Launch event of UN Special Political Missions: 1945 -2025: An Overview

Excellencies, colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, welcome to this launch event of the new DPPA publication, UN Special Political Missions 1945 to 2025: An Overview. Thank you very much for joining us today. Let me add that there's still some seats that are vacant in the front if anyone wants to come and be seated there. This initiative that we're launching today was designed to create for the first time a comprehensive public record of the history of special political missions to inform analysis and research. There are copies of the overview near the entrance. I think some of them already— some of you already have them at your seats. Please feel free to collect them from our colleagues. It is also obviously available online. For most of you. Let me introduce our speakers today. And first of all, myself. My name is Asif Khan. I'm Director of the Policy and Mediation Division in DPPA. I would like to extend a warm welcome to Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, on my right. Also on my right, the President of the Security Council, Her Excellency Mrs. Leonor Zalabata Torres. Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations. And to my left, His Excellency Mr. José Alberto Briz Gutiérrez, Chair of the Fourth Committee of the UN General Assembly and Permanent Representative of Guatemala to the United Nations. And of course, online and on the screen are our colleague, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti and Head of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti, who is connecting from Washington, I understand. Good afternoon, Carlos. And then finally, on my extreme right, Ms. Shamala Kandiah-Thompson, Executive Director at Security Council Report. Thank you very much for all joining us today. We have a fairly packed one hour, so I will ask the speakers to begin, and then hopefully there will be some time left towards the end for any comments or questions from the floor and from you. So to begin with, Rosemary DiCarlo, USG for DPPA, over to you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you very much, Asif. Excellencies, colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for joining us for the launch of this new publication on the history of United Nations Special Political Missions. Now, for 8 decades, special political missions have stood at the heart of the United Nations' most consequential achievements: decolonization and the emergence of new nations, peace agreements that brought devastating wars to a close, and political transitions that opened the door to lasting peace. Yet despite their central role, the full history has never been captured in one place before. Not until now. The United Nations has had no comprehensive record of all special political missions deployed since 1948. This publication changes that. While that may appear to be a simple exercise in documentation, it is far more than that. It reflects our responsibility to understand our own past, to examine what we did well where we fell short, and what lessons we must carry forward. This is the purpose of our work. In many ways, the history of special political missions mirrors the history of the United Nations itself. Their evolution shows how our approach to peace and security has adapted to dramatically different eras. Their record—sometimes modest, sometimes historic—has reminds us of one enduring truth: diplomacy works. That lesson is especially relevant today. You ask, what then are these Special Political Missions? At their very core, they are civilian missions mandated to prevent conflict, support peace processes, and help build sustainable peace. But their defining feature is their diversity. They have taken the form of envoys of the Secretary-General, of fact-finding and investigative missions, of regional offices, of panels of experts helping the Security Council monitor sanctions regimes, and of missions accompanying complex political transitions. They can be mandated by either the General Assembly or the Security Council. Their scope may be country-specific, regional, or global. The flexibility has always been their strength. The same instrument that helped broker a ceasefire can also demarcate a border or support the dismantling of a chemical weapons program. Few multilateral instruments are as adaptable. They embody the principle of the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, disputes, enshrined in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Excellencies, the story of special political missions begins in 1948 with the appointment of the first UN mediator in Palestine. From