(10th meeting) - Fifth Session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on the UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation (INC Tax) - 3 to 13 August 2026

Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome back from the break. I hope we all had a good lunch and have the energy to, as we would say elsewhere, finish well what we started on Monday. As we mentioned, we have a few more stakeholders to make their presentations on the on the article and then we'll move on. So please, no more requests for the floor from stakeholders, anyone. We're just going through this list and then we'll end. Please also remember to keep to the time limit. Immediately you go beyond the time, the microphone will cut and we'll move to the next person. So with that, we want to invite ICC Mexico to take the floor.

ICC Mexico appreciates the efforts made in the current draft to address the relationship between the convention and existing tax agreements. Given the central role of tax treaties in facilitating cross-border trade and investment, Article 21 will be one of the most important provisions from an implementation perspective. While Article 21 seeks to promote coherence between the Convention and other legal instruments, there is still uncertainty around several important aspects. First, the hierarchy of the Convention vis-a-vis existing bilateral tax treaties, future protocols, regional or multilateral agreements, and domestic laws remains unclear. Furthermore, The current text does not clearly explain how conflicts between these instruments would be resolved, creating uncertainty for governments, businesses, and taxpayers alike. Second, Article 21 should be clear on the legal effects of the convention, great conflicts with existing tax treaties or domestic laws. In particular, the meaning of compatible in paragraph 1B and the obligation to take progressive and meaningful steps towards alignment in paragraph three are open to several interpretations. Without additional guidance, these provisions could be understood as creating an ongoing obligation to review and potentially to renegotiate large parts of the existing treaty network. This will create an incredible level of uncertainty for both tax administrations and taxpayers. In closing, in order to promote cooperation and coherence within the international tax system, and at the same time preserve legal certainty and effectively support cross-border trade and investment, greater clarity is needed regarding hierarchy, compatibility, alignment obligations, future protocols, existing treaties, and domestic loss. Thank you, Khalid.

Thank you. Stakeholder two, please.

Thank you very much. My name is Atia Waris. I'm the UN independent expert on foreign debt and international financial obligations, and I thank you for the time. I want to speak about one point specifically, and I'm going to start with a phrase which I think is really important to bring into the room, which is we are in an era of change. I hear the repeated requests about certainty, but the challenge we are facing is actually to have change, to manage change, to moderate it, and to discuss how we are going forward through the change we are trying to put into place. And when we look at draft Article 2, which looks at inequality, sustainable development, of course, and international human rights law, I'm then thinking about Article 21, 1A, and the specific word obligation. And what is that obligation that we are talking about? I've heard conversations today about what are we changing, when are we changing, how are we going to change it, do we have to change it? And this is why I talk about the word change. And under international law, when we have treaties, and I want to reflect on three specific treaties, the one that ended capital punishment globally, the one that ended slavery, and the one that introduced the right to vote for women across the world. These were all treaties that were developed, but developed stage by stage and step by step. So you had the international treaty being rolled out some as early as 1927, and then you had this rollout going on across the world. And in some cases, some of these changes were finally effected as late as 1980s and the 1990s. I'm not encouraging slow implementation. I'm not encouraging fast implementation, but I am encouraging implementation that is staggered where member states are aware. And I think that that's a really important thing because really we are moving away from certainty into change. And the only thing we can be certain of is change at this point in time. Thank you very much.

Thank you. ACBSYF.

Thank you, Co-Lead. We welcome Article 21 and would like to offer two specific suggestions regarding paragraphs two and three. First, we believe the relationship between these paragraphs could be clarified, as everyone mentioned. Paragraph two preserves rights and obligations under agreements concluded prior to the entry into the force of the Convention, while paragraph three requires States parties take progressive and meaningful steps towards aligning those agreements with the Convention. We therefore suggest clarifying the criteria or principles should guide states in determining whether an existing agreement is inconsistent with the principles and objectives of the Convention and how progress towards alignment should be assessed. Without such guidance, implementation could vary across jurisdictions, potentially affecting consistency and legal certainty. Second, paragraph three provides that where a state party requests the renegotiation, amendment, or modification of an existing agreement, the other state party shall enter into negotiations in good faith and without undue delay. We suggest that the text also recognize and address imbalances in negotiating capacity, particularly where developing countries seek to revise existing tax agreements that may limit their ability to protect their taxing rights and mobilize domestic resources. In this regard, Article 21 could expressly connect such renegotiations with the capacity building and technical assistance provided under Article 12. Finally, regarding the reporting requirement in paragraph four, we suggest that reporting include not only the number of renegotiation requests, but also the status and outcomes of those requests and the progress towards alignment. This would allow the conference of the states parties to meaningfully assess progress in implementing Article 21. Thank you.

Thank you. And I believe that we indicated that we're not going to take any more stakeholders aside of those who were there at the time. We've taken the three and so it's up. We will not be able to take those who are now putting up their flags. So thank you everyone on this. I'm sure, Alice, we still can make written input, so you can send whatever written input you want to send later on. And with that, we've concluded the discussions on Article 21. I want to move now to Article 22, which deals with the settlement of disputes regarding the Convention. And now there's one question which I know will come up. The question is in terms of consultation in accordance with Annex I. The proposal for consultation was there during the sessions. This question was asked. And generally the idea is that what will be there will be what member states will suggest or member states want. So we don't have the Annex I yet. I would expect that contributions will be made as to if we agree to conciliation, what we should put in Annex 1. And so with that, I open the floor for discussions on Article 22. Okay. Now, since we don't have any comments on Article 22, we'll move to the next set. What we want to do is to take Articles 23 through to 27 and 28 together. Most of them are just routine articles that you find in other framework conventions and follow basically the same, in some cases, the same wording as you find elsewhere. So we want to take them as a batch between-- so from article-- so we have article 23, which is the depository. I know some people asked about it. Article 24, which looks at civil charter education, acceptance, approval, accession. We have the article 25 on reservations, we have 26 on entry into force, and we have 27 on withdrawals. And then 28, the alternate just indicates the languages in which the text would be provided. So these are the last set of provisions and would welcome Members to comment on them. Malaysia, please. Microphone for Malaysia, please.

Thank you co-lead. We'd like to give a short comment particularly on Article 25.

