The conference, convened by the United Nations Secretary-General as the depository of the Treaty, is designed to rally international support for the CTBT and its entry into force as a core element of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) contains a special mechanism to promote its entry into force: a conference designed to facilitate this objective, which takes place every other year. While its official designation is the Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force of the CTBT, it is more commonly known as the "Article XIV Conference" in accordance with the relevant article of the CTBT. The conference, convened by the United Nations Secretary-General as the depository of the Treaty, is designed to rally international support for the CTBT and its entry into force as a core element of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. Signatory States, non-signatory States, intergovernmental organizations, specialized agencies, and non-governmental organizations are invited to attend and speak as observers, and to sign the final declaration urging States that have not yet signed or ratified the Treaty to do so as soon as possible.
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Good morning, Excellencies, dear colleagues. It is my pleasure to declare open the 14th Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This conference has been convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his capacity as depository of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty pursuant to Article 14 of the treaty. I am pleased to welcome the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, His Excellency Mr. Asbjørn Barth Eide, and the Deputy Minister of Multilateral Affairs and Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Panama, His Excellency Mr. Carlos Rivera Mann. Delegations will recall that Norway and Panama were elected to the office of the presidency of the 13th Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in New York in 2023. At that time, they were also appointed to serve as coordinating countries of the Article 14 process of the States signatories of the treaty for the intervening period between 13 and 14 conferences. I understand that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway and the Deputy Minister of Multinational Affairs and Cooperation of Panama would like to make brief statements. Your Excellency Minister Eide and Your Excellency Deputy Minister Mann, You have the floor, please.
Thank you very much, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, Mr. Dr. Floyd, and of course my dear co-coordinator, Deputy Minister Carlos Guevara Mann. Norway is proud to have led or co-led the Article 14 Conference together with Panama. For the last 2 years. I want to start by thanking Panama for their excellent cooperation. Together we have led global efforts to promote CTBT's entry into force. We have led outreach, diplomatic outreach to Annex II and other non-ratifying states. We have been active in the UN and in other disarmament forums and in CTBTO meetings, emphasized regional cooperation, political engagement, and strengthening the verification regime. We are proud that Norway's National Data Center, Norsar, is monitoring compliance of the treaty through its research and 6 stations, as well as through its international network. It is very positive that Somalia signed and that Papua New Guinea ratified the treaty. The comprehensive The CTBT is an integral part of global nuclear disarmament. Rising tensions and renewed rhetoric make the risk of nuclear testing real. Without a binding ban, we risk a new arms race. The CTBT also helps prevent proliferation. Testing has historically been a step towards developing more advanced weapons. Banning it makes that path harder and probably impossible. Nuclear tests have caused lasting harm to people and to the environment. Upholding the ban is not just about security, it's also about taking responsibility. In a time of growing global insecurity, the treaty remains a cornerstone of non-proliferation and a powerful barrier against the return of nuclear testing. This conference is crucial to advancing the entry into force of the CTBT. We welcome Sweden and the Philippines as new co-presidents, represented today by my dear colleagues from the two countries. This conference is a chance to renew momentum and to strengthen political commitment. We call on all states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT particularly the remaining Annex II states. Let us seize this moment to reaffirm our shared goal: a world free from nuclear testing. Together, we can fulfill the treaty's potential to end all nuclear explosions everywhere and all the time. Thank you.
This one.
Thank you. Thank you for your remarks, Excellency. Greetings, Madam Undersecretary, Mr. Executive Secretary. Greetings to all delegates. The Republic of Panama and the Kingdom of Norway, following the final declaration and action plan adopted at the 13th Conference on Measures to Facilitate the Entry into Force The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, held on 22nd September 2023, assumed the role of co-presidents of this conference with the responsibility to coordinate joint efforts aimed at advancing the treaty's entry into force. It has been an honor to co-preside this meeting to Norway. Over the past 2 years, we have coordinated both individual and joint efforts maintaining an active agenda of bilateral engagements, multilateral interventions, and technical outreach activities in support of the treaty. Our approach has brought together legal, scientific, and political arguments reinforcing the principle of no nuclear testing as an emerging norm of customary international law. Our ministers of foreign affairs committed to undertake diplomatic actions aimed at promoting the universalization and entry into force of the treaty, thereby strengthening the international regime for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As part of our Joint Action Plan, we issued notes verbales inviting the ministers of foreign affairs of Bhutan, Nepal, Somalia, South Sudan, and Tonga to take steps towards signing and ratifying the treaty, advancing universalization in line with the principles of non-proliferation, progressive disarmament, and collective security. As the Minister from Norway has expressed, during our term Somalia signed the treaty and Papua New Guinea ratified it. Today, 187 states have signed and 178 have ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In our dual role as outgoing co-presidents of the Article 14 process, and as a country firmly committed to effective multilateralism, the Republic of Panama reaffirms its readiness to continue working alongside the international community and to redouble efforts towards a shared goal: the peaceful and secure use of nuclear energy. Finally, Panama extends its full support to the incoming co-presidency of Sweden and the Philippines. We trust that this new co-presidency will allow us to continue making progress towards the treaty's higher objective, the consolidation of a world free of nuclear testing in full respect for the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations. Thank you very much.
I thank Minister Eijei and Deputy Minister Mann for their statements. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, I now propose that the conference consider the procedural and organizational matters contained under Item 2 of its draft provisional agenda. I understand that agreements were reached at open-ended informal consultations of signatory states in Vienna on the sub-items of agenda Item 2. The agreements reached are described in Information Paper 5, CTBT-Article 14/2023-Inf5, which was circulated in advance to all States signatories and is available on the Conference website. I would like to invite the Conference to confirm these agreements and to adopt the decisions suggested in Information Paper No.
5.
If I see no objection, may I take it that Conference wishes: to elect by acclamation the Philippines and Sweden to the offices of— office of the presidency of the Conference; to adopt the draft Rules of Procedure as contained in documents CTBT-ART 14/2025/1. C, to adopt the draft provisional agenda of the conference as contained in document CTBT-ART 14/2025/2. D, to elect Burkina Faso and Latvia as vice Vice Presidents of the Conference in accordance with Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure of the Conference. E, to establish the Credentials Committee composed of representatives of Lithuania, Spain, and Vietnam, as well as Cambodia and Finland, whose nominations were received after the issuance of Information Paper No.
5.
F) To confirm Dr. Robert Floyd, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO, as Secretary of the Conference. g) To decide, in accordance with Rules 41, 42, and 43 of the Rules of Procedure, on the attendance of its meetings by the specialized agencies, related organizations, intergovernmental organizations and entities with observer status which have applied to the Secretariat, and those non-governmental organizations that have requested accreditation. In document CTBT-ART14/2023/inf4, the list of non-governmental organizations that have requested accreditation has been communicated. As these same non-governmental organizations have participated in past Article 14 Conferences, I take it that this list is approved by the Conference. I see no objection. It is so decided. I would like to extend my congratulations to the distinguished representatives that have been elected or appointed to offices of the Conference. I have now the honor to invite to the podium the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, Her Excellency Ms. Ma Teresa Nazaro, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Her Excellency Ms. Maria Malmo Stenegård, to assume the duties of the Presidency of the Conference. Madame Co-President, please come to the podium.
Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. As co-presidents, my colleague Minister Malmør Stennergaard and I would like to welcome you all to the 14th Conference on facilitating the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. I would also like to inform you that as co-presidents, we will be exchanging roles as we preside over this important conference. The presidency will count on the support of all delegates— delegations in ensuring the success of this important conference. We believe that the conference will significantly contribute to the ongoing global efforts to facilitate the entry into force of the treaty. The President trusts that in implementing the mandate of Article 14 Conference, all delegates will seize this valuable opportunity to facilitate the early entry into force of this treaty. The presidency would also like to note with appreciation the most recent ratification of the treaty by Papua New Guinea. This is yet another important development resulting from the Article 14 process, which is also a success for the countries from the regions of the Pacific and South Asia. The number of states that have signed the treaty is now 187, and those that have ratified it have thus become 178. Before inviting the UN Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, to deliver the address on behalf of the UN Secretary-General, Mr. Antonio Guterres. I would like to thank the Secretary-General for convening this conference pursuant to Article 14 of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The personal effects— efforts of Secretary-General Guterres and the work of the UN Secretariat in support of this Article 14 process are greatly appreciated. I am also pleased to welcome the Executive Secretary of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, Dr. Robert Floyd. The presidency is grateful to the Executive Secretary and the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBTO in Vienna, as well as the United Nations Secretariat in New York, for the efficient joint actions in preparing for this conference. I would like now to turn to the items in our agenda. In accordance with Agenda Item 2 of the conference, I wish to invite Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, to deliver an address on behalf of the United Nations Secretary-General. Ms. Nakamitsu, you have the floor.
Thank you very much, Madam President. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen. At the outset, please allow me to express my sincere gratitude to Norway and Panama, who served with distinction as co-presidents of the 2023 Conference and as co-coordinators of this year's Conference. I also wish to warmly congratulate and thank the co-presidents of the 2025 Conference, the Philippines and Sweden, for their leadership and invaluable contributions in guiding our work. My thanks also go to the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, Executive Secretary Dr. Robert Floyd, and the Provisional Technical Secretariat. They deserve our deepest appreciation for their unwavering dedication in upholding and strengthening the norm against nuclear testing.— one supported by an advanced and effective verification regime. The CTBT is an integral part of the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. It embodies a simple but vital truth: nuclear tests must never be allowed, not even one. The devastation already inflicted by nuclear explosions has made a truth undeniable. Any test, anywhere, under any circumstances brings catastrophic human and environmental consequences. The treaty offers humanity a framework to ensure such tragedy never happens again. With 178 ratifications and 187 signatories, the CTBT enjoys near-universal support. This achievement is powerful evidence of the world's shared conviction that the era of nuclear testing must end. I warmly welcome and congratulate Papua New Guinea on its ratification of the treaty since our last conference in 2023, bringing us closer to our common goal. At the same time, we must still confront the reality: nearly 3 decades after its adoption, the CTBT has not entered into force. While the normative value of the CTBT is inarguable, This continued delay blocks the establishment of a legally binding prohibition on nuclear testing, leaving the door ajar to practices that the international community has already rejected. It also prevents the treaty's verification system from being fully operationalized. It's limiting its true value. This cannot continue. The CTBT's verification regime, built around the International Monitoring System, IMS, and the International Data Center, IDC, represents a remarkable technical and diplomatic achievement. These mechanisms provide absolute assurance that no nuclear test can evade detection. The United States' continued investment in and support for this regime demonstrates its importance to global security. But this technical progress needs commensurate binding legal authority. We cannot accept the conduct of nuclear tests, nor can we accept threats of renewed testing as means of coercion. Such actions are not deterrence, not diplomacy, not science. They are a reckless gamble with our future. Nuclear tests bring only devastation and it is this shared understanding that gave birth to the CTBT. Excellencies, the humanitarian consequences of nuclear testing are indiscriminate and enduring. Tests have poisoned lands and waters, displaced entire communities, and caused intergenerational harm that persists to this day. Survivors live with those wounds, and future generations inherit their burden. We cannot claim ignorance. Their voices remind us that our responsibility is both moral and urgent. I therefore call on all states to uphold their commitments to a world free of nuclear weapons and tests by signing and ratifying the treaty immediately and without conditions. In particular, I urge those states listed in Annex II of the treaty whose ratifications are essential for its entry into force, to heed this call for our common security. Until that long overdue day, the global moratorium on nuclear testing must be upheld, reaffirmed, and strengthened. As the Secretary-General has warned, we must, and I quote, "stop playing with fire" and silence the bombs before they speak again. End of quote. Distinguished delegates, the very fact that we are gathered for an Article 14 conference is a reminder of the work that remains to bring the treaty into force. The true measure of success will be the day when those conferences are no longer necessary. The United Nations remains firmly committed and ready to support member states to ensure that the promise of the CTBT is realized. Together, we can banish nuclear tests to history, never again to scar our present and never again to threaten the future. We owe nothing less to the survivors of nuclear testing —to our children and to generations yet to come. Let us act now. Let us bring the CTBT into force. I thank you very much for your attention.
