(2nd meeting) Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, the second plenary meeting of the 2026 Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is called to order. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, before we commence with the list of speakers for this afternoon, I wish to inform the Conference that we have received a nomination from the Western European and Other Group for the position of Vice-Chair of the Credentials Committee. Ms. Vivika Munkner of Germany has been nominated for the position. If there is no objection, may I take it that the Conference wishes to approve this nomination? It is so decided. I congratulate Ms. Munkner on her election. The conference will now continue with the general debate. As announced this morning, the list of speakers for the general debate will be closed at 6:00 p.m. this evening. I would therefore encourage all those delegations wishing to speak during the general debate and which have not yet inscribed their names on the list of speakers to do so before closing the list. I would also like to reiterate my call to delegations to be present in the meeting room at the scheduled time in order to promote the punctuality and efficiency of the review conference's proceedings. May I remind all delegations that group statements should not exceed eight minutes and national statements should not exceed five minutes. Similarly, statements in the exercise of the right of reply should not exceed five minutes for the first intervention and three minutes for the second. A traffic light system will be enforced and include microphone cut-offs for rights of reply. Delegations are kindly requested to submit electronic versions of their statements in PDF and Microsoft Word formats to e-statements@un.org no later than two hours in advance of delivery. I now have the honor to give the floor to the first speaker on the list, His Excellency Dag Hattelus, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden. You have the floor, sir.

Chair, Sweden aligns itself with the EU statements and the following remarks are in my national capacity. First, I want to congratulate you on your appointment, Chair. We look forward to review conference under your leadership and will fully support you in your endeavours. The challenges facing the MPT are many. Mistrust among states has increased and rhetoric has hardened. If we are to reach the ultimate goal of a world free from nuclear weapons, adherence to international law and leadership to change the dynamic is necessary. We must work to uphold and strengthen the treaty as the cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation. The nuclear weapons states bear a special responsibility in the pursuit of a world free from nuclear weapons. Engaging in arms control discussions without preconditions would be an important step in building trust. We welcome the U.S. efforts to initiate a dialogue and urge Russia and China to engage without preconditions. However, all States can play a role in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation.

Against this backdrop.

Sweden, together with the Philippines, has assumed the presidency of the CTBT Article 14 process since September last year. The entry into force of the CTBT continues to be of crucial importance. Chair, Sweden condemns in the strongest terms Russia's brutal war of aggression against Ukraine and reaffirms its unwavering support for Ukraine's sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. Russia's ongoing aggression is a flagrant violation of international law, including the UN Charter and IAEA Statute. Russia's threats to use nuclear weapons, as well as its illegal seizure of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and actions against Ukraine's other nuclear facilities, are irresponsible and unacceptable.

Iran and DPRK represent additional challenges to the NPT.

While Iran must never be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon, it's crucial that DPRK complies with international obligations and takes steps towards denuclearization in line with the UNSC resolutions. Chair, the Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament was launched by Sweden in 2019 to mobilize political support for concrete progress on disarmament.

Together, we have worked.

To continuously to emphasize cross-regional cooperation and to build political support for disarmament and consensus to strengthen the NPT. Efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons use are more urgent than ever. While not a substitute for disarmament, risk reduction can decrease tension and increase trust and open avenues for dialogue. Chair, the IAEA plays an indispensable role in the NPT and must have the necessary verification tools. We value the safe and effective application of nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Chair, this Conference should send a strong signal reaffirming our commitment to the NPT. It's important to reverse the weakening of the ADN architecture and move us towards full implementation of the treaty. It's time to show political leadership. We owe this to ourselves and to future generations. Thank you.

I thank His Excellency Dag Hattilios, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, for his statement. I now give the floor to His Excellency Eivind Vat Pettersen, Deputy Foreign Minister of Norway. You have the floor, sir.

President, congratulations on your election. By 1967, five states had developed nuclear weapons, with projections suggesting 25 by the mid-1970s. Six decades later, that number remains in the single digits. Arsenals were eventually reduced, nuclear weapons not used again. Meanwhile, nuclear science and technology have been developed for peaceful purposes, supporting health, agriculture, energy, and more. These outcomes were not unavoidable. They resulted from political choices, common rules over unconstrained competition, verification over uncertainty, cooperation over resignation, and at their core, lies the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT has been foundational in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and enabling peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

These objectives are interlinked.

The right to peaceful uses is integral to the treaty. Nonproliferation and development reinforce each other.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has been central to this success.

Through safeguards, capacity building, and international cooperation, it has helped make peaceful nuclear applications accessible in a safe, secure, and responsible manner. Export controls have also played a key role, giving effect to non-proliferation obligations while enabling peaceful cooperation and development. These achievements, however, cannot be taken for granted. President, we stand at the threshold of a new nuclear age. Reductions have stalled. Bilateral arms control has expired. New destabilizing delivery systems are emerging. Proliferation pressure increases and risks are rising. Prime among the causes is Russia. Russia's brutal, full-scale war of aggression continues into its fifth year, marked also by the persistent nuclear threats, weaponization of nuclear risks, and violations of negative security guarantees. Three years ago, Russia invalidly suspended its New START obligations. Meanwhile, the DPRK continues its illegal nuclear and missile programs. Iran has enriched uranium to levels with no credible civilian justification. China's hasty nuclear buildup threatens a new arms race. Unwilling to acknowledge this expansion, China avoids open debate, while more transparent states are exposed to scrutiny. In response, rearmament has returned to the policy agenda of others. President, the situation is dire. Resignation, however, is not an option. The catastrophic humanitarian consequences threatened by nuclear weapons are simply too grave. Article 6 commits us to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. All nuclear-weapon States must step up their efforts, with the largest possessors bearing a special responsibility. We call on China, Russia and the United States to lead meaningful initiatives toward mutual, verifiable, and irreversible disarmament. And we welcome the United States' proposal for a multilateral arms control process. We need political will and commitment, not attempts to deflect attention through unfounded claims against NATO's extended deterrence, which predates.

The NPT and was essential to its very feasibility.

Let me conclude by highlighting five issues. First, risk reduction. Soaring nuclear risks threaten us all. Measures are needed so they do not materialize as we pursue disarmament. Second, transparency, accountability, and a strengthened review process. Transparency is essential for confidence and progress. Reporting by nuclear weapons states remains uneven. We need greater detail and a system for structured engagement. Third, past conferences identified three essential principles for nuclear disarmament: transparency, verification, and irreversibility. Developing these principles brings us closer to disarmament. Verification and irreversibility have advanced in this cycle. We call for continued support for this work. And fourth, the right to peaceful uses must be reinforced. The IAEA is key. As nuclear energy and proliferation-sensitive technologies expand, the agency needs adequate and sustainable resources for safeguards and supporting states in building safe, secure, and sustainable nuclear infrastructure. And fifth, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the moratoria are essential for nonproliferation and disarmament and deserve this conference's support. President, the NPT is a bedrock of our collective security and prosperity.

We are here to protect and progress it. Thank you.

I thank His Excellency Ivar Vard Pedersen, Deputy Foreign Minister of Norway, for his statement. I now have the honour to invite His Excellency Sok Siphana, Senior Minister and Special Envoy of the Prime Minister to the United Nations from Cambodia. You have the floor, sir.

Mr. Chair, Excellencies, distinguished guests, at the outset, my delegation joins others in congratulating Ambassador Do Hong Viet of Vietnam on his election as chair of the 2026 NPT Review Conference. Rest assured of Cambodia's full support for your leadership. Cambodia aligned itself with the statement delivered by the Philippines, Uganda, and South Africa on behalf of ASEAN, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the State Parties and signatory to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. I will now deliver my statement in my national capacity. This Conference convenes at a time of profound uncertainty for international peace and security. It's marked by heightened strategic competition, a growing arms race, and weakening multilateralism. Against this backdrop, Cambodia wishes to highlight five points. First, Cambodia reaffirms the central role of the NPT as a cornerstone of global effort in nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. We call on nuclear weapons states which bear special responsibility for international peace and security to reduce nuclear risks and refrain from action that could exacerbate them. Second, Cambodia underscored the importance of fully implementing commitments under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which complement and reinforce the NPT disarmament and non-proliferation pillars. We look forward to the first review conference of the TPNW and stand ready to work with partners to advance its objectives. Third, we urge all remaining Annex 2 States to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Its long-awaited entry into force is essential to preserving the global norm against nuclear testing and preventing a renewed arms race. Any such testing must be avoided, as it would undermine decades of progress, erode trust, and heighten global instability. Fourth, Cambodia reaffirms its commitment to preserving Southeast Asia as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, as enshrined in the Treaty of Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and the ASEAN Charter. We encourage continued engagement between ASEAN and nuclear weapons states. Fifth, the inalienable right of States Parties to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must be respected. Cambodia commends the IAEA for promoting nuclear science and technology for sustainable development and calls for enhanced technical cooperation, particularly for developing countries. Mr. Chair, in conclusion, the effective implementation of the NPT depends on our collective will. This Review Conference must deliver tangible, forward-looking outcomes that reinforce trust, strengthen accountability, and advance our shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. I thank you.

I thank His Excellency Sok Siphana, Senior Minister and Special Envoy of the Prime Minister of Cambodia. I now give the floor to Her Excellency Ayano Kounimitsu, State Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan. You have the floor, Madam.

Mr. President, I extend my heartfelt congratulations on your assumption of the presidency. My delegation spares no effort in supporting your work. As one who spent my youth in both Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it is a profound honor to take the floor at this rostrum where the late Senji Yamaguchi a hibakusha from Nagasaki, once made his appeal, "No more Hiroshimas, no more Nagasakis." On this year that marks the 50th anniversary of Japan's accession to the NPT, I am humbled to have this opportunity to deliver a message from Prime Minister Takaichi, which reads as follows. Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, this NPT Review Conference is being convened at a critical junction for the international community. We are confronting an increasingly severe international security situation, an opaque and rapid expansion of nuclear arsenals, and growing nuclear risk and threats posed by nuclear weapons. At the very origin of our aspiration for a world without nuclear weapons lies the earnest plea of the hibakushas. The catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons must never be repeated. We are compelled to further extend the long-standing record of the non-use of nuclear weapons and reinforce our collective commitment to the NPT. We need to make this conference a first step toward dialogue to break the vicious cycle. We must take this first step with a broader perspective and strong determination. More than eight decades have passed since the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Now, we face an urgent imperative to maintain and strengthen the NPT, our vital framework for international cooperation, and thereby ensure that it is passed on the future generations in an even more robust form. The Japanese delegation will make every effort toward the success of the conference by working together with the President and all of you. Sanae Takaichi, Prime Minister of Japan. Mr. President, before I continue with my remark, I quote a Japanese worker poem in Japanese. As we think of your faces and deeds, there are no words. We can only weep. When the atomic bomb fell on Hiroshima, 344 students from my own high school, my alma mater, perished. The waka I just quote was composed by the principal at the time in remembrance of those students. What happened to them and other hibakushas The deaths and suffering caused by any use of nuclear weapons must never happen again. With such profound conviction, hibakushas are watching the course of this conference. We all wish that the achievements had been greater. But to suggest that what has been done so far is insufficient is both inaccurate and unhelpful to further progress. We have a useful foundation built by those who came before us. Now, we must go a stage further by rebuilding trust among nations, even if incrementally. Mr. President, Japan has consistently pursued the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of the World War II. Our commitment remains unchanged. Japan is and will continue to be a guardian of the NPT, which fully observed its obligations under the treaty. Furthermore, as the only country who have suffered atomic bombing during war. Japan will work together with both nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons states and contribute to maintaining and strengthening the NPT regime. With this, my delegation proposes three points. Firstly, The paramount objective of this conference is to reaffirm our commitment to the NPT. Now is the time for us to demonstrate a powerful commitment to the world. To that end, Japan calls for this conference to be an inclusive process for all of us. Secondly, it is vital that we see more substantial discussions on transparency. Transparency fosters dialogue among states and serves as a foundation for confidence building and risk reduction. Japan, for its part, will actively engage in these efforts. Thirdly, we call on nuclear weapon states to promote initiatives that open pathway toward nuclear disarmament and arms control amid the most significant structural changes after World War II. Addressing the rapid expansion of nuclear forces is an urgent matter. Mr. President, Dr. Takashi Nagai, an alumnus of my own medical school, was himself a hibakusha in Nagasaki. Despite his own injuries, he devoted himself to treating hibakushas. He documented his experience in an essay, "The Bells of Nagasaki." In this essay, he wrote, "The human race, with this discovery of atomic power, has now grasped the key to its future destiny, a key to survival or destruction." In just 20 years, a full century will have passed since humanity unlocked the power of the atom. At the very heart of this atomic age lie the appeal by the late Mr. Yamaguchi, once echoed in this chamber, the enduring sentiments of the hibakushas, and the hallowed memory of those who perished. My country takes this reality to heart. As a guardian of the treaty, Japan pledged to continue our collective journey forward together with all of you. I thank you, Mr. President.

