Low Orbit Satellite Internet Systems in the Context of International Peace and Security: Challenges and Threats - First Committee Side Event, General Assembly, 80th session

Dear colleagues, guests, my name is Boris Vasiliev. I'm head of division of the Department of International Information Security of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. And I'm glad to welcome all of you at our briefing on threats related to so-called low earth orbit satellite internet communication systems. which are also called by professional community as non geostationary satellite communication systems. We have guests in the hall from different UN missions and as far as formats of our briefing is hybrid, we also have listeners online. Unfortunately, due to the technical rules of the United Nations, online participants can only listen and don't have right to intervene. But still, I hope that today's discussion will be interesting, especially taking into account that it is co-sponsored by our friends from Venezuela and Iran, and representatives of both of these states will make reports today as well. Later, I will explain why it is important. And we also have statements from our friends from Cuba and Nicaragua. So let's begin. We all use information and communication technologies, so-called ICTs, and become more and more dependent from such technologies. All countries are focused on providing internet access to as many citizens as they can in order to allow everybody to use digital services, which are very useful and popular. And along with digital advantages go threats. Let's ask the question, what will happen if such technologies stop working due to, for example, catastrophe or any other reason? We have a recent case in the Republic of Korea, very well known to everybody who watches the news. By the way, mass media calls this catastrophe as cyber apocalypse. And this shows quite well how we are dependent from ICTs. Let's ask another question. Taking into account our dependency from ICTs, what if such technologies are used against the sovereignty of states in order to undermine internal political situation of the UN member states? Nowadays, ICTs are widely used in anti-governmental protests, And recent cases of Nepal, Morocco, Madagascar, and many other states showed us that it is true. The ICTs are widely used in such protests. Same situation is with low earth orbit satellite internet communication systems. Let me bring some examples. Fall 2022, Iran, anti-governmental protests. And very important thing is that Starlink system terminals illegally imported to Iran were used during these protests. After that, Iran went to the Radio Regulation Board, RRB, of the International Telecommunication Union, ITU. And after long time deliberations, 94th meeting of the RRB proclaimed that this case was indirect contraversion of the provisions of the ITU regulations and resolutions. In this respect, telecommunication administrations of the states associated with Starlink were requested to take immediate actions to disable Starlink terminals operating within the territory of Iran. It is very important because it was the first official confirmation of the use of low earth orbit satellite internet communication system in violation of the principle of non-interference into the state's affairs. Completely same situation happened in Venezuela during protests before the presidential elections in this country. Again, Starlink terminals, again illegally imported terminals, and again they were used to coordinate protests. completely same as in Iran. As all of us know quite well from the media, that even the United States administration some time ago officially questioned the reliability of the Starlink system. And of course, we are talking not only about Starlink, it is an example, don't get me wrong, there are a lot of such systems operating. OneWeb, Amazon Kupier, and many, many others. So what are the risks of such systems? Let's sum up. First one, the use of satellite communication terminals to provide broadband internet access to users, bypassing national information space control systems poses huge risk of interference in the internal affairs of states. This type of system can be used to organize and coordinate protests, establish uncontrolled information transmission channels and conduct mass broadcasts in violation of national legislation of states. Second one, the use of spacecraft for military purposes, including for reconnaissance in the optical and radio frequency spectrum during satellite flights over the national territory of member states. for controlling unmanned systems and for providing communication channels in combat zones is also the risk. Thus, some commercial communication systems are being used to control attack drones and remotely operated boats during the Russia's special military operation in Ukraine. The onboard equipment of these systems includes satellite terminals of various systems, preliminary Starlink. This allows to use unmanned systems at significant distances from their operators, including during attacks on port infrastructure in the Russian cities of Sevastopol, Novorossiysk, the Crimean bridge, and many, many other targets. Furthermore, such terminals are being used by rocket system crews to coordinate strikes on civilian infrastructure in Russia's border regions, such as the Kursk region. What should we do in this situation? How can we protect states from the threats outlined above? We are currently working closely within the International Telecommunications Union and within the COPUOS Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space of the United Nations. In the ITU, the use of radio spectrum and orbits for satellite communication systems is regulated by the Radio Regulations, an international treaty updated every four years at the World Radiocommunication Conferences. Currently, the Radio Regulations do not limit, unfortunately, do not limit the inclusion of states in the non-geostationary orbit service area, yet the number of such systems and the satellites they are used is growing. At the World Radio Communication Conference in 2023, Resolution 14 was adopted instructing states to conduct studies on the development and implementation of regulatory measures to limit unauthorized operation of earth stations on non-geostationary orbits. Furthermore, this item is included on the agenda for the World Radio Communication Conference to be held in 2027. By the way, allow me to take this opportunity to congratulate the People's Republic of China on winning the right to host this conference in 2027. It will be held in the beautiful city of Shanghai. We are confident that this event will be held at the highest level, and we will definitely participate in this conference and discuss the issue of such satellite systems there. We are also actively working in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, COPOS. For example, the Russian side presented working document A/AC.105/2024/CRP.20 at this international forum, which is called Use of Mega Constellations of Spacecraft, Civil Spacecraft and Systems for undeclared purposes. So let's unite our efforts in tackling the issues related to the space internet communication systems. Last but not the least, I can assure you that Russia did much in order to ensure its own security. And our communication satellite developers are ready to ensure security of other states in accordance to the UN Charter provisions, the main principle of non-interference in affairs of other states with full respect to sovereignty of independent states. Thank you so much. And now I would like to give the floor to our esteemed friend, to our co-sponsor, to our very well-known friend, His Excellency, Permanent Representative of Venezuela, Samuel Mancada. The floor is yours, sir. Thank you.