On behalf of all delegations, I wish to thank the High Representative for this important address to the Conference on behalf of the UN Secretary-General and to reiterate our sincere appreciation for the support and cooperation that we have received from him personally and from the staff of the UN Secretariat in preparing for the conference. Turning now to Agenda Item 4, I would like to give the microphone to my colleague in the presidency, Minister Melnars Tenergaud, who would address first the conference on behalf of the presidency.
Thank you, Excellencies. Dear colleagues, I'm delighted to join my dear colleague, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, Theresa Lazaro, as one of the co-presidents of this 14th Article 14 Conference. I look forward to working closely together with the Philippines in support of the CTBT and its entry into force. I thank the Under-Secretary-General, Izumo Nakamitsu, for her statement and the outgoing co-presidents Norway and Panama for their work the past two years. I also express my sincere appreciation to Dr. Robert Floyd, Executive Secretary of the CTBTO, for his tireless efforts in support of the CTBT. For Sweden, assuming this role for a second time is a sign of our— steadfast support to the CTBT, as well as the wider interest to protect and strengthen the international security architecture and the rules-based international order. This is particularly crucial given the current complex and challenging security environment. Sweden has always supported a nuclear test ban treaty. Swedish politicians, diplomats, and scientists worked for years on achieving a total ban on nuclear testing. Our scientists played a leading role in designing the CTBT verification system and continue to contribute to its further development. Now, on the brink of the 30th anniversary year of the CTBT, a lot of progress— has been made. The treaty has near-universal support. There's a surge in commitment during recent years, with 9 more countries ratifying in the past 4 years. We thank them for taking this important step. Crucially, the CTBT has established a strong global norm against nuclear testing, only violated by one country, North Korea, during this century. And even before entry into force, the CTBT's verification system has proven its worth. It has built confidence that any nuclear test explosion can be detected. It is a true global good, as it has also shown its value for civilian use, like tsunami warnings. But there have also been setbacks. Almost 2 years ago, Russia revoked its ratification of the CTBT, taking us further away from entry into force and undermining ongoing non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. Sweden deeply deplores this decision. Russia remains a signatory and as such is obliged to continue to respect the purpose and the objective of the treaty. We want to see the treaty legally binding, a complete ban on nuclear tests. A particular responsibility lies with the 9 states whose ratification is necessary for the treaty to enter into force. For these 9, this is a real opportunity to show international leadership. 35 of the originally 44 Annex II states have ratified, including two nuclear weapons states. We need the remaining 9 Annex II countries to show leadership by taking the same step. I urge the other 9 non-ratifying states to also sign and ratify the treaty as soon as possible. Each ratification is important and contributes to a positive momentum towards the universalization of the treaty and ultimately its entry into force. For the coming 2 years, Sweden has decided to do its part. Together with the Philippines and no doubt many other supporters of the treaty, we will continue to actively engage with the CTBT and to promote its entry into force, aiming to support further tangible progress towards this objective. Thank you. Let me now give the floor to my dear colleague, Secretary Lazaro, who will also address the conference on behalf of the presidency.
Thank you very much, Madam Co-Chair. I am honored to co-chair this year's Article 14 conference together with my esteemed colleague, Foreign Minister of Sweden, Maria Malmers Stennergaard. I also take this opportunity to thank Panama and Norway for their commendable leadership as co-presidents of the previous conference. This year marks the 80th anniversary of the only two incidents that nuclear bombs have ever been deployed. As an estimated 140,000 people in Hiroshima and another 74,000 in Nagasaki perished through these bombings, the catastrophic humanitarian cost and health consequences of which we will feel to this day. This year also marks the 30th anniversary of the opening of the signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. It is regrettable, though, that 3 decades hence, the treaty has not yet entered into force. These anniversaries must drive states —signatories to act in concert and allow this treaty to enter into force, one more crucial step towards a world without nuclear weapons. The Philippines was one of the first countries to sign and ratify the CTBT. Our co-presidency of this conference is a manifestation of our unremitting commitment. A consistent champion of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, the Philippines' commitment to a nuclear-free world is enshrined in our country's basic law. We are party to key multilateral and regional instruments, including the CTBT, the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone Treaty. We are proud to contribute to CTBT's unique global network of more than 300 international monitoring system stations. The Philippines hosts 3 stations in Rizal, Cavite, and Davao. We recognize the accomplishments achieved by the CTBT. This includes the establishment of a global norm against nuclear testing, the buildup of robust verification regime to monitor and detect nuclear explosions, and the use of CTBT data for civil and scientific applications such as tsunami warnings. Excellencies, the Article 14 Conference is mandated to find effective measures to accelerate the entry into force of the CTBT. We therefore reiterate our call for the remaining Annex II states to sign and ratify the treaty without delay and preconditions. In the face of simmering geopolitical dynamics and intensifying nuclear rhetoric, our efforts should even be more unrelenting and united towards this goal. Under our co-presidency with Sweden, the Philippines and Sweden will work tirelessly in the next 2 years to promote the entry into force and universalization of the CTBT. We will take concrete and actionable steps, including through the implementation of the measures mentioned in the final declaration of this conference. Distinguished delegates, we count on your help and and support in doing our part to achieve our shared dream of a world free of nuclear weapons. Thank you.
I thank Secretary Lazaro for her important statement, and we will now move on to the next agenda item. In accordance with Agenda Item 5, Address by the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, I have the pleasure to invite His Excellency Dr. Robert Floyd, the Executive Secretary of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission to address the conference. Dr. Floyd, you have the floor.
Foreign Minister Lozaro and Foreign Minister Malmqvist-Denegård. Excellencies, distinguished colleagues, is the microphone on? It is. That is good. Welcome here today. I'm so glad that you're all with us. We all like to, to celebrate significant anniversaries, right? They are an opportunity to step back and to reflect. Where have we come from? Where are we heading? Has the journey been worthwhile? This year we have seen several momentous 80th anniversaries. First, the anniversary of the Trinity Test, the world's first nuclear explosion. Then, just weeks later, the only times that nuclear weapons have been used in war, the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I had the privilege to attend the commemorations in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Simple things in the museum tell stories that you'll never I will never forget. A tiny charred tricycle. A boy's lunchbox, still with the lunch in it, never eaten. How can we make sure that these devastating weapons are never used again? Part of the answer lies in putting an end to testing once and for all. The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the NPT, aspires to a ban on testing. Its preamble seeks to stop, as it says, all test explosions and for all time. But back then, neither the science nor the diplomacy was ready for such a ban. Underground testing continued, more than 1,000 of them, many far larger than the explosions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It had to stop. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty opened for signature on the 24th of September, 1996, 29 years ago, just yesterday. In the 50 years leading up to September 1996, there'd been almost 2,000— or more than 2,000 2,000 nuclear explosions. From 24 September 1996 through to today, less than one dozen tests. In our century, only one state has tested. Has any other treaty brought about such a dramatic, drastic, and unambiguous change for the better? Why is it that this treaty works? A happy marriage between diplomacy and science. The treaty set up a global network of over 300 monitoring stations, the International Monitoring System, or IMS, as we call it. These stations, they gather seismic data, hydroacoustic data, infrasound, radionuclide data., and they stream it in via satellite to Vienna around the clock. The nuclear— a nuclear test explosion cannot go undetected. But the IMS enhances our security not only by detecting nuclear tests. We saw this just last year. Following earth tremors recorded in northern Iran, rumours of a nuclear test flashed around the world. The CTBTO showed beyond any doubt that those tremors had occurred naturally. No nuclear test had taken place. The rumours and the risks abated. In addition, the Treaty is open. The Treaty is transparent. All the data gathered by the CTBTO in Vienna is available to the Treaty state signatories, and also to the scientific community. It supports tsunami warning, recording asteroid strikes, monitoring earthquakes, studying volcanoes. This CTBTO verification system is a global asset like no other. It's credible and respected because it works. The CTBT is an unambiguous success. A success, an unambiguous force for global good. Today we are here because, despite that success, entry into force still eludes us. We are so close to universalisation. We are getting even nearer, despite the challenges, or maybe because of the challenges, that the world faces today. Just 9 states. It is, as you said, just 9 states that could sign this treaty but haven't done so. Today we make the case for finishing the job. We look to the next year, the 30th anniversary year of our precious treaty, and so we call for action. We call for those states in Annex 2 to think long and hard about what they might contribute and gain by signing this treaty, the global acclaim, the message of their dedication to peace and security for all. And we again call on all Possessor States to restate their moratorium commitment on testing. Assure the world that the days of testing are behind us and will stay behind us. In this next 12 months, as the NPT Review Conference draws near, let's think of ambition, what we can actually achieve together, what a step closer to universalisation and entry into force could mean for our collective security. Let's say that at the review conference. Let's say that loudly next year. Another key date approaches: the 14th of January, 2026, just 110 days from now. You're wondering, why is that a key date? Well, if— well, let's say when we get to the 14th of January without a nuclear test, the world will have set a new record: the longest period without one single test since the very first test in 1945. What a way to start the Treaty's 30th anniversary year. And what a record, the kind that the world can really be excited about. Anniversaries prompt us to think about where we've come from, how far we've travelled, where we're heading. This journey has taken us 80 years so far, with no further use of nuclear weapons in war since Nagasaki in 1945. It's up to us to keep on the right path, to make this journey worthwhile, and I thank you all for your commitment. Thank you.
