(Multi-stakeholder panel 2) High-level meeting on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response - General Assembly, 81st session

Good afternoon. Can we request that you take your seats? We are about to start. All right. Welcome. This is the Multi-Stakeholder Panel 2 of the High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response, and it's called to order. It is an honor and a privilege for me to welcome you together with my distinguished co-chair, Her Excellency Anahit Avanesian, Minister of Health for the Republic of Armenia, to the second multi-stakeholder panel of this high-level meeting. In accordance with General Assembly Resolution 79/333, and as indicated in a concept note and letter circulated, by the President of the General Assembly, dated 20 August and 18 September 2026. This multi-stakeholder panel will focus on equitable access through sustainability and predictability, capacities and financing for strengthened pandemic prevention, preparedness and response. A summary of our discussion will be presented at the closing segment of the high-level plenary meeting later today. Allow me first to make a few introductory remarks. Several years on from the COVID-19 pandemic, the lessons remain fresh. We saw what was possible, rapid genome sequencing, unprecedented vaccine development timelines, and remarkable scientific collaboration across borders. We also saw what fell short, inequitable access to vaccines and therapeutics, surveillance gaps, and health systems that buckled under sustained strain. Since then, there have been various efforts to strengthen pandemic preparedness and address vaccine inequity, so that humankind will be better prepared for the next pandemic crisis. One important plan involves members of WHO and the international health community developing a unifying global framework for preparedness and equitable access. The Pandemic Fund helps finance essential capacities such as surveillance and laboratories, particularly in low and medium income countries. The WHO Pandemic Agreement is a common framework to facilitate better sharing of pathogen information and provide access to vaccines, diagnostics and therapeutics. But that is not enough. We also need to build sustainable regional manufacturing resilience. Each region must understand its needs and strengthen capabilities across the value chain, from R&D, manufacturing, and supply chains regulation. Scientific advances must translate into timely access to vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics for all. And this requires stronger cooperation across the value chain and arrangements that work fairly for both providers and users of biological materials and data. We hope ongoing multilateral negotiations will deliver durable and equitable solutions. Finally, and thirdly, we need to establish a global network connecting surveillance, research, manufacturing, and regulation. Today, GISAID facilitates the sharing of genomic data across countries. to enhance surveillance and detect dangerous pathogens early. Together, we can support CEPI's 100-day mission to develop safe, effective and accessible vaccines for initial authorisation and manufacturing at scale, when a pandemic threat is identified. Finally, we also need to establish a global network of trusted regulatory authorities, so that vaccines can be evaluated, approved and deployed without compromising safety and quality. If we pursue all these plans together, we will be able to prepare to be much more prepared for the next pandemic and to build a safer and more resilient world. I look forward to a productive exchange on how we can build this together. It is now my pleasure to invite my co-chair, Her Excellency Anahit Avanesian, Minister of Health of the Republic of Armenia, to make introductory remarks and introduce the panelists.

I thank His Excellency Mr. Ong Ye Kung, Minister for Health and Coordinating Minister for Social Policies of the Republic of Singapore for co-chairing with me and join him in welcoming all of you to this panel. Ladies and gentlemen, it's a great pleasure to join this important discussion at a critical moment for our collective efforts to prevent, prepare for, or respond to pandemics. Recent experience has reminded us of a simple lesson. Preparedness cannot begin when an emergency starts. It requires sustained investment, political commitment, and strong systems that are built and maintained. And the preparedness cannot be the responsibility of one sector or one country alone. Pandemics do not respect borders, and our preparedness efforts must therefore be based on equity, solidarity, and international cooperation. At the heart of this effort are strong national health systems. Primary health care, disease surveillance, laboratories, a skilled health workforce, reliable supply chains, and effective digital systems are not only essential for everyday health services. They are also the capacities that allow countries to detect threats early, respond quickly, and maintain essential services during the crisis. This is why we should not build pandemic preparedness as a parallel system. The investments we make for pandemic prevention and preparedness should also make our health systems stronger, more accessible, and more resilient every day. The same principle applies to financing. We need to change the narrative. Financing prevention and preparedness are not costs. They are investments and have the high return in terms of saving lives and protecting livelihoods. The panic and neglect cycle has not served us well. It has depleted the resources that flow during a response without ensuring that our systems and capacities are better prepared if we don't sustain them. We need to financing that is sustainable, predictable and aligned with national priorities. International support is essential, particularly for countries facing sufficient capacity and financing gaps. But it is great value comes when it strengthens national institutions and capacities that can be sustained over time. Armenia is taking this approach through our ongoing health system transformation and UHC reform. We are working to improve financial protection and access to essential services while strengthening the capacities that are also fundamental to health security. But no country does this alone. We need stronger cooperation across countries, sectors, and institutions, better sharing of knowledge and technology, and financing mechanisms that respond the realities and needs of different countries. Excellencies, global political commitments give us an important foundation. What matters now is turning these commitments into sustained action. This is how we can build a world that is better prepared, more equitable, and more resilient. Thank you very much. Before introducing our distinguished panelists, I would like to remind delegations that there is no pre-established list of speakers for the panel, which is interactive. I therefore invite delegations wishing to speak to press their microphone button now. If your delegation is represented by the head of state or government or speaking on behalf of a group of states, please inform the secretariat colleagues accordingly. Representatives of civil society are invited to approach the WHO team at the desk by the door to indicate their interest to speak. Now, I warmly welcome our distinguished panelists on the podium. Ms. Emmanuelle Subeyran, Director General of the World Organization for Animal Health. Ms. Mamta Murthy, Vice President of the World Bank Group. Dr. David Reddy, Director General of the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations. Mr. Mark Pearson, Acting Director for Employment, Labor and Social Affairs in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Ms. Hanna Krupova, President of the International Federation of Medical Students' Associations. We will now hear from our eminent panelists, and thereafter, the floor will be open for comments, observations, and questions. Panelists are requested to limit their presentation to four minutes. It is my pleasure to give the floor to our first panelist, Ms. Emmanuelle Soubeiran, Director General of the World Organization for Animal Health, and invite her to address the following question. What measures are needed to strengthen prevention capacities and community-based services at the human-animal environment interface in a sustainable manner? Please, the floor is yours.

Thank you very much and thank you, Excellencies. The response to this answer could be summarized in one sentence. If we want to prevent the next pandemic, we need to invest before an emergency begins and closer where risk emerge, which is at the human-animal-environmental interface. This means strengthening our capacity to detect risk quickly, act locally, and sustain capacities between emergencies. So let's highlight three priorities. The first is that prevention must start at source. you know, many infections, disease, risk originate at the human-animal environment interface, yet our preparedness system and investments too often begin only once a threat has already reached the human health. We need surveillance on the field that connect human, animal, and environment health. laboratories capable of detecting threat rapidly, effective information and data sharing across sectors, and strong local capacities to act on early warning. This required genuine implementation of One Health through coordinated institutions and services. And this is where veterinary services must be recognized as an integral part of pandemic prevention and of our broader health security system. They are often, indeed, the first line of defense, detecting disease in animals, monitoring wildlife and livestock populations, assessing risks, working hand-in-hand with farmers and communities, and identifying and containing threats before they become outbreaks. Second, we need to invest in the people and institutions that make prevention possible. Preparedness, it has been said, is not built during an emergency. It is built every day through trained professionals, laboratories, trusted relationships, and effective cooperation between sectors. This is why strengthening veterinary workforce and veterinary services is essential. In OAR, we have a tool that has showed their efficiency. Through the PVS, this is the name of the tool, we work with countries and territories to assess veterinary services, identify gaps, identify priorities, and define the investments needed to strengthen them. The message here is simple. One Health couldn't be a reality if the systems that implement it at national, local, or community level are not strong enough. Third is prevention needs sustainable financing. Today, we are mobilizing billions when a crisis occurs, while underinvesting in the system that could help prevent it. And the investment gap is substantial. Based on our assessments, an average of 52% budget increase would be required to meet the actual annual cost of effective veterinary services worldwide. That may sound significant, but it represents less than 0.05% of the direct economic cost of COVID-19 in 2020. And this is the imbalance we need to address. Pandemic financing must therefore recognize animal health systems as part of the essential infrastructure for global health security. As Deputy Secretary-General told us this morning, the next pandemic will put our health system to the test. If we want sustainable pandemic prevention, we need to move investment closer to where risk emerge, to communities, to veterinary services, local surveillance, diagnostic, and the interface between sectors. If we invest only when an emergency begins, we are financing response. If we invest between emergencies, we are financing prevention. Thank you.