Thank you very much indeed for the invitation, for allowing me to speak in this event, which we consider very important. Mr. Moderator, The unchecked expansion and deployment of low earth orbit satellite internet systems is a troubling issue. These technologies, once celebrated as advancements in connectivity and progress, are now becoming tools for interference and covert aggression against sovereign states. It is a reality that Venezuela has experienced firsthand. In our most recent presidential election held on July 2024, our national electoral institution faced an unprecedented cyber attack. Technical analysis revealed that this was a coordinated denial of service attack initiated from multiple foreign locations, including nodes traced to Europe and North America. The target of this attack was the data transmission system of Venezuela's National Electoral Council, specifically the infrastructure designed to ensure the transparency and integrity of our democratic processes. At the same time, and with precise synchronization, a so-called parallel vote tabulation network operated by one political party in Venezuela and supported by foreign technological platforms attempted to replace the official transmission of results. That was the key issue to announce the official results before the official entity. This scheme relied on a network of Starlink satellite antennas that were imported weeks before the election. These antennas were intended to transmit fabricated results from so-called independent observation centers located not only in Caracas, but also in Madrid and Washington. Mr. Moderator, it was not a spontaneous civic initiative. It was, in fact, a well-planned operation of hybrid warfare that involved a combination of cyber attacks and information operations aim at undermining our constitutional institutions and provoking social unrest, all to impose a puppet regime. As later confirmed through open source statements, the individuals involved were fully aware of their objectives. They intended to replace the official vote transmission with an alternative data stream designed to fabricate a parallel narrative of victory in the elections. What transpired in our country in 2024 is not an isolated incident. In fact, we have discovered that this is a method of intervention employed by the US aid in over 30 countries since 1995. Recently, this system has undergone a significant upgrade with the advent of social media and satellite technologies such as Starlink. It is a form of digital colonialism. If left unregulated, the use of low-orbit satellite internet systems as tools for interference could become a new arena for geopolitical conflict posing a threat to the stability of all nations, especially those in the developing world, which often lacks the capacity to defend against these assaults on their institutions. Such actions constitute a blatant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and undermine the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. When private corporations based in foreign territories and wielding the power of global satellite constellations provide connectivity beyond authorized jurisdictions, and that access is used to orchestrate destabilizing political maneuvers, we are not merely facing commercial actors. We confront the alarming weaponization of digital infrastructure, a force that drives chaos and incites civil unrest. This case highlights the dangers posed by the privatization of outer space capabilities and the lack of international regulation. Our experience confirm that the same technologies which can facilitate communication between nations can also be used to undermine national security, bypass lawful oversight, and enable information warfare. In armed conflicts, these technologies have already been utilized to coordinate military operations and strikes. In Venezuela, they were weaponized to attempt a coup d'etat through digital means. Mr. Moderator, the international community cannot stay indifferent. The principle of technological neutrality should not be used as a shield for impunity. when digital tools are weaponized. Therefore, Venezuela calls upon the first committee and all UN member states to recognize cyber interventionism through satellite networks as a threat to international peace and security. Promote discussions including within the permanent mechanism on cyberspace to regulate extraterritorial operations of private satellite internet providers. ensure that space-based communications infrastructures respect the sovereignty and national law of all states. Mr. Moderator, Venezuela reaffirms its commitment to the principle of peace, non-aggression, and international cooperation. At the same time, we will combat new forms of digital colonialism that aim to undermine our democracies under the guise of connectivity and freedom. In conclusion, Venezuela stresses that the sustainable and peaceful use of outer space relies on the responsible deployment and monitoring of all satellite systems. Unregulated operations of mega constellations pose a risk of turning the shared heritage of humanity into a battleground for conflict, pollution and domination. Connectivity should not come at the cost of sovereignty. peace or the collective security of nations. Therefore, let this meeting serve as a first step toward restoring balance and responsibility in governance of both outer space and cyberspace. I thank you, Mr. Moderator.