I thank Her Excellency Ayano Kunimitsu, State Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan. I now give the floor to His Excellency Nikolaus Machik, Deputy Foreign Minister of Austria. You have the floor, sir.

Thank you very much, Mr. President. And on behalf of my delegation, I would like to extend all my best wishes to your election as President of our Conference. Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. This conference meets at a time of nuclear buildups, at a time of nuclear threats. Many of us had thought these developments to be of the past. But the NPT is not a policy of the past. Let me share with you just three short thoughts. First, traditionally, my country has argued that a nuclear-weapon-free world is the safest option for us and our children. Today, we see a worrying trend. We see nuclear threats being made. We see nuclear deterrence being expanded rather than being reduced. And we see the buildup of nuclear arsenals. In a world where the rules-based international order for all is shifting more and more into power politics by a few, we see a growing number of countries rallying around the argument that nuclear deterrence is a stronger defensive security argument than nuclear disarmament. How should we address the balance that on the one hand, we recognize that we have to step up, investing in a robust security and defense architecture into equipment and professional staff. And on the other hand, we want to continue to encourage disarmament, support nonproliferation, as well as steps leading to a nuclear weapon free world. We share the position that increasing nuclear capabilities and arsenals do not increase collective international security. We argue that more nuclear deterrence leads to more risks, more nuclear actors, more nuclear weapons, more possibilities for accidents, leading to possible catastrophic consequences. We therefore urge all parties to consider the negative potential of nuclear deterrence and to choose means of deterrence that increase security of our citizens without endangering humankind. A few days ago, we heard the President of the United States on the issue, and I quote, "A nuclear weapon should never be allowed to be used by anybody," end of quote. Second, we see three major regional challenges for the NPT today. In Asia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues nuclear missile activities. This poses a fundamental danger to the region and beyond. Therefore, we continue to argue in favor of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In the Middle East, we see armed conflicts and an extremely dangerous military escalation. And we are confronted with highly enriched uranium in Iran. In our view, it is high time to return to diplomacy on Iran's nuclear program, as well as to reestablish full cooperation with the IAEA. And in the neighborhood of my own country, in Europe, in Ukraine, we see repeated nuclear threats by Russia, a depository of the NPT. Russia must stop its invasion and military aggression and engage in serious peace talks. We are very concerned regarding ongoing armed attacks and threats against nuclear facilities, especially at Europe's largest nuclear power plant at Zaporizhzhia. Therefore, we have proposed a constructive approach as a cross-regional group with several Member States to address this concern in a joint working paper. Mr. President, some of you may know that my country has a particularly strong position regarding the use of nuclear energy. We respect fully every nation's sovereign choice of its energy mix. But in our assessment, several aspects, such as the question of waste disposal, health and environmental risks, as well as the linkages between civilian and military activities, lead us to avoid nuclear energy in total. My final remark. We meet at a time when global disarmament, as well as nonproliferation, are severely under pressure. But we should not forget that we have the tools and instruments to tackle this problem. We have the Non-Proliferation Treaty with its three pillars. We have the agreements that build on it, from the instruments on nuclear safety and security to the CTBT and the TPNW. Let us work hard to achieve concrete progress at this review conference with smart deliverables and with a clear path to a nuclear-weapon-free world. I thank you very much.

I thank His Excellency, Nicolas Machic, Deputy Foreign Minister of Austria, for his statement. I now would like to invite His Excellency, Andzajs Vilimsons, State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia. You have the floor, sir.

Mr. President, Let me congratulate you on your appointment. Your leadership in preparing this conference has been commendable. You may count on our full cooperation and for a positive outcome of this conference. Latvia aligns with the statement of the European Union and adds the following in its national capacity. We remain firm defenders of the principle enshrined in the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the only credible path to nuclear disarmament. Safeguarding treaty's credibility and integrity is imperative. Ongoing conflicts are exposing dangerous trend. Nuclear capabilities and facilities are being used as instruments of coercion leverage, and strategic pressure. Mr. President, Latvia condemns Russia's unprovoked, illegal, and unjustifiable full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, one of the key threats to global peace and security. This includes Russia's occupation and militarization of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. Russia's reckless and escalatory nuclear rhetoric, along with the use of nuclear-capable weapon systems in Ukraine, lowers the threshold for nuclear use, erodes trust, and heightens risk of miscalculation. Russia has severely damaged longstanding norms restraining nuclear dangers by disregarding its arms control and nonproliferation commitments. China's rapid and opaque nuclear buildup adds to these concerns. In this context, Latvia continues to regard NATO's nuclear deterrence as a necessity and a stabilizing factor in European and global security. Since its inception, it has reduced incentives for proliferation. Recent commitments by European partners to strengthen deterrence reflect broader efforts to maintain credible security measures, prevent escalation, and reinforce nonproliferation norms. Geopolitical tensions and evolving military doctrines have complicated efforts to advance disarmament. Nevertheless, all nuclear weapons states retain a clear responsibility to pursue disarmament-related obligations. We know that discussions among the P5 remain crucial for reducing strategic risks and enhancing predictability. We welcome U.S. calls to Russia and China for strategic dialogue. Nuclear risk reduction measures are essential to address misperceptions and the risk of miscalculation. Mr. President, the resilience of nonproliferation norm rests on respect for shared rules. Hence, proliferation challenges posed by DPRK and Iran remain concerning and heighten regional instability. The DPRK's continued nuclear and ballistic missile development violates multiple UN Security Council resolutions. Iran's persistent noncompliance and uncertainties surrounding its nuclear activities remain troubling. The recent sanctions snapped back by Security Council underscores the seriousness of these violations. Rebuilding confidence and halting further deterioration is vital. The universalization and entry into force of the CDBT, as well as a moratorium on nuclear tests, explosions remain critical. Latvia urges all states that have not yet done so to ratify the CTBT without delay. It is essential to strengthen and fully implement EIA safeguards. The comprehensive safeguards agreements and the additional protocol remains the universal standard for verification. Mr. President, nuclear science, when applied responsibly, delivers tangible benefits. Latvia strongly supports continued investment in peaceful use of nuclear technologies while upholding the highest standards of safety, security and safeguards. Latvia commends the IAEA for enabling peaceful application of nuclear technologies through the technical cooperation program. We appreciate the opportunities to build on national competence, including in radiation protection and healthcare. Mr. President, in conclusion, Latvia underscores the importance of strengthening the NPT review process itself. Enhancing transparency, accountability, and reporting, and ensuring continuity across review cycles are practical steps towards meaningful progress. The integrity and robustness of the nonproliferation and disarmament regime depends on our readiness to defend it. upholding its principles with clarity and resolve. Thank you.

I thank His Excellency Andris Vilums, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, for his statement. I now invite His Excellency Marcel de Winck, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. You have the floor, sir.

Thank you, Mr. President. Allow me to congratulate you on your election and assure you of the Netherlands' fullest support. In addition to the statements by the European Union, the NPDI, the Stockholm Initiative, let me make the following remarks. Mr. President, Excellencies, distinguished delegates. In 1968, during a debate on the final draft of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Dutch representative said, "The text before us is a compromise resulting from lengthy negotiations, and we ourselves are not blind to its imperfections. However, such objections dwindle in the face of the historical moment." And this is still valid as we start this review conference. We share the concerns of many in this room today. The international security architecture is experiencing immense strain. Crucial agreements that have kept us safe for years are under pressure, have expired, or have been terminated. Russia, as a nuclear weapons state, is waging a devastating war against a non-nuclear neighbor in Europe and routinely threatens to use nuclear weapons. And with the risk of a nuclear arms race, our common goal of a world free of nuclear weapons appears further away than ever. Yet our view of the NPT remains the same as 58 years ago. The treaty is not perfect. No treaty is. But it is the best we have, and it remains an essential pillar of international peace and security. It has proven successful in keeping the number of nuclear-armed states lower than anyone could have imagined at its inception, while supporting the peaceful uses of nuclear technology in a responsible manner. And in this context, we must, as the treaty clearly states, make every effort to avert the danger of a nuclear war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples. For this reason, the Netherlands will continue to seek balanced and realistic measures on all three pillars of the Treaty during this review conference, in order to implement and strengthen it. First, we call on nuclear weapons states to urgently engage in escalation management and to implement risk reduction measures. Progress should also be made on transparency and accountability to re-establish confidence and trust. so that work on arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament can be advanced again. Second, we must progressively reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons altogether, in accordance with Article VI. Given the expiration of the New START Treaty, the Netherlands calls on the three holders of the largest nuclear arsenals to negotiate a follow-up agreement that is fit for purpose and verifiable. And in this regard, I express our deep concern over China's rapidly increasing nuclear arsenal and call on China to reverse this expansion and to engage in nuclear arms control talks. Third, preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons is a necessary condition for a world free of nuclear weapons. And in that light, the Netherlands calls on Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA to ensure that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. Furthermore, we urge the DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapons program in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. Fourth, nuclear technology can play an important role in realizing the sustainable development goals and climate goals. Therefore, the Netherlands encourages the IAEA and all states to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology while taking into account the needs of developing states in particular. Mr. President, today, as in 1968, we are aware of the challenges before us, but once again, those objections must dwindle in the current moment we're facing. Let this review conference be remembered as the moment when we choose unity over division. I thank you.

I thank His Excellency Marcel de Vink, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, for his statement. I now give the floor to Her Excellency Marie Chatardova, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechia. You have the floor, Madam.

Mr. President, Excellencies, Distinguished Delegates, For more than five decades, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has served as a cornerstone of the global security architecture. It has constrained the spread of nuclear weapons, promoted cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and laid the foundation for efforts toward nuclear disarmament. All States Parties, nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon States alike, benefit from the stability, predictability, and confidence that the Treaty provides. Its erosion would not enhance anyone's security. Selective implementation, disregard for obligations, or their reinterpretation therefore undermine trust and weaken the treaty as a whole. Mr. President, the Czech Republic condemns Russia's belligerent nuclear rhetoric and its threats to use nuclear force in its war of aggression against Ukraine. Nuclear threats are deeply irresponsible. A just and lasting peace that preserves Ukraine's sovereignty and strengthens its security is urgently needed. The ongoing war has serious implications for safeguards and for nuclear safety and security, especially of Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, and is a great cause of alarm for all NPT State Parties. Mr. President, proliferation challenges are further testing the resilience of the Treaty. The continued failure of Iran to comply with its safeguards obligations and the absence of confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program represents a serious proliferation concern. Statements by Iranian officials questioning Iran's continued participation in the NPT cast further doubt on Iran's denials that it seeks a nuclear weapon. A diplomatic solution remains the preferred path, but it must be based on internationally verifiable compliance and transparency. Similarly, the DPRK's ongoing advancement of its nuclear and missile capabilities, in violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions and outside the NPT framework, remains a grave threat to regional and international security. Given the worsening security environment, NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements and extended nuclear deterrence are key tools for preventing proliferation and maintaining security, especially through NATO's role in deterring aggression and protecting non-nuclear Allies. NATO's long-standing deterrence policy, which predates the NPT, respects Articles 1 and 2 and continues to support the Treaty's non-proliferation objectives. Mr. President, the Czech Republic reaffirms the right of all NPT States Parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in full conformity with the Treaty. while emphasizing standards of nuclear safety, security and safeguards and the central role of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Peaceful nuclear cooperation under strict safeguards remains a legitimate right and an important contribution to sustainable development and energy security. In this context, the Czech Republic fully subscribes to the conclusions contained in the French working paper titled Nuclear Energy, a Path to Net Zero. It highlights a shared goal that nuclear energy can and will bring about energy security and a transition to a low carbon economy. The agency's role will continue to be central in harnessing the benefits of nuclear energy from power application to human health. The NPT has persisted precisely because it serves the collective interest. At this review conference, we have a responsibility to once again reinforce its authority. In doing so, we can ensure that the Treaty continues to enhance the security of all States Parties for generations to come. Thank you for your attention.