those early good offices emerged a remarkable array of missions. At the time of the UN's founding, nearly one-third of humanity lived under colonial rule. As that order gave way, special political missions helped supervise plebiscites and guide emerging nations towards statehood, from Cameroon and Togo to Bahrain. In Libya, a UN Commission supported the drafting of a constitution and the creation of a unified state. Libya became the first country to achieve independence through a UN-sponsored process. At the height of the Cold War, even amid deep geopolitical divides, the United Nations found space for quiet diplomacy, often through special political missions. Envoys helped negotiate the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan in the 1980s and end the bloody war between Iran and Iraq. With the end of the Cold War, A renewed international consensus allowed new missions to take shape in Central America, Angola, Somalia, Nepal, and elsewhere, helping implement peace agreements and undertaking comprehensive peacebuilding tasks that were groundbreaking at the time. The expansion of sanctions regimes in the 1990s brought yet another generation of missions—expert panels supporting the the Security Council's oversight of sanctions implementation. Special Political Missions helped oversee the elections that formally ended apartheid in South Africa. They supported the removal of chemical weapons from Syria. They advanced accountability for the crimes of ISIL in Iraq. And they helped end the civil war and support a peaceful transition in Tajikistan. Today, the demand for special political missions remains high, but the landscape is shifting. Geopolitical divisions are deepening. Conflicts are increasing, including a doubling of interstate conflicts between 2024 and 2025. Political solutions are harder to achieve, and the number of conflicts resolved through a comprehensive peace agreement is at its lowest in decades. These global shifts are shaping how our missions operate and the mandates they receive. With fewer peace agreements, mandates are becoming more focused, supporting ceasefires or other partial arrangements. Meanwhile, the demand for peacemaking through envoys in Sudan, Yemen, and elsewhere continues to grow, as does the work of our regionally mandated missions. Excellencies, you may ask, what lessons can we draw from this history? Well, first, geopolitical division is not an excuse for inaction. SPMs operated throughout the Cold War and still achieved breakthroughs. They relied on peacemaking, on diplomacy, on good offices. As we confront a new period of division, we would do well to keep this in mind. Second, adaptability is our greatest asset. As political space narrows, flexibility matters more than ever. Our missions must remain problem-solving instruments for member states, focused and tailored to each circumstance, never drawn from a template. Third, we must continue to work with an increasingly diverse ecosystem of partners. SPMs rarely act alone. They operate alongside regional organizations, multilateral coalitions, and other actors. In Somalia, for example, our Special Political Missions have long worked alongside the African Union's Security Council authorized force,— each brings unique strengths. But we must never lose sight of the UN's singular role, grounded in universal membership and unmatched convening power. SPMs have proven their ability to adapt to changing global demands. Looking ahead, we will continue to strengthen their capacity to deliver, responding to the realities on the ground— and the opportunities that may arise. The Secretary-General's forthcoming review on the future of UN peace operations, including special political missions, will offer recommendations to ensure these missions remain fit for purpose. These will include proposals to enhance peacemaking, deepen partnership with host states, deliver more focused • Adaptable mandates • Envision a new division of labor with the wider UN system • Design missions more agile, cost-effective, and accountable • Strengthen cooperation with regional and other actors. Excellencies, this publication is not only a record of the past; it is a reminder of what is possible. It challenges us to carry forward the lessons of those who came before us, and to renew our commitment to diplomacy at a moment when it's needed most. These missions chronicled here show how— that even in the most difficult of circumstances, dialogue can open doors, patience can build trust, and diplomacy can change the course of history. So let us draw strength from that legacy as we confront the challenges of today and the ones we have yet to imagine. Thank you.