Thank you, Excellency, for such a brilliant intervention. Yeah, I can fully agree with the fact that the Main idea of our cooperation shall be sovereignty, non-interference of internal affairs of states as well. And by the way, we have two cases, very serious cases, in Iran and in Venezuela, which are very, you see, all the media discuss these two issues. But after the issue in Venezuela in 2024, we decided to work with our partners to identify where in which countries such satellite systems are used illegally as well. And you will be very surprised. At least 10 countries confirmed us that They have cases of illegal use of such systems. And next, I would like to give the floor to our next speaker, His Excellency Permanent Representative Jaime Castillo from Nicaragua. So what about Nicaragua? So what is going on? So probably you also have cases of illegal use of such systems. Thank you, sir. Floor is yours.

Thank you, Mr. Moderator, and good morning to all of you. Of course, you know, Nicaragua has also had some cases on the 2018, which was the failed attempt of coup d'etat. You know, there was the use of satellite and international communication that are the the organizer of this coup that utilized to mobilize their attempt, failed attempt. Mr. Moderator, we thank the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela for convening this important event to discuss the growing threat of the malicious use of low earth orbit satellites and possible ways to address this threat. We also join you to congratulate China for the holding of the important conference in 2027. Nicaragua observes that deep, with deep concern, the rise of the so-called low orbit satellite internet system platform that although the rise under the discourse of technological progress and universal connectivity pose substantive risk to national sovereignty, sociopolitical stability, and the international order based on mutual respect among states. The direct provision of connectivity that elude licensing mechanisms, sovereign control of the spectrum, and regulatory obligation under state jurisdiction opens a flank to interference and undermine the authority of national institutions. in different contexts, the use of this system to coordinate political activities from abroad, disseminate disinformation, and even support ends with military implication has been very well documented. Such background confirms that unregulated satellite connectivity can be used as a tool of destabilization and indirect intervention in the internal affair of state. This pattern protected by technological opacity and the remote activation of unregistered terminals, ignored the elementary principle that each state manages and protects its communication infrastructure and its radio spectrum as a strategic resource of a sovereign nature. In Nicaragua, the principle is established in the general law on convergent telecommunications, law number 1223 and 2024, which require the state authorization for the use of telecommunication equipment and services. Nicaragua recognize that the prior free and express consent of the state is an indispensable condition for any provision of satellite connectivity in its territory. We note that any operation must be in accordance with national law, licensing, and sovereign control of the spectrum. Mr. Moderator, low orbit satellite internet system cannot become a technological shortcut to interfere in the internal affairs of state or to weaken their national security. Nicaragua defend and promote innovation at the service of human development, and but not as an instrument of imperial domination. We reaffirm our support for the development and connectivity without interference, the provision of technological cooperation in respect of sovereignty and for the promotion of digital progress in accordance with international law, the UN charter and the constitution of each of our respective countries. I thank you, sir.

Thank you, Excellency. I would like to echo all your words. They are very important. In order to continue this discussion, in order to hold World Radio Conference in 2027, to make joint efforts in order to limit illegal functioning of such systems, we completely agree that it is very important to work together. Next speaker in my list is Mr. Carlos Prieto Lastra, Director General of Cuban Radio Spectrum Agency. We have pre-recorded statement. So please, could you please start the statement? Thank you.

