10th Meeting - 1st Session Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems 2025
Meetings & Events
Date: 7 March 2025
Language: English
Transcript: https://transcripts.un.org/en/asset/k1s/k1sr9hfg09
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Chair [0:02]:

Excellencies, distinguished delegates, welcome back to the room. We have six more requests for the floor and we have one delegation that asked for the floor later on to have some further time for reflection. If they indicate with their plaque once they would like to speak, I will fit them in. At this moment, I have Brazil, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Germany, Pakistan, Sweden, and Luxembourg. And we add Bulgaria to that. Israel, Bulgaria. Good. Let me start by giving the floor to the distinguished representative of Brazil to be followed by Japan. Sir, you have the floor.


Brazil [0:53]:

Excuse me, Chair. I would kindly ask delegation to be brought to the to give it the floor at a later stage. Thank you.


Chair [1:03]:

We will allow you a moment of reflection. And I will now pass the floor to Japan, to be followed by Mexico.


Japan [1:12]:

Thank you, Chair. The Japanese delegation would like to begin by thanking you and your team for your tireless work to come up with this revised version of BUCK 3. I have a number of comments, roughly six. First, on paragraph 2, we saw that now it refers to rules and principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack. We would like to voice our preference to principles and requirements, which was a term used in previous GGE reports, including paragraph 21 of 2023 GGE report. And secondly, on the issue of development, we join others in saying that we believe that this should be considered on case-by-case basis. And with regards to the inclusion in paragraph four, we would also like to ask for its deletion as supported by Canada, Australia, the US, India, the ROK, and others. We think that it is addressed in section 4, as Australian colleagues have mentioned, and thank the Singaporean delegation for a very precise and concrete illustration. Thirdly, on paragraph 5, while we appreciate the substantive discussion on context-appropriate human control and judgment, it seems to us that it remains still ambiguous to what it is that we are actually prohibiting on this prohibition. Therefore, we would like to ask for its deletion, as well as deletion of this term at the end of paragraph 6, as well as the end of paragraph 7. At the same time, we look forward to further discussion on this. I remain hopeful that subsequent discussions on box 4 and 5, definitely not today, but perhaps in the intercessional period, would help us in moving forward on this. Fourthly, on paragraph 6B, we welcome the articulation of responsible chain of command and control in the first half of the sentence. And on the second sentence, on the term "ethical", We consider that while legal considerations enjoy common understanding of what is the basis of its consideration, such is not the case with regards to ethical. Therefore, we prefer to delete ethical. But as a possible alternative, we could also think of a way to not to refer to it in parallel with legal consideration. and use the agreed language from the 2023 GG report, paragraph 18. So one option would be in the second paragraph, this includes legal consideration, comma, as well as relevant ethical perspective, comma, and go on with the rest of the sentence. Also in this same paragraph, with regards to the reference to identification, We wonder whether we need to retain this or not in light of the discussions we had on the core functions. Fifthly, with regards to paragraph 6C in the chapeau, we concur with the delegation of France and ROK to add a language as necessary or as appropriate at the end of this chapeau. And this would be in line with paragraph 22 of 2023 DG report. In the Roman numeral paragraphs 3, 4 and 6, we support Germany and other delegations have asked for deletion of these paragraphs. So we would like to flag a concern to delete "by nature" in the numeral 5 of this paragraph. Yes, that is the end of all I have to say at the moment. Thank you, Chair.


Chair [5:45]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Japan for presenting the views of her delegation and making proposals. Next on my list is Brazil, to be followed by Mexico. The distinguished representative for Brazil, you have the floor.


Brazil [6:01]:

Thank you, Chair, and good afternoon. My delegation would like to note the very, very positively the changes that were introduced to this section, which, as has been clear from our initial engagement, provoked a very substantive and engaging discussion about how to operationalize the concept of context-appropriate human control and judgment. And my delegation welcomes this discussion and believes that this is the changes to the text, even though clearly have not yet garnered approval from all delegations. We are certainly going in the right direction. I will offer some specific remarks, both from the point of view of our initial reaction to the text and also in reaction to possible elements that were raised by other delegations. The first one would be to the reference to developments in both paragraphs one and four. My delegation welcomes the inclusion of these, uh, of the, this reference in paragraph four, and also supports, uh, in principle, the proposal by Austria to include it in paragraph one. Um, and this support is derived from the perception that, uh, the prohibitions and restrictions need to be taken into account, uh, from the earliest stages of the development of the, of any autonomous weapons, And we understand this prohibition as drafted in para 4 and potentially in para 1 as referring to the need to prevent the intentional development of laws in a way that is known from the very start that it's inherently incompatible with IHL. We see it as very similar to the prohibitions that are contained in the Biological Weapons Convention and in the Chemical Weapons Convention. which do not impinge upon or prohibit research on biological agents or toxic chemicals, but only on the intentional purpose of weaponization. However, we do hear the concerns that were voiced by many delegations, including Singapore, India, and others. Regarding the possible effect that this language might have in developments of autonomy in cases where the potential effects are not known from the start, my delegation does believe that there are ways to fix the language in order to avoid those concerns. We take note of the proposal made by Singapore in this regard. We believe that it would perhaps create another set of problems if we do refer to design in this paragraph, but we are very much open to considering alternative formulations and might present them to you and your team at a later stage. Coming to other elements on paragraph 2, my delegation supports the proposal made by Switzerland to include international humanitarian law after principles. And on paragraph 6, we believe that this change has been particularly useful as a way to both bridge the elements contained in paragraphs 1 to 5 and those contained in 6 and 7, and at the same time making it clear that this is the moment in which we are supposed to operationalize the concept of context-appropriate human control and judgment, bearing fully in mind the fact that this is not yet final and that we need to explore this concept further. On 6A, my delegation appreciates the proposal made by France to include development and use prior to employment and the formulation that we see, the revised formulation that we see. I think that the point that France made was extremely valid in that it's not only at the use moment in which these criteria need to be taken into account. And when it comes to 6B, we also support, like others, the maintenance of the terms ethical in this case. And at this point, Chair, this is -- these are the substantive elements that we wanted to raise, and again, very much supports the textual changes that were introduced. Thank you.


Chair [11:21]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Brazil for commenting on the tax proposals put forward and offering a number of suggestions. Next on my list is Mexico to be followed by Norway and Germany, but let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico, so you have the floor.


Mexico [11:47]:

Thank you, Chairperson. and, in line with other delegations, we recognise the work that you and your team have done over the week. As regards the changes in box 3, we believe that these are positive. We are making clear, positive progress pragmatically developing this section, addressing the legal, ethical, technological issues presented by laws. We take a positive view of the fact that in paragraphs 1 and 2, paragraphs 1 and 2 have been combined into one in order comprehensively to respect IHL obligations on weapons control. In paragraph 2, we take into account the discussions of the first reading. My delegation believes these are essential in terms of selecting objectives and respecting the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution in attack. Like Switzerland and others, we should also, in generic fashion, refer to the rules and standards applicable. In paragraph 4, we agree that that is positive in terms of development and use. From our point of view, There has been a clear explanation here of the application of IHL to development, and from Mexico's point of view, the prohibition of this development is essential to development, the relevant evaluations of legality. We see this prohibition as a disincentive to carry out investigations with the due precautionary measures as expressed by Singapore. There could be development that is irresponsible by omission or other. As regards the development of gaps that were mentioned, the prohibition regime in line with the biological weapons, this allows and incentivizes certain developments with the prohibition on the development of biological weapons. To avoid any doubts in this respect, we could reflect the obligation of carrying out the legal evaluations of weapons in the positive obligations of paragraph 6. The EU presented this yesterday, and it was also mentioned by the Asian Pacific Institute. Section 4 is geared to states and how to carry out these evaluations within their national prerogatives. Equivalent reasons are why the development and use needs to be included in paragraph 5. My delegation also reiterates the importance of considering the proposal of the ICRC and civil society in prohibiting anti-personnel autonomous weapons systems. We understand the reason why it was excluded in this version of the rolling text, but we believe that, as we make progress in consideration of the text, this is a topic that needs to be considered. On paragraph 6, the chapeau carries out the objective of giving clarity on positive obligations. required to ensure legality and legitimacy of autonomous weapons systems. 6A addresses essential concerns arising from the very characteristics of these systems. The use of paragraph 6, as expressed by Switzerland for clarity, could There could be additional terms together with control. We agree with the comments by a number of countries on the reasons why it is useful to keep the Roman numbers III to V. Thank you very much.