We feel that the draft does not provide room for reservations under Article 25 in respect of any of the proposed article which may diminish flexibility for member states and could potentially discourage wider voluntary participation and accession.

That would be all. Thank you co-lead and chair.

Thank you. Nigeria please.

Thank you, Chair. And Chair, I create your indulgence to quickly go back to 22. And it's in respect of a word used there, paragraph one. It says the state party shall endeavor to settle any dispute among them concerning the interpretation or application of the convention through negotiation or other peaceful means of their own choice. What do we mean by peaceful means? What will it entail, what will it not entail? For instance, if I go to court, is it peaceful, is it not peaceful? So I think we may need more clarity on what we mean by peaceful means.

In my introduction to the article, I indicated that this was what we had during the transitional period. And it's up to member states to determine what we want. If we don't want a statement there, we indicate that we don't want this statement there. We want it either out or we want to replace it with something. Basically, it's up to us to determine what we mean over there and what we want to do. Thank you. Jamaica, please.

Thank you, Chair. Well, we had the same concern as Nigeria about the word peaceful. And then the other concern we have is in relation to Article 25 and reservations. Now, our specific concern relates to Protocol 2 because within the protocol, the mechanisms, state parties are allowed to reserve on some of the mechanisms. And so therefore, we think that Article 25 needs to be reconciled with that and suggest wording along the lines of no reservations may be made to this convention. We're not gonna speak on the word, no reservation issue, as yet, we're just speaking on the recognition of Protocol 2. And so we believe that following the word convention, we should have words that suggest that however, where a protocol allows for reservations, then such reservations may be made in accordance with the provisions of that protocol or words to that effect. Thank you, Chair.

What I'll say is that during the intercessional period when we had this, It was made clear that this relates just to the framework convention and not protocols. If there are reservations in the protocols, that would be an issue to be discussed as part of the protocols. This relates just to the framework convention. UAE, please.

Thank you, colleague. We have concerns with the blanket prohibition on reservations in Article 25. While we support the objective of legal uniformity and the integrity of the convention, an absolute ban on reservations may unduly restrict states' ability to address constitutional, legal, and procedural requirements arising under their domestic legal systems. We have con- we note that the ability of states to enter reservations were required by their constitutional frameworks, domestic laws and internal procedures is a well established feature of international treaty practice. Such flexibility has often facilitated broader participation in multilateral instruments while ensuring compatibility with domestic legal requirements. Accordingly, we would support consideration of a more flexible approach that preserves the objective and purpose of the Convention while allowing limited and carefully circumscribed reservations where necessary. This could promote wider participation and enhance the convention's practical implementation by the states. Thank you.

Thank you. Cote d'Ivoire, please.

Thank you very much, co-lead. With your permission, I will begin my remarks, beginning with Article 22. The first paragraph of Article 22 indicates that States parties shall endeavour to settle any dispute among them concerning interpretation or application of the Convention through negotiation or any other peaceful means of their own choice. However, paragraph two, which is of concern to us, indicates that any dispute that cannot be settled through negotiation should be submitted to conciliation at the request of one of the States parties. So our first observation here is that in general conciliation is considered an amiable mechanism for the settlement of disputes. So this possibility does seem to have already been covered under one, any other peaceful means of their own choice. And so conciliation would be covered there. And so paragraph two therefore seems unnecessary to us. Also, the conciliation mechanism is not provided for in all jurisdictions. As regards Cote d'Ivoire, our constitutional law does not currently allow for conciliation in fiscal matters, in tax matters. So either if this paragraph cannot be deleted, we would prefer that it then indicate instead that the request of one of the states parties sort of seems to mean that you have to accept conciliation if one of the parties requests it and that really wouldn't be possible for our jurisdiction. And according to Article 24, paragraphs two and three, paragraph two speaks of ratification, acceptance, approval. that the convention is subject to together with the instrument. Paragraph three speaks of accession and indicates that the instruments of accession shall be deposited with the SG. So it may be possible that I may haven't understood. It's true that we speak generally of accession when and state joins after it has entered into force

microphone please.

Oh, and microphone to Kodewa please for him to continue. Since it's quite a normal thing, we'll give just a little above the three minutes, but don't overdo it. Microphone to Kodewa please.

Thank you, Chair. do apologise, I had not realised the microphone had been turned off. So I was saying that we need greater clarification to understand what precisely we are aiming at in paragraph two and in paragraph three of Article 24. Thank you very much, apologies for going over time, thank you.

Thank you, Hondras please.

Thank you very much, co-chair. Honduras considers that the reservations regime is an important element in promoting the effective implementation of the convention and encouraging the broadest possible participation by states. Throughout our discussions, we have noted that certain obligations, particularly those relating to mutual administrative assistance and other forms of technical cooperation, require significant institutional capacity, technological infrastructure, specialized human resources, and financial resources. For many developing countries, these capacities are still being strengthened. In this context, Honduras believes that allowing limited and clearly defined reservations with respect to certain operational obligations could facilitate a gradual and realistic implementation of the convention. Such flexibility should not be interpreted as a lack of commitment to the objectives of the convention, rather that it would enable states to progressively implement their obligations as their institutional capacities continue to develop. We believe that a truly inclusive convention should recognize the different realities and levels of development of its states parties. Properly regulated flexibility can strengthen the implementation while also encouraging broader participation in convention. Finally, Honduras considers that the reservation regime should provide sufficient legal certainty regarding the scope of state parties obligations and contribute to effective implementation of the convention. Thank you very much, co-chair.

Thank you, Chechia, please.

Thank you, Mr. Cody, for giving me the floor. With regards to Article 22, we acknowledge that there should be an article in the framework convention dealing with the settlement of disputes regarding the convention. However, we would like to support the intervention of the distinguished colleague of the Cote d'Ivoire, if we understood it well, in stating that we also think that the second paragraph is already covered in paragraph one, and therefore we can delete paragraph two. But we are open to listen to other member states in explaining why having such a provision would be useful. As regards Article 25, Czechia will not repeat all the reasons for which it is essential to allow reservations in the framework convention, besides mentioning that given the fact that text is such an integral part of state sovereignty, we believe that the framework convention should allow for reservations. What we find even more surprising is that the current draft does not allow for reservations, where clearly a vast majority of member states during the intercessional meeting, with an exception of one member state, supported a provision that would allow states parties to provide reservations. Nevertheless, we would like to suggest once again to allow for reservations in the framework convention. As regards to particular wording, we will submit our proposal in writing. Thank you, Mr. Kourid.