I thank Her Excellency Marie Chtedova, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechia, for her statement. And now, have the honor to give the floor to His Excellency Marek Eschstrich, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic. You have the floor, sir.

Mr. President, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, good afternoon. For more than half a century, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been the irreplaceable bedrock underpinning international peace and security. It has been the cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament architecture and reliable framework for peaceful use of nuclear energy. I believe, with this perspective in mind, we should guide our common multilateral efforts at this renewed conference. Mr. President, The NPT, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, has entered an era characterized by increased risks for all of us, where the threat and use of force, unilateralism, and disregard for international law are increasingly gaining the upper hand. The nuclear domain has not been spared by these developments. On the contrary, it amplifies them. We are seeing a continuous diversification of nuclear arsenals by some States and balancing strategies by others, and with the expiry of the New START Treaty, we find ourselves on the brink of a new nuclear arms race. Furthermore, the moratorium on nuclear testing has been called into question. Moreover, the safety and security of civilian nuclear facilities have been endangered or directly threatened in current conflicts. At the same time, we are living in an era of a renaissance of civil nuclear power, in which the use of nuclear energy is growing and represents a key means of providing affordable and clean energy to modern societies. All these developments put pressure on the NPT and, at the same time, demonstrate that it is more crucial than ever. Mr. President, there is no quick solution to the current crisis. Nevertheless, we must do everything in our power, whether at the international level or within the framework of the NPT process. First, at the international level, more diplomacy and peace efforts are needed. be that in Ukraine or in the Middle East. Peace in Ukraine is urgent, and Slovakia supports a comprehensive, just and lasting peace based on the Charter of the United Nations. Slovakia also supports diplomatic efforts as the only means to achieving a lasting solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Furthermore, stronger multilateralism is needed and, in this spirit, the United Nations and international institutions must be strengthened. Slovakia is ready to contribute to this effort and, in this context, it has presented its candidacy for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council for the period 2028-2029. as well as to become a member of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency for the period 2026-2028. Secondly, within the framework of the NPT, we must preserve and support the Treaty, recognize its continued relevance, and reaffirm existing obligations and commitments in a balanced manner among its three pillars. In our view, the following measures require urgent attention. First, in order to prevent a nuclear arms race, we need a renewed commitment to arms control. In this regard, we encourage the efforts of the United States toward multilateral strategic stability. And supplementary measures are necessary to build trust transparency and risk reduction among nuclear weapons states. We must promote the rapid entry into force of the CTBT, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and the existing moratorium on nuclear testing must be respected. Negotiations should begin at the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty banning the production of fissile material. And we must preserve and strengthen the NPT safeguards regime. And we must address regional proliferation challenges. We call on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to engage in constructive dialogue toward complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization. And finally, we must emphasize the importance of the third pillar of the treaty and the role of the IAEA in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in various fields, ranging from energy production to human health. At the global level, nuclear technologies are essential for achieving sustainable development goals and socio-economic objectives. Slovakia recognizes the importance of the IAEA's technical cooperation program for capacity building, knowledge transfer, and access to nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes. Mr. President, in conclusion, allow me to reiterate Slovakia's commitment to international law, multilateralism, and to the NPT. I hope that we, the States Parties to the Treaty, will use this review conference as an opportunity to strengthen it and to enhance its resilience in today's world. Thank you for your attention, Mr. President.

I thank His Excellency Marek Astok, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, as announced this morning, due to an unavoidable scheduling conflict, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency was unable to address the conference at this morning's opening plenary meeting. I am pleased to inform delegations that the Director General is now able to join us. It is my great pleasure to invite His Excellency, Mr. Rafael Mariano Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to address the conference.

Mr. President, distinguished delegates, first of all, as you just mentioned, sir, I should apologize for my late coming, but I seek your indulgence. since the fact that I could not be here in the morning was due to the fact that I was returning on a long trip, as you can imagine, from Chernobyl. And I mention this because we all know those who work and follow issues related to nuclear energy, nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear safety, Chernobyl transcends very clearly a national event or conference or commemoration. It is something that is ingrained in our memories as citizens of the world. So it was indispensable for me to be there on the 40th anniversary of that fateful 26 April 1986. which I'm sure those who have certain age, like myself, remember what we were doing when we learned that this was happening. So, Mr. President, we are here to review one of the most important instruments in international law and in international politics as a whole. 191 contracting parties of this instrument, which has served us all well for more than half a century since its entry into force in 1970. This instrument, in particular at a time of growing international tensions, fragmentation, war returning to many places, is and continues to be, should I say, a beacon of certainty in a world of thinning international norms. So let's rally around the NPT and support our President in this very important weeks ahead of us. This conference in particular comes at a time where not only this political tensions exist, but also other important elements that make of this norm the most important norm in terms of the nuclear world order has special relevance. When it comes, of course, to disarmament. We know that this principle continues to be embedded in the treaty, and though this aspiration of ours, which is a universal aspiration, seems rather distant at moments of great tension, it continues to be there, guiding our paths towards this goal.

But, of course.

Non-proliferation is the norm, is the core of the norm, and it is important that we reaffirm, that we recommit to the norm at a time where we see a growing tendency in narratives, in certain discourse, to revisit the idea of having nuclear weapons. And in some cases, in several countries, I should say, there is a growing perception that perhaps having nuclear weapons could be good for national security. And nothing is further from the truth. The instrument of this treaty is, of course, the agency I have the honour to lead. And it is so, it is mentioned in the treaty, through the system of safeguards, inspections. starting with the comprehensive safeguards agreements that countries must subscribe. And I want to say that we are tantalizingly close to reach universality, in the sense that all Member States of the NPT already have a comprehensive safeguards agreement. There is only one, and there is a lot of work, I can tell you, these days to try to cross the goal line and have all membership having comprehensive safeguards agreements. Of course, the normative articulation of the NPT is not only that.

It has to do.

Also with the Additional Protocol, already 145 already and growing and counting countries that have accepted an enlarged norm in terms of inspections. And something which sounds a little bit technical, but it's important, the Small Quantities Protocol, which is something that we used to have and allowed countries with very little nuclear material to not be a party to the inspection system. And now we are reducing that group of countries. So as you can see, dear colleagues, the nonproliferation norm is moving, is advancing. And this is, of course, so important because we are at a time where nuclear energy is on very, very high demand. Long gone are those days where there were questionings and challengings about nuclear energy. The COPs, and in particular in COP28 in Dubai, there was a universal consensus around the idea that nuclear energy, alongside renewals, is indispensable in the energy future of the world. And we can see today this demand growing in every continent. not the restricted group of countries that used to exploit commercially nuclear energy, but now we see it almost every day. From Bangladesh to Turkey to Egypt, many countries are moving into nuclear exploitation with the interesting ingredient, I should say, in terms of the interest of developing countries to accede also to nuclear energy that at long last, we have been able to turn another page, which was the page of non-financing of nuclear projects by international finance institutions. Last year, together with the President of the World Bank, Ajay Banga, in Paris, we signed a historic agreement, and now the World Bank is financing, and together with it, A number of other multilateral development banks are also adding their voices, the CAF in Latin America, the Asian Development Bank in Asia, the Islamic Development Bank, we are working and we are very close to signing a similar agreement with the African Development Bank. that nuclear energy, the possibilities of nuclear energy are not restricted to a handful countries. I think this is a concrete step forward if we use the metric of the last review conference as a comparison. So nuclear energy is also not the only manifestation of this idea of atom Atoms for Peace, excuse me, which was pronounced from this very rostrum, this very place, by President Eisenhower almost 73 years ago, because nuclear applications and nuclear science are so important. And the IAEA, together with all of you, we are working in areas like oncology, radiotherapy, through our Rays of Hope project, which is already serving more than 90 countries in the world, and in particular in Africa, where we are opening cancer centers, when we are bringing mammographers, scans, machinery that is actually saving lives. And this is not disconnected from what you are doing here, ladies and gentlemen. Because if it was not for the non-proliferation norm that allows us to facilitate the transfer of technology and the access of all to these benefits, this would simply be impossible. In your jargon, in our jargon, that is, of course, the famous pillar three. So pillar three, which is not a good to have, it is a really transformational instrument that is changing things. And it doesn't apply only to medicine. We have atoms for food, where we are working hand in hand with our colleagues from the FAO in Rome, utilizing nuclear techniques to develop crops that are resistant to drought or to heat, where we are using the sterile insect technique to fight against chikungunya, and so on.

So this is science in movement, and this is the NPT in action, ladies and gentlemen.

This NPT that we need to defend, this NPT that we need to recommit to at this important conference.

So, ladies and gentlemen, I'm very happy to be here.

It is important, perhaps, as I close this few reflections that I wanted to share with you, that certain important, essential, core ideas are in this treaty, and they remain as valid as the day they were drafted for the first time. The idea that few countries with nuclear weapons is better than more countries with nuclear weapons. The idea that nuclear disarmament is also a commitment by countries having nuclear weapons. And the idea that nuclear science, technology and energy must be for all. The NPT does that for all of us. Thank you very much.

I thank the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency for his important address and express to him the appreciation of the States Parties for the work being carried out by the Agency regarding the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Treaty and in preparation for this conference. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, before I return to the list of speakers for the general debate, I would like to inform delegations that some States Parties have expressed support for the Executive Secretary of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Dr. Robert Floyd, to deliver a statement during this afternoon's meeting dedicated to the general debate. As such, I intend to invite Dr. Floyd to address the conference. I now would like to invite Dr. Robert Floyd, Executive Secretary of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, to address the conference. You have the floor,

Mr. President, Excellencies, friends, 29 in the morning. It's called the Gadget. It's been hauled to the top of a steel tower. A flash of light fills the sky, followed by a thunderous sound and a blast of energy. It's the 16th of July 1945 and the world has changed. That famous Trinity test was followed just a few short weeks later with the bombing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Tragedy, devastation.

80 years later, still the only wartime use of nuclear weapons.

In the years that followed, the nuclear weapon testing reached dizzy heights, a peak of one per week.

Nearly 60 years ago, the NPT was agreed.

It was clear back then that ending nuclear testing is a key part of stopping proliferation. But the NPT negotiators couldn't agree it. The science wasn't strong enough to detect the secret underground testing. Instead, they included the cessation of nuclear testing as an aspiration in the preamble of the NPT. It took decades to bring together the diplomacy and the science, and the willingness to compromise. But we got there. In 1996, the CTBT opened for signature. Transformational. from over 2,000 tests to fewer than a dozen. Four years ago, I addressed this eminent body, and I gave an optimistic speech about a bright future. A lot has changed in the world since then, right? Well, a lot has changed for the CTBTO, too. Our international monitoring system, our IMS, is now more complete. New stations coming online in Argentina, China, two in the Russian Federation, and just a few weeks ago, the installation of the last US station in Antarctica. It's more complete. It's also more important. Today, states are expecting so much more from the IMS. It's able to detect and characterise the signs of a nuclear test down to a blast equivalent to 500 tonnes of TNT anywhere in the world. 500 tonnes? That's only 3% of the yield of the Hiroshima bomb. The IMS works. Every DPRK test was quickly detected, even the very small first one. But I know what you're thinking. What about smaller nuclear tests below that 500 tonne yield threshold? What if CTBTO's system can't separate nuclear explosions from other seismic events? The CTBT drafters, they had these issues in mind. For these scenarios, the treaty has other mechanisms: consultation and clarification, confidence-building mechanisms, critically, on-site inspection. But could greater certainty be achieved even before entry into force? Voluntary application of these mechanisms, monitoring stations with increased sensitivity, enhanced transparency on a bilateral, trilateral, or even a pentilateral basis. All this is possible, reducing uncertainty and building trust. Other things that have changed since the last RevCon. Five more states have ratified our treaty, and one more has signed, yet to ratify. More countries benefiting from capacity building and training, as well as the important civil and scientific applications of our data. But friends, At the outset of this important NPT Review Conference, we all have different levels of optimism or pessimism regarding the future of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. I prefer realism, realism that is based on facts. Let me share one fact that shapes my realism. In Japan last year, I heard this saying: Hiroshima was the first, the first place where a nuclear weapon had been used in warfare. Hiroshima was the first, and may Nagasaki forever be the last. And 80 years later, Nagasaki is still the last. Never again has a nuclear weapon been used in warfare. Isn't that amazing?

