Jean-Martin Bauer (WFP) & Rein Paulsen (FAO) on FAO-WFP Hunger Hotspots - Press Conference

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Thanks, Stéphane. Thanks for bearing with us and good afternoon to everyone. So today, FAO and WFP are presenting the June 2026 edition of the Hunger Hotspots Report. This is about looking at food insecurity trends between June and November 2026. It's a joint analysis. It's a joint analysis of early warning risks to food security. It's not really about looking at food security worldwide. It's really looking at the most severe situations and the trends over the next 6 months. So what we want to do here is warn early so that action can be taken as early as possible to head off hunger before livelihoods collapse and before lives are lost. This is, this is what the report is about. So it's brought to you by FAO and WFP under the aegis of the Global Network Against Food Crises. Now, in this edition, we identify 13 countries and territories as hunger hotspots from June to November 2026. And these hotspots are grouped by different tiers of concern. And that depends on the severity of the situation that— and the risk of further deterioration. In the highest level of concern, there is Sudan, South Sudan, Yemen, Palestine, Nigeria, and Somalia. These are contexts where populations are facing or at risk of facing high levels of acute food insecurity, including starvation and death. The other tier is a very high level of concern. That's Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Haiti. The remaining hotspots include Lebanon, Madagascar, Mali, and Myanmar. These are countries that require close monitoring and urgent action as the situation could deteriorate during the outlook period. So the main drivers of food insecurity according to this report, they remain conflict and insecurity, economic shocks, climate and natural hazards. They don't operate in isolation. They actually compound each other and layer on top of each other. Now, what I need to emphasize is that in many hotspots, including the countries I mentioned, overlapping conflict, climate and microeconomic shocks including the spillovers from the Middle East conflict that you just discussed during this briefing, the potential effects of the El Niño, which you did not discuss, but which we'll get into more detail about. They all amplify food insecurity. This is a risk we highlight in this report. Conflict and violence remains the primary driver, and that's the case for 12 of the 13 hotspots identified in this report. And every hotspot of highest concern is a place affected by conflict and violence. Conflict destroys livelihoods, it forces people to leave, it disrupts markets, damages infrastructure, and restricts humanitarian access. So that's really the number one cause. And it also increases risk for civilians and humanitarian workers. Economic shocks are compounding food insecurity. And climate extremes and climate variability are also further intensifying the situation. I'd like to emphasize now the big changes that we have since the previous report in the previous edition of the Hunger Hotspots Report. So as the highest level of concern, Nigeria has been added to this group. This is because there are projections that a group of population in Borno State may face catastrophic levels of food insecurity during the outlook period. Somalia has been added to the group of highest concern because of populations in the Bokhara district facing a risk of famine according to the IPC in a plausible worst-case scenario. Afghanistan and the DRC remain hotspots of very high concern. Haiti has also been added to this category. Haiti is not classified at the highest level of concern. The situation does remain very fragile in the country and it requires sustained monitoring. Lebanon and Madagascar have been added to the list of hotspots. Lebanon because of the escalation of hostilities and Madagascar because of adverse weather. Now I'd like to focus on the most alarming finding, which is the risk of famine. The report highlights 4 hotspots with a risk of famine at some point in '26 or in the outlook period. And that's Sudan, South Sudan, Gaza Strip, and Somalia. And these are the situations that require the most attention. In Sudan, the most acute food crisis continues. The risk of famine persists in several areas, and there's conflict that is expected to intensify and expand geographically, including in Port al-Fana in northern Darfur. In South Sudan, acute insecurity, food insecurity is expected to remain at catastrophic levels in several counties of Jonglei and Upper Nile states. Conflict displacement and severe access constraints are continuing to drive extreme needs, with the risk of famine persisting or newly identified in several countries, counties. In the Gaza Strip, the food security situation has improved since October 2025 and the ceasefire, but it remains extremely fragile. The entire Strip faced a risk of famine through mid-April 2026. Now, there's no projection currently covering the full outlook period at the time of writing. In Somalia, there's continued insecurity, rising tensions, and poor seasonal rainfall performance and pressure on agriculture and pastoral livelihoods. That's creating very serious risks and a risk of famine under a plausible worst-case scenario. In addition, Nigeria and Yemen are identified as places that are at risk. The central message is clear that these crises are foreseeable, they're predictable, and the worst outcomes can be prevented. The window to act is narrowing, and I'd like to turn it over to Rainn, the Director of FAO for Emergencies and Resilience, to continue on the highest concern hotspots and about the ramifications of the Middle East crisis and the expected El Niño.

