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Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) 2nd Report Rollout Event

12 January·15:00·01:15:08Meetings & Events

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United States of AmericaAmbassador; Moderator

Good afternoon, everyone. Thank you for joining us today for this discussion of the second report of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team. I am Ambassador Dan Negre from the U.S. Mission. I will be moderating our discussion today. Before we begin, I’d like to especially thank Germany for providing financial support and coordinating the logistics for this event. I'd also like to thank the Republic of Korea for supplying hard copies of the SMMT report. These printed copies have been made available for the UN member states' representatives joining us today. We ask that other audience members and members of the press please secure your copies of the report online at www.msmt.info. Representatives from the SMMT participating states, of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States are here today to discuss the initiative's second report, which details the DPRK's violation and evasion of UN sanctions through cyber and IT worker activities. These 11 states established the MSMT as a mechanism to monitor and provide public reports detailing violations and evasions of UN sanctions on North Korea after Russia vetoed the renewal of the UN 1718 Committee Panel of Experts mandate in 2024. In today's event, you will have an opportunity to hear from SMMT participating states, as well as four private sector partners from Google Threat Intelligence Group, Palo Alto Networks, Sequoia.io, and Upwork. This is a rare and valuable opportunity to engage one another and some of the private sector's leading experts on a topic that impacts all member states, the DPRK cyber and IT worker operations. Without further ado, let me introduce the United States State Department's Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Jonathan Fritz, who will present the MSMT report's key findings. Thank you.

United States of AmericaMSMTPrincipal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs

Thank you, Ambassador Negrea, and welcome to everyone for joining us for this discussion. The DPRK's cyber and IT worker activities whether through asset freeze evasion or by allowing North Korean nationals to earn income abroad, violate a series of UN Security Council resolutions, including those listed on this slide, and support the unlawful development of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. Today, I’ll highlight some of the salient findings of the MSMT report. on these violations and evasion activities before turning it over to other MSMT participating states to make their comments. Before I address the substance of the report, I want to thank all of the MSMT participating states and private sector partners that have contributed to this effort. As you can see, the report is quite extensive, something like 140 pages. Without all the MSMT governments contributing resources and information to this effort, this endeavor would not be possible. We're also very thankful to our many private sector companies that contributed to the report, including Chainalysis, Dtex, Palo Alto Networks, Google Cloud's Mandiant, Sequoia.io, Uplift, and others. The fact that so many sources, both public and private, contributed to this report reflect serious global concern about DPRK cyber activities and fraudulent IT workers. And the fact that we had such a wide variety of sources adds to the robustness and the veracity of the findings. So thanks to this collaboration, we now have a report that contains an unprecedented depth of new information that we can all use to take action. The DPRK’s activities not only violate UN sanctions, they also harm everyday consumers and citizens of our countries, who have repeatedly been the targets of DPRK cybercrime. North Korea’s cyber and IT worker activities target Pyongyang’s friends and foes alike, as you can see from this slide, which provides a non-exhaustive list of countries that have been targeted. They particularly target companies across the globe to steal funds, information, IPR, and personal data through fraudulent criminal activity. DPRK cyber actors and IT workers are directly subordinate to specific UN-sanctioned entities in North Korea. These entities of the DPRK government, highlighted on this diagram, have all been sanctioned by the UN for their role in the DPRK's unlawful development of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. As you can see, nearly every aspect of the DPRK party state apparatus that engages in activities related to the unlawful development of weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missiles, be that the Reconnaissance General Bureau or the Munitions Industry Department, each has a team of cyber actors or IT workers attached to it. Pardon me. These teams use tactics including fraud, hacking, and very sophisticated social engineering to generate revenue for the UN-designated entities they support through cybercrime and fraudulent IT work. Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 2094, UN member states are required to prevent provision of any financial assets or resources that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related, or other weapons of mass destruction-related programs or activities. Pursuant to the assets freeze set out in UNSCR 1718, 2094, and 2270, all UN member states are required to freeze the assets, funds, and economic resources of designated persons and entities, as well as any persons or entities acting on behalf of or at their discretion, or those owned or controlled by them. This includes economic resources, including cryptocurrency. of designated entities detailed in this report that engage in malicious cyber activity and IT work. This diagram, to our knowledge, provides the most detailed information available to the public on the relationship between DPRK-sanctioned entities, DPRK IT workers, and DPRK cyber actors. We hope that this sort of detailed information will be useful to UN Member States. The DPRK's main motivation for these activities, particularly in relation to the UN sanctions regime, is financial. The majority of North Korean cryptocurrency heists, as detailed in the MSMT report, are carried out by actors working on behalf of UN-designated entities like the Reconnaissance General Bureau, the DPRK's premier intelligence organization. The MSMT estimates that the DPRK stole at least $2.8 billion, that's billion with a B, between January 2024 and September of 2025. And this, it is worth noting, is a conservative low-end estimate. The actual amount is likely higher, and the DPRK has stolen more cryptocurrency since the report was released in October. In February 2025, the DPRK stole $1.4 billion in cryptocurrency from a single cryptocurrency exchange called Bybit. This is the largest cryptocurrency theft of all time, perhaps the largest theft of any kind of all time. According to MSMT participating state information detailed in the report, North Korea has now converted all of the cryptocurrency stolen from Bybit and its customers into fiat currency through sophisticated laundering techniques. The DPRK relies upon networks of North Korean nationals abroad and foreign-based facilitators, including in China, Russia, Argentina, Cambodia, Vietnam, and the UAE, to launder stolen digital assets into fiat currency for procurement activities and for funding its unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs. Since the report’s publication, the DPRK has, unfortunately, conducted even more cryptocurrency heists. The MSMT report also reveals new details about the DPRK's use of cryptocurrency as a form of payment and exchange. MSMT participating states have observed several instances of DPRK actors trying to make payments and sales in cryptocurrency, particularly using stablecoins, which maintain a value equal to the US dollar. This should be a concern to all Member States. The ability to carry out transactions in cryptocurrency for prohibited activities provides UN-designated DPRK entities with a new avenue to evade sanctions. Making and accepting payment in cryptocurrency is likely faster and less cumbersome than cash transactions are, which would likely need to be physically transported, often across national borders, to be used for DPRK procurement activities. DPRK IT workers, while distinct from cyber actors, are also systematically engaged in activities prohibited by the UN Security Council resolutions, including 2375 and 2397. During the reporting period, MSMT participating states found that the DPRK deployed IT workers delegations to at least eight countries, and also operated IT worker teams from within North Korea. The overwhelming majority of North Korean IT workers were based in China, though MSMT participating states found that the DPRK planned to dispatch a new deployment of some 40,000 laborers to Russia, including several teams of IT workers amongst that number as well. From these locations across the globe, North Korean IT workers pose as nationals of other countries online in order to fraudulently gain employment, often with tech companies in order to earn a salary and then remit the funds from that salary to the parent organization, which in turn use those monies to fund procurement and other illicit activities. These IT workers defraud global companies to gain otherwise legitimate jobs, taking employment opportunities from our own domestic populations and exposing our businesses to serious risk. Like DPRK cyber actors, these DPRK IT workers also rely on foreign facilitators from across UN member states to secure employment, to provide support, and to remit earnings back to DPRK entities. The final category of activity detailed in the report is distinct from the financially motivated operations I've been discussing so far. DPRK cyber actors also systematically infiltrate companies in strategic industries, including critical infrastructure and defense companies, in order to steal information, IPR, pardon me, and technology to further the DPRK's unlawful development of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles and contribute to the stockpiling of other arms and related material. Cyber espionage against defense and technology companies around the world contributes to the advancement of the DPRK's unlawful weapons programs directly. This includes key military capabilities that Kim Jong-un himself called for during the Eighth Party Congress in 2021, as well as his efforts to sustain Russia's war against Ukraine. This is a difficult problem for our nations to confront. DPRK cyber and IT worker activities are widespread, and many of their tactics are highly sophisticated and difficult to confront. We know that DPRK cyber and IT workers are adopting artificial intelligence tools to further improve their trade craft. The only way to make a dent in this activity is for UN member states to work diligently together to implement UN Security Council resolutions, and we welcome discussion of how we can best collaborate to ensure not only that North Korea cannot rely on these activities to engage in sanctioned activities, but to protect our economies, our companies, and our citizens from cybercrime. We are glad to report that the information in the report has already supported sanctions implementation by several companies. We're also very grateful to the governments of two member states, Argentina and Pakistan, for taking action to address issues highlighted in the report. In fact, I understand that Pakistan has actually approached an individual, sorry, not approached, but apprehended an individual that the MSMT report identified for her role in facilitating North Korean IT worker activities. On behalf of the MSMT, I'd like to thank Pakistan for taking such swift action. The MSMT would be happy to assist other countries in acting on the information in this report as well. And with that, I will now turn it over to my dear friend, Ambassador Yamazaki, to discuss the report's recommendations. Thank you.