Chair [16:28]:

I'd be failing to distinguish representative from Mexico for giving a reaction to the text presented and for making proposals with regard to further development of the text. I would now like to pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Norway, followed by Germany, but first Norway. You have the floor, sir.


Norway [16:51]:

Thank you, Chair. First, we're positively reviewing the change that you made to paragraph four by including also the development of laws whose effects in attack could not be anticipated and controlled as required by IHL in the circumstances of their use. Prohibiting the development of weapons that are impossible to use in a legal manner would very much contribute to promoting the core principles and values of IHL. Ensuring that they're not developed in the first place is the best way to ensure that they are never used. So we think this adds value compared to simply reflecting well-known basic understandings of IHL. But if we first include development in the fourth paragraph, we agree with others that have mentioned that it should also be included in paragraph one. We struggle to see a reason why we should go easier in a sense on the development of laws that are inherently discriminant or otherwise incapable of using compliance with IHL than laws whose effects are impossible to anticipate and control. We took note of France's point, I think it was, which was then echoed by a number of delegations, India, Singapore, Australia, US, and others, that prohibiting development would be problematic, uh, in light of how development processes work in real life, and that it could have a detrimental impact also on the research and development side, uh, more broadly, especially if the basis on which the pro- the prohibition is formulated is not very clear and easily implementable. And of course, sometimes it's not entirely clear how something will work until it's developed and can be tested. So a possible fix, we think, could be to replace the word "develop" with "manufacture." So in other words, once the weapon is developed and tested and it becomes clear that it's incapable of being used in line with the law, then it would be prohibited to start manufacturing it. On a side note, I'll hop over that and go to paragraph 6, I think, instead. We also believe that the chapeau here is in much better shape now. The current version indicates in clear terms that the elements which follow are measures that contribute to human control and IGO compliance. With regard to paragraph 6C, we agree with the content, but we think that it should be reformulated slightly in line with paragraphs 6A and B. so that the commitment is for states to ensure that the types of targets, duration, et cetera, are controlled or limited and not, as it now reads, that the state as such should be the one to control or limit the targets. Furthermore, we believe that the, um, inter alia at the end of the chapeau in 6C, which, uh, has been introduced, does not quite respond to the issues we raised earlier in the week regarding the fact that the subsequent measures might not be appropriate or relevant, uh, in all contexts. Uh, the words "states need to" in the chapeau of paragraph 6, uh, imply that all those elements which follow are in a sense, necessary or obligations, whereas the words "including", "through", "interalia" and "sicci", they don't change that. They merely imply that the list of elements in the subparagraphs and Roman numerals is non-exhaustive. So, in our opinion, we should have something like the words "as appropriate" to show that the measures that follow are non-prescriptive examples, the relevance of which would depend on the context. And This could possibly also help to alleviate the concerns of those delegations who find the list of subparagraphs to be overly prescriptive and want to delete one or more of them. Finally, regarding paragraph 7, we think it's better now and that it clearly relates to the more critical parts of the mission, the mention of context, appropriate human control and judgment at the end. comes across just slightly off, though, since context-appropriate human control and judgment is a requirement to begin with, with the structure we now have. So we think that the French proposal, human validation, explains in a more precise manner what it is that we should require for such changes to take place. And finally, we also agree with Canada that paragraph 7 fits better in the list of measures in paragraph 6. Thank you.


Chair [21:22]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Norway for providing his views and making concrete suggestions with regard to the text elements. Next on my list is Germany, to be followed by Pakistan and Sweden. Let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Germany. You have the floor.


Germany [21:40]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I have the honor to deliver a joint statement on behalf of Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and my own country, Germany. Our group of countries wishes to highlight that we welcome the constructive spirit and the substantive quality of the discussions at this year's first meeting of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems. In our view, we have made significant progress with a view to consenting text building on a prohibition and regulations-based approach. We continue to fully support the work of the distinguished chairperson, Ambassador in den Bosch, as well as the work of the friends of the chair, and we remain committed to working actively towards fulfillment of the mandate of the GGE adopted by high contracting parties in 2023 as soon as possible, preferably by the end of 2025. To this end, we would like to suggest the Secretariat creates on a voluntary basis an overview containing one point of contact for each delegation in order to facilitate further exchanges between delegations, both with a view to the upcoming intersessional period as well as with a view to the three remaining GGE meetings under the current mandate. Thank you.


Chair [23:02]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Germany for the statement delivered on, uh, on behalf of a group of states. Next on my list is Pakistan to be followed by Sweden and Luxembourg. But let me first pass the floor to distinguished representative of Pakistan. You have the floor.


Pakistan [23:18]:

Thank you, Chair. Uh, I'd like to briefly react on some of the comments made, uh, but I understand it's my second intervention, so I'm in your hands if you would want to give others the floor, okay, then I'll briefly go on, Chair. We listened very carefully to the thoughtful interventions on this, especially from the distinguished delegation of Singapore, as well as some similar concerns on the issue of development in paragraph 4. So very briefly, we would offer our thoughts on this. Firstly, we appreciate Singapore's valuable explanation regarding the iterative and incremental nature of weapons development. particularly highlighting that safety and effectiveness assessments typically occur throughout the development process rather than at a single fixed moment in time. We fully understand and agree with this characterization of the development process. Indeed, this very nature of the incremental assessment is precisely why the word development must remain explicitly included in our text. To clarify, A prohibition on development would not mean that development of a planned laws cannot begin at all when the system's characteristics and implications are not yet fully understood. Rather, as Singapore correctly pointed out, if at any stage during that incremental development process, a determination is made that the weapon's characteristics or operational parameters inherently conflict with IHL obligations or could conflict with those obligations, then development must be halted or substantially adjusted to ensure compliance with IHL. Our intention is not to halt or prematurely restrict technological innovation. Rather, it is to emphasize the necessity of embedding IHL compliance at every critical stage of that iterative process. The Article 36 of AP1 explicitly underscores this very point. It requires states to evaluate the weapons lawfulness not merely at its deployment, but in the study, development, acquisition, and adoption stages. The fundamental purpose provision is to prevent states from developing or adopting weapons whose use would inherently violate humanitarian law. Of course, it was pointed out that there is a determination involved in that process. However, that critical determination is again on whether the weapon can and should not be developed at all. Secondly, some delegations have expressed concerns that referencing development in paragraph 4 will have deleterious effect on the access of such technologies, which could also be used for peaceful purposes. To clarify, Explicitly mentioning the development phase does not imply a prohibition on technological progress or peaceful applications. Rather, it ensures that technological advancements occur responsibly, ethically, and lawfully. Embedding clear guardrails at early stages of development prevents the inadvertent creation of inherently unlawful weapon systems. However, we do note that in some other instruments, there has been some language on guaranteeing unhindered access to technologies for peaceful uses. And we remain open to including that language in our elements of an instrument as well at an appropriate stage. Thirdly, there is a critical distinction to be drawn regarding IHL obligations. While it is correct that IHL obligations primarily direct directly govern battlefield conduct, thus primarily focusing on use, effective compliance with these obligations must begin far earlier. Compliance checks and safeguards are most effective when implemented during early stages. If IHL compliance is assessed only at the point of use, it may already be too late as systems could inherently embed biases, unpredictability, or functionality limitations. that render lawful use impossible. When we look at our box three, paragraphs one and four deal with those specific cases when the laws must never be used at all circumstances. The most effective means of ensuring these prohibited systems never enter the use phase is precisely to prevent their development from the outset. I think this point was just very eloquently stated by the delegate from Norway as well. Lastly, regarding the question raised in our discussions, whether the CCW framework permits considering prohibitions on development, the CCW has a precedent for establishing prohibitions beyond mere use, such as transfer prohibitions, for instance, outlined in AP2. Importantly, our mandate of GGE also explicitly demands us to go beyond simply restating previous conclusions that we agreed, for instance, in 2019, six years ago, or simply reproducing IHL formulations that we drafted many decades ago. Our responsibility includes clarifying or expanding existing obligations to address the novel challenges posed by laws. We believe that IHL is not a static construct, and the core purpose of our work within the CCW is on the progressive development and continuous codification of rules applicable in armed conflict. In sum, explicitly referencing development is vital to maintaining both the integrity and practicality of our regulatory framework. Thank you, Mr. Chair.


