Press Conference: We need to talk about the elephants in the room (and why ignoring them perpetuates biodiversity destruction), UN Convention on Biodiversity - COP 17 Conferences Date: 21 October 2026 Language: English Transcript: https://transcripts.un.org/en/asset/k1r/k1rjwh5z6t Transcripts available through this tool are created by using automatic speech recognition and are not official records nor official documents of the United Nations. Official records and official documents are available on the Official Document System of the United Nations. --- TWN · Moderator [0:01]: Good morning, everyone. Thank you for being here. My name is Li Ching. I'm from the Third World Network, and I'm very happy to welcome you all to our press conference and the launch of our report. We need to talk about the elephants in the room and why ignoring them perpetuates biodiversity destruction. This report, which we actually released last week, is published by the Third World Network, Friends of the Earth International, Rainforest Action Network, in collaboration with the Global Youth Biodiversity Network and the CBD Women's Caucus. Well, why did we publish this report? As you all know, the global review is being undertaken at COP17 at the moment. It's probably the biggest item on the agenda. But really, it hasn't been designed to contend with what we're calling the elephants in the room, the structural root causes of biodiversity destruction. And so long as governments only address the symptoms without tackling these deeper structural issues, we will not be able to halt biodiversity loss and harms to peoples. We also know that In the crisis that we have today, those who contribute the least actually bear the greatest burdens. And these elephants in the room actually rest on very inequitable systems of exploitation and control, creating a justice gap that must be recognized and addressed. We have four speakers today to talk about the four elephants that we have identified, and I will introduce them in turn. The first speaker is Audrey Irvin-Burke, from the University of British Columbia. And the first elephant that she will talk about is when financial stability depends on biodiversity destruction. Audrey, please, you have the floor. UBC [2:04]: Thanks, Cheng. So as we have been discussing here in Yerevan, the scientific community through IPBES has noted the necessity of transformative change, defined as fundamental system-wide shifts in views, structures, and practices that address the underlying causes of biodiversity loss and nature's decline. In this report, we argue that a key system in need of transformation is the international financial architecture. These are the rules and institutions that make the global economy function, but that can also constrain governments in reforming the rapid and unequal resource extraction that drives biodiversity loss. The international financial architecture includes a constellation of formal and informal institutions, rules, and norms that govern cross-border finance, including sovereign lending and capital flows. It can be thought of as kind of the global plumbing of the financial system meant to provide stability across a complex and volatile global economy. In its current form, however, the international financial architecture does three things that hamper the implementation of the convention. First, it incentivizes export-oriented economic strategies that generate short-term benefits for some, but long-term ecological degradation and instability for many others. It can reward governments for the expansion of harmful financial flows and activities, or render them necessary to repay debts and regain financial stability. Second, it constrains fiscal space and thus limits investment in biodiversity protection, restoration, and transition away from harmful sectors. It often disincentivizes the very investments that we know are necessary to avoid the impacts of ecosystem decline, viewing them only as costs in the short term. Third, it exposes states to financial penalties for implementing strong environmental policies. This can constrain policy pathways that would align with the realization of the KMGBF and the implementation of the convention. And you can read more about these points in the report. Crucially, the system exposes governments to these pressures unequally, meaning that some governments, particularly those in the global south, face stricter constraints than others, pointing to the justice gap that Ching has just described. This is not meant to let any government off the hook for bad decisions, including human rights violations or land dispossession. Instead, it points to the collective responsibility to ensure that these international barriers to ambitious science-based domestic policy are reformed. There are many other reasons that governments and social movements are calling for reforms to the system from climate change to human health and education. We point here to its particular relevance for biodiversity, given that the majority of the world's terrestrial species and tropical forests are located in global south countries. For far too long, we have attempted to make biodiversity work within this system, trying to make it financially valuable enough to compete with the pressures of resource extraction. But this has not succeeded in challenging the norms of the system, leaving nature relegated to what we call a never ending bake sale, a small subsidized market that we are told at conference after conference is just about to take off. This points to the need for more forcefully challenging the political economic dynamics that keep nature expendable. Now, the convention does not have the ability to unilaterally reform these rules, but