I thank Mrs. Subeyran. I now give the floor to Ms. Mamta Murugamuthy, Vice President of the World Bank Group, and invite her to address the following question: How can international financial institutions, development banks, donors, global health initiatives, and the private sector better support country-led preparedness and response priorities while avoiding fragmentation and duplication? The floor is yours.

Thank you very much to the co-chairs, and good afternoon to everyone in the room. I want to begin by saying that pandemics are actually development crises. For example, COVID-19 showed the weaknesses in existing systems, and it also erased decades of hard-won progress in a matter of months, whether we're looking on the economic side or on the health side. Indeed, the ongoing Ebola Bundibugyo outbreak in DRC is a reminder that these threats are not behind us. The likelihood of another pandemic on the scale of COVID-19 is close to 70% in the next 25 years. So it's not a question of when it will come, but whether we will be ready for it when it does come. And that's the question on the table today. Pandemic financing, unfortunately, and preparedness tied to pandemic financing, follows a cycle of panic and neglect. So there's a surge of resources immediately when an outbreak hits and for a few years after that, followed by underinvestment once the crisis fades. And my colleague has spoken about it very eloquently. And this is exactly the cycle that produces fragmentation and duplication. And this leads to the question that Madam co-chair has asked, which is, how do we arrive at a system which is much more integrated and much more effective? I'd like to propose four priorities. The first is, I think, all financing, including from donors, partners, bilaterals, and the private sector, must align around national health priorities. National health priorities set by national governments are our most powerful tool. They not only set priorities, they also galvanize political commitment, and they unlock the bottlenecks for private investment, and they anchor domestic financing, which has to be at the heart of prevention. I would also like to say, echoing my colleague to the right, that preparedness and preparedness financing is inherently cross-sectoral. It has to take a One Health approach in which health, agriculture, livestock, water, and the environment are connected. The second thing that I would like to propose is an investment in emergency-ready primary health care. And the reason for this is that when an outbreak is first detected, it is where communities are being reached and where trust is being built, and this is what allows a crisis to be unearthed. A community health worker or a veterinary scientist who is working today is the very same person who detects an outbreak. And that's why preparedness and universal health coverage and investment in One Health really need to be treated as the same, one and same investment. And every actor needs to be comprehensively behind it. These should not be parallel systems. The third priority I would like to emphasize is regional manufacturing capacity. Just to give two stark examples, in ASEAN, 70% of vaccines are imported and only two manufacturers hold WHO pre-qualification standards. The picture is very similar across Africa. That's why institutions such as ourselves are working through initiatives such as AIM 2030 to double pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity in sub-Saharan Africa over the next five years. These investments focus both on the enabling environment as well as on private investment to create jobs and economic sovereignty, and also ensure that there is preparedness for the next outbreak. The private sector is essential here. It needs the right entry points. It needs the right enabling environment. It needs regulatory harmonization as well as market signals that make the preparedness investments investable. on a sustainable basis. And this is what needs attention, especially during peacetime. Finally, a priority should be around ensuring faster access to emergency financing when there is an outbreak. Recent outbreak responses, including in the DRC this past year, have shown clearly that pre-positioned financing and pre-arranged procurement saves lives. Speed really matters more than volume when there is an outbreak that needs to be brought under control. The system of pre-agreed mechanisms ready on day zero, which the Minister from Singapore on the right referred to, this is what ensures that countries are not waiting weeks or months for resources to be mobilized. This means doing the design work now before the next crisis arises. And there's a role for everybody here, national governments, international organizations, global health initiatives, and bilateral donors. Finally, I'd like to say that I'm really pleased that the Pandemic Fund, housed at the World Bank, is going to be recognized in the political declaration that is to emerge from this high-level meeting. It plays a very important role in strengthening pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response. and its catalytic grants have really incentivized countries and partners to invest more in preparedness. No institution, no country, no agency, no region can close the preparedness gap on its own. It requires all of us to work together. That's why I want to conclude by saying that while we cannot predict when the next outbreak happens, we can certainly determine how well prepared we are when it does. Thank you.

I thank Ms. Murthy, and I will now turn the meeting over to my fellow co-chair.

Thank you, co-chair. Let me now invite an old friend, Dr. David Reddy, Director General of the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Association, to address the following question. We all know what we need during a pandemic crisis, vaccines, therapeutics, diagnostics, other health products. We want them to be effective, we want them to be distributed in a timely way, in an equitable way. And this requires us to strengthen capabilities across the value chain, from R&D, manufacturing, regulatory, supply chain. So from the industry perspective, how do we strengthen all these capabilities?

Honorable co-chairs, excellencies, and distinguished delegates, it's a pleasure to be here today. So I'd like to address this question by focusing on a number of key enablers that will strengthen equitable access to innovative countermeasures. The first is the importance of actually sustaining an innovation ecosystem. Decades of R&D investment enabled the first covid vaccine to be registered within 26 days of isolation of the sequence. And similar long-term investments will be needed moving forward, particularly in areas like platform technologies, development of new antivirals, but also to enhance pandemic influenza preparedness. We need to maintain the conditions that encourage long-term investment towards that innovation. Intellectual property is a critical enabler of innovation. It's the foundation for private sector investment, for voluntary licensing that includes technology transfer, and for manufacturing partnerships. And the pharmaceutical industry supports technology transfer under voluntary and mutually agreed terms and in line with international obligations. Next, there are other enablers we need to focus on that will be key to the 100-day mission. ensuring rapid access to pathogens and scientific data. And here, I'd like to reflect on the ongoing Ebola virus outbreak. Rapid access to pathogens and sequence information allowed companies to begin working immediately in partnership on diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines. And that work is ongoing today. Second, we must institutionalize regulatory reliance and harmonization. recognizing that streamlined, reliant-based approaches can reduce duplication, accelerate approvals, and that this ensures more timely and equitable access to safe and effective medical countermeasures. Third, we must invest in resilient healthcare systems today in much the same way as we've just heard from one of the previous speakers regarding the animal-human interface. Investment today in primary healthcare delivery and routine immunisation will have the following benefits. It will help ensure the systems are in place to deliver pandemic measures and vaccines to people that need them during a crisis. It improves the underlying health of populations, making them more resilient to pandemic pathogens. It increases public confidence and will help establish and sustain geographically diversified manufacturing. Now just to make a few comments about manufacturing. Strengthening manufacturing readiness and creating resilient supply chains is also critical. And as I just mentioned, access to primary healthcare, including vaccination, can expand and establish diversified manufacturing. Just a note that this must be done in a way that doesn't fragment or duplicate manufacturing to the point where economies of scale diminish and costs increase. Governments should remove trade barriers and export restrictions during health emergencies. This is critical because most of us operate global supply chains and create conditions that allow manufacturers to scale rapidly during times of crisis. And finally, just a few words on financing. Donors, development banks, and global health initiatives should work with countries and with the private sector to provide predictable demand signals, advanced procurement mechanisms, and financing arrangements that can be activated rapidly during pandemic health emergencies, hence the focus on day zero. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Dr. Reddy, for those pertinent points. You mentioned international financing. That will be our next topic. So I now give the floor to Mr. Mark Pearson, Acting Director for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs in the OECD, and invite him to address the following question about international financing for pandemic PPR. Essentially, how do we make sure international financing is predictable, consistent, at the same time the deployment of those financing resources is aligned to the mission and makes an effective impact?