Thank you, Sweden, please.

Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor. On Article 25, we also agree that the possibility of making reservations can facilitate broader participation in and acceptance of the convention. And given the framework nature of this instrument and the diversity of national legal and tax systems, states should retain a degree of flexibility when becoming parties.

And we're also mindful that international treaty law already provides safeguards against inappropriate reservations and that reservations that are incompatible with the object and the purpose of a treaty are not permitted. So Sweden would therefore favor an approach more closely aligned with established treaty practice, allowing reservations rather than imposing a blanket prohibition. We therefore also suggest replacing the current text with language reflecting the general approach under the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, and specifically Article 19, which we will also submit in our written input. And since we do know that there are different practices in treaty law on this matter, we would be interested to hear the source of the language proposed in both draft Article 24 and 25, or where inspiration was drawn from.

Thank you.

Thank you, Switzerland, please.

Thank you, Mr. Koelie. I can be brief, but as also my neighbor did just right now, I have to persist holding up the view that the lack of the possibility to make reservations is an obstacle. It is an obstacle for Switzerland. in regard its sovereignty and also constitutional constraints, but it is also an obstacle for the wider acceptance of the Framework Convention and ultimately for its success. We acknowledge that there must be a core of the Framework Convention that is not negotiable and where no reservation should be possible and we think this should mainly be the case in regard of high level commitments, but where operational provisions are concerned, there we must insist on the possibility to make reservations. These concerns in our view in particular mutual administrative assistance where particular types of assistance are required in Article 10 and I can for further explanation refer to our statement made in that context. Thank you so much.

Thank you. Austria, please.

Thank you, colleague. Austria will also keep it short. We would like to echo the distinguished delegates from Malaysia, UAE, Czechia, and Sweden in their call for reservations for the reasons mentioned by them. Thank you.

Thank you. Israel, please.

Thank you, Chair. We want to echo previous delegates regarding the reservation. We think we should allow reservation to achieve a wider consensus and all the other reasons that delegates said. Regarding Article 26, we thought maybe to propose an entry into force of the convention as it is a framework convention.

With a mass of a critical mass of delegates of states that will ratify the convention maybe a diverse according to geographical regions we understand that it was done in other UN treaties so maybe.

We will do it here also thank you.

Thank you. China, please.

Thank you, colleague, for giving me this floor. Regarding Article 25, we have one comment. To encourage a broader participation by state parties and to enhance the inclusiveness of framework, contracting parties should be allowed to become parties to framework while entering reservations with respect to specific commitments or obligations. When a potential contracting party find it impossible to fulfill every obligation and the framework convention due to domestic legal constraints, the absence of a reservation clause would block its participation and contribution to the framework convention, which would compromise the overall inclusiveness and effectiveness of framework convention. Thank you, Mr. Cody again. Later, we will submit our written comments. Thank you.

Thank you. Guatemala, please.

Thank you for giving us the floor. Thank you for drafting this convention. Regarding Article 25, Guatemala would support proposals made by several delegations with regard to the possibility of formulating reservations. Certain legal restrictions could be established under national legislation. In certain cases, these limitations could have a constitutional rank, causing certain incompatibilities and causing an obstacle to certain states. Given the importance of strengthening international cooperation in this area, we believe that it would be a good idea to take into account this aspect during negotiations. This inclusion would definitely contribute to broader participation of states and consequently make this convention more successful. It would also strengthen international laws enshrined in various international instruments of relevance. Lastly, Guatemala will submit our comments and observations in writing. Thank you.

Thank you. Belgium, please.

Thank you, Co-Lead. We want to echo the distinguished delegates of the UAE, Malaysia, Czechia, and Sweden. Austria and China. We believe also for to have broadest participation possible to the framework convention that there should be a possibility to make reservations concerning language. We were also thinking about what is provided in the BBNG that no reservations or exceptions may be made unless expressly permitted by other articles of the agreement. Thank you.

Thank you. Nigeria, please.

Thank you, Co-Chair, and thank you for allowing me to come back. In Article 23, there is a word present in, it says, the Secretary General of the United Nations shall be the depository of the present framework convention. We do not think the word present is necessary. And except there's a special reason we included there, I think we suggest it should be deleted. Then Article 24, paragraph one. It says the convention shall open to all states for signature in particular date, in a location from a particular date to a particular date and thereafter at United Nations headquarters in New York until a particular date. We don't think the until is necessary. Our understanding is that any states that wish to join the convention should be allowed to join irrespective of the time it has taken its decision to join. So we don't think the time threshold where those conventions will not be available for joining should be necessary. So we are suggesting there should be full stop after New York and there should be no other wording there. Then Article 26, in paragraph two, the entry into force dates is 30th day after the date of deposits. We observed in Article 19, paragraph four, the entry to first day is on 19th day. So we are thinking both dates can be aligned. If there's no specific reason we have different dates, we will suggest that if we want to adopt 30, we adopt it both in Article 19 and 26, And if you want to adopt 19, we adopt both in article 19 and 26. Then lastly, on article 27, withdraws. We respect also the sovereign choice of any jurisdiction that wish to withdraw, but we want to seek clarification. If a judicial withdraw and after some time, it feels it want to be readmitted, We want to seek clarification on whether that jurisdiction can be readmitted. And if so, I think we may need to make that clarification that readmission may be possible on application by that, by jurisdiction. Thank you.

Okay. Thank you, Nigeria. The entry into force, going to look at it a bit clearer. The initial one is 90th day for everyone. But if after the number has been reached, that is when the 30th comes into place. So the amendment also is for 90 days after the amendment. And basically, so it's more of a sequence than a contradiction. But anyway, But thank you for the comments. Mexico, please.