JapanAmbassador

Thank you, Mr. Fritz, and I also thank the US mission headed by Ambassador Nigrea for this event. I would like to thank those who are present at today's side event. First of all, I would like to reiterate that the MSMT plays a crucial role in monitoring the implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions on North Korea after the deplorable loss of the panel of experts of the 1718 Committee due to Russia's veto. As the MSMT report notes, The value of cryptocurrency theft by DPRK amounts to more than 2.8 billion US dollars in less than two years. We cannot underestimate how much North Korea has gained in revenue from malicious cyber activities for the sake of developing its own, its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. which is a clear violation of relevant Security Council resolutions. The MSMT report does not intend to name and shame, but rather aims to share information and raise awareness about North Korea's activities related to violations and evasions of Security Council resolutions, and encourage all Member States to take actions. As mentioned in the report's recommendations, Japan believes Raising awareness across international society, including the maintenance and development of capabilities to trace cryptocurrency transactions, is important to prevent North Korea from employing its malicious cyber activities. Japanese companies are also targeted by North Korean hackers, and, for instance, the hackers stole 308 million US dollars worth Bitcoin from DMM DeepBitcoin. The company was forced to shut down their operations. Last year, Japan issued an updated report alert to provide detailed information on new trade craft used by the North Korea IT workers and gave advice to private sectors to mitigate the risk of in inadvertently hiring, supporting, or outsourcing work to North Korean IT workers. As we will hear the views from the private sector later on, I would like to reiterate the importance of cooperation between the governments and the private sector in pursuit of this endeavor. The report describes cases of malicious activities of North Korean IT workers across the world, including Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. But we are afraid this is just the tip of the iceberg. Therefore, I would like to call on all UN Member States to remain vigilant and to make necessary measures in the financial and institutional systems. Japan, together with MSMT, participating MSMT participating countries stands ready to assist if any Member State needs support and to work with the Security Council and the 1780 Committee for further cooperation on this matter. I thank you.