Well, distinguished co-chairs, distinguished delegates, the case for early and effective investments in prevention, preparedness, and response is well established. Just last week, we released a report on the economics of PPR, which showed that, beyond the impacts on people and society, the economic risks of pandemics are enormous. It shows that a future uncontrolled pandemic would cause between a 3% and 17% contraction in GDP in the first nine months. These are not worst-case scenarios. just the inevitable outcome of any global pandemic. Yet, six years after Covid-19, we are facing another looming crisis: the collapse in financing needed to protect us from similar threats in the future. Those pressures are particularly acute in low-income countries, where around three quarters of all PPR financing relies on official development assistance. Recent historic cuts to ODA have reduced global health funding to levels not seen since the early 2000s. ODA funding for infectious diseases is projected to decrease by up to 40 per cent between 2024 and 2026. What can be done to ensure more sustainable financing for PPR? First, as the saying goes, if you cannot measure it, you cannot manage it. That is why the OECD is working with the WHO, the World Bank and other partners, including in the defence, animal health and environmental sectors, to develop a global health and resilience tracker, with support from the European Commission. To be successful, this work needs support from all relevant stakeholders, including countries willing to help road test the new methodology as it is rolled out. Such a tracker responds to a recommendation by the high-level independent panel, and it will provide a comprehensive picture of public PPR spending across sectors. bringing together domestic and external financing. That will make it easier to see whether resources are being allocated effectively, to identify where investment is falling short and to better align external financing with national priorities. Ultimately, those solutions will help us to move from the cycle of crisis and response to more sustained investment in PPR. We look forward to collaboration with all of you on these new ways of working and on this new PPR metric, which will be critical for tracking all these flows. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Pearson, for that statement. I now give the floor to our last panelist, Ms. Hanna Krupova, President of the International Federation of Medical Students Association, and invite her to address the following question. How can we ensure that local actors and communities, including students and youths, can contribute to PPPR, especially through building trust and curbing misinformation?

Thank you. Your Excellencies, distinguished delegates, on behalf of 1.5 million medical students and young health professionals across more than 125 countries, it is a privilege to contribute to this discussion. When we discuss pandemic preparedness, we emphasize that the workforce that will respond to the next pandemic is already being trained today, and the communities that will experience its consequences are already here. Preparedness, therefore, needs to be built with them, not simply for them. For IFMSA, sustainable pandemic preparedness means investing in resilient health systems, grounded in UHC and strong primary care, as these systems providing care every day are the systems that will also be in the forefront of detecting, absorbing and responding to the next health emergency. What does this mean? Predictable and long-term investment in the health workforce across its full life cycle, from quality pre-service education and continuous professional development to adequate staffing, safe working conditions, and retention. This investment must include local organizations, youth networks, and community-led initiatives that build health literacy and help ensure that preparedness reflects the daily realities of the people it serves. Additionally, young people should not be viewed only as beneficiaries of preparedness or the workforce of tomorrow. We are already students, health workers, educators, researchers, community members, and trusted peers today. As such, our meaningful involvement should start today before any crisis. This means youth and community voices in preparedness planning and governments, participation in simulation exercises and after-action reviews, and dedicated support for community-led health literacy and risk communication initiatives. Importantly, participation should not be limited to consultation. Communities and young people should have meaningful opportunities to shape priorities, raise concerns, and see how their input influences decisions. By involving students and young health professionals in preparedness planning, we are not only giving them a voice, we are making an investment in future capacity. A pandemic response is only as strong as the people and systems delivering care every day. However, just one part of preparedness is about the capacities of people and systems. It is also about the trust in health systems and health and care workers. For every effort to make our societies better informed, more educated, and more aware through evidence-based information, we also see misinformation emerging, and at times, health issues becoming part of broader political divisions. Countering misinformation cannot simply mean communicating more information. It also means listening to communities, understanding why concerns emerge, and creating trusted spaces where questions can be raised without stigma. this is why community participation is also an important part of preparedness. When people have trusted channels through which they can ask questions, raise concerns, and receive transparent responses, there is less space for mistrust to grow unchecked. Building these trusted relationships before crisis erupts is therefore essential. Health workers, community organizations, civil society organizations, educators, and young people can all play an important role as trusted messengers. particularly in local contexts, and can identify concerns that may not be visible from national institutions. They can bridge the gap between health systems and the communities they serve, but a bridge only works if it is built before you need to cross it. Public health communication must also be transparent and responsive, communicate what is known, acknowledge uncertainty, and explain the rationale behind decisions. When communities are only engaged after decisions are made, mistrust and misinformation have space to grow. We also need to meet people where they are, using the channels and formats they already engage with, including social media and other digital and community-based channels. All of this requires us to invest not only in systems, but in relationships that make those systems work. So, as we discussed the investment in pandemic preparedness, we must invest in three core pillars: capacity, engagement, and trust. Ultimately, trust is not an emergency response measure. It is preparedness capacity that needs to be built, maintained and invested in long before the next pandemic. Thank you.

Thank you, Ms. Krupova, for that statement, underscoring the importance of transparency and communications to build trust. I now invite delegations to engage our panellists in an interactive discussion. As mentioned earlier, there is no pre-established list of speakers. Those wishing to take the floor are invited to press the microphone button in front of them to request the floor. We will call on the delegations in the order they press the microphone button to request the floor, unless there is a Head of State or Government who will be given priority. Civil society organisations wishing to speak should approach the WHO team at the desk by the door. The floor will be given in rotation to representatives of Member States, observers or United Nations entities and civil society organisations. Further, I would urge delegations to observe the time limit of two minutes for individual statements and three minutes for statements on behalf of a group of States. At the same time, I would like to appeal to speakers to deliver their statements at a reasonable pace and send a copy of your statements to the Secretariat to facilitate interpretation into other official United Nations languages. I urge participants to respect the agreed time limits to ensure that as many speakers as possible may have the opportunity to deliver their statements. A countdown clock is visible on the screen to alert speakers when it is time to conclude. In case speakers exceed their time limit, the microphone will unfortunately and automatically be deactivated. Due to high interest in the panel, we wish to hear from as many speakers as possible in the limited time that we have. I now hand over to my co-chair to call the first member state to make an intervention.

Thank you, my fellow co-chair. I start by giving the floor to the distinguished representative of Thailand, followed by Kenya and France. I think-- Thailand, you have the floor.

Thank you, thank you, Excellency, distinguished delegate. Thailand welcome these important discussions. The COVID pandemic and many other emerging threats show us that preparedness cannot be built after crisis begin. It requires sustained investment before an emergency occur. For Thailand, three priority are essential. First, preparedness must be embedded in strong and resilient national health system. Investment in primary healthcare, surveillance, laboratory and skilled workforce and community capacity strengthen both universal health coverage and health security on essential elements. Second, equitable access must be built before products are urgently needed. We should strengthen R&D technology transfer, regional manufacturings, regulatory collaboration, resilient supply chains, so that vaccine, diagnostic, therapeutic, and other essential health products can reach people in a timely, equitable, and affordable manner. Finally, financing must be sustainable, predictable, and country-led. Domestic investment should remain the foundation, complemented by predictable, diversified, and rapidly deployed international financing that align with national priorities. excellency, Thailand believe that the preparedness must be nationally sustained, regionally supported, and globally enabled. We must invest before the crisis build and sustain capacity before need, and make equity part of preparedness from the beginning. Thank you.

Thank the distinguished representative of Thailand, and now the floor is Kenya, yours?

Thank you, co-chairs, excellencies, distinguished delegates. Equity is not decided in the middle of the pandemic. It is decided years earlier by what we choose to finance when there is no emergency. The last pandemic taught Kenya that goodwill is not a supply chain. Solidarity came, but after the wave had passed. A continent of 1.4 billion people cannot again wait at the end of another regime's queue. At home, Kenya universal health coverage reform put primary health care at the center because the facility that treats fever on an ordinary Tuesday will detect the next outbreak. Excellencies, Kenya asks for three things. One is to make Africa a producer, not a purchaser of last resort. Kenya is building a regional center for pharmaceutical manufacturing and invites partners in technology transfer and quality assured production backed by regulatory harmonization and pooled procurement. Second, finance the unglamorous events, reagents, cold chains, laboratory quality, and health workers who are trained, protected, and paid. A system funded only during emergency will be ready only after then. Third, make financing predictable. Kenya will carry costed preparedness priorities in its budget. In return, we ask the Pandemic Fund, development banks and partners to align behind one country plan, offer grants and concessional terms, and release emergency funds action still matters. Kenya invites partners to invest with us in capabilities that endure. I thank you.