Thank you, dear colleague, and good afternoon, colleagues. It will hopefully be my last intervention this week, but who knows? On this couple of articles, I fully agree with the lack of necessity of putting, or say, a date until when countries can ratify the instrument. I think the objective here is at some point most of us will come in and join, so putting definitive end date would then make matters difficult for countries that might come into terms and wanting to join after that date. So maybe we can leave it open-ended. On Article 25, we had a discussion yesterday on the decision making. There was a discussion about whether or not consensus is something that we can achieve at the COP and to move forward with some of the decisions that are going to no doubt come our way when this convention gets going, but then ironically we do have Article 25 that doesn't leave space for member states to show flexibility in the sense of making reservations. So my question, and it's tied to my earlier intervention, is are we looking at this article as an independent article and not in relation to whether or not decision making, if it becomes single majority, which is the ask of one of the negotiating groups means that countries who might not accompany that decision that is won by simple majority would then want to have a reservation about the convention would not be able to. So that's a double caveat in the sense of showing some displeased position in items that we're going to be negotiating in this convention. So for us, as with other delegations, we will suggest the deletion of this language and allow for reservations at the end of the day. Other colleagues have mentioned it better than I will probably do about the inclusivity process and we want everyone to feel comfortable when they're part of the convention. But again, it's another kind of those articles in which there's language that seems to put this in a direction that this convention is not about cooperation, it's about enforcement. And so again, the plea here is to try to move back into that aspect into which other member states can feel comfortable joining. in participating in this convention particularly if some of this decision-making will come to the protocols we're going to do some substantive technical work to kind of go into the specifics of what we're going to consider legally binding and to allow this convention to be as flexible as possible so that countries can also realize whether or not this is legally possible with their own tax systems and tax regimes so we would also support changing this article. We don't understand why this was put in the first place, to be honest, but we would welcome changing this and hoping that in Nairobi, if it's line by line, we can be the first ones to add a language to revert this to allow reservations in Article 25. Thank you.

Thank you. You can always include it in your comments that you'll be sending after this session. Norway, please.

Thank you, Mr. Kolind. We have some comments on Article 25 and Article 26. On Article 25, we would agree with those delegates that have spoken in favour of retaining a possibility to make reservations to the Framework Convention. Although fragmentation of the international tax system would not be desirable, a fragmented tax system would run counter to the objective of establishing a more inclusive and effective international tax cooperation as we are aiming for with negotiation of this framework convention. For that reason, our strong preference is to develop a framework convention that can command broad participation by a large number of countries. Ideally without the need for countries to have reservations to specific articles. At the same time, whether this will be possible depends on the final content and level of ambition to the convention, like Mexico also pointed out right now. If the framework convention contains a number of substantive obligations that states consider too far reaching, including in relation to their ability to design and administer their own tax systems, and conflicts with domestic legal and constitutional constraints, it may be difficult to secure broad participation. In such a situation, some States may see the need for the possibility of making reservations to specific provisions. We recognise, however, that broad participation, broad reservation possibilities may themselves create internal fragmentation within this convention. For these reasons, there is a balance here and we believe the question of whether reservations should be permitted under the framework convention will have to be finally assessed in light of how the convention as a whole develops. We may therefore need to return to this provision once there is greater clarity on the other articles. With respect to Article 26 on the entry into force and the number of ratification instruments deposited in order for the convention to enter into force. We should keep in mind also here the issue of fragmentation of the international tax architecture, as well as also having a well-functioning framework convention. We therefore believe that the number of states required before the framework convention can enter into force should be carefully considered and be at a level where this convention can actually have effect for a large number of countries. Thank you.

Thank you. Germany, please.

Thank you, Mr. Cowley. Like the many previous speakers, we believe that reservations should not be excluded as a general matter. Instead, we to encourage the membership of this committee to consider allowing for a certain reservation, which would need to be discussed further and have already been raised repeatedly in relation to individual provisions. At the same time, we share the assessment that it will remain crucial to strike a balance and to avoid causing fragmentation. Thank you.

Thank you. Okay. Kenya, please.

Thank you, co-lead. I'm speaking on behalf of the 54 member states of the Africa group. The Africa group will be submitting more detailed written input on these final provisions, but we would like to highlight some positions of all 54 member countries. In relation to Article 22, the Africa Group submits that the article should establish a mechanism for facilitating the operationalization of Protocol 2, because we need to create a link between Protocol 2 and the settlement of disputes. On Article 25 on reservations, We wish to support the draft language as has been presented in this framework convention that no reservations may be made to this convention. We therefore counter the statement that a majority of the countries have supported a call for reservations to be adopted to this convention. We support this draft and our view is that it is in full alignment with the aim of achieving the objectives, principles, commitments and all other provisions of this framework convention to ensure that these will actually be implemented. And we also acknowledge that this is not unfamiliar language. We see similar language being adopted in many framework conventions such as the UNFCCC. We see it in the framework convention on tobacco control. We also see it in the Kyoto Protocol. And we therefore support inclusion of this wording. Very briefly, co-lead on Article 22, we just wanted to say that we will be submitting written comments on that as well, especially to reinforce the integrity of that article when it comes to the existing rights and obligations. In our national capacity, we want to support the Africa group's position, especially in relation to Article 25. And we just wanted to add that on the issue of broad participation, we do believe that this is ideal, but we are not sure that it should be pursued to the detriment of achieving an implementation of this framework convention and what we are seeking to achieve. Thank you, Khalid.

Thank you. Spain, please.

Thank you, Chair. On Article 25, I would echo what has been said by many colleagues, such as the Emirates, Norway, China, others, with regard to the possibility for this framework convention to allow formulation of reservations, to grant more flexibility to states, and for this convention to have broader support, especially in a situation where various provisions raise doubts And this leads to legal uncertainty. Thank you very much.

Thank you. Singapore, please.

Thank you, Colleen. We just have a couple points to make. On Article 25, we echo the comments made by many colleagues before us that the current proposal would limit broader participation. Allowing for reservations or declarations is not uncommon in UN treaties. They are, for instance, present in the UN Convention against Corruption, Cybercrime, and UNCLOS. As discussions on several substantive issues in the convention remain broad and unresolved, and many member states have shared their constitutional or legislative constraints on adopting several proposals that we've discussed today and earlier, we would call for allowing states to enter reservations. On Article 26, our view is that the threshold in Article 26 too should be sufficiently high to reflect broad participation before the convention enters into force. On Article 27, we were wondering what was the intent behind the two-year timeframe in paragraph one, if I'm not wrong. Yes. It could create a lock-in period of sorts that results in state parties becoming bound to COP decisions made during this period, even if it disagrees with them. Thank you.