I thank Under-Secretary General DiCarlo for her remarks, and I now turn to the rest of the panel today. I have the pleasure to give the floor to Ambassador Leonor Zalabata Torres, Permanent Representative of Colombia and President of the United Nations Security Council for June. The floor is yours, Madam.

Saludo a la Subsecretaria General.

My greetings to the Under-Secretary General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Rosemary DiCarlo, Chair of the Fourth Committee, Permanent Representative of Guatemala, Ambassador José Alberto Brice Gutiérrez, Special Representative of the Secretary General and Head of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, Abinu Carlos Ruiz Massieu; the Executive Director of Security Council Report, Shamala Kanzi Thompson. Excellencies, distinguished colleagues, it is an honor to participate in my capacity as President of the Security Council in the launch of the report United Nations Special Political Missions, 1945 to 2025, an overview. The Security Council has recognized that conflict prevention should be nationally led and owned. It has also reaffirmed that member states They're the primary responsibility for preventing conflict and building peace and for addressing the root causes of violence and conflict in their countries, and that national efforts to build and sustain peace contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. In this vein, The Council has also recognized the contribution of peace operations in efforts to advance peacebuilding and sustaining peace. And special political missions particularly have been an important instrument available to the Security Council for developing tailored political responses to a wide range of peace and security challenges. From supporting the verification of peace processes to facilitating good offices and preventive diplomacy in multiple regions, special political missions have contributed, inter alia, to facilitating dialogue and negotiation building trust, supporting reconciliation, and strengthening institutions and peacebuilding efforts. The history of SPMs is therefore closely connected to the history and evolution of the United Nations. Since 1945, Special political missions have had diverse mandates and have adapted in response to the circumstances of each situation and the priorities and needs of the countries concerned. We commend the effort of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs And to all those who contributed to the preparation of this publication, to contributing to institutional knowledge and supporting reflection on the experience accumulated by the organization over 8 decades. At a time when the world faces a significant number of Simultaneous security and humanitarian crises. The Security Council underlines the significant impact its statements and actions can exert in situations of armed conflict or in support of peace processes. In that context, Special political missions continue to constitute a valuable tool for the Council to respond to peace and security challenges, contribute to conflict prevention, or support political processes and peacebuilding efforts. They are a testament that reminds us of the importance of diplomacy. Dialogue, mediation, and political engagement, and of the need for the United Nations to retain effective and adaptable instruments to respond to evolving challenges. The Security Council will continue utilizing special political missions as instruments of the organization for the maintenance of international peace. Building on lessons learned, responding to changing political realities while remaining guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The members of the Security Council have also underscored the critical importance of improving— the accountability, transparency, efficiency, and performance of United Nations peace operations. We therefore acknowledge the contribution that this overview could make to the ongoing reflection on the future of United Nations peace operations and look forward to the Secretary-General's review on the future of all forms of United Nations peace operations and to considering its recommendations. Thank you.

I thank Ambassador Zabaleta Torres for her remarks, and I now give the floor to Ambassador José Alberto Brice Gutiérrez, Permanent Representative of Guatemala to the United Nations and Chair of the Fourth Committee.

The floor is yours.