I thank you and now give the floor to the representative of France.

Excellences.

Excellencies, the COVID-19 pandemic taught us a vital lesson. We cannot ask the world to prepare for pandemics better without financing that preparation better. Given this, we, together with the World Health Organization and the World Bank, have created the Pandemic Fund, whose role is to catalyze domestic financing. The pandemic agreement on its hand has consolidated this through provisions that guarantee the sustainable strengthening of prevention, preparation and response capacities for pandemics. But today we need to go further because we are facing a double challenge, one of financing and one of architecture. We can no longer have, on the one hand, needs that are underfinanced, and on the other hand, financing that is not properly coordinated. And that is precisely the point of the financial coordination mechanism provided for by the International Health Regulations and the Pandemic Agreements. Its ambition is simple, to better identify needs, to better coordinate existing instruments, and to ensure that each bit of resources contributes to bridging gaps. Discussions are currently underway in Geneva on the modalities for implementing this mechanism. We must not give way to pessimism or a sense of inevitability. We are at a critical point. Multilateralism is under pressure. Financial availability is contracting while needs are rising. It is precisely now that we need to mobilize and invest today in the capacities that will protect the populations of tomorrow, because solidarity is not just a matter of justice. Solidarity is a precondition of our collective security. Thank you.

I thank the representative of France and now give the floor to Egypt.

Excellencies, co-chairs, distinguished colleagues, the experience of COVID-19 and the emergencies that have followed has shown that equitable access cannot be created in the moment of crisis. It must be built into preparedness long before the crisis occurs. For Egypt, this begins with sustained investment in national capacities. But capacity to detect a threat is only one side of preparedness. A country may detect an emerging threat quickly, but if it cannot access the vaccines, therapeutics, diagnostics, or other tools required to respond, detection alone does not constitute preparedness. We therefore need stronger global and regional capacities for research and development, local and regional manufacturing, technology transfer, regulatory cooperation, and diversified supply chains. These capacities should not be developed only after an emergency exposes a shortage. They should be a part of preparedness planning from the outset. This requires a financing model that is equally predictable. Domestic financing must remain the foundation of sustainable preparedness. At the same time, international financing should be predictable, catalytic, and responsive to country needs, particularly where fiscal space is constrained. International financial institutions, development banks, donors, global health initiatives, and the private sector can contribute more by aligning behind country-led preparedness priorities, coordinating investments, and reducing fragmentation and duplication. We also need to recognize preparedness as an investment in health, economic continuity, and social stability. The cost of preparedness is measurable, but so is the cost of being unprepared. Egypt, therefore, advocates a preparedness architecture that's country-led, sustainably financed, regionally connected, and globally supported. with equity built into the system from the beginning. Because if resources arrive only after the crisis, we are not financing preparedness, we are financing the consequences of its absence. Thank you.

I thank the representative of Egypt and now give the floor to the representative of UNICEF.

Financing for preparedness must ultimately translate into operational capacity and continuity of essential services. We often think of equity in a pandemic context in terms of access to vaccines, diagnostics and therapeutics, and that requires investment in the less visible infrastructure of medical countermeasure preparedness, including forecasting and procurement, prepositioning, warehousing, the cold chain, transport, supply chain data and the workforce needed to deliver supplies to the last mile. We see the need for that investment in acute emergencies. During the current Ebola response, UNICEF has delivered around 450 metric tonnes of supplies across affected and at-risk countries, but getting supplies quickly into a country is not the same as getting them promptly to a health facility or a remote community. Financing preparedness also cannot overcome insecurity. Humanitarian access is critical. Frontline workers and supplies must be able to move safely, including in conflict-affected and hard-to-reach areas. We therefore need to finance resilient end-to-end supply chains as core preparedness infrastructure before an emergency begins and sustain them during emergencies. Those investments should also deliver long-term results. Cold chains that are built for vaccines in an outbreak can strengthen routine immunisation. Warehousing, data and distribution systems that are established for emergencies can support essential services every day. Ultimately, the real test is whether essential services continue to function during an emergency and whether children and communities can continue to access them safely and effectively when they are needed most. This is where financing and equity come together, and UNICEF remains committed to supporting Governments and working with partners as we invest in preparedness for the next pandemic.

I thank the representative of UNICEF and now give the floor to the representative of the Global Preparedness Monitoring Board. The floor is yours.

Excellencies, distinguished colleagues, I speak today as co-chair of the Global Preparedness Monitoring Board. Equitable access to medical countermeasures requires sustainable capacities and predictable financing. Both must be in place before the next emergency begins. Our 2026 report highlights two priorities. First, we must strengthen the capacities and systems that develop and deliver lifesaving countermeasures. That means more diversified manufacturing, including at regional level. It means stronger supply chains and regulatory cooperation. And it means successfully completing negotiations on the pathogen access and benefit sharing system under the pandemic agreement. These capacities cannot be built in the middle of a crisis. Second, these systems must be backed by predictable and sustainable financing. Countries need greater and sustained domestic investment and preparedness. International financing support must continue, especially through the pandemic fund, which is already supporting country priorities and helping reduce fragmentation. And when an outbreak begins, financing must be available from day zero. We must still solve for this crucial enabler of early action. But commitments alone are not enough. We need strong global monitoring to know whether investments are being sustained and making a difference. Equity must be built, financed and monitored before the next crisis. Thank you.

I thank the representative of Global Fund Global Preparedness Monitoring Board and now give the floor to the Representative of Ghana. Representative of Ghana, sorry.

When the next pandemic begins, a breakthrough anywhere must mean protection everywhere. COVID-19 showed how quickly science can move and how slowly its benefits can reach those with the least purchasing power. The political declarations promise of equity will be tested in the choices we make now. First, we must invest in the systems people rely on every day. Primary health care, surveillance, laboratories, and skilled workforce. These foundations cannot be built overnight. Second, financing must be reliable. Ghana will invest at home. Partners must align behind country-led plans and release resources when needed most. coordinating financial mechanisms to turn that commitment into action. Third, equitable access requires production closer to the people who need it. Ghana has established a national vaccine institute to support research, technology transfer, and local manufacturing. Across our region, that ambition needs strong regulation and dependable markets. A factory without buyers cannot protect anyone. Distinguished colleagues, Let us measure our success by a simple question: when danger comes, can every country protect its people in time? Let us invest before the alarm and make equity real when it matters most. Thank you.

I thank the representative of Ghana and now give the floor to Spain.

Thank you. If we want to be better prepared for the next pandemic, the current carry-on financing or funding emergency and defunding the preparations, investing in preparation and prevention during the period in between pandemics is absolutely essential. Monitoring laboratories, primary care, health professionals or research and production capacities require predictable sustained financing, even when the crisis is now out of the headlines. But it's not enough to mobilise more resources. We have to ask ourselves how we finance and with what priorities. the severe compromise gives us a roadmap: increase investment, face up to debt pressure and reform the international financial architecture, also enhancing the capacity of developing countries to define their own priorities. Spain is committed to bringing that ambition to global health. There can be no health sovereignty without economic sovereignty, but health sovereignty can't be a pretext to neglect states who don't have the resources they need or the communities that are directly affected. We can help to increase the fiscal space available to southern countries of the south who are very constrained by the external debt. Spain supports debt health swap programs. The fragmentation of financing at the international level can be reflected in the fragmentation of health systems. Vertical programs are still necessary, but they can't work as islands. They must be better integrated into national systems. They must be permeable to national priorities, and they must help to build lasting capacities. Spain has argued that an excessively fragmented financing or vertical financing can end up weakening the capacities it hopes to strengthen. For Spain, health sovereignty means a real capacity to decide and respond, not isolation. The next pandemic can't find us searching for emergency funding. We must have finance systems, capacities that are built and a global architecture that is ready to respond. Thank you very much.

I thank the representative of Spain and now give the floor to Guyana.