I wish to thank Dr. Floyd for his important address, and on behalf of all participants, I would like to express to him our sincere appreciation for the hard work done by the CTBTO Preparatory Commission and by him personally. I also wish to thank, through Dr. Floyd, the staff of the Provisional Technical Secretariat for their tireless efforts in preparing for the effective implementation of the treaty and assisting the activities of signatory states in facilitating the entry into force of the treaty. We now move on to Agenda Item 6, the adoption of a final declaration of the conference. I wish to draw the attention to Working Paper 1 of the conference dated 12th of September, 2025. This document includes the draft final declaration. It has a number of suggested actions to promote and work for the entry into force of the treaty. All delegations have received the document in advance of this conference. The document is the positive result of open-ended informal consultations in Vienna. I understand that there is a consensus among the CTBT ratifying states as well as those non-ratifying states who have associated themselves with the text to adopt this draft final declaration. Would any delegations like to take the floor under this agenda item? I see none. May I then take it that the conference now wishes to adopt its final declaration? I see no objection. It is so decided. Keeping with established practice, the final declaration will be annexed to the report of the conference. The draft report will be considered under agenda item 13. It will be issued soon on the ECS and the CTBTO webpage. It will also be available on the UNE Journal portal. The Presidency will request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to forward the final declaration to all member states of the United Nations. We will, as the Presidency, now sign the letter addressed to the UN Secretary-General transmitting this request to him. This concludes our work under Agenda Item 6. Let us now take up Agenda Item 7, entitled Presentation of a Progress Report on Cooperation to Facilitate the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This progress report was referred in the statements made by the distinguished Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway and the Deputy Minister of Multilateral Affairs and Cooperation, Foreign Affairs of Panama, under Agenda Item 1. I understand that a written report is also available to delegations online. It is contained in document CTBT Article 14/2023/INF3. The progress made by signatory states under the leadership of Norway and Panama in promoting the objectives of the treaty during the last 2 years is laudable indeed. No doubt this creates a good starting point for the new coordinators of the Article 14 process, the Philippines and Sweden, to continue and possibly accelerate this process. That concludes our consideration under Agenda Item 7.
Let us now move to Agenda Item 8, Statements by New Ratifying and Signatory States Since the Last Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Since the last conference, um, the— there one state ratified the treaty, and that's Papua New Guinea. I understand that there are no inscriptions on the speakers list under this item. We could proceed to the next agenda item.
Let us now move to agenda item 9, general exchange of views by ratifiers and signatories on facilitating the entry into force of the CTBT. At this stage, 57 delegations have been inscribed on the list of speakers. I would like to encourage others who wish to speak to liaise with the secretary— secretariat in the room. Please note that the presidency intends to close the list of speakers at noon, that is at 12:00 hours. The live list is available on the eDelegate portal. The link to the list is available through the QR code displayed at the entrance of this conference room. The Presidency may need to exercise some flexibility in adjusting the list of speakers. The Presidency would also like to draw your attention to the agenda of the conference in document 9. 2. It states that speakers limit their statements to 3 minutes. All written statements sent to the Secretariat will be available on the website of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission. I would now like to turn to the list of speakers under this agenda item, and the first speaker on the list is the distinguished Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, His Excellency Juan Ramón de la Fuente.
Thank you, Presidents. On the eve of the 30th anniversary of the signing of the CGPT, It still remains without having entered into force. Meanwhile, if we look at the international environment, we see there are new threats of the use of nuclear weapons, and this environment strengthens our endeavor to continue to seek the total prohibition of nuclear tests. Today, 8 decades have passed since the July 1945 test in Mexico. After this, alas, dreadful— the dreadful attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki followed, and more than 2,000 tests happened close to the northern border of my country. The impacts of these tests still linger today. Mexico's foreign policy is humanistic, human, and therefore we commemorate the victims of the test throughout the world as well as the survivors of the effects of nuclear weapons. These feelings must become powerful ones to prevent any further nuclear test at all costs. —under any circumstance whatsoever. With the implementation of the monitoring system of the treaty, with a global network of more than 300 stations involved, some of them indeed in Mexico, and 16 laboratories for isotope and radionuclide testing, it's impossible for a test to be carried out secretly. There are also scientific and civil applications and many are very proud of what Mexico has done here. We pay tribute to Solipés, to Robert Floyd, Executive Secretary of the organization, for his determination to move forward in universalizing the treaty and improving the organization. Co-presidents, Mexico believes that we should focus on the following four points. One, maintaining the moratorium on nuclear tests, that states support and strengthen the moral and political weight of the CTBT. Two, pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Treaty Law, states have the obligation to refrain from anything that might prevent the implementation of the treaty. Thirdly, here we issue a call to all states who must ratify the treaty for it to enter into force so that they do so without delay, unconditionally, and refrain from carrying out any sort of nuclear test, including digital simulations thereof and subcritical tests, which run counter to the spirit of the treaty. And fourth, and lastly, we have to take legal measures to strengthen the provisional implementation of the treaty. We welcome the fact that Latin America and the Caribbean is the first region to have achieved the universality of the provisions of the treaty, and we are following it when it comes to nuclear tests, the compatibility of the treaties together with the NPT is moving us closer to a world free of nuclear weapons, an objective which Mexico has always espoused as a central element of its foreign policy. Thank you.
I thank His Excellency Juan Ramón de la Fuente, Minister of Foreign, Foreign Affairs of Mexico, for his statement. And I now invite His Excellency Takeshi Iwaya, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, to take the floor.
Thank you, co-chairs. Dr. Robert Roy, Executive Secretary of the PTS of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen. This year marks 80 years since humanity's first nuclear test and atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Next year marks the 30 years since the CTBT was opened for signature. However, contrary to our aspirations, progress toward a world without nuclear weapons remains stagnant and increasingly difficult. Moves such as North Korea's progress in its nuclear and missile development, as well as the opaque and rapid nuclear force buildup by certain states, continues. And the security environment of the international community is becoming increasingly severe and complex. Precisely because of these challenging circumstances, the CTBT, which prohibits all nuclear testing and thereby prevents the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, remains a crucial treaty for advancing Nuclear Disarmament. On this occasion, we call on all states that have not yet signed or ratified the treaty, including the remaining Annex 2 states whose ratification is necessary for its entry into force, to promptly sign and ratify by the treaty. At the same time, even before the treaty enters into force, implementing its substance through upholding moratorium on nuclear testing is critically important for realizing a world without nuclear weapons. Furthermore, strengthening the verification regime to ensure the effectiveness of the CTBT is also necessary. In order to establish an effective deterrent against nuclear testing, all signatory states must strive to maintain and enhance the International Monitoring System, IMS. From this perspective, support for the capacity building of experts is indispensable. For approx— approximately 30 years, Japan has annually conducted training programs to develop experts in nuclear test detection. To date, a total of 302 participants from 80 countries have participated in these programs. Japan intends to continue these initiatives. Finally, I would like to once again express my respect for the strong leadership of CTBTO Executive Secretary Floyd and reiterate my gratitude for his visit to Hiroshima and Nagasaki on this significant year that marks 80 years since the atomic bombing. We also extend Japan's full support to the Philippines and Sweden, who have assumed the role of coordinators of the Article 14 Conference. Furthermore, while paying tribute to the contributions of the late Ambassador Hoffman, the first Executive Secretary of the CTBTO who recently passed away. Japan seeks to make our utmost contributions towards the early entry into force of the CTBT. Thank you very much.
I thank the Foreign Minister of Japan for his remarks. I now invite Her Excellency Selma Ashipala Musaibi, Minister of International Relations and Trade of the Republic of Namibia.
Thank you very much, Co-President. The President of the Republic of Namibia just finished speaking in the Trusteeship Council where we are commemorating the day on the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and I'm happy to be here at this conference to reiterate Namibia's voice at a conference which is solely devoted to promoting entry into force of the CTBT. Namibia is a proud party to the CTBT, which is integrated into our legal framework binding us not to carry out nuclear test explosions on our territory. Our entry into force Facilitating agreement with the PTS to support the operations and maintenance of international monitoring system stations in Namibia has been mutual— has been beneficial. And for this reason, Namibia reaffirms her continued support to the development and strengthening of the CTBT regime with our national experts participating at all policy levels of the organizations. Namibia is the third largest supplier of the source material, and we take serious our global responsibility to ensure that it's used for peaceful and non-explosive purposes only. In this context, we regard the ban on nuclear test explosions as a key legal instrument. We are also of the firm belief that the non-selective implementation of the three pillars of the NPT are mutually reinforcing to our common goal of maintaining international peace and security and promoting universal socio-economic development. Being mindful of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. We believe that the CTBT cuts off a significant pathway to the development and testing of nuclear weapons. However, the fact that the treaty has not yet entered into force is a reminder of the work which remains to ensure that it enters into force. Since the last Article 14 Conference, In 2023, we note with concern that no progress has been made towards the ratification of the CTBT by the remaining nuclear-weapon states, as we call on these states to show leadership amongst the Annex II states and take tangible steps to ratify the CTBT. Our call remains for the CTBT to enter into force without delay. Finally, Namibia will continue to support the expansion and completion of the International Monitoring System, support the provisional commissioning of the International Data Center, and the development of on-site inspection techniques and procedures that form the verification pillars of the CTBT. And I thank you for your kind attention.
I thank the Minister of Namibia for her statement. I now invite His Excellency Tri Tariat, Deputy Minister for Multilateral Affairs of Indonesia.
Madam Chair, distinguished colleagues, we convene today in the midst of an evolving global landscape where nuclear disarmament continues to face multifaceted challenges. Concerning developments have drawn our attention, including the persistence of nuclear deterrence and threats of use of nuclear weapons. In light of this situation, Indonesia underlines the important role played by CTBTO in bringing about the cessation of nuclear testing and the advancement of nuclear disarmament. Distinguished delegates, our shared aspiration for comprehensive, verifiable, and enforceable implementation of the treaty remains unfulfilled. This is a gap that we— that must urgently be addressed, given that the CTBT remains a vital instrument of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. We stress the urgency of the early entry into force of the CTBT, and as a ratifying state, we urge the remaining Annex II states to sign and ratify the treaty without delay and without preconditions. Against this backdrop, allow me to highlight the following key points. First, we must strengthen our political resolve and redouble efforts towards the early entry into force of the CTBT, including by enhancing synergies between CTBT and other international instruments such as the NPT and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Second, we must enhance the role of the CTBTO in strengthening its verification regime in preparation of the treaty's entry into force and universalization. Effective capacity building and training programs are essential, especially for developing countries, and should continue to receive strong support. Third, raising global awareness of the CTBT's importance remains essential, including through collaboration with civil society and academia. Such partnerships are essential to fostering a deeper understanding of the treaty's contribution to international peace and security, while also mobilizing broader support for its universalization and entry into force. To conclude, once again Indonesia reaffirms its strong commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons and stands ready to continue supporting efforts to promote CTBT's entry into force and universalization. I thank you very much, Madam Chair.
I thank the distinguished Minister of Indonesia for his statement. I now invite Her Excellency Hanna Likö, Vice Minister of European and International Affairs of Austria, to deliver her statement.
Thank you, distinguished co-presidents, Executive Secretary, Excellencies, distinguished participants. Let me begin by thanking Dr. Floyd and his extraordinary team at the CTPTO for their tireless dedication to strengthening the CTPT and promoting its universalization. I would also like to thank Panama and Norway for bringing us together today, and of course, congratulations and best of luck to the new co-presidents, Sweden Sweden and Philippines. When this treaty opened for signature in 1996, it set a clear course towards ending nuclear testing. Nearly 30 years on, however, entry into force remains elusive. Even so, 187 nations signed and 178 ratified the treaty, together establishing establishing a powerful global moratorium on nuclear testing. Since 1996, nuclear tests have occurred only 10 times compared to more than 2,000 in the 50 years before. In this century, only one nation has breached that norm. The clearest example of the treaty's tangible difference is the CTPTO's International Monitoring detection system, a sophisticated global network of stations in all corners of the world that ensures no nuclear test remains undetected. It also provides important civilian and scientific benefits far beyond verification. This stands as tangible proof of multilateral— what multilateral cooperation can achieve even in times of crisis. Let us be clear: Voluntary moratoria are no substitute for a binding, verifiable, and permanent ban. More than 80 years after the first nuclear tests, many parts of the world still have to live with the deep human and environmental scars that were left behind. We owe it to the past and future generations to close this dark chapter of history. There must be no more excuses and no more delay. It is high time for the remaining Annex II states to sign and ratify the treaty without delay and without preconditions. Let me therefore welcome the ratification by Papua New Guinea since the last Article 2014 Conference, and as a proud host of the CTPTO, Austria will continue to advocate until this treaty enters into force and the era of nuclear testing is finally behind us once and for all. Thank you.