Thank you. Azerbaijan, please.

Thank you, Mr. Collett. Uh, we recognize that pro- prohibition on reservation exists in number of United Nations convention. However, international tax cooperation has particular characteristics as it interacts directly with domestic tax systems and a wide network of existing bilateral and multilateral tax treaties. agreements. Experience with multilateral tax instruments shows that limited and clearly defined reservation can provide flexibility and encourage wider participation. But bilateral tax treaty also reflect individual negotiated balances between source and residence jurisdictions. We therefore suggest a long reservation provided that they are not incompatible with object and purpose of convention. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Republic of Korea, please.

Thank you, Mr. Collett. I will be brief. Regarding Article 25, Korea shares the concerns raised by previous speakers, including the UAE, Malaysia, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, China, Belgium, and Norway, Germany, and Spain, Singapore. For the same reasons expressed by those delegations, Korea does not support the current provision. Thank you very much.

Thank you. Lesotho, please.

Thank you, Chair.

Lesotho aligns itself to the comments and position advanced by Kenya on behalf of the African group. At our national capacity, we just want to talk to Article 25. Article 25, if there was no 21 that we spend the rest of the morning dealing with, I think members would be justified to want to have reservations. But when you go back to what will happen under 21, it allows you to put your house in order. It allows time to make sure that your international obligations are met without necessarily having to terminate those. as a result of what we discussed under 21, there's actually no need to have reservations in this framework, not unless we want to weaken further what we had under 21. And we also, as a closing remark, we don't appreciate how is it possible that participation can be broadened by reservations. For us, if you're going to say you are participating, collaborating in the framework through reservations, it's like having a team of players and you put them on the team sheet and then some of them say we are not going to play. For us, that will not be collaboration or participation. It's as good as not being there. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Lise. Back to Bojan.

Thank you. I just wanted to come back on something else in Article 22. Since there is a reference to Annex 1, I believe we need to have an article also on annexes in the final provisions, as is done with other conventions where there is an annex to state their nature, that they are an integral part of the convention, and also a procedure how new annexes to the agreement might be possible in the future. So that is, I think, an article that is now missing since in Article 22 there is reference to an annex. And then I also wonder why we don't have an end provision on declarations and statements when the convention is ratified or signed. Thank you.

Thank you. Kodewa, please.

Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor once again. I'll try and be brief this time. So, Cote d'Ivoire supports the position presented by Kenya on behalf of the Africa Group. Especially, Cote d'Ivoire supports keeping Article 25 on reservations. We believe that the possibility of having reservations would weaken the convention. On our national capacity, we wish to comment on paragraph one of article 24, which states that ratification is open to all states, but There are jurisdictions that do not have the status of state, but they do have autonomous agency as regards international fiscal cooperation and tax matters. So if these jurisdictions cannot become party to the obligations under the convention, this could limit the scope and efficacy of the Convention. So we would suggest therefore to the Secretariat to analyse the possibility of opening up the Convention to signature from this type of jurisdiction. Thank you.

Hello. Sorry. Thank you. Japan, please.

Thank you, colleague.

I'll be really brief. We would like to echo many other colleagues that reservations should be allowed for flexibility and account for different situations for each member state.

We understand that the reservations may weaken the convention, but given the current draft, we believe the.

Reservation is necessary for broad participation. Thank you.

Thank you. Rezoo, please.

Thank you, colleague. My particular view on this issue is we are not yet in the position to decide whether we should or should not have reservations. In general, we are more inclined not to have reservations, but we would recognize that depending on the final text, final wording, it might be necessary. For instance, if we insist in having an article that can be reasonably interpreted as having a direct effect, direct consequence on the exchange of information, for instance, I think that would be difficult to accommodate the position of many countries. because in a framework convention, as we understood in the beginning, the framework convention would allow for further protocols, including the exchange of information. In relation to Article 1, it doesn't seem that we would need reservations in the principles. Principles are just principles, so they should be broad values or guidance, shouldn't have any need for reservations as well. On the material part, again, we have seen that the wording of the different part of the different wording of the different articles of part two, it has improved throughout time and the obligations moved or shifted much away from obligations of results to obligations of best efforts. I do accept that there are some provisions that might still need, there are work in progress a bit more than others, maybe especially Article 5, but in general we understand that the text that is before us has moved much more from obligations of result to obligations to cooperate. And obligations to cooperate, it's very difficult to make a reservation on it, it's reserved not to cooperate, in relation to harmful tax practices, it's, I mean, in practice you can decide that how much you'll cooperate. So we don't need a complete reservation to send that message that we will not cooperate, for instance, in relation to harmful tax practices. So in short, understand that we are moving more in the direction of what had conceived initially as obligations to obligations of cooperation, obligation of best efforts, and we might see much less need for reservations. But in the end, we will have to double check the final provision and then decide with more data and more information whether we will need, whether it will be necessary to have reservations to accommodate more countries and to strike this balance between inclusivity and effectiveness and resilience of the convention itself thank you.

Thank you. canow netherlands please.

Thank you co lead listening to the discussion on article twenty five it seems to us that what is now in the text is reflecting a minority view. We would therefore like to see reflected in the text the majority view of this room, at least as an option, that reservation to this framework convention may be possible. We might not want to preclude what will be discussed in the coming sessions, but at least it's important to see that there are several options that can be taken here. Otherwise, merely reflecting the majority view for the time being is also possible. We could draw some lessons from the second protocol, for example, which also reflects next to the majority view, the minority view, specifically being option B, for example. Thank you.

Thank you. Chechia, please.

Thank you, Mr. Kowalick, for giving me the floor again. We would like to quickly support the possibility of having an article on declarations and statements in the framework convention as brought up by the distinguished delegate of Belgium. Thank you very much.

Philippines, please.

For Article 22, the Philippines supports the peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms under Article 22 as non-binding conciliation and voluntary negotiations are key in effectively resolving interpretative differences while respecting state sovereignty. The Philippines is closely monitoring Article 25 while understanding the goal of uniformity.

We emphasize that baseline provisions must remain high level so as not to infringe upon non-negotiable constitutional limitations. Thank you.