Thank you, Jean-Martin. Rainn, please go ahead.

Thank you very much, Steph, and thank you, Jean-Martin. So, colleagues, Jean-Martin, as he has just outlined, has highlighted the highest concern hotspots representing some of the most severe acute food insecurity situations in the world at risk of deterioration, as was said during this period projected from June to November. To be clear, these are both crises in terms of food consumption and also crises in terms of livelihoods and livelihoods collapse. And that's why also protecting livelihoods is central to preventing to prevent hunger from worsening. As you see, as you will see in the Hunger Hotspots report that's been released today, the ability of WFP, of FAO, and of our partners to act at scale is being severely constrained at the moment. Let me talk about that from a few different angles. Humanitarian funding for food security sectors has fallen sharply, and there's an important data point here. When it comes to funding for food security activities, those funding levels in 2025 dropped to a level that was last seen in the period 2016 and 2017. At the same time, during that same period from 2016 to 2017, uh, 2016-17 through 2025, the percentage and share of the population analyzed as being in acute food insecurity High acute food insecurity has doubled during that same period. So significant funding reduction, a doubling of acute food insecurity at high levels during that same period. In 2026— excuse me— humanitarian partners aim to assist some 135 million people globally, prioritizing immediate life-saving assistance of 87 million people most at risk. This is the hyper-prioritization that you've, that you've heard about. And yet, as of June 2026, only about one-third of the hyper-prioritized requirements for food security funding and activities globally has been met. This is forcing extremely difficult choices. Assistance is being reduced. Impossible choices already within already hyper-prioritized plans have to be made. And at the same time, we are having to make cuts to assessments, cuts to our monitoring and analytical capabilities, all of which are weakening the evidence base that's needed precisely to be able to prioritize assistance and to guide our decision-making. And this, this is a major risk. Without reliable data, vulnerable communities become invisible. The Hunger Hotspots report also highlights some other drivers of acute food insecurity at high levels during this reporting period. One of those is around the consequences of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East on food security, and specifically the impact on the hotspots. And the other is the impacts of El Niño on those same hotspot areas. So let me say a few words around both of those, reflecting what you'll see in the report. The conflict in the Middle East is creating significant disruptions for agri-food markets on a global level, with increasing risks for countries already facing high levels of acute food insecurity. Nearly one quarter of global oil supplies and roughly one third of global fertilizer trade pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Disruptions in this corridor therefore represent a major risk for global food, energy, and input markets. Higher fuel prices, rising fertilizer costs, increased transportation costs, increased insurance costs, and global supply chain disruptions— all of these things can quickly translate into higher food prices. They can also delay the provision of humanitarian assistance, uh, and/or make humanitarian operations even more expensive. And for households struggling to afford food, for those the most vulnerable, those most acutely food insecure in these hotspot contexts, even small increases in food and fuel prices can have severe consequences. For humanitarian organizations, higher costs mean the same level of funding reaches fewer people. The impact is particularly serious for hotspots that defend— depend heavily on food imports, on fuel imports, fertilizer imports, and humanitarian assistance. If we look at that from a geographical perspective, in the Near East, countries and territories listed in the Hunger Hotspots report, such as Sudan, Palestine, Lebanon, Yemen, and the Syrian Arab Republic, are particularly vulnerable. Because of impacts on domestic food production, economic shocks, and humanitarian funding cuts. In Central Asia, Afghanistan is exposed to trade disruptions, tighter food supplies, higher food prices. In South and East Asia, including Myanmar, rising fuel prices, supply disruptions, uh, can increase, uh, staple food prices and constrain agricultural production, particularly where conflict is is already affecting communities. And if we turn to Africa, in Western and Eastern Africa, including Mali, Nigeria, South Sudan, Somalia, Burkina Faso, and Niger, higher fuel, fertilizer, and food import costs are increasing food price inflation and eroding household purchasing power. All of these higher input costs can also impact, uh, coming planting seasons, which has a knock-on effect, as you would understand, in terms of reducing future food availability. In Haiti, higher fuel prices and transport costs risk further straining economic activity and household purchasing power. And these regional spillovers that I've just run through in a very summary fashion show why a crisis in one part of the world can rapidly deepen hunger in another. Let me say a few words quickly about El Niño and wider climate risks. El Niño conditions are now present and expected to strengthen towards the end of the year. This could significantly alter rainfall patterns and temperatures across several hotspots at a time which is critical for the agricultural seasons. In Eastern Africa, Somalia remains particularly exposed after consecutive poor rainy seasons that have severely affected agricultural and pastoral livelihoods. The current rainy season started poorly, worsening drought conditions, and it's possible that El Niño may even in some areas increase risk of flooding in the last quarter of 2026. And this impact, both in terms of water scarcity and water— excess in different geographies is the dominant theme of the impacts of El Niño. Parts of South Sudan may face below-average rainfall and localized moisture deficits, as well as heat stress during the main agricultural season, with then expected possible impacts both on crops and pasture. In West Africa, Mali and Nigeria may expect delayed rainfall. Prolonged dry spells, particularly across, uh, parts of Western Sahel. And at the same time, localized flooding could still occur in flood-prone areas of Nigeria during the peak rainy season, which would also disrupt agricultural activities. In Yemen, Sudan, and Afghanistan, the impact of recent dry conditions and consecutive poor seasons continues to affect agricultural production and rural livelihoods. Later in 2026, El Niño-related rainfall may also increase risk of localized flooding. And finally, in Southern Africa, uh, in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Madagascar, both countries remain exposed after erratic rainy seasons marked by drought, floods, and cyclones, variously. Emerging El Niño conditions may further increase dryness risks during the second half of the year, potentially affecting agricultural production and food availability. So, colleagues, the conclusion is clear: conflict, economic shocks, climate extremes, and funding cuts are converging in a way that puts millions of lives and livelihoods at risk. And Jean-Martin was saying previously, in this report, FAO and WFP are calling for urgent coordinated action. Let me say 4 things quickly about that. You'll see in the report the call for action articulated around these 4 key areas. First, that civilians must be protected, that humanitarian access must be guaranteed, that all parties to conflict must respect international humanitarian law. Hunger, must never be used as a weapon of war. The right to food is a basic human right, and peace is a prerequisite for food security. Secondly, with all of the data that's provided and the analysis in, uh, in front of you and as detailed in the report, it's imperative that acute food insecurity and malnutrition remain high on the global political agenda. These crises require political commitment, humanitarian diplomacy, coordinated action across humanitarian development and also peace efforts. Thirdly, we urge investment in early warning systems, in emergency preparedness, anticipatory action and prevention. Acting before a shock hits not only saves lives, it protects livelihoods and costs significantly less than responding after people have lost everything. And cost-effectiveness, of course, is top of all of our minds at this challenging time. Fourth, funding must be urgently scaled up for food assistance, for emergency agriculture, and for nutrition support. This means saving lives today and also protecting the means by which people will feed themselves into the future. I'll just add a final point, which comes through the report in different points and bears strong emphasis, and that is the point of protecting data and evidence systems. A growing data drought would weaken our collective ability to see crises coming, to prioritize limited resources to respond to those crises, and to be able to reach the most vulnerable communities. But as I wrap up, let me just say that the worst outcomes that you see described in this report are not inevitable. They are foreseeable and therefore they are preventable. But the window to act is narrowing, which is why the issuance of this report and action in response to it is so important. Thank you. And Steph, back to you.