This is a fact.

If you were a diplomat in September 1945, would you have thought it possible? Well, I'm an optimistic sort of guy, but I would not have believed it. This fact gives me a solid base for optimism. We have journeyed 80 years without another nuclear weapon being used in warfare. Friends, surely We can journey on for yet another 80 years, where Nagasaki will still be the last. We can do this.

Thank you.

I thank Dr. Floyd for his statement. The conference will now continue with the general debate. I have the honour to invite His Excellency Stephen Doughty, Minister of State, Europe, North America and Overseas Territories of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. You have the floor, sir.

Thank you, Mr. President. For more than 50 years, this treaty has been a truly vital pillar of international peace and security. It has helped limit the spread of nuclear weapons, facilitated access to clean and reliable energy, and has built confidence for responsible nuclear trade. In short, it has delivered real benefits for people around the world. The United Kingdom remains fully committed to the treaty and our obligations under it, including Article VI. But we should not take the Treaty or the stability it helps provide for granted. And over the next few weeks, our task is to renew our common commitment to the principles of the Treaty, so that it can continue to support the security of us all. But since this Conference last met, Russia has developed novel nuclear systems, continued its unprovoked and illegal invasion of Ukraine, in which it has relentlessly attacked civilian targets, including with medium-range ballistic missiles and reckless behaviour in relation to Zaporizhzhia and Chernobyl. And it has engaged in coercive nuclear signalling. Iran is in non-compliance with its safeguard obligations. And the DPRK continues to develop nuclear weapons. And furthermore, China is rapidly and opaquely expanding its nuclear arsenal and is not fully engaged in meaningful transparency or risk reduction measures. And so against that backdrop, the UK's position is clear. Firstly, we will continue to work to support the IAEA and countries around the world in tackling the major nuclear proliferation challenges, and above all the programmes in Iran and DPRK. We have been clear that a negotiated outcome is the only long-term solution to the threat posed by Iran's nuclear programme, and we remain committed to avoiding conflict on the Korean Peninsula. We urge the DPRK to dismantle its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. re-engage in meaningful dialogue and return to full compliance with the NPT. Secondly, nuclear deterrence remains the bedrock of UK security and our commitment to NATO, and we have and will continue to take the steps necessary to maintain our deterrence capability, always with the aims and obligations of the NPT in mind. And at the same time, we continue our work to create the conditions to support nuclear disarmament when the security circumstances So our approach is pragmatic and principled, and we believe the right approach is to proceed step by step in a transparent, verifiable, and irreversible manner based on the principles of increased and undiminished security for all. Our focus is on practical efforts, and this includes our continued support for negotiations to commence in the Conference on Disarmament on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, maintaining our voluntary moratorium on conducting nuclear test explosions, and our support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. We are fully committed to the P5 process and have taken our role as chair seriously this year, using meetings under our chair to promote active engagements and practical measures between nuclear weapons states to reduce risks. strongly support US efforts to intensify discussions among the P5 on strategic stability, including through proposed multilateral strategic stability talks. The UK supports and strongly supports the principle and practice of nuclear weapon-free zones, and we will continue discussions with ASEAN member states to establish a path for the UK to sign the protocol to the Bangkok Treaty to progress the establishment of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone. And thirdly, as access to peaceful nuclear energy expands, with the obvious benefits to the the climate and people around the world, the need for rigorous safeguards becomes greater. The IAEA and its safeguard system underpins the effective implementation of the treaty, providing assurance that nuclear programmes are exclusively peaceful, and it's essential this conference supports that work. The UK's goal on peaceful use of nuclear technology is clear: to work with others to make sure that civil nuclear technology is used safely and responsibly in a way that builds trust between countries, and we are driving the largest expansion of civil nuclear power in a generation, including through small modular reactors. We are working with partners and the IAEA to make sure that technologies are used safely and responsibly, from cancer treatments to food security and clean energy, so that every country can benefit. As we enter a period of unprecedented growth in nuclear power, the NPT will continue to play an integral role in building global confidence in safe and secure expansion without increased risk of proliferation. The UK believes that the treaty remains the only credible route to tackle the nuclear challenges of the decades to come, and we must use the next few weeks to unite behind it. We want this conference to deliver a consensus outcome that strengthens implementation of the NPT, but whether or not we can get there, the treaty's role in global security is enduring and undiminished. But a collective signal that, despite our differences, we can come together to restate common commitments would further strengthen it and send a powerful message. So, Mr. President, at this conference, we will all play our part, working with all state parties in a spirit of pragmatism, in support of the treaty and its enduring role in the years ahead. Thank you.

I thank His Excellency Stephen Doughty, Minister of State for Europe, North America and Overseas Territories of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The next speaker on my list is Her Excellency Audra Plieplete, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania.

Mr. President, congratulations on assuming the presidency of the 11th NPT Review Conference. and I extend the full support of the Lithuanian delegation. Lithuania aligns itself with the statement of the European Union and the joint statement delivered by Ukraine. In my national capacity, I wish to underscore the following. Mr. President, this review conference convenes in an increasingly volatile and security environment. The global disarmament and nonproliferation regime is under growing strain. notably from Russia's action, but also from the growing disregard for international norms and transparency. Russia's ongoing aggression against Ukraine, its reckless nuclear rhetoric and threats, the announced deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus, and precedent in militarization of civil nuclear facilities are profoundly irresponsible and represents a systemic betrayal of MBT. by a nuclear weapons state and by a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Lithuania, as a small state, understands the dual challenge many nations face: the growing pressure from the aggressive neighbors and limited capacity for self-defense at a time when military threats are increasing. Therefore, for Lithuania, strong international and regional frameworks are indispensable for preventing conflict, reducing risk, and avoiding a nuclear arms race. To remain free, we rely on deterrence and defense, as these frameworks provide. I underline that NATO's extended deterrence and nuclear sharing arrangements enable countries like mine to remain secure without pursuing nuclear weapons. NATO provides protection through rules, commitments, and collective responsibility, never through proliferation and never through nuclear coercion. NATO's arrangements are fully consistent with both Articles 1 and 2 of the NPT. Mr. President, we strongly condemn Russia's illegal seizure and militarization of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, as well as its continued attacks on Ukrainian civilian energy infrastructure, which significantly increase risk to nuclear safety and security. We call on Russia to cease all hostile actions and to unconditionally withdraw its forces for Ukraine's internationally recognized borders, including the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, and to return its control to the competent Ukrainian authorities. We also condemn the Belarusian regime's complicity in Russia's war of aggression. We are deeply concerned by the growing military cooperation between Russia, Iran, and DPRK. Lithuania condemns Iran destabilizing behavior and nuclear activities. It's clear violence of comprehensive safeguards agreement. We fully support a diplomatic path forward. call for maximum restraint, and call on Iran to return to full compliance with the NPT and safeguards, and to restore full access of International Atomic Energy Agency. We also remain gravely concerned by the DPRK's advancing nuclear and missile program. The DPRK will never be recognized as a nuclear weapons state. In both instances, the full compliance of the UN Security Council's sanctions remains essential. We are also concerned by the lack of transparency from certain states, notably from the permanent member of the Security Council, China, whose rapidly expanding and diversifying nuclear arsenal appears inconsistent with its stated policies. This discrepancy fuels uncertainty, undermines trust, and heightens global insecurity. We are alarmed by recent allegations of nuclear testing and call on all states to uphold the global moratorium. Mr. President, disarmament remains the ultimate goal. Stability will not come from alternatives to NPT, but from all states faithfully upholding its principles and obligations. A robust and universal MPT is in all our interest. Lithuania is committed to a credible outcome of this review conference and calls of all states to act responsibly to ensure its success. I thank you.

I thank Her Excellency Aude Rappl-Elpita, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania. The next speaker on my list is His Excellency Robert Kupiec, Under Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland.

Mr. President, distinguished delegates, as many previous speakers called the NPT Treaty a cornerstone of international peace and stability, I wish to underscore on behalf of my country solid expectations for a meaningful result of this conference.

taking place amidst growing global uncertainty. Poland fully support statements by the European Union and the one of NATO.

And on behalf of my own country, I wish to add a few remarks. Poland underlines its commitment to the full implementation of the NPT Treaty, and that concerns all three pillars of the document: disarmament, non-proliferation,

and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Under the NPT disarmament pillar, we need to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict, and that requires accountability and transparency by

all nuclear weapons states, particularly Russia and China, which have pursued opaque policies on their nuclear posture and doctrines. Risk reduction measures must be genuine and reciprocal, not deceptive. Russia's nuclear rhetoric, translated into its updated doctrine, is a matter of grave concern, not only to the neighboring states, but it should be the one for the whole world. Moreover, Moscow has also moved beyond words by, first, militarizing the Kaliningrad Oblast. including by upgrading nuclear-related infrastructure and stationing of dual-use Iskander-M missiles. Second, by announcing the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons to Belarus, including the dual-use Oreshnik delivery systems. And third, employing at least twice the Oreshnik missiles against Ukraine. Russia also maintains the world's largest stockpile of non-strategic nuclear warheads, a category unconstrained by any arms control arrangements. Some warheads might be stored in Kaliningrad Oblast, located approximately 260 kilometers from my capital, Warsaw.

These actions have a high escalatory potential

and directly contradict both the letter and spirit of Article VI of the NPT. Faced with an aggressive, revisionist, nuclear-armed Russia, vigilance remains a necessity. And this is why, as long as nuclear weapons are used to threaten us, Poland will consider nuclear deterrence as an indispensable tool to preserve peace, prevent aggression, and resist coercion. NATO's nuclear posture is defensive, proportionate, and fully aligned with international commitments, including the NPT. Moreover, nuclear deterrence for defensive purposes does not weaken our commitment to the long-term objective of a world free of nuclear weapons. Poland supports this goal, while emphasizing that a responsible disarmament must, in effect, strengthen international security.

Mr. President, distinguished delegates, ensuring that all states comply with their obligations is essential for the integrity of the NPT.

The continued development of nuclear weapons by the Democratic Republic of Korea must be collectively remedied. We reject the notion voiced by Minister Lavrov in 2024 that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is a closed issue. Such rhetoric undermines the NPT and directly encourages proliferation. Equally troubling has been the trajectory of Iran's nuclear program. The stockpile of highly enriched uranium must be secured. and the International Atomic Energy Agency must be granted free access to a strictly peaceful nature and transparency of Iran's nuclear activities. We urge Iran to demonstrate that it does not intend to develop nuclear weapons. Every state has an inalienable right to develop nuclear energy in line with non-proliferation obligations. Poland itself advances its ambitious nuclear power program with an estimated total capacity of 6 to 9 gigawatts.

The first reactor is expected to become operational in 2036.

While developing the program, Poland also supports other NPT states seeking peaceful nuclear applications, and Polish institutions regularly host IAEA fellows and share expertise on medical and industrial use of nuclear technology. Distinguished delegates, the purpose of every NPT review cycle is to reinforce the treaty and reconfirm its enduring relevance. Today, such reaffirmation is more important than ever, and I want to emphasize Poland's full commitment to the NPT and its principles. For this review conference, we seek pragmatic outcomes. We call for substantive dialogue across all three pillars to reaffirm the NPT's essential role and to lay a strong foundation for the next review cycle. Thank you very much for your attention.

I thank His Excellency Robert Kubiak, Under-Secretary of State of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland. And I now give the floor to His Excellency Richard Arbeiter, Political Director and Assistant Deputy Minister of Canada.

