wishes to offer 3 observations. First, the veto power is a unique component of the institutional setup of the United Nations. It was born of lessons learned and experiences recorded in blood. In granting the veto power, the UN Charter recognizes the extraordinary contribution and sacrifices made by the 5 permanent members in achieving the victory of the world anti-fascist war. It was informed by lessons drawn from the failure of the League of Nations and was the result of thorough and thoughtful reflections. The veto always acts as the safety valve and cornerstone for the UN's collective security mechanism. In essence, it encourages major powers to communicate and coordinate with one another to build consensus, maintain international peace and security, and safeguard international fairness and justice. It must be pointed out that the reform should ultimately serve to preserve the outcomes of the victory of the Second World War and the postwar international order. There should be no room for doubt in this respect. Second, the existence of the veto has significant influence on the Security Council to keep in check its impulse to rashly authorize the use of force and instead to strive to create space for diplomacy and mediation. Hasty actions by the Council could aggravate tensions, lead to the escalation of conflicts, or even plunge the states concerned into chaos. Here, one would do well to think long and hard about relevant lessons from the past. Third, the veto is not a privilege, but a special responsibility conferred by the UN Charter, a responsibility that comes with high expectations. The permanent members should take the lead in discharging their duties under the Charter and exercise their veto power in a cautious and responsible manner. The key here lies in adopting an objective and impartial position and standing on the side of international justice. While we oppose the reckless abuse of the veto, we do not go along with the blanket negation of the veto without any regard to merits Where peace and security are at stake, China's position has always been objective and impartial, reflecting our commitment to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, uphold the basic norms governing international relations, and defend the legitimate and lawful rights and interests of developing countries. On the question of the veto, our approach has always been cautious and balanced. and responsible. As we consistently work to uphold international justice, facilitate political settlement, and seek to secure the last remaining space for diplomacy and mediation, we stay true to our word and consistent in our actions. The vetoes that China has cast are able to stand the test of time and history. We are ready to work with all member states to chart a course for Security Council reform that serves the common interests of member states and the long-term development of the United Nations. Thank you, Co-Chairs. I thank the distinguished representative of China for his statement, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of South Africa. Thank you, Co-Chairs. Co-Chairs, South Africa aligns with the statements

delivered on behalf of the Africa Group and the L69. Co-Chairs, we appreciate the convening of this plenary session on the question of the veto and the

guiding questions provided. In the Pact for the Future, our heads of state and government agreed that the question of the veto is a key element of Security Council reform, also to make it more representative, inclusive, transparent, efficient, effective, democratic, and accountable. In terms of your guiding questions, And the first question regarding the proposed two-tiered permanent membership. South Africa is of the view that the proposal for a two-tiered permanent membership cannot be considered at this stage, as there is no consensus on the proposed third category of permanent membership without veto rights. However, suggestions that the veto should remain the exclusive right of the 5 permanent members of the Security Council. Will only serve to perpetuate an inequitable status quo and undermine the principle of a democratic Security Council that should underpin its reform. South Africa, in accordance with a common African position, reiterates the need to enlarge the Security Council in both the permanent and non-permanent categories and accord the new permanent members the same prerogatives and privileges as the current permanent members, including the right of veto, for the Council to be more representative of the current UN membership and reflective of the realities and the contemporary world. On your second question, on conditions, if any, that should govern a proposed extension of the full veto rights, South Africa supports calls for the abolishment of the veto in principle. However, so long as it exists, and as a matter of common justice, it should be made available to all permanent members of an enlarged and reformed Security Council. This is consistent with a common African position and based on respect for the sovereign equality of all member states. Co-chairs, in terms of your question regarding limitations of the use of the veto, we note existing efforts aimed at limiting the use of the veto on matters concerning mass atrocities and war crimes, including the Mexico and France initiative and the Accountability, Coherence, and Transparency, or ACT, Group Code of Conduct. However, the continued use of the veto by some members of the Security Council despite these initiatives demonstrates that they do not guarantee limited use of the veto. South Africa is therefore— South Africa therefore maintains that the use of the veto should be addressed as part of a comprehensive reform and not through a piecemeal approach. We restate the affirmation in the Pact for the Future on the importance of intensifying efforts to reach an agreement on the future of the veto, including discussions on limiting its scope and use. On the form of a possible qualifying mechanism, South Africa would like to point to Article 24 of the Charter, which confers on the Security Council the responsibility to act promptly and effectively in the maintenance of international peace and security on behalf of the UN member states. Therefore, all member states of— all members of the Security Council remain accountable to the General Assembly. Additionally, Article 24 provides that the Security Council shall submit annual reports and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration. These articles are further reinforced by General Assembly Resolution 76262, whereby the President of the General Assembly shall convene a formal meeting of the General Assembly within 10 working days of a veto cast by one or more permanent members of the Security Council to hold a debate on the situation on which the veto was cast. I thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of South Africa, and I give the floor to the distinguished representative of India. Distinguished co-chairs, Excellencies and colleagues, I express our sincere appreciation