Australia

Thank you very much indeed, Jonathan, for bringing us together. Dan, much appreciate your leadership in this space. First of all, from an Australian perspective, can I commend the meticulous analysis and research that's gone into the MSMT's second report. The report lays out in a compelling way the egregious conduct which is cause for the gravest concern for all of us. And it's clear that the scope and scale of North Korea's criminal enterprise used to fund its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile program calls for our collective attention and immediate action, and Australia has heeded that call. On 6 November, the Australian Government acted on this report by imposing targeted sanctions on four entities and one individual involved in supporting North Korea’s WMD programs through malicious cyber activity, entities responsible for major cyber attacks on hospitals, on Sony Pictures, the Bangladesh Bank heist, and the 2017 WannaCry attack, as well as entities engaging in cyber espionage against government officials and journalists. Australia calls on all countries, including North Korea, to ensure their activities in cyberspace are consistent with international law and the norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. As the report clearly and rigorously demonstrates, this is not a hypothetical threat. Malicious cyber activity from DPRK can adversely affect every single country and region, which is why we ask every state to be vigilant and businesses to protect their operations from exploitation so that North Korean hackers and fraudulent IT workers cannot find safe havens to perpetrate their crimes. Moreover, The MSMT’s detailed reporting provides a compelling account of the connections between North Korea’s malign cyber activities and DPRK entities that are already subject to UN sanctions. The DPRK relies on these cyber operations to illicitly finance their weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. UN-sanctioned entities, including the Reconnaissance General Bureau, are carrying out the majority of these activities to circumvent the asset freeze imposed in Security Council Resolution 1718. We reiterate our calls for North Korea to abandon its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. Australia looks forward to further reporting from the NSMT in the coming year. Russia’s reckless decision to end the mandate of the UNSC’s Panel of Experts on North Korea means that the NSMT is a vital mechanism to expose the DPRK’s violations and evasions of UNSC sanctions. Thank you so much.

Netherlands (Kingdom of the)

Thank you. I would like to start with a word of thanks to the U.S. Mission for hosting this very important event. I would like to thank the other MSMT members and all those of you present here today, because, in our view, the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team is a vital instrument in monitoring the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions related to sanctions imposed on the DPRK. And despite Russia's veto in April 2024 on the UN Security Council's 1718 Sanctions Committee panel of experts, we stand here proudly with a second report. The Kingdom of the Netherlands is greatly concerned about the vast scale and impact of DPRK's cyber operations outlined in this report. Through malicious cyber operations, DPRK entities and IT workers have found new ways to circumvent and violate UN Security Council sanctions and generating billions of dollars for the unlawful development of its weapons of mass destruction programmes. And given the cross-border nature of these operations, international cooperation is paramount. Servers in the Netherlands, with its well-operating hosting climate, have also been abused by DPRK for their attacks and to launder funds. Through cooperation, the Netherlands has interrupted their criminal services on different occasions. And as was highlighted in the presentation, the report reveals that IT workers often operate outside of their national territory, collaborating with criminal networks in various countries. We call on all States to exercise their due diligence and not to knowingly allow their territory to be used for such acts. Finally, the private sector plays a critical role in enhancing cybersecurity and strengthening transaction monitoring systems. And I would like to thank the representatives for being here today. Continued cooperation between the international community, law enforcement, and the private sector remains essential to detect and counter these malicious operations. In closing, I would like to underline that the Kingdom of the Netherlands remains fully committed to the enforcement of internationally agreed UN sanctions. The MSMT's work here is vital, and we are looking forward to continue working with our partners in this. Thank you very much.

GermanyAmbassador

Colleagues, first of all, I would like, like my previous colleagues who spoke before me, I want to thank the United States Ambassador Negri and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for, first of all, convening us and especially for the presentation of the second MSMT report. I mean, I echo what my colleagues have already said. This is a meticulously well-documented and researched And the report shows, I think, in great detail how the DPRK uses illegal cyber activities to generate billions of dollars every year, and probably only the tip of the iceberg, and how the DPRK steals sensitive information in support of its weapons programs. It further shows convincingly, we believe, how DPRK skillfully uses and exploits private actors in countries in criminal activities such as cryptocurrency theft, fraudulent IT services, and cyber espionage. And it's been very well presented and said this causes substantial economic damage across the globe, results in loss of intellectual property, and undermines the privacy of our citizens. Germany has experienced this criminal activity firsthand over the last years. In recent years, the German private sector has had several cases of undercover DPRK workers. These workers use false identities in order to be hired as IT specialists by German IT companies. Some of these fraudulent experts were luckily uncovered by German media, but also and especially by our intelligence services. We have now issued warnings and provide handouts to our companies on how to hire remote IT experts, hopefully to be better protected in future. Most of these criminal activities are carried out by a whole network of DPRK state institutions and organizations, such as the already mentioned General Reconnaissance Bureau, institutions which have been sanctioned by the United Nations for violations of the asset freeze and other obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1718. Of course, I want to echo what my colleague said: we condemn the sanctions evasions by the DPRK. And we believe that unaddressed, the systematic violations of these resolutions will continue to help the DPRK to advance and finance its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programme, a programme which poses a threat not only to East Asia, but for peace and security worldwide. By participating in MSMT, Germany wants to fill the gap that the Russian Federation deliberately caused in 2024 with its veto against the continuation of the mandate of the UN 1780 Committee Panel of Experts. But unfortunately, the Russian Federation is not limiting its support to only obstructing DPRK sanction regime. Russia also provides political cover and technical support to the DPRK's illegal weapons programs, as the first MSMT report very convincingly highlighted a few months ago. Therefore, it remains for us indispensable to continue monitoring both the DPRK’s sanction evasion and their weapon development. Like my colleagues, we believe it is absolutely critical that we continue to advocate a strict implementation of the DPRK sanctions regime, and we also would like to call on all Member States of the United Nations to comply with these sanctions and to make them as effective as possible. Thank you.

