(Part 2) Multistakeholder Hearing on Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response (PPPR)- General Assembly, 80th session General Assembly Date: 9 June 2026 Language: English Transcript: https://transcripts.un.org/en/asset/k1n/k1n1n7ztig Transcripts available through this tool are created by using automatic speech recognition and are not official records nor official documents of the United Nations. Official records and official documents are available on the Official Document System of the United Nations. --- Moderator · Dr. Hanan [0:03]: Good afternoon, everybody. Good afternoon. I would like to welcome you all to the second panel in today's multisectorial hearing. After a very engaging session this morning, we move from the broad multilateral approach to more focusing on whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches. At the national level. This panel is a whole-of-government and whole-of-society— is on whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, predictable and sustainable capacities and financing for strengthened pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response. The distinguished panelists represent diverse areas of expertise and will reflect on real-life examples to share some key messages. Ms. Nina Jamal, Global Affairs Navigator and Deputy Director of Lobbying and Advocacy at Four Paws International. Ms. Nina Grundmann, Deputy Director for Health Security, International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations. Mr. Shunsuke Mabuchi, Head of Resilience and Sustainable Systems, for Health at the Global Fund, and Dr. Yasin Cholakov from the World Medical Association. As we heard in the previous panel, there have been— there has been progress since the first high-level meeting on PPPR in 2023, but some gaps still exist. We need to identify them to be able to move forward, and we need to end the panic and neglect cycle that we keep finding ourselves in as a matter of urgency. It is not a luxury. On the contrary, it costs more in terms of funding, but more importantly, in terms of lives lost and health that is impacted. Global health security relies on the collective of local and national capacities that represent its cornerstone. In assessing these capacities, We will also explore the role of other relevant stakeholders like the pharmaceutical industry, who represents key partners in the PPPR landscape, and the contributions that they make to support timely and equitable access to health-related products. The financing landscape represents a key part of the pandemic PPPR equation and needs to be sustained, especially during times of fiscal restraint, viewing spending on PPPR as a long-term public investment rather than a short-term investment. And lastly, all of this is only possible with dedicated, trained, and protected health and care workforce. They are our frontline of defense, and investing in them is an investment in our collective security. The different interventions during this session will attempt to answer the following overarching question: What are the concrete commitments that are needed now to operationalize whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, and what would tangible success look like at the national and local level within the next 3 to 5 years? Some housekeeping notes before giving the floor to the panelists. I would like to inform participants participants that those wishing to speak during the interactive discussion are kindly requested to press their microphone button. Participants, participants may indicate their wish to speak starting now. They will be called to speak after the presentations by the panelists once the floor is opened for the interactive session. Without further delay, I now move to our distinguished panelists to start our interactive discussion. The first panelist, Ms. Nina Jamal. What are the most critical gaps in national and local PPR capacities, namely what are the core capacities under IHR, and how can countries coordinate a unified PPR system working across all sectors and with communities? So, Ms. Nina, you're giving us the overall picture, please. FOUR PAWS · Global Affairs Navigator; Deputy Director of Lobbying and Advocacy · Nina Jamal [4:18]: Thank you. Thank you so much, Your Excellency Dr. Hanan, for the thoughtful question. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, my intervention is informed also by a whole-of-government, whole-of-society approach because it draws not just on insights from FOURPAWS and academia, including Georgetown, O'Neill Institute, NGOs— some of them are in the room, some of them are listening online— multisectoral initiatives like the PRIZOD Initiative and the member-state-led organization, World Organization for Animal Health. And my statement also aligns with the key asks of the Friends of the High-Level Meeting. As we meet here today, outbreaks are emerging and remind us of a difficult truth: pandemics are not inevitable. They are enabled by gaps in how we invest, coordinate, and act. The current Ebola outbreak is the 17th in the DRC and has claimed hundreds of lives. It has been declared a public health emergency of international concern, and like COVID-19, Hantavirus, mpox, and many more. These are infectious diseases of animal origin. More than 70% of emerging infectious diseases in humans have animal origin. And the gaps that lead to outbreaks evolving to this extent are critical, and I would like to highlight 4. First, we continue to underinvest where it matters most, at the source of disease emergence. Our systems, still focus on response after spillover of pathogens from animals to humans. By then, communities and animals will have already suffered. Key drivers, including ecosystem disruption, high-risk agricultural systems, weak animal health services, and wildlife trade remain insufficiently addressed. Prevention at source is foundational, though, and to achieve it, we must support regions facing the highest highest risk of spillover and having the least capacity to manage them. Local communities and health and animal health workers are at the front lines of these outbreaks, and when empowered with knowledge, resources, sustainable livelihood alternatives to protect themselves and their animals and the environment, they can reduce high-risk practices and prevent local threats from escalating into global crises. Second, while the One Health approach, which recognizes the interconnection between human, animal, and environmental health, widely endorsed by governments in all regions, implementation remains fragmented. True pandemic prevention requires an integrated One Health approach where human, animal, environmental stakeholders plan and act together. And when governments engage communities and stakeholders in designing solutions, ownership and effectiveness increases. On One Health, we also need to look at regions. Regional collaboration remains underutilized. It is present in some regions— ASEAN is one good example— but we need more regional collaboration because it is essential in addressing transboundary risks. Third, even though prevention costs a fraction of response, the global architecture for prevention remains fragmented and underfunded.. And while institutions and frameworks exist, they are not sufficiently aligned or resourced. There is a significant financing gap in animal health, environmental, and community-level systems. And here, the World Organization for Animal Health estimates that animal health receives only 0.6% of global health spending. And it receives less than $1 billion annually directed to veterinary services through development aid. Which is far below what they estimate to be the need, which is $2.3 billion. Investing in prevention is a global health security imperative, especially when it empowers communities and the environmental and animal health workforce, because they are at the front lines of interfaces where conditions for pathogens to emerge, evolve, and spread is high. Fourth, and lastly, regulatory gaps persist at the human-animal-environment interface, where multiple sectors are responsible for a common challenge, but no single sector has sufficient mandate or capacity to act alone. They must be mandated to coordinate. Existing international frameworks that tackle the stages of pandemic prevention, preparation, and response challenges are also fragmented, with no single coordinated approach through multilateral governmental agreements, public health instruments and institutions, They're tackling different parts of the project, of the strategy, of the PPR strategy, but they're not working within a common strategy, and this weakens collective impact at a time when coherence is essential. Excellencies, we have the evidence and the tools. What we need now is political will to prevent at source and deliver on One Health. The next pandemic is already emerging. The question is whether we choose to prevent it. Thank you, Your Excellency. Back to you. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [9:17]: Thank you, Nina, for these pertinent remarks. Miss Nina Grundmann, how can the pharmaceutical industry best contribute to building a more predictable, regionally distributed, and sustainable global ecosystem for vaccine, therapeutics, and diagnostics R&D and manufacturing? IFPMA · Deputy Director for Health Security · Nina Grundmann [9:36]: Thank you very much for the invitation first and for this question. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, colleagues, we share a common objective: a world better prepared to prevent, detect, and respond to pandemics. The innovative pharmaceutical industry is a core part of that system, strengthening population health, developing vaccines and therapeutics, and scaling the manufacturing and delivery of life-saving products. Recent outbreaks remind us of an important reality. Health security threats are not isolated events. They are continuous. The emergence of hantavirus and Ebola outbreaks in recent weeks underscore the importance of strong, sustained preparedness systems and greater investments in R&D, particularly given the existing gaps across high-risk pathogens. In this context, industry has a clear track record of stepping up. During previous health emergencies such as Ebola, mpox, or COVID-19, companies mobilized rapidly, exploring what they had in their pipelines, advancing R&D for new medicines and vaccines, and working with partners to deliver solution at speed. They also engaged They also engage in efforts to support equitable access to medical countermeasures through voluntary approaches such as donations, tiered pricing, licensing, and other global collaboration. Regarding geographically diversified manufacturing efforts, the private sector can be a strong partner through voluntary, trust-based, and business-realistic models. Experience shows that these efforts need to be carefully designed as they can also carry risks. For example, fragmenting or duplicating manufacturing processes and supply chains, diminishing economies of scales, and increasing production costs. For these efforts to be sustainable and to deliver impact for global health and health security, security, three conditions need to be in place. First, invest— investment follows demand. Without reliable long-term procurement and predictable market conditions, even well-funded facilities risk becoming underutilized. Outbreaks and pandemics, by their nature, do not generate the predictable and sustained demand needed to support manufacturing capacity. For geographically diversified manufacturing to be viable, it is therefore— it therefore needs to be anchored in broader ongoing demand, for example, routine vaccines and treatments that can sustain facilities over the long term. So the real risk is not that facilities are built, but that they absorb significant resources without delivering sustained benefits to health security. A second condition that is needed for successful geographically diversified manufacturing is the presence of enabling infrastructures. First, on the industrial side, this means reliable production capacity, including supply chains, utilities, and a skilled workforce to ensure manufacturing can operate consistently. On the healthcare side, it requires systems able to absorb, distribute, and deliver products effectively to patients. A third condition that needs to be in place is what we call policy coherence. And here there are 3 important layers. The first one is a strong regulatory framework, which is the foundation that ensures quality and also creates and builds trust, both domestically and internationally. A robust intellectual property framework is also critical to provide the legal certainty needed for companies to engage in long-term partnerships. Finally, trade policies need to be aligned with health policy objectives. I'll stop here. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [14:09]: Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Nina. I now turn to Mr. Shunsuke Mabuchi. Can you tell us what role can multilateral financing mechanisms play in complementing domestic investments for PPR while reinforcing national ownership equity and access, and sustainable capacity building? Global Fund · Head of Resilience and Sustainable Systems for Health · Shunsuke Mabuchi [14:31]: Thank you, Excellency Dr. Hanan, for the great question. Excellency, distinguished participants, thank you for the honor, for this invitation. The global health financing is shrinking. In this reality, what multilateral organization financing mechanism must do is clear. Help countries maximize return on investment and build sustainable paths to self-reliance. Two recommendations: one, build multi-purpose system that controls infectious diseases and prevents pandemics, and we have to do it with clear timeline. In many countries, pandemic preparedness is not a separate agenda. It lives inside the same system managing HIV, TB, and malaria and other outbreaks every day. The highest return and most sustainable investment is in those systems. Senegal built a single surveillance network, the same sentinel sites, the same health workers, the same laboratories, that simultaneously detects malaria, dengue, influenza, hemorrhagic fevers, and emerging threats. No parallel systems. Multiple returns. In Uganda, the sample referral network built for HIV and TB now moves over 4 million specimens every year across all diseases and is actively serving the current Ebola response. The mobile laboratory units that find missing TB cases in remote communities are deployed for Ebola testing today. In Uganda and across the border into DRC. The Global Fund is the largest multilateral financier for PPPR over the past 8 years, averaging $4.3 billion a year, according to the analysis by OECD. Because HIV, TB, and malaria investments directly build pandemic preparedness capacity, we all need to be even more deliberate about this integrated multipurpose investments away from siloed investments are most efficient and sustainable path forward for PPPR and also broader health impact. And currently, the Global Fund is making a huge shift and providing that limited timeline or the timeline for transition for our funding in many of the countries. And work together with the country backwards to build out the sustainable systems for countries to manage HIV, TB, and malaria. I think we have to do it for PPPR as well, with very clear time-bound targets that we can hold ourselves accountable together and then work together on it. Two, optimize funds across all sources. At the global level, multilateral mechanisms should operate with clear role divisions based on comparative advantages or strengths. The Global Fund provides agile, predictable, and flexible funding directly to the government and to the most vulnerable communities, highly complementary with GAVI and the World Bank, and we support the coordinating financing mechanism to make our funding transparent, rules clear, and accountability real. At the country level, Global Fund, GAVI, and the World Bank are already coordinating country by country. Very important, because multi-year funding decisions for both the Global Fund and GAVI will be all made this year. But the real transformative change happens when countries are equipped to lead all of us. I saw this firsthand during the West Africa Ebola response in 2014 to '16 as the World Bank team leader at the time. Liberia, Sierra Leone had whole-of-government mechanism with clear plans and the capacity to navigate donor funds and the authority to hold everyone accountable. That made the difference. We have known this for years. However, we have not built a systematic mechanism to support countries in doing it. Support remains ad hoc, fragmented across organizations. The political declaration is an opportunity to close that gap. Finally, equity cannot be an afterthought. A fully operational pandemic agreement and meaningful civil society and community engagement, echoing all the other participants' comments, are essential to ensure the most vulnerable are not left behind. As we see in DRC today, community-led responses are backbone of early detection, risk communication, and trust-building. No preparedness architecture works without them. Thank you very much. Back to the Chair. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [19:30]: Thank you, Mr. Shamsik. And now I give the floor to Dr. Yacine Cholakoff for our most important assets, our human assets. Thank you. WMA · Yasin Cholakov [19:42]: Thank you. Thanks a lot. We, as many have pointed out, we meet at a critical moment. While member states are continuing negotiations in Geneva, another Ebola emergency reminds us that pandemic preparedness is not a theoretical exercise. The question before us now is whether the agreed principles can actually be implemented and operationalized. At the HLM in 2023, I emphasized that trust is damaged when communities experience unfairness, when countries that report outbreaks get punished, when protective equipment, vaccines, diagnostics arrive too late, or when those most affected are excluded from decision-making. I'll pick up from there because I think that all of those conclusions remain true today. Unfortunately, PAPS negotiations in Geneva could not conclude in the initial timeframe and part prob— probably because those negotiations were plagued, and then excuse the thematic terminology, by distrust as well. Nevertheless, I was heartened to hear the ambition and the optimism that came out at the WHA looking forward to the extended timeline in the year to come. But now, if we take a step back from those political negotiations and think about pandemics themselves, pandemic response heavily relies on trust. And I understand this very well from my public health work in Nunavik, a northern region in Canada where the predominantly Inuit population have experienced profound historical and ongoing injustices, and where public trust in institutions cannot be assumed. I also work extensively in TB nationally and internationally, and the, the current cuts in global health funding have already been disastrous from for some programs. Many of these programs were highly valued by communities, and when they are disrupted, we see a double impact. There's a growing disease burden, but there's also rising distrust from populations who feel abandoned by institutions that were meant to protect them. TB teaches us that trust is not built during crises alone, but that it needs to be nurtured over years and through consistent engagement. It also requires respect, the delegation of resource and the decision-making power over research and relinquishing powers to those communities most affected. And this is where physicians and health workers and medical associations and other trusted health actors come in play. Despite the rising distrust in institutions and science, physicians and health workers that are front and close to patients remain often amongst the most trusted messengers in people's lives on matters related to health, and that's further amplified when those health workers come from the communities that they serve. Yet for that work, health workers themselves must also be protected. During the COVID-19 pandemic, health workers, and oftentimes the most junior health workers, were redeployed on the front lines and often exposed to the greatest risks of what was then, and to still, to a certain extent, still is, a frightening health threat. And too many settings, they were asked to carry out tasks that have inherent risk without the adequate protection and support. This must not be repeated. And unfortunately, today we see that repeating with the Ebola outbreak, where health workers' deaths were already reported. We should be able to do better. So, what should this political declaration commit to concretely? Firstly, it should make community participation a standing part of PPPR. Governance at all levels. Communities, civil society, medical associations, health workers, and other trusted actors should have defined roles in preparedness planning, surveillance, risk communication implementation, and hold political institutions to account. And this must happen also in between crises, not only once emergencies are underway. Secondly, it should commit to financing across sectors in those systems that when strengthened in times of peace are available for response during pandemics. This certainly means sustained financing in health systems to ensure that we have universal health coverage and that the health systems are available to respond, but it also means financing other systems such as housing, such as water and sanitation, which obviously have tremendous impact in health crises. Preparedness has to be recognized as a public good, and thinking of it in this framework makes financing much easier as well. Thirdly, it should make equity, human rights, and accountability operational. So this means fair and timely and public health priority-driven access to countermeasures, protection of health workers, safeguards against stigma and discrimination, and measurable commitments that allow communities to hold decision makers accountable. I'll stop here for now, but I'll have other thoughts. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [24:40]: Thank you, Dr. Yassin. I'm going to come back to my panelists, but now I'd like to open the floor for comments and questions. Once I give the floor to participants, I would like the speaker to press the microphone button. At that point, the green light on your microphone will guide the technician to activate your microphone. Once the light on your microphone turns red, indicating that your microphone has been activated, you may proceed to make your intervention. In order to allow maximum participation by all present, I appeal to all our participants to limit your interventions to 2 minutes. To manage our time effectively, the microphone will be cut off after 2 minutes. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, which is the Philippines. Philippines, you have the floor. Philippines [25:30]: Thank you very much, Madam Moderator, and thank you to the panelists for their remarks. In view of the limited time, we'll just highlight a few issues that we played an active role in negotiations on the WHO Pandemic Agreement, including through the Group of Equity and as a co-facilitator of provisions on health workforce, technology transfer, production capacities, and supply chains. We remain convinced that stronger global solidarity and multilateral cooperation is essential to preventing a repeat of the inequities experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic. We would like to see the declaration therefore include concrete commitments to operationalize the pandemic treaty, strengthen technology transfer and regional manufacturing capacities, support sustainable financing mechanisms, and ensure equitable and timely access to vaccines, diagnostics, therapeutics, and other pandemic-related health products. We believe these are not only health priorities but investments in our shared security and resilience. We fully support a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach, including as what the panelists mentioned, involving the workforce and the communities. We nationally have been working to strengthen our universal health— healthcare system. And we want to just emphasize that we have to continue working to protect and support healthcare workers whose contributions remain essential before, during, and after health emergencies. Lastly, we look forward to working with all member states to develop a very strong action-oriented political declaration this September and to remain guided by the lessons of COVID-19 to make sure the world is prepared for future pandemics. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [27:19]: Thank you. Thank you, Philippines. I give the floor to Uruguay. Uruguay [27:27]: Muchas gracias. Thank you. En nombre de— On behalf of Uruguay, and firstly I'd like to thank all of the panelists for being here today and for sharing their most valuable insights. We'd also like to thank and appreciate the specialized agencies, especially the World Health Organization, civil society organizations, as well as other stakeholders. We appreciate all of your contributions and we look forward to continuing to work closely with all of you. Uruguay wishes to reaffirm its commitment to the pandemic agreement. We believe it is crucial for global Health. Its aim is to guarantee that the international community is never underprepared again in the face of a health crisis. Ahead of the high-level meeting, we believe that it should reflect a clear commitment to multilateralism, international commitment, and international solidarity, including in terms of access to health technology, health cooperation, and financing. This is a major issue for developing countries and also for the international community as a whole. And we are grateful to see this being addressed so comprehensively by all of the different panelists. The high-level political declaration should strengthen rather than weaken intergovernmental commitments that have previously been agreed both in Geneva under the WHO framework but also in the political declaration, the high-level political declaration that was made in 2023 here in New York. We also think it's important to highlight that the COVID-19 pandemic has shown that countries are not able to negotiate access to technology and knowledge in an isolated manner. The gaps in technology between and within countries in terms of medical access, those issues should not be repeated and this is This is why we think that it's important to recognize that isolated negotiations with providers and the concentration of knowledge represent obstacles and prevent us from allowing solutions to reach all people in all countries. We also feel it's essential to achieve a consensual result to the negotiations currently ongoing in terms of the PAB system in Geneva. We must have clear norms and transparency and security rules, and we look forward also to a commitment in terms of equitable access in the high-level declaration. It has been an absolute pleasure working with all of you, and we also want to support the permanent representatives of Armenia and Rwanda in their roles as co-facilitators for setting the bar so high. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [30:13]: I thank you. Thank you, Aguri. I give the floor to France. France, you have the floor. France [30:22]: Thank you, Excellencies. We've closely followed the debate and we believe that there's a great deal of convergence on the challenges that we are facing. Various panelists underscored the budgetary constraints that have affected countries, the growing pressure on health systems, And the need to maintain political momentum on the PPPR. When it comes to financing, PPPR cannot depend solely on emergency financing in times of crisis. As was mentioned, PPPR ought to be financed upstream through sustainable financing, better mobilization of national resources, and long-term planning. This approach is entirely in keeping with the commitments made under the French presidency of the G7 through the framework for the promotion of health sovereignty, financing, and autonomy. For example, the Global Platform for Cofinancing, which facilitates the identification of possibilities for cofinancing through public development bonds and international financial institutions involved. When it comes to governance, the COVID-19 crisis clearly demonstrated that the PPPR cannot be implemented by governments alone. Inclusion and trust are vital. In other words, a pan-governmental, pan-societal approach is crucial, and therefore Article 15 of the agreement is a response to that. Preparation and response to pandemics is based upon trust— trust between governments and citizens, between institutions and communities, and between countries. And this Trust ought to guide us in the future for negotiations. There is an international consensus on inclusive governance and sustainable financing. Our responsibility now is to implement these commitments and to translate them into tangible operational measures, and the high-level meeting on the EPR will be a testament to that. Thank you. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [32:24]: France, I give the We now turn to Spain. Spain [32:32]: Thank you very much, Madam Moderator. For Spain, financing for pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response, PPPR, must be better aligned with countries' national regional priorities. Only in this way can international cooperation effectively strengthen national health systems, which is the cornerstone of any credible preparedness response framework. At the same time, we must recognize that no single national system can tackle the health risks of the 21st century alone. Multilateral and regional mechanisms continue to be indispensable for facilitating cooperation and coordination in the face of threats that know no borders. From this perspective, Spain has identified two priorities. The first priority is to improve the quality of financing. We need resources that are more predictable, more sustainable, and better aligned with countries' priorities. Fragmented financing or overly top-down funding can end up weakening the capacities that we actually seek to strengthen. The second priority is the diversification of the donor base. The scale of today's challenges calls for mobilizing resources from a broader coalition that includes traditional donors but also new partners, development banks, regional institutions, philanthropic actors, and the private sector while preserving public leadership and accountability. We should also honestly address the issue of debt. Many countries are trying to increase investment in healthcare while at the same time facing a growing financial burden. And for this reason, Spain supports mechanisms such as debt-for-health swaps to generate fiscal space aimed at strengthening health capacities. However, the discussion goes beyond financing. Spain wishes to contribute to international reflection and thinking on how to build economies that produce health equity, health security, and other public goods that actually strengthen our societies. It is this conviction that is the inspiration behind the new Global Council for a Common Good Economy that was launched in Barcelona together with Mariana Mazzucato. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [34:44]: I thank you. Thank you, Spain. I give the floor to UNDP. UNDP [34:53]: Chair, Excellencies, let me begin by expressing our solidarity with the countries and communities affected by the ongoing Ebola outbreak and with frontline workers risking their lives to contain it. As we have learned from HIV, COVID-19, and other pandemics, as also we have heard today, effective prevention, preparedness, and response requires whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach that strengthen institution, reduce inequalities, and build trust. On prevention, tackling the drivers of zoonotic spillover such as biodiversity loss, climate change, and unsustainable land use through nature-based solutions and One Health approaches are essential. On preparedness, addressing structural inequalities, including gender disparities, and ensuring equitable access to medicines, diagnostics, vaccines, and quality healthcare must be a priority. Equally, countries need the long-term investments in core public systems in health, social protection, digital infrastructure, early warning, and local governance so they can respond quickly to shocks before they become crises. In line with our strategic plan 2026-2029, UNDP remains committed to bringing expertise in inclusive governance, upstream prevention, early warning and resilience, logistics, and health system strengthening to complement the critical work of WHO and many of the health partners and others in this room. This includes our role as a longstanding partnership with the Global Fund, as well as our— as an accredited entity of the Pandemic Fund. We must remember that pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response cannot be built as a standalone crisis architecture, and we have heard that from many today. It must be grounded in the institutions and delivery systems countries and communities rely on every day. UNDP therefore welcomes the second UN High-Level Meeting as a timely opportunity to move from commitment to implementation, backed by sustained, multi-year, predictable financing that prioritizes equitable access and strengthens capacities across the prevention, preparedness, and response continuum. Thank you. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [37:00]: Thank you, UNDP. I give the floor to Interpol. Interpol, you have the floor. INTERPOL [37:11]: Mr. President, Excellencies, distinguished delegates. 6 years ago, our world was profoundly changed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Amidst global turmoil, law enforcement authorities acted as first responders, enforcing public health measures, assisting with contact tracing, and delivering emergency supplies. As we now gather to prevent the next pandemic, allow me to explain why law enforcement must remain a crucial part of our conversation. First, law enforcement supports the early detection of biological risks which could trigger or exacerbate pandemics. For instance, Interpol manages the world's only global list of weaponizable biological agents or toxins which could be misused to cause dangerous biological incidents. We also host BioTracker, an early warning system used to share alerts about unusual disease events and biological threats. Second, when outbreaks do occur, Law enforcement maintains public order and protects civilians from crimes that grow prevalent during pandemics, including domestic violence during lockdowns or the deliberate spread of infection. During COVID-19, Interpol published bespoke guidance assisting law enforcement to respond to these emerging criminal threats. Distinguished delegates, as you draft the 2026 Political Declaration on Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and response, we urge you to recognize the crucial role played by law enforcement in the text. Interpol reaffirms our commitment to strengthening global biosecurity and keeping our societies healthy, safe, and prepared. I thank you. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [38:59]: Thank you, Interpol. I give the floor to World Veterinary Association. World Veterinary Association. WVA · Veterinarian · Dr. John de Jong [39:13]: Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen and friends, my name is Dr. John de Jong, and I'm a practicing veterinarian. Equitable pandemic prevention cannot be achieved without systematically integrating animal health systems, veterinary services, and the veterinary workforce within global and national preparedness architectures. A significant proportion of emerging infectious diseases originate at the human-animal interface. Yet prevention efforts continue to be unevenly distributed across sectors and geographies. Effective pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response require coherent governance frameworks and predictable, sustained financing across all sectors. In this regard, animal health systems and veterinary services remain systematically underprioritized despite their central role in preventing health risks at the source. A whole-of-government approach necessitates the institutionalization of One Health coordination mechanisms with clearly defined roles and mandates across human, animal, and environmental health sectors. Without such structures, fragmentation persists, limiting the effectiveness and efficiency of national and global responses. This approach should not be limited by borders because pandemics are not constrained by borders. From a financing perspective, current investment patterns remain disproportionately focused on downstream response rather than upstream prevention. This imbalance is neither cost-effective nor sustainable. Evidence consistently demonstrates that investments in prevention particularly in surveillance, laboratory capacity, workforce development, and biosecurity and animal health, yield significant returns by reducing the likelihood and impact of outbreaks. Strengthening veterinary services and animal health systems should therefore be understood as a strategic investment in global health security. This includes supporting integrated surveillance systems, ensuring access to essential veterinary medicines, and reinforcing capacities at the human-animal interface where risks are most likely to emerge. The political declaration should explicitly recognize animal health systems as part of core prevention capacity and call for dedicated, predictable financing to support their strengthening. It should further promote the integration of veterinary services within national and international PPR planning and budgeting processes, ensuring that prevention at the source is adequately resourced as a central pillar of global health security. It is time to not just talk the talk, but time to walk the walk. Let's put our money where our mouths are. Thank you. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [42:02]: Thank you, World Veterinary Association. I give the floor to Preventing Pandemics at the Source. Preventing Pandemics at the Source · Executive Director · Neil Vora [42:11]: Thank you, Chair. Excellencies, appreciate this opportunity. My name is Neil Vora. I'm a physician and executive director of Preventing Pandemics at the Source. My comments are shaped by nearly a decade at CDC as an epidemiologist responding to outbreaks around the world, including in West and Central Africa during the two largest Ebola outbreaks ever. That work has made clear to me that a One Health approach is not just good for animals and nature, it is fundamental to health equity. Our current public health model, however, essentially waits for zoonotic diseases to occur followed by a scramble to contain them. That is inherently inequitable to the communities that suffer those spillovers. We are seeing this play out with the current Ebola outbreak. This high-level meeting and the declaration is an opportunity to change course. To do so will require a clear articulation of what is involved in operationalizing a One Health approach, highlighting the following four aspects. First, distinguishing between the two types of prevention, both of which are critical. Secondary prevention, the type that gets more attention, manages outbreaks after a pathogen has already entered a human population. Primary prevention, in contrast, stops outbreaks in the first place, particularly by addressing the drivers of spillovers. Second, committing to addressing the drivers of spillovers, specifically through halting tropical deforestation, stopping risky commercial wildlife trade, improving biosafety in animal agriculture, and ending farming of animals for fur products. Third, urging member states to develop national action plans grounded in One Health and establish formalized national multisectoral coordination mechanisms. Fourth, establishing concrete financing commitments for primary prevention. Prevention costs a fraction of response saves millions of lives, and every dollar spent is one that goes a long way by simultaneously advancing climate and biodiversity goals. The science is clear. The stakes could not be higher. We now have a rare open policy window. Your actions in the coming months could change the course of history. Civil society is here to support you. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [44:25]: Thank you, Preventing Pandemics. At the source. And I really would like to thank everybody for sticking to the time. However, we're reading a little bit too quickly for the interpretation. So may I please ask people to read their statements at a reasonable pace and to email their copies of their statements to the work of the— to who? Email their statements to where? To eStatements@UN.org. Thank you. And the next speaker is Canadian International Complacency Association. You have the floor. Canadian International Chaplaincy Association [45:05]: Distinguished Chair, Excellencies, panelists, thank you. I have the honor of delivering the statement on behalf of the Chaplaincy Cycle, which is Chaplaincy International and university. And I just want to mention that the COVID-19 pandemic exposed not only gaps in the system but gaps in trust, equity, and inclusion. As we consider intervention, prevention, preparedness, and response, we must recognize that this is not solely a technical or medical endeavor. It is fundamentally a matter of solidarity, human dignity, and shared responsibilities. Communities at the local level, faith-based organizations, education, educators, and grassroots leaders played a critical role during the pandemic. They informed, protected, and sustained populations often where formal systems systems could not reach. Yet their contributions remain insufficiently integrated into national and global preparedness frameworks. SAICA underscores the importance of people-centered and inclusive approach. Preparedness must extend beyond infrastructure and include strengthened community engagement and trust building. Inclusive community communication strategies that are culturally and contextually responsive, investment in education and digital, digital equity as tools for resilience, and the integration of mental health and psychosocial support into response systems. Excellencies, preparedness does not reach the last that does not reach the last mile is not preparedness. Equity must guide both policy and practice. We must also reinforce accountability and transparency at all levels to ensure that commitments translate into meaningful outcomes for those most at risk. The lesson before us is clear. We must act decisively to build build systems that are resilient, inclusive, and grounded in ethical leadership. As we move forward, let us do this with collective resolve, ensuring that no community is left behind and that the future responses are defined not by disparity but unity and shared response and purposes. My question to the panelists: In what ways do these interventions that are proposed today finally formally integrate faith-based organizations, civil societies, and community leaders into a national preparedness and response framework to strengthen the trust and local uptake. I thank you. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [48:12]: Thank you, Canadian International Chaplaincy Association. I give the floor to UN Foundation. UN Foundation [48:19]: Thank you, Chair. The UN Foundation welcomes this opportunity to align priorities for the High-Level Meeting on Pandemics. This issue requires deep cross-sectoral collaboration and the highest levels of political leadership this forum uniquely provides. The world's response to hantavirus and Ebola in recent weeks underscores an inherent truth: multilateral cooperation is fundamental to how we prevent, prepare for, and respond to global health threats. Strengthening cooperation remains a strategic imperative that will predict our ability to save lives now and in the future. Since the last high-level meeting in 2023, we have seen major policy and scientific innovation. Yet these improvements have not kept pace with accelerating risks and changing geopolitical and financial context. Critical gaps remain, and recent emergencies demonstrate that viruses can strike whether we address these challenges or not. We are concerned that political gridlock and physical constraints will continue to delay urgent efforts. In that respect, we'd invite member states in the panel to consider how the upcoming political declaration can galvanize key areas of convergence that have surfaced through the pandemic agreement. While negotiations often focus on differences of opinion, we know there is significant alignment around core preparedness priorities. One of the clearest areas of consensus is that preparedness begins with people. Investing in the health workforce strengthens both everyday systems and emergency capacity. The pandemic agreement also reflects shared commitment to evidence-based prevention through the One Health approach in addressing risks at the interface of humans, animals, and the environment. And finally, while debate continues on data sharing, the value of surveillance itself is rarely contested. There is broad support for upgrading surveillance systems, lab networks, and mechanisms for early detection and reporting of outbreaks. These areas, we believe, provide a foundation on which implementation can move forward even as more contentious issues continue to evolve. In closing, this high-level meeting offers a unique window for us to endorse bold solutions that are grounded in evidence and guided by equity. Thank you. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [50:20]: Thank you, UN Foundation. I give the floor to Afro Global Alliance. Afro Global Alliance · Executive Director · Austin Arinze Obiefuna [50:28]: Thank you, Madam Chair. My name is Austin Arinze Obiefuna, the Executive Director of Afro Global Alliance and the Vice Chair of the Stop TB Partnership. I speak today from the perspective of communities affected by tuberculosis and from the broader struggle to build resilient health systems. Madam Chair, pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response cannot succeed if it is built only around emergency response. It must be rooted in strong, equitable, community-led health systems that can detect, prevent, and respond to threats every day. Tuberculosis teaches us a painful lesson. TB remains one of the world's deadliest infectious diseases, yet it is preventable, treatable, and curable. The gaps that allow TB to persist are weak surveillance, delayed diagnostics, underfunded primary health care, poor infection control, limited access to new tools, stigma, and exclusion of affected communities, These are the same gaps that weaken pandemic preparedness. If we cannot find, treat, support people with TB today, we will not be ready for the next pandemic tomorrow. Pre-PPR must therefore invest in integrated systems, laboratories, digital surveillance, community health workers, oxygen and respiratory care, infection prevention and control, health, supply chains, and social protection. These investments should not sit in silos. They must strengthen TB, HIV, AMR, respiratory disease, and outbreak response together. Communities must also be in the center. During COVID-19 and in the TB response, we saw that trust, local leadership, and community networks are essential for reaching the unreached. Community-led monitoring, Meaningful engagement and accountability should be recognized as core components of preparedness, not optional additions. Finally, financing must be predictable and equitable. Countries need support to strengthen domestic systems, but global solidarity remains essential. Preparedness must not divert resources away from existing epidemics like TB. Instead, it must build on them. A pandemic agreement that ignores TB and other ongoing infectious diseases will miss the foundation of true preparedness. Let us build a pandemic preparedness agenda that protects everyone, leaves no one behind, and strengthens health systems before, during, and after emergencies. Thank you. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [53:10]: Thank you very much. I give the floor now to AIDS, AIDS Healthcare Foundation, you have the floor. AHF [53:25]: Thank you very much, Madam Chair, esteemed panelists. I have the pleasure of speaking on behalf of AIDS Healthcare Foundation. We represent 3 million patients which we deliver care to in 50 countries. As member states prepare for the high-level meeting on pandemic preparedness, prevention, preparedness, and response, we urge governments to focus on 4 priorities that will determine whether the world is truly better prepared for the next pandemic. First, equitable pathogen access and benefit sharing, or PABS, must remain central to the implementation discussions leading to the high-level meeting. Countries that share pathogens, scientific data, must be guaranteed timely and affordable access to the vaccines, diagnostics, and therapeutics developed from these contributions. Second, the Pandemic Fund must be fully financed and serve as the primary financing mechanism supporting implementation of the pandemic agreement. Commitments on paper will not strengthen preparedness unless countries have the resources to build and sustain essential public health capacities. Fragmented financing creates inefficiencies and weaknesses and weakens accountability, while a well-funded coordinated mechanism can help translate commitments into actions. Third, we must strengthen regional PPPR capacity. Regional institutions are often best positioned to coordinate surveillance, laboratory networks, procurement, manufacturing, and emergency response. A more resilient global system requires stronger regional systems. Finally, meaningful civil society engagement must be guaranteed at all levels of governance. Communities, healthcare workers, patient groups, civil society organizations bring essential expertise, accountability, and lived experience. Their participation should be institutionalized, not treated as an afterthought. The lessons from COVID-19 are clear: preparedness is not only about responding faster, it's about responding more equitably. We urge Member States to ensure that equity, financing, regional capacity, and meaningful participation remain at the center of the global pandemic agenda. Thank you. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [55:46]: Thank you very much. I will go back to my panelists for a series of questions, but before that, let me just emphasize how pleased I am that we all share this common objective of a world better prepared to detect, prevent, and respond to health emergency. And I hear that we are all highly committed to a high-level meeting that is impactful and implementation-oriented. We have a lot of common themes. I'll come back to those at the end because I see a lot of speakers and I'd like to make sure we give everybody an opportunity to speak. So, in terms of our panelists, let me ask Nina, Jamal. Nina, what concrete steps can governments take to ensure that current investments in PPR translate into sustainable local capacities? FOUR PAWS · Global Affairs Navigator; Deputy Director of Lobbying and Advocacy · Nina Jamal [56:34]: Thank you, Your Excellency. In terms of concrete actions that governments need to take, one of the things we heard earlier today was the Panama Agreement is here, we can start focusing on implementation. There are gaps that need to be addressed. And I have a few actions to propose, some of them on national level and others on global. On national level and regional level, we need to see One Health strategies for pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response, and they must explicitly address the drivers of spillover, preventing pandemics at the human-animal interface, tackling drivers like ecological degradation, commercial wildlife trade, high-risk agricultural practices. So strategies. The other measure we need to see is establishing or strengthening multi-sectoral coordination because currently different institutions are doing their part of the equation but they're not working jointly on one strategy, at least in In some settings they aren't. In some countries we see a beginning of that, but it needs to be supported. The third point is related to financing. We heard a lot of remarks from colleagues here about the financing gap, and from a prevention and One Health perspective, we need to make sure that the gap also includes the highly underfunded sectors like the animal health sector, environmental health, community-level prevention, because when they are also listed as eligible recipients of support, we prevent pandemics at the earliest stage possible. And we have the coordinating financial mechanism soon. We have the Pandemic Fund. We have other funds that are addressing different stages of the PPPR pathway. So there is more to be done on financing here. The fourth point is related to technical and financial support, especially to lower-income countries, because there is the willingness. We know from several countries with low resources that they're doing everything they can, but they need more support, and we need to make sure that they have the ability to protect their communities. This is what equity is. Enabling communities to— and governments to protect their own communities. And the fifth point is related to the multilateral framework. We have several multilateral environmental agreements. We have the pandemic agreement, International Health Regulation. Each of them tackles part of the equation, but they're not developing a single strategy, and there will be gaps. So we need to see a single strategy. So we need to see strengthening alignment across these frameworks. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [59:27]: Thank you, Nina. May I also ask you to reflect on the question that was asked by one of the participants on how do we— how can we integrate faith-based institutions in pandemic preparedness? FOUR PAWS · Global Affairs Navigator; Deputy Director of Lobbying and Advocacy · Nina Jamal [59:38]: Thank you. Thank you. I was looking forward to having the opportunity to talk about that. So the best way for us to make sure that faith-based communities are part of strategies is by operationalizing the One Health approach. Because the One Health approach is about a whole of government, whole of society way of working. What it does is governments work with the communities that come into daily contact with animals and the environment to identify high-risk activities. They work with community leaders and in many— countries, faith-based communities are a source of trust. They are a source of collaboration. Communities rely on them. And we imagine that when governments are going to develop these strategies, when they're going to go into hotspots where there are high-risk activities, they're going to have to develop the strategies together with those communities. They're going to have to to talk to them and see how can their livelihoods still be protected while they tackle the high-risk practices. And faith-based communities are a very big source of trust and authority, and many governments will not be able to achieve their effective strategies without them. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [1:01:01]: Thank you, Nina. I now turn to my other Nina. Nina, what— What practical challenges continue to limit timely and equitable access to medical countermeasures? IFPMA · Deputy Director for Health Security · Nina Grundmann [1:01:13]: Thank you for that question. So, indeed, there is a broader set of practical challenges that continue to limit timely and equitable access to medical countermeasures. And I'd like to take this opportunity to highlight a few factors that determine whether responses are fast, equitable, and effective in alignment with the objectives of the 100 Days Mission. So these factors include, first, a streamlined regulatory pathway and reliance mechanisms. This is critical to accelerate approvals while maintaining safety and quality and ensuring timely and equitable access to medical countermeasures across countries. Second is predictable demand and financing, and in particular, early day-zero funding. And this is critical for the quick scaling up of production and to ensure that procurement mechanisms can be activated immediately when there's an outbreak. Third is the strong preparedness infrastructure, including, for example, routine immunization, systems, but also primary healthcare, and that enable rapid scale-up and effective delivery during crisis. And here I'd like to make the link with next year's high-level meeting, which will be an opportunity to take stock on progress made on universal health coverage, because ultimately, as we know, universal health coverage and health security are two sides of the same coin. And there's another point that is also a really critical enabler. It's the resilient supply chains and open trade. I've already touched upon this in my first intervention, but this is really critical because it needs to recognize that medical countermeasures productions depends on globally sourced inputs and must not be disrupted if we are able— if we are willing to deliver at scale. So looking ahead, the pharmaceutical industry remains committed to partnering with governments, research institutions, international organizations, and civil society to strengthen pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response. Thank you. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [1:03:36]: Thank you, Lina. Mr. Shunsuke, what do you think are the strongest economic and policy arguments for sustained investment in PPPR? As you heard, many of the participants emphasized the importance of sustained predictable financing, as well as you did. Thank you. Global Fund · Head of Resilience and Sustainable Systems for Health · Shunsuke Mabuchi [1:03:52]: Thank you, Excellency Dr. Hanan. The case for sustained PPPR funding is clear, and probably clear to many of us here. According to IMF, COVID-19 cost the global economy over $12 trillion. The annual funding gap for pandemic preparedness is about $10 to $15 billion. So that single pandemic could have funded 1,000 years of prevention. And the next threat may be far more, a disease combining Ebola's fatality rate with COVID's transition speed. It's not a hypothetical. It can happen and it's may be a matter of when. So this is not a health budget question. It is a security and fiscal question. A small, predictable investment now or catastrophic bill later, paid-in-lives, economic collapse, and social instability. And the window to act is before day zero. And I want to add two comments on the medical countermeasures related to the day-zero financing. Firstly, World Bank's effort to make large-scale funding immediately available at day zero for counter— medical countermeasures is a critical step and really important for equitable access. But the coverage must be broad. We cannot focus on only on vaccines. Diagnostics, therapeutics, Protective equipment and the raw materials for medicines must all be included. The current Ebola outbreak, as you all know, proved this. There is no approved vaccine or therapeutics on this strain, and other countermeasures are carrying the entire response now. Second, procurement and last-mile delivery must be solved end-to-end now. Using mechanisms built through the decades of work. GAVI for vaccines, the Global Fund for Diagnostics, Therapeutics, and Protective Equipment. Economy of scale and expertise matter. The market shaping and procurement is not a simple work. It requires supplier relationships, quality assurance, and logistics infrastructure that take decades to build. We cannot rebuild the system from scratch in a pandemic. The Global Fund and the World Bank already have an agreement to operationalize exactly this. The system is getting ready. We need a political will to use it. Thank you. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [1:06:37]: Thank you, Mr. Shiosaki. Dr. Yassin, why is coordinated global action required today more than ever for ready and resilient community? WMA · Yasin Cholakov [1:06:48]: Thank you for the question. To answer this, I'll take on my public health physician hat. Controlling outbreaks requires the deployment of the right intervention for the right population in the right context. And at its core, global coordination is striving to achieve that, something that we were unable to achieve effectively during the COVID pandemic. It strives to ensure that that we have the resources and the possibility to actually do the best public health that we can. And this means coordination between countries so that resources can be distributed internationally in an effective way and in the most efficient way, but also between sectors. And that's where the One Health approach comes in, where we can ensure that other sectors are collaborating with the response. Now, the real question is— this is very commonsensical, and that's why I said I was starting from first principles in public health. But the question is, how do we achieve this? And I think one important part of the answer is something that previous WHO DG used to say: what gets measured gets done. And the answer is finding ways of measuring risk and making sure that we can hold political structures accountable for the action or lack or lack thereof, ahead of time so that we can move forward in shorter timeframes and timeframes that political structures respond to. So that's where I'll conclude. Thanks. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [1:08:17]: Thank you, Dr. Yassin. I'll go back to the floor, and I'd like to give the OECD the floor. OECD [1:08:26]: Thank you very much, Moderator. Excellencies, colleagues. The OECD work consistently shows that regardless of the type of outbreak, early action saves for more lives and at a lower cost than reacting once a disease has taken a hold. This is why the OECD is working to quantify the investment needed for stronger surveillance in its return. At the same time, in line with the recommendations of the G20 High-Level Independent Panel, the OECD, working with the World Bank and WHO, has been developing a new methodology, PPPR tracking, that brings together different external and domestic financing sources across all relevant sectors to better identify and address the biggest financing gaps globally. This is because we still do not have a clear picture of how much countries are investing in PPPR or which specific functions those resources support. Let me share two key findings from our initial analysis that are relevant for all global health risks going forward. First, investments in pandemic preparedness and response were more than 30 times lower per capita in low-income countries where the highest risks occur, as we are now seeing with the Ebola emergency. And secondly, to date almost 80% of this financing for low-income countries has come from ODA, Official Development Assistance. But as aid cuts continue to affect the healthcare sector and Africa disproportionately, and as the poorest countries struggle to replace this funding with other sources, the PPPR investment gap between advanced and developing countries could expand even further. Thank you very much. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [1:10:17]: Thank you, OECD. I give the floor to UNICEF. UNICEF [1:10:22]: Thank you. I'm pleased to speak on behalf of UNICEF's Director of Health Emergencies, who unfortunately couldn't be here as he is responding to the Ebola outbreak in the DRC at this time. Pandemic preparedness is ultimately tested where the outbreaks do occur. While global agreements and financing mechanisms are important, success really depends on what happens in communities, health facilities, and in districts, and on the ability of partners to work together operationally at the point of delivery. Strong public health partnerships are therefore essential. In the current Ebola response, the government-led incident management team is bringing together WHO, Africa CDC, UNICEF, and other partners around a common plan and shared priorities. This helps align technical expertise, community engagement, surveillance, logistics, and operational support behind a single nationally-led response. These partnerships are essential and most effective when they strengthen national capacity and help ensure that support reaches the last mile. To this end, communities are critical. We need to develop understanding about who people trust, listen to their concerns, identify barriers to behavior change, and work through local leaders, faith groups, women's organizations, youth organizations, and especially community health workers. Finally, preparedness requires sustained investment, but investment must not stop at global and national levels. Resources have to flow to frontline workers, local organizations, and communities themselves. Strong preparedness is built from the bottom up, and resilient communities must remain our strongest defense against future pandemics. Thank you. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [1:12:02]: Thank you, UNICEF. I give the floor to Medical Impact. Medical Impact · Director General [1:12:08]: Distinguished Chair, Excellencies, colleagues. I speak today not only as the Director General of Medical Impact, but as a medical doctor who served alongside healthcare workers on the front lines during the Ebola outbreak of 2014, as a former Chief of Biosecurity for the Mexican Army during the COVID-19 pandemic, among many other outbreaks and natural disasters in my career. One lesson remains clear: preparedness begins with protecting those who protect us. Healthcare workers cannot respond effectively without adequate personal protective equipment, occupational safety measures, and mental health support. During crisis, burnout, anxiety, and psychological trauma weaken health systems when they are needed most. Preparedness must also include harm reduction and other evidence-based risk reduction strategies that keep people connected to health services, particularly during emergencies when fear, stigma, and disruption can rapidly undermine public trust. Today, as we confront ongoing Ebola outbreaks, we are reminded of a fundamental reality: diseases do not cross borders. Do not require visas, and do not pay tariffs. At a time when the world faces more than 100 simultaneous armed conflicts, health security cannot be achieved through isolation. It can only be achieved through cooperation. This is why we must continue to place our trust in science, in the World Health Organization, and in the multilateral system. No country can prevent, prepare for, or respond to future pandemics alone. We must also recognize that effective preparedness requires meaningful engagement with civil society. Communities are often the first to identify the risks, the first to build trust, and the last to leave when emergencies occur. Thank you. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [1:14:07]: Thank you, Medical Impact. I give the floor to Pandemic Fund. Pandemic Fund Secretariat [1:14:12]: Thank you, Madam Chair. Excellencies, I speak today on behalf of the Pandemic Fund Secretariat. This panel has asked how we can secure predictable, sustainable capacities through whole-of-government approaches. The answer fundamentally is that a whole-of-government response cannot survive on fragmented, unpredictable funding. We cannot build resilient systems in the middle of a crisis. As my colleague, the Global South Civil Society Alternate Representative of the Governing Board, and many others articulated so so powerfully in this morning's session, the world does not lack commitments, it lacks delivery. At the Pandemic Fund, our role is to help bridge the gap between global political commitments and concrete country-led delivery. Our experience points to a few clear realities for the global health architecture. First, financing must drive integration, not silos. A true One Health approach doesn't happen by accident. We have seen that when international financing explicitly requires ministries of health, finance, agriculture, and environment to design a single shared plan. It successfully breaks down traditional silos and crowds in domestic investment. Second, the architecture must be agile. The ongoing Ebola emergency reminds us that while we build long-term capacity, the financing ecosystem must remain flexible. Empowering countries to rapidly reprogram resources and fast-track support, as we have done recently, is essential to containing outbreaks before they come— become pandemics. Third, as we have heard today, global financial commitments are not keeping pace with country readiness. The fact that country-led demand for pandemic— for preparedness funding has outstripped the Pandemic Fund's available resources by more than 6 times shows that national political will is strong, but it requires the will of the international community. Excellencies, as member states prepare to negotiate the declaration, we have a profound opportunity to transition from an era of ad hoc responses to one of shared accountability and structural readiness. We urge member states to use the HLM to commit to a fully resourced and complementary PPPR ecosystem, including the full capitalization of the Pandemic Fund, ensuring our shared architecture is equipped for future threats. I thank you. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [1:16:24]: Thank you, Pandemic Fund. I give the floor to Unite Parliamentarians Network for Global Health. UNITE [1:16:31]: Thank you, Madam Chair. Excellency, I speak on behalf of Unite Parliamentarians Network for Global Health, representing more than 550 parliamentarians in 120 countries. We are committed to fostering cooperation between parliamentarians to advance robust and evidence-based legal frameworks that place PPPR as a national priority. Through the exchange of good practices, advocacy tools, and dialogue with stakeholders, We aim to strengthen parliamentary engagement on PPPR. Effective preparedness cannot be delivered by health ministries alone. It requires coordinated action across government and broad social participation, actively engaging parliamentarians, civil society, and other key stakeholders to build trust, enable rapid response, and strengthen resilience. Simultaneously, increased funding for international financing mechanisms is needed close the investment gap and support countries in strengthening core capacities, including embedding PPPR within stronger and equitable health systems. Parliamentarians have a critical role in making these approaches a reality. Through legislation, budget approval, oversight, and advocacy, they ensure that preparedness remains a national priority. They are uniquely positioned to bridge health, finance, environment, and other policy areas, translating commitments into coordinated to action. In this context, it is crucial to include parliamentarians in national delegations to the UNHLM and related processes so that legislative and budgetary power is part of the dialogue. It is important to recognize PPPR as not only a health but a national security and economic resilience priority and strengthen coordination across health, finance, defense, and other relevant ministries and sectors. To guarantee that we keep equity at the center of the pandemic agreement to ensure fair access to vaccines, diagnostics, and therapeutics, and finally to mobilize sufficient and consistent financing for the Pandemic Fund to support nationally-led PPPR investments that integrate the One Health approach and strengthen health systems. Thank you very much. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [1:18:35]: Thank you, UNITE! Parliamentarian. I give the floor to Impact Outreach. Impact Outreach [1:18:43]: Mr. Secretary-General, distinguished delegates and colleagues, dispatch protocol initiative alongside file medical organizations like Medical Impact call upon member states to strain multilateralism as well as technical and technological cooperation to address present and the future pandemic challenge. In this regard, multilateralism must remain a central priority in the ongoing reform of of the global health architecture. As an organization delivering humanitarian medical assistance to populations living in conditions of extreme marginalization in hard-to-reach settings across multiple countries, particularly in Latin America and Africa, we witness firsthand the critical importance of international cooperation to ensure that no one is left behind. These communities are often among the first to experience the impacts of disease outbreaks and are those most in need on the effective implementation of the lessons learned and commitments already undertaken by the international community. We must apply not only the lessons derived from the COVID-19 pandemic, but also those gained from the previous global health crises, including HIV and AIDS, as well as from persistent and often overlooked diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria, which continue to affect millions of people worldwide. We must advance coordinated multilateral response that is strengthening prevention, preparedness, response, risk reduction, resilience, and evidence-based harm reduction approaches, enable the international community to respond more effectively. To future pandemics. Such crises continue to expose the vulnerabilities faced by countries, not only within their health systems, but also across the broader social, economic, and development sectors that are essential to human well-being. We call upon the member states to ensure that this political declaration serves as an opportunity to consolidate the global health architecture, reinforce international cooperation and strengthen multilateralism as essential tools for responding to future health emergencies and ensuring that no one is left behind. Thank you. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [1:21:05]: Thank you, Impact Outreach. I give the floor to IPPPR. IPPPR [1:21:08]: Thank you, Chair. Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [1:21:20]: Sorry, could you just start again because the mic is not yet red, so I don't hear you clearly. Just one minute. Yes, please. IPPPR [1:21:29]: Good. Thank you, Chair. The Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response is proud to co-convene the Friends of the High-Level Meeting. We have a list of priority asks circulating amongst member states and stakeholders signed by some 75 groups. We also align with yesterday's open letter to leaders, now with more than 130 signatures, including more than 20 Nobel laureates. Their message is clear: it's not only about being ready to respond to outbreak and pandemic threats, it's about preventing them altogether. The One Health work to end spillovers of disease from animals to humans is essential for our planet and for all life on it. When outbreaks do occur, we must stop them when and where they start. First, we need to know where our risks are. A multidisciplinary outbreak and pandemic risk assessment could pinpoint risks like Andy's hantavirus and Ebola, diseases we know about and those we don't yet know exist. Such a body would join the continuum of overall outbreak and pandemic risk readiness monitoring. Current monitoring has some useful tools, but it's fragmented, and key monitoring bodies are set to sunset, as we've heard. We call for a consolidated monitoring mechanism that is mutually supportive and clearly shows where investment is needed most, that can align with the pandemic agreement when it comes into force. Second, regional self-reliance for medical countermeasures is critical. Charitable donations and the consolidation of R&D and manufacturing in a few countries will unfortunately never provide the speed, scale, and equity required to keep everyone safer. Regional hubs for research, development, and manufacturing offer the solution. They will take time, but the high-level meeting can set specific milestones for making progress on these hubs, which will absolutely require technology and knowledge transfer. Third, sustainable funding for preparedness. Post-COVID analysis identified a $15 billion annual gap for low- and middle-income countries. Just a fraction of that has been raised. These funds are badly needed to support communities to understand and prevent outbreaks, to build surveillance and laboratory capacity, and to equip and protect the health workforce to stop outbreaks when they occur. Funding must also be prioritized for scientists in low- and middle-income countries to develop the tools that work best for their regions. Finally, the pandemic agreement is essential. We call for its completion with an equitable pathogen access and benefit sharing annex and its implementation without delay. Thank you. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [1:24:10]: Thank you, IPPR. I give the floor to Johns Hopkins University. JHU [1:24:17]: Thank you, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, and colleagues. An often ignored element of pandemic PPR is time. It is also critical to the success of the high-level meeting. Time is detecting an outbreak when there are 50 cases instead of 100 cases. It is a vaccine deployed today instead of one to be developed over the next 6 months. Time is $25 million in emergency funds released last week while airports were still open versus $50 million released next month when supply chains are blocked and healthcare workers infected. These are the dynamics at play in the Ebola pandem-bajoh virus outbreak. Acting now to provide finance and support to affected communities is the difference between less than 2,000 deaths or more than 20,000 cases by the end of August. Time is of the essence. What we do now will set the stage for the HLM in September. Action now must include reversing the global disinvestment in pandemic PPR, It must include using the new provisions for equitable access to health products in the amended IHR to give momentum to the successful conclusion of a PABS annex with legally enforceable obligations for both access and benefit sharing. And as a next step, ratification and entry into force of the pandemic agreement. These reforms were developed with public health expertise in the halls of WHO in Geneva, and the months ahead to the HLM is a rare chance to infuse the with the political and finance expertise of the permanent missions to the UN in New York. Or we can go into September with an even greater tragedy of lives lost, of inequities repeated, undermining the reforms and trust that we have spent the last 5 years working towards. We must go into September with demonstrated multilateral cooperation that gives strength to the political will necessary for an ambitious political declaration. As the baton for pandemic PPE is shared here, it is time for us to show what is possible in a New York minute. Thank you. Speaker 61 [1:26:20]: Thank you, John Hopkins. I give the floor to Action for Animal Health. Action for Animal Health [1:26:26]: Thank you, Chair, for the floor. Excellencies, we align with the key asks of the Friends of the High-Level Meeting. Most pandemics begin in animals, yet we continue to chronically underinvest in animal health systems. Quite simply, we are neglecting our first line of defense and therefore our ability to operationalize One Health and a whole-of-government approach. Action for Animal Health, a coalition of NGOs, academic institutions, and technical experts, works at the front lines of these systems. That means we clearly see the gaps: weak surveillance, shortages of properly trained animal health workers who are the backbone of surveillance, and limited access to essential veterinary medicines and vaccines create the conditions for zoonotic diseases to emerge, spread, and spill over to people. Strong veterinary services, routine surveillance, and even just basic animal care can help prevent, detect, and contain outbreaks early. These systems allow us to track the evolution of pathogens. Take avian influenza H5N1 as an example, which has expanded expanded beyond birds to infect mammals, with an increasing risk of further mutation and potential person-to-person transmission. The longer it circulates in animals, the greater the risk to people. This is why we urge member states to first build on the commitments of the 2023 declaration by specifically committing to strengthen animal health systems to enable the earliest and most effective response outbreak. This is essential to operationalize One Health. Second, commit to invest in a skilled and supported animal health workforce at all levels alongside access to medicines, vaccines, and diagnostics, because these professionals are critical to the early detection and control, especially in communities. Practitioners in communities are the early warning system, and they can also be deployed in a response. Third and finally, mirror the commitments already made to strengthen animal health systems in the UN Declaration on Antimicrobial Resistance. 