Chair [29:31]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan for also responding to earlier remarks made, to remarks made earlier by delegations. Looking at my list, next is Sweden to be followed by Luxembourg and Israel. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Sweden. Sir, you have the floor.


Sweden [29:54]:

Thank you, Chair, and thank you for giving us an opportunity to comment on revised box 3. And also to comment a bit on the statements made by delegations earlier today. So as a compromise, we could accept new Paris 1 and 2. We reiterate that loss that cannot be used in compliance with IHL should be prohibited. We also welcome the phrase "rules and principles" and want to underline that rules can derive both from treaties and custom. As we mentioned previously, Sweden would want to remove "in all circumstances" in para. 1 to better make the text reflect existing IHL. In a spirit of compromise, we could also consider to add "protected" before "civilian." and or to add that civilians that are protected unless and for such time as they take direct part in hostilities in this para. We would still like to remove the insertion of developing para 4. We support the prohibition of the use of laws if they have the mentioned effects, and we can support regulation of development, but we have problems with prohibitions on development as this could complicate things on a very early technical stage that is far from actual use. We believe that the obligation on legal reviews also addresses this concern in a stage that precedes use. Delegation from Singapore had some interesting suggestions earlier today for this para, which we could support. My apologies. Regarding, we can accept the new chapeau of para six, provided that inter alia remains in point C. Regarding B, we believe that it is required and essential to ensure that legal considerations are given by a human. But we would like to remove ethical, since we do not believe that this is a requirement of IHL. We also consider that it could be difficult in practice to ensure other ethical considerations than those that form an integral part of the already required legal considerations in the mentioned stages. We can accept Roman III with the added changes, and we consider this could be implemented by practical measures, such as limitations of ammunition or fuel, as mentioned by the US previously. We further see this limitation as building on existing prohibition to order or threaten that there can be no survivals. We would still like to remove Roman IV and the part of Roman V that comes after targets. We consider that Roman IV goes beyond existing IHL, and that this text and existing IHL already emphasizes measures taken to ensure the general protection of the civilian population. and individual civilians against dangers arising from military operations and their protection from direct attack, unless and for such time they take a direct part in hostilities. Similarly, we considered that Roman V goes beyond existing IHL. We believe that laws may be used in compliance with IHL, also against other military objectives, including objects that become such objectives by location, purpose, or use. We can accept Roman 6 in para 6, as well as para 7, but we believe that Roman 6 in para 6 really is superfluous, given that we already have para 7. Thank you, Chair.


Chair [34:04]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Sweden for sharing his views and making comments and suggestions. Next on my list is Luxembourg, to be followed by Israel and Bulgaria. Let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Luxembourg. Sir, you have the floor.


Luxembourg [34:22]:

Thank you, Chair. At the outset, we would like to express our appreciation for your efforts and those of your team. We broadly support the proposed text and would only wish to share a few observations for further consideration. Regarding paragraph 2, we support Switzerland's text proposal to encompass all principles and rules of IHL to ensure clarity and avoid potential misinterpretations. On paragraph 6, my delegation fully supports the proposal by Switzerland and the ICRC to amend the wording from "to ensure that laws can be used in compliance with IHL" to "are used" or "are only used." Compliance with IHL is not optional, it is an obligation. Concerning paragraph 6a, we believe that laws should not only be traceable and explainable to those responsible for their deployment, but to all persons involved in a chain of command and control. Traceability and explainability are, from our perspective, important pillars of ensuring human responsibility and accountability. We also support France's position in this point. In this paragraph, the wording should not be overly restrictive and should extend beyond just the engagement phase. With regard to paragraph 6C, Roman 1, we would like to underline the importance of ensuring that operators have the ability to disable a system whenever necessary at any time and under any circumstances. The current wording, timely deactivation, may not fully capture this imperative. Finally, on paragraph 7, from our perspective, laws should not be able to autonomously modify their own targeting criteria, operational scope, or engagement parameters without human intervention and explicit approval. Here, I would like to reiterate our position stated earlier this week that mission parameters should never be substantially changed without human approval. While we appreciate the introduction of the notion of context-appropriate human control in the rolling text, We would prefer more explicit wording in this paragraph. Thank you, Chair.


Chair [36:21]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Luxembourg for providing us with his comments, views and suggestions. Next on my list is Israel, to be followed by Bulgaria and Cuba. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Israel. So you have the floor.


Israel [36:49]:

Thank you so much, Chair, and thank you once again for the work and for the facilitation of such a complex yet important discussion. We can support some of the changes and additions made in this section. Regarding the fourth paragraph on the rolling text, we have some major concerns left. First, we cannot support the inclusion of the word "anticipated" in this paragraph. As we already pointed out, anticipation of effect is not a primary obligation under the IHL, but rather a second-order requirement intended to fulfill certain primary obligations. Moreover, it is our delegation's view that the reference to anticipation of effects may be read as an expectation for a degree of certainty that does not exist in the battlefield. We consider the current wording does not reflect the crucial nuances under IHL with regards to assessing effects of attacks. We may add that the core point on anticipation of effects that does have a possible legal implication on legality of the weapons can be viewed as sufficiently covered by the rest of this paragraph. We are open to refer to anticipation of effects as a practical measure in the implementation of IHL obligations, but not as it currently appears, namely an independent legal requirement that by itself can disqualify weapons. This has no basis in IHL. In addition, we request replacing the word "control" with "limited." in order to align the text with the terminology in Article 51 of the First Additional Protocol. We also reiterate our position that the phrase "in all circumstances" is unsuitable. The end of the current paragraph explicitly and correctly refers to dependency on the circumstances of use. The last comment regarding paragraph 4 concerns the replacement of the word "employ" with "develop". Such as the US, India and many other delegations, we believe this change is inappropriate, as IHL in its nature focuses on the use of weapons rather than on their development. As explained by other delegations, even Article 36 of the Additional Protocol of the Geneva Conventions does not instruct how to develop weapons, but merely addresses the development phase as a phase where future legal use is examined. We also want to note the very useful explanation provided by Singapore, which raises an additional challenge in this regard. For these reasons, we support deleting the word "develop". Regarding the fifth paragraph, As explained before, for various reasons, we object the language, context, appropriate human control and judgment, and think that there is an alternative language that could be suitable and achieve consensus. Another important issue, again, is that human-machine interaction is not a primarily IHL rule, so we disagree with putting it in the same list with well-established IHL prohibitions. For these reasons, We suggest changing the text of the fifth paragraph to the following text: "Appropriate human involvement with regards to laws must be ensured, where required to comply with IHL obligations under the circumstances." We have heard this week other alternatives to the current wording of paragraph fifth, which we think are workable, such as those proposed by Canada and the US. Regarding the sixth paragraph on the rolling text, this paragraph lists a variety of practical measures, some of which may be needed to implement IHL in certain circumstances, and some that reflect policy measures that exceed legal obligations. Currently, in our view, the chapeau does not adequately reflect the nuances and the mixing between the different types of requirements and expectations. For this reason, we think that the words "where necessary" should be added in the beginning of the paragraph. And secondly, changing the words "need to" to the words "should take appropriate measures to." In addition, we support the U.S., Japan, and other delegations suggestion to remove the text and with context appropriate human control and judgment. Also in line with the practical nature of the list, we think this paragraph should be moved to section four of the document. Accordingly, the text be phrased as follows, quote, "Where necessary to ensure that laws can be used in compliance with IHL, comma, States should take appropriate measures to. And go on. Regarding Article 6A, while we can see a connection between predictability and reliability to IHL implementation, we are still not convinced this is also the case with explainability and traceability. In addition, the meaning of the word traceability is not clear to us yet. In line with the comments made by others, we suggest to delete the words "explainability" and "traceability" from this paragraph. Regarding Article 6, we find the coupling with the concept of responsible chain of command and control is confusing. It mixes together too many concepts and terms. Therefore, we think that in this paragraph, only the first sentence should remain. Regarding Article 6, As the need in this, the restrictions is context dependent, we think that the beginning in the chapeau, in the beginning of the chapeau, the words "if needed" should be added. Or alternatively, the words "depending on the circumstances". Other than that, we feel that the current text of the chapeau is a good compromise between the different views. In relation to article C6, sorry, 6C, Roman number 1 and 6, Roman number 3, we appreciate these changes and are open to considering them in view of reaching an agreement. As for Article 6, Roman number 4, we repeat our suggestion to rephrase it in more generic terms. As we explained, on the one hand, risks may be presented also in areas where there is no concentration of civilians. I remind you the example of flying a passenger aircraft over the open sea. And on the other hand, one can imagine how LOS may be operated lawfully in areas where there are civilians or civilian objects, depending on their mission and capabilities. Therefore, we suggest replacing the current suggested text with the following text, limiting the operation of LOS to a defined perimeter. Lastly, regarding the seventh paragraph in section three of the rolling text, changes to mission parameters are not inherently unlawful, even if it is done regarding the target selection and engagement functions. For example, if the system was configured with a specific priority order for types of military targets, and in real time it prioritized one kind over the other, This kind of change will not violate IHL. For these reasons, we think that the text should accurately reflect that only modifications with negative legal implications should be considered. We suggest the following text accordingly. Take appropriate measures to ensure that laws mission parameters with regard to the target selection and engagement function-- sorry, I will read this again-- take appropriate measures to ensure that laws missions parameters with regards to the target selection and engagement functions will not be modified by the system in a way that will violate IHL. This is the end of our remarks. I know that they were a little bit detailed, and again, I ask your pardon for being detailed, but we wanted to explain ourselves. And as always, we are available to send the text to anyone that requires it. Thank you.


Chair [45:58]:

I thank the distinguished representative of Israel for his comments, remarks and also proposals. And the Chair would appreciate indeed to receive them in writing for further consideration. Next on my list is Bulgaria, to be followed by Cuba, Belgium, China and Kazakhstan. Let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Bulgaria. You have the floor.


Bulgaria [46:23]:

Thank you, Chair. We appreciate yours and your team's efforts to present a new draft for of box 3 to the group. We see this version as an advancement of the previous one, and we have just a few comments based on the reactions of the delegations in the room. Generally, we can support the new para 1 and para 2, but with the proposal made by the Swiss delegation to include IHL and all of its principles. On part C, we see merit in numeral number 1 with the proposal made by the Irish delegation. And on numeral 3, even though we see value in adding autonomously, we would prefer reformulation, the version proposed by Germany on Wednesday, where we combined numerals 3, 4, and 5. Similar to other delegations, we find 6C, numeral 6, to be quite similar to para 7, and as Canada proposed, maybe it would be better to integrate para 7 in para 6. Thank you.


Chair [47:50]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Bulgaria for his comments and suggestions. Next on my list is Cuba, to be followed by Belgium. Let me pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Cuba. Madam, you have the floor.


Cuba [48:09]:

Thank you, Chair. We're grateful for your efforts and for those of your team in order to consider all these points in one document. Generally speaking, We are aware that trying to achieve a consensus document is an exercise that requires willingness on the part of everybody, particularly in light of the subject we have before us. As our delegation has said, we have to contribute to consensus, although we hope to build an internationally binding legal instrument. We see that we have to take this step by step, in terms of regulations and prohibitions of certain kinds of weapons, although that might leave the door open for those weapons to exist under certain standards. That runs counter to our aspiration. As Pakistan, Brazil and others have said, prohibitions and regulations need to exist through the development and use of weapons. We need to try to find an appropriate application of IHL in all of the process. I think the amendment on development and use in paragraph 4 is acceptable. Cuba does not hope with this to limit the development of technologies for peaceful means, but rather for those that could be used for military means. We are looking at the ethics of this included in 6B. We also agree that we'd like to keep the Roman numerals 3 to 5 under paragraph 6. Thank you.


Chair [49:47]:

Let me express my gratitude to the distinguished representative of Cuba for her comments and suggestions. Next on my list is Belgium, to be followed by China and Kazakhstan. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Belgium.


Belgium [50:04]:

Uh, thank you, Chair. My delegation, uh, wishes to echo the other delegations that express their appreciation for the work undertaken by you, your team, and the friends of the Chair on this section. In our view, the overall text in box three is in good shape. We view this box as a key section for the two-tier approach. Regarding para six, we support the Swiss proposal and the ICRC addition reading. to ensure that laws are only used in compliance with IHL. In our view, the new chapeau helps clarify how the concepts of context-appropriate human control and judgment can be interpreted in relation to IHL. We attach importance to para 6 and the concepts developed under its Roman numerals in an open manner. We also welcome the insertion of Roman 6 regarding machine learning. This is something Belgium has provided a text proposal for, albeit slightly different than the one included here. For us, the gist is not to prevent machine learning, but rather to avoid that the laws reprograms itself while in operation, leading to unpredictability. So in our view, the key factor here is the time of implementation of the machine learned lessons. We feel this nuance is presently missing in the proposed text. Hence, we had originally suggested the wording, quote, implement machine learning in its critical functions in real time, close quote. Thank you, Chair.


Chair [51:50]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Belgium for sharing with us his views and making proposals to the text. Next on my list is China, to be followed by Kazakhstan, the UK, Australia, and the United Arab Emirates. But first, the distinguished representative of China. Madam, you have the floor.