Canada

Good afternoon. Let me start by saying that Canada is proud of the ongoing work of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team to shed light on the DPRK’s illicit activities. As we have already heard from Jonathan and my MSMT colleagues, the DPRK’s malicious cyber activities and fraudulent IT worker schemes are nefarious not only because they fund the country's illicit weapons programs, but because of the impact these activities have on individuals, including their human rights, on business owners, and on the integrity of all of our national economies. By working together and sharing information widely about how North Korean IT workers operate, We hope to assist businesses in identifying and exposing malicious activities. We believe that the DPRK's use of IT workers is yet another example of how the regime is exploiting its own people to enrich itself and fund illicit weapons programs. These North Korean IT workers operate in large numbers within the DPRK, but as we have heard from Jonathan, also elsewhere. Several countries, including Russia, continue to allow such workers to undertake fraudulent activities within their borders in contravention of UN Security Council resolutions. It is therefore crucial that all countries harboring North Korean IT workers implement these resolutions and repatriate them to the DPRK immediately. Lots has been covered, but I just wanted to touch on artificial intelligence, which is really increasing the risks, I think, for all of us. It is no surprise to anyone that fraudulent North Korean IT workers are also becoming more adept at using artificial intelligence for nefarious purposes. We all know that AI can facilitate text translation for resumes and emails, complete work-related tasks, perform live deepfakes during video calls, and change a person's voice, among many other things, leading otherwise legitimate businesses around the world to unwittingly employ DPRK fraudulent DPRK IT workers who may go on to steal funds and information. This was confirmed in our report. In 2025, DPRK cyber actors obtained accounts with ChatGPT and DeepSeek to further their illegal operations. Last June, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police issued an advisory warning to the Canadian public about the threat posed by malicious DPRK IT workers. We have asked Canadians who suspect that they are working with or have inadvertently employed North Korean IT workers to share this with the authorities. Advisories can be a useful tool to protect the integrity of national businesses, national business communities from infiltration by such workers. And we encourage all countries to consider sharing information about this threat within your own borders. With the publication of this second report, the MSMT has demonstrated its value in seeking accountability by attributing these malicious activities to the DPRK. And Canada is pleased to continue to contribute to this important work in the absence of reporting by the 1718 Committee panel of experts. I thank you.

Republic of Korea

First of all, I thank the United States for organizing these events. In the interest of time, let me highlight three points. Number one, why we are doing this in the name of MSMT, why we are reaching to member countries like today. Because we believe the UN sanctions regime of the DPRK is constantly being challenged by malign actors across the globe, given the situation that the DPRK continuing its illegal WMD program and its method of sanction evasion has also become increasingly sophisticated, demanding a coordinated global response. And our coordinated action became all the more critical following a profound setback in March 2024 when Russia's veto led to disbandment of 1718 Committee, panel of experts, and many other colleagues talked about this sour experience we had two years ago. And with this disbandment, the International Committee lost its primary monitoring mechanisms that had been in operation since 2009. And this is the very reason why the MSM came into being with the cooperation of like-minded countries, including the Republic of Korea, to breach the monitoring gap and provide rigorous oversight over DPRK's and provide again information and evidence, credible evidence, so that the member countries implement this resolution in a more efficient manner. I believe without an accurate understanding of the situation, no further appropriate action can be taken by member countries. And second point, how serious is this DPRK's violation about? I don't want to repeat the detail second report of this MSMT. Instead, I would like to quote our own national intelligence agency's assessment of cyber threats over the past year. DPRK-affiliated hacking groups have intensified attacks against cryptocurrency exchanges, and other targets to generate illicit revenues, dealing the largest amount to date. Most recently, a major Korean virtual assets exchange, we call it Upbit, also suffered a hack two months ago that resulted in the theft of assets worth roughly $30 million. While investigations are still ongoing, many suspect that the DPRK affiliated cyber actors could be behind this attack. And this second report also addresses convincingly the connections between UN designated DPRK entities and the DPRK's malicious cyber activities, including cryptocurrency theft, fraudulent ID work, and cyber espionage. And like many other colleagues stated, this report shed light on the DPRK's illicit network of thousands of overseas IT workers and foreign facilitators to launder assets and proceeds from malicious cyber operations. This second MSMT report reveals the frightening situation where DPRK is financing its unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs by exploiting the crypto industry and systematically undermining the integrity of the global financial systems. Last, but not least, the way forward. This second report emphasizes that every UN member states must act in unison to close the loopholes exploited by the DPRK. And we believe the MSMT should remain steadfast in sharing actionable evidence with international community until the Security Council reestablished the panel of experts with its original strength and mandate. And as a participating state, MSMT, the Republic of Korea will continue to do its part for this joint efforts. Before closing, taking this opportunity, the Republic of Korea urges the DPRK to comply with international obligations and return to the path of dialogue, and calls upon all UN member states to work together to this end. I thank you.

France

First, France would like to thank the organizer and the other MSMT members for this event. As the 17-18 Committee Panel of Experts could not be renewed in 2024 due to a veto cast by Russia, I cannot stress enough how valuable the MSMT's reporting activity is. For 15 years, the Panel provided independent reporting on the implementation of Security Council resolutions on North Korea. While its re-establishment remains our objective, the MSMT is a legitimate effort to support the work of the 1718 Committee through information sharing on sanctions violations. We welcome the second MSMT report dedicated to North Korean cyber threats. It highlights North Korea use of cyber-enabled means and the deployment of information technology workers in order to circumvent UN sanctions. The report underlines a significant challenge in the cyber domain. North Korean hackers constantly improve their skills, reinforcing the cyber threat that North Korea poses to both its neighboring countries and those further afield. At a time when states are discussing ways to strengthen security and stability in cyberspace, this increasingly complex threat is a major factor of insecurity and instability. The report shows that from 2024 to 2025, the amounts of cryptocurrency stolen by North Korea rose from 1.19 billion to at least 1.65 billion USD, explaining in part the DPRK's economic growth. Since the report's publication last October, Chain analysis evaluated that in 2025, 60% of the world cryptocurrency thefts were accounted for by North Korean hacks. We are deeply concerned by these activities which allow Pyongyang to generate revenue and to continue funding its illegal weapons of mass destruction and missile programs in direct violation of relevant UNSC sanctions. Financial resources raised through malicious cyber activities could account for up to 50% of the financing of North Korea's WMD programs. North Korea's pursuit of these programs continues to constitute a threat to regional stability, to international peace and security, and to the nonproliferation regime. The international community's concern have been reiterated in a joint statement supported by 83 states and the European Union during the last preparatory committee for the review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in May 2025. Our objective, in line with relevant UN resolution, remains a complete irreversible and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea. We hope that this second MSMT report will raise awareness on the DPRK’s malicious cyber operations and that it can help support UN Member States in tackling this threat. France calls on all Member States to renew efforts to implement relevant UNSC resolution, and once more, calls upon North Korea to halt its illegal illicit military programs, comply with its international obligations, and engage in diplomacy. Thank you.