it can more clearly name the contradiction between these norms and institutions and biodiversity conservation. and it can undertake an agenda of work to ensure that financial system transformation is aligned with biodiversity targets. The global review should name these barriers clearly. We increasingly understand that environmental destruction presents a real threat to our collective stability, and this is a threat that any fit for purpose financial architecture must take seriously. Thank you. TWN · Moderator [5:48]: Thank you very much, Audrey. It's my pleasure now to introduce Tom Picken, who is with the Rainforest Action Network and Forest and Finance, who will talk about the second elephant that we identified in the report, financing biodiversity destruction remains legal, profitable, and weakly governed. Tom, please. RAN [6:07]: Thank you, Jing. Good morning, everyone. My contribution to this report looks at a rather extraordinary contradiction at the heart of global biodiversity finance. A great deal of time is spent in these negotiations discussing how to mobilize money to protect nature, and rightly so. Conservation, restoration, indigenous stewardship, and environmental public institutions are chronically underfunded. And developed countries also have longstanding obligations to provide finance to developing countries, which they have yet to fulfill. But these negotiations are largely ignoring the vastly greater amounts of money flowing in the opposite direction. United Nations Environment State of Finance 2026 report estimates, I'm sorry, 2024 report, estimates that in 2023, 7.3 trillion US dollars flowed into activities harmful to nature, compared with just 220 billion supporting nature. That's a ratio of roughly 33 to 1. And when separating public and private finance from that data, the picture becomes even more striking. For public finance, the ratio is around 12 to 1, but for private finance, that ratio rises to 213 to 1. Now, these are UNEP estimates, lots of caveats based on definitions of its own nature negative and nature positive, but the scale of the imbalance is unmistakable. And this isn't just about a few bad actors or illegal deforestation. We're talking about the mainstream financial system, public subsidies, tax incentives, development finance and government guarantees helping to make destructive activities profitable. And commercial banks, investors and insurers providing the capital and additional risk coverage that allows them to keep expanding. These different flows of finance reinforce one another. Public money can lower the risk and costs for destructive activities, attracting private investment that then locks in those business models for decades. And much of this remains perfectly legal, very profitable, and weakly regulated. So this is the second elephant in the room. We can't expect conservation finance to mop up the destruction being financed through the main real world economy. So what does this mean for governments here at COP17? Four years ago, the GBF was adopted, including a commitment under Target 14 to align public and private financial flows and biodiversity goals. Target 18 commits governments to reform harmful incentives and subsidies. Target 15 provides the entry point for addressing impacts of business and financial institutions, while Target 19 addresses the need to mobilize resources. But these commitments need to work together. The international debate has been disproportionately focused on this last question, how to raise more finance. And the private sector is championed as the main solution, despite it being fundamentally structured around destruction. So the missing question is, what are governments doing about these much larger flows that continue to finance biodiversity destruction? The troubling answer is very little. We're releasing another report here today at 1:15pm through the Forest and Finance Coalition, which examines financial regulation across 11 major financial and producer jurisdictions. So please come along and we can go into the detail of that a bit more. But my core message really is that the real test of biodiversity finance is not simply how much money we can raise for nature and how many more green sounding initiatives can be launched. It's whether governments change policy and the financial rules so that concrete biodiversity outcomes are built in. Thank you. TWN · Moderator [10:08]: Thank you very much, Tom. And now we turn to the third elephant, which Nelly Marianne from Friends of the Earth International will introduce, which we've identified as the legal system that privileges corporate rights over environmental regulations. Please. FoEI [10:26]: Thank you, Jing. And yes, what we see is that there is an international legal system that actually puts trade and profits before environment and rights. and this fundamentally undermines the possibility to implement the GBF and biodiversity policies. The way in which this is most clearly visible is through the investor state dispute settlement mechanism known as ISDS. And this is a legal mechanisms that provides the possibility to foreign investors, mostly corporations, to sue states before international arbitration tribunals. These are asymmetric because states cannot sue investors, but it can be the other way around. And they are mostly confidential as well. The right for investors to sue states comes mostly through international investment agreements. So once a country signs an international investment agreement, it is mostly stuck into this kind of possibility to get sued. What happens when a country gets sued is that they can get a huge compensation claim for, for example, having raised the bar on environmental measures or, for