I thank the Vice Minister for her statement.
Y ahora doy la palabra a Su Excelencia Alejandro I now give the floor to His Excellency Ambassador Alejandro Solano Ortiz, Vice Minister of Multilateral Affairs of Costa Rica. You have the floor, sir.
Madam Co-President, Mr. Floyd, Executive Secretary, Costa Rica participates in this 14th Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the CTBT. In accordance with Article 14 of the treaty, reiterating its longstanding commitment to a world free of nuclear testing, to nonproliferation, and to disarmament. Nearly 30 years after its opening for signature, the vast majority of member states have ratified this vital instrument. It's a clear signal of the international community's determination to advance nuclear disarmament as foreseen in the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and fully aware of the catastrophic and lasting effects that such tests have inflicted on human lives and the environment. Since then, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization has deployed a formidable verification architecture and established an international monitoring system, the IMS, that is extremely important not only for the detection of nuclear tests, but it also has a tangible impact on security and sustainable development. It is for these reasons, and mindful of the historic moment we are living in where the nuclear threat is once again being wielded as an instrument of coercion, that we attend this conference to urge, on the one hand, the nuclear weapons states to lead by example, to return to diplomatic negotiations, and to transform their voluntary commitments into binding obligations through the ratification of the CTBT.
On the other hand, there are states which do not possess nuclear weapons which have not yet ratified the treaty. We urge them so to do to proceed with universalization. We are proud of the efforts that have been made and we wish also to commend Panama and Norway as co-chairs of the 13th conference and also the ratification by Papua New Guinea is a subject for congratulations. We believe that more than ever we need ratification to go ahead. So the Philippines can— we welcome what the Philippines has done and we assure you in Costa Rica of our close cooperation I encourage you to spare no effort in promoting additional signatures and ratifications, as well as further strengthening the verification regime for the benefit of our people. Thank you. I didn't realize that was called—
I now invite Her Excellency Melita Gabrič, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs— Foreign and European Affairs of Slovenia.
Madam.
Distinguished Mr. President, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, Slovenia is a strong believer in multilateralism, rules-based international order, and respect for international law. Unfortunately, we are observing their erosion. We are observing increasing pressure on global nonproliferation disarmament and arms control architecture. For its fourth year, the Russian Federation is waging a war of aggression against Ukraine, which is eroding European and global security. Russia's irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, coupled with announcements of readiness to conduct nuclear tests, heightens security risks not only for Europe but for the whole world. Likewise, the illegal and provocative missile tests by the DPRK raise tensions and endanger regional and global security. The possibility of further nuclear tests remains a matter of utmost concern. Co-presidents, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and its organization remain indispensable and are more important than ever. The CTBTO not only has the vital role of detecting violations of non-proliferation norms, but is also reinforcing the global standard against nuclear testing. The ratifications of Annex II states are long overdue. We appreciate the intense efforts of E.S. Floyd and his team to universalize the treaty and bring about this, its entry into force. We call on all remaining annexed states to ratify the treaty, and we urge Russia to reverse its decision to revoke its ratification. Co-presidents, Slovenia is in the final months of its tenure in the UN Security Council. Maintaining international peace and security has been our guiding principle our fios, and we will continue to uphold this commitment. In this challenging context, we must redouble our efforts to uphold the universality and effective implementation of the international legal framework pertaining to disarmament and non-proliferation. The CTBT is an essential part of that. We all benefit from the International Monitoring System, which provides not only critical verification infrastructure, but also valuable civil and scientific applications, such as early warning for earthquakes that may trigger tsunamis. Finally, I extend Slovenia's sincere appreciation to Dr. Floyd, the Executive Secretary of the CTBTO, and the Secretariat for their dedication and professionalism, which inspire our continued commitment to a world without weapons of mass destruction. Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Slovenia for her statement. I now invite His Excellency Levent Gümüşoğlu Çiçek, Ambassador and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye.
Thank you, Madam President. Excellencies, we thank and congratulate the Philippines and Sweden as co-presidents of the Article 14 Conference. We assure you of our full support. We also commend our co-coordinators for the past 2 years, Norway and Panama, for all their efforts in contributing to the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. And finally, of course, we thank Dr. Robert Floyd and his team for their dedicated work at the helm of Executive Secretariat. Excellencies, since we last convened, our world has not become safer or more secure, and proliferation concerns have not diminished. For instance, the war in Ukraine continues to undermine global stability and security with continued attacks on nuclear facilities. Likewise, the situation in the Middle East is also increasingly worrisome. Israel's genocidal attacks on the Palestinians in Gaza are intensifying with serious impact on the entire region's security and stability. Besides, reckless and unlawful assaults were undertaken on nuclear facilities in Iran while nuclear talks were underway, preventing the continuation of these talks and the implementation of IAEA safeguards. We also remain seriously concerned by DPRK's repeated nuclear tests in the past that ran counter to the global consensus against nuclear testing. We reiterate the call upon the DPRK to comply with its obligations under the relevant UN Security Council resolution and refrain from actions that may lead to further tensions in the region. Distinguished participants, in these circumstances, it has become even more challenging, but equally necessary, to uphold and expand the existing international instruments including in the field of non-proliferation. The CTBT is certainly among those instruments. Unfortunately, 29 years since its opening for signature, the treaty is yet to enter into force. So we reiterate our call once again for the remaining 9 Annex II states to sign and ratify the treaty without further delay. On a positive note, though, Despite lack of progress on new ratification by Annex II states, we are pleased to see that the number of state parties are increasing. As such, the most recent ratification by Papua New Guinea is certainly a welcome development. In any case, at this critical point, pending the entry into force of the treaty, it is critical that all states maintain or implement moratoria against nuclear tests. Continued support to and cooperation with CTBTO to strengthen its capabilities, including through international monitoring system, is of course also crucial to reinforce the norm against nuclear testing. Excellencies, Türkiye was among the first countries to have signed and ratified the CTBT. We remain committed to the treaty and its objectives., as well as to sustained political engagement in raising broad awareness, encouraging its ratification. We will continue to support all efforts to that end, both on a bilateral level and multilaterally, including through the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative. Finally, let me also reiterate our full support for the final declaration we adopted today and reaffirm our determination to take concrete steps in line with the measures outlined in the text. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I thank the distinguished Deputy Minister from Türkiye for his statement. Y ahora doy la palabra a—
Now I give the floor to His Excellency Carlos Francisco Guevara Van, Deputy Minister of the Republic of Panama.
Thank you. Madam Guterres. La República de Panamá.
The Republic of Panama is part of the CTBT and has been since 1998. As a current non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, on many occasions in many multilateral fora, We have reiterated our call to those of Annex 2 to conclude the signature and ratification. Panama realizes the importance of the entry into force of the treaty. We say once again that we believe that this is a universal commitment to halt nuclear tests, looking at collective security for us all. The modernization and development of new nuclear weapons by those states with nuclear capabilities must be governed under the norm of full responsibility. They must stick to their commitment to the moratorium on nuclear tests. This conference provides an opportunity for the international community to look at the threats to peace constituted by nuclear weapons and tests by means of diplomatic challenge— channels, actions and commitments can be taken and entered into to strengthen the multilateral legal system that completely prohibits nuclear tests. Panama calls once again for the signature and ratification of this treaty, looking at its universal and legally binding nature and the tangible benefits that accession would provide to States Parties when it comes to access to the international monitoring system, strengthening national capacity and participation in the international governance of the treaty. Panama contributes to the treaty organization by means of nuclear radio stations. There are 50 in our country as part of the international monitoring system. Uh, we also measure parameters of ex— nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in the sea, and, uh, subterranean ones. The RN50 station is the only one of its kind in Latin America, and it also provides, uh, data to the treaty organization looking at the environmental, uh, parameters involved, uh, looking at the propagation of radioactive clouds in order to identify the site of explosions and, uh, to parry the risk of pollution. Panama firmly supports working together to achieve the full entry into force of the CTBT. As the outgoing co-chair— co-president, we call for a world free of nuclear weapons, acknowledging that the treaty is a cornerstone in the global architecture of international security, disarmament, and non-proliferation. The Republic of Panama historically has wanted to see the peaceful resolution of disputes and international disarmament under effective multilateral control with the formalization of the international system, making it more consonant with those aims that we share. Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Panama for his statement. I now give the floor to Mr. Ivars Lasis, Undersecretary of State of Latvia.
Distinguished co-presidents, Latvia congratulates the Philippines and Sweden on assuming the presidency of the conference and thanks the ongoing presidency of Panama and Norway. Latvia commends UN Secretary-General for convening this conference and the CTBTO Secretariat for their vital work in these challenging times. Latvia fully aligns with the statement of the EU and wants to deliver the following remarks in a national capacity. Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation face —growing challenges. In this context, CTBT's goal of verifiable end to nuclear testing remains a moral and strategic imperative. Though not yet enforced, the treaty serves as an indispensable instrument to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and thus enhance global security. Excellencies, let me highlight the CTBTO's respected verification regime, and monitoring system and its success in delivering unique data that fosters our capacity to detect and act on potential violations, upholding the integrity of the non-proliferation regime. We also underscore its civilian and environmental applications. In this context, Latvia is proud to announce its recent establishment of a national data center to contribute to the broader CTBT verification system. We support in words and deeds the Secretariat's work to ensure the long-term sustainability of the international monitoring system and encourage all states to contribute actively to these efforts. The IMS's successful detection of tests conducted by the DPRK underscores its operational ability to ensure that no nuclear test goes unnoticed. Latvia reiterates its strong call for the DPRK to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay and abide by its provisions. Excellencies, Latvia calls for renewed momentum toward full adherence and implementation. We deplore the Russian Federation's decision to revoke its ratification of CTBT. This step runs counter to the spirit of the treaty and sends a troubling signal at a time when arms control demands sustained commitment. We call upon all remaining Annex II states to ratify the treaty. While voluntary moratoria are valuable, they cannot replace the legal certainty offered by the CTBT's entry into And to conclude, Latvia reaffirms its strong support of the CTBT as an important instrument for providing peace and security. Let us build on the progress achieved and work together to bring the CTBT into full legal effect. Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Latvia for his statement. I now give the floor to His Excellency Ki-hwan Kyeon, Minister for Multilateral and Global Affairs of the Republic of Korea.