Equitable access begins long before an emergency. When an outbreak has already spread, countries cannot quickly build laboratories, train workforce, or negotiate a reliable place in the queues for vaccine and medicines. Those capacities and the financing behind them must be in place beforehand. COVID-19 made this painfully clear. Guyana is strengthening the health system of our people that what people depend on every day. We are expanding access to primary health care, laboratory services, and using technology such as telemedicine to ensure that care can be delivered at a distance. We are also building capacity for surveillance and one health. And these investments have improved our system now. Sustaining them, however, requires a clear division of responsibility. At a national level, governments must continue to invest in their systems, while regional institutions should be able to pool expertise and specialized capacity, particularly for smaller states. The international partners can assist with financing that is predictable enough to plan and flexible enough to meet the needs of countries and also to make sure that we are accountable. That is why Guyana supports a strong and sustainably finance pandemic fund. It values, lies in helping countries build surveillance, laboratories, and workforce capacity before a crisis. But financing preparedness is only part of equity. countries that share information.

I thank the representative of Guyana and now give the floor to Philippines.

Distinguished colleagues, the Philippines recognizes that equitable pandemic prevention, preparedness and response depends on resilient systems, empowered communities and sustained and predictable investment. Preparedness cannot be treated as an exceptional expenditure activated only when an outbreak occurs. It must be embedded in national systems and local development plans, maintaining the ability to anticipate, detect, respond to, and recover from threats. This requires a coordinated preparedness and response system integrated in an interval of surveillance and laboratory networks, a capable workforce, emergency response mechanisms, and community-based services that translate timely information into coordinated action. When a threat emerges, people need timely access to vaccines, diagnostics, and therapeutics. Regional cooperation, technology transfer, and diversified production can further strengthen resilience and support timely response. However, none of this can be sustained without predictable financing. and domestic resources should remain the anchor, complemented by international financing for critical gaps, preparedness before crisis, and rapid surge financing during emergencies. Partnerships must reinforce this country-led approach and not fragment it. Hence, the Philippines National Action Plan for Health Security provides a framework for aligning partner support with national priorities. And ultimately, Global commitments must translate into meaningful protection for people. Thus, the Philippines remains committed to working with member states and partners to ensure that investments we make today strengthen our ability to face future threats with greater readiness, resilience, and equity. Thank you.

Thank you, representative of Philippines, and now give the floor to Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.

Can you see it with my name tag? This is my name tag. Thank you, Chair. Pandemic preparedness begins long before an outbreak. Countries cannot build response capacity in crisis. Sustained, predictable investment in resilient health and community systems is essential to prevent, detect, and respond to health threats. The challenge is clear. Preparedness must advance faster with fewer resources while supporting countries towards greater self-reliance. The Global Fund is now the largest external investor in health system strengthening, investing 5.9 billion U.S. dollars in over 100 low and middle income countries. In this grant cycle, we upgraded over 200 laboratories, installed more than 400 oxygen plants in 57 countries, and supported over 100,000 health workers. We help countries address HIV, tuberculosis, malaria, Ebola, and emerging threats through integrated systems that strengthen preparedness and resilience. We maximize impact, supporting both routine health services and emergency preparedness. We focus investments where needs are greatest. 80% of our next funding cycle will support countries in sub-Saharan Africa, while backing pathways to greater self-reliance. Chair, access to medical countermeasures is not only a financing challenge. It requires the capacity to procure, quality assure, distribute, and deliver life-saving tools equitably, affordably, and at scale. The Global Fund stands ready, together with Gavi, WHO, Africa CDC, the World Bank, and partners, to help operationalize access to diagnostics, therapeutics, personal protective equipment, and oxygen through trusted systems built over decades. The lessons from COVID, Ebola, and other outbreaks are clear. The world cannot afford complacency.

I thank the representative of Global Fund and now give the floor to the Pandemic Fund.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I'm pleased to speak on behalf of the Pandemic Fund, Excellencies. When we gathered here for the last high-level meeting in 2023, the Pandemic Fund was a new promise. We had just announced our first round of grants. Three years later, that promise is a country-led reality. We are actively investing in the capabilities of countries to prevent, detect, and contain outbreaks before they escalate. Today, the Pandemic Fund has 11.5 US dollar billion portfolio of investments supporting surveillance, laboratories, diagnostics, and the health workforce across 128 countries. These investments are strengthening countries' abilities to detect threats earlier and respond faster. And we are helping make One Health a reality across countries. What makes this possible is our focus on partnership and country leadership. Our catalytic model has helped mobilize US$6 billion in international co-financing and expertise from multilateral development banks, including the World Bank, UN agencies, and other partners, alongside US$4 billion in domestic co-investments from the countries themselves. That is important because preparedness cannot be built from the outside. The countries we're supporting are putting their own resources and leadership behind it, breaking down silos and investing in the systems and capacities needed. We're encouraged that the draft political declaration recognizes the pandemic fund's unique role. But the message from countries is equally clear. Demand is now more than six times the resources available. The next step is therefore straightforward. We need to match country leadership with sustained global partnership. We urge member states to turn the commitments in this political declaration.

I thank the representative of Pandemic Fund and give the floor to my co-chair.

And I in turn give the floor to the United States.

Thank you, Chair, distinguished delegates. We know that durable, multi-sectoral national capacity is what allows countries to prevent cases from becoming outbreaks and outbreaks from becoming pandemics. Financing, national actions, and global support are how that capacity gets built and sustained. With this in mind, the United States reiterates that terms like equity and other ambiguous terms that lack an international definition and a clear way to measure achievement can obscure rather than advance concrete progress. The United States recognizes the need to address medical countermeasure access for public health crises. Timely global access to safe and effective medical countermeasures relies on two things. One, how quickly safe and effective medical countermeasures are researched, underpinned by rigorous, independent scientific inquiry that minimizes external bias and preserves the integrity of findings. Developed, manufactured, tested, and distributed, including last mile delivery. And two, how effectively timely global access can enable countries to get safe, effective, and quality assured vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics to the people who need them most based on public health risks and needs. These are objectives that every country can work toward and measure progress against. However, none of this holds up without financing that matches the ambition. Domestic resource mobilization must remain the primary source of health security financing, complemented, not replaced, by bilateral and multilateral cooperation and innovative international sources of financing. Financing frameworks work best when they reinforce national ownership and sound stewardship of resources, not when they create open-ended obligations on other countries that are difficult to define or sustain. At the same time, while focusing on the transition to country ownership and self-sufficiency, the United States remains the world's largest donor to global health and health security. The U.S. government is in the process of obligating nearly a billion dollars to support health security and outbreak response efforts overseas and expects to continue that support this year. To date, the United States government has provided 887 million in direct

Thank you, Chair. The COVID-19.

Pandemic reaffirmed the fundamental truth: no country is safe until every country is safe. Inequitable access to vaccines, diagnostics, therapeutics, and other countermeasures prolonged the pandemic and impeded global recovery. Equity must therefore be at the heart of pandemic prevention, preparedness and response financing. We need predictable, sustainable and adequate financing to enable countries to build, strengthen and sustain essential preparedness capacities before a next health emergency. Investments should prioritise resilient health systems, genomic surveillance, laboratory networks, a skilled emergency workforce, research and innovation and resilient supply chains. A one-size-fits-all financing model cannot deliver equity. Financing should be guided by risk, need, and fiscal capacity. LICs and debt-constrained countries require greater grant-based support, while middle-income countries should have access to catalytic financing that can leverage domestic and MDB resources. We must also strengthen local and regional manufacturing, technology transfer, and diversified supply chains to ensure timely, affordable, and equitable access to medical countermeasures. India's PM-ABHEM, with its focus on surveillance, laboratories, critical care, and health emergency preparedness, illustrates how domestic financing can strengthen national resilience. Financing mechanisms must be country-driven, accountable and complementary, with clear outcomes and minimal fragmentation. Our collective responsibility is to translate solidarity into sustained investment and ensure that no country is left behind. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative from India. Let me now give the floor to South Africa.