example, for not having given a permission to or retire a permission to operate, for example, for a mine or this kind of things. So what this does, it locks into the system the baseline of where countries are with their policies and it locks into previous decisions on investment, etc. When a country wants to raise the bar, it risks getting a huge claim against it, to have to pay billions of dollars in certain cases for the compensation for these investors. This can even be compensation for future expected profits. So it is huge. For example, in Pakistan, there was a case where Pakistan had to pay 5.8 billion, which is really completely out of sync what a country can pay. This was for a copper mine. The result of this is one, countries get punished for doing environmental legislation. Two, countries also get an effect of regulatory chill, meaning that countries don't even try. Countries feel like, okay, we better don't try increasing our environmental regulation. We better don't try to stop something that is really harmful for biodiversity because we run the risk of getting these claims. It's not only this environmental chill, it also has a real impact on indigenous peoples on the ground, because if a country would want to stop, for example, a mine, they can't do this, so therefore they are kind of obliged to impose these projects on indigenous peoples on the right, so on the ground. So we can see how this really impacts very badly. Most of the cases, 62% of the cases are in the global south, and that's also where the baseline regulation is weaker, so that the impact there is very, very strong. So really in the CBD we need to change the way how we address the global legal system. We need to have a talk about that and see what is the way forward. So we need to make sure that the CBD discusses this. We also, for example, bring it to the IP, best who could also bring recommendations on this. And we need to make sure that putting rights and environmental regulation that this comes before investment and before profit and trade. So this is the major measures and it's urgent that the CBD addresses this elephant. Thank you very much. TWN · Moderator [14:27]: Thank you very much, Nayla. And now our final speaker will be Myrna Ines Fernandez Pradel, also my colleague at the Third World Network, who will talk about the market oriented instruments for biodiversity finance that actually facilitate biodiversity destruction. Myrna, please. TWN [14:44]: Thank you so much. Our fourth elephant is focused on the market-oriented instruments that are listed on Target 19 of the Global Biodiversity Framework. And these instruments are based on a market logic that is flawed when it's applied to nature. First of all, these market instruments are labeled as innovative, and none of this is really innovative because they exist in the '70s. Biodiversity offsets and credits exist since the 70s, payment for ecosystem services exist since the 90s, and green bonds exist since 2008. And all these years, they have shown environmental impacts and social impacts that are very important to highlight. In the environmental impacts and concerns, we can list the lack of equivalence because the complexity of biodiversity and ecosystems cannot be translated into singular tradable units, monetary units that can be exchanged or sold or traded. There is lack of additionality because many of these conservation efforts happen in places that would have been conserved anyways. There is a lack of permanence because we cannot ensure the permanence of the impacts because in most of the cases the monitoring frames are really short in time and the ecosystems takes decades to restore. There is leakage of impacts because many of the impacts do not get suppressed but they just are translocated from one site to another site and we end up having ecological homogenization because very complex ecosystems tend to be replaced by monoculture plantations and sometimes even with invasive species. Finally, we have greenwashing because most of these biodiversity credits will be purchased, for example, by companies that will use them to look greener. The same happens with green bonds and payment for ecosystem services. We have social impacts as well-being, for example, the most concerning, the displacement of indigenous peoples and local communities. for the project implementation. We have high impacts on the land rights and the tenure rights, especially for the ones that don't have access to land tenure, like the women in the communities. We have community fragmentation because this leads to land conflicts and the communities will have to fight against each other. We have unequal payments, especially for the implementers on the ground, having the most portion of the payments to the intermediaries. And in the case of green bonds, we have debt burden for countries, especially in the global south. And in all of them, we have commodification. That is really important because for most of the indigenous peoples and local communities in the world, we see nature as our mother and not something that can be sold or exchanged. The underlying problem of this market logic applied to nature is that the market considers nature as an asset. that can be sold, exchanged, or invested in. The market does not really care about nature, the species, the fragile ecosystems, or the rights of the people that depend on nature. This is very useful for destructive sectors to keep business as usual, because then they can pursue their activities that are destructive of biodiversity while pretending that they are doing something by investing in these market-oriented instruments. And therefore, it is a very dangerous destruction. And it's used as a tactic to avoid the