China [52:11]:

Thank you, Chairman. The Chinese delegation would like to take this opportunity to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and your team for the tremendous amount of work you have done over the past week. Regarding paragraph 6, box 3, as we have stated in the first round of discussion, if we get bogged down in the technical details of regulating the research, development, use, and deployment of laws, It could lead to rather difficult technical disputes, and it would be difficult to reach consensus. China believes that with the prohibition clause in place, each country should be allowed to decide how to regulate laws in accordance with its own research and development and use regulations. Specifically, paragraph 6 and paragraph 7. Preliminary, we believe that they are both talking about the evolutionary nature of the machines, meaning the system can change preset functions and parameters through machine learning without human supervision and intervention. And we believe these two paragraphs can be usefully integrated and merged. The above are the Chinese delegation's preliminary comments on the rolling text in this session. Thank you.


Chair [53:55]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of China for sharing these preliminary remarks. Next on my list is Kazakhstan, to be followed by the UK. Let me pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Kazakhstan. You have the floor.


Kazakhstan [54:14]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you for your work and the work of your team on this updated rolling text, and we positively know the changes in the text as a indicator of interactive involvement of all delegations here. And regarding the box 3, on new para 1, we propose to include words "develop" before "employ". On the para 2, it is here unclear about what rules and principles, but what I heard Now, it was a suggestion to make a reference to IHL that we can positively consider. On para 4, we support the changes and keeping word "develop" and also to add "word transfer." So prohibit, develop, use, and transfer. I can understand the positions of many delegations about not to limit science progress, but this is not the case about such a limitation or prohibition. Here is only about the prohibition development with a concrete intention to develop concrete laws. Then we also in favor to keep the word "ethical" in the 6B. In 6C, also we like to keep the word deactivated by the human user. Without human user, it will be unclear by whom it will be deactivated. Because in the Roman 2, we have self-deactivation. So the Roman 1, it should be about the deactivation by the human user. Also, we are in favor of keeping the Roman 3, 4, and 5. And we welcome the new Roma 6. Same time, at this stage, we can support the idea of Chinese delegation to merge Roma 6 with the 7 para. This is all. Thank you.


Chair [57:16]:

We thank the distinguished representative of Kazakhstan for providing us with his views and comments. Next on my list is the UK, to be followed by Australia. But now, first, the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom. You have the floor.


United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [57:32]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. The UK would like to thank you again for the development of this text and the way in which it's taken into account the comments that we've heard in this room over this week. We think this discussion is actually vital in terms of working out how we can find bridges across the positions in the room, and we've been really pleased with delegations and in the way in which positions have been set out, so we're going to attempt to do the same. Mr. Chair, in general, we recognize that paragraphs one to three are designed to reflect statements about the application of IHL to the use of weapons, including laws. We did hear the Swiss intervention this morning in relation to including a reference to IHL in paragraph 2, so it would read, "rules and principles of IHL, including distinction," et cetera. We also listened to the intervention from the US, and we can see value in saying, "applicable rules and principles of IHL, including distinction." And we recognize the point also made by the US that there's not always complete agreement on whether precaution is a rule or a principle. So we think this is probably a reason that the text uses both rules and principles. However, we could see a possible way through this in terms of drafting. So laws may only be used in accordance with applicable IHL, including principles of distinction and proportionality and the rule of precaution in attack. Alternatively, I think this group has previously used requirements and principles of IHL to ensure that we reference both principles and the rule of precaution, so perhaps this would be a good approach, a good time to follow that approach. Mr. Chair, we'd like to make the point in relation to the inclusion of develop. Here, the UK would like to thank Australia and others who have spoken on this point for their, and Australia in particular, for their cogent intervention, and we support their points in relation to the need to ensure the reference to development is included in a way that is consistent with the purposes of the CCW. Like others, we don't support additions of development to paragraphs 1 and 5, given that paragraph 1 is effectively referring to specific principles of IHL, and paragraph 5 is under some real debate in terms of the way in which we engage the concept of human engagement. So, we would say that the lifestyle approach, which we think that's why we are looking at development here, really needs to be picked up as a theme in the document as it progresses, particularly in box four and onwards, and can't properly be added to straightforward enunciations of IHL in box three. Coming to the develop point in relation to paragraph four, We can see that the objective here is to speak to the need over the life cycle to consider the applications of the rule of IHL. However, from our comprehensive discussions about characterization in this room, we also know that these systems are not easily captured by definition. And there is a conflict in the idea of placing a prohibition on developing something on the basis of an effect, which may not be ascertainable at the point of development. This is something that we would expect to come out at points of testing. We would also point to the multifaceted nature of this technology in particular. And this is where we would distinguish it from other sorts of technologies where we see restrictions on development. here we're talking about technologies of, of software, which includes software, includes data sets, include training requirements. So the critical issues about the performance of the system is how it performs during testing, at which point one of those components may well need to be replaced or adjusted to ensure that the effects and attack may be anticipated and control. We would therefore support perhaps Singapore's suggestion that when we're talking about what is prohibited in this box 3, we think about prohibitions relating to the design or deliberate design of laws with a view that their effects cannot be anticipated or controlled. The other effects may well be better picked up later in this document. On paragraph five, we recognize that this is a place where the bridges that we were talking about are still under construction. The UK is really grateful for the useful interventions that we've heard about human control over the past day. We know that this group has recognized in a number of its reports the importance of operational context and the importance of ensuring accountability sits with the human. We're reflecting on how we might suggest suitable text that reflects the human element to provide a meaningful inclusion at this point in the box. Mr. Chair, as we are on Friday and this group has had a constructive week, we would actually welcome further discussions on the questions on human control that you posed yesterday, perhaps in the intercessional period, and we will certainly be thinking about how we better articulate our position during this time. To move on to box 6, we expect that we'll need to keep on working on this list in box 6, but we did want to raise a couple of queries about the text. At the moment, paragraph 6B references "identify and engage", whereas paragraphs 6C and 7 talk about "select and engage". We are not sure whether this is a deliberate distinction being drawn between the identify and select functions, and it would be useful to understand whether that is the case. We also suggest replacing the word "stages" with the word "functions" in paragraph 6B. Further on paragraph 6, the UK recognizes that temporal factors may be useful safeguards in relation to ensuring that systems would remain within the parameters of the law. However, we would also like to hear the further rationale for limiting number of engagements if all other requirements of IHL are met in the way in which the system is being used. And if all of those other requirements of IHL are not being met, we would suggest that the number of, any number of engagements would not be appropriate. So we're trying to understand what is the basis for the number of, limiting the number of engagements under paragraph 6C, Roman III. Thank you, Mr. Chair.


Chair [1:04:21]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom for her comments, suggestions, and also offer to continue discussions during the intercessional period. Next on my list is Australia, to be followed by the United Arab Emirates and Peru. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Australia. Madam, you have the floor.