Mr. President, I convey a sincere gratitude to the delegation of the Federation of Russia by the invitation to this important parallel event in a context in which the dual use of low-orbit satellites represents a serious danger to the national security of states. The technological advance and the possibilities of improvements in telecommunications provided by non-geostationary low-orbit satellite systems are unquestionable in terms of improvements de ancho de banda, velocidad de transmisión, baja latencia y cobertura mundial a bajo costo. Ello facilitaría la interconexión con lugares de difícil acceso y sin infraestructura de telecomunicaciones y contribuiría al mejoramiento de los servicios y a la disminución de la brecha digital. Sin embargo, el empleo inadecuado de estos medios, así como su uso sin la debida autorización y regulación internacional, constituyen una violación de los documentos rectores de la Unión Internacional de Telecomunicaciones y otros instrumentos sobre esta materia. En Cuba se han introducido dispositivos técnicos sin la debida autorización para acceder a servicios de Internet a través de terminales ilegales de Starlink, with the purpose of facilitating campaigns of disinformation and media manipulation and promoting actions that threaten the internal order. This violates our national sovereignty and violates what is established in our internal regulations, in particular Resolution 232 of 2015 of the Ministry of Communications. Denunciamos esta operacion ilegal que representa una amenaza para nuestra seguridad nacional y afecta los servicios del unico operador cubano de telecomunicaciones, ETECSA. Presidente, es preocupante que la Comision Federal de Comunicaciones, FCC por sus siglas en ingles, del gobierno de los Estados Unidos autorice el uso supuestamente civil de estos medios. Es preocupante, además, que el regulador comunicacional estadounidense no brinde información pública sobre este tema, en contravención del Convenio sobre el Registro de Objetos Lanzados al Espacio Ultraterrestre, puesto en vigor el 15 de septiembre de 1976. Cuba aboga por la prohibición de la militarización de los sistemas de comunicaciones de orbita baja. Rechazamos el empleo de tecnologias satelitales para promover el intervencionismo, la guerra y la subvencion politica. Debe preservarse su uso para fines exclusivamente pacificos sobre la base de la cooperacion internacional, el respeto mutuo y la estricta observancia del derecho internacional. Muchas gracias.

We would like to thank Cuba for prerecorded statement. And now we have the last speaker in our list, our another co-sponsor of today's briefing. We have Mr. Tafti Zadeh, advisor of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iran. We have online. intervention. So, Mr. Zadeh, you have the floor. The floor is yours. Do you hear us? So, let's start with the esteemed representative of Iran. in our hall and then we'll give the floor to our online participants. So the floor is yours, sir.

Thank you, Mr. moderator, and good morning, all colleagues. I sincerely apologize that our panelist was unable to participate due to some technical problems. However, I hope that he could join us a little later, but if you allow me, I'd be glad to explain this important issue. Mr. Moderator and distinguished colleagues, the rapid advancement of technology and the increasing reliance on space capabilities across various aspects of human life have driven a substantial rise in private actors participating in diverse space activities, including the deployment and operation of mega constellation in low orbit in low Earth orbit. Proliferation of this constellation has already created and will continue to create significant challenges and complex implications for both outer space security and outer space sustainability. The growing congestion in low orbit has significantly increased the risk of collision between space objects, resulting increased debris and threatening access to safe launch windows. This situation directly contradicts the principle of equitable and free access to outer space, non-appropriation, and long-term sustainability. Moreover, mega-constellations disregard and infringe upon the sovereignty of states over their territories. In recent years, certain commercial space companies have rapidly developed actively engaging in interference in internal affairs, of other countries and military activities while expanding their civilian services. This involvement complicates outer space security and presents new challenges to Paris. Addressing the impact of large constellation on the security of space activities is essential as their proliferation poses serious challenges beyond just increasing space debris and harmful radio frequency interference. In light of these developments, Iran has proposed adding a new agenda item to the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of COPUOS titled Addressing Emerging Issues of Large Constellations to facilitate discussion and promote urgent action on this matter. This agenda item would provide a more structured framework for addressing various aspects of large constellations. And as I said, I hope that our panelists are experts and now can join us and give more detailed explanation about this important new emerging challenge for outer space. I thank you, Mr. Moderator.

Yeah, thank you so much. And now we have a possibility to listen to our online Are you with us? Not yet. Yes, so we can start another part of our briefing. So as far as it is a briefing, we are just providing our views. But anyway, we have some time for Q&A, for questions and answers. And as a moderator, I would like to again highlight the fact that Iran was the first state who applied to Radio Regulations Board of the ITU and got official decision, official confirmation of the fact of illegal use of Staling terminals. My question to the esteemed representative of Venezuela, to his Excellency, are you planning to go to the RRB as well? Thank you.