Co-presidents and Excellencies, at the outset, I would like to express my sincere thanks to the co-presidents for their able leadership in presiding over this important conference. My delegation commends the Executive Secretary of the CTBTO Dr. Robert Floyd and his team for their tireless efforts in advancing the universalization of the CTBT. We also take note with appreciation the adoption of the final declaration, which demonstrates our strong commitment to strengthen the global norm against nuclear testing. Above all, tomorrow marks the 30th anniversary of the opening for signature of the CTBT. This milestone is a reminder of its enduring importance and the urgent need for its entry into force. In this light, we welcome the recent ratification of the treaty by Papua New Guinea since the last conference. Yet, despite such progress, 3 decades on, the treaty still has not entered into force. Out of the 44 annexed of 2 states, 9 have not signed or ratified. We strongly urge those remaining states to act without delay. Distinguished delegates, while the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the only state to have conducted nuclear tests in the 21st century, the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula remains one of the most pressing challenges for the global nonproliferation regime. We call on the DPRK to take concrete steps towards complete denuclearization, to refrain from further nuclear tests, to sign and verify the CTBT, and to return to dialogue. The Korean government, in close cooperation with the international community, will work towards tangible progress on the nuclear issue and lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. Excellencies, the Republic of Korea, as an original state signatory to the treaty, has taken various efforts to enhance the CTBTO's verification and monitoring capabilities. These efforts include the modernization of the Korea Seismological Research Station in Wonju, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute Institute's plan to establish a radionuclide monitoring station by 2026, and the Korea Institute of Geoscience and Mineral Resources' contribution to data analysis and capacity building. While reaffirming my government's unwavering commitment to the prompt ratification and universalization of the CTBT, I conclude my remarks. I thank you very much.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea for his statement.
And now I give the floor to the Secretary General of Foreign Policy of Chile, Ambassador Rodrigo Olson.
Thank you very much, Madam President. I would say once again that Chile is and has been a strong supporter of general and comprehensive disarmament. We want to see a broad-ranging, transparent, and democratic multilateral debate. We espouse and defend the indivisibility of international security. This means that all states, regardless of their size or have the duty to contribute to the consolidation of an international system with cooperation based on norms. It's no surprise to any state here that we are experiencing an extremely complex international scenario at the moment. We've seen a proliferation of armed conflict in recent years aiming to undermine international law and the multilateral system. We observe with concern the doctrine of nuclear weapons contradicting totally the no-proliferation doctrine. More than ever, the complete banning of nuclear tests and the provision of nuclear weapons are pillars of the international architecture of universal disarmament and non-proliferation. These are complementary one to another and strengthen the corner cornerstone that we all perceive in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. So therefore we want to see the immediate entry into force of the CTBT and we urge those states and Annex II to accelerate the process of ratification. And we also emphasize the fact that Chile attributes vital importance to the technical work done by the CTBTO, which we see Again, in the 7 monitoring systems in Chile, we refer to the 3 programs of verification, the International Data Center, the in situ inspections, and the International Monitoring System, all of which are important. Madam, we appeal for the total elimination of nuclear weapons and we believe that anything else would be counter to the UN Charter and its main purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Here, my country, Chile, states that the very existence of nuclear weapons is a threat in itself and that the use or threat to use of constitute an international crime and a violation of international law, including international humanitarian law. The current scenario requires us to redouble our efforts looking at February and May 2026 and the adoption of an agreed-upon outcome document. Document. We do not want to see failure. This would jeopardize the effectiveness of the system of nuclear disarmament.
Thank you. Thank the distinguished representative of Chile for his statement and I now invite the distinguished representative of Australia, Ms. Jan Adams, Secretary Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade. You have the floor.
Excellencies and distinguished delegates, Australia thanks the co-presidents, the Philippines and Sweden, for their leadership. I also acknowledge Dr. Robert Floyd and congratulate on his reappointment as Executive Secretary of the CTBTO, a tribute to his determined efforts to universalize the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Australia is proud of our historic and continuing leadership on promoting entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Australia was honored to chair the 11th meeting of the Friends of the CTBT last year which brought together 50 states to reaffirm their shared commitment to the treaty. Our support is underpinned by a solemn recognition of the devastating impact of nuclear weapons testing, which lingers in the Pacific, in Australia, and around the world. This terrible history should never be repeated. With 178 ratifications, the treaty is an essential part of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. It underpins the strong global norm that exists against nuclear weapons testing and contributes to our shared ambition of a world free of nuclear weapons. Before the treaty opened for signature, more than 2,000 nuclear tests were conducted. This century, only one state has tested a nuclear weapon—North Korea. But the CTBT is more than just a disarmament and non-proliferation treaty. It delivers tangible public goods to people globally. The CTBT's international monitoring system detects seismic activity such as earthquakes and other events that could cause a tsunami thereby contributing to national natural disaster prevention— protection, excuse me. Australia hosts the world's third largest number of IMS installations. As member states, we have a mandate and a responsibility to maintain the IMS's long-term integrity and readiness., and we must ensure the system's sustainability. Australia is committed to strengthening the CTBT through practical measures in our region. We are providing technical assistance for Pacific Islands Forum members, and we will support PIF members' efforts to access the civil and environmental benefits of the international monitoring system. We too congratulate Papua New Guinea for ratifying the treaty last year and deplore Russia's revocation of its ratification. Achieving universal membership of the treaty is fundamental to ending nuclear weapons testing. For those countries who are yet to ratify, we urge you to do so without delay. Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Australia for her statement, and I now invite the distinguished representative of the Holy See, His Excellency Archbishop Paul Richard Gallagher, Secretary for Relations with States and International Organizations, to take the floor.
Madame la Présidente, The Holy See would like to express its gratitude to the Philippines and Sweden for their work as Article 14 coordinators and to thank the Executive Secretary of the CTBTO, Mr. Robert Floyd, for his dedication to the noble goals of this organization. For nearly 3 decades, the treaty has been a fundamental component of the non-proliferation and disarmament regimes. However, it remains a regrettable reality that the treaty has not yet entered into force. This situation undermines global efforts against nuclear testing. In this respect, questions also arise regarding ethical responsibility. In today's international context, where human dignity and international law are all too often undermined, The Holy See reiterates its appeal to the remaining Annex II states that have not yet ratified the CTBT to take the necessary steps in order to ratify this treaty. The Holy See's consistent position is that peace cannot be secured through mutual fear or the logic of deterrence. Regrettably, the continuous expansion and modernization of nuclear arsenals perpetuate the dangerous illusion that security can be achieved through the threat of annihilation. As Pope Leo XIV stated when commemorating the 80th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, despite the passing of the years, those tragic events constitute a universal warning against the devastation caused by wars and in particular by nuclear weapons. I hope that in the contemporary world marked by strong tensions and bloody conflicts, the illusionary security based on the threat of mutual destruction may give way to the tools of justice, to the practice of dialogue, and to trust in fraternity. Mesdames co-présidentes, the CBT is more than just a technical treaty. It symbolizes humanity's capacity and will to choose dialogue over destruction, reason over rivalry, and solidarity over suspicion. Let us not allow this moment to pass without reaffirming our commitment to a future in which no nation, leader, or generation ever considers the testing or use of nuclear weapons to be an option. Thank you, Madam Co-President.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Holy See for his statement, and I now invite the distinguished representative of Argentina, His Excellency Juan Navarro, Undersecretary for Foreign Policy, to take the floor.
Thank you, Presidents.
It is an honor for me to speak on behalf of the Republic of Argentina in this conference on Article 14 of the CTBT. Our country has always been in favor of disarmament and non-nuclear proliferation, and we believe that the total prohibition of nuclear tests is essential for international peace and security. May I then commence by expressing a special word of thanks to the CTBTO Executive Secretary Robert Floyd for his leadership and untiring work in this organization. The CTBT is much more than the prohibition of a practice. It's a vital contribution to halt the perfection of nuclear arsenals, to curb the arms race and reduce the risk of such arms being used again. Its entry into force would moreover be an essential step towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the prime aim of multilateral disarmament. More than 25 years after its existence for signature, we are concerned that the treaty has not yet entered into force. We therefore call once again on those states which have not yet ratified it to do so. And we welcome what has been done here by the entire region of Latin America and the Caribbean. Okay, Presidents, Argentina welcomes the progress in the IMS and also the preparation of the verification mechanism. This is a tangible step forward under the system here. Our country has actively contributed to the endeavors with the certification of 8 monitoring stations the radioisotope laboratory as we promised. Moreover, we have reasserted our commitment with the recent visit of the Executive Secretary in March. Several countries— areas of the country were visited with academic activities and receptions by our government. I would want to once again to express Argentina's heartfelt gratitude to this organization for its invaluable assistance in seeking the San Juan submarine, a gesture of solidarity and national commitment that we shall never forget. The entry into force of the CTBT is not just an outstanding aim, it is an urgent matter when it comes to consolidating peace and international security, strengthening the disarmament architecture and preventing nuclear proliferation, aims we all share. Argentina reiterates its firm commitment to work together with all States Parties with the executive secretariat of the CTBT and international organizations which are relevant here to achieve this third objective so that it may become real and lasting. Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Argentina for his statement and I now invite the distinguished representative of Guatemala, Her Excellency Mónica Renata Bolaños Pérez, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, to take the
Good afternoon.
May I commence by expressing Guatemala's gratitude to the delegations of Sweden and the Philippines for having been elected as co-presidents of this conference. Guatemala is proud that it has signed and ratified the CGBT. We believe that is— it is an essential pillar in the international system of disarmament and non-nuclear proliferation. This treaty is a vital tool when it comes to preventing the modernization of nuclear arsenals and also moving towards our shared aspiration of a world free of nuclear weapons and WMDs. Today we recall all of those who are victims of nuclear tests and those whose lives have been affected by these. We do not wish to repeat the consequences of nuclear tests and nuclear explosions. Madam, more than a quarter of a century after the treaty was open for signature, we have still not have not seen it enter into force. This jeopardizes not just the credibility of the international system, but it also sends a worrying message on the lack of political will on the part of certain states which must ratify. Guatemala respectfully urges these states to comply with their historical and legal obligations to ensure that this treaty become a universal and binding provision. We are seeing a particularly complex time in international affairs with conflicts and threats to international security. Against this backdrop, it is unacceptable for us to see greater risks occurring. We need more progress than backstepping. The treaty is an instrument of hope, of prevention and curbing the existential risk facing us. The survival of humankind must guide us. We once again wish to express our firm support for the IMS and the activities pursuant to the treaty—scientific cooperation and mutual transparency. Progress here shows that the technical implementation of the treaty is possible, but there has to be political will so that it becomes is legally operational. Latin America and the Caribbean, by means of the Tlatelolco Treaty, have moved towards the provision— the prohibition of nuclear weapons here. And we reiterate our belief that lasting and true security will not be achieved by nuclear weapons but by their total elimination. Therefore, we once again wish to say that We wish to see the CTBT and the Treaty Against Nuclear Weapons as complementary and we wish to take advantage of this conference to renew our clear message together and to send a message that there is no room for nuclear tests in the 21st century. We want to see real actions and not justifications. Thank you.
Guatemala for her statement. And distinguished delegates, as it's now almost 12 o'clock noon and as previously announced, the speakers list is now closed. With that, I now invite the distinguished representative of Bulgaria, Gergana Karadzhova, Director General for Political Affairs, to take the floor.