Australia [1:04:48]:

Thank you again for providing the updated text overnight for states' consideration. Noting that section 3 is relatively long and there are many changes, we are here providing some preliminary thoughts today and will take the opportunity to consider this text in more detail over the course of the intercessional period. As a preliminary point, as with other States, we recognize and understand the rationale behind the deletion of para 1 and the resultant amendments to the new paragraphs 1 and 2. We also see merit in the proposal put forth by Switzerland on para 2 and will study this further during the intercessional period. In respect of paras 1, 3 and 4, Again, we share the views of Switzerland in respect of the "in all circumstances" terminology. For consistency with IHL and for clarity, we prefer deletion of the words "in all circumstances" from these paragraphs. The reason for this is simple. A prohibition is a prohibition, and the words "in all circumstances" do not add to the meaning of the text. Adding this text from our perspective also detracts from the clarity of the existing IHL obligations. For example, with respect to paragraph 1, the phrase "inherently indiscriminate" governs the prohibited circumstances of use. That is, a weapon is prohibited if it is inherently discriminate. As a possible compromise, we could look at relocating the words to the end of the sentence. So paragraph one would read from the new text, "or which are otherwise incapable of being used in compliance with IHL in all circumstances." As an aside, we also agree with April's comments regarding paragraph four on conflating existing legal obligations with the measures necessary to comply with those obligations. Moving then to paragraph five, we reiterate our previous position on this para and seek its deletion. And just to say a bit more on this, because actually I've already said that the discussions about context appropriate human control and judgment and what it means have been really useful. And just to say that from our perspective, the context appropriate human control and judgment is the bridge to and the means of achieving compliance with IHL. It's not a rule of IHL in and of itself. And this matters because for Australia and my delegation, Chair, IHL is the compass by which we operate and by which all states must adhere. To this end, context-appropriate human control and judgment may assist us in understanding how states can give effect to their IHL obligations, but it is not an obligation in and of itself. With respect then to the chapeau of paragraph 6, we've already talked about context appropriate human control and judgment and when it's helpful. For those reasons, we have some reservations about retaining it in the chapeau as it is, with IHL and context appropriate human control and judgment treated as parallel. While we would like to give further consideration to paragraph 6, just as a preliminary comment, We think it would be preferable to replace the words "need to" with "should" or "may consider". We would also like to offer some initial responses on the content of para 6, noting these remain subject to the formulation of the chapeau. So, in respect of 6, we can support France's proposal to include "as appropriate", for which, thank you, France. In respect to subparagraphs 1 and 2, as has been suggested by others, we would propose these be merged through the addition of "or, when not feasible, by." We think this is an easy improvement. The ICRC has also suggested a grammatical improvement for "timely," which we would also make. In respect of subparagraph 3, While we had proposed a different formulation for this subpara, we think your proposal is good. In respect of 5, we have no concerns with this text, but we wonder if we might improve the accuracy by simplifying it to limiting the types of targets to objects that are military objectives by nature. We also heard with interest the suggestion that was made by Canada on this para. And then on new paragraph 6C6, subpara 6, we specifically reserve our position as we need to think further about this point. From our perspective, there could be benefits to real-time learning to enhance AHL implementation. Echoing then the views of Canada and Bulgaria earlier, we support subsuming para 7 into the list as para 6, at para 6. We think this makes a lot of sense given the similarities of the measures and including that both reference context appropriate human control and judgment. And Chair, we hope that these preliminary comments, in addition to the comments we made earlier on this section this week and today, are useful and we look forward to further engagement with you and you all on this section during the intersessional period. Thank you.


Chair [1:10:33]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Australia for providing us with preliminary comments and suggestions, and also for the offer to continue the discussion during the intersessional period. Next on my list is the United Arab Emirates, to be followed by Peru. Madam, you have the floor.


United Arab Emirates [1:10:54]:

Thank you, Chair. I would like to begin by expressing my thanks to you and to your team. as you've delivered this new iteration of Box 3. We have some observations regarding the various items therein. With regard to paragraph 1, we see that there's an importance in linking the prohibition with the provisions of IHL to ensure that there is legal certainty and clarity. We'd like these systems to be under human control, and we'd like to replace a phrase there about used in compliance with IHL, so that the phrase says that cannot be used under IHL or in compliance with IHL. With regard to paragraph 3, we see that there's an importance in insisting on the responsibility of states in preventing violations and addressing them. We need mechanisms for investigation and accountability to be clarified there. With regard to paragraph 4, it is important to expand the prohibition to cover the deployment phase, not just development and use, as was mentioned by the UAE previously. We don't have other observations with regard to paragraph 5, but we might be amenable to support other suggestions to delete this paragraph. With regard to para 6, we have no observations, but under 6a, we see that there is importance in including independent review in response to some of the fears regarding transparency and accountability. As to 6b, we stress the importance of legal human responsibility. We have some observations regarding the sub-paras under c. including Roman II, regarding the fact that laws incorporate self-destruct and self-activation. These technologies should not be a replacement for the meaningful human intervention, and self-destruction can be insufficient to comply with IHL, particularly in events of unpredicted This is why, uh, human operators, uh, need to have the capability to, uh, deactivate the system without relying on self deactivation by loss with regard to limiting the number of engagements. The important aspect is human control and not limiting the number of engagements per se. This is why we don't see that compliance with IHL is pertinent to limiting the number of engagements, but pertinent to the human supervision across stages. And there's nothing in international law that tries to limit the number of engagements, but focuses on distinction, proportionality, and meaningful human control. With regard to the para on avoiding civilian targets or civilian objects, well, we see that it could be deleted because it's a rule that is covered by other paragraphs that do take up the issue of civilians and civilian objects. And the coherence of IHL covers this aspect, and there's no need to dedicate a sub-item to it. This is at least our point of view. Now, regarding the following paragraph, we don't have any further observations, but with regard to the paragraph on limiting real-time machine learning with regard to target selection and engagement functions, we see that the focus should be on guaranteeing human supervision that is adequate and not just targeting the capabilities of the machine to learn in real time. There is a degree of consensus that all the engagement decisions, all of them must be under human review in some form. With regard to para 7, we insist on the importance of human supervision when it comes to adjustments by laws. And we'd like to replace the phrases that don't mention the appropriate human control and judgment. Thank you.


Chair [1:15:41]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of the United Arab Emirates for sharing her observations with regard to the text. Next on my list is Peru, to be followed by Mozambique and Panama. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Peru. You have the floor, sir.


Peru [1:16:02]:

Thank you, Chairperson. At the outset, I wish to thank you and the friends of the Chair for the efforts to reflect the progress made within this rolling text. And I wish to express my delegation's support including or maintaining the word "development" and together with "use" in paragraphs 1, 4, 1 and 4, yes. I would recall that in the proposed protocol 6 presented by myself and other countries, In addition to development and use, we spoke of design, production, possession, acquisition, deployment and transfer. And I believe we should recall that the preamble of the CCW not only refers to the need to continue codifying and developing progressively the standards of international law applicable to armed conflict, but also recognize some of the preamble paragraphs of the convention, recognize therein the importance of contributing to progress leading to overall disarmament, complete disarmament. In paragraph two, Chair, I support the proposal by Switzerland to include a reference to the principles and rules of international humanitarian law. On paragraph 6, we're still looking at the scope of the proposal and we have some preliminary comments. On the chapeau, we believe that we should keep the text as is and avoid any caveats or use the verb "shall". As to 6, Roman 1, this is, so I'm sorry, C, Roman 2, We support keeping the word "ethical". And in Roman 4, we believe the text as you have set it out should be kept. Thank you.


Chair [1:19:20]:

Let me Thank you, distinguished representative of Peru, for sharing his observations and making comments and suggestions. Next on my list is the distinguished representative of Mozambique, to be followed by Panama. But first, the distinguished representative of Mozambique, you have the floor.


Mozambique [1:19:40]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Regarding paragraph 6, sub-paragraph c, Roman numeral 2, Mozambique should like to suggest adding remote offline tracking to the list of the measure needed for controlling loss. This should be important for multiple reason, but we would like to focus on prevention or diversion of such system in case of loss of contact during the conflict, especially in case this system fail to self-destruction and the self-neutralizer. We understand that we may have to change the words of subparagraph C for it to fall into this scope. We should suggest adding proliferation to the list of things to control. Subparagraph C should then read, "control or limit the type of target duration, geographical scope, population, and scale of the operation laws, including through entire area. Final, we suggest that Roman numeral two should read, ensure that laws incorporate self-destruction, self-deactivation, remote offline tracking, or self-neutralization mechanism. Thank you, Mr. Chair.


