1st Meeting - 1st Session Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems 2026

Excellencies, distinguished delegates could ask you to take your seats, then we can start the meeting.

Good morning to all of you. Excellencies, distinguished delegates. It's my honor to welcome you as Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts related to emerging technologies in the area of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems to the group's first session in 2026. Allow me to once again express my sincere appreciation for the confidence that you, the high contracting parties to the ccw, have placed in me to take this important responsibility. I remain deeply committed to facilitating our collective work on the mandate in a transparent and inclusive manner and and I look forward to continuing our engagement on this critical issue.

I am also grateful for the spirit of cooperation during our previous sessions and I trust that you will again approach our deliberations with openness and a constructive mindset. I am also grateful for the spirit. Sorry. I would also like to extend a warm welcome to the nine delegates joining us through the CCW sponsorship program which is made possible by the generous support of Australia, China and the Philippines. Your participation enriches the diversity and inclusivity of this group and contributes meaningfully to our shared endeavor.

Needless to say, I hope that our deliberations this week will stimulate you to consider acceding to the Convention in due course. The CCW remains a cornerstone of international humanitarian law and a vital framework for addressing the challenges posed by emerging weapons technologies. Its role in protecting civilians, strengthening humanitarian norms and fostering international cooperation remains as essential today as ever. Our work this week is a continuation of the long standing commitment to ensuring that technological advancements are aligned with humanitarian principles and and legal obligations. As we will now turn to our agenda and provisional program of work, I would like to remind you that these have been issued as official documents, have been circulated by the CCW Implementation Support Unit and are available on the 2026 GGE on Laws webpage of UNODA Meetings Place.

It's my intention to proceed in accordance with the agenda, enabling us to move efficiently to substantive discussions given the limited time available.

Let us turn to agenda item 1. Opening of the meeting. You will recall that the 2023 meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW decided that the GGE is to pursue the following mandate in the context of the objectives and purpose of the Convention. The Group is to further consider and formulate by consensus a set of elements of an instrument without prejudging its nature and other possible measures to address emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems. Taking into account the example of existing protocols within the Convention proposals presented by High Contracting Parties and other options related to the normative and operational framework on emerging technologies in the area of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, building upon the recommendations and conclusions of the Group and bringing in expertise on legal, military and technological aspects, as contained in para 20 of the Final Report of that Meeting Document, CCW MSP2023.

7. The 2025 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW decided that the GGE would meet for a duration of 10 days in 2026, from the 2nd to the 6th of March and from the 31st of August to the 4th of September, as reflected in para. 19 Charlie of its Final Report, CCW MSP2025. 8. In accordance with the decision by the 2025 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties and by the powers conferred to me by the High Contracting Parties, I declare open the first 2026 session of the CCW group of governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems.

Excellencies, Dear Delegates, we have been entrusted with a task of considerable importance to further consider and formulate by consensus a set of elements of an instrument without prejudging its nature and to submit a report to the seventh review conference, which will take place from the 16th to the 20th of November 2026. Nothing less, but also nothing more. At this stage, the urgency of our task cannot be overstated. We are now two thirds of the way, with only two formal sessions remaining to complete our work, which includes our current session. We must therefore proceed decisively and in a spirit of cooperation and flexibility.

It's essential that we build on the momentum generated during our previous sessions with a clear and constructive focus on narrowing our differences and consolidating the areas of convergence that continue to emerge. With this in mind, I would also like to strongly encourage all delegations to focus their interventions this week and going forward exclusively on the substantive issues before us. I thank you in advance for your cooperation. Before proceeding to the next agenda item, I would like to ask the Secretariat to play a video message addressed to the Group by the United Nations Under Secretary General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Madame Izumi Nakamitsu.

Excellencies, distinguished Delegates, in this decisive year, I am pleased to address the first 2026 session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the area of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Let me begin by expressing my appreciation to the Chair of the Group, Ambassador Robert Indenbosch of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. His dedicated leadership has sustained continuity in your substantive deliberations and ensured a constructive and Inclusive space for dialogue. Thanks to his stewardship, the group enters its final year under the current mandate with a strong foundation. You're now nearing the completion of the task entrusted to you to formulate elements of an instrument to address emerging technologies in the area of laws.

I commend the meaningful progress you have made on the basis of the rolling text. Your deliberations have strengthened understandings across all central aspects, from how laws should be characterized, to the application of international humanitarian law to potential prohibitions and restrictions, and the means needed to ensure IHL compliance and accountability.

As you now enter its final stretch, it will be essential to continue narrowing the remaining divergences through cooperation, flexibility and compromise so that agreement can be reached. The urgency of this work cannot be overstated. Technological developments are accelerating at a relentless pace, and weapon systems with increasing levels of autonomy are reality. These developments raise serious concerns and compel us to reaffirm a fundamental principle. Human judgment and control must be retained in every use of force.

This is why the United Nations Secretary General has repeatedly called for a ban on lethal autonomous weapon systems operating without human control and for the conclusion of legally binding instrument with concrete prohibitions and regulations on the development, deployment and use of laws. The elements you are elaborating could form the basis for negotiations of such an instrument within the ccw. Distinguished delegates, your work will be consequential and the world is watching with great expectations. In the years ahead, the value of this group's efforts will be measured not only by the text it produces, but by whether it helped set standards that endure. The report you will submit to the Seventh Review Conference of the CCW will shape how high contracting parties decide the way forward on one of the most significant disarmament and humanitarian challenges of our time.

The CCW has long provided a framework through which states ensure that technological developments in warfare remains consistent with the humanitarian imperative. I urge you to make full use of this opportunity and to counter the multifaceted risk stemming from the unregulated development use of METHO autonomous weapon systems. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, you have two formal sessions ahead of you. Ten days of work. It is now time to consolidate the progress we've mapped in the rolling text and to translate it into a concrete and meaningful outcome.

My office and I stand ready to support you in reaching this goal. I wish you productive discussions and every success in the important final year of your mandate. Thank you very much for your attention.

On behalf of the high contracting parties to the CCW and all the participants in the work of this gge, I thank the Under Secretary General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs. For her message of encouragement and support, I now invite you to consider item 2 of the Provisional Agenda titled Adoption of the Agenda. The Provisional Agenda has been issued as document CCW GGE 120261 and was circulated by the CCW Implementation Support Unit via email on December 18, 2025. The document is also available on the 2026GGE on Laws web page of UNODA Meetings Place. As you may recall, the first four agenda items are dedicated to the usual procedural and organizational matters.

Under item 4 on the organization of the work of the Group, I will explain more in detail how I plan to structure our discussions and we will have the opportunity to exchange views on this if delegations would wish to do so. Agenda item 5, our main substance agenda Item reflects our current mandate and will form the core of our substantive work. Under Agenda Item 6 On other matters, I will invite delegations to raise any issue that may not have been addressed under the preceding agenda Items. Agenda Item 7 is dedicated to the adoption of the Report. As you are all aware of, in accordance with its mandate, the Group is expected to submit a report to the seventh review conference scheduled to take place from the 16th to the 20th of November 2026.

See para. 19G of the Final Report of the 2025 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties, document CCW MSP2025. 8. It's therefore my plan to consider and adopt the report during our second session this year under agenda item 7. Under agenda item 8.

Closing of the meeting I will close the first 2026 meeting of the Group before we adopt the Agenda. Is there any delegation wishing to take the floor at this stage?

This is not the case. I now invite the Group to adopt the agenda as contained in document CCW GGE 1 2026. Thank you. The Agenda is adopted.

We now turn to Agenda Item three, confirmation of the rules of procedure under this Agenda item, I would like to remind the Group that the Sixth Review Conference decided that the rules of procedure of the Review Conference shall apply mutatis mutandis to the group. See document CCW conf. Romans 6:11, decision 1, para. 40. The rules of procedure can be found in document CCW conf.

As well as on the web page of this meeting. With this in mind, I now invite the Group to confirm the rules of procedure under this Agenda item with the understanding that I intend to conduct the meeting as I conducted the meetings of the Group during our previous sessions. Are there any requests for the floor?

I recognize the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation, sir, you have the floor.

Distinguished Chair, we're very pleased to welcome you and other delegations during this meeting of the Group of Experts Parties to the CCW on lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems. The Russian Federation reaffirms its readiness to provide you with all the necessary assistance.

The Russian Federation on this issue has not changed. We believe that chapter 10 of the rules of Procedure does not by default provide non governmental entities any automatic possibility to take the floor during official plenary meetings as part of the events taking place under the Convention. Moreover, any activities of such organizations as observers, including in the form of presenting working documents, should be strictly limited to the field of their competence and be aimed at making a constructive and positive contribution to the work of States Parties and not politicize the work of the meeting. The Russian Federation is interested in the participation of non governmental entities in the work of the Group. We believe that their technical and legal expertise may contribute to the implementation of the mandate by the Group and help us find substantive recommendations and conclusions.

Taking into account what I just said and the nature of the Group of Governmental Experts, we would like to once again propose that we follow the compromise solution that was found during the Session of the groups in 2024 and 2025. We're ready to reaffirm and confirm the Rules of Procedure with the understanding that non governmental entities that are mentioned in chapter 10 can participate in the meetings of the Group, introduce working documents and take the floor only on questions that fall within their competence and in a non politicized manner without making any accusations against States Parties. This refers both to the working Documents, but also to the statements that will be made during plenary sessions.

If such an approach is to be ignored, then the decision to confirm the Rules of Precision will be null and void and the question will require additional consideration by the Group. This understanding does not create any precedence for the future work of the Group and the CCW as a whole, but it relates purely to the specific nature of this Group of Governmental Experts. The solution will continue to be in force purely in case of this session and does not create any precedence for future events related to the CCW and all of this. We do hope that finding the best optimal solution of this problem, the context of limitation of Chapter 10 of the Rules of Procedure, will be implemented by States Parties both on the sidelines of the Working Group and also during the intercessional period. Thank you.

I take note of the remarks made by the distinguished delegate of the Russian Federation and let me assure him that I intend to chair this meeting with a clear eye on having a substantial technical debate with the aim of making concrete progress and exercising the powers conferred upon me under the rules of procedure while upholding the rights of delegations.

I do not see any other request for the floor. I see no objections. Then it's so decided. We will now move on to Agenda Item 4. Under Agenda Item 4, allow me to briefly go over the main aspects of the organization of the work of the GDE for this week.

I wish to remind delegations that the meeting is being broadcasted live on UN WebTV, which allows viewers to follow the proceedings remotely in all six UN official languages. The link to the live broadcast has been made available on the webpage of the 2026 GGE on laws on UNODA Meetings Place. The video recording will also be available on the website of UNWEBTV shortly after the meeting ends. All relevant information on the session and relevant documents, including working papers and conference room papers, will also be shared on the GTE on Law's UNODA Meetings Place webpage. Please note that the statements will be posted on the meeting webpage only if they have been submitted to the CCW isu.

Therefore, if your delegation wishes to have its intervention made available online, kindly submit it to ccw.

I would also like to remind delegations to send all their prepared statements to speechesuan.org prior to their delivery, as this will be important for the crucial work of the interpretation services. May I also request that speakers maintain a measured pace to facilitate accurate interpretation? Additionally, a fully automated speech to text service will be provided so that text of the proceedings can be found on INDICO following the conclusion of the meeting each day. This is a machine generated text and does not constitute an official record of the meeting nor is it checked for accuracy by the Secretariat regarding Rule 24 of the Rules of Procedure on the Right of Reply. I would also like to inform delegations at the outset that given the time constraints we are facing, I will limit the rights of reply to 2 minutes each and to a total of maximum free per delegation.