Thank you, Chair. Distinguished co-presidents, allow me to congratulate the Philippines and Sweden on assuming the presidency of the 14th Article 40 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT and express my delegation's appreciation for the work carried out by Norway and Panama's previous Article 14 coordinators. I assure you of Bulgaria's full support for achieving a successful outcome of this meeting. Bulgaria fully aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union. Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, 80 years have passed since the first nuclear test was conducted on the 16th of July, '45. More than 2,000 nuclear explosions followed over the subsequent decades, revealing new opportunity for the peaceful application of the nuclear energy, but also fueling the nuclear arms race and causing serious danger to the international peace and security. Motivated to curb the nuclear arms competition and prevent further proliferation, the international community negotiated the CTBT as one of the most important pillars of the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. It complements the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by constraining the development of the qualitative upgrade of nuclear weapons and serves serves as a global confidence-building measure. Its entry into force and universalization are among the practical steps needed for the achievement of the ultimate goal set in Article VI of the NPT: a world free from nuclear weapons. Today, 187 nations have signed Treaty and 178 have ratified it. We welcome the latest ratification of the treaty by Papua New Guinea as a positive development since the 2024 Article 14 Conference. Yet 29 years after the CTBD has opened for signature, we still need to continue our collective effort in order to bring the treaty into force, to effectively implement and make it universal. Distinguished Co-Presidents, ladies and gentlemen, the ongoing Russian Federation's unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine and its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and threats to use nuclear force continue to undermine the foundation of to global nonproliferation and disarmament architecture. We deeply deplore the decision by the Russian Federation, contrary to its NPT obligations, to revoke its certification of the CTBT, which seriously erodes the treaty's regime and distances the prospects of its entry into force. We call on Russia to re-ratify the CTBT and to stick to its commitments to the treaty. We also call upon all states to fully observe the de facto moratorium on nuclear test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and to refrain from action incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty pending its entry into force. Likewise, we urge the DPRK The only country that has conducted nuclear tests in the 21st century to return to full compliance with the NPT and the IAEA safeguards obligation as a non-nuclear weapons state, to immediately and without preconditions sign and ratify the CTBT, and to engage in meaningful dialogue aimed at pursuing the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Among the most important achievements of the CTBT's regime in this is the establishment of an effective, highly respected international monitoring system, which serves as a deterrence against non-compliance with the treaty. In that regard, we commend the work of the Executive Secretary, Dr. Robert Floyd, the CTBT Commission and the Provisional Technical Secretariat, the organization's expertise, and all its activities, including the exploration of potential benefits of the civil and scientific applications of IMS data. We are also encouraged by the effective work of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, the Provisional Technical Secretariat, and the International Data Center on keeping keeping the CTBT verification regime functioning. In conclusion, distinguished co-presidents, on behalf of Bulgaria, a country from Annex II that has signed and ratified the treaty, allow me once again to call upon all states, and in particular Annex II states who have not done so yet, to sign and ratify the CTBT. At their earliest opportunity. Designed to limit the nuclear testing in an unprecedented way, the CTBT's entry into force and universalization will be a crucial advancement to the noble goals of the nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation and an invaluable contribution to our collective security. I thank you.
Distinguished Representative of Bulgaria for her statement. I now invite the Distinguished Representative of Estonia, Her Excellency Miss Mina Linnalinde, Deputy Foreign Minister, to take the floor.
Good afternoon. Thank you very much, distinguished co-presidents and dear friends and colleagues So Estonia aligns itself with the statement of the European Union, and in addition, I'd like to make some comments in my national capacity. The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on 10 September 1996. 29 years later, 187 states have signed the treaty and 178 states have ratified it. However, there are still 9 Annex II states remaining whose modifications are needed for the treaty to come into effect, as we heard already in this room. Estonia supports all international efforts towards the entry into force of the CTBT and urges all states, particularly the Annex II states, to sign and ratify the treaty without further delay. The entry into force of the treaty is in all of our interests. The CTBT is a key pillar of our collective security and indispensable multilateral instrument to advance towards nuclear disarmament and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions represent a serious threat to international peace and security and undermine the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Estonia deplores Russia's de-ratification of the CTBT which represents a severe step back on its commitment to promoting the treaty and its goals. It endangers the global norm against nuclear explosive testing and demonstrates a disregard for the broader nuclear nonproliferation regime, of which a prohibition on nuclear testing is an important part. We call on all states to abide by a moratorium on nuclear weapon testing test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and to refrain from actions that would undermine the objectives of the treaty. Even though the CTBT is yet to enter into force, it is already a success story. Its verification regime and the effective work of the international monitoring system make sure that no nuclear explosion goes undetected, enabling the international community to respond appropriately and deter non-compliance. I thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Estonia for her statement. I now give the floor to His Excellency Shores Khalid Said, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, to take the floor.
Thank you.
Your Excellencies, at the outset, I would like to congratulate Sweden and the Philippines for assuming the presidency, or rather the co-presidency, of the 14th Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. I wish them all success in presiding over this conference. This conference convenes in a complex security environment where we are witnessing further tensions and an escalation in differences and conflict. At the same time, the success of this conference reflects the ongoing efforts by the international community to accelerate the entry into force of the CTBT. This treaty has been adopted more than two decades and a half ago, and it was open for signature. Hence, the need to make further efforts to guarantee its entry into force and to achieve its universality. This is important to fully eliminate nuclear weapons. I would also like to thank Norway and Panama for their efforts in their co-presidency of the 13th Conference. Madam President, the government of Iraq attaches great importance to this conference. We were keen on effectively participating at the highest level in the conference ever since we have joined the CTBT in 2013 out of our belief in the importance of this treaty. We believe that this treaty is a binding legal instrument that contributes to promoting nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. The government of Iraq also supports all international efforts to guarantee the universality of relevant instruments pertaining to weapons of mass destruction elimination, including the CTBT. Without further delay, in this context, Iraq welcomes the ratification of Papua New Guinea On the CTBT, we believe that this measure pushes us closer to its entry into force, and we hope that other countries will do the same in order to build momentum and to achieve our common goals. Madam President, Iraq urges all countries to preserve their moratorium on nuclear tests. These tests are a blatant violation of relevant Security Council resolutions, and they represent a threat to regional and international peace and security. They have negative consequences on all levels. Iraq also expresses its deep concern over the fact that 29 years have gone without the entry into force of the CTBT at a time where this treaty is of growing importance owing to the increasing international tensions and the threats of use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, we need urgent and serious action to accelerate the entry into force of the treaty by guaranteeing the ratification of the 8 Annex II countries. This would end the threats arising from these nuclear tests. Madam President, Iraq reaffirms that the entry into force of the CTBT will grant it a binding legal power in addition to its political and moral weight, and it also reinforced the effectiveness of the nuclear nonproliferation regime It will support efforts to create regions free from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, including the Middle East zone. Iraq believes that achieving this goal will be a practical response to end the sufferings of peoples who have long been affected by the impacts of these tests. And it also reflects our collective commitment to preserve the future of the coming generations and protect them from the risks of nuclear weapons. In this context, our government reaffirms its full support to U.N. resolutions and Security Council resolutions, including Security Council Resolution 2310 of 2016, which reaffirms the vital importance of— and the urgent need to start implementing the CTBT. In conclusion, Iraq warns again of the security threats and challenges that the international community might face as a result of the possibility for some terrorist groups to get the material and technology that would allow them to produce nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, Iraq emphasizes the need to reinforce the nuclear security arrangements which are a basic tool to prevent these materials from falling in the hands of terrorist groups. Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Iraq for his statement, and I now invite the distinguished representative of Nigeria, Mrs. Bosede Olaniyi, Joint Services Director, Ministry of Defense of Nigeria, to take the floor.
Your Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, Nigeria wishes to extend a warm congratulations to the Philippines and Sweden on their election as co-presidents of this important process. You can be assured of Nigeria's full cooperation and support as you discharge your responsibilities. I also like to take the opportunity to commend the leadership of Norway and Panama over the past two years. Their tireless efforts to promote the universalization of the treaty and their constructive engagements with the provisional technical secretariat are deeply appreciated. Nigeria thanks the Executive Secretary, Dr. Robert Lieflefeld, for his insightful opening statement and for his dynamic leadership since assuming duties in 2021. His vigorous outreach and the Secretariat's sustained efforts have yielded tangible results, including 9 new ratifications and 1 additional signature. This progress reflects the continued vitality of the treaty and the growing recognition of its importance to global peace and security. Co-President, Nigeria is pleased to join other ratifying states in marking the 30th anniversary of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, CTBT. Looking back on the journey so far, It is clear that even in the absence of its entry into force, the treaty has already contributed significantly to international peace and security. We commend the Executive Secretary, the Secretariat staff, the Ad Gon Corps presidents, and all ratifying states for their steadfast commitment to advancing the treaty's objectives and strengthening its regime. Nigeria has consistently supported Nigeria has supported and will continue to support the CTBT as a vital pillar of the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. We recall with deep concern the harmful environmental and human consequences of nuclear tests conducted in the Sahara in the 1960s. It is experiences such as these that informed Africa's decision to adopt the Pelidamba Treaty, establishing our continent as a nuclear weapon-free zone and prohibiting entirely the stationing and testing of nuclear explosive devices on Africa's soil. The CTBT, Comprehensive Ban on Nuclear Test Explosions, remains an indispensable building block towards nuclear disarmament. Nigeria therefore attaches the highest importance to sustaining and strengthening the treaty and its verification regime. Co-presidents, we welcome the significant progress achieved in the development of CTBT verification system and support its continued enhancement. Our priority is not limited to banning nuclear tests explosions, but to also extend to ensuring that nuclear energy is harnessed exclusively for peaceful purposes in ways that benefit humanity and safeguard the environment. While Nigeria regrets that the CTBT has not yet entered into force, we welcome the strong global norm that the treaty has nonetheless entrenched. We urge all states that have not yet done so, particularly the Annex 2 states, to sign and ratify the treaty without further delay. We underscore the special responsibility of nuclear weapons states to ensure the entry into force of this landmark instrument. Co-President, the essential threats posed by nuclear weapons cannot be overemphasized. The resources devoted to maintaining and modernizing this arsenal are vastly disproportionate when measured against the urgent needs of socioeconomic development. The risk of use, whether international or accidental, can only be eliminated through the total irreversible and verifiable elimination of this weapon. Today's conference reminds us of our shared duty to advance this noble objective, with the CTBT playing a central role. Nigeria reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the CTBT and its goal. While we redouble collective efforts to secure the treaty's entry into force, we call on all nuclear-armed states to maintain their moratoria on nuclear testing. The world cannot afford a return to the era of nuclear explosions. We owe this responsibility to the future generations. In conclusion, I reaffirm Nigeria's full support for your leadership, co-presidents, and we look forward to working constructively with you and all parties to realize the objective of the CTBT. I thank you very much.
I thank the distinguished representative Representative of Nigeria for her statement and now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Romania, Mr. Eduard Iosiper, Director General for Political Affairs of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Romania.