United States of AmericaAmbassador; Moderator

Many thanks to the participating state representatives for these insightful reflections. I would like to open the floor now to questions from member states. The other audience members please remain in listening mode. We have 10 minutes to take questions, and please identify yourselves at the beginning of the questions and the country that you are representing. Thank you. Usually when there are no questions, it means that the report and the interventions were perfect, and there is nothing to be added. Okay, thank you very much. As I was saying, it was perfect. We will ask now for a change in who is sitting at the podium, and we invite people from the private sector to join us.

United States of AmericaPrincipal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs

So we are very lucky to be joined today by industry experts from several global companies. As you heard from our first panel, cooperation between the public and private sectors is vital to protecting companies and citizens from North Korea's IT worker schemes and cyber activities. So in that spirit, The MSMT asked key industry partners to provide information for the report and corroborate its findings. We are very, very grateful to our partners that are joining us on stage, as well as others in the room, for their contributions. And so here, I am happy to say I am joined by experts from the following companies, Google Threat Intelligence Group, Palo Alto Networks, Sequoia.io, and Upwork. And I'm going to start with Caitlin from Google's Threat Intelligence Group for her thoughts on this topic. Caitlin, I know you're an expert on North Korea's cryptocurrency theft and laundering practices. And of course, we've seen massive thefts recently, including a record-breaking heist from the Bybit exchange just last year. Can you explain to our audience, please, how a nation state manages to steal such massive sums? How does it get that money back to North Korea?

GTIGExpert

Absolutely. So as has been mentioned previously, the Google Threat Intelligence Group shares the assessment that North Korean threat actors have stolen at least $2 billion in cryptocurrency since January of 2025. And as was put in perspective by the last speaker on the previous panel, this accounts for at least 60% of all cryptocurrency thefts worldwide last year. And what we've seen over the last decade is that North Korea has used cryptocurrency thefts as a means of generating revenue to offset the impacts of international sanctions, while constantly evolving new methods of compromising cryptocurrency entities and users to generate these revenue streams. In general, we observe that North Korean cyber operations targeting cryptocurrency rely on a combination of social engineering, usually through e-mail phishing, social media engagement, malicious QR codes, or IT workers applying for fraudulent employment under false pretenses. Since 2023, we've also observed North Korean compromises of software providers and services that are used by cryptocurrency entities, such as wallet providers and IT services, which has extended the reach and theft potential of North Korean cyber operations targeting cryptocurrency. And as you mentioned, one notable example is the theft of over $1.5 billion from the Bybit cryptocurrency exchange last year. In this case, the North Korean hackers were able to compromise the software that Bybit used to manage its reserve accounts while also tricking Bybit employees into approving transactions to cryptocurrency addresses controlled by North Korea. And what is unique in this case, and is notable in terms of North Korea's cryptocurrency heist operations, is that this attack methodology was designed to specifically circumvent cryptocurrency industry safety standards that are meant to protect against one of these two attack vectors, but not both at the same time. After a cryptocurrency heist, North Korea uses a variety of blockchain-based laundering tactics that were mentioned in the MSMT report, including swapping between different types of cryptocurrencies, moving funds between different cryptocurrency blockchains, and depositing the funds at exchanges, mixers, and other platforms to make it more difficult for individuals to track the origin of the stolen cryptocurrency. And once that stolen cryptocurrency has been laundered on the blockchain, North Korea almost certainly relies on a network of regime operatives and facilitators to convert that laundered cryptocurrency into cash, at which point it becomes usable in support of any of the regime's objectives.

United States of AmericaPrincipal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs

Thank you so much, Caitlin. Thank you so much, Caitlin. I think one silver lining There are a lot of steps required for North Korean actors to get these ill-gotten gains converted into cash that they can use, which means there are opportunities for member states working together to disrupt that chain of events. Also means there are quite a few folks who are facilitating these activities, which could obviously point to asset freeze violations. Next, we're, sorry, we're gonna skip over one. We're gonna go to Evan next from Palo Alto Networks. Evan, getting a job under any circumstance can be a difficult process, and yet we know these North Korean IT workers are able to pull the wool over a lot of very smart people's eyes. Can you talk to us a little bit about how they are able to pass through the vetting processes and a lot of skills and so on and so forth required to get these sorts of jobs?