to the co-chairs for convening this meeting on the question of the veto. India fully aligns with the statements delivered by the

PR of Saint Lucia on behalf of L69 and the PR of Brazil on behalf of G4. In addition, I would like to make the following points in my national capacity. First, there are 2 fundamental aspects that result in an imbalanced structure and lack of legitimacy and non-representativeness of the UN Security Council. These are the membership and veto. There is broad agreement on the dire need to reform the UN Security Council. It is evident that a structure designed more than 80 years ago does not meet the requirements of the current geopolitical realities. We have earlier discussed extensively on both issues. A discussion on the veto is central to the IGN. Second, the sole reform of the Council in the '60s, which expanded only the non-permanent category led to an increase in the relative power of veto wielders. In comparative terms, while the original ratio of permanent members with veto to non-permanent members was 5:6, it was amended to 5:10 thereafter, to the relative advantage of veto wielders. Any reform that is not accompanied by an expansion in the permanent category with veto would deteriorate this ratio further and thereby perpetuate the existing imbalance and inequities. Therefore, expanding the permanent category with veto is critical to real reform of the Security Council. Third, consideration of a new category under the framework of UNSC reform with or without veto would complicate an already existing discussion that involves wide-ranging views. It's important to limit the scope of reforms to the existing framework in order to streamline and fast-track the path to reforms. In this context, India reiterates that our views are aligned with the African model. New permanent members must also be given the veto as long as veto exists. Fourth, there have been calls for restraining the veto. Resolution 76/262 was adopted in 2022 with the aim of convening a formal meeting of the General Assembly within 10 days from exercising a veto to hold a debate on the same. However, this has not been an effective deterrent. Since the adoption of the resolution, 24 vetoes were cast on 20 draft resolutions. In fact, the 7 draft resolutions that were vetoed in 2024 was the highest since 1986. The UN membership has also witnessed the restraint of 2 permanent members who have not cast a veto for over 3 and a half decades. Permanent members exercise veto many a time on the basis of their own national considerations. No limits can be effectively considered for imposition unless there are enabling provisions in the UN Charter, which paradoxically need a Charter amendment and hence again subject to a veto. Fifth, India would like to highlight an important concept that deserves attention of member states. This is the effective veto every Security Council member, elected and non-elected, enjoys on products and outcomes such as the PRST, the press statements, sanctions committees, etc. There have been instances in the past where elected members have created hurdles by exercising effective veto on Council products to serve their narrow vested interests. Finally, veto has been a major topic of discussion both within and beyond the IGN. However, this does not impart this cluster precedence over the others. Reform of the Security Council must be undertaken in a comprehensive manner because a piecemeal approach that focuses on one cluster over another is bound to fail. Well-laid-out timelines, concrete milestones, and text-based negotiations are key ingredients to the success of such a comprehensive approach. In closing, India emphasizes that we will continue to remain fully engaged with the co-chairs and the member states towards achieving real reform of the UN Security Council. We will support all genuine efforts that are aimed at delivering meaningful and lasting outcomes. I thank you, co-chairs. I thank the distinguished representative of India. And I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Australia. Thank you very much, co-chairs, for convening this meeting to address one of the most consequential

questions in Security Council reform: the use of the veto. Australia's position has been consistent since the founding of the