Co-presidents, distinguished delegates, I would like to thank the co-presidents for convening this conference and to assure them of our our full support. While Romania fully associates itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union, I would like to make a few remarks also in national capacity. Romania strongly believes that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is an essential pillar of the international security architecture, and this event is an opportunity for States Parties to renew their commitment to the treaty as a sign of strengthening international peace and security. From this perspective, we welcome CTBT achieving almost universal adherence with signatures of 188 states and ratifications by 178 states as of today. In the meantime, we consider important to refrain from any action contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty and to continue to uphold the moratorium on nuclear weapon— test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. Distinguished delegates, Romania has always considered CTBT an important element of the global disarmament and non-proliferation regime and a strong confidence and security building measure internationally and regionally. We appreciate that in the current geopolitical context when multilateralism is under increasing pressure, additional efforts are needed to uphold and strengthen the international non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. Today's conference takes place in a fundamentally altered security environment marked by increased tensions, new global challenges, and hybrid threats. Russia's unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine undermined the very foundation of international relations and the rules-based international order. CTBT was not spared of such effects when Russia decided to withdraw its ratification from the treaty. Despite the complex geopolitical context, the CTBTO continues to bring a remarkable contribution through the increasing number of monitoring systems. For its part, Romania will continue to provide all the political and technical support required in order to enable the Preparatory Commission to complete its task related to the progressive development of the coverage of the International Monitoring System. In this regard, we would like to highlight our participation in the Auxiliary Seismic Monitoring Network of the IMS with the seismic station at Kea, Monte Le Rocheux. Co-presidents, we are convinced that the treaty's entry into force is an essential pillar towards a safer and more peaceful world, and we stand fully behind this objective and put our trust in the leadership of CTBTO. We remain deeply concerned about the threat of a 7th nuclear test being conducted by the DPRK, the only state to have conducted nuclear tests in the 21st century. As such, we call on the DPRK to refrain from such actions as well as to return to full compliance with international law and sign and ratify the CTBT. The entry into force of the CTBT is directly linked to our efforts in maintaining this goal high on the international political agenda, where the threat of nuclear tests will not cease to exist unless we fulfill our duty and responsibility to work together to address this issue in a resolute way and speed up the process of ratification. We sincerely hope that today's conference will encourage all all states to join the treaty, thus contributing to the consolidation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament treaties and regime. Thank you very much.
I thank the distinguished representative of Romania for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Canada, Mr. Richard Arbeiter, political director and assistant deputy minister.
Thank you.
Distinguished co-chairs, Canada is grateful for the collaborative efforts of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs in putting together this conference and its final declaration. I would also like to personally thank Dr. Robert Floyd for his enduring leadership and commitment to a world free of nuclear testing. Canada remains committed to the CTBT, its entry into into force, and its verification system. We have worked in our national capacity, as well as with our G7 partners, and through the Friends of the CTBT, to promote these priorities. We reiterate our call on all states that have not yet done so to ratify the treaty without any further delay. We recall that the 9 Annex II states that have yet to ratify the treaty bear a special responsibility for the CTBT's entry into entry into force. In this regard, we deeply regret Russia's revocation of its ratification instrument. We encourage all Annex II states to seek new and innovative ways to overcome any remaining obstacles, such as through enhanced transparency, and to this end, offer Canada's continued support. While we await the treaty's entry into force, Canada believes that more can and should be done. In particular, we call on We call on all States to continue to devote attention and resources to the International Monitoring System, which has consistently demonstrated its ability to achieve the Treaty's objectives. It is in our collective interest to maintain the long-term viability of the IMS to deter clandestine testing and reduce the risk of a renewed nuclear arms race. I will now switch to French.
At the height of the Cold War, a consensus crystallized that nuclear testing was unacceptable and dangerous for populations, the environment, and strategic stability. We therefore urge all states to declare or to maintain national voluntary moratoria on experimental explosions of nuclear weapons pending the entry into force of the treaty. These are important and necessary confidence-building measures. That is particularly the case for the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, the only state to have conducted an experimental explosion of nuclear weapons this century. We urge once more the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to refrain from further nuclear tests in the spirit of facilitating regional peace and security. In closing, distinguished co-presidents, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization and the international community may count on the support of Canada to facilitate the entry into force of the treaty. A treaty that is fully in force will provide everyone with tangible security benefits and contribute to our collective efforts to end the proliferation of nuclear weapons and eliminate existing stockpiles. I thank you.
I thank the representative of Canada for his statement, and I now give the floor to the European Union representative, Martina Penko, counselor at the European Union here in New York.
Good afternoon. Thank you very much, distinguished co-presidents. I have the honor to speak on behalf of of the European Union. The candidate countries Montenegro, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Georgia, and the EFTA country Norway, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Andorra, Monaco, and San Marino aligned themselves with this statement. I thank the Secretary General for convening this conference and thank all distinguished High Representatives of state signatories for their engagement and support. Let me start by congratulating Sweden and the Philippines on assuming the presidency of the Article 14 Conference and express our appreciation to Norway and Panama for their work as previous coordinators. I assure you that the European Union's full support and cooperation on our collective efforts to promote the CTPT's entry into force. Distinguished co-presidents, ladies and gentlemen, we have gathered here today at a time marked— by Russia's continued illegal war of aggression in Ukraine, increased global and regional tensions, and continuing proliferation crisis. During these challenging times when multilateralism is under increasing pressure, we must redouble our efforts to uphold and strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, promote the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and advance towards its entry into force. Distinguished Co-Presidents, ladies and gentlemen, the CTBT is a key pillar of our collective security and an indispensable multilateral instrument to advance towards nuclear disarmament and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions represent a serious danger to international peace and security and undermine the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Halting all nuclear weapon and other nuclear explosion limits the development of new or improved nuclear arms and thus serves as an effective support for disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects. The EU stresses that all state signatories are obliged to refrain from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT pending the treaty's entry into force. Promoting the entry into force and universalization of the CTBT remains a top priority of the European Union. All 27 EU member states have ratified the treaty and we reaffirm strongly committed to it— remain, excuse me. The CTBT would codify the global norm against nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion and reinforce international peace and security. Since our last meeting, Papua New Guinea has ratified the treaty, bringing us one step closer to its universalization. It is regrettable that no further progress was made among Annex II states that still need to sign or ratify the treaty. The EU deeply deplores the unprecedented decision by the Russian Federation, contrary to its NPT and other commitments, to revoke its ratification of the CTPT. The EU calls on all states which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the treaty without any preconditions or delay. It is crucial for international peace and security that all states fully abide by the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion and refrain from any action contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty. In this regard, we call on all states to continue to honor their engagements and reaffirm their commitments. No state should conduct nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosions. The EU strongly condemns the nuclear tests carried out by DPRK and urges the DPRK to comply with its obligations under relevant UN Security Council resolutions to refrain from testing nuclear devices and ballistic missiles, reaffirm the moratorium on long-range ballistic missile and nuclear tests, and sign and ratify the CTBT without any preconditions or further delay. While the goal of bringing the treaty into force has not been achieved yet, the CTBT has established itself as a strong fully verifiable instrument signed by 187 states and ratified by 178. Its international monitoring system has already demonstrated its value in providing independent and reliable data that will help deter non-compliance and strengthen transparency. Following the DPRK's nuclear tests, reliable and independent data was quickly available for decision-makers, enabling the international international community to respond appropriately and swiftly. The fact that all state signatories already adhere to its objectives further demonstrates the CTBT's strength and value. Its entry into force would outlaw nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions in a verifiable way, for good. This is what we must continue to strive for. Distinguished Co-presidents, The EU is strong supporter of the CTPTO. Since 2006, the EU has provided extra budgetary contributions of more than €29.5 million for the strengthening of the CTPTO's monitoring and verification capabilities. The EU considers that IMAS data should be exploited also for civil and scientific purposes following the precedent of its use for tsunami warning that was approved by consensus and supports capacity building in this regard. We call upon all states to honor their financial obligations and step up their political support for the CTPTO. At the same time, ensuring the sustainability and effectiveness of the verification regime through adequate funding remains crucial. On its part, the EU will continue to use will use every opportunity to advocate the treaty's prompt entry into force and universalization in international fora and with third countries that have not yet signed or ratified the treaty. Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of the European Union for her statement, and I now invite the distinguished representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands Also, on behalf of the Friends of the CTBT group, Ms. Bahia Tazeeb Lee, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Excellencies, distinguished delegates, I have the great honor to speak on behalf of the Friends of the CTBT, Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan, and the Kingdom The Netherlands. We thank the Secretary-General of the United Nations for convening this conference. As friends of the CTBT, we fully support the work of the co-presidents of the Article IV Conference, the Philippines and Sweden. We thank them for all their great efforts in drafting and finalizing the text of the final declaration for the 14th Conference of the Article IV Process. We are gathered here today to take stock and evaluate the progress towards the entry into force of the treaty. We greatly appreciate the tireless, dedicated efforts by the Executive Secretary to bring the treaty closer to universality. In this regard, we welcome the ratification of the treaty by Papua New Guinea in 2024. But we also regret the decision of the Russian Federation as annexed two states to revoke its ratification in 2023. The Executive Secretary has our full support in his continued work to bring the importance of the CTBT to the fore. We, the ratifying states, also have the responsibility to call on and persuade those who remain outside its fold to join and bring about a legally binding ban on nuclear testing. Pending the entry into force of the treaty, we call upon all states to declare or maintain existing national moratoria on nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions. Furthermore, we call upon them to refrain from any action that would undermine the treaty's objective and purpose. This may serve as an example of responsible international behavior that contributes to international peace and stability. Let me also seize this opportunity to commend the work of the CTBTO, an organization that has well-established, respected, reliable, and transparent capabilities to play an important role in upholding the international non-proliferation regime. The primary verification facilities that underpin the international monitoring system are a global joint investment from which we have all long benefited. The CTBTO's initiative for core IMS sustainment deserves full, full positive consideration by states— we therefore recognize and appreciate the Executive Secretary's foresight and his responsive and responsible actions to secure the future of the IMS. As we all know gathered here today, this network not only provides a robust verification regime, but also scientifically valuable and potentially life-saving civilian uses. The IMS IMS enables us to monitor and warn against earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions, as well as to better study climate change and its effects. This combination of verification and civil applications makes the IMS a unique tool, one worth completing and sustaining. As friends active since 20— 2002, to and committed to the successful entry into force of the CTBT, we will continue to support all efforts to universalize the treaty.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of the Netherlands for her statement, also on behalf of the Friends of the CTBT group. I now give the floor to Miss Véronique Petit of Belgium, the Director-General of Multilateral Affairs and Globalization.