To further facilitate our work, rights of reply will be heard at the end of each morning and afternoon session. With that, I wish now to turn to the organization of the substantive part of the meeting for this group to fulfill its mandate in the time frame provided. It's now absolutely imperative that we work ambitiously toward further narrowing our Differences following our second 2025 formal session in September. Last year, the CCWISU circulated the Chair summary of the discussion via email on October 20, 20, 2025, which is also available as working paper. 9 By submitting this summary, I wanted to capture my understanding of the work carried out during our second 2025 session and to maintain an informal record of proceedings to help inform the work of the group this year.

On December 18, 2025, the CCW ISU circulated a revised version of the Rolling Text on my behalf. As I explained in the corresponding letter, this new version is an honest attempt to take into account the sometimes diverging comments submitted by the High Contracting Parties and the Exchanges delegations had in the room during our September 25 session. I would like to emphasize that in the continuity of what was stated during previous years, I am putting forward this Rolling Text with the understanding that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. At the same time, as I said during my opening remarks, I count on all High Contracting Parties to work towards consensus in good faith in the spirit of compromise and effective multilateralism. I would also like to take this opportunity to express my deep gratitude to the Friends of the Chair for their commitment and involvement in the process of revising the Rolling Text.

Your work has been invaluable and I will continue to count on your support in the lead up to this first formal session of our final year. I also held a set of virtual intersessional informal consultations on the revised rolling text on January 26th and 30th with the high contracting parties and on January 28th with observers. I believe these informal consultations have deepened our understanding of where common ground may be found while also clarifying the principal areas of divergence that will require further discussion this week. I am confident that during the week ahead, together with the constructive spirit demonstrated by all delegations thus far, will provide a valuable opportunity to continue making meaningful progress. And I believe that the discussions we had during the last two years show that we are coming closer to finding agreement on the proposed elements contained in the Rolling Text.

As we have only two sessions remaining under our current mandate, it will be particularly important that we focus our efforts on substantive technical discussions of the Rolling Text. In this period and as in our previous sessions, we we will move directly to the consideration of the Rolling Text without general statements in order to make the most efficient use of the time available. Similar to our last session, we will undertake a full reading of the Rolling Text during the first part of the week, proceeding box by box through the entire text. Where there are no concerns or red lines, we may be able to conclude that we provisionally agree on certain parts of the text during this reading. Subsequently, discussions later in the week will then focus on identified areas of divergence with a view to elaborate concrete compromises and points of convergence, including through the development of textual proposals and revised language where needed and if appropriate.

To this end, I also intend to call for informal consultations during the week and have asked the Secretariat to make the necessary necessary arrangements for informal evening meetings on Tuesday and Thursday this week, which I intend to hold from 1900 to 2100 hours in room 11. Finally, I intend to allocate time on Friday as part of agenda item 6, other matters to exchange views on the preparation of the final report of the GGE to be submitted to the Review Conference in November, and on the organization of the intercessional period so that we can approach the second session with a clear sense of direction. I suggest we use our time wisely and now quickly move to the substantive portion of this session.

Turning to agenda item 6, substantial work on our mandate to further consider and formulate by consensus a set of elements of an instrument without be judging its nature and other possible measures to address emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems. Taking into account the example of existing protocols within the Convention, proposals presented by high contracting Parties and other options related to the normative and operational framework on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems, Building upon the recommendations and conclusions of the Group and bringing in expertise on legal, military and technological aspects, I would like to turn straight to the first box of the Rolling text. Should your delegation nonetheless wish to provide general remarks, I kindly request that this be indicated at the start of the intervention and ask that these be kept to a maximum of three minutes or five minutes if speaking on behalf of a group of States. I also kindly ask all delegations to focus their interventions on the matter at hand and to refrain from making political statements that are unrelated to substance, matter or outside of this group's mandate.

Can we put up the text.

With that? We will now turn to the first section of the rolling text. You see it on the screen. Box 1. The working characterization remains one of the more firmly debated parts of the rolling text.

Also, during the informal consultations we had in January, most of the text in this box has been retained as it reflects the outcome of lengthy discussions during our earlier sessions. However, as you know, there will still be there were still several issues to resolve and as a result I refined and streamlined the language in box 1 to address some of these concerns. Overall, I retained the core formulation we have been working with over the past session, while changing the earlier three paragraph characterization to one paragraph with clarifying subparas which build on and clarify what is contained in para 1 rather than representing separate notions regarding the content. Several adjustments were made which received broad support during the September session. We added the term functionally before integrated, replaced user with operator and substituted DEF with loss of life, all to better align our text with established international humanitarian law terminology.

Regarding the autonomous functions, I decided to re include Identify alongside select and engage as a number of delegations maintained that identify is not always encompassed by select, emphasizing that identification and selection represent two distinct phases in the targeting process. The idea for a new subpara alpha started to form towards the end of our September 2025 session and seeks to address the concern voiced by many in the room that the inclusion of identify would possibly lead to unduly narrowing the scope of the characterization and create potential loopholes. At the same time, I decided to limit this language to the matter of concern rather than inserting a definition within a characterization, which is something we already sought to avoid On Lethality as you are well aware, the issue of lethality and how to capture it in the rolling text is a long standing topic within our group. In the previous version of the Rolling text we had a para explicitly defining lethal as a capacity to cause death. Throughout our last session we increasingly moved away from this notion as it is not necessary to elaborate that lethality includes death as it seems to be a very well understood causality.

Rather, this para seeks to clarify that systems that cause non lethal effects are not excluded from our working characterization. The text, as it stands now, is the result of our work during the September session. The main change we made is to turn it into a subpara bravo and this is because we see it to serve similar purpose as subpara bravo alpha, which is to add further clarity to the characterization. Overall, I do believe that these changes shift box 1 toward a more technologically grounded and operational working characterization.

Following our informal consultations held a couple of weeks ago, I believe that further consideration will be needed with respect to the working characterization, notably with regard to the critical functions that define laws as the subparras related to the lethality aspect. With this I would now like to hear from you. I strongly encourage you to not only reiterate your positions, but also to try to engage with each other and address or suggest possible compromises solutions. I will now open the floor for comments and suggestions from delegations.

I have requests for the floor from France and Japan, but let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of France. You have the floor.

Thank you very much, sir.

Sir, France wanted to assure you of our full support as you conduct your work. Now, before we discuss the text, I do in more general terms, want to to speak to the focus of our work. This new draft goes in the right direction. We are closer to our goal, which is by consensus to draft a set of elements of an instrument which I hope will lead to a negotiation of new instruments within the ccw. Our aim with this text is to clarify how international humanitarian law, which was put into place once technical process did not yet conceive of autonomous weapons, does in fact apply to these weapons.

That is the lies at the heart of the CCW's work. No purpose in having standards solely for autonomous weapons with the risk of fragmenting IHL. IHL's implementation is entirely sensible when faced with a whole series of actions. So in part two, all of the elements which are then detailed in other parts should detail how these apply to laws. The instrument that we're working on doesn't aim to revolutionize the conduct of of hostilities.

It would allow us to have very clear indications on the use of autonomous systems pursuant to ihl. It would also allow us to dispel any doubts as to unlawful use. And it would protect populations by clearly describing prohibited or restricted actions. It would allow for legal certainty and in the cases of violations, and the chain of command would remain responsible. Sir, on characterization, characterization allows us to limit the scope of application of a future instrument in order to clarify the systems it covers.

It does not prejudge any measures, prohibitions or restrictions to be applied to these systems. So we would take a broad technologically neutral characterization and one which is able to adapt to future developments. In our view, such characterization should cover the systems which, once activated, could select a target by previously identifying it, and it can engage with fire with no human intervention. Now, part of identification can be carried out by a human upstream of the action when defining target parameters. The system would be covered if this identification is then continued and actually implemented by the system itself with a certain degree of autonomy.

If a human effects the target selection, such as happens with certain kinds of munitions, then it would not be sufficiently autonomous to be covered by our instrument. And this would be even less the case if the human makes the decision to engage a system including an autonomous nature, only on the firing sequence, for example, only on election and engagement, would remain subject to international law, particularly to ihl, but would not be covered by our work because they don't raise the same problems as to the autonomy of their decision making. These systems can take the form of a simple physical unit, a single physical unit or of a different kind, component parts which are held in the same place or remotely and weapon systems that are conceived in to harm persons or to damage or otherwise harm objects would be covered. And the text reflects our position and so we can therefore reflect approve it as it stands. Thank you.

My thanks to the Ambassador of France, Japan, to be followed by Ireland and Panama. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Japan. You have the floor.

Well, thank you, Mr.

Chair and good morning, colleagues. First of all, this loading text provides a good basis for our deliberation and my delegation would like to express its appreciation to Chair and the Friends of Chair and the Secretariat for the tireless work. And based on this substantive and focused discussion held in this group, my delegation would spare no effort to cooperating to fulfill the DG's mandate. Now, in section number one regarding the characteristics of loads, we expect to deepen our common understanding without unduly expanding or limiting the scope of weapon systems on which this GGE should focus. Now, Mr.

Chair, we understand the subparagraph A of this box 1, section 1 intends to avoid making the scope overly this relative by deferring to identification in par 1. However, the formulation that a human operator sets the parameters of the targets is a bit ambiguous and we need further discussion on the end of clarification on this part. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I thank the District Increased representative of Japan for sharing the views of his delegation. Next on my list is Ireland, to be followed by Panama and Cuba. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Ireland. You have the floor.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair and good morning, colleagues. I want to join previous colleagues in thanking you for your efforts as well as that of your team and the ISU for getting us to this point. As we begin the final year of this group's mandate. I'll make some brief general points before moving to box one.

After a decade of discussions, we finally managed to narrow in on some common understandings on key concepts, and we're making clear progress towards delivering concrete results. And it's important that we do so given the rapid technological developments taking place outside these walls. This real progress is thanks to the rolling text and the manner you have guided our work. In general, we want to reiterate our support for this rolling text as a whole, which is well structured, coherent and succinct and provides a sufficient basis for future negotiations, as was declared in a joint statement and working paper supported by 42 high contracting parties last year. We also want to take the opportunity

to recall the purpose of the CCW and of our work in this gge, which is not to repeat previous GGE report language or merely restate existing IHL rules, but to clarify how they apply in the context of of laws and to strengthen through articulating specific measures in order to ensure compliance and accountability under ihl. And to this end, we echo the French Ambassador who just now elaborated this point much more eloquently. Moving to box one, we are happy overall with this characterization. In paragraph one, we would have preferred to drop the reference to the term identify or insert an and or. For the reasons already expressed numerous times by multiple delegations in previous sessions, we think this characterization should remain broad in scope.

Just because a weapon system may fit under the characterization does not mean it will be prohibited necessarily. It's important that we cast a wide net at the start so as not to inadvertently create loopholes down the line. That being said, we think the solution by adding identify with subparagraph A is a potential solution to the cumulative approach debate. Although this is at the expense of simplicity and clarity to the text, in our view, we think some elements may need to be added to subparagraph A in order to include other actions that a human operator could take beyond only setting the parameters of the target, such as setting general target profiles or a list of potential targets. Again, not to needlessly narrow the scope at this stage on lethality.

While we would have preferred leaving out the term lethal again for the reasons mentioned many times by other delegations over the years, we can live with a clarifying paragraph B. And lastly, Chair, we note that significant compromises have been made in this box and across the entire rolling text, and it's important we keep that in mind as we continue through this week and in September as well. Thank you very much.

I thank the distinguished representative of Ireland for sharing views from this delegation and pointing out earlier positions. Next on my list is Panama, to be followed by Cuba. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Panama. You have the floor.