Thank you. Excellencies, Under-Secretary-General, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, it is a pleasure to join you today for the launch of a publication that provides a valuable perspective on the evolution of one of the United Nations' most important instruments for prevention of conflict, the peaceful settlement of disputes, peacebuilding, and political transition. By tracing the history of special political missions over 8 decades, this overview demonstrates how the organization has continuously adapted its political tools to respond to changing global realities. As chair of the Fourth Committee, I warmly welcome this initiative. The publication reminds us not only of the breadth and diversity of SPMs, but also of the important role that the General Assembly has played throughout their history. From missions supporting decolonization and self-determination to those accompanying peace processes and political transitions, the Assembly has helped shape this important instrument of multilateral action. Today, through the Fourth Committee consideration of overall policy matters pertaining to SBMs, Member States continue to contribute to ensuring that these missions remain relevant and effective. The overview serves not only as a historical record but also as an invitation to reflect on how the United Nations can continue to strengthen its preventing capacities in the years ahead. One of its most compelling aspects is the reminder of the historical relationship between SPMs and the realization of self-determination. Some of the earliest missions supported territories and peoples navigating complex transitions towards independence and self-government. Their experiences underscore the enduring relevance of the Charter's principles and the contribution that political engagement can make to peaceful and sustainable futures. The publication also illustrates the remarkable adaptability of SPMs. Over time, they have evolved to meet changing political realities while maintaining their core purpose of supporting dialogue, prevention, and peaceful political solutions. From Guatemala's perspective, the emphasis placed on prevention and political engagement is particularly meaningful. Guatemala's own experience demonstrates the transformative value of sustained political dialogue and international accompaniment. The support provided by the UN during Guatemala's peace process and implementation of the peace accords remains a powerful example of how political engagement can help societies overcome conflict, strengthen institutions, and lay the foundations for lasting peace. The lessons of that experience also demonstrate that international engagement can only succeed when accompanied by national ownership, political commitment, and the active participation of national stakeholders. Our connections to SPM extends beyond our own peace process. As reflected in this publication, Guatemalan diplomat José Raul Bennett served in 1962 as the Secretary-General's personal representative in West New Guinea, helping to facilitate a sensitive political transition under UN auspices. This contribution reflects Guatemala's longstanding commitment to dialogue, multilateralism, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. These experiences continue to shape Guatemala's engagement with the United Nations. We have consistently supported initiatives that strengthen preventive diplomacy, mediation, dialogue, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. We remain convinced that addressing tensions early is both more effective and less costly than responding once crises have already escalated. In this regard, SPMs remain among the most effective tools available for the UN. They provide a flexible means to engage early, facilitate dialogue, support national stakeholders, and help prevent disputes from escalating into violence. Much of their work takes place away from the spotlight, yet their contribution to international peace and security is profound. Excellencies, the history reflected in this overview demonstrates that prevention works when Member States provide the political support support, trust, and cooperation necessary for the United Nations to act early and effectively. As we reflect on 80 years of experience, we are reminded that the challenges we face today are increasingly complex and interconnected. Yet the fundamental lessons remain unchanged: dialogue is more effective than confrontation, prevention is less costly than crisis response, and political solutions are more sustainable than those achieved through force alone. The lessons captured in this overview encourage us to continue investing in prevention, dialogue, national ownership, and international cooperation. They remind us that political engagement remains one of the most effective means available to the international community for reducing tensions, supporting peaceful transitions, and helping societies build sustainable peace. The experience documented in this publication also reminds us that prevention is not so— not solely the responsibility of the Secretariat or of SBMs. It is a shared responsibility of all Member States. The success of preventing diplomacy ultimately depends on our collective willingness to act before crises emerge rather than after they have already exacted a human political and economic cost. Let us therefore draw inspiration from the lessons of the past and reaffirm our commitment to a United Nations that is not only capable of responding to conflicts but also of preventing them. As Chair of the Fourth Committee, I hope this publication will serve as a valuable reference for Member States, practitioners and scholars alike. By preserving institutional memory and documenting the decades of experience, it enriches our collective understanding of how political engagement, dialogue, and prevention can advance the purposes and principles of the Charter and contribute to a more peaceful and secure world. I thank you.