Mr. President, dear colleagues, we gather today in support of the NPT, the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation architecture. For five decades, it has curbed proliferation, enabled peaceful nuclear cooperation, and supported arsenal reductions. However, as key arms control arrangements lapse and shared constraints erode, the NPT is no longer simply foundational; it has become load-bearing. That weight cannot be borne by words alone, nor by broken promises, evasive doctrines, or narrowing transparency. Credibility begins with naming reality. Safeguards and safety norms are being undermined. Arsenals are being modernized and expanded. Restraint on nuclear testing is weakening. Doctrines blur intent and reduce predictability, and deterrence is evolving into more complex trilateral and multipolar dynamics. When states parties agreed to the 1995 indefinite extension, it was a good faith contract, not a gift. A contract to strengthen review, advance disarmament, and address regional security. These commitments stand unless fulfilled, collectively revised, or replaced. Yet Article 6 obligations are not being translated into near-term disarmament priorities. As a NATO Ally, Canada understands the security realities. As a non-nuclear weapons state, we also see the risk of deferral becoming the default. Canada brings candour and consistency to both of these discussions, applying the same standards to partners and others alike. This conference must advance disarmament and reduce nuclear risks, with principled transparency, credible follow-through, and real accountability. Non-proliferation is central to this effort. Disarmament cannot gain traction if safeguards are treated as optional, or if non-compliance is met with ambiguity. Robust verification, full implementation of comprehensive safeguards in the Additional Protocol, and continued strengthening of safeguards are not technical formalities, but are essential to confidence in this treaty. That credibility is being tested worldwide. The ongoing conflict linked to Iran's nuclear program underscores that these are not abstract debates, but realities with serious regional and global consequences. Iran's failure to cooperate with the IAEA to resolve long-standing safeguards questions, including 440 kilograms of unaccounted for highly enriched uranium, is a serious challenge that must be addressed. Nuclear safety and security must be upheld in all circumstances. Canada opposes any action by any state that creates nuclear safety and security risks, including military activity near nuclear facilities. We support the IAEA's work in Ukraine, including at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, where Russia's illegal military presence and attacks against energy infrastructure pose unacceptable risks. We also condemn the DPRK's continued nuclear activities in violation of Security Council resolutions.

Colleagues. Non-proliferation and disarmament are mutually reinforcing. Both are indispensable to the Treaty's credibility. That same balance requires attention to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The treaty endures because it constrains risks, but also because it enables peaceful nuclear applications that support development, energy security, health, and climate-related goals under the highest standards of safety, security, and safeguards. As a champion of peaceful uses, Canada possesses unmatched structural advantages across the entire nuclear value chain. including uranium mines, reactor technology, a strong export track record, a skilled and growing workforce, and strong regulatory reputation. And we are looking for states with whom we can establish mutually beneficial partnerships. Canada offers safety, security, and long-term energy independence. a complete, end-to-end and integrated nuclear solution, including ongoing expertise and support and sound waste management guidance. Colleagues, this conference will be judged by its results, what we deliver now and what we implement before we meet again. Our task is clear. to advance arms control and disarmament, to restore transparency and predictability, to secure CTBT entry into force, strengthen standards, and expand peaceful uses whilst applying the highest standards, not by rituals, but by results. Thank you.

I thank His Excellency Richard Arbiter, Political Director and Assistant Deputy Minister of Canada. The next speaker on my list is Her Excellency Ana Tinka, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania.

Mr. President, distinguished delegates, Romania aligns with the statement of the European Union and would like to add the following remarks in its national capacity. For more than five decades, the NPT has been indeed the cornerstone of international peace, security and prosperity. It remains our most effective instrument for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, advancing disarmament and enabling the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Romania reaffirms its strong commitment to the Treaty and to the integrity of the global non-proliferation regime. This review conference takes place at a moment of profound instability. Since 2022, security challenges have intensified. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, rapid and opaque nuclear buildup, continued proliferation ambition, escalation in the Middle East, and growing polarization within the NPT community. This has been the most turbulent review cycle in the Treaty's history. Mr. President, Russia's aggression against Ukraine continues to undermine nuclear safety, security, and stability. Its actions, including the ongoing occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, constitute flagrant violation of fundamental nuclear safety and security principles. Romania fully supports the IAEA's efforts to assist Ukraine and ensure safeguards implementation. For many years, Romania has first-hand knowledge of Russia's nuclear rhetoric and diversions. Its nuclear cyber rattling is regularly accompanied by destabilizing military actions in our immediate vicinity. Recent drone incidents on Romania's territory, including the crash of an explosive-laden drone into a household, show how conventional threats, nuclear signaling, and broader hybrid threats reinforce each other and undermine regional stability and global security. We condemn such actions, and we also condemn the transfers of weapons and technology that enable Russia to continue its illegal aggression against Ukraine, in blatant violation of the UN Charter. The DPRK's continued development of nuclear and ballistic missile programs, in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, remain a grave concern. Iran must return to full compliance with its NPT obligation and cooperate fully with the IAEA. Mr. President, it is in this increasingly dangerous environment that Romania supports a realistic, pragmatic, and progressive approach to nuclear disarmament, one that prioritizes reducing risks, preventing the use of nuclear weapons, and strengthening global nonproliferation. NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements are fully consistent with Articles 1 and 2 of the NPT and a necessity in the current international context. We must also look ahead. The expiration of New START underscores the need for a new legally binding instrument involving all nuclear weapons states with large-scale capabilities. Progress is also needed on the CTBT and FMCT. Romania reiterates its call for the entry into force of the CTBT and the immediate start of FMCT negotiations. The IAEA's role in safeguard safety, security, and peaceful uses remains indispensable. Romania supports the universalization of key legal instruments, including the Additional Protocol, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of nuclear terrorism. As a non-nuclear weapons state party, Romania fully upholds the inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in line with Articles 1 and 4 of the Treaty. We continue to advance this agenda through the refurbishment of our nuclear power plant, through exploring nuclear innovative technology, as well as through extensive cooperation with the IAEA. Mr. President, the global security environment is deteriorating. Strengthening the NPT is therefore essential, and Romania remains fully committed, as an EU and NATO member state, to working constructively towards a successful review conference. I thank you for your attention.

I thank Her Excellency Ana Timca, Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania. The next speaker on my list is Mr. Diego Martinez-Bello, Secretary of State for Foreign and Global Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation of Spain.

Thank you very much, President. I congratulate you on your appointment as President of this Review Conference and assure you of my delegation's full support and cooperation as you successfully complete your mandate. Spain aligns itself with the statement of the European Union and wishes to make the following remarks in its national capacity. Mr. President, in the light of the worsening international security situation, Spain firmly supports a multilateral system based on the UN Charter and international law, including international humanitarian law, which underpins the global disarmament architecture that we must preserve and strengthen. Spain reaffirms its commitment to the NPT and reiterates its central and irreplaceable role as the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime. We call for the universalization of the Treaty and declare our full and unequivocal commitment to its three pillars, which must advance in a balanced manner, together with the adoption of nuclear risk reduction measures and the promotion of dialogue, transparency and accountability. In order to make coherent progress towards these objectives, Spain coordinates positions and contributions in the framework of the European Union and as a NATO Ally, in accordance with all provisions of the NPT. It is urgent to move towards complete, verifiable nuclear disarmament through a realistic, pragmatic and gradual approach, such as that proposed by the Stockholm Initiative, of which we are a member. Spain supports the launch of new multilateral strategic talks among nuclear weapon states with the largest arsenals in order to prevent a new arms race and advance nuclear disarmament. Likewise, dialogue must be resumed to restore trust in negative security assurances, which has been undermined by the flagrant violation of the Budapest Memorandum through the unjustified, illegal, and unprovoked military aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The current insecurity does not allow further delay in the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We urge Annex 2 States to ratify it and call on nuclear weapons States to maintain the testing moratorium. Spain is ready to begin negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and invites all countries to maintain a moratorium on production. Spain reaffirms the authority and irreplaceable role of the IAEA in the implementation and verification of safeguards agreements, which, together with the Additional Protocol, we consider the global standard in this area. We also emphasize the crucial and positive role of export control regimes in preventing nuclear proliferation. We consider it to be of vital importance to ensure nuclear security and prevent attacks against nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, which we deem unacceptable. Spain rejects any military action in the Middle East that would constitute escalation and contribute to a more uncertain and hostile international order. We call for restraint and for full respect for international law, including the principles of the United Nations Charter and international humanitarian law. We urge Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA, to comply with the obligations of its safeguards agreement and continue the diplomatic process to reach a constructive, consensual and sustainable solution to its nuclear program, including a robust verification system in which the IAEA plays a fundamental role. North Korea will never be recognized as a nuclear state, and we consider any statements to that effect unacceptable. We call for compliance with all United Nations Security Council resolutions, the cessation of its nuclear and ballistic missile tests, the implementation of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and the initiation of a diplomatic process leading to the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. Spain reiterates its commitment to establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Spain reaffirms the right of all states to the peaceful use of nuclear technology and underscores the fundamental role of the IAEA's technical cooperation program. Spain also advocates for diversity and gender equality, as well as the full, equal, and meaningful participation and leadership of women in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. In summary, Spain once again reaffirms our unequivocal commitment to the NPT. an essential element of the multilateral system and for the success of this conference. Thank you very much.

I thank Mr. Diego Martinez-Bello, Secretary of State for Foreign and Global Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation of Spain for his statement. The next speaker on my list is His Excellency Nuno Pinheiro Torres, Deputy Minister for Defence Policy of Portugal.

Mr. Chair, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to congratulate the appointment of the President and the Bureau of this Review Conference. Portugal stands ready to offer its full support and cooperation during their mandate. This Treaty remains the foundation of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and a fundamental basis towards nuclear disarmament. It has contributed to reducing stockpiles and limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, while promoting cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is therefore important to address its three pillars in a balanced manner, and call for the Treaty's universalization. We underscore the importance of supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency's impartial, independent, and objective mandate. The current mandate deepens the goal of nonproliferation and confidence-building between State Parties for further cooperation while preventing the diversion of fissile material for weapons use. Portugal serves as a current member of the Agency's Board of Governors and has been strengthening its cooperation with the Agency, including by contributing to the Director General's flagship initiatives. The NPT has shown itself to be a dynamic instrument. successfully adapting over the last five decades to changing political, technological, military, and other circumstances, while preserving its core authority and integrity. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should enter into force without delay. And Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, whose negotiations by the Conference on Disarmament must start as soon as possible. Despite polarization and geopolitical tensions, we must be pragmatic and work together to pursue incremental measures to achieve a successful outcome at the Review Conference and meet the Treaty's objectives. Transparency and accountability play a central role in the Treaty provisions and can be improved qualitatively. One key measure is submission of national reports, a commitment that Portugal fulfilled before the start of this conference. Mr. Chair, Portugal is firmly committed to upholding a framework for disarmament and non-proliferation based on responsible and effective multilateralism, and on full respect for international law anchored on the Charter of the United Nations. Strategic stability is closely linked to the establishment and enforcement of nuclear guardrails, which include communication, transparency and accountability, and risk reduction measures. Nuclear risk reduction as confidence-building measures between states is neither a substitute nor a prerequisite for nuclear disarmament, but alongside verification and irreversibility, complements the first pillar of the NPT. Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture is eroding rapidly, and the proliferation crisis we are facing must be addressed. Recent responsible nuclear rhetoric and coercive nuclear signaling are deeply concerning, as they contribute to a climate of strategic intimidation. Such actions risk lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. Ongoing nuclear arsenals modernization and expansion, coupled with the lack of transparency, can heighten the risk of misperception, misunderstanding and miscalculation, ultimately increasing the risk of escalation. The scenario is complicated even further by the impact of emerging technologies. including artificial intelligence. Within the framework of the NPT, transparency remains essential for the full implementation of its obligations and objectives. There is a need for continuing engagement and dialogue. To conclude, over 80 years after the first nuclear test and the first use of a nuclear weapon, history reminds us of the destructive potential of these weapons. Portugal reaffirms its dedication to strengthening the NPT, building trust through transparency, and ensuring the future generations inherit a world without nuclear weapons. Thank you for your attention.