Thank you very much. We'll take some questions. Edith.

Thank you both very much on behalf of the United Nations Correspondents Association for doing this briefing. Um, you said that, um, there— the agent— you'd received one-third of the funding. Is that funding for both WFP and FAO? And could we get the numbers? And what impact is the US announcement of $800 million to WFP going to have on hunger in these hotspots? And secondly, if there is no significant increase in funding, What is the world going to be looking at in these hotspots? Famine? More deaths? Can you elaborate? Thank you.

Jean-Martin, do you want to go first?

Sure. Thank you, Stéphane. Thanks, C.D., for the question. So what I'd like to say is that overall, the World Food Programme is still largely underfunded. I mean, we welcome the news of additional resources allocated to WFP. But we need to know that our appeal for this year is over $10 billion. The forecast that we have is quite, quite low, and we're very far from being able to support the people in the countries that are mentioned in this report. We still have very large funding deficits in many geographies, including the hotspots mentioned in this, in this report. And what that means is that people on the front line They're having to make decisions about who gets fed and who does not get fed. We are in a situation where we've had to target in a way that's extremely sharp and leave aside people who are in high levels of vulnerability. As explained earlier, you've got 4 countries with a risk of famine currently, 4 countries and territories with a risk of famine. And if funding does not come through at 100%, and if the access constraints continue on the ground, and if the risks that we mentioned materialize in the form of the continuation of the impacts of the Middle East crisis and the El Niño, what you could see is a famine in a plausible worst-case scenario. This is exactly what we're weighing at this point. It's a situation of famine in those four countries. Maybe over to Rayne.

Go ahead, Rayne.