United Nations. We have long opposed the veto, including its extension to any new members of a reformed Security Council. While the veto remains part of today's institutional reality, it often sits in tension with the collective maintenance of international peace and security. And against this backdrop, I will make 3 points. First, all Security Council members have a clear obligation to uphold Article 27 of the UN Charter, which requires a party to a dispute to abstain from voting on decisions under Chapter 6. This obligation is foundational, not optional. We therefore welcome further consideration of the measures proposed by Liechtenstein and the cross-regional core group working to support Council members meet this obligation. Sustained attention to responsible veto use can deliver results, and it is time to support concrete efforts to ensure full full compliance with Article 27. Second, restraint of the use of the veto is essential to an effective and credible Council. We welcome that last year the number of vetoes was halved from 8 in 2024 to 4 in 2025. That progress matters, but restraint must be principled and predictable, not just episodic. Australia encourages permanent members to commit to voluntary collective limits on the veto by refraining from its use in situations involving mass atrocities, as envisioned by the France-Mexico Initiative, and by not blocking resolutions intended to prevent or halt such crimes in line with the ACT Code of Conduct. These commitments strengthen the Council's legitimacy. Third, so long as the veto remains a part of Council decision-making, transparency and accountability are indispensable to its responsible use. Australia welcomes the greater light that is shed on the veto and its consequences through this IGM process, through the veto initiative, and also through enhanced reporting. Transparency, however, must be accompanied by meaningful follow-up. We therefore reiterate the call in the most recent General Assembly revitalization resolution for the PGA to identify concrete recommendations on how the General Assembly can respond following the casting of a veto. Australia remains firmly committed to ensuring that the Security Council, the United Nations as a whole, are fit for purpose and faithful both to the letter and spirit of our Charter. Thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of Australia, and I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Thank you, Mr. Chair. At the outset, allow me to express our sincere appreciation for your continued leadership

and convening this dialogue on the question of the veto. Bulgaria aligns with the statement delivered by Liechtenstein

supporting the draft Resolution on the implementation of Article 27 of the UN Charter and would like to make the few points— a few points in national capacity. The implementation of the UN Charter provisions in their entirety is not optional. If pacta sunt servanda principle applies to all treaties, it applies with even greater relevance to UN Charter. In the Pact for the Future, our most recent recent collective promise to make multilateralism deliver for all, we have recommitted to full implementation of the Charter, including Article 27. Bulgaria belongs to the core group proposing the draft resolution. It seeks to foster a common understanding and to prompt discussions and achieve shared clarity on the scope of Article 27 for the benefit of the entire UN membership. The draft resolution aims at uniform and non-selective application of the Charter. It is not intended to limit in any way the right of veto, nor is it targeted to the permanent members of the Security Council. An abstention on a resolution under Article 27 does not guarantee its adoption and the provision of the article applies to any member of the Security Council. Supporting the draft would strengthen the General Assembly's role in peace and security, building on the momentum of the veto initiative. It seeks neither to alter the text of the Charter nor to introduce new obligations, but merely to ensure the consistent and faithful application of a provision already agreed upon by all. Bulgaria remains also firmly committed to the implementation of the French-Mexican initiative and the ACT Group Code of Conduct aimed at restraining the use of veto in situations involving mass atrocities, as well as to strengthening the role of General Assembly in addressing such critical issues. Allow me also to add a few further points. Bulgaria supports the expansion of the Security Council in both categories of membership, permanent and non-permanent, in a manner that ensures fair and equitable regional representation. In this regard, we underscore the importance of addressing longstanding imbalances, including by allocating at least one additional non-permanent seat to the Eastern European Regional Group in any future enlarged Council. We also wish to highlight the growing urgency of comprehensive United Nations Security Council reform in light of geopolitical realities and the complexity of global crisis. Advancing towards text-based intergovernmental negotiations could be essential to move the process forward in a structured, transparent, result-oriented manner. I thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of Bulgaria and I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Lithuania. Honourable Kochias, thank you for convening this session dedicated to the discussion on the question