PanamaExpert

If I may, I'd like to address some of the delegates that are here in this room, particularly those that aren't participating in the MSMT. When your citizens apply for jobs, they do so when they need a job. That doesn't happen every day. It doesn't necessarily even happen every year. But when they need a new job, they need to start applying. They'll brush off their resume. They'll touch up on their skills. They might practice for coding questions. And then, hopefully, they get a job. That is not how the North Korean regime operates. For the North Korean regime, getting a job is their job. Day and night, there are thousands of North Korean citizens that are trained specifically for certain parts of the job hunting campaigns. You have folks that are specialized in interviewing. You have people that are specialized in writing out resumes that meet the exact needs of what is being requested of them in a job description. You have folks that will interview perfectly, but might not participate in the actual job after the job is gotten. And then you have any number of people on the back end that might serve to do the job once that job description, excuse me, once that job is filled. What your citizens are competing against is a mechanized system that has been honed over years of training to exploit how we hire. And until we change that fundamental system of hiring, I don't think there is anything that we can do centrally to make sure that this doesn't happen. And so your citizens are being placed at a disadvantage. These are typically well-paying jobs, sometimes jobs that can be taken from home. So folks that have issues with accessibility, folks that have children that they must care for, folks that are caring for elders. These are the type of jobs that would be gold mines for those families. And instead, the North Koreans have devised a system to take advantage of how jobs are gotten and take advantage of those very people that are trying to get those jobs to take away money not just from your citizens, but also from tax breaks, excuse me, from tax revenues, and some of the money that would've been put back into your economy. And they do this through a number of ways, but maybe the most important one is the identity mule. They have folks that are in country, and we see this in all six inhabited continents on Earth, that will willingly sell out their own identity so that somebody that they met online can get these jobs. From there, all the money that would have been fed back into your economy, all the payroll taxes that you stood to gain, all of that is gone, it is remitted over to Pyongyang. And this system won't go away, not anytime soon, until we figure out a better way to cooperate internationally to make sure that we have the systems that we need and the cooperation that we need, both with private industry, but in between governments, so that we can figure out how it is we can make this system harder for them to take advantage of, and so that your citizens can get those high-paying jobs, those flexible jobs, those jobs that suit just exactly their needs. and make sure that money doesn't end up funding weapons of mass destruction.

United States of AmericaPrincipal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs

Thanks for that, Evan. That's kind of a chilling presentation, but I think it underlines the need for a very high degree of vigilance on the part of companies that are hiring folks and the real costs, not just individuals, but to us as governments of member states as well. I think getting out information to raise awareness is very, very important in this battle. And of course, that's what this report does. Thank you again, Evan. Very insightful. We're going to turn next to Sequoia.io. Nicholas, the report does talk about DPRK IT workers beginning to engage more frequently in other types of malicious cyber activity, including cryptocurrency theft and stealing data. So we've been talking about these as two separate groups. Are we beginning to see more overlap? Is this distinction one that actually bears scrutiny?

Sequoia.ioExpert

Thank you, yes, they are distinct groups, but I would look at them as hunter-killer teams. The IT workers function essentially as an insider threat. They don't need to necessarily execute the attack themselves. They can relay, they function as reconnaissance to these attack units. I recommend implementing some type of system for corporate intelligence. You need to, similar in a way that you would attack anti-money or implement anti-money laundering mechanisms, you have to know your employees, identify folks that are disgruntled inside that might reach out to these folks, rely upon unit cohesion and that your employees know one another, that you meet regularly. Use your imagination to get these people away. from a remote-only situation and look at them face-to-face, test them. You have to use your imagination because they're adapting their TTPs relentlessly.

United States of AmericaPrincipal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs

Thanks for that. That again underlines the importance of vigilance and that we are dealing with a very flexible and very adaptive adversary here. We're now going to turn, last but certainly not least, to Chris from Upwork. about how fast those changes can occur. Chris, you have had many opportunities to observe the online activities of North Korean IT workers over the years, and the report contains, as I said, something like 140 pages of insights on these activities, but these actors are constantly evolving their tactics in order to evade new safeguards that we create. So what, from your point of view, is like the next evolution we can expect in North Korea's tactics? And, you know, what has changed even since the report came out in October?

UpworkExpert

Yeah, thank you. First of all, thanks very much for the invite to speak on the panel today. I love the fact you gave me the hardest question of what's next. If you look at what's next, I think it's important to look at where they've been. The IT workers have shifted from a pretty rudimentary group of bad actors that arguably would even go to the extent of wearing masks, putting on hats and wigs, to a highly sophisticated, well-funded, well-organized nation state that are able to infiltrate across every country in the world. It's important that we look at that as the key element because ultimately it's all down to identity. Can somebody's identity be moved? whether it be physically or virtually. And I think Nicholas mentioned about the opportunities for people to have background checks and be validated. Sadly, I think we've reached the stage now where even people who have gone through rigorous background checks as facilitators will be able to bypass certain controls that have come about as a result of the many advisories that many of the countries here have put in place. Sadly, that's even reached to a point where I'm aware of one particular company who had hired somebody and that person came into the office, carried out a 9:00 to 5:00 job, went home, and then overnight, the IT worker was able to remote access into their network and carry out the work that they should have been doing during the day. So even that person sitting in the office, operating within the confines of business, is also susceptible to this. As we think about the way that MSMT has really helped us understand the landscape and the partnerships across all forms of business, it's really important to recognize that it's not just one type of company that may or may not be more susceptible. We've talked about the impacts of cryptocurrency theft, but any company that is able to hire somebody, whether remotely or not, needs to be aware of and understand the articles that have been reported in this really important document that fundamentally helps people understand at the root cause, not only the why, but also the how. And then last week, I think Evan mentioned it, and I think it's a really important one. As you are looking to gain job, gain employment, you are no longer competing against a competitive landscape of people with similar skills. You are competing against professional facilitators whose role it is to gain the job. Regardless of whether they ultimately do that job long term, they are the ones that are fighting against normal applications for full-time or remote work. I think As we look at where it's going next, and to wrap up to your point, the way I see it is that the facilitators will gain more opportunities to get into more areas, and every aspect, whether it means to bypass the controls that are on the advisories or to just carry out simple tasks, will be carried out by facilitators, placing it another step behind industry and public sector to tackle.