I thank His Excellency Nuno Pinheiro Torres, Deputy Minister for Defence Policy of Portugal, for his statement. The next speaker on my list is His Excellency Adonia Ayebare, Permanent Representative of Uganda, speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Mr. President, on behalf of the group of Member States of the Non-Aligned Movement party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, I congratulate Ambassador Doohun Viet on assumption of the presidency of the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. Allow me also to congratulate other Bureau members on their election. The Conference coincides with the 80th anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations and the adoption of its first General Assembly resolution, which called for the elimination of nuclear weapons. This serves as an urgent reminder of the pressing need for the achievement of that goal. The Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasize that a balanced progress in nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects is indispensable to strengthening international peace and security. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties reaffirms once again its principled position on nuclear disarmament, which is its highest priority, and remains extremely concerned at the threat to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and of their possible use or threat of use. We continue to reiterate that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group reaffirms its principled position on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects. The Group emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements, as it was reaffirmed in the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice. The Group reiterates its deep concern over the greatest threat to peace and security posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and related military doctrines, modernization of nuclear forces, and development of more effective and newer, including low-yield nuclear warheads, as well as other policies and practices that run contrary to the principles and objectives of the treaty, such as the continued and evolving nuclear weapons sharing arrangements and extended deterrence. The Group strongly calls for an immediate end to this trend that, in fact, is a new nuclear arms race and thus a clear violation of Article VI of the Treaty. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its deep concern over recent public pronouncements and preparations suggesting the possible resumption of nuclear weapon testing and condemns any move towards such a resumption. and a resumption of nuclear weapon testing would also undermine the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, CTBT, and the longstanding moratorium on nuclear testing. This would also run counter to the obligations of states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT, under Article VI, to pursue effective measures towards nuclear disarmament. The Group also recalls that Decision 1 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference on the Strengthened Review Process represented an essential element of the package upon which the Treaty was indefinitely extended. Indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear arsenals. The Group strongly calls for the implementation of Article VI of the Treaty. This is an explicit legal obligation of all the parties, and its implementation is neither optional nor conditional. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the Group calls for the early commencement of negotiations on effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding negative security assurances all non-nuclear weapon states by all the nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances as a matter of high priority. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it also calls upon nuclear weapon states to commit a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons as an interim measure and not as a substitute to nuclear disarmament. The Group regrets the expiry of the New START Treaty without agreeing on a successor treaty on strategic offensive arms reductions. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the importance of continuing strategic dialogue and expresses its concern that domestic commitments to nuclear weapon modernization strongly undermine the actual impact of any actions envisaged in bilateral nuclear disarmament and arms control treaties such as the New START treaty, with the understanding that arms control does not constitute nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments. The movement highlights the urgency of achieving a meaningful and ambitious progress towards progress during the current review cycle on the matters related to transparency and accountability of the nuclear weapon states. NAM underlines that the aspired exercise on transparency and accountability should stay focused on addressing the implementation gaps related to Article VI, nuclear disarmament obligations. NAM expresses its grave concerns regarding the expansion and modernization of nuclear forces including the compounded and significant risks of integration of artificial intelligence by nuclear weapon states into command, control, and communication systems of nuclear weapons, and underscores the necessity for ensuring full and effective human control over these weapons pending their total elimination. Mr. President, the Group continues to reaffirm the inalienable right of each state to develop research, production, and peaceful use of nuclear energy, including the sovereign right to develop full national nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful purposes without discrimination, and to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material, and scientific technological information for peaceful purposes. The Group reaffirms the inviolability of the peaceful nuclear activities and that an attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, poses a great danger to human lives and the environment and constitutes a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the regulations of IAEA. as stipulated in IAEA General Conference Resolution GC 29/444 and decision GC 34/533, and to recognize the need for a comprehensive, multilaterally negotiated, legally binding instrument prohibiting attacks and the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes of nuclear energy, and pending the conclusion of such an instrument, to strongly urge all States to refrain from attacks or the threat of attacks on such facilities. The Group recognizes that the IAEA is the sole competent authority for verification of compliance with obligations under the respective safeguard agreements of the Member States. We underline the importance of universalization of the Treaty and call upon the four non-parties to the Treaty to accede to the Treaty without any condition and further delay as non-nuclear weapon states and place all their nuclear facilities and activities under IAEA full scope safeguards. strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the treaty conditions for any cooperation in the nuclear area with states not parties to the treaty. All states parties to the treaty shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to states not party to the treaty unless these conditions are met. Mr. President, The Group reaffirms the important role of the nuclear-weapon-free zones in fulfilling the objectives of the Treaty and supports the full operation and strengthening of treaties establishing such zones. The Group welcomes the adoption of the General Assembly resolution 79/241, entitled Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects, The Group anticipates that a new comprehensive study will contribute to the maintenance of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and the establishment of new zones, including in the Middle East. The Group once again expresses its long-standing strong support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the great contribution to the regional and international peace and security. it will represent. The Group further underlines the prime importance of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which is an integral and essential part of the package of decisions reached without a vote that enabled the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. Pending its establishment, the Group demands once again that Israel, the only non-party to the NPT in the region, renounce any possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the NPT without preconditions and further delay, and place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA full scope safeguards. In this regard, the Group welcomes United Nations General Assembly decision 73/546, the convening of five successive sessions of the Conference, the establishment of the Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction and acknowledges their constructive outcomes. The group stresses that the 1995 resolution and other decisions on the subject adopted within the context of the NPT review conference remain valid until the objectives are achieved and that the implementation of decision 73/546 is not a substitute to the 1995 resolution and without prejudice to its full implementation, their validity and shall not also be construed as their replacement. The group calls upon Israel to participate in the conference and engage with it constructively and in good faith with a view to agreeing on arrangements freely arrived at by the countries of the region. We acknowledge that two of the three co-sponsors of the resolution, the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the other two nuclear weapons-free states attended the conference and support its important work, and we urge the United States to act likewise. NAM reaffirms the continued significance of the spirit of collaboration and multilateralism that led to the unanimous adoption of Security Council Resolution 2231 of 2015, and underscores that its provisions and timelines must be strictly respected. NAM further stresses that all provisions of the resolution should be terminated in accordance with paragraph 8 of Resolution 2231 thereof. Mr. President, Allow me to conclude by underscoring the importance of renewed political will by all states parties to achieve the successful conclusion of this review conference. The group stands ready to engage constructively towards this objective and to attain a peaceful and secure world for present and future generations. Time to act is now. The full version of this statement will be submitted to the Secretariat. I thank you, Mr. President.

I thank His Excellency Adonia Abere, Permanent Representative of Uganda, speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, for your statement. I now invite the European Union. His Excellency Stephane Clement, EU Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, speaking on behalf of the European Union and its Member States.

Thank you, Mr. President.

I have the honor to speak on behalf of the European.

Union, the candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Georgia.

As well as Andorra, Monaco, and San Marino, align themselves with this statement.

Please accept also our congratulations on the assumptions of your duties.

Mr. President.

The EU reiterates its unequivocal support to the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and an important element in developing nuclear energy and technology applications for peaceful purposes. The EU reaffirms the importance of universalization of the NPT and calls on all states that have not yet done so, in particular India, Israel and Pakistan, to join it as non-nuclear weapon states and pending their accession to adhere to its terms.

Mr. President.

We meet at a moment of ongoing strain on international peace and security. Disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation regimes are under increasing pressure as geopolitical rivalry intensifies. Principles of international laws are undermined and landmark agreements are broken or are ended. The European Union condemns in the strongest possible way Russia's actions, its nuclear rhetoric, and its threats to use nuclear force in its war of aggression against Ukraine, which are irresponsible, provocative, dangerous, and escalatory. with Moscow prioritizing its war effort over its nonproliferation and disarmament obligations and commitments. This includes deep concern about Russia's announced deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of Belarus, ongoing regional proliferation crisis, China's rapid and opaque expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and an uneven implementation of obligations and commitments also contribute to this complex situation. The EU strongly supports all three mutually reinforcing pillars of the NPT and the comprehensive, balanced and full implementation of the 2010 Action Plan. We stress the urgent need to implement all obligations under the NPT, as well as commitments made during previous review conferences, including the need for concrete progress towards full implementation of Article VI, with the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons. The EU notes the very severe consequences associated with nuclear weapons use and emphasizes that all states share the responsibility to prevent such an occurrence from happening. Mr. President, recalling the obligations for all nuclear weapons states arising from Article VI of the NPT, the EU reiterates its commitment to.

Further reduction of nuclear arsenals and underlining the special responsibility of the states with the largest nuclear arsenals.

Strongly encourages seeking further reductions to their nuclear arsenals, including strategic and non-strategic.

As well as deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons.

In this context, the EU notes the potential serious repercussions of the expiry of the New START Treaty. The EU calls for urgent work towards a new legally binding framework limiting the largest nuclear arsenals. We urge Russia to engage meaningfully and call on China to contribute constructively. Mr. President, the EU strongly encourages nuclear weapons states to pursue discussions on confidence-building, transparency, risk reduction, and verification. While not a substitute for nuclear disarmament, concrete risk reduction measures contribute to the prevention of nuclear war, can play a major role in creating trust, confidence, and predictability, and complements disarmament and arms control efforts. Any explosive nuclear weapon test by any state would be harmful and destabilizing for global nonproliferation efforts and for international peace and security. The EU remains deeply committed to the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, urges all remaining states, in particular those in Annex 2, to sign and ratify it without precondition or delay, and calls on Russia to reverse its unprecedented deratification. The EU reaffirms its commitment to uphold and strengthen the norm against nuclear testing. It calls on all states to abide by the existing moratorium and to refrain from any action contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty. The EU strongly supports the International Atomic Energy Agency, its impartial, independent and objective role. Comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with the Additional.

Protocol, constitute the current IAEA verification standard under Article III of the NPT and should be universalized.

We reiterate that Iran must never be allowed to seek, develop, or acquire a nuclear weapon. We continue to urge Iran to fully adhere to its legal obligations under the NPT and its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and to resume full cooperation with the IAEA. The EU remains committed to diplomacy efforts as the only way to bring about a durable solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Developments in Iran and in the wider region threaten both regional and global security. The EU welcomes the ceasefire agreed by the US and Iran. We urge all involved to fully respect it across the region, cease all military operations, and fully ensure freedom of navigation in line with international law. All parties must comply with international humanitarian law and protect civilians and civilian infrastructure. Diplomacy is key to resolve all outstanding issues, and parties should engage in good faith in efforts to reach a sustainable agreement on all areas of concern. The EU reiterates its call on the DPRK to abandon all its weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile and existing nuclear programs, and to engage in meaningful discussions with all relevant parties towards the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, as required by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2397. The DPRK will never be accepted as a nuclear weapons state under the NPT or have any other special status in that regard. The EU is concerned over the potential implications of armed attacks against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes, recalls the importance of upholding the IAEA seven pillars, and calls upon states to refrain from such actions in accordance with international law. The EU recalls with grave concern the severe implications of Russia's war of aggression for safeguards and for nuclear safety and security in Ukraine. We record the importance of upholding the IAEA's five principles for ensuring nuclear safety and security at Ukraine's ZNPP. The EU acknowledges the importance of existing nuclear weapon-free zones for peace and security and remains committed to the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference. The EU welcomes the convening of the six sessions of the UN conferences on the establishment of such a zone. The EU reaffirms its support for the inalienable right of all parties to the NPT for peaceful use of nuclear energy without discrimination and in conformity with the NPT. The EU reiterates its commitment to the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and safeguards. The EU underlines that gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls are top cross-cutting priorities. The EU calls for agreement to strengthen the NPT review process, including around transparency and accountability. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

I thank His Excellency Stephane Clement, EU Special Envoy for Disarmament and Nonproliferation, speaking on behalf of the European Union and its member states. I have been informed that the delegation of the Russian Federation have requested request of the floor.

No.

I now give the floor to His Excellency Omar Al Qathiri, the Permanent Representative of Oman, speaking on behalf of the State Parties of the seventh session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction. Excellency, you have the floor.

Mr. President, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my honor to address you today in my capacity as the President of the Seventh Session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons, and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction. On behalf of the Member States participating in its work, with deep sense of responsibility towards this multilateral process. We meet today at a critical juncture as a disarmament and the non-proliferation regime faces mounting challenges, including the continued modernization of nuclear arsenals, the escalation of rhetoric related to the use, public pronouncements and preparations suggesting the possible resumption of nuclear weapons testing, and the lack of progress in the implementation of disarmament obligations by nuclear weapons states. Taken together, these challenges pose a real threat to international peace and security, particularly in the Middle East, a region characterized by a complex and sensitive security environment. Mr. President, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains the cornerstone of international disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and the principles framework of balancing nonproliferation, the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and the nuclear disarmament. However, the failure to reach consensus in previous review conferences places the treaty at the crossroads and underscores the need to intensify efforts to ensure success for this review and the review.