Distinguished co-chairs, excellencies, let me begin by commending the remarkable work accomplished by our colleagues from Norway and Panama and expressing Belgium's full support to Sweden and the Philippines in hosting this mission. I would also like to congratulate Dr. Rob Floyd for his commitment as Executive Secretary to the— of the CTBTO. Thanks for your leadership of the organization. The organization is today more robust, more inclusive, and better prepared to meet the challenges of tomorrow. Ladies and gentlemen, who wouldn't want to live in a world free from nuclear threat? While this goal will not be achieved overnight, it is up to us to chart the course today. Banning nuclear tests is an essential step on this path. Such tests contribute significantly to the emergence of new nuclear-possessing states and the development of ever more destructive weapons. Significant progress has been made. Only one country has conducted nuclear tests in the 21st century, and each of these acts have been con— strongly condemned by a large majority of the international community. The International Monitoring System in place is now one of the most effective in terms of verification. The CTBT is a fundamental pillar of the non-proliferation regime. However, Russia's decision to withdraw its ratification of the treaty represents a worrying step backwards. Its growing cooperation with North Korea raises serious concerns and illustrates the multiple threats to the non-proliferation regime. Faced with these challenges, states have a clear responsibility: to strengthen the regime rather than to weaken it. States that have not yet joined the CTBT must ask themselves, can we remain passive in the face of the abyss? Should we maintain rigid positions while the stakes evolve? This question is particularly relevant to those who declare themselves in favor of nuclear disarmament but condition their accession to the CTBT on criteria that have become unconvincing in light of current threats. I will now switch to French. Mesdames et messieurs, il n'existe qu'un seul instrument—
Ladies and gentlemen, there's only one instrument which can bring about the complete prohibition of nuclear tests, one single instrument that can detect the clandestine effects. There is therefore no alternative to the CTBT. There's no shortcut. When it comes to nuclear disarmament without the entry into force of the treaty. The NPT, if it is to come into force, comes thereby by the complete ratification of the CTBT. Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative from Belgium for her statement. I now give the floor to His Excellency Ismail Chakori, Ambassador and Director General of Global Issues in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Morocco.
May I firstly most sincerely congratulate the Republic of the Philippines and the Kingdom of Sweden on their election to the for the presidency of this 14th Ministerial Conference on Article 14. Looking at the CTBT, we are aware of their continuous commitment to promoting this treaty. It's a vital instrument for international peace and security. We'd also like to congratulate Dr. Robert Floyd for his exceptional dedication and work looking at the provisional ratification, considering the framework of ratification of the treaty. So this ministerial conference coincides with the celebration of the 30th anniversary of the treaty's being open for signature, and this is a milestone when it comes to our collective engagement towards nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. It's time to highlight the commitments and the aim that we all wish to see of the universalization of the treaty ridding the world of nuclear weapons. The Kingdom of Morocco remains of the belief that this conference participates in this belief, strengthening the commitments towards the CTBT and NPT. This ministerial conference is also being held on the eve of— the 11th Conference reviewing the NPT. This is a significant opportunity to take stock of this as an instrument, an important international instrument when it comes to stockpiling and preventing nuclear weapons. For Morocco, the entry into force of this must go hand in hand with its universalization. It is extremely regrettable that 30 years down the road from its being open to signature and despite the political support that it enjoys, the CTBT is still not enforced. When we look at the world scenario, we see there are threats of nuclear tests and uncertainty stemming therefrom. We call upon states to take firm steps steps necessary to bring about nonproliferation. So, ladies and gentlemen, Morocco has actively participated in the universalization of this treaty, one of the first signature countries, and we have been unwavering in our appeal to all countries to ratify, particularly those who have not yet done so and are in Annex II. Morocco emphasizes the vital importance of maintaining the verification system. We should spare no effort to this end. This can help the entry into force of the CTBT and its universalization by means of the adoption of the resolution of the GTA. Morocco has acted in the interest of international cooperation and in strengthening cooperation on the African continent. Africa is a strategic priority for Morocco. We believe that enhancing capacities in the region by means of workshops and training sessions of experts will make possible a greater use of the CTBT technology, which can be used for scientific and peaceful ends. So Morocco continues to encourage the IMF to continue its efforts to train experts, particularly in the African continent, by means in particular of the International Center of Research— scientific research in Morocco in order to contribute to with the training of African experts. Morocco believes in multilateralism and that international cooperation is an essential tool to provide effective universal responses in this world to bring about non-proliferation. We are firmly attached to the entry into force of the CTBT. We have been unwavering in our support to promote this treaty and we fully support the outcome declaration to be adopted at the end of this conference. Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Morocco for his statement.
And now I give the floor to Ambassador Daylenis Moreno Guerra of Cuba.
Distinguished co-presidents, We should like to congratulate you on your taking on this important responsibility and we wish you every success. We welcome the support of the CTBT to Cuba. Its cooperation has meant improvement of our country's response capacity to national disasters. This international cooperation on means to facilitate the entry into force of the treaty is of the greatest importance. 80 years after the UN launched atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we have seen thousands of nuclear weapons threatening the very survival of mankind. We are seeing that international arsenals of nuclear weapons are being increased with sustained increase of military expenditure promoted by the racist narrative of the U.S. The only way towards a peaceful world is by eliminating nuclear weapons in a transparent, verifiable, and irreversible fashion. The complete prevention of nuclear tests is vital to achieve this end. We advocate the immediate entry into force and universal universalization of the CTBT. This would contribute to strengthen the international disarmament and nonproliferation system together with other instruments such as the NPT, the Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean NPT. It is time to take our collective responsibility to international for peace and security. Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba for her statement. I now give the floor to His Excellency Kangoné Alphonse Kouibi, the Ambassador of Côte d'Ivoire.
Merci, Madame la Co-présidente.
Thank you, Madam Co-president. Madam Co-president, Dr. Robert Floyd, Executive Secretary of the CTBTO, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen. Allow me to begin by extending my warm congratulations The congratulations of my country to the Republic of the Philippines and to the Kingdom of Sweden for their election as co-presidents of this conference. Speaking to them, I wish them every success as they go about their mission. Furthermore, I would like to extend our gratitude to the Executive Secretary of the CTBTO, whose dynamism, pragmatism, and effectiveness have contributed to sterling results achieved Hitherto distinguished participants, ladies and gentlemen, Côte d'Ivoire remains convinced that nuclear weapons constitute a genuine serious threat to humanity. Their proliferation and the continuation of nuclear testing jeopardize international stability, the protection of the environment, and the security of current and future generations. This is the reason why my country believes the universal An effective entry into force of the CTBT represents a decisive stage to turn the page on nuclear testing. It would bolster confidence among nations, and it would be the basis for a safer, fairer, and more sustainable world. Côte d'Ivoire hails the progress made in the development and deployment of international monitoring, which shows the central role of the CTBTO in the prevention and detection of nuclear testing. We encourage in this regard the strengthening of technical and scientific cooperation so as to allow all states, in particular in Africa, to fully draw on the benefits of the civilian and peaceful use of this technology, especially in terms of disaster management, scientific research, and environmental protection. Having said that, we're compelled to note that the entry into force of the CTBT remains hampered by the lack of ratification of certain states whose adherence is vital. Côte d'Ivoire therefore sounds a solemn call to these states, asking them to take the step of ratification in the name of collective security and shared responsibility to humanity. Côte d'Ivoire recalls that the unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing need to be maintained, but they are no replacement for a legally binding prohibition, which is the only lasting guarantee for a world free from nuclear testing. Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, my country is honored to co-preside over the preparatory commission of the CTBT for the year 2025. Believes this mandate is a vote of confidence in its staunch commitment to the goals of the treaty and to— it's a recognition of its commitment to peace and security internationally. Côte d'Ivoire also welcomes the awareness-raising efforts done since the conference in 2023 by the co-presidency of Panama and Norway. And by numerous states, including in Africa, to encourage more signings and ratifications. Building on that momentum, the visit of the Executive Secretary to Côte d'Ivoire in June of 2024 was an opportunity to promote the treaty to the accredited diplomatic corps of my country. We encourage the continuation of these initiatives, in particular, for the non-signatory states so as to authorize their participation as observers in the preparatory commission. Madam Co-President, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, Côte d'Ivoire welcomes the advantages of its cooperation with the CTBTO since its adherence to the treaty in March 2003. We will continue to work with our partners so that the shared objective of a world free from nuclear testing finally becomes a reality. My country thus harbors the hope that our debate and our collective actions will bring the international community closer to its common objective, thus guaranteeing security, dignity, and well-being for everyone. Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Côte d'Ivoire for his statement. I now invite the distinguished representative of Malta, Mr. Christopher Kustahar, Permanent Secretary.
Distinguished co-presidents, Excellencies, colleagues, thank you for convening this conference, because I regard it as a very important link within this chain that can lead us towards harnessing peace around the world. In today's global context, where mistrust between states prevails and disarmament architecture is deteriorating, it is worrying that the CTBT has not yet entered into force. The humanitarian effects that would result from even a so-called limited nuclear war would spare no country, big or small, possessing nuclear capabilities or not. It is therefore imperative to strive for a world without nuclear weapons. Strengthening the norm against nuclear testing and committing to this treaty goes hand in hand with this goal of total elimination. There can be no nuclear arsenal expansions without nuclear testing. In this regard, Malta calls calls on all countries that have yet to sign and/or to ratify the CTBT to do so without delay and allow the CTBT to eventually enter into force. Pending the entry into force, Malta calls on States to abide by the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. Multa also calls on the DPRK to refrain from carrying out further nuclear weapons tests in violation of UNSC resolutions and commend the CTBTO's monitoring stations for continuous detection of these acts. In relation, we remind of the disproportionate effect effects that nuclear testing has on women, girls, and indigenous communities, as explicitly stated in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Despite the pending entry into force, the international community has already witnessed some of the treaty's benefits. Beyond their verification role, the CTBT's international monitoring stations and the International Data Centre continue helping our scientific communities through capacity building and also operating the tsunami warning systems. These results should further strengthen our commitment to the treaty. President, Malta views the consensus on the Joint Final Declaration as an encouraging step in the right direction. We commend all member states involved for the spirit of negotiation, which we hope will serve as a catalyst for further diplomacy towards the treaty's entry into force. We also thank the co-presidents for their tireless efforts towards this achievement. Step by step, our common goals can be achieved. In conclusion, Malta fully supports the CTBT and considers it as vital in halting further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Malta aspires for universal adherence to the treaty and remains committed to further our efforts towards the same for the guarantee of a safe and prosperous future of mankind. Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Malta for his statement. Y ahora doy la palabra a su excelencia—
And I now give the floor to His Excellency Diego Martínez de León, Deputy Minister from Spain.
Secretary-General, President of the General Assembly, Executive Secretary, Presidents, Ministers, distinguished delegates, I would like my first words to be of gratitude to the commitment of the UN Secretary-General and my colleagues of the Philippines and Sweden in promoting this Article 14. We thank Panama and Norway for their work regarding the entry into force of the CTBT and endeavoring to achieve this. Spain also wishes to express its gratitude to the High Representative of the European Union, and we endorse what was said. I would like to make some comments in our national capacity. We believe the entry into force of the CTBT is one of our main priorities. We are therefore delighted to see new signatures and ratifications, and we congratulate those states who have been doing this, in particular the states of Annex II. Regret the withdrawal of Russia's ratification running counter to the aim of the treaty. We support the work of the Preparatory Committee and the Executive Secretary for universalization of the treaty, and we call for the moratorium on nuclear tests, which has become the international norm with the regrettable exception of the DPRK. The technical characteristics of the CTBT made it possible to assess the technical characteristics of nuclear trials. We can therefore contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. Additionally, the network of sensors and verification systems foster the civilian— civil and peaceful use of nuclear technology. We want to see this continuing and we trust that the preparatory conference will continue with verification work pursuant to its mandate. When we see multilateralism under challenge, the success of the CTBTO is an example of successful multilateralism So we mustn't forget our main aim to bring about the entry into force of the treaty and that there be no further nuclear tests. Thank you.
Thank you, Representative of Spain, for his statement. Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, it is now a little past 13:00. We will resume at 15:00 and continue our deliberations on agenda item 9. The meeting now stands adjourned until 15:00 sharp. Thank you very much.