Thank you. India, please.

In fact, right now, our entire document is a work in progress. So I'm not sure we are in a position to say anything, including as to what is the majority view or the minority view. Now, currently, Article 25 simply says that no reservations may be made to this convention. And I think it was the distinguished delegate of Switzerland who said that there has to be a core of articles, a core provisions which are non-negotiable. We completely agree with that. And I think a similar point was made by the distinguished delegate of Japan. Now, if one looks at this document that we have with us, I wonder which is that article on which we can place a reservation or which placing a reservation would be useful. As I think the distinguished delegate of Brazil made out, that part one is something that doesn't need a reservation. I don't think anyone would like to place a reservation on objectives and principles and then sign the convention. It just wouldn't make any sense. Now, part two is elaboration of what is there in part one. It elaborates on what our objectives are, what our principles are. And that eventually forms the heart and soul of this framework convention. I don't think anyone would-- it would make sense for anyone to sign up this convention and then stand back and say that I don't believe in fair allocation. I don't agree to fair allocation of taxing rights. I mean, it would just not make any sense. So therefore, part two is the heart, which has to be the core and which cannot allow any reservations. Thereafter, we come to technical assistance, institutional arrangements. Would we like to have reservations? Would anyone, any jurisdiction like to have reservations on that? So I'm actually at a loss at this moment to understand as to what is that provision that we want to place a reservation on. And of course, the short time that is available in a couple of the conventions where there is a little different language which allows reservations where it is mentioned in a particular article of that convention. I think those refer to certain modes of dispute resolution, if my understanding is correct, and that I'm open to correction on that. So over here, such a thing is only there in Article 22 where some of our distinguished delegates had mentioned some what to say, some issues regarding the references to conciliation. So apart from that, if at all that is an issue, I am not sure that there is any portion of this framework convention as it exists today where making a reservation is either possible or necessary. So I think let us, we will know more when we have this text is more complete, but even as it stands today, I really do not see any need to make change to the language of Article 25. Thank you.

Thank you. Zambia, please.

Thank you, Chair. I start by echoing the remarks made by the delegate of Kenya on behalf of the 54 Member States of the African group. Chair, hearing the sentiments made by different delegates on the issue of the reservations, the issue here is if you open up for reservations, what documents do you have as an end result? There's a risk that then the document becomes watered down. The issue is that there are a lot of commitments being made in the Framework Convention, but in that regards, when you look at Article 21 and other articles, they provide for member states to take the necessary legislative measures and administrative measures to ensure that they are then able to implement the commitments made here under the Framework Convention. And I don't foresee that those legislative and domestic measures that are needed to be undertaken, which the COP will then be checking in terms of adherence, are those where there will be a timeline that they should be immediately be undertaken within one year. I don't think so. I don't think that would be reality. But the idea of us having such texts is the realization that as we negotiate this framework convention, there are matters which will be at variance with what we have in terms of domestic legislation, constitutional provisions that we need to be undertaken and also that's why we have even capacity building, how do we help member states build the necessary capacity to ensure that they are then able to fulfill the commitments of the framework convention and therefore opening up for reservations And as I think India said, I think we need to look at it carefully. Further, Chair, it's our understanding that some of the issues in terms of where countries may be constrained, if they go to the protocol, depending on how the protocol is structured, probably a protocol may have some form of reservation where members at that particular point are not able to undertake that commitment that is the protocol. I think we've seen some optionality on protocol two and therefore I think it would be important that if we have to have an effective document, I think the issue of the text as is should be supported. I submit.

Thank you. Okay, yeah, African Union, please.

Thank you, colleague, for giving us the floor. The African Union strongly supports the statement delivered by Kenya on behalf of the Africa Group, as well as the interventions by Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Lesotho, Zambia, and equally align with the interventions made by Brazil and India. The African Union strongly supports the draft language provided for no reservations under Article 25. We associate ourselves with the point made by Lesotho in response to the argument that allowing reservations is necessary to encourage broader participation. In our view, participation cannot be pursued at the expense of the integrity and the effectiveness of the Convention itself. This framework convention is intended to establish a common foundation for international tax cooperation. Its value lies precisely in the fact that parties accept a coherent set of objectives, principles and core commitments. If parties are permitted to selectively exclude or modify those commitments through reservations, we risk creating different versions of the same convention and weakening the common framework we are seeking to establish. And I think India has made that quite clearly. For the African Union, therefore, the article is not about restricting participation, it is about ensuring that participation is meaningful and that states joining the convention do so on the basis of clear shared understanding of commitments they are undertaking. The African Union therefore supports retaining this text without provision for reservations. In conclusion, we will be working with the Africa group to submit written submissions at the later date provided. I thank you.

Thank you. ETAF please.

We thank you, Chair, for giving us the floor. On Article 22, Chair, we draw the attention of honorable members of the committee back to the terms of reference which mandate us to create mechanism for dispute resolution. We envisage that such mechanism must be able to involve, to have an active involvement of the framework itself in helping members resolve dispute, both in the context of the convention and also in the context of the protocol. We move that that article be revised to reflect that. On the reservation article, which is article 25, we would be happy to just go with India and Brazil, But in international tax, we have seen stranger things. And for that purpose, we have two major comments. One is that no reservation helps to reinforce the integrity of the convention. A framework convention of this kind is an interlocking bargain. The commitment and the alignment duty in Article 21 are well calibrated against one another. Reservation will let a party have the benefit of the whole while exercising the obligation it finds inconvenient. This will unravel the package and negate the object and the purpose of the convention. In any case, Article 19C of the Vienna Convention on Laws of Treaties says that reservation incompatible with the object and the purpose of the treaty are impermissible. A no reservation clause simply in any case makes explicit and administrable what the object and proposed text would otherwise leave to case by case basis. On flexibility, Chair, the usual justification for reservation is normally centered around accommodating different national circumstances. In this sense, that is made by design and not by derogation. The convention already carries a differentiation inside the text. the capacity qualifiers, the sovereign right saving clauses, the optionality in Article 21, and above all, the fact that parties have right to choose a protocol which operationalizes the detailed rules of the convention. Then flexibility tools is channeled through choice of protocol and the means which I have enumerated above and not by putting reservation on the body of the convention. A party that needs latitude has it already through those choices which I have listed. There are precedents to this in different UN conventions and instruments, and the one that I want to point out specifically is the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. We align ourselves completely with parties who do not want reservation, and we want to move that we accept this condition for the integrity of the convention itself. We thank you.