Thank you very much, Chairman, and a very good morning to all distinguished colleagues. First of all, we wish to echo the vote of thanks expressed by the delegations that have spoken before us. A vote of thanks for the work that you've done for this group of government experts, and we extend our thanks to all members of your team. We also have a positive view of the broad ranging and transparent consultations that have been conducted on this text with high contracting parties and other interested stakeholders.

Panama is one of the more than 40 states that consider that the work done by the GGE on this rolling text is in line with its current mandate and it is therefore a sufficient basis to move on to the next phase, which in our view should be the negotiation of a legally binding instrument on autonomous weapons Systems as a Protocol 6 to the CCW. This is in line with the repeated calls made by the UN Secretary General and particularly Action 11 of the Pact for the Future and Action 27. And it's also in line with the position defended by the ICRC and civil society organizations.

This occurs after nearly 10 years of deliberations on this issue. Now, when it comes to box one, along the lines of what Ireland said, we continue to have reservations on the inclusion of the term identify.

If we interpret this together with paragraph A, we run the risk of this falling outside the scope of its application when it comes to the majority of systems that we are attempting to regulate now. In order to allay this concern, one possible solution would be to include and or after the verb identify, when it comes to subparagraph B, A compromise solution would be trying to find some common ground between those delegations that, like Panama, were expressing concerns about the term lethality. We therefore believe that subparagraph B can remain unamended. Thank you.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Panama for commenting on the text we have in front of us and indeed also reminding of what is said in the Pact for the future, again reflecting the sense of urgency that was also part of the intervention by the High Representative at the beginning of this meeting. Next on my list is Cuba, to be followed by Brazil, Venezuela, and then I have Italy, Sweden, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Pakistan. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Cuba. You have the floor.

Thank you very much. Chair, allow me to begin by commending your efforts to lead our group so that we can make progress towards measures that, bearing in mind existing protocols within the Convention, ensure close abidance with CCW provisions and rules governing laws. We are aware of what a colossal task this is and we'd like to thank you and members of your team as you work towards consensus in the group. We are willing to work constructively in order to find solutions and try and find consensus now on box one, which we're currently looking at. It is absolutely essential if we want to progress in the debate to come to a consensual definition of autonomous weapons.

We recognize progress made in previous discussions and which can be found in the rolling text, although we do think that we could make even more progress in trying to Find consensus language. This exercise to find a definition found in Box one could, could be more explicit regarding a definition not just of fully autonomous weapons, but also of semi autonomous weapons.

Now, if we look at subparagraph A and the actions of a human operator setting the parameters. Well, this is very useful. But we could make even more progress if we included semi autonomous weapons here, where there is supervision of a human operator in its critical functions, that is in the selection and engagement of targets. So our suggestion would be to include in this box a definition of semi autonomous weapons, understanding that the definition of laws should include both fully autonomous and semi autonomous weapons. Now, the latter may have oversight of a human operator, at least in its critical functions, that is for the selection and engagement with targets.

And it is necessary to include a specific. Specific regulations and norms. And this is something that could be found in the same instrument. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba for sharing the views of her delegation and for making proposals. Next on my list is Brazil, to be followed by Venezuela. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative. Representative of Brazil. You have the floor.

Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Good morning. We would like to begin by thanking you and your team for your efforts

in steering this DGE thus far. We would also like to thank you for the preparation of the latest revision of the Rolling Text. I will make very brief general remarks about the text and then focus on box one.

As you recall, Mr. Chair, last November Brazil circulated a joint statement prepared in cooperation with CO drafters Ireland, Norway and Switzerland, which characterized the previous version of the Rolling Text as a, quote, sufficient basis for the negotiation of an instrument on lethal autonomous weapon systems.

The joint statement was co signed by 42 high contracting parties to the Convention, which demonstrates the wide and cross regional support that the previous version of the Rolling Text had attained in our national capacity. I would like to express our belief that the December 19 version continues to

be a sufficient basis for such negotiations. The new version preserved all the important substantive elements of the previous iteration and introduced some improvements and language requirements. While there are still some areas that merit further work, we are convinced that

we will arrive in September with a solid text, one that the GGE will be in position to submit to the Review Conference for use as a basis for a long overdue negotiation mandate. Rest assured, Mr. Chair, that Brazil will continue to support

your work towards that goal. Let me now turn to the issue at hand, which is the characterization of laws as contained in Box one. We believe that Box one is close to an optimal point.

The only comments we have at this stage pertain to the issues of target identification and lethality. The delegation has long held the view that including target identification in the list of functions that qualify weapon systems as autonomous is not only unnecessary, but might unduly restrict the scope of our discussions. We believe how, however, that the language

in subpara 1Amight be a potential solution to this problem as it clarifies the issue of scope. We would have preferred a clear definition of the term target identification, but we can live with this approach. However, the language could be further refined

in order to ensure that other operator inputs, such as lists of potential targets or target profiles, would not exclude it from the scope of these elements of an instrument. The same applies to the issue of lethality. Brazil has indicated that the term lethal is unnecessary and potentially detrimental to our

work as it can lead to excessively restrictive understandings. Paragraph 1B, however, offers an appropriate basis for a common view of what this term means. Our basic position is that lethal. The inclusion of the word lethal cannot lead to the exclusion of anti material weapon systems from our scope. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil for sharing the views of his delegation and for clearly also indicated his flexibility with regard to the present text at hand. Next on my list is Venezuela, to be followed by Italy and Sweden. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Venezuela. Sir, you have the floor.

Mucha Horacia.

Thank you very much. Chair.

I would like to join others who thank you for your leadership and the way you guide our process. And we praise the open and transparent and inclusive manner in which the consultations were held. At the same time time, Venezuela also takes a positive view of the text that presented to us a very solid foundation and an opportunity to move forward towards balanced, constructive and focused negotiations. So we're ready to have a serious and technical discussion here with a view of achieving consensus. I'll be brief and focus on box one, paragraph A.

There are elements of improvement, but we'd like to say we do not have any other options to the terms related to the word identify and then components. So we do not have any problems of keeping that in text. But we also believe that it's very important to have an explicit reference to the lethal nature in the characterization of laws.

We have been consistent in saying that lethality is an essential part to limit and scope of the legal and ethical implications related to use of such systems. And the use of this term can help us avoid any ambiguities in order to ensure legal security and consistency. So we reiterate our position and ready to work in a constructive manner on these issues to overcome the serious humanitarian concerns and how this relates to applicable ihl. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Venezuela also for the kind words addressed to the Chair and all others who have done it, and all others who will still do it. I won't react to that every time, just to save time. Next on my list is Italy, to be followed by Sweden and Sri Lanka. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Italy. You have the Flora.

Thank you Chair for giving me the floor and for this revised version of the Rolling tax. The task of our group is to further consider and formulate by consensus a set of elements of an instrument. This instrument should try to adopt a functional approach focused more on a scope of application rather than physical characteristics, and in our view we are moving towards the right direction. With regard to Section one, we support the retention of the phrase within the scope of the application of the CCW as it clearly defines the parameters of the future instrument. We also welcome the addition of and for the purpose of these elements, which further clarifies and strengthens the objectives of the text.

As we have underlined on previous occasions, we consider that a level autonomous weapon system is one which, once activated, can identify, select and engage targets without further human intervention does implying the use of autonomy across all the three critical functions. While we are cognizant of the divergences that persist on this issue, we believe that the current formulation brings us closer to a consensus definition. Turning to Porter's A, B and C, we note with appreciation that the text specifies that the system, which is little by nature cannot be excluded from characterization even when used to damage objects or inflict injury, or when it requires additional parameter input from an operator. We view this as a balanced and pragmatic compromise, consistent with the discussions held over the last year. Since the definition of lethality still reflects different perspectives, the current approach offers a constructive way forward by deferring detailed characterization to the future negotiation of the instrument among the high contracted parties.

We would encourage applying the same approach to the final paragraph by postponing a potential exclusion of specific weapon systems to subsequent negotiation phases and I thank you Chair,

I thank the distinguished representative of the Italian Republic and indeed we should not try to solve all issues. I think it has been said during our first meeting in 2024 that this is a working characterization and of course in future this working characterization could be revisited if we see if then a need for that is seen next on my list. Now is Sweden to be followed by Sri Lanka and Switzerland. But first, let me pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Sweden. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. As stated by several delegations already, Sweden also want to express our appreciations for your efforts in guiding our group to achieve our mandate on formulating a set

of elements for an instrument and wish to express support for the Rolling Text. As to the characterization, Sweden recognizes the compromises made and we are open to finding a way for this group to reach consensus on a technology neutral characterization

that focuses on autonomy in critical combat fight functions. For this discussion, we wish to emphasize the text provided for in C on the possibility of future modifications and exclusion of certain types of systems. The characterization demonstrates, together with the text as a whole, that our discussion has progressed and that the CCW remains the

appropriate forum for this topic. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Sweden for sharing the position of her delegation. Next to my list is Sri Lanka, to be followed by Switzerland and Pakistan. But first, the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Sri Lanka also joins others to appreciate you and your team for presenting the updated version of the the Rolling Text. We appreciate your continued efforts in incorporating most of the constructive contributions made by the delegations in previous sessions into the Rolling Text in a consolidated and inclusive approach. We also appreciate your efforts in streamlining the language and structure of the Rolling Text while retaining the provisionally agreed contents over the previous discussions.

Sri Lanka perceives that the Rolling Text contains fundamental elements to serve as the basis for future negotiation of a legally binding instrument to prohibit lethal autonomous weapon systems with necessary improvements through further discussions at this forum. Therefore, my delegation wishes to comment on the Rolling Text in a constructive spirit with a view to making the Rolling Text the a clear starting point for future negotiations. Moving to box one, my delegation welcomes the revised version of the text in terms of clarity and structure, which can be further improved during our discussions at this session. Sri Lanka supports reintroducing the critical function of Identify alongside the select and engage in characterization of laws. We note that Identify and Select are two distinct steps in the targeting process and therefore specific reference in the Rolling Text is needed.

My delegation is also mindful of the risk of having either an overly narrow text or a too broad text. Therefore, we need to take a balanced approach. We carefully note the concerns raised by the delegations and ICRC regarding creating an overly narrowing scope by including Identify in the characterization. Therefore, it is important to set the explanation in para 1A as a qualifier for Identify with suitable language to ensure that Other common human inputs prior to activation, such as setting the generalized target profiles, the list of potential targets, or the operating parameters of the system, do not exclude a system from this characterization. Mr.

Chair. Given the rapid advancement in autonomous weapon technologies, the identification phase could take place at different levels with extremely high speed, with a large number of real time data compared to what a human can do. Therefore, the autonomous identification function can undermine the human's ability to meaningfully intervene at the subsequent selection and target stages. Therefore, these aspects need to consider when we deliberate on para 1A of the box 1. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka for commenting on the tax proposals made by the Chair and his team. Next on my list is Switzerland, to be followed by Pakistan and Austria and the United States States. But first, let me pass the floor to distinguished representative of Switzerland. You have the floor.

We thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you and your team for your sustained efforts and professionalism in steering this demanding process. Allow me, like others, to make brief remarks before turning to Box one.

My delegation, including, like others, we have approached SGG with the aim of working towards a protocol rooted in international humanitarian law. In recent years, notably the last three, we have effectively negotiated elements of a future instrument, developing a two tier framework of prohibitions and regulations. This has required flexibility from and we have engaged in extensive discussions on notions such as lethality, seeking to avoid formulations that would be unusual in IHL and cause wider concern. Similarly, time and effort have been devoted to the term identify, requiring detailed explanatory subparagraphs. We have accepted such proposals in a spirit of compromise.