structural root causes of biodiversity destruction. So this elephant is also used as a tactic to avoid the other elephants. Who wins? The biggest winners in this game are the certification agencies, the high-income countries, and the ones behind the instruments. And the big losers are especially countries in the global south, but more especially rights holders, indigenous peoples, women, youth and communities on the ground. The real solutions are beyond the market, like right access, direct access and stopping harm on finance and regulation of this destructive finance. And to say the last words, we don't really need to make biodiversity more attractive to financial markets. What we need is to make biodiversity a non-negotiable public responsibility and ensure that those who steward it have the rights and the resources to do so. Thank you so much. TWN · Moderator [19:30]: Thank you to all our speakers. I'd like to open the floor now to questions. I'm going to prioritize questions from press first. If there are any press who want to ask questions, please go ahead. If not, we'll open the floor to everyone. Thank you. No questions? Okay. Please. SCB [20:06]: Yeah, I think it works now. Sorry. Volker Malfour, Society for Conservation Biology. Yeah, thank you very much. And I have a particular question to Mice about this investor agreements. It's a very legal topic. I've published myself three books about law and sustainable development, and I have several contributions on this issue in there because it's really a critical issue. So where are the, from your point of view, the most important legal points to put the finger on what to change in the overall legal system for this? Thank you. Okay. TWN · Moderator [20:47]: Are there any more questions? We might take one or two more and then we can quickly answer. Okay. Do you want to start, Neil? Go ahead. FoEI [20:58]: Okay. Thank you very much for the question. So this is a huge and big legal problem, of course. It roots from post-colonial times when actually corporations during the colonial times, they were used to extract resources from the global south. And then after that, this kind of mechanism got installed. And of course, by now it is a solid legal system. We need to talk about this. We need to address what are the impacts of it and to just open the discussion. I don't have all the legal answers on how precisely to do this, but by just pretending that it doesn't exist and that we can make here in this convention biodiversity decisions and that this will not be impacted by this kind of things is complete madness. So my call is for having an open dialogue between all the parties involved, between the legal experts, et cetera, and see what can be done. I don't pretend to have the final legal answers, but it needs to be addressed. That is the main issue here. So that's also why we call for dialogue within the CBD, maybe a CBD resource paper, the IP best to look into it, talk with other fora and things like that. TWN · Moderator [22:11]: Thank you. And of course, many countries that have negotiated bilateral investment agreements and free trade agreements have themselves either pushed to exclude ISDS from those treaties or have exited some of the bilateral investment agreements. And this has been a call that has been taken up widely, including by Joe Stiglitz, for example. So I think this is something that is very widely recognized as a big problem, particularly for the environment-related cases. Any other questions, please? Please, yes. Speaker 14 [22:50]: Hi. Thank you so much for your insight. My question is this. There's actually a pavilion here that is kind of where businesses are coming together, as you may know. with the aim of lobbying governments to open up markets and to make policy environments easier so that they can, you know, businesses are saying protect biodiversity more. I want to know, like, what kind of key recommendations would you have then for maybe global or regional policy changes? Because given that businesses are organizing very effectively and it's important that we have, you know, at least two or three recommendations that we can then all amplify. Thank you. TWN · Moderator [23:34]: I'll give that question to both Tom and Marina to just answer quickly. Thank you. RAN [23:41]: That's a high expectation. You know, I think the report chapters and the different elements present some of the the most important structural underlying barriers to achieving this sort of objectives we see? And I don't think there's an easy answer to your question, but it's a great question. I think it's all of those things. We know over the past decades that private wealth and private power continues to accumulate, I think, at an extraordinary rate, where public asset and public wealth has been largely stagnant over several decades. We see increasing lobbying power, we see the revolving door issue, so we see that influence within government policy both at national levels and through these sorts of international forums and of course that has a huge influence in creating the kind of outcomes that we see where there's a tendency from governments to look to the private financial sector to deal with its own sustainability issues on a voluntary basis. So I think one aspect of that is strengthened public institutions, building up that democratic accountability and shifting from treating the financial system as some kind of exception case that isn't routinely incorporated into legislation. and to move to very much regulating and governing private finance and business for the benefit of biodiversity. So, yeah, please. TWN [25:22]: Thank you so much. And yes, we are aware of all the developments inside and outside the CBD promoting this