Thank you, Chair. South Africa welcomes this critical dialogue. Today, we must confront a fundamental truth: equitable access cannot rest on charity. True equity must be built into predictable, transparent systems, established before the next crisis, not improvised during the crisis. Past health emergencies exposed how structural fragmentation compounds inequity, leaving developing regions to face severe access barriers and regulatory bottlenecks. To move from vulnerability to resilience, South Africa calls for three immediate imperatives. First, we must advance regional regulatory harmonization. Strengthening and operationalizing regional regulatory networks is vital to fast-tracking approvals, upholding safety standards, and reducing over-reliance on external bodies during global emergencies. Secondly, we must secure regional production backed by genuine technology transfer. Meaningful investments in localized manufacturing must be paired with the removal of intellectual property barriers. Developing nations must have the sovereign, unhindered ability to produce their own medical countermeasures. Thirdly, we must demand predictable, country-led financing. International financial institutions and global health funds must align behind national priorities. We must eliminate administrative duplication and ensure financing shifts away from bureaucratic processes and towards direct impactful implementation. Co-Chairs, South Africa remains steadfastly committed to a reformed global health architecture anchored in equity and solidarity. We look forward to this panel translating these priorities into the bold action-oriented commitments our peoples urgently require. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative from South Africa. Let me now give the floor to Brazil.

Thank you, President. For Brazil, equitable access to pandemic-related products began long before a pandemic occurs. It requires sustainable investment in capacities that make preparedness possible. resilient health systems, surveillance and laboratory networks, a qualified health workforce, research and development, and local and regional manufacturing. The COVID pandemic demonstrated that the dependence on highly concentrated global supply chains can deepen inequalities during an emergency. We therefore need to diversify production, strengthening technology transfer, and build regional manufacturing capacities for vaccines, therapeutics, diagnostics, and other strategic health products. Predictability is essential. Countries and producers must have the condition to invest before a crisis emerges, and not only mobilize resources once it has begun. This requires sustainable and predictable financing, both domestic and international. Pandemic preparedness cannot depend primarily on short-term or fragmented projects. International financing, development bands, and global health initiatives should support country-led priorities, strengthen national capacities, and improve coordination, avoiding duplication and fragmentation. Financing mechanisms should also promote equity, technology transfer, and productive capacity in developing countries, rather than simplify responding to emergencies after they occur. Finally, Brazil believes that strengthening local and regional capacities is not a competing objective to global cooperation. It is foundation. Thank you.

Thank the distinguished representative from Brazil. Let me now give the floor to the Society of Nurse Scientists, Innovators, Entrepreneurs, and Leaders.

Excellencies, distinguished delegates, members of civil society, colleagues, and friends. I speak today on behalf of Sancielle, a global professional nurse-led multidisciplinary organization, which has engaged over 7,000 nurses in over 70 countries and partnered to award over a million dollars in funding to help them launch innovations and to transform health. Sustainable financing should not only ask what we fund, it should ask what endures. Delivering health, every health emergency, during every health emergency, the global community rapidly finances technology, emergency operations, and short-term response. Yet between outbreaks, investments in workforce development, digital literacy, implementation capacity, and institutional partnerships often decline. Pandemic preparedness cannot depend on crisis funding cycles. We should invest in the human infrastructure that remains long after an emergency has ended. As artificial intelligence becomes increasingly integrated into disease surveillance and public health decision making, we must finance competencies required to govern and use these tools responsibly. This includes training multidisciplinary health workforces, strengthening interoperable systems, supporting implementation research, and building trusted partnerships across governments, academia, civil society, and the private sector. Financing should also recognize that innovation is not synonymous with invention. The greatest return on investment may come from enabling countries to adapt, implement, and scale proven solutions within their own context, rather than continually reinventing them. Predictable financing should therefore both be digital infrastructure and human capability. Science diplomacy offers a framework for countries not only to share technology, but expertise, evidence, and implementation experience. If we truly seek resilient pandemic preparedness, our greatest investment is not only the next algorithm, but the people and institutions that transform innovation into action.

Thank you, Song-Sel, for that statement. Let me now hand the floor to S.F. Hoffmann La Roche.

Excellency, distinguished delegates, Roche thanks the UN General Assembly for convening this high-level meeting. We share the global commitment to a world better prepared to prevent, detect and respond to health emergencies. When a virus spreads, speed is everything. It's the difference between a contained crisis and an uncontrolled one. As we build global health frameworks for effective pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response, we need speed to be our guiding criteria. Does this proposal help or hinder the speed of response? To hit targets like the 100 days mission, speed cannot be summoned in a panic. The answer doesn't begin when an outbreak spreads. True speed is built behind the scenes strategically through open dialogue, partnership, and commitment. It means securing immediate, predictable access to pathogens and data so scientists can start work on day one. It means setting up harmonized regulatory pathways today so safe vaccines, diagnostics, and treatments don't sit trapped in paperwork while people suffer. Speed not only requires the strategic preparedness, it also requires practical partnerships built on trust. An example we have at Roche is our partnership with the Medicines Patent Pool, which expands manufacturing and supply chain capacity for influenza antivirals across 129 low and middle income countries. This is how we ensure that speed and equity go hand in hand. We must avoid barriers that slow our collective response. Innovation flourishes when researchers have the clarity, predictability, and the freedom to act at scale. Responding to a pandemic requires a unified global response. As both a diagnostics and medicines company, Roche stands ready to partner with governments, international bodies, and civil society. We ask the General Assembly to keep the private sector at the table, ensuring that when the next threat arise, we can collectively act with speed. Thank you.

Thank you, Rosh, for that statement. Let me now hand the floor to the Medical Women's International Association.

Thank you, Chair.

On behalf of the Medical Women's International Association, representing 12,000 female physicians in more than 70 countries, and on behalf of the Global Sepsis Alliance, we welcome the adoption of the WHO Pandemic Agreement and the establishment of the Pandemic Fund. Hereby, building on the experience of the latest pandemic, we have one single message. Sepsis should be the integral part of the pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response. Why are we calling for prioritizing sepsis? In 2021 alone, during the major pandemic year, more than 21 million children, women, and men died from sepsis. Estimated 78% of the COVID-19 patients in intensive care units had viral sepsis. And irrespective of the pathogen causing the next outbreak or the pandemic, sepsis will continue to take millions of lives as the common pathway to deaths and disability. Therefore, we call the UN Secretariat, Member States and multiple stakeholders to prioritize sepsis in the pandemic frameworks, preparedness and response frameworks, and related political declarations. We need stronger risk communication, surveillance and capacities to ensure more effective prevention, early detection and effective treatment of sepsis. And this effort should be supported with increased investments in resurgent innovations, including new vaccines, antimicrobial therapies, diagnostics, and pathogen-agnostic immunomodulatory approaches. I thank you for your attention.

Thank you for that statement. Let me now give the floor to the O'Neill Institute for National and Global Health. You may start. Where are you?

Hello. Excellencies, distinguished delegates and colleagues, the Ebola outbreak in DRC is already the second largest on record and the fastest growing. Together with COVID, two Mpox emergencies and this year's hantavirus outbreak, health emergencies continue to demonstrate that PPPR remains an urgent global priority. We welcome the political declaration before member states this afternoon. Its endorsement today would signal that multilateralism can still deliver and that protection from pandemics is a shared responsibility owed as much to those facing Ebola today as to those facing the next inevitable pandemic threat. Now the job turns to implementation. The global community must put its new pandemic governance instruments to work. The states adopted amendments to the IHR and the landmark pandemic agreement. Together, these instruments strengthen the normative foundation for action across a pandemic's life course and provide support for implementation and ongoing norm setting. Crucially, the Pandemic Agreement can't open for signature until PABS is finalized. We call on every member state to conclude those negotiations without delay, ensuring rapid access to pathogens and the equitable sharing of benefits that flow from their use. But pandemic threats will not wait for negotiators to finish. The IHR amendments are already in force, and states can begin implementing them and the Pandemic Agreement now, including developing comprehensive national plans, building core health system capacities, and strengthening One Health surveillance and prevention. Doing so will make ratifying the Pandemic Agreement the easy choice, while making us all safer. As we've heard time and again, PPR is an investment, not a cost. The price of neglect far outstrips the cost of investment in money and in lives. Countries need the discipline to invest between crises and the fiscal space for that investment facilitated through debt swaps, a fully capitalized pandemic fund, and a sustainably financed WHO. Thank you.