More broadly, a number of proposals over time have aimed at narrowing the ambition of the text. While not always easy to accept, many delegations committed to a strong and coherent outcome have again demonstrated flexibility in order to preserve overall balance and inclusive progress. As we approach the end of our mandate, we hope to focus on resolving remaining issues and consolidating convergence rather than further narrowing and even weakening the text. Achieving consensus requires compromise across the spectrum. This applies in particular to what we consider the core of our discussion, the role of the human in the use of force involving autonomous systems.

It is now essential to consolidate agreement around the concept aligned with context, appropriate human judgment and control as its central tool for ensuring compliance with ihl. Let me also note that our delegation has only a few outstanding concerns with the text where we do not intervene on specific paragraphs. This should not be interpreted as a lack of support. Quite a contrary. As we approach the conclusion of this gg, it will be important to avoid last minute removal of substantive elements or erosion of balance, something the CCW has unfortunately witnessed in the past.

With that and as articulated by Brazil earlier, we reiterate that the current version of the rolling text remains a solid basis for long overdue negotiations, and we hope that more high contracting parties will join the 42 delegations that have already expressed their readiness to move forward towards negotiations within the CCW on the basis of this text. With regard to box one, we reiterate the importance to avoid narrowing the scope without good reason. We see the revised characterization as workable and improving compared to previous iterations.

We support the notion human operator that is included. This is an important phrasing in light of what is at the core of our discussion here, the Role of Humans on Identify I would like others reiterate that we do not wish to see the word identify in this paragraph. The reason is that the inclusion of identify would exclude from its scope most, if not all, the systems that are meant to be on the table. But our delegation in spirit of compromise can go along if we find the shared understanding on identify, and we thank the ICRC for its drafting proposal reflected now in paragraph 1A. We had the impression in the intercessional consultations that this proposal, while helpful and already quite concise, might require further work for my delegation.

This is essential to avoid that the mere fact that a human operator defines a list of potential targets, establishes a generalized target profile or sets of operational parameters would exclude a system from this characterization. We're open to working on this language to ensure that the characterization adequately captures the full range of relevant functions and parameters of autonomous weapon systems, and that human involvement in the early stage of the engagements alone does not automatically remove a system from the scope. At the same time, we are mindful also of the need to avoid introducing a definition within a definition which could create unnecessary complexity or ambiguity. And as we seek to refine the current language of this subparagraph, we should be cautious of convoluted language that may undermine the clarity of the text and consequently its broader acceptance and understanding beyond this room. So further refinement should therefore prioritize clarity, precision, and practical readability.

Let me also stress that paragraph 1A doesn't stand alone. Paragraph 1C provides the occlusion of systems that are not relevant to the scope of this characterization. We hope such an understanding can be reached. Alternatively, we support those who have recommended to either reinsert and or before select or to delete the term identify, as has been done in previous iterations of the ruling text on 1B. Briefly, lethality reiterate that for us, the characterization without the word lethal is.

For us, the characterization without the word lethal is important because we do not want to exclude a whole set of systems of actions that need to be addressed in view of their IHL implication. We see the current wording as an example of where and many other chi contracting parties have shown significant flexibility. But we have shown that flexibility because we want to reach a compromise and we want to move forward. If we're willing to show flexibility, we will insist on ensuring that the finally agreed text does not open the door for exclusion of relevant systems from the scope of the characterization. Because the word lethal is in there.

I stop there just to say overall box one. We are confident that we're almost there on this important box and we hope to find the necessary spirit of compromise. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would like to thank the distinguished representative of Switzerland for sharing the positions of his delegations and for commenting on the tax proposals and also other tax proposals made by delegations earlier. Next on my list is Pakistan, to be followed by Austria, the United States and New Zealand. But let me first pass the floor to distinguished representative of Pakistan. You have the floor,

Chair. As this is the first time my delegation takes the floor, allow me to congratulate you on the manner in which you have organized this group of governmental experts. You can count on our full and constructive engagement. We believe the rolling text, as it stands in its December 2025 iteration, is in a good place. It contains many useful elements that should be preserved.

We commend you, Chair, for having advanced the text in a balanced manner that reflects the broad range of views in this room. At this stage, it bears reminding ourselves where we are in the process. We are not yet negotiating a legal instrument. We are developing a set of elements, a foundation upon which further negotiations can build. This distinction should inform the mood of our work.

Our priority must be to capture the full range of essential elements. Nothing relevant should be prematurely discarded. We should take a broad, inclusive and forward looking approach, developing, if we will, a comprehensive menu from which a future instrument can take form.

Chair on box one. Specifically, we have spent considerable time over the years on the characterization, and rightly so. But we must ensure that our definition serves the broader purpose of our work rather than consuming it. The real challenge with lethal autonomous weapons systems does not lie in in finding the perfect words to describe them. It lies.

It lies in addressing the risks they pose, the limits on their use and the principles governing their development. That work lies primarily in the box 3 through 5 we therefore urge colleagues to treat box 1 as a working characterization, one that is good enough to anchor our discussions and move us forward, while recognizing, as Para 1C itself acknowledges, that this characterization may evolve as our understanding deepens.

Chair Colleagues will recall that in September our delegation raised several concerns about including the verb identity alongside select and engage. We noted the risk of ambiguity whether identify refers to design phase, encoding of target profiles, operational level, positive identification under international humanitarian law, or sensor based classification at the moment of use. We cautioned that if states interpret identify differently, we risk creating loopholes. A state could argue its system does not autonomously identify targets because it merely acts on preloaded data, even though the system autonomously selects and engages.

We acknowledge here that you have sought to address precisely this concern through the edition of Para 1A. We welcome this addition. It goes a significant way forward, closing the loopholes we identified. It makes clear that a system does not escape the characterization simply because a human presets certain targeting criteria.

To further strengthen this safeguard and ensure full clarity, we would suggest a small textual addition to 1a. Our concern remains that sets the parameters may not fully capture all forms of human preloading that could be invoked by states to argue their system falls outside scope. Engineers may preload target profiles, emitters, signatures, thermal shapes, image libraries that effectively encode identification criteria at the design stage rather than during use. We would therefore propose that IA be amended to read as the fact that a human operator sets the parameter or profiles of the targets does not exclude the system from the characterization. Chair with this clarification, our delegation can support the characterization in paragraph 1, read together with subpara 1A, 1B and 1C.

As a solid working basis for our continued deliberations, we would encourage to avoid the characterization debate at length this week. The target before us is workable. It captures the core concern systems that can identify, select and engage targets without human intervention. While 1A ensures that this is not read narrowly, we hope to invest more of our time and energy in the areas where convergence is still needed. The prohibition and obligations in other boxes which are where the regulatory substance lies.

I thank you, Chair,

and let me thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan for commenting on the tax for making concrete proposals, and indeed, it's also my intention to clearly move forward on the characterization. And as you stated already, there is still a lot of work to be done on what is now box 3. Having said that, next on my list is Austria, to be followed by the United States, New Zealand and Portugal. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Austria, you have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. And allow me to thank you, your team and the ISU for the hard work and assure you of the full support of my delegation. The draft that we have in front of us is in well shape and it's going in the right direction and our delegation is fully committed to work together to fulfill the mandate of of the group to elaborate a set of elements for future instruments within the CCW and on this basis to adapt a negotiation mandate in the revcon with a view to establish the necessary rules and limits to regulate autonomous weapon systems and assure a legally based level playing field in this area. After more than 10 years of deliberations and accelerating developments in the world outside this room, time is right for negotiations. Let me turn to box one.

There is only a few issues left that we see work needs to be done. The box generally we think is already a very good basis and the three points that we would like to make is is. First, we would prefer to delete the word lethal on lethal autonomous weapon systems. It's not a term of IHL and we think it could be understood as limiting the scope and as a minimum, we would see the need for the clarification in B to ensure that this is not the case. On the term identify.

We regard this as not helpful and opening up for further complications. We understand there are different positions. We would prefer to delete the word identifier, but we are open to solutions on this. And third point regarding a We think that the formulation that is in now that the human operator sets the parameters of targets doesn't capture the full range of functions that we would see need to be reflected here. And therefore we would like others propose to.

Further include and for the parameter. The fact that human operator sets the list of potential targets, the generalized target profile and the operational parameters of the system doesn't exclude the system from the characterization. Thank you.

I have thanked a distinguished representative of Austria for sharing the views of a delegation and making proposals in particular with regard to one Alpha. Next on my list is the United States, to be followed by New Zealand, Portugal and Argentina. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States. You have to floor.

Thank you, Chair and good morning colleagues. At the outset we would like to thank you and your team, the Secretariat and the friends of the Chair for all of the work that's gone into revising the rolling text and collaborating during the intercessional period. Our goal is to support you, Chair and the GGE in reaching a successful consensus outcome under the current mandate. We believe this week is critical in reaching that goal, and we appreciate the effort on your part to arrange for informal sessions on Tuesday and Thursday. We hope that during this session we will see some breakthroughs in the remaining areas of division before turning to the text before us this morning, Chair, we did want to reiterate a small comment that we've made on the chapeau in previous meetings.

As we've previously stated, this is very much a working document reflecting a Chair's proposal, and it does not reflect provisional consensus. We think that's a shared understanding in this room, but we did want to note that remains our view. So Chair turning to Box one Like many others, we think the conversation on characterization has been extremely useful and the text continues to progress in in important ways. This group needs genuine common understandings about what systems concepts and characteristics are being addressed by the elements. The language also needs to be comprehensible and implementable to those who have not been participating in these discussions over the years, our proposed changes are focused on ensuring that clarity the United States views laws as including existing weapons systems that State states have used in armed conflict for decades and without legal controversy.

Laws can take the form of, for example, active protection systems close in weapon systems, loitering munitions or air defense systems that, without operating intervention after activation, can select and engage threats.

For paragraph one and Box one, we have five suggestions to make the characterization clearer and more precise. First, we continue to have concerns with the phrase functionally integrated. Although the components of the weapon system do not need to be physically connected, we are concerned that functionally integrated could capture systems that are not part of the weapon system, for example Communication systems, Global Positioning System satellites that may support the operation of the weapon system. We propose integrated technology components whose autonomous functions enable the system. This would connect the notion of technological components to the functions that the system is able to perform autonomously.

And as we know, Chair, autonomous functions is a phrase that was used in paragraph 19A of the 2019 GGE report. So it's a term this group has accepted by consensus before. Second, as we have previously suggested, we also recommend adding by their design or intended use to incorporate the notion of design, which has been a key element in CCW definitions in amended Protocol 2, Protocol 3, and Protocol 4, including or intended use after by their design would however, acknowledge that weapons that have not been designed as laws could still be used as such, and there should be and they should be included in the characterization.

Third, the word lethal is currently in the name of the weapon system. The text is seeking to characterize, but it is not an element of this characterization. It needs to be. This could be done in a variety of ways, but the same simplest may be by adding the phrase with lethal force after the phrase engage a target 1B then provides the needed clarification that the fact that a loss can be used in a way that does not result in loss of life but only damage to injury would not therefore exclude it.

Fourth, we continue to be concerned with the term human operator. It's redundant. No IHL instrument uses this phrase. Doing so here creates the implication that there is a category of non human operators of a laws. Again, we are open to different ways to address this issue.

An alternative we would support is referring to the personnel operating the system.

Finally, we support the proposal to remove the phrase in the execution of these tasks. That language is overly narrow and we need to include when autonomy is used to initiate the identification, selection and engagement of targets, rather than merely when autonomy has been used to execute tasks directed by an operator chair. We're happy to share this with you and the rest of the delegations, but with these suggestions the paragraph would then read within the scope of the application of the CCW and for the purposes of these elements of an instrument, a lethal autonomous weapon system can be characterized as a combination of one or more weapons and integrated technological components whose autonomous functions, by their design or intended use, enable the system to identify, select and engage a target with lethal force without intervention by the person personnel operating the system chair. Moving on to the subparagraphs, I think we have three observations that we'd like to make here.