Thank you. Stakeholder three, please.

Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor. My name is Farah Delance, the president of the Farah Delance Foundation. I would like to comment on Article 25 and particularly the mutual agreement procedure and the needs of developing countries. I appreciate that Article 25 recognizes that taxpayers need a mechanism to seek relief when taxation is not consistent with the convention. However, I would encourage the committee to continue considering accessibility, transparency, capacity building and fairness, particularly for taxpayers in developing countries. For many individual and business operating across borders, international taxation can be extremely complex. A taxpayer may face taxation in more than one jurisdiction while having limited resources and limited access to specialized tax expertise. Therefore, I believe the effectiveness of the mutual agreement procedure should not depend only on whether a person has the financial resources or technical knowledge to navigate the process. I will encourage consideration of clear procedure, accessible information, reasonable timelines, and appropriate assistance, particularly for smaller business and taxpayers in developing countries. I also want to make a broader connection to human mobility. People increasingly live, work, study, conduct businesses, and support families across borders. Migrants and diaspora communities contribute significantly to economies through their work, entrepreneurship, investment, and remittance. When people move across border, they can encounter complicated question concerning residence and come taxation and potential double taxation. A fair and accessible dispute resolution mechanism can therefore contribute to greater certainty and trust in international tax cooperation. For countries such as Haiti, capacity building is particularly important. Developing countries should have the institutional expertise and resources necessary to participate effectively in mutual agreement procedure and protect the legitimate taxing right finally regarding the true alternative presented in article 25 I believe the committee should carefully consider access to effective resolution the cost of arbitration independence and expertise of arbitrary arbitrator in particular circumstance and developing countries. International tax cooperation should not only prevent double taxation, it should also promote fairness, certainty, transparency, and meaningful access to the solution. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you. ACB SYF, please.

Thank you, Khalid. Thank you, Khalid. Amotes Khalifa speaking on behalf of the ECB Sustainable Youth Foundation. We understand that the consolation procedure mentioned in Article 22, paragraph two will be set out in Annex One, which is not included in the current draft. We would like to offer three suggestions on what the annex should include. First, it should say clearly how the appointment of conciliators and the timelines for each stage of the conciliation process. Without this, a party that does not wish to cooperate could impede the timely resolution of disputes. Second, Article 22, paragraph two refers to disputes that cannot be settled within a reasonable time. but does not say how long that is. We suggest setting a clear period so that delay cannot be used as a tactic. Third, the annex should say who bears the costs. Conciliation requires legal expertise and resources. For states with fewer means, the procedure may not be genuinely accessible to them. Finally, We note that Article 22 provides no step beyond conciliation and consultation procedures, recommendations rather than binding outcomes. We invite the committee to consider whether the convention should provide additional voluntary options for dispute resolution where the conciliation does not resolve the matter. Thank you.

Thank you. DMUN Foundation, please.

Thank you, Chair. I'm delivering this intervention on behalf of the financing for development constituency for children, youth of the major group of children, youth on Article 22. A clear defined process may assist states parties in resolving differences consistently and through peaceful means. Regarding paragraph one, the reference to negotiation or other peaceful means provides states parties with flexibility to select an approach appropriate to the dispute. States parties may wish to consider whether supporting procedures should address written notification of a dispute identification of the provisions and issues concerned designation of relevant authorities and indicative timelines for consultations. The relationship between negotiation and other peaceful means could also be clarified. For example, the text or related procedures could specify whether states parties may pursue mediation, good offices, fact finding, or another mutually agreed mechanism before referring a matter to conciliation. Regarding paragraph two, further clarity concerning a term reasonable time may contribute to procedural certainty. This could be addressed through a defined period and indicate indicative time frame or criteria reflecting the complexity of the dispute and the conduct of the parties. Any time frame could allow extension by mutual agreement. States parties may also wish to clarify whether conciliation may be initiated at the request of one party after the relevant period and what procedural arise following such request. Annex one could address the appointment and qualifications of concealed conciliators, procedural timelines, participation by additional states with a direct interest, allocation of costs and treatment of related disputes. The legal status of the outcome of conciliation should be stated clearly, including whether recommendations are binding or non-binding and how any agreement reached by the parties is to be recorded. Procedures could also address confidentiality and the protection of taxpayer specific commercial or other sensitive information. Consideration may also be given to the relationship between conciliation under Article 22 and proceedings available under the other agreements. Clearer rules concerning parallel proceedings, suspension, termination, or settlement could reduce the risk of procedural duplication or inconsistent outcomes. The effective participation of all state parties may require attention to differences in legal, technical, and financial capacity. Upon request, appropriate assistance could be made available without affecting the neutrality of the process or the responsibility of the parties for presenting their positions. The major group of children and youth encourages continued consideration of measures that are clear, peaceful, timely, and consistent with the sovereign equality and consent of state parties. Thank you.

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Kohli. I speak on behalf of Bread for the World Germany and the Global Alliance for Tax Justice. Article 25, as it is written, is a very standard formulation that we see in a wide range of UN conventions. And we believe it is very important to keep it as it is. Allowing for reservation will create a confusing system where it is unclear which country has committed to what. We are fully aware that the OECD has a tradition of allowing countries to make a long list of reservations and exceptions. For example, the OECD's multilateral convention to implement tax treaty related measures to prevent base erosion and profit shifting allows the signatories to make reservations to over 20 different articles in that convention, the sum of the articles allowing several different types of reservation. The OECD approach is not a solution. It has created a very complex and incoherent international system with a high degree of confusion and uncertainty. And that is in fact one of the key problems we are here to resolve. The last thing we need in the international tax system is more side-by-side agreements. where countries pretend to commit to joint rules but are in fact just doing their own thing. It is time for everyone to commit to true cooperation and to developing and abiding joint international rules. The UN tax convention should be inclusive and we are happy that we finally have a process where all countries are able to negotiate on an equal footing. But inclusivity is not the same as allowing countries to demand exemptions from rules that have been adopted. Therefore, we call for Article 25 of the UN tax convention to be kept as it is in the current draft and to say no reservations may be made to this convention. Thank you, colleague.