Of this conference.

In this context, the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction remains an essential and indispensable objective, not only for enhancing regional and global security, but also as a fundamental element in the strengthening of the global non-proliferation regime. It also constitutes a standing commitment under the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which performed an integral part of the package that enabled indefinite extension of the treaty, and whose full implementation remains an urgent priority Member States recall that the three co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution bear specific responsibilities for its implementation and calls upon them to engage actively and in good faith to fulfil those obligations. Mr. President, since the establishment of the Conference, Member States have made steady and incremental progress, evolving from organizational arrangements.

I beg your pardon, to more substantive and technical discussions.

Supported by the work of the working group and the working committee during intersessional periods. This has contributed to building a cumulative process characterized by sustainability and credibility. Successive session made consolidated that this process is an inclusive and open platform for dialogue based on consensus and non-selectivity. also capable of addressing the complex issues related to the establishment of the zone. They have also contributed to the advancing of discussion and enhancing shared understanding and initial elements that could serve as a building block for the development of a legally binding instrument to be freely negotiated.

By the states of the region.

Mr. President, in the framework of the seventh session, which the Sultan of Oman has the honor to preside over, We will build on this momentum by adopting a practical approach, focusing on the deepening of substantive discussions on a number of key issues, including obligations and prohibitions related to chemical and biological weapons, declarations, institutional arrangements, and the relationship with other relevant international agreements. This approach aims to strengthen common understanding bridge differences, and lay the necessary.

Technical and legal foundations to support the negotiating process, paving the way towards elaborating of a draft legally.

Binding instrument establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. We will also continue to support efforts of the working committee, engage with experts and international institutions to draw on the experiences of other nuclear weapon-free zones. thereby contributing to capacity building and enhancing the quality outputs. Mr. President, Member States of the Conference reaffirm their full commitment to preserving the inclusive, consensus-based, and non-selective nature of this process, and call upon all States of the region, without exception, to engage constructively, reflecting a shared responsibility for achieving peace and security. We also stress the importance of addressing the existing challenges facing the conference, foremost among the continued absence of the State of Israel and the non-proliferation and non-participation of some observer states, which calls for intensified efforts to enhance inclusivity and to ensure.

The full and effective engagement of all members of the region in this multilateral process.

In this regard, member states renew their call upon Israel, the only non-party in the region to the treaty, on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, to accede to it without preconditions, and to place all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive safeguards of the International Atomic Agency, thereby strengthening the credibility of the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime, contributing to the universality of the treaty, and reinforcing the foundation of regional peace and security.

Member States.

Reaffirmed that the non-proliferation regime can only achieve its objective if its obligations are applied universally, consistently, and without selectivity to all states in the region, and called practical steps towards placing all regional nuclear activities under comprehensive international safeguards. Mr. President, we are pleased to announce that the Sultanate of Oman, in partnership with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, will organize a side event on Wednesday, 29th of April, at 1:15 p.m. in Conference Room 12, on the margins of this review conference. This event aims to review progress achieved, highlight challenges and opportunities, and present the priorities of the seventh session presidency, and promote dialogue on practical pathways towards establishment of the zone. Mr. President, the unwavering and comprehensive implementation of the 1995 resolution remains a paramount imperative during the 2026 MPT review conference and beyond. The success of this process requires active support of state parties of the treaty, particularly the three co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution, as well as the provision of political, technical, and financial and human resource necessary to enable the conference effectively carry out its mandate. We stress that the 1995 resolution and other decisions on the subject adopted within the context of the NPT Review Conference remain valid until the objectives are achieved. and that the implementation of Resolution 73/546 is not a substitute to the 1995 resolution and without prejudice to its full implementation, its validity, and shall not also be construed as its replacement. In conclusion, we reaffirm that the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction goes beyond being a regional objective. It constitutes a shared international responsibility and a clear demonstration of the effectiveness of multilateralism in addressing global challenges. We look forward to a final document of this review conference that delivers a strong message reaffirming the commitment to the implementation of the 1995 resolution and the responsibility of the three co-sponsors, while welcoming the supporting and the constructive contributions of the United Nations Conference process, which my country has the honor to preside over. We renew our call upon all states to work in a spirit of responsibility and consensus towards achieving this shared objective, ensuring a more secure and stable future for the present and the future generations. I thank you, Mr. President.

I thank His Excellency Omar Al Qahtani, Permanent Representative of Oman, speaking on behalf of the State Parties of the seventh session of the Conference on the Establishment of the Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction. I now invite His Excellency Solisa Mabongo, Deputy Director General, Department of International Relations and Cooperation of South Africa, speaking on behalf of the States Parties and signatories to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Excellency, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. President. We congratulate you on your election as a leader of this Review Conference. I take the floor on behalf of the States Parties and signatory states to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the TPNW. As fully committed states parties to the NPT, we recognize it as a cornerstone of disarmament and nonproliferation regime. We remain committed to the balanced implementation of all the three pillars of the NPT and deplore any threats or actions that risk undermining its integrity. We remain alarmed at the worsening international developments in the nuclear space. These include increased nuclear threats and the troubling rhetoric on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as the erosion of the arms control architecture, including the expiration of the New START and the loss of its associated monitoring and verification mechanisms. Likewise, There have been attacks on nuclear installations devoted to peaceful uses, an intensifying reliance on nuclear deterrence in security doctrines, the ongoing modernization, quantitative expansion, and possession of nuclear weapons, and recent developments which risk undermining the global nuclear weapon testing taboo. All these point to a deteriorating security environment that demands immediate and decisive action from all of us. We reaffirm the need to build confidence amongst all members of the international community and to achieve and maintain a world free of nuclear weapons. And we will continue to champion the unequivocal rejection of nuclear weapons and work relentlessly for their total elimination. Mr. President, TPNW States Parties and signatory States stress that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is a violation of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, and is inadmissible and contrary to international humanitarian law. We firmly deplore all nuclear threats and nuclear rhetoric, which is increasingly strident and only serves to undermine disarmament and non-proliferation efforts and international peace and security more broadly. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon states must commit to never use or threaten to use these weapons under any circumstances. We are also witnessing renewed advocacy of and attempts to further embed nuclear deterrence in security policies around the world. Such actions will weaken the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament architecture. As States Parties and signatories to the TPNW, we have clearly stated our belief that nuclear weapons do not provide enduring national, regional, or international security. To the contrary, nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence entail significant, even potentially existential, threats to humanity. The inherent risks and transboundary and global consequences of the use of nuclear weapons make clear that all states' security is jeopardized by these weapons and that all states, therefore, have an urgent security interest in their total elimination. We reiterate the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones as effective regional instruments for disarmament, nonproliferation, and confidence-building. We positively recall the practice of bringing together representatives from all existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, along with Mongolia and the five nuclear-weapon states, to strengthen interzone cooperation and promote inclusive dialogue between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states. A further concern relates to emerging technologies incorporated into nuclear-weapon systems that heighten the risks of accidental, unintended, or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, nuclear-armed States must maintain full human control and oversight over command, control, and communications of their nuclear weapons and their delivery system. In the context of the development of artificial intelligence in the military sphere, Mr. President, the retention of nuclear weapons has a negative impact on non-proliferation and progress towards nuclear disarmament. We also emphasize that calls for non-nuclear-armed States to develop nuclear weapons are inconsistent with and undermine all disarmament and non-proliferation obligations and commitments, especially under the NPT. In this regard, we urge the nuclear-weapon States to reinvigorate their efforts to fully and urgently implement their Article VI nuclear disarmament obligations, as well as the actions and commitments agreed upon at NPT review conferences. The unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their arsenals must be translated into full and concrete action. We, the States Parties and signatories to the TPNW, reaffirm our grave concern about the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons, which transcend national borders, pose grave implications for human survival and the well-being of humanity. These humanitarian consequences are also substantiated by new scientific evidence This growing body of research confirms that the effects of nuclear detonation are more severe, cascading, long-lasting, and complex than previously understood. The catastrophic humanitarian consequences and risks associated with nuclear weapons underpin the moral and ethical imperatives for nuclear disarmament and the urgency of achieving and maintaining a nuclear-weapon-free world. Mr. President, it is unacceptable that decades after the use or testing of nuclear weapons, many affected communities still await assistance and environmental remediation. We, as the TPNW States Parties and signatory States, are doing our part by advancing the humanitarian provisions of the TPNW. including, through India, the discussions on the feasibility and potential establishment, amongst many other feasible mechanisms, of an international trust fund for victim assistance and environmental remediation that is viable, effective, and sustainable. We urge all states that have not yet done so to join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons the TPNW without delay and without preconditions. We encourage constructive engagement by all States, including those not yet party to the TPNW, at this Review Conference, as well as the first upcoming Review Conference of the TPNW to be held in November 2026, in support of the shared goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. As I conclude, we, the States Parties and signatories to the TPNW, stand united in our unwavering determination to confront escalating nuclear dangers. The urgent, complete, verifiable and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons remains a high priority and is not just an aspiration, but an imperative for global peace and security and the survival of humanity. The full version of the statement will be uploaded with the Secretariat. I thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the distinguished representative of South Africa for his statement on behalf of the parties signatories to the TPNW. I now have the honor to invite His Excellency Enrique Manalo, Permanent Representative of the Philippines. speaking on behalf of ASEAN and this will be the last speaker on my list for this afternoon. Excellency, you have the floor.