Several delegations have raised concerns with 1A both during the informal session and again this morning.

We would recommend reframing this paragraph into a positive statement that indicates what systems are included instead of trying to say what is not excluded. The double negative formulation what is not excluded makes the language very difficult to understand, especially for those who have not been following the GGE's conversations.

So our proposal here is intended to give to help give a better sense of the systems that are covered. As our colleague from Switzerland and some others have said, how can we bring more clarity and precision to to this particular phrase, drawing on elements that we've seen in other delegations proposals for a characterization of laws and it would also seek to address the concerns we've heard from those who believe that identify will overly narrow the scope of the definition. Again, a concern we've heard on a number of occasions this morning. So our suggestion here would be to revise the subparagraph term read. This characterization includes systems with software, algorithms or other technologies that when activated, can process sensor data to identify targets in the environment, determine whether to engage such targets and initiate an engagement.

And so we hope, Chair, that that would be a suggestion that would address a number of concerns that we have heard heard this morning. A second proposal for the subparagraphs is to add a phrase to describe what is not covered by the characterization. And here we would suggest a system is not intended to be used autonomously and is not included in this characterization if the personnel planning and conducting the attack select the targets to be engaged by the system. So if you take the two sentences that we've just suggested, I think our view is that this would be more clear, better identify what would be covered by the scope of identify, and also retain a little bit more clarity about the types of systems that would continue to be excluded.

This language would clarify an important aspect of laws. As the ICRC has explained in the past, after initial activation or launch by a person, an autonomous weapon system self initiates or triggers a strike in response to information from the environment received through sensors and on the basis of a generalized target profile. This means that the user does not choose or even know the specific targets and the precise timing and or location of the resulting applications of force. On the other hand, homing munitions, once activated, can select, identify, select and engage a target. These munitions are used when the user does know and choose the target.

We think this is an important clarification laws or systems where the system, not the personnel, select the target. Finally, Chair, and this is our last comment. As we mentioned last September in subparagraph 1c, we recommend adding or inclusion after the term exclusion. This avoids prejudicing current or future negotiations by giving States the freedom to both explicitly remove or add specific categories of systems in a future instrument. Thank you, Chair.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of the United States for sharing the views of his delegation and making proposals. And indeed we would appreciate to receive them in writing to carefully study them. And I think that would also be the case for other delegations. Next on my list is New Zealand, to be followed by Portugal, Argentina and Uruguay. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of New Zealand.

You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. New Zealand appreciates the continued work on the rolling text. As a general point, and as others have also said this morning, we consider that the document provides a credible and practical basis for moving from exploratory discussions towards negotiation of an instrument. We therefore approach this session with a constructive and pragmatic objective.

We're not looking for perfection at this stage, but convergence around a workable starting point for future negotiations. We would echo Switzerland's remarks that this convergence should not weaken what is already a thoroughly deliberated and well balanced text.

Turning very briefly to box one Chair as others comments have covered much of what we would want to say and we consider it a good basis to work from. We also had similar questions around identifying the chapeau that it unhelpfully narrows the scope. But at this stage we can live with what is produced in subparagraph A. As a useful attempt to provide clarification, we will consider others proposals, such as Pakistan's that we've heard earlier, as to whether that can help strengthen the clarity of the clause. We would also prefer to delete the word lethality in the paragraph.

Lethality is not a term formally used in ihl and our concerns are centered on the use of force in this context. But we do remain flexible with the characterisation, as we say, as a starting point for discussions. We also welcome the clause in subparagraph C. Given rapid technological change, the characterisation should be capable of refinement as an operational experience develops.

I'll just leave my comments there on box one chair and look forward to contributing further. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of New Zealand for sharing the views of his delegation and for making proposals and reacting to the the remarks by other delegations. Next on my list is Portugal, to be followed by Argentina, Uruguay and the Philippines. But first, Portugal, you have the floor.

Thank you, Chair and good morning, colleagues. Thank you first and foremost for the Rolling tax and for your hard work, as well as the hard work of your team and the Secretariat, which is well appreciated by my delegation. We would like to also state that we agree in general with the Rolling tax as is it provides certainly very balanced and oriented elements towards the negotiation of a future convention, a future protocol, eventually, as we hope it will.

We do agree that the ruling text provides a broad scope, it's technological neutral, it's future proof, and so it is indeed a very good basis. We would also like to remind that we are not negotiating yet an instrument, international legal, binding instrument. We are basically agreeing on some terms of reference for future negotiations, so we will have the ability and the opportunity to be more refined in the language if we so wish in the future. Turning to box one as others, there are some language that we would like perhaps to be more refined or even excluded, for instance, in what concerns the reference to the identification of targets, or in subparagraph A when referring the human operator setting the parameters of the target. This is in our view a bit ambiguous, but overall we are very satisfied with the balance reach in box one.

And we can support it, as you have proposed to us, without any further amendments or changes. Finally, Mr. Chair, of course we are in a very decisive moment of the work of the GGE laws. We only have two sessions this year to the two last sessions, and we would like to remind that consensus is not a veto. Consensus is a responsibility to negotiate towards common solutions, to reach balanced terms of reference.

Balance rolling text and we think we are almost there. You may count with our supports and our commitment. Thank you.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of Portugal for sharing the views of the delegation and for his support expressed. Next on my list is Argentina, to be followed by your greater Philippines, India and Mexico. But let me first pass the floor to distinguished representative of Argentina. You have the floor.

Thank you very much, Chair. As we've had an opportunity to say in other fora and along the lines of what Brazil and other delegations have said, we believe that there's been significant progress with this text and it's very close to closing considering the mandate of the group. We thank you and your team for your efforts and for the professional attitude you've demonstrated throughout the procedure on box 1. The question of identify is an important function which should be included in any measure that we adopt in future. The flexibility of 1A is commendable because it doesn't exclude certain systems.

And subparagraph B we believe, is an acceptable compromise on the question of lethality, which has been a particularly difficult topic and has found fixed positions on it. So we would urge this intermediate solution language in subparagraph C seems to us essential in order to find that to keep that flexibility and also to encompass what may arise from technological progress or emerging in the field of laws. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Argentina for sharing the comments of his delegation. Next to my list is Uruguay, to be followed by the Philippines.

But let me first pass the floor to distinguished representative of Uruguay. You have to floor. Gracias.

Thank you very much, Chair. Uruguay agrees with others who've already said that this is an improved version compared to previous ones, and it's a useful basis to continue and progress with our discussion.

So we thank you and your team for. For the very hard work you've put into it. We also reiterate our commitment to a responsible, human centered and robust system on laws, on autonomous weapon systems. Now on box one, we believe it's a consensus and ballast solution. And so we have a very positive view of it.

We welcome the inclusion of the act of identifying as a central element of these systems. And in section A, we should avoid any restrictive interpretation of this. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Uruguay for stating the position of her delegation. Next to my list is the Philippines, to be followed by India and Mexico. And then I have still Finland, Russian Federation and Canada and already also some observers next to my. But first let me pass the floor to the Philippines. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. Before we proceed directly to our delegation's Comments on Box 1, we thank you for you and your team's efforts towards having a consensus document to fulfill the mandate of this group. We also appreciate the circulation of this version of the revised Rolling Text early on and for conducting informal negotiations prior to these. To this meeting, please count on our delegation support. We hope that convergence can be achieved in this group and fulfill its mandates so we can proceed with what is only the next stage left for this group, which is to move to the negotiations of a protocol within the CCW to govern laws on box one.

Our delegation generally supports its current formulation as it provides a functional and technology neutral characterization of loss. We support that the characterization is not limiting the definition of loss to a weapon system that only requires the absence of human intervention and or to obey what weapon systems that only result to loss of life to be deemed as loss. On the inclusion of identify, we support the calls for further clarification of the term to prove the necessity of its inclusion if truly needed. We support proposals to indicate in the text the involvement of human operator in the initial stage of setting target profiles to ensure that early human involvement does not exclude a weapon systems based on emerging technologies from being characterized as loss. That's all for now.

Thank you, Chair.

I thank you for sharing the preliminary views of your delegation. Next on my list is India, to be followed by Mexico and Finland. But let me first pass the floor to distinguished representative of India. So we have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

And good morning, colleagues. Mr. Chair, I want to start by acknowledging your contributions and efforts in steering our work. We also commend you and your team for your inclusive and consultative approach. And we also do not want to be remiss in appreciating the contributions of the isu.

My delegation has engaged actively and constructively and we will do so going forward this year. The Rolling Text is slowly but surely shaping quite well. It is indeed better than the previous versions that we have seen. Nevertheless, some more work still needs to be accomplished going forward, I want to take the opportunity to present our views on box 1 and in some cases reiterate some of the points that we made during the last informal consultations. Broadly, we want a characterization that is balanced, progressive and forward looking.

It should not be too restrictive, such that our instrument is unable to address concerns emanating from autonomous weapons which are increasingly under development and will impact the conduct of of armed conflict going forward. It should also not be too expansive, such that our focus on the most important set of such weapons is diluted. A balance, therefore, is necessary. I have three points, Mr. Chair, on para 1A.

As a concept, we believe that this is a very useful addition. This, if I'm not wrong, was proposed by the ICRC and we thank them for their contribution. The idea to distinguish between human input that may be nominal from what would be substantive is a valuable idea. We do believe that it adds more clarity to what we are trying to achieve over here. However unintentionally, the para is vague in some respects.

The current formulation could inadvertently cover a category of fire and forget missiles, including homing munitions, which in our view are not fully autonomous. The important question is that at what point setting of parameters as is given in the characterization that you provided, excludes real autonomy which is to be exercised by a system. There are also questions on what these parameters look like and how they impact autonomy. For example, if setting of parameters is akin to fixing a target, then the system has no means to demonstrate real autonomy, excepting maybe in terms of tracking. Therefore, such systems should not be covered.

However, in case of presetting of parameters is like providing only certain conditions which upon discovery of an object, a determination is made by the system whether these conditions are being fulfilled or not. Then it should be covered in the characterization because it gives real autonomy to a system. To decide a lot, therefore, would depend on weapons, their design, how they function and the exact nature of parameters that are given to them. Therefore, we ask for more clarity before we could agree on its insertion. The point two that I have is with respect to the term lethal.

The term lethal is a part of the mandate or the instruction to this group by the high contracting parties since its inception. In the text provided by you which is on the screen, the term lethality has been expanded to an extent where it may have lost any specific meaning. We prefer the previous text that was proposed by you in May last year. There was a delicate balance in that formulation. The term lethality primarily in our view, deals with permanent incapacitation or injury related to life These lethal autonomous weapons that can also damage or destroy objects should also be included.

We are willing to discuss this issue going forward and achieve some compromise on this term. The last point that we have is, is an insertion that we had requested in respect of Box 2 in the Informal consultations, emphasizing the point that peaceful use of such technologies, autonomous technologies, should not be impacted by the instrument. This is very important for developing countries, countries from the Global south, such as mine. We have two ready made formulations as agreed in the previous reports. The first is from the 2019 report, paragraph 23C, which states that research and development of autonomous technologies should not be restricted based on the sole rationale that such technologies could be used for weapon systems.