I sincerely have no idea. But what we are planning to do is to spread the news, to spread information to all countries around the world that this system is in place. And we investigated the issue last year and we found out that the very same system of parallel vote networks with particular embassies in those countries and with an information campaign within the country and outside the country. And then even universities were implicated in the issue, supposed experts on statistics, electoral statistics and elections, they broadcast the results before the government and then the international media expands the news that who the winner is. This is a recipe. And we found out that in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Serbia, Mozambique, Angola, I mean, you found, you found 10 countries. We found 30 countries before even the use of Starlinks. What Starlink and all these technologies have done is to, strengthen, expand, potentiate, I mean, the strength turbocharge, I say, the system, make it extremely powerful and very difficult for countries without the capabilities to have an answer to it. So we need to get together and to understand the use of these technologies. which are used with malicious intent, and they are actually used as weapons against democracies and self-determination, for us is a very, very important issue because a number of countries are unaware of this threat directed towards them.

Thank you, Excellency. Same question to the esteemed representative from Nicaragua. So as far as you had just some illegal cases of use, of illegal use, some cases of illegal use of low orbit satellite internet communication systems in your country, are you planning to apply to the Radio Regulations Board of the ITU, which is the correct body to address this issue, by the way? Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Moderator. As you know, developing countries don't have the technology and the capacities, you know, to know everything, you know, about this phenomenon, which has been abused by developed countries and imperialist countries, you know, to try to retain the privilege that they had. in this technology. And there is no indication either that all the UN resolution regarding the cooperation and the transfer of technology of this aspect of science is being done, neither now nor in the future. So that's why it's important the cooperation. the international cooperation, the exchange of information, and the exchange of experiences of how these, how, you know, the developed countries, and especially, you know, the neo-colonial forces utilize this technology in different countries so we can learn each other. And of course, in Nicaragua, we are analyzing, you know, all these aspects of this technology their use and how that impact, you know, within national territory. We have a very open access, you know, for the population. For example, in Nicaragua, all the public park do have internet provided, you know, by the government. So internally, the access is completely open and broad. So therefore, you know, the state has to have more responsibility in order to be able to regulate the inappropriate and the abuse of this technology. Thank you.

Thank you, Excellency. And now finally, we have our Iranian speaker online. So we can just for some time stop Q&A session and just listen to our Iranian. colleague uh which and I think that your statement is very important as far as uh Iran was definitely the first country uh who after the protest uh in 2022 got a decision of the radio regulations board of the itu in favor of uh uh your country against illegal use of such satellite telecommunication system in your country. So could you please share with us what happened in 2022? Probably you had some addition to what happened as far as we know from the media in 2025, Iran had unfortunately had to limit function of the internet in your country due to security reasons and replying to this decision of the government of Iran, the Mr. Elon Musk, just SpaceX, he replied in Twitter that beams are on. Everybody knows what does it mean, what it means. So probably in 2025 you also have cases of illegal use. So could you please share with us, could you please tell us about the situation in Iran with regards to the low orbit satellite communication systems and share your experience in the country who got the positive decision of the RRB of ITU. The floor is yours, sir. Thank you. So unfortunately we don't hear you. So we see you, we see your presentation, but we don't hear you unfortunately. We'll try to resolve this issue very soon. Stay with us. Yeah, this issue shows us that information communication technologies are not reliable, unfortunately, and not only provide advantages, but also provide the risks. So I think that we need some additional time in order to resolve the situation. So I have a proposal as far as we still have technical issues, we for just five, ten another minutes can continue the Q&A session. And after we are done, we can again give a floor to our esteemed representative from Iran. So my questions are done. probably somebody with in the hall would like to provide some comments, questions that you are free to ask. You are free to comment. Thank you. Yeah, please China.