Mr. President, I have the honor to deliver this statement on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The ASEAN associates itself with the statement delivered by Uganda on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. We also congratulate you on your election. Mr. President, ASEAN reaffirms the NPT as the cornerstone of a global nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Amidst heightened geopolitical tension, now more than ever, urgent and meaningful progress under NPT is essential. We reiterate our deep concern over the growing risks of nuclear danger and conflict, further expansion and modernization of nuclear arsenals, the increasing salience of nuclear weapons in military and security doctrines, as well as the weakening of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. We hope this review conference will pave the way for States Parties to produce a clear and balanced roadmap that will enable full and effective implementation of the NPT, particularly Article VI, as well as the commitments and undertakings agreed to during the past review conferences. Also to redouble efforts to protect its credibility and integrity, to implement the 13 practical steps and the 64-point action plan, and to rally towards a much desired meaningful consensual outcome document. The total elimination of nuclear weapons remains the only guarantee against the use and risk of their catastrophic humanitarian consequence. ASEAN emphasizes that the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons must remain central to all disarmament deliberations. Mr. President, on nuclear disarmament, ASEAN calls upon all countries, especially nuclear weapons states, to fulfill their obligations and commitments in good faith. promote mutual trust and cooperation, enhance transparency and accountability, and take concrete actions towards our shared vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. ASEAN reiterates its collective opposition to nuclear testing and stresses the importance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT. All ASEAN Member States have ratified the CTBT and call upon the remaining states listed in Annex II of the CTBT to sign and ratify that document without further delay. In this regard, ASEAN also urges all NWS to maintain, at minimum, a moratorium on nuclear explosive testing pending the entry into force of the CTBT. ASEAN expresses deep concern over the expiration of the New START Treaty in February 2026 without a successor agreement, a significant setback for strategic stability. We call upon the United States and the Russian Federation to resume urgently negotiations on a new legally binding arms reduction framework. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, ASEAN also calls on all NWS to provide and adhere to unconditionally legally binding negative security assurances, adopt a no first use policy regarding nuclear weapons, and take steps to reduce the risks of nuclear weapons use, including those posed by the integration of emerging technologies into nuclear weapons systems. We urge all NWS to make an unequivocal commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-NWS and within nuclear weapons-free zones. Mr. President, on nonproliferation, ASEAN underscores the immense contribution of nuclear-weapon-free zones to nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and enhancing international peace and security. We continue to support ongoing efforts toward the establishment of such zones globally, especially in the Middle East. ASEAN is committed to preserving the Southeast Asian region as a nuclear weapons-free zone and free of all other weapons of mass destruction, as enshrined in the ASEAN Charter and the Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone, or the Bangkok Treaty. The 47th ASEAN Summit last October welcomed Timor-Leste accession to the Shan Treaty, thereby reinforcing ASEAN's longstanding vision of a Southeast Asia free of nuclear weapons. We stress the importance of the full and effective implementation of the treaty, including through its plan of action for 2023 to 2027. We noted that the Executive Committee of the Chantepie's Commission is continuing to explore the possibility of allowing individual NWS, which are willing to sign and ratify the protocol to the Chantepie's Treaty without reservations and provide formal assurance of this commitment in writing, to go ahead with the signing. We welcome any NWS ready to do so. We reaffirm our commitment to continuously engage all NWS, including those with reservations, and intensify efforts of all parties to resolve all outstanding issues in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Treaty. In addition to the NPT, CTBT and nuclear weapons zone treaties, ASEAN maintains that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is a historic agreement which continues towards global nuclear disarmament and complements the NPT and CTBT and other existing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation instruments. We acknowledge that the first review conference of the states parties to the TPNW will be held later this year, as well as the role ASEAN member states play in advancing its intercessional work. Mr. President, on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. ASEAN reaffirms the inalienable right of all states to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, in particular for sustainable economic and social development. We recognize the central role of the IAEA in this regard and believe that it is important to help further the IAEA's capacity. ASEAN will continue to expand its cooperation with IAEA. In 2024, ASEAN and the IAEA renewed their practical arrangements and cooperation in the areas of nuclear science and technology and applications, nuclear safety, security and safeguards until 2029. Furthermore, the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy, which convened its 12th annual meeting last August, continues its efforts to enhance cooperation among the nuclear regulatory bodies and further strengthen nuclear safety, security, and safeguards in the region. ASEAN Member States will continue their close cooperation with international partners and develop their respective nuclear infrastructure for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with applicable IEA standards and regulations. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Philippines speaking on behalf of ASEAN. This concludes my list of speakers for this meeting. I have been informed that the delegations of the Russian Federation and the delegation of China have requested the floor to exercise their right of reply pursuant to the rule 19 of the rules of procedure. May I remind delegations that in accordance with rule 19, such statements shall be as brief as possible and as indicated at the start of the general debate, a time limit of five minutes will be enforced with mic cut off. May I also remind delegations that in accordance with established practice, the number of interventions in the exercise of the right of reply for any delegation is limited to two. The second intervention should be limited to three minutes, also enforced by a mic cut off. I now give the floor to The Distinguished Representative of the Russian Federation.

Thank you, Mr. President. Our delegation requested a right of reply regarding the reckless statements by the representatives of the Kyiv regime. Not for the first time now, as part of the NPT review process, the delegation of Ukraine is deigning to make the same irresponsible, lie-ridden, unfounded statements that are detached from reality. Their content entirely reflects the criminal nature of the Kyiv authorities and also the essence of their domestic and foreign policy. It is clear that this is being done with a single aim: to convince the international community of their own innocence, their lack of guilt for an aggressive nationalist policy and crimes against the part of the Ukrainian population and numerous war crimes. Convinced and to convince them of their innocence for the daily numerous attacks on these upper Asian nuclear power plants, which has jeopardized the safety and security of the power plant itself and which could generate a lethal nuclear catastrophe. attempts to roll back history and to get revenge in the context of the Ukrainian crisis at the expense of hundreds of thousands of their own citizens' lives. This only confirms the conclusion that the Ukrainian authorities have no interest in a prompt settlement of the situation through political and diplomatic means. which Russia has consistently been calling for. A confirmation of the aggressive efforts of Kyiv and its hope to change the situation in its favour by any means possible are behind their statements about the desire to acquire nuclear weapons. It's important to note that Kyiv has gone from words to action and has undertaken a real attempt to acquire the elements of a nuclear weapon. These steps by Kyiv and its backers from a number of European states are undermining the NPT regime. We deeply regret the position of those states that echoed the statements in support of the statements of the Ukrainian delegation and are voicing an anti-Russian narrative that is being advanced by Kyiv. In so doing, these countries maintaining and feeding this aggressive revanchist plan by Kyiv and are making the NPT conference and its outcomes dependent on its dangerous political plans. The Russian delegation reserves the right subsequently to respond to other anti-Russian statements that we have heard during the conference. Thank you for your attention.

I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of China.

Mr. President, in today's general debate, certain countries that participate in nuclear military alliances or benefit from a nuclear umbrella or country groups have made groundless accusations against China's nuclear policy and nuclear development, and have hyped up the fallacy of a so-called China nuclear threat, which China firmly opposes and will never accept. China Firmly committed to the path of peaceful development, pursues a self-defensive nuclear strategy, and adheres to a no-first-use policy, China unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear weapon states for nuclear weapon-free zones. China's nuclear policy and intentions are highly transparent, stable, consistent, and predictable. China has always kept its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security and has exercised utmost restraint in both the scale and development of its nuclear arsenal. China does not compete with any other nuclear weapons states in terms of investment, quantity, or scale, whereas never, nor will it ever, engage in a nuclear arms race with any country. However, some countries turn a blind eye to these and deliberately exaggerate claims that China is pursuing a nuclear arms race or rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal and promote the so-called China nuclear threat. Such accusations are completely baseless and driven by ulterior motives. China actively advocates the comprehensive prohibition and total elimination of nuclear weapons and actively supports and participates in international arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation efforts. China maintains an open attitude towards arms control dialogue, but will not participate in any negotiations aimed at curtailing China's national defense capabilities or undermining the strategic security environment. Genuine dialogue must be based on mutual respect. Any approach that calls for dialogue while engaging in confrontation will not be accepted. China's nuclear arsenal is not at the same level as those of countries possessing the largest stockpiles, and its nuclear policy and strategic security environment are fundamentally different. At this stage, requiring China to join the so-called trilateral nuclear arms control negotiations is unfair, unreasonable, and unfeasible. The so-called Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control and Strategic Stability Dialogue ignores China's legitimate concerns and positions, and in essence, it serves as a pretext for certain nuclear weapons states to shirk their own disarmament responsibilities and to divert international attention. By contrast, if we look at the countries that make groundless accusations against China, some are engaged in nuclear sharing or extended deterrence, some benefit from a nuclear umbrella, and even openly advocate for acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And some have explicitly stated their intention to increase their nuclear warheads and even try to establish a new collective nuclear deterrence arrangements in Europe, attempting to base regional security architecture on nuclear proliferation, thereby mining the purposes and principles of the NPT. In effect, these countries are complicit in damaging the international nuclear disarmament process and the nonproliferation regime. Driven by geopolitical self-interest and a flawed understanding of their own security environment, these countries turn a blind eye to the negative actions of their superpower ally in the field of nuclear arms control, but instead hype China's nuclear policy and nuclear force development. This double standard approach not only fails to address their own security dilemmas, but also seriously undermines their credibility in international arms control. China urges relevant countries to engage in self-reflection rather than shifting blame onto others. and take more actions conducive to safeguarding the international nuclear arms control and international peace and security, and to stop distorting and smearing China's nuclear policy and exaggerating the so-called China nuclear threat. Thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the distinguished representative of China. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Thank you, Mr. President. My delegation categorically rejects the statement delivered by the United Arab Emirates during this morning's session. The allegations are baseless, politically motivated, and aimed at misleading this conference. Iran's candidacy has been duly endorsed by the Non-Aligned Movement, representing more than 120 state parties. This endorsement reflects the confidence of a large majority of the international community in Iran's constructive engagement and its commitment to the treaty. It is therefore deeply concerning that the UAE, itself a member of ENAM, has chosen to disregard the collectively agreed position of its own group. This runs counter to the fundamental principles of unity, solidarity and respect for collective decisions and sets a troubling precedent. We have consistently underscored the nominations put forward by regional groups should be respected. It is therefore particularly alarming that the UAE is now challenging the decision of its own group. The same delegation has also refused to condemn the recent illegal and unprovoked attacks carried out by the United States and the Israeli regime against Iran's peaceful nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards. Such silence raises serious questions about its commitment to the principles and objectives of the treaty. Furthermore, in referring to the situation in the Strait of Hormuz, the representative of the UAE presented a selective and misleading narrative omitting the root causes of the current tensions, namely the unlawful attack of the US and the Israeli regime against Iran. facilitated by the logistical support from military installations in the region, including within the UAE, as well as the impact of the United States' illegal blockade on Iran. Such omissions underscore the inconsistency of the position presented. Iran is a committed state party to the treaty. Its nuclear program remains exclusively peaceful and under international verification. Its nomination to the Bureau reflects its continued commitment to the treaty and this process. I thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the distinguished representative of Iran. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Arab Emirates.

Mr. President, my delegation is compelled to respond to the statement made by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran. We heard once again the familiar language of denial, deflection, and accusation. But no amount of political rhetoric can erase the central fact before this conference. Iran's record is incompatible with the responsibility it has just assumed. Iran cannot simply invoke the NPT when it wants to claim rights and disregard the same treaty when it comes to obligation. Iran cannot claim commitment to safeguard while failing to provide transparency required by the IAEA. Iran cannot speak of peace while destabilizing its region and attacking its neighbors in violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations. And Iran cannot speak of freedom of navigation while threatening and obstructing one of the world's most vital waterways.

I thank you, Mr. President.

I thank the distinguished representative of the United Arab Emirates. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States.

Thank you, President. I take the floor to respond to previous comments. To be clear, neither the United States nor the other states who spoke this morning are violating the treaty. Nobody has found them to be in noncompliance with their NPT obligations,

even once, let alone twice.

Conversely, Iran is violating the treaty, and that is why it is inappropriate and an embarrassment to have it serve as a VP of this review conference. If Iran dislikes this fact, rather than point fingers elsewhere, it should abandon its nuclear ambitions, resolve outstanding issues with the IAEA, and come into compliance, stop violating the treaty.

On February 28th, the United States began an operation to protect the American people, U.S.

forces, and partners against threats posed by a regime that has for decades undermined U.S. and international security, including by advancing its nuclear program in a manner inconsistent with any conceivable civilian purpose and repeatedly stonewalling the IAEA. This was not our preferred course of action. Indeed, the United States repeatedly pursued a diplomatic solution in good faith, and in doing so, we always provided clear timeframes for meaningful dialogue, including most recently in Islamabad on April 11th. Iran, however, has thus far chosen not to take those opportunities. Diplomatic efforts remain underway, but have thus far not succeeded, primarily because Iran has refused to commit to the responsible path. Iran continues to violate the treaty, and more must be done to hold Iran accountable to its NPT obligations. The administration is continuing to test a diplomatic path from a position of strength. President Trump has been clear that he prefers a diplomatic solution, but Iran has to make the right choices. If not, Iran will continue to face mounting military, economic, and diplomatic pressure with no relief in sight.

We ask you all to

join us in using this RevCon to defend the NPT and the safeguards system, to uphold the IAEA's authority, and to hold Iran to account. Further, we also ask this body to join us in urging Iran, loudly and resolutely, to engage constructively with us as we continue to pursue a deal to verifiably address Iran's nuclear program. Iran has an opportunity. We should all encourage it to seize the moment.

I thank the distinguished representative of the United States. I do not see any further requests for the floor. This concludes the list of speakers for this meeting. We will continue the general debate tomorrow morning at 10:00 a.m. Before concluding the meeting, and as indicated earlier, I propose that the list of speakers for the general debate be closed. May I take it that it is the wish of the Conference to proceed accordingly? It is so decided. I now give the floor to the Secretariat to make an announcement.

Thank you very much, Mr. President. The Secretariat would like to inform delegations that a side event entitled "Briefing on Regional Consultations for the 2026 NPT Review Conference" 15 p.m. in conference room 1. The event is convened by the President of the Review Conference with the support of the European Union and will provide an opportunity to share key outcomes and regional perspectives that emerged from the consultations. All delegations are warmly invited to attend. Thank you.

I thank the Secretariat. And before adjourning the meeting, I would like to take the opportunity to express my sincere thanks and appreciation to our interpreters, for the hard work that they have done throughout the day and especially for staying on beyond the closing time. Thank you very much. The meeting is adjourned.