kind of market-oriented instruments. And also at the national level, there are many governments, even regional governments like the European Union that is developing a natural credits market this year. And the message that we want to convey is that the social and environmental impacts that have been documented so far gives us too many questions to propose these kind of solutions right now. There are not safeguards, there is not any insurance that any of these will be translated into the inputs that we have seen, and there are so many other financial solutions that will bring more resources to the people on the ground that we really feel that these should be the ones that should be taken into account first. TWN · Moderator [26:16]: Okay, any other questions? Arida, please. Speaker 19 [26:25]: But I wanted to, I'm not sure if others have asked, but any thoughts on the debt report that's come out? It's taken a while, but yeah, is that circulating in the room? Because I think that's something that's underlying with all the pressures of primary commodities. I think that's one of the things that never really gets addressed. And what are you hoping for on the conversation on debt at COP17? TWN · Moderator [26:50]: Take the pulse of. UBC [26:52]: It. Okay, great. Yeah, so certainly there were some issues. I think nobody will be entirely happy with any report like this that comes out. But what we found encouraging in the report was that it really made a strong link between debt and fiscal consolidation and limited investment in biodiversity. It concluded that there was very limited impact of things like debt for nature swaps or green bonds on alleviating these pressures. And it also noted the continued important role of public finance in funding biodiversity. So we think it was very strong on those points. Where we wish that it had gone further was to really engage more deeply with how debt can act as an underlying driver of biodiversity loss by expanding extractive sectors and incentivizing export-led development in that way. So mixed on that front, but ultimately we think that there was some very promising openings to continue having that conversation. And do you want to take the COP17 point? TWN · Moderator [27:56]: I think definitely this is an issue that we have been raising consistently, and Audrey and her colleagues even published a report called Exporting Extinction, which looked at some of these issues and how the debt conditions that are placed on developing countries, including some middle income countries, right, and actually incentivizes more extractive activities. Now, whether COP17 will take this up, I think it's an open point because as we heard in discussions yesterday, there was some this unhappiness with the report, but what we do hope is that this conversation continues to happen in the CBD because, and this is precisely why we are publishing this report called The Elephants in the Room, because we feel that these wider and deeper structural drivers of biodiversity destruction, the rules of the economic and financial game that are being played of system, let me say, that are being played out, which are inequitable for developing countries, largely have impacts on communities on the ground. These are not being adequately addressed here at the COP, and we want to keep that on the table. Thank you. If there are one last question, because we are almost out of time, please. Speaker 23 [29:24]: All right, I'll be quick. Thank you for your efforts in identifying these four elephants. I was checking the report, you have a tactic to avoid the other elephants. So I'm also curious, where should we look to avoid having a fifth or a sixth elephant, beyond the scope, of course. You have addressed that there are some connections with unsustainable patterns of consumption and production, which are part of the least addressed targets, target 15, target 16. So where should we look out in the next days or beyond this COP? Thank you. TWN · Moderator [30:08]: Thank you very much for that question. Just to quickly sum up, first is that of course when we did identify some tactics that are avoiding elephants and the issue of, for example, market-based instruments is both an elephant that's not adequately addressed because of the flawed the flaws when market logic is applied to these instruments, but as well, it avoids the conversation of biodiversity finance that is really needed. And that is one, the provision of financial resources from developed to developing countries, two, the issue that Tom raised in terms of the vast amount of harmful flows that are going and the lack of regulation and governance thereof. You've raised very important points. Of course, many of these have also been identified in the IPBES reports. I think perhaps we may have a future publication at the COPs where we will also start to look at other elephants. We're not claiming these are the only four elephants. That's why we say elephants rather than the elephant, because we think there are many structural drivers that really needs to be seriously addressed, because we cannot continue. It's important, of course, we need to address the symptoms as we are calling it. We need to be able to fund communities more. We need to strengthen protection. But if we don't address these underlying drivers, we're just going to be pouring money into a bucket with no bottom, right? And that's not going to solve the problem. And we really do need to address these root causes. So I think we're out of time. Thank you so much for coming here. We have a side event tomorrow at 6:15. Please do look out for it in the screens and please do join us where we will have more time to go in depth into the elephants. Thank you very much.