Thank you. Thank you for giving me the floor. Let me begin just thanking the delegations from Iran, Russia and Venezuela for organizing this event and to discuss the important issue related to the malicious use of LEO satellites. In recent years this issue has been raised frequently on different occasions and different forums including UN, ITU, just as many previous speakers mentioned WRC-27 which will be held in Shanghai and we welcome the discussions of all agenda items in 2027 in Shanghai and as well as relevant to UN process go beyond what we discussed here such as the GGE and OEWG of Paris, on Paris. And as there's still no effective international framework to solve this issue and given the rapid expansion of LEO systems without a proper regulation, there's urgent need to have this discussion within the UN framework and find ways to address the challenges provided the misuse or malicious use of LEO satellite constellations. I would like to share some comments in addition to what discussed here and raise one question for the panel. Generally, we believe the development of LEO satellites constellations could be an opportunity to further explore and utilize space and promote global economic and social development and even as our Cuban colleagues mentioned to narrow the digital divide. So they have given the advantage of such technology, but without proper regulation, it will or has already brought some new challenges to the global space security governance, including in addition to what we discussed here, that is, the possible harming of the national securities. Just now, I think previous speakers have mentioned threats posed by the malicious use of LEO satellites, especially the risk of, as I mentioned, harming national security of sovereign states due to malign activities involving the LEO satellites constellations. We share similar concerns, but we have some additional concern in addition to this. For example, the increasing risk of collision in low orbit, the limitation on the peaceful use of space due to unlimited occupation of space frequencies and orbital resources. the recent arms race in our space caused by the military or even for company use of the such systems. And I just take some examples to save time. In 2021, Starlink satellites approached China's space station twice in a dangerous manner, forcing it to adjust its orbit for emergency collision avoidance. And in South Asia, Starlink satellites or terminals are being used by telecom fraud criminal groups to conduct some international telecom scams. And Chinese people are many, a lot of Chinese people are victim to this criminals. So we share these concerns and even during the the GG on low perils and OEWG on perils in all its aspects and even in the COPAs, within the forum of COPAs, we have raised our concerns, you know, just about the issue I mentioned. So just to conclude, I just would like to ask a question which should relate to a, I would say, a legal issue. According to Article 6 of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, state parties should bear international responsibilities for national activities regardless whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or non-governmental entities. And according to international responsibility law and the neutrality law, if a country's commercial space activities are used to intervening armed conflicts of other countries, should the government of that country bear relevant legal consequences or lose its neutral status in armed conflicts and how to accurately define the supervisory responsibility of such a country under Article 6 of the Outer Space Treaty, this question may go beyond what we know, this side event, but I think this will help, you know, to complete the whole picture of what the, I mean, the threats arising by the malicious use of such systems. Thank you.

Yeah, thank you. Let me begin and then I'll give it for to other speakers. So our initial idea was to discuss this issue, of course, first of all, from the Telecom perspective uh of course there are a lot of risks uh being discussing copus in the GG on paros as well uh of course uh when we are talking about from the outer space perspective yeah uh having in orbit about several dozens of thousands of new uh satellites it is a problem for sustainability of outer space activity. Unfortunately, I'm not an expert in this field. So we have experts watching us online. Unfortunately, they don't have possibility to intervene, but definitely it is a problem. There are a lot of other problems. For example, there was an initiative of, there was a problem that scientists cannot use their equipment for astronomy because of the dozens of thousands of satellites on orbit. It is another problem. So it was clear and white sky initiative, if I'm not mistaken, within Copus as well. So there are a lot of problems, definitely. Let's discuss all of them at relevant just platforms, multilateral platforms. And we from our sides believe that a very important platform will be the World Radio Communication Conference to be held in Beijing in 2027, because we'll have to decide how to limit illegal functioning of these systems, how to make not only operators of the systems, but their administrations, telecom administrations, official authorities, regulators be responsible for illegal use of such systems as well. So this is what plus minus we are going to propose during the World Radio Conference in 2027. and we're glad that our friends from China will host this conference. So this is my part of response. Probably our colleagues from Venezuela would add something. Yeah, there is a technical problem with the mic.