United States of AmericaPrincipal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs

That is a very sobering conclusion, Chris, but I thank you for the insight. And look, before we turn back to Ambassador Negrea to moderate the Q&A, let me just do one more quick run down the line. If you guys have any recommendations or insights about how we can work together, private sector together with governments, please feel free. And by the way, I should have asked you guys if you want to say something about yourselves and your companies. I should have done that up front, but you could throw that into the mix as well.

GTIGExpert

Thank you. Yeah, just want to echo Chris's thanks for including us in the panel, and note that I think in terms of collaboration, companies like ours here on the panel have really unique insight based on the digital infrastructure that we operate. And we see collaboration with the public sector and in the private sector as a mechanism for raising awareness and combating some of the malicious activities that are detailed in this report. This activity is not happening in a vacuum, and when, to Chris's point, we can surface that this activity is specifically targeting a certain type of company and design protections in collaboration between the public and private sector for that particular situation and share greater information, that really changes the game in terms of how we're able to combat North Korean cyber operations.

Sequoia.ioExpert

As we continue to collaborate on the private sector side, it's iron sharpening iron. If we have a known bad actor and we've mapped out, say, their command and control infrastructure, we should all be collaborating, especially when it's in that. If it's energy sector, for example, if I'm providing services to one energy sector client, We see TTPs, tactics, techniques, procedures, applied against them. We should be informing our peers for these very similar things. These artifacts are live, fresh. If we can interrupt the attack before it is detonated, that's a success.

PanamaPrivate-sector panelistsExpert

Over the past four years that we've been working in a very concentrated manner on this type of threat, We've developed a certain level of muscle of what it takes to investigate one of these incidents and what it takes to make your HR systems more resilient against this. I will emphasize, there is no single cure. The way that we hire right now leaves itself open to fraud of the North Korean variety, as well as a number of others. But that doesn't mean we can't take steps to improve how we are doing things. What we have seen here in the private sector, and I will echo the delegations of the Republic of Korea, of Japan, and of the Kingdom of Netherlands, to say we are available to help. We have been battling this sort of threat for decades. We have been battling this exact threat for more than five years. And we've developed some of the muscle needed to understand when a threat is eminent. when a threat is going to be coming, and what in your design is maybe susceptible to this sort of thing. And I think I speak for all of us here on this panel from the private industry side that we want to help. If you are trying to figure out how to help your private sector be resilient against this, we want to help, free of charge. We want this to go well. When it comes to public-private partnerships, there needs to be trust. And at least with the United States, we've been able to establish a level of trust where we can feel confident that the information that we bring is not going to jeopardize a victim, but we can feel confident that the information that we bring will impose cost against those that are attacking the infrastructure of private industry in the United States. And with the United States government, we have deepened this relationship to a point where we can say, "Hey, during our work, we have observed this sort of thing. We think you should take a look at it. And that's the kind of open-ended, high-trust sharing that I think can be replicated both within each of your countries, but also between each of your countries, to say, we have observed a shift in tactic. One that I observed a few weeks ago is a real-time AI that will change the accent of the speaker. How do you protect against something like that? What are some of the tells in that software? to where you can go and surface the underlying North Korean accent and not the Texan accent that they're trying to come through with. It's that sort of collaboration that we can have between countries on the MSMT, between countries, one that is on the MSMT and maybe one that is interested in joining. That sort of collaboration can be internationalized, and we have already done it on a small scale between the private industry here, as well as between the private industry and the United States government. We're optimistic that we can do something more.

UpworkExpert

Thank you. As we go through the journey of the relationships with our U.S. government partners, both on the private sector and an industry level, it's really heartening for us to see that it's a great barometer of how everybody else is also upping their game. We too have seen this particular threat actor group for a very long time, and I think over the last two or three years especially, we have seen a fundamental mind shift in how people are perceiving it, how people are recognizing that this is not uniquely positioned to one organization or one particular type of business. And as we And I certainly meet with various industry partners, and we share information on a regular basis to really help understand certain processes and controls to level set whether the work that we're doing internally is on par with what everybody else is doing. Can it fundamentally help shift what everybody else is doing, but also give us a sense of whether this is the right journey to go down? The mechanisms and the processes and controls that are put into place are accelerating at a speed in the last six to 12 months that I've not seen before. What used to take several months to develop and implement now takes days or weeks. And you have to be on the forefront of understanding that if you have any chance of detecting it in the first place. Education is also key. These reports and the work from MSMT is critical in getting that knowledge out. I recall about a year ago, I had a conversation with an HR company that had no idea about this. And that blew my mind as an HR company that they weren't able to recognize this threat. Jump forward a year, that company is now implementing very specific controls to tackle this type of issue. That kind of engagement, that type of knowledge, only comes from sharing the knowledge, sharing the trust that's come with it, and some of the pitfalls that go along the way. This is not a straightforward end-to-end process. This takes time, this takes focus. And it takes a strong team that are willing to be able to pivot very quickly and understand the threat actors that not necessarily take place at a company level, but also take place across the globe. And with that, I'll hand back to you. Thank you.

United States of AmericaPrincipal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs

Ambassador Negre, back to you to moderate any questions folks might have for our panelists.

United States of AmericaAmbassador; Moderator

Thank you for the contribution of the private sector representatives. Any questions for them, please, from the Member States? Ambassador Zanneisen.

GermanyAmbassador

Now that somebody speaking was really not a specialist on the issue, thank you very much for this presentation. I just retain a couple of sentences you said. Unless we change something profoundly about our hiring mechanisms, not a lot of things can change. I mean, I understand that criminal activity will always remain, but we shouldn't make it easy. Being a civil servant, we always think in terms of regulations. Is there anything that we can nationally do in order to to level the threshold of awareness through regulation in hiring processes? I mean, for me, it's clear that if you have an online partner, that you should at least see them once in real life. It makes already way more difficult to be fraudulent if you have to appear. It's not a perfect thing, but it is one way of lowering the risk. But I was just wondering, is there anything we can collectively do in leveling, I mean, getting a better system of hiring through legislation, or is that naive?