I thank Ambassador Brice Guterres for his remarks. And before I turn to the next speaker, I wanted to mention that the Permanent Representative of Colombia will be departing the meeting at 3:30 or so. I now turn to Mr. Carlos Ruiz Macio, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti and head of BINU, the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti. The floor is yours, Carlos.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for inviting me for the presentation of this really, really important publication. That documents all what the SPMs have produced over the years. I have had the honor to lead two of these special political missions that would qualify in the area of SPMs field missions, but both missions that in a way are very reflective, are very good examples of many of the characteristics that USG DiCarlo was describing at the beginning of this event: the adaptability, the flexibility, the national ownership, the focus mandates. And I will describe just a few examples to illustrate this. I would say in themselves, both missions with different characteristics, different mandates, but some commonalities as well. In the case of Colombia, basically following up on the historical signing of the peace agreement of 2016, requesting this SPM to accompany both parties of the peace agreement to verify the implementation, to verify the obligations under the peace agreement that they were to be fulfilled, and within it, elements such as mediation in order to encourage the parties to continue implementing, obviously, good offices within it. And helping in this already almost 10 years of the implementation in terms of getting what we can still call a success story for the country, for Colombia, but also for the SPMs and the UN at large. On the case of Haiti, I would say we have an SPM that contrary to Colombia is not focusing on implementation of a peace agreement or the ceasefire, but rather accompanying the country in a very difficult, in a very difficult moment whereby we are working on promoting political dialogue, inclusive political dialogue by all parties, that we are promoting and helping in organizing elections after 10 years of not having elections. And be part of, of, of landscape that also USG DeCarlo was describing when we engage with different actors in the same area and we have differentiated roles and responsibilities that are important to complement each other. In this case, we having a multinational force that is helping the country to improve its security But at the same time, a UN mission that is supporting logistically that, that force, but with a primary role of an SPM that leads the political work of the UN, that tries to give coherence to the whole work of different actors, that cooperate with other regional actors such as CARICOM, such as the OAS, and obviously individual member states that have been traditionally helping Haiti. In the case again of Colombia, very wide mission across very regions of the country in the implementation of the peace agreement. In the case of Haiti, very focalized in the capital of Port-au-Prince where the main challenges are still there. Evidently, as has been said, adapting to different circumstances of the countries themselves In the case of Colombia, with a strong institutional capacity encouraging implementation so the country can move forward, particularly in the rural areas. In the case of Haiti, on the other hand, with more institutional fragility, helping them to move forward in this situation of multidimensional crisis, but at the same time helping them to consolidate its institutional capacity so it can in the long run assume the responsibility of moving forward on the security side, but also on the political side in the face of the dire situation that we are facing. But as I said, there are commonalities that are very important to recognize in these contributions of the SPMs that give us a lot of insights and lessons learned for now and for the future. Focused mandates in both cases, very much delineated, very much specific where the UN can make a difference, and the SPMs have developed and have delivered results on that, very much focusing on national ownership. Both processes are very much owned by the countries themselves and request our presence and our delivery. Most of all, I would say, which is a feature that we have to recognize, is that the element of trust. In both cases, there is trust in the UN and in the work that we have been doing and the predecessor and those have preceded me have been doing. There's an element of trust in the UN, the trust that the SPMs can deliver And by doing our work, it's continued to consolidating this trust. It's something really to recognize, to cherish, to embrace, and to continue doing our best in order to continue adapting to the circumstances of today's reality. So those are a few elements that I wanted to share with the ambassadors. In this contribution, but knowing that in this world with the additional conflicts, with situations of post-conflict, the SPMs within the country team are called to continue to provide this important work. And we have these stories to share with different levels of of success and hope in the case of both situations, and committed to continue delivering on this, on this important work of peace and security prevention and conflict resolution. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank S.R.C. Ruiz Maciú for his remarks, and I now give the floor to Ms. Shamala Kandiah Thompson, Executive Director of Security Council Reporting.

Over to you.