Thank you. NYU, please.

Thank you very much and thanks to all the delegates and stakeholders on this Friday afternoon. It has been a really major endeavour this week. Just on Article 25. The suggestion by many delegates, although it's by no means clear it's a majority, to have reservations is actually a little surprising in relation to a multilateral framework convention. It might be perhaps a consequence of bringing expectations relating to previous tax treaty practice to this forum. So as noted by a number of others now, in a context of framework conventions, it is not typical that there would be an ability to do a reservation. And we've heard some examples, tobacco control, climate change, Kyoto Protocol, biodiversity. In respect of the convention against corruption, there is one possible reservation relating solely to disputes under the convention itself and the settlement process. A different example is provided on the law of the sea. So just if there were no provision at all on reservations, then of course they would generally be allowed, but I would draw attention to article 19 C of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, which states that A reservation is not permitted if it is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. And I think this goes to the issue of principles and objects of this high level framework convention. It seems to me the real problem or concern we're hearing from states is that in debating this clause is really about specific operational articles. and whether there is a main core and others that might possibly be carved out. A concern with carving out operational, for example, administrative assistance clauses is weakening the benefit of the convention in respect of the support of domestic resource mobilization or sustainable development, which are, of course, fundamental aims of the convention. I would suggest that also it's not attractive to have more fragmentation if we can avoid it in this convention. I'd suggest the better process going forward is actually to retain this prohibition in Article 25, but for delegates to debate the requirement in any particular other articles as to whether there is a significant concern. that might possibly require a reservation in respect of a one particular article or otherwise. Thank you.

Thank you. Ghana, please.

Thank you, colleague. Ghana supports the statement made by Kenya on behalf of the 54-member Africa group that was also supported by Lesotho, Cote d'Ivoire, Zambia, as well as the African Union and ATAF. Same sentiment also by the colleague from India. Particularly on Article 25, we support the call that the Framework Convention should not allow for reservations to be made by members. Allowing for reservations will water down the objectives that the Framework Convention seeks to achieve. We reiterate that the current draft text of Article 25 is in line with other framework conventions like the UNFCCC that has been referred to numerous times by distinguished colleagues and which basically all members in this meeting have acceded to. As such, we support the draft language of Article 25 as is. Thank you, co-lead.

Thank you. United Republic of Tanzania, please.

Thank you, colleague. The United Republic of Tanzania aligns itself with the statement delivered by Kenya on behalf of the Africa Group, which has also been supported by many delegations from Africa, Africa Union and the ATAF. We also echo the comments made by distinguished delegates from India. Colleague, we wish to emphasize that the issue of broad and inclusive participation has already been addressed in paragraph 14 of the terms of reference, which provides optionality in relation to protocols. Colleagues, parts may have flexibility on protocols, but conversion itself must remain coherent and binding in order to preserved its object and purpose. In our view, Colleen, international tax cooperation cannot be built on unlimited optionality. If the convention is the option, its provisions are optional, the protocols are optional, and even the provisions of the protocol are optional, then we risk creating optional international tax cooperation rather than the effective international tax cooperation. For this reason, colleague, the United Republic of Tanzania, we support the Article 25 as currently drafted. Thank you, colleague.

Thank you. Cameroon, please.

Thank you, Chairman, for giving us the floor. Cameroon would like to endorse the statement of the Africa Group on Article 25 of the Convention, supported by various African delegates. In particular, the delegate of Kenya, Nigeria, Lesotho, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Tanzania, as well as several partners, including TAF, the African Union, NYU. Cameroon approves the text of Article 25, which excludes the possibility of having reservations under this convention. This text seems to us to be in line with Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which explicitly envisions the possibility of excluding reservations, in particular when the formulation of such reservations goes against the objectives and the goals pursued by the treaty. which would seem to be the case given the goals of this convention. Thank you.

Thank you. BCAS, please.

Thank you, colleague. Protocol two deals with disputes between taxpayers resident of one country and tax authorities of another country and gives various options. Article 22 of the convention deals with tax disputes between two state parties but as I said does not offer any specific mechanism. Obviously these are disputes between two or more sovereigns. Text of para one is little vague. If there is a dispute between two parties, which parties should get involved in negotiations? Only the two disputing parties or one or more other parties to the convention? Will the involvement of one non-disputing party be treated as a conciliation contemplated under para two? Should the disputes be reported to the secretariat or depository? Some mechanism for making those disputes public or some list of those disputes. Any other UN agreement which gives guidance or mechanism on such disputes between sovereigns. Article 22 uses the words peaceful means. The question is whether retaliatory trade tariffs blacklisting or grey listing can be said to be peaceful means the member states may want to deliberate on this. Thank you.

Okay. Thank you. We have stakeholder three. There's no one there. Okay. All right. I believe we all deserve congratulations. And let's clap for ourselves for a change. At the beginning of the week, I asked a question that are we sure we'll be able to go through all the articles this week? I said yes, but a lot of people doubted whether it was possible. But I think we have all proved that it is possible for us to do that. And I want to congratulate all of us in having that done. I mean, we've achieved something which, looking at the complexities and the perspective, different perspectives and where we're all coming from, we've been able to somehow come out with something that I believe when we come out of the next draft, it will reflect a lot of the things we've said here and what we want to do. We will need to continue the dialogue. We will need to continue the discussions both at the bilateral level, at the regional level, and in other forums as we go along, just to be sure that we'll be able to come out with that, achieve the objectives actually of this committee and of this particular workstream. I also believe that come Nairobi and the days after, we will continue to do refining of the document. So I want to say thank you to everybody for the cooperation, the suggestions, the jostling and the filibusters and all the other things that we have been using to make the process interesting. Yes, because it can be very boring just reading text. So thank you, have a good night and a nice weekend and we'll meet again on Monday to continue the other protocols. I'm sure Chair will also have something to say.

No, okay, I would like to thank everyone and just have a nice weekend and the next week we're gonna meet for a bigger challenge, which is to finish protocol one just in two days. So hopefully we'll be able to do it also. So have a nice weekend and see you all Monday morning, 10 AM in the same conference room. Thank you.