And the second formulation that we have is from the 2017 report, paragraph 16D, which states that acknowledging the dual nature of technologies in the area of intelligent autonomous systems that continue to develop rapidly, the Group's efforts in the context of its mandate should not hamper progress in or access to civilian research and development and use of these technologies. We could use formulations from these paragraphs. This could also be reflected in conjunction with paragraph 1C, if so decided by the Group. And we are also alternatively willing to such an insertion in box two. I'll stop over here.

However, we look forward to finding resolution on the issues that I have mentioned and we want to thank you once again for your contributions. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of India for commenting on the text and making proposals, and the BBP that we always appreciate to receive them in writing. Next on my list is Mexico, to be followed by Finland and the Russian Federation.

But first let me pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico. So you have the floor.

Muchas gracias. Thank you very much, Chair. Our first words are words of thanks to you, Ambassador Den Bosch, and thanks to your team moving us on in these substantive discussions, which in fact have been lasting for the past 10 years on this convention involving both States, parties and observers, and it does show commitment to the positions expressed by the different delegations. We want to decide on a set of elements of a normative instrument. Now, the reality of including ever more advanced laws and using them together with land based weapons, the application of IHL and the public discussions on the regulations that are required, all of this points to the need to have a legal framework offering certainty and transparency.

Now, in Mexico's view, the text we have before us is a solid basis for moving towards a negotiation on an instrument which allows us to regulate weapon systems of this kind. We've had Discussions between more than 40 states, as has been said, and this rolling text, it seems to emerge, is a basis for for moving towards further discussions. We believe the rolling text will continue to offer this solid basis if it continues to show this compromise. We should therefore be focusing on nuances and not substantive changes. As you yourself have said, Chair, these are elements that can be considered at a labour date later date.

Now on box one, Mexico recognizes the compromise that has been included in box 1, particularly 1B which is a constructive decision on the basis of delegations discussions on lethality. Now,

characterization is not something that we thought was essential because it's not the technical elements that are most important but the human related elements in the view of our delegation.

But the functional elements that are concerned have been included, particularly when it comes to identifying and selecting objects targets. But there have been objections raised by other delegations relating to identify. Now there's the risk that this term will be interpreted very restrictively excluding any human intervention prior to substantive activation. If such systems are excluded from characterization, we would have had a regulatory gap created and there must be human control which is included.

The way we see it, there must be a distinction drawn between the key problem identified over the years, which is ensure a human element during critical stages of selecting targets and the use of force, and the regulatory scope which will require pre and post facto measures to ensure that there really is significant human control throughout the process. We must limit ourselves to these two stages, although we do understand that 1A does help to contextualize characterization and as Brazil and Ireland and other delegations have said, it does include a consideration of identification on 1A. We can support the current formulation because this covers systems that exist now or could be developed in future does include a particular element of human control. There's also the question of potential lists or operational parameters. So it is acceptable in our view.

But we listened with great interest to Pakistan's proposal and will consider it carefully.

Furthermore, I think we have to be careful in moving towards characterization on the basis of of technical characteristics for the reasons we've already mentioned. Although we don't rule out the key note of algorithmic procedures when considering the technological components of one or more weapons. Now on 1B we think it's an acceptable solution for an issue which from the very outset, 10 years ago created differences within the group. I think it does put in the right context lethality and this should not be one of the key components, particularly when thinking of ihl and we believe that it's a good compromise solution to move towards negotiations. We have to consider the nature of international instruments and when we are developing elements which will have to be fine tuned during a negotiation.

This is an important consideration. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for commenting on the text, sharing the views of his delegation. Next on my list is Finland, to be followed by the Russian Federation, Canada and Israel. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Finland.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. We would like to join other delegations in extending our appreciation to you, Mr. Chair, and to your team for the

constructive work carried out through throughout this process. We believe that the overall evolution of the Rolling text has in many respects progressed in a positive direction. Many of the recent amendments bring welcome clarity and are, from our perspective, broadly favorable. Regarding box one, we support the definitions contained as they currently stand.

The amendments introduced are constructive. We are pleased to see that the term identify has been reintroduced among the select and engage functions. Likewise, the replacement of the word user with operator is, in our view, a positive and clarifying improvement. Regarding paragraph 1B, we find the current formulation appropriate as it ensures that outcomes other than solely lethal effects are duly taken into account.

We also support the formulation of paragraph 1C as it provides pragmatic flexibility to accommodate future technological developments. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I thank the distinguished representative of Finland for commenting on the text. Next on my list is the Russian Federation, to be followed by Canada and Israel.

But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation. So we have the floor.

Thank you very much, distinguished Chair. At the outset, I would like to join others who express their gratitude to you and to your team for preparing this document and the efforts that you're making with the view of implementing the mandate of our group. By the way, on the mandate, we believe that at this stage, any attempts to discuss the future mandate of this group are rather counterproductive. Rather than bringing us closer to achieving our final result, we believe that this question should be discussed at the final stage of the work of this group in this format, when it will be clear what substantive results the group will achieve. But it's really not necessary to do it now.

What we need to do now is to focus on the implementation of the current mandate. And in this respect, we'd like to recall that the current mandate, as reflected in paragraph five of our agenda, provides for not just consideration of a set of elements of some instrument, but also other possible measures related to lethal autonomous weapon systems. And this is exactly what we should focus our efforts on.

This is why, as part of paragraph one, we believe it is necessary to delete the words and for the purpose of these elements of an instrument, because it does not correctly or properly reflect our mandate and it probably prejudges the final result of the discussions in this group. Moreover, for the end purposes, we probably really would not need this language in this paragraph.

Moreover, on the parameter of lethality, we believe that it is necessary to include the characteristic of lethality in the working definition directly because this is part of the mandate of the group. This is something that is included in the name of this GGE as one possible solution or a possible option. On how to include this, we suggest we replace the word target with the word manpower that would fully reflect the criteria of lethality. And in all of that we do hear the concerns being raised by other delegations related to to.

The possibility of inflicting harm or eliminating destroying non human objects, and we believe in a balanced way. This is already covered by subparagraph B. And overall, in connection with the option that we're proposing, replacing the word to target with the word manpower, subparagraph B in a balanced manner would reflect these concerns raised by delegations, with our position also reflected in the text.

Moreover, just like the delegation of the United States of America, we believe that it is necessary to delete the last part of the paragraph, namely the words in the execution of these tasks, because this ending of the sentence creates a certain level of confusion in this paragraph in the definition and creates the feeling that the functions of identifying, selecting and engaging our target I only related to the carrying out of such functions. We believe that these functions will be part of weapon systems throughout the entire life cycle of such systems. And this is why we believe that the last part of this paragraph the words in the execution of these tasks to be superfluous.

Also, we would like to react to the comment that was made by the delegation of the United States related to actually expanding our understanding of what we mean when the word system. We do not share the point of view that we should introduce any limitations in terms of the characterizations of this term and understand under the word system, where auxiliary elements and destructive elements would be integrated in one same device. We believe that we have to consider also systems weapon systems, where different technological elements of the systems, both auxiliary, just like the main systems of destroying the targets, will be brought together in a functional manner in to such a system. And in this way we fully support the language that you are presenting to us in. Mr.

Chair in paragraph one also distinguished chair on the parameter of identification.

On several occasions we already presented our views on this Matter, we are ready to to live without the inclusion of the word identify in paragraph one, as is being proposed by most delegations in this room. We are ready to live with this language that we have in this paragraph. But at this stage we believe that it is really unjustified and counterproductive to try to actually identify what identify means.

We believe that this will lead us to nowhere and we share the views of the delegation of Switzerland. Attempts to include a definition in the definition are counterproductive and will hardly help us find a consensus based compromise result. In light of the fact that this definition is a working definition, this is something that will continue to be continue to discuss this in the work of this group. As we understand at this stage it is probably really not necessary to try to deepen our understanding of what this means, because if we try to do that, then we would like to know what we mean when we say select, engage, and also what we mean when we use other terms in this definition. I think we simply do not have to time to do that.

Also. Distinguished chair, on 1A, in this respect, we believe that we need to delete this subparagraph completely because we believe that it takes us further away from the result that we wish to achieve on 1C. Overall, we agree with this subparagraph. The only thing that we would like to ask you to do to delete the word possible before the word exclusion, because we believe that we all share the view that certain categories of systems will be excluded from this definition. And finally, Distinguished Chair, we're categorically against to go back to attempts to include words once activated in the working definition.

We believe that this language moves us further away from reaching a consensus based result because this provokes many additional questions. What that exactly means, who will activate the system, how will that be done and at what stage will that be taking place? Thank you very much.

Let me thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation for sharing the views of his delegation and for making concrete proposals. Let me also reassure him that it's not my intent to develop a glossary or something on everything we say, but there was some good reason to look especially into identify as a form of compromise. I have a problem in understanding one of the proposals he made with regard to changing the text and it's with regard to parallel one that in the version circulated by the chair reads that can identify, select and engage a target. We got your proposal translated into that can, identify, select and engage manpower. Is that what you would like to see in English?

Okay, thank you very much. Next on my List is Canada, to be followed by Israel, the Republic of Korea, Spain, China, Turkey. But let me first pass the floor to distinguished representative of Canada. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation wishes to add to the voices of others in thanking you and your team for the great work in getting us this far in our mandate. Indeed, Canada aligns itself with your approach and you can count on our full support.

Generally, my delegation believes that this latest version of the Rolling Text brings us closer to our overall objective and Canada could broadly support the text as it currently stands.

Mr. Chair, with respect to the formulation of identify, select and engage, Canada sees merit in the three elements as presented in the Rolling Text. We understand the intent behind each of the terms and recognize the desire to ensure clarity and operational coherence. My delegation listened carefully to the arguments made for select and engage being sufficient in this box. However, in our view, identification is an operational function that enables verification, which in turn supports compliance with the IHL principle of distinction.

One cannot meaningfully select without first identifying the object of that selection. For these reasons, we support the inclusion of identify in para 1. Regarding subpara B. Canada recognizes that setting a human role in setting target perimeters does not in any way constitute sufficient human involvement to satisfy the judgment necessary to ensure compliance with the principles of proportionality and precaution in attacks. As such, Canada welcomes the clarity that simply setting target perimeters would not constitute sufficient human involvement and therefore would not exclude exclude such a system from the characterization. Mr.

Chair, our objective here is to ensure that the terminology we adopt is precise, operationally meaningful and reflective of a disciplined approach. And we believe that this latest version of the text helps us meet this requirement. But we are considering the proposals that we have heard this morning, such as the ones made regarding functional integration and around the concept of lethality. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Canada for the positions of his delegation and commenting on the proposals made by other delegations. Next on my list is Israel, to be followed by the Republic of Korea. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Israel. So you have the.

Thank you so much, Chair, and good morning. Good afternoon to you all. Colleagues. First, Israel would like to thank you, Chair, as well as your team and the Secretariat for the efforts, dedication and hard work and assurio our full support in the discharge of of your duties. Regarding the first paragraph, paragraph one, we'd like to note the recent positive amendment and welcome the addition of the term identify to the cumulative elements, which in our view reflects an essential characteristics of laws and contributes to greater clarity regarding the scope of systems under consideration.

However, we have a few suggestions regarding the current formulation of the paradox. Firstly, we'd like to suggest deleting the word functionally from the phrase functionally integrated and add their integral before technological components so that the sentence will read A lethal autonomous weapon system can be characterized as an integrated combination of one or more weapons and their integral technological components.

We do not fully understand the practical meaning of functionally integrated and are concerned that it may broaden the definition beyond a clearly identifiable weapon system to external components which are not actually part of the system. The current text does not sufficiently reflect the fact that weapon systems often rely on a large amount of information that and external features that are not inherently part of it. This concern is even more pronounced with the addition of the term functionally integrated as it risked broadening the definition to loosely capture connected elements based on functionality alone. The way it is phrased now, it makes it very difficult to determine what is considered part of the system and what is is not, and this will contribute to further confusion. Furthermore, we would like to suggest replacing the word can to is designed to in line with the common terminology in the international law applicable to weapons, including in the context of the ccw.