PanamaExpert

I think making systematic changes from a government-led perspective is going to be difficult because there's going to be certain mechanisms in hiring that are going to need to stay the way that they are, or else you're going to disrupt business. That said, I think there have been a number of commendable documents, some from the United States government. The FBI has put out several alerts on this. The UK government has put out a fantastic one, I think, last year. The Japanese government has put these out, of raising awareness of here's how these things are happening. They're very good at telling you what the threat is. Sometimes they're not so good at telling you exactly how to mitigate the threat. If you can work with somebody who is technically versed enough to say, here's exactly the type of things you should be doing to lower the threshold for this threat entering your systems, then that's good. This sort of threat that we talk about, the cyber threat, it's not specific just to North Korea. There's quite a few actors that are taking advantage of the hiring system. to steal wages, to figure out what's going on from a competitive landscape. So any kind of improvements that you can make on the security of the hiring system, I think will pay dividends beyond just mitigating a North Korean cyber threat, but it can increase over to reducing the amount of fraud that may be coming through systems. And what we've noticed is the number of job applications that we are receiving is so high because it's so easy to make a perfect resume with AI, right? And that leaves hiring managers in a bind because you either want to try to go through and figure out what's AI and what's not, or you have to just disqualify a whole bunch of people on the premise of maybe they used AI. And so I think referral-based hiring is probably going to make a comeback. And then having actual relationships with the people that you are hiring is unfortunately probably going to have to be a thing. And that's going to take time to implement, and it's going to cost a lot of time and resources to implement. But just switching the culture from when I want people to work at my company, I can go out and get them, to instead, i need to be mindful about who I am hiring, and I need to understand who exactly they are, will go a long way. ID verification is the number one piece in this. If you are able to validate the individual that has shown up for your interview each time, then the individual that is coming to work for you on the first day, make sure they're all the same person and that they have legitimate government ID, goes a long way. And we have seen that work tremendously well at our clients. So recommending that sort of thing, I think, is a good first step.

UpworkExpert

If I may, I just had one other element to add to that. From a policy level, I think having some form of safe harbor for industry sharing of information is critical, as the flow of this process is not ordinarily maintained on one particular company or one particular platform. There are a series of processes that go through. Companies that are not financially regulated share information up. That information, sadly, cannot come down due to policy. So having the ability to share information in the right way with a safe harbor from any adverse impacts on sanctions or otherwise, or at least discussions with regards to that, I think would also be a critical move forward for all of us.

Canada

Question on AI, since you've mentioned it a couple of times. So it's becoming harder to detect fraudulent activity as a result of the use of AI. Are we using AI enough to detect the fraudulent use of AI? Is that something that we can do better? And yeah, any thoughts you can offer on that would be most appreciated. Thanks.

PanamaExpert

We'll avoid the minutia of what all is AI. For now, deepfake technology is incredibly accessible. I can run it on my desktop computer, and it's reasonably good. The North Koreans have experimented with this, and it does work. It is still detectable, and it will remain detectable for the foreseeable few years. There may come a time when it is not, but there are a number of Companies out there that have developed their own detection algorithms, that is not AI in the sense of like it's generative artificial intelligence, but it is more kind of machine learning based and looking at pixels and how things are formulated. That technology works well, and it can be implemented directly into your hiring pipeline, excuse me, into your hiring process right now. It's comparatively low cost, and it can tell you, hey, this person that I'm interviewing with, there's something wrong with the signal. There's a confidence threshold put on it where they say 97% chance that this person is a deepfake. And even if we didn't have to think about, is this person a North Korean agent or not, wouldn't you not want to hire someone who's using a deepfake in your interview? So I would encourage all of you here to think about, at your organization, do you have the capability to do this? And if not, What do you need to get that capability? And then push that recommendation down. This technology is quite accessible. It is cheap to run, it is quick to run, and you can start to tell things very quickly. And the North Koreans love deepfake technology, especially in using financial crime, showing up as somebody that this person would know. Often they show up in a call where it's six people that this other person knows, and they say, yeah, we need to make this money transfer. So maybe for everybody in an organization that is authorized to transfer money, it might make sense to put that detection software there so they can know, are the people that I'm talking to, are they real? We think that technology is going to mature. We think it's going to get cheaper. And as long as something fundamental doesn't change on how generative AI creates face swaps, we think it will remain detectable. Anyone else want to add something?

GTIGExpert

I'd just add that also from a broader security research perspective, it's certainly possible now to, when you come across these artifacts that say, that you say, you know, maybe this is a little suspicious, this person doesn't look quite right, the ID doesn't quite match, you can push that back through a lot of the generative AI models and ask it to make an assessment about whether or not it believes that the image or resume or document is in some way either modified by AI or created by AI in general, and that's a very low barrier to entry first step that you can take, particularly if you're investigating a large volume of activity at scale or you come across a particularly interesting artifact where, in most cases, models will be able to tell you if they were used to generate that document or if they can detect that a different model was used.

Sequoia.ioExpert

And just briefly, I would recommend that you embrace inconvenience. and mix up your hiring practices so you are a difficult target to fix and locate.

United States of AmericaAmbassador; Moderator

This concludes our event today. Thank you all for coming and participating in this discussion. We're very grateful for our private sector partners for supporting MSMT's work and today's event. The DPRK cyber and IT worker activities pose a global challenge for UN Member States and industry, and I hope that today's event is the start of a much more profound collaboration between us all. We look forward to convening again later this year to discuss the SM&T's next report. Thank you.