Thank you, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen. Congratulations to DPPA on this excellent publication which reminds us of the long history of special political missions. I, I'm particularly pleased to speak at the launch of this publication because during my time at Security Council Report, I've had the opportunity to cover a number of the SPMs discussed, including Afghanistan Afghanistan, Burundi, Kosovo, Myanmar, Timor-Leste, and Nepal. For some reason, my early files were all SPMs, and the very first issue I had to write about was Burundi, and it was around the time that BINUP was established, so 2007. And throughout Security Council Reports' 21-year history, we have been closely connected to political— special political missions not just by the reporting on them, but also by the experience and leadership of those who have led our organization. We've had two EDs who have had close association with SPMs: Ian Martin, who was the first head of three of your missions in Libya, Timor-Leste, and UNMIN in Nepal, and then we had Karen Langren, who was also the head of UNMIN and then in Burundi in the UN office. So I think that has possibly affected how we report a little bit in that, you know, there was a lot of knowledge there of the missions. So I thought I knew something about special political missions with, you know, these executive directors, but I did learn a great deal from the publication. For example, that the Council had mandated a special representative for East Timor under Chapter 11. This was new to me. So there's a lot of very interesting details, and for those of us who like this type of history, I think it will be a very good reference. Excellencies, one of the central messages of this report is that special political missions are a versatile and cost-effective tool for the Security Council in advancing peace and security. And this is something Security Council report has seen in our reporting over the years as we documented how the Security Council has used these Chapter VI tools. We followed closely the establishment, the renewal of SBMs reported on the regular briefings by the Secretary-General's Special Representatives, Special Envoys, Personal Envoys, and their work, whether in preventive diplomacy, mediation, good offices, confidence-building, or political dialogue, has for decades been at the heart of the UN's efforts to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes. We've also covered the increasing attention given to regional offices, UNOAS, UNOCA, and UNRCCA, and to the special envoys whose mandates extend across borders. What, as you've heard from the other speakers, what makes SPMs particularly remarkable is their adaptability. There is no single model, as you can see in this report. Instead, they have evolved to meet the different challenges over the years. So they've accompanied mediations, peace processes in Yemen and Colombia. They've supported political transitions in Iraq and Haiti, helped sustain peacebuilding efforts in countries emerging from conflict like Burundi, Liberia, provided regional platforms for preventive diplomacy through the offices I mentioned just now, UNOWAS, UNOCA, and UNRCCA, and supported accountability mechanisms when required. They have also provided the Council with a way of maintaining sustained political engagement without perhaps the personnel, logistical, and financial footprint of peacekeeping, and they are often the Council's only practical instrument when peacekeeping is sometimes not either politically feasible or operationally appropriate. Excellencies, our reporting has also shown how SBMs have allowed the UN to adapt its footprint to changing circumstances., where followed transitions from peacekeeping operations to political missions, from multidimensional missions to lighter political presences, and eventually sometimes to UN country teams. And equally important, they can accompany— as BRIMs can accompany countries and regions throughout the conflict cycle, from prevention and mediation to peace implementation, political transitions, and peacebuilding, while adapting their mandates to these evolving circumstances. But one lesson we've learned, or we've seen emerge from our reporting, is that special political missions cannot substitute for political will. They can facilitate dialogue, convene parties, provide technical expertise, but they cannot impose political settlements. And ultimately, their success depends on whether national leaders, and indeed Security Council members themselves, have created the political conditions in which these missions can operate. Effectively. At the same time, we have also seen that expectations placed on preventive diplomacy continue to grow, but the resources available to support it have not kept pace. And this is perhaps particularly worrying right now when there's a growing focus on how the UN can prevent conflict. We hear this from Council members. Pakistan's resolution last year in 2025 focused on prevention and Chapter 6 tools will be taken up next month again, and also from candidates running for the post of Secretary-General. It is very much what, you know, members and these candidates are talking about. So this report is therefore particularly timely, and it reminds us that the SPMs have quietly become an indispensable instrument for conflict prevention and political engagement. They're often less visible than peacekeeping operations, but they're no less essential. And understanding how they evolved, what they have achieved, and what they require to remain effective is central to our thinking about the future of the UN's work in peace and security. I look forward also to the recommendations in the review for all forms of peace operations and to watching perhaps the next phase of the special political missions. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Shamla, for your remarks. I'm sitting next to my boss, so I can say the review will be out anytime. But we've been saying that for a while. It's ready. It's ready. So before I turn to the floor for questions and comments, and I think we're doing quite well with time, I just want to take a second to thank some of the people who've actually been involved in this rather long-standing, long-term project, which has finally come to fruition. Alexandra Fong and Renato Mariani are sitting right behind me. Wen Tianjiang is there at the door. Ben Kutive is there in the other corner, but also I should mention Nabila Driss, who's in the room, and Liliana Šetka is on leave. Thank you very much for all the work and effort that's been put into this. Now turning to the floor, we have interpretation until— until 3:50, but until then and after that, of course, we have time until 4 o'clock, so I'd like to open up the floor for questions and comments, and I'll try my best to turn to whomever I see. I see the PR of Slovenia. Over to you, sir, please. Thank you very much.