There is a reason why definitions of weapons are based on design in particular, since they better reflect the element of intended circumstances of use, which is crucial a crucial element in defining and reviewing weapons. We believe it is helpful to maintain the language that has been already agreed upon by many States here in the context of other protocols, as it ensures clarity and facilitates implementation. Lastly, on the paragraph one, we believe that any characterization of laws must focus on lethal autonomous weapon systems in accordance with our current mandate. In our view, adding the phrase with lethal force conveys the idea without reopening the broader discussion on the definition of lethality within this forum. Therefore, the paragraph will read as A lethal autonomous weapon system can be characterized as an integrated combination of one or more weapons and their integral technological components that is designed to identify, select and engage target with lethal force without intervention by a human operator in the execution of the task.

With your permission, I will refer now to paragraph 1A.

We believe that this subparagraph is not necessary for the characterization and may complicate the consensus by introducing an unduly expansive concept. A categorical statement that human involvement in setting target parameters does not exclude from the characterization is too vague as humans regularly set targets sorry, set target parameters which clearly do not have to do with loss. For example, a human operator may set GPS coordinates that merely guide the technical trajectory of a missile, but such categories of weapons clearly fall outside the intended focus of this group. Therefore, we will prefer deleting the sentence.

Alternatively, we suggest making the following modifications to the text so it will be less vague and have a clear practical effect. First, replacing the wording parameters of the targets with parameters to identify categories of targets. This helps clarify that we are not including systems that merely execute an attack. Second, we will suggest adding the words in and of itself after the words does not. In our view, this will clarify that not every system falls that falls under the description in this paragraph is necessarily a lethal autonomous weapon system.

Therefore, the text will the fact that a human operator sets parameters to identify categories of targets does not in and of itself exclude the system from the characterization. Finally, regarding 1b, the previous meetings have shown that the meaning of the term lethal is subject to significant disagreements and that the attempts to define lethality are complex and are not necessarily needed. For the purpose of this discussion, we are concerned that this issue could divert the forum from reaching consensus. Furthermore, a definition of lethality might have broader implications that extend beyond the scope of our discussion. Therefore, from a practical standpoint, we will recommend deleting the paragraph altogether.

Alternatively, we will suggest narrowing it by adding language as does not necessarily result in loss of life, which will help anchor the definition in design and intent rather than in speculative outcomes. I thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Israel for sharing the comments of his delegation and for making proposals. Next on my list is the Republic of Korea, to be followed by Spain. But first, a distinguished representative of the rok. You have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. At the outset, my delegation expressed its sincere appreciation to the Chair and your team for dedication and hard work. We will continue to support your approach and actively participate in the discussion to achieve the consensus outcome and adopt a report as mandated.

Regarding the Box one, I have three points to make. First, we welcome the inclusion of identification as one of the critical functions of laws. Second, regarding 1A, why my delegation agrees with the general direction of the paragraph. However, we also share the concerns expressed

by many delegations on the ambiguity of the paragraph, and we need to further clarify and have a common understanding on the terms and concepts used in this paragraph, such as parameters as explained by many other delegations. Also in this regard, we also note the US suggestion and we may incorporate some of the elements suggested by our US Colleagues.

Also today, many delegations mentioned the use of potential targets, list of potential targets, or the general target profiles. In spirit of the interactive discussion, I would like to ask those delegations mention these terms, what they actually mean by those list of potential targets or the general target profiles, and what are the

differences between the parameters and their use of terms. Furthermore, we share similar understanding with distinguished delegation from India that we need to conceptualize what parameters mean. And it doesn't mean

does it mean setting the conditions or picking the targets? And as the US suggested in their intervention, in our view, the system is not included in the characteristics if the person planning or conducting the attack select the targets to be engaged by the systems. So, keeping that in mind, lastly, third, we share the concerns also experience expressed by India on the delicate balance we achieved in paragraph 1B.

And to solve this, to restore this balance, we can go back to the original formulation that you suggested, Chair, in the last draft, or we can simply add by little force in the figure one to have a solution. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of the IRK for sharing comments and reacting to the views of others and also asking questions with regard to proposals made by others. And please feel free to react to that. Next on my list is Spain, to be followed by China, Turkey and Bulgaria. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Spain. You have the floor.

Thank you very much, Chair. At the outset, I would like to join delegations that took the floor before me in thanking you, your team and the Secretariat for the efforts and your dedication that you have demonstrated to to reach the point where we find ourselves today. And you can count on the support of our delegation during this meeting and the upcoming September meeting. In general, the text, we believe is an excellent basis for successfully implementing the mandate of this group. Indeed, we are focusing on elaboration of a group of elements and not negotiating a legally binding treaty.

And I think with this text we have reached a point where we can feel very positive about attaining our objective. Now, on paragraph one of the text, Spain is in favor of ensuring that the framework for application, paragraph one that we see on the screen to have a ccw, to have CCW as the framework. Now, just like other delegations, the word lethal. We believe the inclusion of this term responds or reflects the very foundation of our mandate. And we believe that it is necessary also to include the term identify as a critical function of these systems that are autonomous and lethal.

On 1A, we believe that with the word identify, perhaps it would not be necessary to include this sub paragraph, but with the view of being flexible and the possibility of reaching a consensus, we can think about keeping paragraph 1A with the understanding that it should be interpreted in such a way that they don't mean that the paragraph will exclude semi autonomous weapon systems and self defense systems. On 1B, we agree with the substance of the paragraph as a consensus based proposal related to the clarification of the term lethality. Now on 1C, finally, we believe that this is a good compromise and we believe that it is important to keep the characterization that will be open, an open characterization of this system to future technological developments. Thank you.

I thank the Ambassador of Spain for sharing the views of her delegation. I think that we meant one alpha as in a way as not to narrow down parallel one. I think you give it a different interpretation. We will certainly look into that. Next on my list is China, to be followed by Turkey.

But let me first pass the floor to distinguished representative of China. Madame, you have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. First of all, we wish to thank you, the friends of Chair, the Secretariat and others for your efforts in promoting the work of the gge.

We will fully support your work.

As for the text box 1, including 1A on the matter of autonomy, China stresses autonomous identification, selection and engagement are all core functions of laws.

This has been identified in the report of the GGE in 2019.

We recognize the inclusion of identify in a new text and the one A paragraph that has been included.

That a human operator sets the parameters of the targets does not exclude the system from the characterization.

This framing is rather vague. For example, during the phase of select and engage, If a human operator sets the parameters to identify the target to select and engage the targets, does that constitute human intervention? If the answer is affirmative, such weapon systems should not fall into the category of laws.

And if the answer is affirmative, this contradicts to para. 1A to paragraph 1.

Given the technical ambiguity of 1A, China believe we should further discuss it or rather delete it.

On1B lethality, it is our view that the current discussion should follow the mandate of the group to identify that lethality is an intrinsic property of laws.

The phrasing of 1B would apparently expand or diverge the discussions.

We note that some colleagues have made textual proposals on lethality.

Currently, we believe that we can go back to the rolling tax in May 2025.

As for 1C, we pointed out on several occasions that the scope of laws.

Should be consistent with the original purposes of the disclosure. Discussion of laws within the framework of ccw.

Indeed, the original intent of the discussions on emerging technologies in the field of laws within the framework of ccw, we should not attempt to include long standing or long existing.

Traditional conventional weapons that are subject to international humanitarian law.

Given the evolution of technologies, we should prevent an over narrowing definition that would give rise to loopholes in the future. On the other hand, we should also prevent closing doors to the development of lawful technologies in the future. Therefore believe that this exclusion clause in the current text is helpful. Thank you Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of China for sharing the views of her delegation and making concrete proposals. Next on my list is the distinguished representative of Turkey, to be followed by Bill Garria. But first Tuki

thank you Chair. I join others in thanking you, your team and ISU for all your efforts. We found the informal discussions very useful to make the best use of intersessional period with a view to maintaining momentum on box one. I'll reiterate our proposals from informals and also reflect on proposals of others we heard today on paragraph one in response to proposals to add and or we strongly urge maintaining the cumulative approach in this paragraph. We could support addition of with leader force after engage a target.

Now moving on to 1A. You will recall we made a proposal in the informals to get rid of the ambiguity that some of the delegations were insinuating and we have formulated another formulation. So I would like to hear other delegations reflections on this proposal. We would like to add or is involved in the systems functioning after parameters of the target or target.

So the new formulation would read. The fact that a human operator sets the parameters of the target targets or is involved in the system's functioning does not exclude the system from the characterization. Moving to 1B.

Like some others, we have concerns with the current formulation of this subparagraph because because we believe including damage to objects under the same characterization may unintentionally broaden the scope to encompass a wide range of automated weapon systems that are not intended to fall within the laws framework. If lethality is not treated as a distinguishing criterion, the term lethal becomes functionally redundant, weakening the credibility of the characterization. For that reason, with the current formulation we prefer the deletion of the subparagraph. You would also recall we made a proposal for a new sub paragraph which would be 1d along similar lines to what India proposed today. The purpose would be to clarify that civilian use and dual use technologies could be developed as long as they are in line with international law.

The new subparagraph would read, this characterization is without prejudice to the development and use of civilian or dual use technology consistent with applicable international law. I thank you Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Turkey for sharing the views of delegation making proposals Next on my list is Bulgaria, to be followed by Norway. But let me first pass the floor to distinguished representative of Bulgaria. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair. Allow me to express gratitude to you and your team for the creative leadership and devoted efforts. Bulgaria welcomes the latest version of the Rolling Text which takes into account key considerations from the 2025 sessions and offers a more coherent language. The role in text advances in a constructive direction towards prospective negotiations of an instrument on loss.

With regard to box one, we consider it to be well organized and to contain broad enough working characterization. It is important to avoid unnecessarily limiting the scope of this characterization. Therefore, we recognize subpara as a compromise. However, as already highlighted by several delegations, subpar A which aims to describe the identify function, may benefit from further clarification to better encompass the various uses and understandings of the web identifier. Regarding par 2, we can support as we acknowledge the controversial nature that the concept of lethality has held within the gg.

Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Bulgaria for sharing the views of his delegation. Next on my list is the distinguished representative of Norway, to be followed by Iran. And then I have Article 36 MA the Mount for Peace ICRC. But let me see how far we get. So let me first pass the floor to distinguished representative of Norway.

You have the floor.

There we go. Thank you, Chair. And thank you to you and your team and the ISU for your continuing hard work for us. Generally speaking, and like others, we believe the revised Rolling Text is a step in the road direction that takes the GGE closer to discharging its mandate and many of the changes made to the road.

Scope to improve the text. And we still have some time to do that. But as mentioned by Brazil, we were part of a joint statement last year in which we said that the routing text, while not perfect, of course contained a set of elements that we believe is a sufficient basis for negotiations of an instrumental laws in the ccw. And in our estimation, like Brazil and others, we believe the current version of the Rolling Text still merits that description. So, over to box one and the critical functions.

We welcome your solution, Chair. To re include the critical function of identification in the characterization, which some have asked very strongly for, but at the same time then rendering explicit in paragraph 1A that a weapon system remains a lawsuit even if the operator has determined to a greater degree, I.e. specific targets, or to a lesser degree, I.e. more generalized target profiles that the system shall seek out and select for engagement and then engage. So for us, the main point is that the characterization not be too narrow or easily circumventable, as we've said before, which is what we risk with the cumulative definition with many conditions, and especially when we then have terms used in that definition that do not have a clear common understanding, which is the case for the word identify, and which is why our primary position still remains that identify should have been an alternative element of the characterization.