of veto with a particular focus on Article 27 of the UN Charter regarding the stipulation that a party to a dispute shall abstain

from voting. Lithuania strongly believes that the question of the veto is among the essential issues of Security Council reform. The recent increase in the use of the veto is inhibiting the Security Council capacity to carry out its primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, as is reflected in the UN Charter. Particularly, the illegal, unprovoked, and unjustified war against Ukraine waged by Russia, holding the seat of permanent member of the Security Council and exercising veto power, clearly exposed the structural and procedural limitations of this body. However, even before agreeing on appropriate steps to address this deficiency through reform, we must ensure full adherence to the existing principles and provisions of the UN Charter. In this regard, we reiterate the necessity to comply with Article 27 of the UN Charter, which requires that any Member State involved in a dispute must abstain from voting. The UN membership must demand that all Security Council members express their commitment to full adherence to this provision. Lithuania remains a steadfast supporter of efforts to limit the use of the veto, particularly in situations of mass atrocity, and encourages all member states to commit to the accountability, coherence, Transparency Code of Conduct, and the French-Mexican initiative. We also appreciate and thank Liechtenstein for its leadership in enhancing transparency and accountability regarding the use of the veto. The adoption of the UNGA resolution, Standing Mandate for a General Assembly Debate When a Veto Is Cast in the Security Council, during the 77th session marks a significant and overdue step. Furthermore, building on Vito's initiative, the recent distributed draft resolution on Article 27, initiated by the Inter-Regional Group of States, is a most welcome development, and we look forward to engaging in joint work to achieve its adoption. We believe that resolution could potentially be even more ambitious, by encouraging abstention also in the spirit of 27, when definition of dispute is not explicit, but such abstention would enable Council action. Lithuania stands ready to join in the consultative process based on the proposed text, which we can broadly support. Thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of Lithuania, and I give the I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Ecuador. I thank you, Co-Chair. Given time constraints, I will focus on 3 points. My first point, I wish to recognize

the leadership of the Co-Chairs in this new stage of the IGN on Security Council reform, and I recognize that leadership not simply in adherence

to diplomatic protocol, but rather because I do want to point out that the chairs are acting in line with the Pact for the Future, and as such, they are serving the purpose of establishing a consolidated model based on areas of convergence on the 5 clusters and models proposed by the member states. My second point: the issue of the veto is worthy of deep consideration because the widespread criticism of its use has not stopped calls being made for the veto to be expanded in spite of the challenges involved in reforming the Charter, in spite of those challenges that lie also within the Charter. And if such challenges were overcome— and we know that those challenges are not complex really because of their legal components, but the complexity lies elsewhere— in light of that fact, we should ask ourselves how permanent members have contributed to peace and security in the world and how having more Council members with veto powers would contribute to protecting that peace and security. In the San Francisco Conference, like many other countries, Ecuador did not vote in favor of having a veto in the Charter because we were of the view that the veto violated the principle of the sovereign equality of states. This has been an ongoing tenet of Ecuador's foreign policy. We continue to be of that view, and none of the arguments put forward to expand the veto power can do anything other than undermining that principle of states' sovereign equality. My third point. While we agree on a comprehensive reform, we can and must take concrete steps forward to ensure that the practices and procedures within the Security Council are more democratic. As such, we are— we can see the merit in the Franco-Mexican initiative in terms of restricting the use of veto in the case of mass atrocities, and see merit in the ACT Code of Conduct so that the Security Council can respond in case of genocide and crimes against humanity. We must continue to study mechanisms which allow us to strike a balance between the prerogatives of permanent members and the need to ensure Council members' accountability to the wider membership of the United Nations. We're not seeking to reopen the Charter, but rather properly implement it. We're not looking to create new rules. Rather, we should be respecting the existing ones, and this applies to 27.3. Co-chairs, colleagues, in order to create the greatest possible areas of convergence, all delegations must show flexibility. Specific countries or certain groups should not be the only ones to be flexible. Ecuador will continue to work constructively, independently, and with a pragmatic focus rooted in principles. Thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of Ecuador, and I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Latvia. Thank you. Distinguished co-chairs, the credibility of Security Council and of the multilateral system as a whole depends

on our ability to make tangible progress, in particular on the question of the veto. In this context, I would like to make the following