Thank you to USG DeCarlo to being with us. And thank you for all the briefers. I'll go very quickly, but I'll just agree with Kamala, what she just— what she was saying at the beginning, that this appetite for prevention and mediation, UN mediation, is really increasing. You mentioned the candidates, they're all talking about it, but also if you ask public outside of the UN, What do they think that the UN should be doing? I think that's what they will be saying. They should— the UN should prevent war or should stop the war. So I think, as you said, the appetite for special political missions will definitely increase. And this is one of the key instruments that there is in the toolbox of the UN. So all the support and thank you very much for the report. I think it's very, very useful to have this overview since the beginning. I'm just wondering whether there is a need for point 2 report, the second report, because I think would be— I think would be very useful that somebody will distill some recommendations given all type of reports that were there through the history. What works, what didn't work, what types, what ingredients one needs for different situations. Kind of a handbook based on this report, which is factual report of the things, but more analytical maybe to distilling in a handbook, hopefully then that Council members would take up when they confront different situations. But maybe that could be, I think, helpful and useful, so that would be just my suggestion. Part of it probably will be in the report, in the report that you mentioned, and Rosemary already mentioned 3 lessons learned. That should also be inside the lessons learned from— but mostly what works for what. And, and, and, and obviously through the history they also changed, uh, given the conflicts that changed. But yeah, that's, that's my 50 cents and, um, a proposal from my side. Thank you.

I thank the Permanent Representative of Slovenia. Rosemary, if you don't mind, maybe I'll take one more, uh, and then we can come back to you. We have— I think we have enough time. I'll turn now to the Permanent Representative of Guinea-Bissau. Over to you, sir.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Director. Thank you, Asif. It's good to see former colleagues. I would commend the Department of Peacebuilding and Political Affairs— Political Affairs and Peacebuilding. Madame DiCarlo, my former boss, ESG DiCarlo. Congratulations. I don't think we have— I have much to say. The report is timely. The publication is timely, not least the challenge we are living through.— crisis, conflicts, wars. But I think this is the most cited issue in the UN statement. It says it's conflict prevention. Everybody talks about conflict prevention. And I think it's not— I don't think enough credit is given to the Secretariat. It's not like we don't see issues coming. I mean, the Secretariat provides some of the best analysis alerting things are coming, but the issue is what my colleague, the PR of Guatemala, José, said that it's really to mobilize collective willingness to act before conflict becomes violent. And that is the big challenge. It's not because we don't see the analysis. We have good analysis. We have, you know, we can— you can deploy— your department has put in place a unit that can deploy mediators, you know, in less than 24, 48 hours. And I think the big— perhaps my own takeaway here is what you said, that it's a reminder of what is possible. The publication is a reminder of what is possible. But also, it's a reminder what could have been possible, right? And that cannot go to the publication for many reasons. What could have been possible if we embraced— we had embraced conflict prevention as we talk about it? What could have been possible if Really, we had— somebody mentioned about allocation of resources to the mechanism, to the organ, to the body that have been put in place to advance conflict prevention. So I think that would be one of the big questions ahead of the publication of the report. Of the report on the review of peace operations. But I only think that this time much attention will be given to the implementation of the recommendation because reviews are good, but they are not an end in themselves. I mean, I can cite one— many, but I can cite perhaps the most recent before before I left the other side of the UN, there was a report, a review that was conducted during Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. It's called HIPO, the High-Level Panel for the Review of Peace— Independent Panel for the Review of Peace Operations. And one of the things that review discussed thoroughly is that we as an organization, particularly the decision-making body, the members, should reflect on how we go about deploying— the issue of deploying missions in the context of counterinsurgency. The whole issue of protection of civilians, what are the challenges? And before that, there were many reviews. I go to Brahimi about— Yoshihide Kawa mentioned realistic mandate, but I think that also, you know, we all look forward to seeing the report, but let us look forward to working together to implement any possible recommendation there. So that I wanted to say. Thank you so much.

I thank the Permanent Representative of Guinea-Bissau and I turn to the Representative of the Russian Federation.

Thank you. Thank you, President.