Thank you for that contribution. I will now hand the floor to the International Council of Nurses.

Thank you, Chair, excellence, ladies and gentlemen. The International Council of Nursing, ICN, is a federation of more than 140 national nurses associations, representing millions of nurses worldwide and serving the global voice of nursing. As the international community considers how to better prevent and prepare for future pandemics, we must not lose sight of a fundamental lesson from COVID-19. Pandemic preparedness is workforce preparedness. The world is changing. Populations are aging rapidly. Chronic diseases are increasing, and older people can be vulnerable during infectious disease outbreaks. At the same time, communicable diseases have not disappeared. Outbreaks and emerging infectious diseases continue to threaten communities, while climate change is creating additional pressures on healthcare systems and health workers. We therefore cannot allow the end of COVID-19 emergency to become the end of our investment in preparedness. Nurses are the backbone of health systems and are essential to prevention, surveillance, vaccination, infection prevention and control, emergency response, primary care, long-term care, and community resilience. Strong health systems require nurses who are sufficiently staffed, protected, supported, and prepared before the crisis arrives. As we look forward towards the appointment of the next UN Secretary General, we urge future UN leadership to recognize that healthcare workers essential to keeping societies functioning, not only during pandemics, but across the broader challenges of our time. Thank you.

Thank you for the statement, and thank you to the immense contribution of nurses. Let me now hand the floor to the Framework Convention on Global Health Alliance.

Thank you, Chair. Distinguished delegates and esteemed colleagues, this high-level meeting on pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response comes amidst polio crisis and a Bundibugyo outbreak that has surpassed four months. We must act swiftly to safeguard and strengthen our collective health. The Convention on Health Equity Alliance advocates for a UN convention on health equity to ensure the right to health and end health inequities. We align with the key aspects of the Friends of the Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and Response HLM, supporting their continued work beyond this HLM, and call on member states to adopt a political declaration that emphasizes the following principles. First, equitable access, ensuring vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics are distributed based on health needs, not a country's ability to pay. Second, technology transfer and intellectual property waivers. suspending strict intellectual property barriers to enable local manufacturing and knowledge sharing, thereby increasing regional capacities. Third, public funding accountability, placing strict conditionalities on public funds used for research and development to ensure that the resulting technology remains accessible to everyone, particularly vulnerable communities. And finally, civil society engagement, increasing opportunities for local communities to influence health financing decision and empowering civil society to hold governments accountable for their commitments to PPR and shaping health architecture reform. We must collectively commit to building an equitable global health system that can tackle the range of health threats that we collectively face. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative for his statement. Let me now hand the floor to the International Student Surgical Network.

Hello. Distinguished co-chairs, excellencies, distinguished delegates. I'm speaking on behalf of INCSYN, the International Student Surgical Network, representing around 5,000 students, trainees, and early career health professionals across more than 80 countries, working to strengthen surgical systems worldwide. Throughout this session, we've heard a consistent call to move from crisis-driven response towards sustained investment in resilient health systems. From INCSYN's perspective, this requires what we would describe as dual readiness. The capacity to respond to the threat itself, while maintaining the essential health services that people continue to need throughout the crisis. For surgical systems, this distinction matters. A pandemic does not suspend emergency surgery, obstetric care, trauma care, anaesthesia or cancer treatment. Yet, when health systems come under pressure, continuity of these services can be compromised, creating preventable harm alongside the immediate effects of an outbreak. The capacities required to maintain this care, a trained and protected workforce, functioning referral systems, continuity of these systems can be compromised, creating preventable harm alongside the immediate effects of an outbreak. are therefore not separate from pandemic preparedness. These are part of preparedness. We encourage member states and international partners to reflect this dual readiness within national and global preparedness frameworks, financing and monitoring, including measurable indicators for workforce capacity and continuity of essential surgical, obstetric, and anesthesia services. And preparedness must be built with the people who will deliver it. Young health professionals should not be viewed only as the workforce of tomorrow. Through networks such as Incision, we are already contributing to health systems and should have meaningful roles in preparedness planning, implementation, and monitoring. Excellencies, preparedness should not be measured only by whether we can detect and contain a pathogen. It should also be measured by whether, while responding to it, our health systems can continue to provide safe, timely, and affordable care. Thank you.

Thank you for sharing the views of students. Let me now hand the floor to Dopa C Foundation.

Thank you, co-chairs. I speak on behalf of Global Soul Society South in my role representing Soul Society on the governing board of the Pandemic Fund and Stop TB Partnership. I want to focus on one word from the title of this panel, predictability. We cannot call a system prepared if its laboratories, surveillance, workforce, and community systems depend on financing that arrives only after an emergency begins. But importantly, We do not need to invent another financing mechanism. We already have one. Through pandemic fund, US$1.4 billion in grants has mobilized US$4 billion in domestic co-investment and US$6.1 billion in international co-financing. Yet, demand across the first three funding rounds exceeds available resources by more than six times. demonstrates both country commitment and unmet demand. I therefore urge governments, development banks, philanthropy and private sector to invest in the fully resourced pandemic fund so that it operates at a scale that preparedness requires. But financing must also reach frontlines. Civil society and communities cannot remain in an unfunded implementation assumption. If we expect them to provide trust, reach and accountability during a crisis, they must be meaningfully engaged and financed before the crisis. We should also build on systems that already exist. TB programs have spent decades building molecular diagnostics, laboratory surveillance, supply chains, and community networks. These are not only TB investments, they are preparedness infrastructure for the next airborne threat. They supported during the COVID pandemic, and they will support if tomorrow there is another respiratory pandemic. Finally, I would echo the Friends of PBPR high-level meeting in calling for swift follow-up on political declaration with measurable commitment, sustained financing, and accountability. Preparedness should not be financed only when fear is high. We have the mechanisms, we have the country demand, and we have the systems. We need now is the political will to finance them before the next.

Thank you for that statement. I will now hand the floor to the distinguished representative from Mauritius.

Madam Chairman, distinguished panelists, excellencies, I represent International Medical Crisis Response Alliance. we have direct personal experience with one of the factors that make pandemic prevention so difficult. During COVID, our medical NGO disseminated large packets of information on preventing infection and on vaccination. In doing so, we encountered numerous direct threats from individuals and groups that firmly believed in quack cures, the uselessness of vaccination, and the evil intention of physicians and scientists fighting the contagion. Excellencies, it became clear then and since that financing might be most effectively directed toward efforts to cope with the strategic misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda programs which keep populations medically in the dark or in the throes of mental manipulations that serve private or corporate goals. Our program is called Disseminating Truth in Telecommunications, and our website is www.imcra.net. Thank you all very much.

I thank the distinguished representative from Mauritius. Let me now hand the floor to Medical Impact.

Distinguished delegates, excellencies, and colleagues, Medical Impact calls upon member states to strengthen sustainable and predictable capacities and financing for pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response. The lessons from COVID-19 and HIV and AIDS response have to show that preparedness requires sustained investment not only in surveillance, laboratories, and health workforces. but also recent harm reduction, prevention, and education programs, scientific knowledge dissemination, and technical capacity building. These efforts are most effective when the governments, academia, civil society, communities, development partners, and private sector can contribute through the coordinating complementary actions. During a pandemic, we can know the four fragment response and disconnect investments. We need mechanisms, align resources, expertise, and capacities around country priorities. We must also strain research and development, manufacturing, regulatory systems, and supply change to ensure timely, equitable, and affordable access to vaccines, therapies, diagnosis, and other essential health products, particularly in context facing structural inequalities. Sustainable financing should therefore support both immediate preparedness and long-term capacity, including community-based services and meaningful community engagement. And this is essential not only for the future pandemics, but also addressing the growing challenge posed by emerging and re-emergent disease. For medical impact, investing in preparedness is an investing in health equity, social justice, and community resilience in human security. Predictable financing, a stronger technical capacities and coordinated action must become foundation of a more resilient and equitable global health architecture. Thank you.