3 points. First, the use of the veto must be in line with the responsibilities entrusted to the Security Council and its permanent members. The Council bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the veto has never intended to obstruct that Is thus an essential element of the Council's duty under the Charter. Second, greater transparency and accountability of the use of the veto are essential to strengthening trust in the Security Council's work. Improving Council's working methods remains an important and achievable dimension of the reform. Transparency, inclusivity, and predictability strengthen both the effectiveness and the credibility of the Council. In particular, enhanced transparency around decision-making, including the use of the veto, together with the meaningful participation of affected States under Rule 37, brings the Council closer to the wider UN membership. In this regard, initiatives aimed at enhancing accountability, for the use of the veto play a vital contribution to greater transparency and responsibility. Third, the UN Charter already provides binding legal limits on Council decision-making, which must be respected and applied. Article 27 of the Charter clearly states that a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. Yet this provision has hardly ever been applied. This is not a political choice, but a legal obligation that must be interpreted in line with the principle of good faith outlined in Article 2, paragraph 2 of the Charter. Its consistent application is essential to ensure impartiality and safeguard the credibility of the Council's decisions. Respect for the provision is a concrete and immediate step toward more responsible use of the veto. Colleagues, the IGN process has generated a wide range of proposals and increasing convergence on key elements. What is needed now is renewed urgency and political will to move from positions to text-based negotiations. Latvia remains committed to engaging constructively with all Member States States to advance a reform that is comprehensive, balanced, and firmly anchored in the UN Charter. I thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of Latvia, and I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Nigeria. Thank you, co-chairs. Nigeria aligns itself with the statement delivered by Saint Lucia on behalf of the the LCC9 Group and Sarah Loon

on behalf of the Africa Group. We thank the co-chairs for convening this timely meeting as we navigate the complexities of intergovernmental

negotiation process. The veto remains the most glaring symbol of a global dispensation that no longer exists. Nigeria views the question of veto as a matter of redressing a profound historical injustice. Africa remains the only continent without permanent representation on the Security Council a structural defect that undermines the Council's legitimacy and the very principles of the UN Charter. When we reflect on the Pact for the Future, we become more inspired to underscore the need to move beyond rhetorical support for Africa as a special case and take concrete steps to address the legitimate and historical injustice faced by the region. It is pertinent that the Pact explicitly recognizes the urgent need to make the Council more representative and transparent. There is urgent need to translate this commitment into extension of veto rights to new permanent members, specifically to Africa, to ensure that the continent is not a mere observer of decisions that affect its own security. Our position is firmly rooted in the Ezulwini Consensus. Veto must be extended to all new permanent members so long as it exists. The idea or thought that Africa could be granted permanent seats without veto is tantamount to entrenching the inequality we seek to abolish. We reiterate that Africa demands at least 2 permanent seats with all prerogatives and privileges of current members. The extension of veto to Africa will be a tool for collective security which will bring a much-needed perspective to peace and security operations, 70% of which are concentrated on our continent. Nigeria is also positively disposed to the ongoing discussions regarding the limitation of veto in cases of mass atrocities and crimes against humanity. However, this should not be a substitute for the equitable distribution of the power itself. We must express our growing frustration with the current stagnation of the IGN process. For decades, we have moved in circles. While global crises evolve and intensify. The credibility of these institutions hangs in the balance. The time for incrementalism has passed. We must move beyond the era of performative diplomacy. Nigeria strongly calls for a transition towards text-based negotiations that reflect the urgency of the current global climate. We must move from dialogue to decision-making. To conclude my remarks, let me reaffirm Nigeria's commitment to a Security Council that is democratic, transparent, and fit for the 21st century. We will continue to champion a Security Council reform out of a shared duty to ensure that the United Nations serves all humanity, not just a privileged few. I thank you, Co-Chairs. I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria, and I give the floor to The distinguished representative of Ethiopia. Thank you, co-chair. At the outset, Ethiopia aligns itself with the statement delivered by Sierra Leone on behalf of the African Group. The United Nations