And my thanks also go to the Secretariat for preparing this publication on these special political missions. This is the first attempt to compile the organization's experience in this matter. Special Political Missions, indeed, play a crucial role in crisis management—crises, that is, that threaten international peace and security. They are a flexible instrument that can be used to support member states. The instrument serves to prevent the resurgence of conflict. Special Political Missions make it possible to contribute to national reconciliation by supporting authorities in every country. That is the national authorities. It is particularly relevant to learn from lessons that we've accumulated over the last 85 years. At the heart of problems and current conflicts, there is technological development, social cohesion, but the very causes— causes competition over resources, various levels of influence of different parties and their rivalries, the desire of certain people to survive, some states to survive. Everything is done to survive and that causes conflicts. Past experience is perhaps very useful rather than drawing up new strategies that are temporary in nature by— and we should be focused more on objective realities. In this context, we underscore the importance of the adoption of realistic, precise mandates where SPMs are concerned. To conclude, I wish to recall that Special Political Missions are not a piecemeal creation or one from outside that looks to impose abstract priorities onto a specific country. They are useful tools, rather, established by states themselves to help other governments. And there is no doubt whatsoever that the success of SPMs In terms of contributing to these issues is success that's built with the consent of host countries and with full respect for their national sovereignty. It is on this basis that we build trust. That was referred to by Mr.

Massieu. Thank you. I thank the representative of the Russian Federation. And before I turn to our panelists. I just wanted to make sure if there are any other requests to speak from the floor. If I don't see anyone, then I will— perhaps first I'll turn to the chair of the Fourth Committee and to Ms. Robinson before I ask USC DeCarlo whether they had any comments or wanted to add anything.

Thank you very much. Probably not a comment, more a reminder that we're beginning a conversation, and I think that this publication is very good for, for the conversation that happens in the Fourth Committee. And tomorrow morning we will be having an interactive dialogue following the meeting of the Fourth Committee where we will have the operation— the opportunity to continue discussing these issues with the DPPA as with the operational support. So just a small commercial from my side. Thank you.

Thank you, Ambassador, and thank you, Mr. Chair. As usual, I have a tendency to forget the people who are online, so I also wanted to give a chance to the SRHC in Haiti who's online, if he wants to respond to any of the comments.

No, no, no.

Thank you for the, for the comments and references. I actually refer to my actual boss for the questions.

Excellent. Thank you so much. And Shamla, if you wanted to come in at all. Thank you.

No, just very briefly to say that I liked Ambassador Stovini's comment that I think a report that provides the Security Council, for example, with a certain type of analysis when they're thinking about options could be useful.

Thank you. Now, before I turn to the USG of DPPA, I wanted to thank our interpreter colleagues also who are still here and just thank them for joining us today and helping us out in this meeting. USG De Carlo, final comments to you. Thank you.

Well, thank you, thank you, Asif. Just in response to Ambassador of Slovenia's request or comment that perhaps there should be recommendations on what works and what doesn't work, I think you will see in a new publication that will come out soon, the future of peace operations, and that's future not only of special political missions but also peacekeeping operations, you'll see quite a bit of that. We have done a fairly thorough assessment of our operations in both areas and want to make some recommendations going forward and present some analysis. I want to thank you all for coming today, and we really appreciate it. It's been a lot of work putting this document together. I can't take I don't take any credit for it. It's my colleagues, Asif and team, who did put it together. I think it's a really useful thing. I learned a lot. I've been in this job 8 years, but I learned a lot from reading the publication about our past and things that maybe we could do in the present and future and shouldn't do. So I'm very, very grateful for their efforts, grateful for your entire support across the board. We don't do this alone. We do this with member states. Everything we do, we do with member states, and we really count on you for your— not just support, but advice and interactions and really helping us, you know, carry out our mandate to promote peace and security around the world. So please, thank you very much for coming. Thanks to the panelists who've been fantastic giving us their time, and we really are grateful. And of course, Carlos, who's on the screen. And I hope to see you again when we launch the Future of Peace Operations along with my colleague Jean-Pierre Lacroix.

Thank you. Thank you, Excellencies. This event is adjourned.