But with paragraph 1A, we should be in a position to support the inclusion of identify and the characterization in paragraph 1. Of course, it's not easy to read this paragraph 1A, but at least it provides a solution that avoids the problem of a definition within a definition. So that said, I think Pakistan made an interesting point regarding the fact that parameters might be set by somebody other than the operator. And in order to fix that, we would like to float the idea of omitting the word operator and just rather say the fact that a human sets the parameters and so forth.

And also we appreciate the various proposals that were made today to make the text clearer in 1A, including some interesting but quite long proposals by the US that I'm not quite sure I caught properly. So we'll come back to them once we have seen them on paper and have had time to consider them properly. And on the issue of broadness, I mean, as we've said many times before, the characterization is just for us, the starting point, the sort of scope, maximum scope of what we look at. It doesn't in itself impose anything, restrictions, regulations or otherwise, and that is something, of course, we deal with in the subsequent parts of the text. So we have the opportunity there to take a nuanced approach to the various subsets of weapon systems that fall within this characterization, if that should prove necessary.

That said, we do not think that the concept of context, appropriate human control and judgment, and the associated measures that we have in box three would raise problems for current systems in which humans have preset the target parameters. And I think, as Canada mentioned, made a good point here, that presetting the parameters of a target does not in and of itself amount to an appropriate human involvement that depends on other contexts. So such systems should be included in the characterization so that they can be further examined. And of course, as Pakistan pointed out, this is merely working characterization. So we have the opportunity to revisit it, and we probably should do that once the rest of the instrument has found its final shape to, to ensure that it is coherent and matches our aims as regards human operator, as we understand laws and as we believe they are commonly Understood, they are weapon systems that, once they've been activated by a human, no longer require human intervention to execute the critical functions.

So we are okay with the current formulation, human operator, but we could also simply write human. And the reason we want to retain the word human is twofold. First, the special concerns that laws raise stem from the way they move the human further and further away from life and death decisions, the way they diminish the human presence in the causal chain, leading to the engagement of a target, if you will. And we believe it is important to highlight at the very outset that it is this human dimension, or the lack of it rather, that sets laws apart from other weapon systems. And the best way to do this, we think, is to tie the characterization explicitly to what the human does not need to do.

And it's been argued that by saying human operator, we imply that there might be other kinds of operators that are not human. And we agree, of course, that the normal interpretation is that an operator is the human that operates the system. But AI capabilities grow, and we can't exclude the possibility that operator might take on new meanings a few years down the line. So if necessary to avoid this problem of implying anything by saying human operation operator, we propose to reformulate it to avoid this. And it would then read that can identify, select and engage the target without intervention in the execution of these tasks by the human that operates the system that way.

We're not using human to qualify or describe the operator, but instead explain which humans it is that we are thinking of, namely those that operate the system. And I think the US made a similar proposal here. Finally, on lethality, we believe 1b is an improvement of previous paragraph 2. It no longer attempts to define lethality, which is good in our opinion. We don't strictly need a paragraph on lethality, but if there is to be one, we think it is useful to underscore that a weapon system does not stop being a laws just because it is used to damage and to cause damage and not to cause death.

So we can support the current version of paragraph 1B. Thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Norway for sharing the comments of his delegation and reacting to the views of others. I apologize to Australia, I missed your plaque. So I have now on my list Australia to be followed by Iran. But let me first pass the floor to distinguished representative of Australia. You have the floor, Ryan.

I actually put up my flag after Iran, so I'm happy for them to go first.

Oh, I see. Thank you. We have a certain.

I understand as this is the first Time my delegation takes the floor.

I would first like to thank you and your team for your ongoing efforts to find areas of convergence in the text. Australia believes that this latest version of the rolling text has progressed significantly. Secondly, we can see increasing convergence, compromise and clarity, which will be immensely helpful in producing a consensus product in September. And more broadly, it will be helpful to States in considering the application of existing international humanitarian law to lethal autonomous weapons systems. Turning to box one, it is important that any characterisation we agree to include in the text accurate, accurately describes the laws and is commonly understood amongst States.

In this regard, we listened with interest to the US's proposed suggestions across box 1, and we'll give it positive consideration on paragraph 1A, which reflects entirely new text. The inclusion of this paragraph seems to us to be a neat solution to address the potential for misunderstanding created by the reinsertion of Identify in paragraph paragraph 1. Human involvement in setting a target profile should not in and of itself be considered completion of the identification step. We have listened to suggestions by other delegations as to how to more accurately describe this process and look forward to further focused discussions on this paragraph. Further, as a minor edit, for consistency and clarity, we would suggest paragraph 1A refer to this character characterisation rather than the characterization as it does in paragraph 1B.

On paragraph 1B, we recognize the continued pursuit of a compromise solution here, and we should not Forget that paragraph 1C does assist in this regard. Thank you.

I have one more request from high contracting parties, Singapore, then to be followed by Iran, that we pass floor to distinguished representative of Singapore. You have the floor.

Thank you, Chair, and good morning, colleagues. At the outset, Singapore would like to thank your Excellency, distinguished Chair and your team, as well as the friends of the Chair, for the intercessional informal consultations and the amendments to the rolling text. As we arrive at the final two sessions of the GGE's mandate, my delegation assures the Chair of our full support and look forward to working constructively with our fellow delegations.

My delegation welcomes the reinstatement of IDENTIFY as one of the key characteristics of lethal autonomous weapon systems. It is a distinct function from target selection. We have intervened at length at past meetings on the technical requirement on why IDENTIFY should be included and need not repeat those explanations. Further, my delegation is of the view that the revised paragraph one may now make the characterization of laws sufficiently sound technologically and implementable for the purposes of the GGE. My delegation understands that the intent of paragraph 1A is to address some delegation's concern about unduly narrowing the scope of the characterisation.

Based on what we have heard at the informal consultations in January and from earlier interventions today, there remains a strong concern from some delegations about the inclusion of existing uncontroversial weapon systems, such as homing munitions that were cited. While my delegation considers how to improve paragraph 1A, we would like to invite fellow delegations to perhaps elaborate further. Weapons possible the specific types of weapon systems that should be considered laws, but which are excluded by virtue of the current characterization. This would allow us to better understand the specific types of weapon systems that 1a is meant to include and in

doing so work with other delegations to refine it further. I thank you, Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Singapore for sharing the views of the delegation and reacting to other proposals and asking questions to further clarify one Alpha. Next on my list is the distinguished representative of Iran. And I think that's probably the last one. And then we. I have Article 36 either for before lunch or after lunch, but.

Sorry. Oh, I. Again. One more then. Algeria, you have to floor first, and then Iran.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. As this is the first time my delegation takes the floor, we wish to express our appreciation to you and your team for your efforts in preparing this session of the gge. You can count on our delegation full

support and constructive engagement. Mr. Chair, we consider the rolling text solid basis for the GGE's deliberations, including the future possibility of developing legally binding instrument to regulate laws. Our delegation wishes to make the following

remarks regarding box one of the rolling text on paragraph one, we think that is important to reach a common understanding of the concept of functionally integrated combination of one or more weapons and technological components. We also agree with the views regarding the need for a broad and practical approach in defining laws in this first stage. Such a definition would constitute a valuable contribution to the pursuit of negotiations on a legally binding abstrument. We welcome also the reinclusion of the term identify as identification is critical stage and fundamental element in the characterization of laws.

It is the phase in which a system detects, recognize and classifies potential targets. We nevertheless believe that at this stage, human control must be ensured, particularly to guarantee the accurate identification of military targets and distinguish them from civilian infrastructure which is protected.

Protected under the international humanitarian law. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the distinguished representative of Algeria. I now pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Iran.

You have the floor, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Since it's the first time my delegation takes the floor, let us join the previous speakers in Thanking you and the team supporting you for the efforts put into drafting the ruling text before us. The Islamic Republic of Iran is honored to participate in this meeting as an observer state, and we maintain the view that the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons is the most appropriate and relevant forum to address concerns and implications arising from lethal autonomous weapon systems. However, we regret that due to the unlawful war of aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran by the regime of the United States and the Israeli regime, our concerned experts were not able to participate in this meeting.

On 28 February, the regime of the United States of America and the Israeli regime perpetrated a premeditated and criminal act of aggression against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and people of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which constitutes a flagrant violation of the fundamental view.

Address the rolling text we are discussing today, please. I caught your point with regard to the inability of your experts to travel, but I think the issues you are now raising have been addressed in the Security Council. To my knowledge, the Security Council has indeed not agreed on a solution for that. But I think the GDE laws is not able to help you with that either.

So could I please ask you to focus on the topic we are discussing today and I would really appreciate your cooperation in this. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for the point. If you allow me to finish my statement, you will find out that it is fully relevant to the work and mandate of this group of governmental experiments experts. Because the use of autonomous lethal forces against my people is evident in this war of aggression. If you allow me, I will proceed with the statement.

Mr. Chair,

if the statement indeed pertains to what we're discussing.

Okay, Mr. Chair. The use of little autonomous force by the United States and Israel against the people and civilian infrastructure in Iran, including through the vast use of MQ9 Ripper and Locust drones, is evident and is a matter of grave concern. While indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian objectives constitutes a war crime, as a consequence of indiscriminate and egregious attacks carried out against civilians and civilian infrastructures, a significant number of innocent individuals, among them women and children, have lost their lives.

In a single deliberate attack on an elementary school in Minob, city of Iran, 163 girls lost their lives. The international community, United Nations.

Sorry, sorry, I have to cut you now. Please. This is a political statement and this is not going to help us.

With regard to bringing forward the work of the group of governmental experts regarding lethal autonomous weapon systems. I gave you an opportunity, indeed to focus on the text but you are now continuing with your statement. Could you please focus again, if you have no remarks on it, then I would consider that your effort has been done. But please focus on the text and not deliver statements. We had an understanding at the beginning of this meeting that we would not have political statements and focus on the text we have in front of us.

And I would like you to either come with reaction to the rolling text as all delegations before you have done, or indeed refrain from further intervening. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will conclude my statement with the fact that the international community should not remain silent to this war of aggression. I thank you.

I thank the distinguished representative of Iran for his statement. And let me just make use of this opportunity to remind delegations to limit the statements to the subject on the discussion According to Rule 21 Bara 2.

I see one more request for the floor by the United States. Sir, you have the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, in particular for your efforts to allow us to remain focused on the issues before this group of governmental experts. Chair, we are here to engage in the GGE in a non politicized expert exchange. This is not the forum to raise geopolitical issues or discuss specific contexts. Doing so will only distract from this group's important work and endanger the process aspects of reaching consensus.

Although we do not intend to engage in repeated back and forth interventions on issues that are appropriately being discussed in other fora, I am compelled to respond briefly to the earlier intervention by the delegate from Iran. We strongly reject the assertions regarding U.S. and allied military operations against Iran. President Trump has been clear in his communications to the world why it was imperative for the United States States to act. As you said, Chair, this is an issue for the UN Security Council, not this forum. And our statements in the Council have been equally clear about the need to act at President Trump's direction.

The United States is taking military action against specific Iranians. Could I ask you. I got your point, but I think we should avoid continuing this discussion. It's also one o', clock, so we are losing our interpretation. I thank you for your initial remarks.

I would now like to join the meeting and start again at 3 o'. Clock. We have then a number of observers request for the floor. Article 36 MAT for Peace I ICSC I Hlyi Stop Killer Robots University of Nottingham and iCrack so quite some more this delegation still taking the floor. I wish you all a good lunch break and see you back at three o'.

Clock.