Chair [1:21:28]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Mozambique for his comments and suggestion. Next on my list is the distinguished representative of Panama. Madam, you have the floor.


Panama [1:21:44]:

Thank you very much, Chair. I'd like to join in the expressions of thanks from the delegations before me for your efforts, leadership and the great endeavor made by your team in trying to draw together the different positions that exist on this topic over the course of this week. In general, We agree with a number of the comments raised by the delegations of Austria, Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru and the ICRC. There are a few points we'd like to refer to. For example, we believe that in paragraphs 1, 4 and 5, we should refer to development as well as use. or deployment. A number of delegations have raised concerns as to whether this is a requirement under IHL. But part of the discussion we're having today is that although IHL is applicable, we know it's insufficient and we need to establish some kind of standard that contains provisions and regulations in the area of laws. Yet we're also operating under the framework of the CCW, which not only refers to requirements and considerations of IHL, but as the colleague from Peru just said, it also refers to the need for the development of arms and control of weapons to the principles of public conscience, the Martens Clause. which would suggest that that discussion is not only restricted to IHL. In addition, the only way in which we can comply with the current provisions of paragraph 1, 4, and 5, which are prohibitions of use of these weapons, is explicitly to avoid their very development. Paragraph 6A We firmly support the maintenance of references to predictable, reliable, traceable and explainable, because that is a component that is contained in our protocol 6 on systems for laws. We also support maintaining reference to ethical considerations in paragraph 6. Here, many delegations refer to the guiding principles, and ethical principles are, of course, contained within these guiding principles. So, here, we're not recreating the wheel. And then, to conclude, we support that in box 3, we continue to maintain references to human control. Thank you very much.


Chair [1:25:07]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Panama for her comments and suggestions. I have two more requests for the floor, Colombia and Austria. Let me pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Colombia. Madam, you have the floor.


Colombia [1:25:26]:

Thank you very much, Chair. I will be brief. because I simply would like to support many points that have been raised by colleagues, in particular the last speaker from Panama. I think this really sums up a lot of what I wanted to say. Although we're continuing to analyse the proposed text, we appreciate the inclusion in the first paragraph, the prohibition of all weapons that undermine IHL, which is also in step with paragraph two that's proposed. For our country, we believe that the respect for the rules and the principles of distinction and proportionality and precaution can only be respected through human control. We also support including the word "develop" in paragraph 4, and as other delegations have said before me, it is our duty in this work on laws to consider how to regulate not only the use of autonomous weapons but also their development. On paragraph 6, we agree with maintaining the proposed drafting, including the adjustments that you've just mentioned, and above all, that we keep the reference to human control throughout this box 3. Thank you very much.


Chair [1:27:06]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Colombia for sharing your views and comments. Next on my list is the distinguished representative of Austria. You have the floor.


Austria [1:27:19]:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I just wanted to follow up on the discussion and mainly two questions that have been brought that are very general, but they refer to the one about the idea that development is or that IHL is only about the use of weapons and we just have to make some comments about that. The second one is what the CCW is about and what it is not about and there's also something to say about that and then of course the issue of development. But first before going into this I just wanted to say that the whole week as we are going into Friday afternoon the whole week has been very enriching. It also and this is the one main point I wanted to make it's also helped to understand our own positions better by being challenged and, and by having questions asked, uh, the one from yours, but also the one from colleagues, and I think we are in a very good place here and, and we are definitely moving forward also in, in, in understanding the positions of other spotters, but also understanding better our own position, and that, um, was just a point I wanted to make. The issue of use, if IHL only covers the use of weapons, I think that's a clear no, because we have many instruments which go far beyond that. I mean, I mentioned the one that cover weapons of mass destruction, but still there are also, I mean, those are the main examples and there is a clear development clause in all three of them. So there is this is not something completely new. The big question is, is it needed here as well? And I will go into this later. Then about the CCW, has it been designed only to prohibit or restrict weapons? I mean, this is something that is mentioned in the Preambula. But the interesting thing about the CCW that it also has given itself very lofty aims, with the, I mean, it has this catch-all phrase, the normative element with the Martens Clause. It has also the, it's also reaffirming in the preamble that the need to continue the codification and progressive development of rules and international law applicable in armed conflict. And then in the very same preamble or part that is talking about wishing to prohibit or restrict further the use of certain conventional weapons, it's also talking about facilitating the talks on disarmament, we have a view to putting an end to the production, stockpiling, and proliferation of such weapons. So on the one hand, you are having this prohibit and restrict focus on certain conventional weapons, but you also have the ambition to do otherwise. And in the history of the CCW, we have instruments that have gone beyond that very clearly, because we have several protocols that don't only talk about the restriction of the use of weapons, but it's also talking about transfers, clearance, recording, destruction, assistance, and cooperation. assistance to victims and other things. So we are not limited by this, and the development is definitely something that we should take into account. Why has been put forward by other colleagues already. The development, as it has been proposed by us and others in several of the paras, in particular in para 1, is supporting the initial prohibition of use that was there in the original part of the text. It's supporting it by giving an additional indication to everyone who is involved in the development phase. And the original idea, as was already explained, why we should do this is that the development phase with this kind of weapons is probably different. There will be other stakeholders involved, and it's important that they are clear about what are the possible consequences. The arguments that have been brought forward by, by Singapore, and it has been a very good example, um, are very pertinent, and the examples they have outlined about what could happen if something is developed and you hit a certain roadblock or a problem is exactly the way how it probably should also be done. with relation to lethal autonomous weapon systems. So if there is a problem when it pops up and you realize there is something I should test, I should look into, this might be relevant if this and this prohibition, then you test it, you look into it already in the development phase. The wrong way would probably would be to just go along and wait until you're getting to the stop point of an Article 36 review because this is Very much too late in the development process, and you're probably losing a lot of money, time, and resources when you arrive there, and a, a legal advisor from the MOD will tell you, okay, you failed the Article 36 review, and this is not something that we cannot use, so it's advisable for many. reasons that this has already been done in the earliest phase as possible, and it's also practical. When we are talking about dual use or companies and the general question if regulation hampers technological development or innovation, I mean, there I have to say it's probably already too late because there is a lot of civilian regulation already going on. The most prominent example is the UAI Act, and every AI system that wants to enter the European markets has to pass the thresholds that this regulation is doing there. And any developer that does not take that into account is probably wasting some resources there as well. So this is just a basic outline. Also from other civilian regulation discussions, we know that the industry, especially the civilian one, usually prefers having guardrails, prefers having legal clarity, especially when it comes at a multilateral level, and when there is not a mix of different legal systems that contradict each other and different practices. Legal clarity is an economical asset, and it's something that we can provide here. Another place where legal clarity is useful is Article 36. While it is conducted on a national basis, it happens against the background of IHL, and the more specific we are in that regard, the better. So any additional clarity that we can provide here also helps with all the Article 36 reviews conducted. And I think I covered all points that are noted on. I thank you.