Thanks, Steph. So let me just add that summary number of one-third funding against the hyper-prioritized requirements is, of course, a a summary funding figure, and the specific details do look different by organization. If I speak for FAO, just to give you concrete numbers, Edie, our emergency request and requirements for 2026 are for $1.5 billion. As of yesterday, we were funded at $205 million against that. We do have some promises in the pipeline, and we are thankful for the support being provided. You can see in percentage terms that that funding level is really low in light of the analysis provided in the Hunger Hotspots report and what's required in terms of action. And I think Jean-Martin answered well the very concrete consequences of what would happen should funding at higher levels not materialize.

Thank you. Bisanne?

Thank you very much. Bisana Baqweiq with Al Jazeera Arabic. I just wanted to ask, do you have specific numbers that you can share that have to do with the impact of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz? Like, from your remarks, you mentioned what the possibility would be if it continues and how many ships pass through and so on and so forth, and how many areas across the world it effects, but you have specific numbers of actual impact right now?

Go ahead.

So on this, I would just say you see in the Hunger Hotspots report summary information that's provided. There are so many interlinked factors that it's difficult to quantify in every specific location what the consequences would be. What I would say in summary terms and what you'll see in the is we're describing projections for the period June to November. We are highlighting a number of geographical areas where we are concerned about the evolution, where we expect a deterioration, and we expect that deterioration specifically because of the interplay between a variety of factors. We've mentioned conflict, we've mentioned El Niño, and yes, the ripple effects of the crisis in the Middle East feed into that as well. But obviously, the number of geographies included and the number of situations and variables we're talking about make it difficult to give a very concrete number in response to the question that you've asked.

If I'm—

thank you so much. Two questions, please. The first one on Lebanon. Can you give us a little bit more granularity on what is happening there? Is there not enough food, or— we heard warning from the beginning of the war that there was only 3 months' worth of food left in Lebanon, or 6 months, I don't remember. Do you still have that assessment? What exactly is happening on the ground? Is it just a portion of the population that's not eating, the displaced, or is the whole country at risk? Do you also think that there's an intentional destruction on part of Israel as well of the food systems in Lebanon? We've seen them throw, why, phosphorus on agricultural land. We're seeing also farmers not being able to work their crops. If you can just explain to us exactly what's happening. And the second question on Gaza and Sudan together. Let's say you get all the funding you're asking for. How confident are you that actually Israel will allow the food in, seeing that speaking with other UN representatives there, There's a whole thing called dual list, and it's an elastic list, and what's being allowed to enter changes every day. So how will the funding help with that? In Sudan, the same thing. It's also a problem of access. Thank you so much.

Thank you. Jean-Martin, you want to take that one?

Sure.

So indeed, Lebanon has been one of the countries that has been the most affected by the situation in the Middle East overall and by the increase in conflict and escalation in conflict. And what we've seen in Lebanon is an increase in food prices at a time where there's been large displacement in the country. There was an IPC that was done, thankfully, just a few weeks ago, which did outline what's going on, which is an increase in vulnerability to food insecurity. It's important to note that when displacement occurs, the folks that are most affected are those who have been forced to flee their homes. And this is happening at a time of great pressure on— great, great pressure on local markets and with attention on also the exchange rates and the macroeconomy. Now, in terms of the displacement, it— of course, we're seeing a different situation at present. What I would say is that when we have access, we are able to deliver, we are able to reach the most vulnerable population within Lebanon and therefore assistance and funding to the agencies, FAO or WFP, would help alleviate the situation. That's what we've seen in the past. We're able to coordinate with our partners on the ground to get through. But there has been an uptick in vulnerability, definitely, in Lebanon in the past few weeks.

Thank you. Abd al-Hamid, then the gentleman over there. Sorry, if you could address Gaza and Sudan as well. My question on Gaza, so we can combine them.

Okay.

Yeah, my question is on Gaza, so you can answer both, from my question. Abdul Hamid Sayam from the Arabic Daily Al Quds Al Arabi. Could you tell us how about your presence in Gaza? How many WFP staff? How was your relation with other UN agencies, especially UNRWA? And what is the average truckload enters Gaza on like daily or weekly basis? What are the obstacles you are facing with the cross, cross points? And why is the Rafah crossing is not open since it— the other side of the crossing is Egypt, not, not Israel? Thank you.

Go ahead.