was founded on the principles of sovereign equality, collective security, and international cooperation. However, the structure

of the Security Council, particularly the veto power held by its permanent members, does not fully reflect these principles. The veto is an outdated mechanism rooted in the geopolitical realities of 1945. While it might have served a purpose in ensuring the participation of major powers at that time, it now poses a significant challenge to fairness and effectiveness in global governance. Ethiopia underscores that comprehensive rectification of the veto's fundamental issue, whether it should be retained and extended to new permanent members or whether it should be abolished, must be part of the reform of the Council. Ethiopia supports abolition of the veto. However, so long as it is retained, It should be extended to new permanent members of the Security Council. Ethiopia's position is in line with the common African position as outlined in the Isaluni Consensus that fundamentally opposes the veto and calls for its abolition. However, in the event of its retention, All prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership, including the veto, should be extended to new African permanent members. In the existing system, Africa is the only regional group with no veto right. Rectifying the injustice against Africa requires allocation to it of the same rights and prerogatives as other permanent members. Without this, the reform will not meet its primary objective and will simply introduce a third category of membership. Co-chairs, any proposal that advocates for permanent or semi-permanent membership without a veto undoubtedly represents an introduction to an entirely new category that falls outside the scope of the existing categories of membership. Ethiopia believes that reform of the Security Council is both necessary and urgent. Any meaningful reform must address the issue of veto and historical injustices that have excluded Africa from permanent representation. In conclusion, Ethiopia remains open to constructive dialogue on the future of the veto. We call upon all member states to demonstrate political will and commitment to comprehensive Security Council reform. The credibility of the United Nations depends on its ability to adapt to changing global realities. and to represent all regions equitably. I thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of Ethiopia, and I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Maldives. Thank you, co-chairs. The question of veto goes to the very credibility of the Security Council. When the Council is prevented from acting in the face of grave

crises, confidence in its authority is weakened and the faith in the multilateral system is diminished. I wish to make 3 points. First,

our principal position remains clear: the veto should be abolished. It is inconsistent with the principle of sovereignty, equality, and has repeatedly paralyzed the Council in the face of grave crises. If abolition remains beyond reach, then at the very least use of veto must be limited, especially in situations involving genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The Maldives also supports efforts aimed to restrain accountability, including the Code of Conduct and the veto initiative. Second, if member states decide to create additional permanent seats, there cannot be a second class category of permanent members, equal status must mean equal rights and equal responsibilities. A model that creates new permanent members without the same rights as existing permanent members would further institutionalize inequalities. At the same time, let me underline that our preference is not for the expansion of the veto but for the movement towards an eventual elimination. Recent experiences have shown why the veto cannot remain beyond scrutiny. In Gaza, the international community witnessed repeatedly the consequences of a Security Council being unable to act. The problem is not just the formal casting of a vote; it is also the shadow of the veto, the way it deters action, weakens texts before they are tabled, and lowers the level of ambition. The result is a Council that appears selective, hesitant, and disconnected from the gravity of human suffering. The Maldives therefore believes that the Council must be more representative, more accountable, and more capable of acting in the interest of the entire membership. That is the second standard by which the question of the veto must be judged. I thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of the Maldives. And I give the floor to the Republic of Moldova. I thank the Co-Chairs for convening the 3rd meeting of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the Question of Veto. The Republic of Moldova aligns itself with the cause for a Security