Okay, thank you. It's a very important question, the one you post. One of the, I've been thinking a lot about this issue after our painful experience last year. And one of the conclusions is that these marvelous technology without regulation and basically without knowledge, it becomes a vulnerability. for countries that don't have the capabilities to manage it. So we are vulnerable. That's one conclusion. And because we were naive, allowing all these technologies within our country, thinking we were improving our capabilities, and actually they turned it against us in the name of freedom. The second thing is that we need to understand better how it works. One of the issues I told you about was the use of Starlink to send data streams abroad and turn it into malicious information. But also the electoral center in Venezuela was blinded actually with this denial of service attack. that came from the US and from Europe and when we denounced last year that our technical analysis demonstrated that we had a denial of service attacks by millions of contacts from North Macedonia, well, people laugh at us because it's a laughable issue. What the hell had to do North Macedonia with Venezuela National Electoral Council? It's laughable, but it was true. The point is that this is one way of using these kind of technologies. There were millions and millions of attacks from North Macedonia and we have no explanation how that happened. And the third issue is the privatization of the system. I think it's a brilliant device to present Starlink as a private company. It's ridiculous. It's not a private company. Elon Musk is a mask. It's just a front. I mean, this is a company with more than, we investigated the thing, more than 4,500 satellites actually working in space. And it's ridiculous to think that Elon Musk works without the support of the United States government. It's a front of the United States government. It's ridiculous to think that it's a private entity different from the government with that level of support. And it works not just for military areas or fields, but also for these technological and very important economic areas, but also for political areas. Elon Musk himself was involved in Venezuelan political campaign, electoral campaign last year. He came up with all the power of Twitter promoting one political party and attacking the government and then denied our Venezuelans interested in politics, when they have their Twitter accounts exposing, expressing themselves, using the supposed right of self-determination, they were shadow banned on Twitter. So they couldn't express themselves on Twitter. I myself, I had a Twitter account of more than 100,000 followers, and I couldn't use it, and I have been, I mean, I stopped using it since last year, but it was very difficult to communicate that. I mean, it turned Twitter into a weapon. And then there was a campaign in Venezuela, what they call, what's they call it? This artificial campaign, they call it astroturfing, is the technical name for this. Astroturfing campaign, meaning this, campaigns that are supposedly or apparently grassroots campaigns, but they are not grassroots at all. They are paid by corporations and by the USA. And this astroturfing campaign claiming and asking Mr. Musk, please save Venezuela, sending your antennas, we need Starlinks all over the place. And Venezuela was filled with thousands of Starlink antennas, and we couldn't figure out at the beginning what was the purpose of it until we found out later on. I mean, but to think that a private company like Starlink is apart or unconnected to the government that promotes it and allows it to grow and lends all the capabilities to have 4,500 satellites in outer space is ridiculous. I mean, it's a front of a government and it worked in conjunction and in actual cahoots with the United States government and with the USAID all over the world. Our scheme was repeated exactly the same scheme months later in Mozambique and this year in Angola. I mean, it's a recipe to intervene in democracies and governments around the world. And so the governments are responsible, is the short answer.

And probably Nicaragua, something to add.

Thank you again. Well, I think both of you, you know, have said plenty, but I will just reiterate that what I said before with the following observation. Private companies, they own this technology and they regulate who can use it. As you know, our companero Ambassador Venezuela was saying, they can cancel you anytime. You know, that is the double standards and the hypocrisy of the West, that they speak about technology, they speak about freedom of expression, but they do control the means of who can use this technology. So they regulate us in the sense that if they don't like whatever Ambassador Moncada is saying, they just simply cancel. And he has been banned for these several you know, a user. So if we see that, obviously, each state has the obligation to protect and regulate for the protection of our own population to regulate whatever it is, you know, it could be a foreign government interfering or a private company, you know, it's the right of the state to defend and protect the national sovereignty. That's what I will add. Thank you.

Yeah, thank you so much. So probably any other questions and additional comments from other colleagues? So not yet. Again, let me try one more time, probably. We resolved technical issues with Iran. So we see you, but still don't hear you. Probably. So unfortunately, we don't have sound. So this is the that's the problem. Uh, actually, to, uh, listen, Iran was, to listen the intervention of Iran was personally was very important for us but unfortunately we have technical issues I don't know what to do probably as far as we still have them and we have to adjourn our meeting so far probably I have a proposal I have a proposal so we right now briefed other member states and international community about the threats of low orbital satellites, internet communication systems. And I believe that today's briefing and discussion as well was very fruitful, not only for member states, but for us, for Russia as well. And we believe that it is very important to continue such discussions, make not only one briefing, but probably to make a series of events in future on this very important issue. So let's work together, let's unite our efforts in order to get advantages of ICTs and especially of such systems. but at the same time to tackle the issues related to their use, their illegal use, their use in violation of the UN Charter, their use undermining the sovereignty of the UN member states. So let's work together and see you. next time during our next events dedicated to this very important issue. Thank you all of you. Thank you offline participants, online participants, and of course thank you our speakers and co-sponsors. Thank you so much.