Chair [1:33:34]:

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Austria for his comments and also reacting to the previous statements. He was the last on the list. So, if anybody would still like to share some views or to react to the views that have been put to table, then this is the moment. If not, I will try to make an attempt to summarize a bit the discussion. I have been scribbling down your remarks on an A3. I think I will advise the permanent representation to buy a new printer with A2 format, uh, if we discuss something like this, because it's been, you had many, many suggestions, and that's of course great. And it was all done in a very constructive manner. And indeed, there was a lot of explaining. And it was, as was said by the distinguished representative of Austria, there was even a lot of better understanding, the own views of delegations, where they were challenged by others to respond to questions. And that is certainly helpful. I also very much appreciate, uh, what are the offers to continue discussion in, in, um, in the intersessional period, I will make some announcements, uh, regarding that later on, um, I think, um, if I can make an, uh, a very humble, uh, ap… attempt to summarize the discussion, I think I would like to say that in the first four hours, we have tried to summarize existing AICHL. And I think to a very high level, we have already agreement on that. It's now the way of phrasing it properly, rephrasing it. There are certain There's still, of course, a discussion on, uh, on, on the develop- development, that's clear. We can continue that discussion, I think. Uh, then para five, I think the UK has won the prize for the understatement of the day, uh, with regard to para five, calling it still under construction, uh, and let's call it like that, uh, and indeed, we have to work on it, but somewhere in the text, we have to say something about, control, et cetera, and I will refer to that also in my concluding remarks because this is, of course, one of the takeaways from this week. Then we have para 6, alpha to Charlie and Roman numerals, 7, perhaps we can fix that into 6. a lot of proposals to do work on it, in certain cases deletion, but I think there is a good basis to work upon that and perhaps with also some streamlining we can make good progress. So that's, I would say, then for box 3. Then there was the request by Germany on behalf of a group of states to to try and set up a list of focal points. I had some contacts with the ISU. They are, of course, always helpful, always prepared to be helpful. This is, of course, entirely voluntary. But if you are interested, we will try to create this opportunity. The ISU will send out an e-mail with some further details of that. So action will be taken. And I think it would fit very good into the idea of intercessional work and into continuing also the direct context between delegations in order to promote our work. So I think this is a bit what we have on the agenda item five, the most substantive agenda item, the most substantive we have on our agenda, then we always have, if I remember correctly, any other business on the agenda item number six, if that's correct, any other matters, indeed. Is there a request for the floor under agenda item 6, other matters? As there are no requests for the floor, we will move to our next item, agenda item 7, adoption of the report. I would like to remind you that the 2024 meeting of the high contracting parties recalled the decision of the 2023 meeting of the high contracting parties that the group should submit a report to the seventh review conference, as laid down in paragraph 23 of the final report of that meeting, document CCW/MSP/2024/7. I, we will continue our discussion on the rolling text during our session in September. Therefore, nothing will be considered under this agenda item during the current session. Agenda item eight, closing of the meeting. I have prepared some remarks for you, but I think we are still very well on schedule. So please allow me to have those remarks, and they are not only looking back, but there's always a forward-looking aspect in it also. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, I think I can look back at this week's session with satisfaction. Our discussions have not only been substantive and technical, but also very informative. Furthermore, they have allowed us to make substantial progress in better understanding delegations' positions and to clarify our understanding of applicable IHL, as some of you said this morning and also this afternoon. During this week, we have completed a full reading of the text and, based on our discussions and exchanges, have embarked upon a second reading of boxes 1 to 3 with, I dare say, numerous textual suggestions. This will enable us to further shape the rolling text. In our collective endeavor to formulate possible elements of an instrument and other possible measures to address emerging technologies in the area of laws, full stop. We do this by building upon the recommendations, guidelines and conclusions as formulated by the Group. As Chair, I am focused on delivering on the mandate that has been entrusted to this Group by the Meeting of the ICPs in 2023. Work done in the past deserves recognition. But we should not forget that on many occasions, discussions on substantial issues had to be cut off for the purpose of reaching consensus on a report on the last day of the Meeting. Our mandate allows for a more in-depth and substantial discussion, and I intend to make the best use of that. Some of you have also voiced the desire to move beyond restating existing IHL and contribute to the progressive development of IHL. On the other hand, let's not forget the Group works on the basis of consensus. A special thanks also goes out to the observers, whose contributions greatly enriched the discussion. I was also happy to note several newcomers to the GGE laws, and I hope the non-high contracting parties that observed and participated in this week's discussion will feel emboldened to take further steps to what's becoming a high contracting party to the CCW. Let me now provide you with some preliminary conclusions from my side. and prospect for the way forward, including my ideas for the intercessional period. Substantive conclusions. Discussions on box one, the working characterization of ALWs, show that there is a continued need for further work, notably around the notion of lethality and the key functions of ALWs. The second reading of the text included a constructive and rich discussion on new wording on lethality, and I intend to build on this when developing a new version of the rolling text. Another key achievement this week is our discussion on Box 2 and the application of IHL, which underlined that there is a common understanding of various notions and that consensus on many of the elements in this box appears to be possible, if not already within reach. Furthermore, our exchanges on the section reflecting prohibitions and regulations were equally rich and detailed. Although we still have work to do on this part, including on deciding which elements should be in which box, It seems that the form of prohibitions and regulations in box three and measures in box four is a suitable way to proceed for many delegations. Box five has always been the last of the boxes to be discussed, and that means that some ideas and concepts by that moment had already been discussed in earlier boxes. However, I think I have received useful input for a new version of box five. and may consider in the next session to use a different sequence of discussing the boxes, also because of the relation between responsibility and accountability and control. That said, key divergences persist. Delegations currently still hold diverging views on the terminology of identification and/or selection and engagement in the working characterization. Another issue that requires further discussion is how to reflect the need for and degree of human control and judgment, which is first mentioned in box two, but comes back in later boxes. All in all, I'm very grateful for the detailed exchanges we had, which allowed us to better understand how delegation perceived these concepts. Your input is duly noted and will be considered in detail in the next version of the rolling text. On the way forward, it is with these substantive consideration in mind that I am looking towards the intercessional period in the run-up to our September session, which will take place from the 1st to the 5th of September in the, for me, a bit depressing surroundings of the Tempest building. First of all, It's my intention to provide you with a revised rolling text, taking into account comments put forward during the first reading done this week and your remarks concerning my informal textual suggestions that I presented to you in the latter part of the week. Thanks to the intercessional sessions and this week, I feel we should be able to share the revised rolling text in the course of April. As per past practice, I also aim to share with you a Chair's summary of this week's deliberations in the coming weeks. I also plan to hold further informal consultations during the intersessional period. I acknowledge that the disarmament calendar is already busy and that we will have to take account of the summer break. In other words, I see valid reasons to keep the momentum of this week and resume our intercessional work sooner rather than later. I intend to carefully balance the capacity of delegations and workload. After all, we can only do so much in informal work. I intend to answer to the call of many delegations to try and use one or more of the informal intercessional consultations to discuss specific examples of systems and other more technical considerations to facilitate moving towards a common understanding with regard to some key points of discussions, of discussion like identify, select, and engage, and context appropriate human control and judgment. Given the high quality and detailed nature of our deliberations this week, I believe our debate would merit a conversation that allows to discuss specific examples and scenarios relation to the rolling text, in relation to the rolling text. For instance, to identify which specific sys- which, sorry, to identify which kind of systems would fall under the characterization in box one. Specific information on this informal intercessional will follow in due time so you can prepare accordingly. If this specific discussion during informals turns out to be useful, I might consider facilitating a follow up during our upcoming formal meeting. As always, I aim to provide delegations with the documents for our second session in September no later than a month in advance of our next formal meeting, so let us say the 1st of August. On closing, in closing. I once more reiterate my deep appreciation for your time and active participation this week. I also would like to thank my team and the friends of the Chair, Claudia Hanfrey of Australia, Claudio Leopoldino of Brazil, Christiano Brice of the Philippines, and Reta Wollman of Switzerland, for their efforts in preparation of and during the meeting. My thanks also goes out to UNODA and especially to the CCW ISU conference service officers and interpreters for their efforts throughout this first 2025 session of the GGE on Laws. With that, I close our meeting.