Council that is more representative, more legitimate, more effective, and more accountable. For small and

medium-sized countries, this is not an abstract debate. It goes to the heart of the credibility of collective security and the ability of the United Nations to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. On the issue of categories of membership, the Republic of Moldova has consistently pursued a flexible and pragmatic approach. We do not exclude any configuration that would enhance representativeness, preserve regional balance, and maintain accountability through periodic and competitive elections. At the same time, reform must not create new inequalities or entrench existing ones under a different form. This should remain a fundamental benchmark for all proposals under consideration. With regards to the proposal for a new category of permanent members, Without veto rights, concerns about the emergence of a two-tiered permanent membership can only be addressed if any new arrangements genuinely enhances inclusivity, improve regional balance and perseverance, preserves accountability to the wider membership. In our view, the objective should not be to replicate privilege, but to design a model that broadens representation while ensuring continued responsibility to the membership as a whole. In this regard, regular review and meaningful accountability should remain a central component of any reform package. Distinguished co-chairs, on vacation of extensive— extending full veto right to any new permanent members. My delegation believes that the veto remains at the core of Security Council reform. The growing use of the veto in recent years, often preventing action in situations of grave humanitarian concern, is deeply troubling. For this— that region, our priority is not the expansion of the veto but the strengthening of accountability and restraint in its use. In this context, we see merit in approaches that may help build broader convergence around veto reform, particularly those aimed at limiting its scope and use. The Republic of Moldova supports the France-Mexico initiative on voluntary veto restraints in situations of mass atrocity crimes, reaffirms its Commitment to Act Code of Conduct and welcome the implementation of General Assembly Resolution 76262. As for possible qualifying mechanisms, my delegation believes that any such approach should strike a careful balance between the prerogatives of permanent members and the accountability of Council to the wider UN membership. For the Republic of Moldova, the way forward is clear. Reform must enhance equitable representation, strengthen accountability, and restore confidence in the Council's ability to act on behalf of all member states. We remain committed to engaging constructively with all partners in pursuit of a balanced, credible, and broadly supported outcome. I thank you. I thank the distinguished representative of the Republic of Moldova. And I give the floor to the last speaker on our list this morning, Philippines, please. Thank you, co-chairs. The Philippines thanks you for convening today's meeting and for your continued efforts in advancing the IGN process

in a transparent and inclusive manner. The Philippines reiterates its longstanding position that common ground among member states may be achieved through

practical measures that promote restraint restraint and greater accountability in the use of the veto. While the abolishment of the veto remains our aspiration, it is equally important to pursue concrete steps that mitigate its adverse effects. In this regard, we support voluntary restraint, including through the French-Mexican initiative and the ACT Code of Conduct, particularly in situations involving mass atrocities. We encourage the permanent members of the Security Council to demonstrate leadership by exercising restraint in the use of the veto and by supporting initiatives that promote accountability and transparency. We also underscore the importance of enhanced engagement of the General Assembly in situations where the Security Council is unable to act due to the use of the veto. The veto initiative allows the broader membership to articulate collective positions and helps ensure that their voices are not sidelined. In addition, the Philippines sees merit in revitalizing underutilized provisions of the UN Charter, including Article 27 on the obligatory absent— abstention of parties to a dispute. We take note of the emerging draft initiative to fully implement and adhere this provision and stand ready to engage constructively with its proponents to ensure that any approach is consistent with the Charter and operationally feasible. These considerations are also relevant to the broader question of Security Council reform, including discussions on categories of membership. On proposals to create new permanent members with or without veto rights, the Philippines recognizes concerns regarding the possible emergence of a two-tiered structure within the permanent category. To help this process forward, expanding representation without extending the veto may be viewed as a pragmatic and transitional step toward a more representative council, provided that such arrangements do not entrench new hierarchies and remain subject to periodic review. Ultimately, reform of the veto must contribute to a Security Council that is more effective, accountable, and responsive to the needs of the international community. The Philippines reiterates its support for Security Council reform in the context of a comprehensive package with agreement on elements across all 5 clusters. The Philippines remains committed to working constructively with all member states toward this objective. Thank you, co-chairs. I thank the distinguished representative of the Philippines. Colleagues, we have heard the last speaker for this morning. We will reconvene this afternoon at 3 PM in this hall to continue the discussion, followed by a closed interactive dialogue without This meeting is adjourned.