So if I may. So the— in June so far, WFP has been providing assistance in Gaza, and we've been able to provide a general food assistance to 195,000 people in Gaza at 75% rations. So we're operational and we're also producing more than 200,000 hot meals daily. We were able to support 28 bakeries with wheat flour and fuel, and we've also provided support to additional 5 bakeries with, with fuel to allow them to produce the bread that's needed by the population. We've been able to also reach almost 70,000 pregnant or breastfeeding women and girls. So the children under 5 with malnutrition treatment. So there's been, again, some ability to access the population in Gaza. What we've seen in the, in the past in Gaza has been the fact that when access is available, when WFP and its partners are able to reach Gaza and all parts of Gaza, food security indicators improve dramatically. And when that's not possible, the food security indicators don't do so well. And they, in fact, are going into reverse quite quickly. So that's, that's what I'm able to say right now about why Rafah is closed. I mean, I don't have an answer to that right now. But if you'd like more detail on WFP's footprint in Gaza, including more information about our staff numbers, I'd have to get back to you. I don't have that on hand right now. Yes, sir.

And then Stefano.

Hi, I'm Max Maloussa from IPS News. I just had a question about— there's a lot more conflict going on, humanitarian needs are rising, and I was wondering what steps can governments, aid organizations, and private aid, private sector logistic partners take to reduce supply chain disruptions and risks which are leading to higher costs and longer delivery times? One of you?

It's a huge question. Let me maybe respond with a data point from Sudan and related to FAO's activities in 2025. So I think there are many parts of the answer. One of the parts of the answer is doing everything we can to boost local food production where possible in the midst of crisis context. And if I take the example of Sudan this last year, 2025, the key staple crop, the key cereal that's consumed is millet. FAO supported hundreds of thousands of households with millet production, spent 17— 17 $500 million. It resulted in the production of some $515 million worth of food in Sudan. That, that type of intervention, it's not the answer to everything. A number of actions have to be taken also on the supply chain side for international inputs being delivered. But greater emphasis on local production is part of the answer.

Thank you. Stefano. Thank you. Stefano Vaccara, Italpress. You mentioned and welcomed the recent US contribution of $800 million to WFP. However, looking at the broader picture, does this funding fully compensate for the loss of programs, capacity, and resources that resulted from the dismantling of much of the US aid humanitarian infrastructure? And the cuts to US foreign assistance over recent months? And I have also, do you know whether your report found its way and was discussed at the recent G7 summit in France?

Go ahead, Jean-Martin.

Thanks, Stephane.

So, Stephane, we hope that these reports are used by decision makers and they do make their way to the right circles. We know that the report is widely read. Thanks to you, by the way. Thank you to the press for relaying these messages. Messages so that they are heard. I can't tell you specifically about the G7 because the report came out today and the G7 had already started. I don't have the details. Now, the question you ask about the $800 million contribution from the US to the World Food Program, I have to say it's absolutely welcome. It's something that's going to help us save a lot of lives in many geographies where food security has been a mounting problem. I think that's really the focus, that, that I'd like to put on, on, on that, uh, contribution. It's, uh, welcome and, uh, it's going to help us do what we need to do.

Thank you very much. Uh, Noreen.

Thank you very much. Okay, thank you very much. Noreen Hussein with IPS News. Uh, I actually like to focus on a different aspect of the report, specifically the section on the other situations that require further monitoring from your part, from your respective organizations. So this does mention other countries that also have acute food insecurity situations like Ethiopia, Iran, and Burkina Faso. But specific—

the—

of note to me is the specific mention of the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. I would like to ask, therefore, what was the purpose of highlighting the Rohingya refugees in this report? Specific community or specific group as opposed to other countries in this report? Thank you.

Thank you.

One of you, right?

The reason— oh, maybe Rain, go ahead.

All right, sure.

The reason why that community is in the report is because rations were reduced in April, uh, so there's a insufficient resources to support a very vulnerable population. So that's why you see them flagged. Great.

Last question, a short one from Bisan, and then we'll close.

Just a quick one, since the part about Sudan was not answered. So given that Ephraim had asked, since they're banning the humanitarian access, so what difference does the funding make, putting that in perspective on Sudan specifically?

Go ahead, Jonathan.

So on that one, the WFP office in Sudan is operational, and just last month we reached more than 3 million people in the country with essential food assistance. So we can't say that access is banned. It's difficult. There are places in Sudan that are very difficult to access, but we are there in the country. We are delivering. So it's— I'd like to correct any misperception around that. Access is a challenge, but it's not a situation where we have no access at all. We are, quite the contrary, doing everything we can to reach people in need everywhere in Sudan.

Great. Jean-Martin Reine, thank you very much. We appreciate you coming out here, and we'll see both of you very soon. Thank you.