2024, recognizing that animal health is essential to both pandemic prevention and to tackling AMR. Our health hinges on the health and welfare of the animals that we depend on every day and the planet that we both share. Thank you. Chair [1:28:39]: Thank you, Action for Animal Health. I give the floor to Prisodi. PreZoLD · Kristina Pattenbrouwer [1:28:45]: Thank you, Chair, for the floor. Excellencies, colleagues, distinguished delegates. My name is Kristina Pattenbrouwer. I'm a university professor and a scientist veterinarian. Today, I'm representing PreZoLD, Preventing Zoonotic Disease Emergency. Pandemic prevention cannot be imposed from above. It must be built and co-created together, respecting and preserving the diversity of knowledge systems and cultures. Pandemic prevention through a One Health approach is not only a health priority. It is an environmental priority, a development priority, an economical investment priority, and a global social equity priority. Through PREZOD, countries are already working together to translate these principles into action. For example, multidisciplinary teams in Madagascar, Cameroon, Gabon, Gabon, Central Africa, Cambodia, Brazil, and other Latin American countries are strengthening community-based surveillance, sharing and integrated data, and co-designing prevention strategies with the stakeholders and local voices in areas at risk of zoonotic emergency. That's why preventing pandemics at their source and upstream prevention are not only a global health imperative, it is an investment in sustainable development, habitat conservation, biodiversity, biodiversity, resilience, and global stability. Knowledge, tools, and partnerships already exist. What is needed now is the political will and sustained investment. The time is now. The focus is health. Let us move from immediate reaction to enhanced prevention. Let us invest in Global One Health and unite organizations, regions, and countries. Let us protect biodiversity, the environment, and ecosystems that sustain life. Let us bring more community representatives to these meetings and events like today. And let us collaborate. The cost of inaction will be measured not only in lives lost, but in species lost, ecosystems lost, and opportunities lost for the future generations. Agui jei. That's thank you in Tupi-Guarani. One of the 295 indigenous languages in Brazil. Chair [1:31:11]: Thank you, Prisôde. I give the floor to Core Group. Core Group · Executive Director · Lisa Hilmi [1:31:16]: Good afternoon, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, Madam Chair. I'd like to thank you for convening this important event. We thank the panelists for all of their views. My name is Lisa Hilmi. I'm the Executive Director of Core Group, a network of civil society, faith-based organizations and global health practitioners working at the community level around the world. Our members are responding right now to outbreaks as frontline health workers in multiple countries, and we're grateful for all those efforts. We commend the member states for advancing the political declaration and continued negotiations with the pandemic agreement. Our statements also align with the friends of the high-level meeting. Pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response is not only a technical or economic agenda. Right now we're at a juncture in history. It's a responsibility we all share, a moral imperative to protect the people, especially those most at risk and too often left behind. Too many communities, as a meaningful part of the whole of society, they still serve as the world's early warning system without being protected by it. Let me highlight briefly 3 critical investments that deliver both health, economic, and moral returns for a whole-of-society approach. Community-based surveillance is both a protection tool and a matter of equity. Up to 80% of outbreak signals originate at the community level, often identified by community, community health workers, volunteers, and civil society networks. Yet these actors remain under-resourced, under-recognized. Investing in these community-based surveillance mechanisms is not just efficient, it's about ensuring that the people closest to the risk are closest to protection. Early detection reduces illness, prevents death, and protects livelihood. No one should be the first to face an outbreak and the last to be protected from from it. Community engagement and civil society as partners who help build trust is vital in achieving this. Two, One Health approaches are sound investments to prevent avoidable suffering and mortality. Nearly 75% of emerging infectious diseases are zoonotic, often emerging in these settings where environmental pressures and limited services intersect. One Health approaches reduce response costs by up to 30% and deliver returns of up to 10% for every $1 investment. But more importantly, they prevent outbreaks before they reach people. Preventing spillover is not only cost-effective, it is the most humane choice we can make for humans, animals, and the environment. One Health approaches and community-based surveillance must be system— systematized. Systematize and prioritize. Investing in prevention and preparedness as a duty of care to populations. We know that countries that have strong prevention and preparedness and response systems conduct regular simulation exercises, they respond 30 to 50% faster, they save lives and they limit disruption. Preparedness is not optional. It is a responsibility of governments, that hold to their people and must have a multiple, multiple stakeholder approach to building trust. Prevention and preparedness are how we honor our responsibility to prevent lives— sorry, to protect lives before crisis strikes. At its core, pandemic preparedness is about a simple promise that where a person lives should not determine whether they are protected from preventable threats. Thank you. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [1:35:12]: Thank you, Co-Group. I give the floor to Gavi. GAVI [1:35:18]: Thank you, Madam Moderator. Gavi welcomes the opportunity to contribute to this second panel. The lesson from the recent outbreak and from the COVID-19 pandemic are clear: pandemic preparedness and response must be rooted in strong, trusted, resilient health systems. Vaccines are central to how we prevent infectious diseases outbreaks and how we respond to outbreaks, epidemics, and pandemics when they occur. And routine immunization is a cornerstone of primary healthcare and a frontline defense for global health security. Security. High-performing immunization systems supported by trained health workers, reliable supply chains, robust surveillance and community helps reduce the risk of outbreaks and enable countries to rapidly introduce and deliver new vaccines when emergencies arise. GAVI's experience also shows that PPPR requires financing mechanism that can operate across the full spectrum of needs, from prevention to rapid response. GAVI-funded vaccine stockpiles, for example, help countries prevent and respond to outbreaks of cholera, yellow fever, meningitis, and Ebola. Where no vaccine program exists, the First Response Fund can make resources available quickly and at risk, and it has been demonstrated with the mpox outbreak and recently the, the latest Ebola outbreak in, in DRC. Looking ahead, further commitments are needed to secure predictable PPPR financing that brings together domestic and international resources, including financing from multilateral development banks. These instruments reflect a broader point: pandemic preparedness depends on complementarity across the PPPR ecosystem. The comparative advantages of organizations involved in PPPR must be brought together in a coordinated way, guided by equity, solidarity, and collectivity. Collective responsibility. As a member— as member states take forward the UN political declaration, we have an important opportunity to shape a more coherent, equitable PPPR architecture, one that strengthens routine systems, enables timely and equitable access to medical countermeasures, supports regional manufacturing capacity, and ensures that financing can move quickly when speed matters the most. GAVI stands ready to work with member states and partners to help translate this agenda into practical action. Thank you, Madam Moderator. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [1:38:26]: Thank you, GAVI. I give the floor to GMP. GMP [1:38:29]: Thank you, Excellency. I agree with all the comments that have been made, particularly by Shinsuke Mabuchi. All our GMP reports underscore predictable sustainable financing as key to the whole-of-society, whole-of-government approach, so as to finance PPR. But we will not be able to fund readiness for the next pandemic without fully bringing the whole of the private sector to the table beyond just private sector pharma and biotech companies responsible for medical countermeasures, because this is not where the money is. The industries with the highest concentration of global liquid funds available for investments are the financial services sector, technology sectors, and energy, with global banking institutions, insurers, holding companies, that have war chests, liquid war chests of trillions of US dollars. This massive— they can provide massive catalytic financing that is required for the infrastructure, health infrastructure that is required, that we require. Technology and comms companies, they account for 47% of US non-financial cash reserves. There are primary drivers of pathogen tracking software that they can provide, digital analytical early warning systems, and AI-assisted diagnostics. This is where we should be looking for funding. If you look at the energy and automotive sector, heavily regulated, highly profitable, sitting on historic cash piles. These are the people that we can bring to the table to assist us with logistical issues, supply chain management, last mile cold chain delivery systems, and the global supply chains, and vital for medical countermeasures. This is where the money is. I'm just disturbed that we are continuing to look at the same sources of funding—governments that are currently cash-strapped. And our global financing initiatives, which are underfunded. Let us go where the money is, but we have to bring them to the table as equal partners. Thank you. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [1:41:02]: Thank you very much, GMP. I give the floor to Panel for a Global Health Convention. Panel for a Global Health Convention [1:41:11]: Thank you, Madam Chair. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, and colleagues, the Panel is an independent coalition of global leaders committed to strengthening the world's ability to prevent, prepare for, and respond to pandemics, and aligns with the key asks of the Group of Friends for this process. And I wanted to hone in on two of those asks in particular. Firstly, the financing, and then political support to deliver on new legal commitments. So, as we heard this morning, PPPR is an investment, not a cost, and yet domestic PPPR investment is underprioritized, and international financing tends to fall short of the estimated $15 billion a year needed to close PPPR gaps. So we therefore like to call on UN member states to acknowledge that PPPR is a global public good, the benefits of which extend across borders and accrue to all countries. Encourage the use of innovative financing mechanisms to expand the fiscal space for PPPR investments for countries facing debt distress, because we recognize that this is a concern for many countries, particularly lower resource countries. And most importantly, to strengthen financing across 3 levels. And that means committing to expanding domestic investments in PPPR, recognizing the essential role of regional development banks in PPPR financing, and at the international level, expanding support for the Pandemic Fund, strengthening predictable financing for WHO and its contingency fund for emergencies, and supporting the operationalization of the coordinating financial mechanism under the amended IHR, and the pandemic agreement. But we also need to track the investments that are being made and what financing is available, particularly for countries experiencing health emergencies. We therefore would call on member states to establish transparent disaggregated national mechanisms for tracking PPPR investments and a unified international mechanism for tracing PPPR financial flows. Over the past 2 years, and in the face of strained geopolitics, the global community adopted two milestone instruments, that being the amendments to the IHR, followed by landmark pandemic agreement with its hard-won mutually reinforcing provisions spanning prevention, health system strengthening, a suite of provisions enhancing equitable access to countermeasures, and essential governance, financing, and implementation mechanisms. The global community now expects countries to deliver on those commitments, and recent outbreaks demonstrate just how urgent that task is. The political declaration that should therefore support these processes by firstly calling for widespread implementation of the amended IHR, second urging the rapid conclusion of negotiations on the PABS annex unlocking the pandemic agreement for signature, and finally welcoming the adoption of the pandemic agreement and working towards its full implementation even in advance of it coming into force. Thank you. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [1:44:01]: Thank you, panel for a Global Health Convention. I give the floor to Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids. CTFK [1:44:09]: Thank you, Your Excellency. At the Global Health Advocacy Incubator, an initiative of the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, we support government and civil society capacity to strengthen public investments in health security. And the primary health care systems that maintain it. The devastating Ebola outbreak is one more reminder that the PPPR, that PPPR depends on international coordination. It also requires strong domestic health systems. Our shared global health security depends on the ability of every country to deliver on the International Health Regulations. This means domestic resource mobilization for PPPR at a time when public health budgets everywhere are being strained. The good news is that we know what's possible. In countries we've worked with to increase health security budgets at the national and subnational levels, progress has come from both budgets, development capacity at relevant government ministries, and sustained political will supported by an engaged civil society. This is one reason The response to pandemics must recognize the essential role of civil society in driving political agendas by developing, delivering, and tracking health policies and their outcomes. Political will cannot be imported or imposed. It is developed locally. Preparedness is built through local capacity, from manufacturing, workforce, and laboratories to surveillance. That's why we've worked with the Global Fund's community-led monitoring partners to track and report on pandemic prevention and response, and partnered with Resolve to Save Lives to train African and Asian civil society organizations on health financing policy. The world's health is only as secure as each country's health system. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [1:46:04]: Thank you very much, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids. I give the floor to World World Federation of Chinese Medicine. WFCMS · Dr. Tian [1:46:14]: Yes, thank you. Thank you for chair, and thank you for our panel and all the participants. And I'm Dr. Tian and represent for the World Federation of Chinese Medicine Societies. I also am the founding president of American TCM Association. Every participant talk about today about for the medical resource limitation and also the financial cost for the prevention of the pandemic. Actually, there's a missing one piece I want to mention about for traditional medicine, especially for Chinese traditional Chinese medicine. And in the past 2,000 years, and we have been dealing with like hundreds major pandemic and accumulate very rich experience. And because such as, and recently the SARS, the COVID-19, and in China, and Chinese medicine plays a very important role. And for 3 parts, Chinese medicine can do it. First one for the prevention, second one is intervention, third one is rehabilitation. About for prevention, because once some new pandemic happened, everybody panic. Especially before vaccine happened, because they will take a time to be happened. And so before it happened, what we can do? And for traditional medicine, and we, based on the symptoms, we can use a certain kind of method to, such as to deal with the weak, weaker group of people, and to increase the immune system, make the body immune system stronger. To prevent they get sickness. Even they got sickness, make sure they just get a mild case. Preventing the mild one to be a moderate, a severe case. These things we can do. And also, what is already happened before the vaccine happened, we can to do all the things. But even vaccines happened, because some area, especially for the developing countries, the vaccine may not be available, or some people may not able to tolerance for this vaccine. So this is a time and the Chinese medicine can do a lot of job. And also such as, and the people who has, um, people with like a ventilator, uh, and the human against each other, people cannot handle this for these things. And for the, the rehabilitation part is a Chinese medicine also can do is to help them to prevent their getting worse and last like a long COVID too long. The people so tired, difficult breathing, and diarrhea, and lost the smell and the taste. So this part of Chinese medicine can do too. So that means Chinese medicine and is a missing piece for the prevention for the pandemic. So that's why we encourage UN and each country and try to integrate traditional medicine into the mainstream medicine to play important job to prevent and treatment and rehab for the pandemic too. Thank you so much. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [1:49:35]: Thank you, World Federation of Chinese Medicine. I give the floor to Virus Watcher. Virus Watcher · Founder · Chris [1:49:44]: Thank you. Madam Chair and everyone, I'm Chris. I'm the founder of Virus Watcher. I'm here with my colleagues. Our epidemiologist just recently left us. What I wanted to discuss was early detection. This is what we're focused on. You can see our platform at viruswatcher.com if you wanted to learn more. We are looking to not only tap into the local communities, but to also derive early insights that can be fed to groups like the World Health Organization. We have demonstrated the ability to do this. We are very technically proficient. I'm an engineer by trade. I have been leading data engineer at many organizations. So data is— that's my language. I feel very blessed and fortunate to be in a room with so many respected folks in this field, and I'm— I've learned a lot from even just being here. One of the new things I've learned is about the importance of zoonotics and the detecting of some of these symptoms from animals, and that's going to be a new data source that we ingest after I leave here. So we just want to bring awareness to what we're trying to do and hope that we can somehow be not the end-all be-all, not the solution, but a part of the equation. I really hope anyone here, if they have any free time, can go and look at what we're doing. We detected Hantavirus pretty early through our system. We were alerting a lot of our users on our platform. We are currently alerting a lot on Ebola. We are also tracking World Cup. So I want to be a part of the equate— or a part of the solution. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [1:51:56]: Thanks. Thank you, Virus Watcher. I give the floor to CEPI. CEPI [1:52:04]: Thank you, Chair, Your Excellencies. Managing epidemic and pandemic risk is a defining health security challenge of our time. The next iteration of CEPI strategy, CEPI 3.0, orients around whole of government and whole of society towards achieving the 100 Days Mission through building resilient PPPR capabilities that are country-owned, regionally anchored, and globally connected. The current Bundibugyo outbreak demonstrates that imperative to continue making progress towards this mission. Investments in PPPR and in organizations such as CEPI are the world's insurance policy to mitigate the worst impacts of epidemics and pandemics. CEPI, as with the other organizations, stands ready to support member states in the declaration and the ongoing negotiations for the high-level meeting on PPPR. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [1:52:58]: Thank you. Thank you, CEPI. I give the floor to IPPS. IPPS [1:53:09]: Thank you, Chair. Your Excellencies, whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches depend on having clear, coherent, and comprehensive information across the full PPPR cycle. Today, monitoring is fragmented and leaves major gaps such as pandemic risk assessment and financing, as colleagues have mentioned earlier. This limits countries' ability to coordinate across sectors, guide investments, and mobilize society around shared preparedness goals. With some monitoring efforts set to conclude by early 2027, including the IPPS and the GPMB, and with monitoring provisions of the pandemic agreement not yet operational, the world faces a dangerous data gap. This is why the Friends of the HLM have recommended establishing a consolidated, independent PPPR monitoring mechanism. To address this, the political declarations should mandate its creation. This mechanism should act as a single access point for data across the PPPR ecosystem. It could use AI and digital tools to draw on existing assessments and reporting processes such as the JEE and the 100 Days Mission Scorecard, and filling priority data gaps such as in risk and financing. This would promote interoperability, reduce reporting burdens, and be consistent with what wider global health architecture reforms to make a more efficient use of resources and reduce duplication. As a result, countries would have a comprehensive picture of PPPR to identify preparedness gaps, prioritize investments, and coordinate action to using a common evidence base. This is a matter of mutual assurance and collective security. Establishing this mechanism would be a concrete step towards predictable and sustainable capacities and financing for strengthened PPPR. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [1:54:50]: Thank you. Thank you, IPPS. I do not see any more requests for the floor from— requests for a speaker from the floor, so I'll go back to my panelists., and I will ask for some final reflections. Start with Dr. Yassin. Dr. Yassin [1:55:12]: Yeah, sure. I don't want to take too much time, so I'll restate a couple of the points that I said very briefly. I think in order to move ahead, we have to be able to rebuild and nurture trust before crises begin, and with healthcare workers being key actors in doing so. Additionally, we must make sure that we protect those healthcare workers in the course of their duties and in the course of their interactions with the population. We must engage communities as partners in governance, not only as recipients of service and information. We must finance preparedness as a sustainable public good, not as an emergency expense, and we must do so making sure to integrate different sectors. And as mentioned, different sectors not only with public monies, but also with other sources of financing that have not thus far been fully integrated in our budgeting for pandemic response. Finally, we must operationalize equity, human rights, and accountability through whole government, whole society approaches and keep those public structures accountable for delivery in this area. Physicians and other healthcare professionals are valuable partners and are committed to contributing to this work. And the political declaration will likely be judged on the success— on its success not only if every country can point to having a national plan, but if we can demonstrate functioning local systems with trained and protected health workers and trusted community channels for accountability. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [1:56:54]: Thanks. Thank you, Dr. Yassin. I now ask Mr. Shunsuke for his final remarks. Global Fund · Head of Resilience and Sustainable Systems for Health · Shunsuke Mabuchi [1:57:02]: Thank you, Excellency. So really, very helpful, amazing amount of inputs from very diverse group of people. And as Ambassador Amproul said, I think there's a very clear convergence about what we need to do, but I feel there's much more work to be done collectively about how, by when, by whom, and with what money. And as a financing institution, we need to be very clear about responsible for quality of financing, as Spain commented. So we will work on it. Additional key takeaways. One is many theme is related to governance. How can we set up the global governance mechanism, including monitoring mechanism? And also, how can we support country governance mechanism for optimized use of funding? Really determines the impact of our PPPR work. And second is to be creative. In solution. I agree with Madam Joy about thinking more about bringing in private sector, both into solutions and also from funding point of view. It's an economy issue as well. And I think much more work and much more thinking can be done to really bring the private sector into the solution piece. Thank you very much. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [1:58:37]: Thank you, Mr. Shunsuke. I give the floor to Nina Goodman for her final remarks. IFPMA · Deputy Director for Health Security · Nina Grundmann [1:58:46]: Thank you very much. And as a final statement, I'd like to share a few reflections actually on the role of the private sector and come back briefly on the importance of preparedness. The innovative pharmaceutical industry's greatest contribution to improving health globally and more specifically health security is really the research and development of innovative medicines and vaccines. But without advanced preparedness, valuable time is lost and outcomes worsen. So we must strengthen preparedness across the full system. And here are just a few points. So first, this means really improving population Population health, recognizing that high burdens of non-communicable diseases increase vulnerability to infectious threats. Second, expanding pipelines for vaccines and therapeutics for emerging infectious diseases, which unfortunately remain critically thin. This means that for advancing these products, it requires sustained sustain investments and multiple scientific approaches. And this brings me to a third point that is really the need to sustain a viable innovation ecosystem between outbreaks, or rather before the next emergency hits. And this includes robust intellectual property frameworks, targeted incentives, de-risking approach, but also rapid, predictable access to pathogen and their genetic sequence data. And this is really a critical point because it's essential to enable, enable researchers from the public and private sectors to begin working immediately when there's an outbreak on developing diagnostic vaccines and treatments and helping to protect populations far beyond the borders of any single country. So as a conclusion, I'd say that it's important to remember this is a really complex and high-risk space. What we need are policies that support public-private partnerships and facilitate private sector's engagement, not approaches that risk discouraging participation or slow response when it matters most. And as we continue to have to face outbreaks, strengthening trust in science institutions and evidence-based decision-making will remain critical to ensure that scientific progress translates into real impact for patients. So, we call on the United Nations General Assembly to really reinforce the political support and sustained investments needed to ensure the world is better prepared for future threats. Thank you. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [2:01:42]: Thank you, Nina. Now, Nina Jamal, what— can we hear your final reflections as well? FOUR PAWS · Global Affairs Navigator; Deputy Director of Lobbying and Advocacy · Nina Jamal [2:01:47]: Thank you. Thank you, Your Excellency, and I'll be brief. So, listening to everyone, it was clear that we have NGOs converging and coordinating because several have aligned with the statement and the key asks of the Friends of the High-Level Meeting. On the content, there were several elements that were repeated, which were very reasonable. So investing in communities, enabling communities to protect themselves, ensuring that the health workforce, which includes also animal and environmental health, are empowered and able to support these communities, prevention at source via One Health approach. The UN is a multi-sectoral space. We have the entire spectrum, not just public health here, so we're keen to see a broader range of commitments, reducing fragmentation on all levels. So, in terms of international agreements, but also financing coordination, and here monitoring will be helpful so that better strategies can be designed, we can track progress. Finally, support for implementation, and here financing was a very popular and essential topic, especially, for example, when we heard the OECD, they were talking about how the countries that have the biggest risks are the ones that are not able to invest in their health systems. We heard from Spain about debt-for-health swaps. We have a dire situation and geopolitically governments cannot afford a next crisis, so it's become economically wise as well to invest in global health security and prevention. Moderator · Dr. Hanan [2:03:33]: Thank you, Your Excellency. Thank you, Nina, and thank you to all my wonderful moderators here, my wonderful panelists here today. Their insight has been truly, truly important, and thank you for all the participants. Let me just reflect on a few things that I picked up as essential. They will not cover everything because we had a very rich discussion, and— but what strikes out to me is the cost of fragmentation is too high to ignore, and that we need to focus on the logic of on multipurpose systems and on integrated systems in order to advance. This would address some of the other pressing diseases such as TB, malaria, as well as infectious diseases, and will prevent or ensure that we have the infrastructure to be better prepared to prevent the next pandemic. The other thing is, of course, the health workers and how important it is to protect our health workers. As well as the law enforcement workers and all the frontline workers that have shown that they have been essential in COVID, during the COVID pandemic, and we need to protect them, engage them, and ensure that they are well trained and developed for any future pandemic. The other element which we was the topic of today's discussion, the importance of whole-of-government, whole-of-society approaches, as well as the importance of One Health—animal health, human health, and environmental health—as well as how do we ensure that we have country and community leadership, because evidence has shown that when there is strong country leadership and community leadership, we have much better outcomes and we have communities that are better prepared. And that also touches on trust, because when we engage the health workers and the professionals in the field, especially those that are in from the community, we have a higher trust in, in our health systems and in our response. But that also requires further investment on delivering what we promised our communities, whether it is on this— in fact, on the pandemic preparedness or in other programs, because trust is built on implementation, is built on evidence, and showing that we are accountable to what we plan and what we promise, as well as the importance of research and development and innovation in order to advance our VTD and advance our readiness in general. And that also brings back the topic of sustainable, predictable financing. And the point raised by Ambassador Joy is— Minister Joyce is that we need to look at divesting sources of funding, including the private sector. But more importantly, we know what we need to do, so we are hearing from We heard from our participants the amount of work that we know we need to do, but what we need to focus on now is implementation of everything that we have identified as gaps and areas of implementation. And finally, the importance of global governance mechanisms and ensuring that we monitor what we are doing so that we hold ourselves accountable. And so for me, that is the end of my closing remarks. And that gives us an opportunity to hand over and transition to the next segment a little bit early. So I— thank you very much. Co-Chair [2:09:06]: Dear colleagues, we now begin the closing segment of the informal interactive multi-stakeholder hearing as part of the preparatory process for the 2026 high-level meeting of the pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response. I would like to express my appreciation to all participants for their invaluable insights and contribution to this meeting. I will now give the floor to Dr. Raj Panjabi, member of the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness for Disease and Response and former White House senior director during the Biden administration. You have the floor. IPPPR · Member · Raj Panjabi [2:09:54]: Thank you, co-chair. Excellencies, distinguished guests, colleagues, it's been a productive day, and I want to help close with a few remarks. I'm a physician and a health advocate. I'm also proud to be here representing Helen Clark and the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response. The panel, as you know, released its main report in 2021 called COVID-19: Make It the Last Pandemic. And we meant it. That is the work that we're all here to do. And this afternoon, I invite you to come with me to shift our imagination from this chamber to the front lines of an Ebola response. Because it is on these front lines, together with communities, as has been mentioned several times this afternoon, that we identify outbreaks and pandemic threats and stop them in their tracks. It is also on this front line that we understand people's fears and their bravery and their commitment. In 2014, I joined my fellow Liberian health workers in rural parts of Liberia where we were faced with what's known as history's worst Ebola outbreak. The situation was dire. Health clinics and hospitals were not seen by my patients as places to get better, but as places to die. There were no approved treatments or vaccines for that virus. There was very little testing. Their relatives couldn't understand why they were forbidden from holding their loved ones or preparing them for burial in the way their culture demanded. We had to earn their their trust. At the height of the West Africa Ebola outbreak, the US CDC projected that over a million people could become infected and that many of them would die. And at the height of that crisis, we were terrified. I was terrified I would bring Ebola home to my own family, to my own children. Now think of a church the size of a living room. Imagine mud walls and a thatch roof. That's where we were, together with nurses and community health workers in the middle of Liberia's rainforest, working with nurses and community health workers to help them learn how to safely wear the masks, the gloves, and the gowns to keep themselves safe while serving their patients. Those people were so scared. They had so many questions. And we all knew someone who had died from Ebola. And yet, and yet, they did not surrender to fear. A foundational shift came when we mobilized and trained those community health workers to fill a deadly void with trusted information and care. Community residents learned the signs and symptoms of Ebola, teamed up with nurses and doctors to go door to door to find the sick and get people into care. Together, they boxed in the virus and helped stop it in its tracks. Together, we learned that in a crisis, common ground is not found by forcing compliance with public health measures. It is built through shared humanity, through shared curiosity, through transparency. Today, however, in this Ebola outbreak and in too many health emergencies since, Voids in trust still exist. Too many people have no real connection to their health systems because those systems have been weakened, weakened by underinvestment, by conflict, and by debt. The bottom line is people are often left out of the response, local people, again and again. To truly stop outbreaks before they become epidemics and to truly stop epidemics before they become pandemics, we need to invest in people. Veterinarians and environmental workers who can stop disease from spilling over from animals to humans. Community and health workers who build trust and serve as the eyes and ears that send an alert when something goes wrong, as they did in West Africa. Now, to be sure, countries must invest in their own people and their own systems. And the international community must be prepared to fill fill the gaps where debt, conflict, and weak infrastructure make that impossible to do alone. Why? Because doing so makes all of us safer. Doing so makes all of us stronger. For years now, our panel has called for the filling of a $15 billion gap—$15 billion to be provided annually for prevention and preparedness to help finance low and middle income countries, not just to invest in their people, but to ensure we're investing in life-saving products those people can use to save lives. And this financing exists. We cannot give up because international development assistance is on a dangerous decline. I want to join my friend Minister Joy Phumaphi in challenging all of us to look at other models of investment, to look at global public investment models that can incentivize the push to accelerate discovery and development of new vaccines, treatments, diagnostics, and other tools, and the pull to ensure that those tools reach all who could benefit from them. That takes public-private investment models, and we should do that. We should make pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response a global public good because it makes our society safer and our economies stronger. Let's look at the current Ebola outbreak. We know it is a terrible test run for a pandemic threat, a disease with high mortality, not identified for many weeks, no approved vaccine, vaccines or treatments, limited diagnostics. Our panel recommended a surge financing mechanism that would mix public and private funding so that there's ease of mind in a crisis instead of the scramble that we're now witnessing. For this Ebola outbreak, there have been generous pledges, and those should be acknowledged, but when will the money actually flow at the scale the threat demands? That is the question we are asking together. Those dollars are needed today, and we need a surge mechanism that is fast, reliable, and clear. Now, on research and development, there has been a public-private investment model, and therefore there is some genuine progress. Within days, WHO named vaccine candidates and treatment options. CEPI and GAVI made their plans very clear because they have created a push model, with CEPI accelerating discovery and development, and a pull model, GAVI committing an advanced market commitment to purchase vaccines if they are actually brought to bear and approved. But diagnostics, the very things we need to see the threat, to make it visible, are still a gap. The current tests require electricity and trained staff, which are often in short supply in the very places pathogens spill over, often in rural areas into humans. So therefore, we need in this outbreak and in every outbreak the kind of point-of-care tests that anyone can use anywhere, the kinds that we all used during COVID We don't have them for this outbreak. We need them for this one and for future ones. We also still don't know who will fund treatment trials or test validation. We don't know whether sufficient vaccines will reach the front lines. There are as yet, my friends, no guarantees. Since COVID the World Health Organization has declared not one, not two, but three public health emergencies of international concern, two for mpox alone. The 2014 to '16 outbreak of Ebola carried a $53 billion price tag in direct and economic costs. And I remember, as so many of my fellow nurses and doctors do, that we lost one out of every 10 of our health workers. In the region. So let me be blunt: we cannot afford to keep responding to crises when we have the know-how to prevent them. That's why this high-level meeting must commit, commit to solutions, commit to the finalization of the pathogen access and benefit sharing annex with equity guaranteed, commit to rapid ratification of the pandemic agreement. Why not set a target 100 ratifications within a year. And leaders must commit to filling the enduring gaps in financing, in equitable access, in monitoring, and in political leadership. Every gap left unfulfilled will be paid in human lives. I have seen it with my own eyes. Every gap unfulfilled will be paid in human lives. At the UN, we often speak of strengthening systems, but when we have crisis after crisis, let us not stop at aiming to simply to strengthen. Let us make these systems strong once and for all. In the weeks ahead, my colleagues who are permanent representatives have a tough job ahead of you. This might be one of the most challenging times in recent memory to be a permanent representative in the United Nations, and it's a role I don't envy. I say that with humility because there are dangerous crises all around the world that grab the attention of your leaders and your countries, as they should. Those crises, whether they're wars or conflicts, threaten to pull us as humanity apart. But what if— what if we could actually, instead of coming apart, come together? What if in the face of all that danger in the world, you could be part of a political declaration that made the world safer? This is achievable and winnable in the next several weeks. So in closing, I ask you to picture yourself. Picture yourself not here in the UN, but in Ituri Province in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Picture yourself and your family faced with the threat of Ebola, and ask yourself, if you knew that people thousands of kilometers away were negotiating your future of health and safety, if they were negotiating your future health and safety, what would you want them to do? There is where you'll find your answer. There is where you'll find that you have the power to do exactly that. I thank you. Co-facilitator [2:21:26]: I thank Dr. Punjabi for the statement, not only professional but very emotional and touching, and you gave us additional points to continue with our co-facilitation. We already been motivated, if we agreed, of course, but you gave us even more motivation to do so. I will now speak in my capacity as co-facilitator on the intergovernmental negotiations for the political declaration. Thank you to all stakeholders, member states, and UN entities that join us for this very enriching and insightful hearing. Today we have heard two very diverse and rich panels that gave us food for thought on progress made, existing challenges, and some recommendations for what is needed to ensure that the world is prepared for the next pandemic. In Panel 1, we heard about the importance of multilateralism for equitable access. Speakers talked about available tools and mechanisms. The critical importance of the adoption of the WHO pandemic agreement was highlighted, which is a testament to the strength of multilateralism when countries come together to find shared approaches to shared threats. We also heard about strategies for prevention, including through a One Health approach, where the role of member states is critical, with support from the quadrupartite agencies. Communities and youth are also essential to PPR, and it is vital that they are fully engaged in all aspects, especially when it comes to building trust and preventing the spread of disinformation. Empowering communities was stressed by many speakers in that regard. The role of other actors, such as parliamentarians, was also stressed to ensure that global commitments are aligned with local and national priorities and that they are reflected in national legislation, as well as get the required resource allocation. In Panel 2, we focused on capacities and financing for strengthen PPPR. Speakers shared their views on concrete commitments needed to operationalize whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches. They also highlighted gaps in local and national PPPR capacities and shared recommendations on what government can do to ensure that current investments can translate into sustainable capacities, such as strengthened surveillance, resilient and better trained workforce and diversified regional manufacturing capacities. The role of the private sector was highlighted as well. During the discussion, we heard that domestic financing remains central for strengthening pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response, as well as the role of international financing in complementing and filling the gaps. Speakers also highlighted the need for capacity development in low- and middle-income countries,, and that investments now can save not just lives in the future but reduce costs. Ambassador Ngoga and I have listened carefully to all of the interventions, and we will take this forward as we finalize the draft zero of the political declaration. At the onset of this hearing, Ambassador Ngoga shared that our aim is to have a concise, action-oriented, and inclusive political declaration, and I fully share that point. We will work closely with all member states throughout the negotiating process to ensure this. I now resume my capacity as moderator of this segment. I would like to express once again appreciation to all participants for active participation and interactive multi-stakeholder hearing. The informal interactive multi-stakeholder hearing as part of preparatory The voting process is now concluded and the meeting is adjourned.