Thank you for the statement from Medical Impact. Let me now give the floor to Drugs for Neglected Diseases International.

Thank you, co-chairs and excellencies. The Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative is an international not-for-profit research and development organization, and today we strongly urge UN member states to adopt the political declaration that you have been negotiating over the past several months. But even without it, governments can start now to implement key priorities related to accelerating innovation for medical countermeasures and ensuring equitable access to resulting therapeutics, diagnostics, and vaccines through national action, as well as regional and cross-regional coalitions and alliances. I will highlight three priorities. First, biomedical R&D must be treated as a core preparedness function, as we are seeing with the Ebola Ugio emergency, and countless other outbreaks, when treatments, vaccines, or rapid tests do not exist, starting R&D after an outbreak is detected leaves communities, caregivers, and clinicians empty-handed. To sprint towards late-stage clinical development and equitable access during an emergency, we must run the research marathon before emergencies hit. We are therefore pleased with the political declaration's emphasis on R&D, including the goal of developing medical countermeasures within 100 days of identifying an outbreak. Second, the R&D gap is particularly acute for therapeutics and must be addressed. Although this neglected aspect of pandemic preparedness is not highlighted in the political declaration, DNDi and our partners are seeing growing recognition of the need, and we urge member states to support and finance a global therapeutics development coalition to be launched in 2021. And finally, public R&D funding must deliver public benefits. Article 9.5 of the pandemic agreement provides a critical framework and obligation for ensuring that publicly funded R&D translates into accessible health tools. These commitments.

I thank the distinguished representative from DNDI. I will hand the floor now to Health Diplomacy Alliance.

Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you for this opportunity at a time when we're looking at the biggest Ebola outbreak in history. These are not abstract matters. We need to determine the speed with which we react, but it's most important on who is really receiving that response. We congratulate the member states of the WHO and all organizations for the what's been reflected in the political declaration and to close the financing gap for implementation. Financing in itself will not guarantee access. We welcome the continual commitment to research, development and production of diverse manufacturing. But when it comes to vaccines and diagnostics arriving to the people who really need them within the deadlines that are important, that's absolutely essential. And we also want to recognise the technological advantages and the political will of the Member States shown by States in terms of the PABS, the pathogen access and benefit sharing system. We also need to improve coordination under a One Health approach in practice. We must take just one approach and not three parallel approaches. This is one of the most cost-effective means of investment for preparation. This approach is essential to improving microbe resistance, which is a which is absolutely key cause of pandemics, together with the meeting that has just finished, we wish to have more clarity on the monitoring of access and capacity.

I thank the distinguished representative from Health Diplomacy Alliance. I will now hand the floor to Jeunesse du Monde en Action.

Thank you very much, Chair. I call for a universal approach to strategies to fighting pandemics. Lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic show us that using HIV screening services, whether they are free or not, significantly diminished among the population. Some people are having trouble undergoing screening. According to them, they were primarily preoccupied by the COVID-19 vaccine, which was talked about much at the time, and they were afraid of receiving a shot. And there is a widespread belief that the vaccine could be harmful to their health. So as far as I'm concerned, there needs to be ongoing dialogue between the authorities that plan preventative health programs and those who work on the ground, who are the best place to understand local realities when it comes to misinformation and social factors that have a negative impact on pandemic response. It's simple. example, some service users believe that condoms or other means of contraception that are offered to them free during a prevention campaign are of poor quality. According to the research that I've conducted, the idea that something is free often is accompanied by an expectation of low quality, and the same goes for free rapid HIV or hepatitis B and C testing. Therefore, I urge for large-scale awareness-raising efforts that would explain that preventative tools-- and the speaker has been cut off.

Thank you, distinguished representatives. Unfortunately, we have run out of time, and it was not possible to hear from all those wishing to intervene. So participants who are not able to take the floor, you are encouraged to submit electronic copies of your statements to e-statements@un.org and it will be posted on the e-statement section of the UN journal. I'll now hand over to my co-chair.

Thank you very much. Apologies to the mission of Mauritius for the statement made mistakenly on their behalf by an NGO. Sorry very much. I will now give the floor to our distinguished panelists for one minute each to respond to the comments and questions raised from the floor. Please, Mrs. Emanuelle Subirman, the floor is yours.

Thank you very much. I think to be prepared to emergencies, to be able to react quickly, to be able to control outbreaks, we need strong and resilient health systems. I think we all said it today. What I want you to really keep in mind is that health system is not only human health system, it is also including animal health systems and mechanisms of coordination between all the different sectors. It could include law enforcement, as the colleague from Interpol highlighted this morning. Investment needs to be based on the national priorities, based on objective assessment of the strengths and weaknesses. And my last word would be to say that I urge donors, public or private donors, to invest in a One Health spirit. Thank you.

Thank you very much. Mrs. Mamta Murthy, the floor is yours.

Thank you very much, Madam Co-Chair. And I want to thank all the distinguished participants and the civil society organizations for their very rich comments. It's very hard to respond to so many comments, so I'd like to take the opportunity to reiterate that at a point of time when there is a lot of rethinking about the international health architecture, it is really important to align behind country-led health plans and health priorities. The second thing I want to say is that very good points were made about the importance of sharing pathogens early during an outbreak, and I'd like to underline that point. That's what allows development to go into -- to get supercharged and to make medical countermeasures available. Finally, pre-positioned emergency financing is absolutely essential to respond to an outbreak, whether it's human health or animal health. And I think this requires coordinated action amongst all the players. So with that, I just want to thank you once again for the incredibly rich comments. And I'll hand back to the co-chair.

Thank you very much. Dr. David Reddy, the floor is yours.

Thank you, and I'd also like to thank all of the people who, all of the various groups that have made comments, and I think that what they reflect is a real convergence in terms of our understanding of what is required moving forward, particularly in capacity development across various areas. coordination, particularly around financing, and also the importance of continued innovation. And I draw attention to the comment made by DNDI, particularly regarding the gap in the pipeline in antivirals and the importance of continued work in that area. Thank you.

Thank you very much. Dr. Mark Pearson, the floor is yours.

Thank you very much. Many, indeed nearly all of you, rightly called for sustainable, predictable and country-led financing for PPR. Great, but we're a long way from being able to say how we're doing. We don't know how much we're spending on PPR, especially in the non-health areas. We have no framework. for assessing the risks we face. We have no way of identifying whether we are investing enough, and we often have no way of monitoring whether our financing delivers what is intended. That undermines the case that we need to make to finance ministries and more broadly for financing international. Our case is weaker than it should be. So we do need to work together to fill in these gaps in our information systems in order to be able to mobilize the finance in that sustainable, predictable way to enable you to make good decisions about how to spend your money. Thank you.

Thank you very much. Mrs. Anna Krupova, the floor is yours, please.

Thank you very much. Having heard today's strong emphasis on sustainable and predictable financing, I would like to highlight one of the points mentioned, and that is the preparedness is not only about what can be purchased, built, or rapidly deployed during a crisis. The workforce, trust, and relationships that make health system function take years to develop, and they also require sustained investment. This is why students, young health professionals and communities must be meaningfully engaged before an emergency begins, not only consulted once priorities have already been decided. They should help shape preparedness planning, simulation exercises, community engagement and risk communication. This is at the core of sustainable pandemic preparedness. So I would leave three messages. First, finance the health systems and workforce that deliver care every day. Second, embed communities and young people as partners in preparedness structure. And third, invest consistently in health and digital literacy through dialogue and knowledge exchange rather than one-way communication. Thank you.

Thank you very much. I would like to thank all the panelists. And before concluding, allow me to take this opportunity also on behalf of my co-chair, His Excellency Mr. Ong Ye Kung, Minister for Health and Coordinating Minister for Social Policies of the Republic of Singapore, to thank all panelists and delegations for actively participating in the discussion of this important topic. As mentioned earlier, a summary of our discussion will be presented during the closing of the high-level meeting, which will take place at 5:30 p.m. in conference room 1. The multi-stakeholder panel 2 is now concluded. The meeting is adjourned.