Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons System Geneva, 2-6 March and 31 August - 4 September 2026
Provisional agenda 1. Opening of the meeting. 2. Adoption of the agenda. 3. Confirmation of the rules of procedure. 4. Organization of the work of the Group of Governmental Experts. 5. Further consider and formulate, by consensus, a set of elements of an instrument, without prejudging its nature, and other possible measures to address emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems, taking into account the example of existing Protocols within the Convention, proposals presented by High Contracting Parties and other options related to the normative and operational framework on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems, building upon the recommendations and conclusions of the Group, and bringing in expertise on legal, military, and technological aspects. 6. Other matters. 7. Adoption of the report. 8. Closing of the meeting.
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Your Excellencies, the English delegates could ask you to take your seats again so we can start. We have still quite a long list of delegations wanting to take the floor. Good. Welcome back. I hope you had a nice lunch or a virtual lunch. Some of you, I am afraid, with all the consultations going on. Next on my list is Germany, to be followed by Panama and Nigeria. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Germany. You have the floor.
Chairman. First of all, we would like to thank you and your team for your work on the draft final report, as well as for your tireless efforts to come up with further suggestions on the text to help us reach consensus. In our view, the final draft report is a very solid basis for this final session of the GGE laws. We see it as a balanced reflection of the interactive and constructive discussions we had over the last sessions and through the intercessional period. and we look forward to working with you and with delegations on the last remaining issues to achieve a consensus outcome and pledge our flexibility to reach this aim if this is reciprocated. As you requested, we will focus our interventions on the additional text suggestions you have circulated earlier in August, as well as proposals by delegations. Regarding the characterization of loss, we believe the text has developed in the right direction over the last sessions and is in good and balanced shape. Regarding your text suggestion on paragraph 25, we believe the addition of "specific" in front of "group of targets" might make it more precise. We would like to reiterate our view that the characterization should be broader rather than too narrow. In that regard, we would like to thank the distinguished delegate from Brazil for his proposal on paragraph 25. This suggestion might address the concerns voiced by some delegations that the exclusion of systems like fire-and-forget could otherwise lead to too narrow a characterization. However, we are still studying this proposal in more detail as it might require some tweaking. We could also show some flexibility regarding delegation's proposals on alternative wordings for the term "functionally integrated". Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank the distinguished Ambassador of Germany for stating the position of his delegation and commenting on proposals made, and of course, for the flexibility shown. Next on my list is Panama, to be followed by Nigeria and Ireland. Let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Panama. You have the floor.
Good afternoon, colleagues.
May I commend you first and thank you and your team for the laudable work done during the inter-session period by this GGE. May we also extend our deepest condolences to Norway for the recent passing away of the King. On paragraph 25, on the characterisation, We agree with a number of delegations who took the floor before us that this characterisation is crucial for the next provisions and therefore should not be weakened or reduced in terms of its scope, that is. We would like to speak to the subparagraphs specifically, chiefly, especially subparagraph a. We agree with the ICRC and the other delegations who spoke to this, namely that it would be better to reword the paragraph to refer to "group of specific targets", quote unquote. We also support the proposal made by Brazil, namely that we should refer to the moment and the circumstances when these attacks take place. On B, we fully agree with what was said by Switzerland. The chapeau and the subparagraphs, in our view, are a package, the product of a sensitive balance achieved through a lot of effort by you and put to our consideration. In B, we could agree to it being eliminated. With regards to lethality, we've said on previous occasion, the term lethal does not have any legal basis under international humanitarian law, which is why B is a solution, a compromise solution, that is, which is constructive in nature, balancing what delegations have voiced over the last three years that the GGE has been meeting and should be kept to preserve consensus. A proposal was also voiced about this paragraph being limited to those weapon systems which kill or assassinate. Now, international humanitarian law protects civilians against death and injuries and protects civilian objects, which is a concept which is properly embodied in the preamble part of this convention. So to change it or to limit it just to assassination or killing would be a reinterpretation of international law, existing international law, including international law, which is why we could not accept it. Thank you.
Let me thank the distinguished representative of Panama for stating the positions of her delegation and commenting on proposals. Next on my list is Nigeria, to be followed by Ireland, Colombia and Bangladesh. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished colleague of Nigeria. You have the floor.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. Once again, I appreciate you for giving Nigeria the floor as an observer state. I also want to tender our sincere apology for the fact that my delegation could not help but make a general statement that sounded like a closing remark during the first time we had the floor. That being said, I wish to place on record that my delegation supports paragraph 25 in its present form. We consider the proposed characterisation of lethal autonomous weapons systems to be clear. functional, and technologically neutral. By focusing on the system's capacity to identify, select, and engage targets without intervention by human operating the system, the paragraph appropriately captures the critical function of the distinguished lethal autonomous weapons systems. Nigeria also supports retaining subparagraphs A, B, and C, as well as the concrete proposal by Brazil on paragraph 25. We also agree with your proposal to add specific to the group of targets. Together, they provide necessary clarity concerning predetermined target parameters. This formulation reflects extensive deliberations and significant compromises among delegations. My delegation, therefore, encourages its preservation without reopening the carefully balanced language already achieved. I thank you, Mr. Chair.
And let me thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria. Next on my list is Ireland, to be followed by Colombia, Bangladesh, and the ROK. But let me first pass the floor to distinguished representative of Ireland. You have the floor.
Thank you, Chair, and we echo other delegations in thanking you and your team, as well as the ISU, for your excellent efforts and guidance that have led us to this point and assure you of our continued support. Overall, Chair, we support the characterization contained in paragraph 25. We think it reflects well the positions of all delegations and is close to achieving consensus. That being said, we share the concern raised by Brazil, Pakistan, and other delegations regarding the second sentence of 25A. We think it creates a loophole that would allow certain potentially problematic systems to slip under the radar. The concern is that the second sentence does not take into account geospatial and temporal aspects we and others have raised, and as Brazil has eloquently laid out earlier. That is, the longer that the system operates in space and time, the more that the assessment made by the operator regarding the specific target or group of target degrades over time. This poses significant concern regarding accountability under IHL and such systems should be included in the scope of this text. With this in mind, we can support the suggestion made by Brazil, which seems to address this concern in an elegant way, if we're going to keep that second sentence. As we noted in previous consultations, Attempting to agree on an exact watertight characterization for these elements of an instrument before negotiations is futile, and we don't have the luxury of time to find that precise language, if it even exists. As some have mentioned, this is a working characterization for elements of an instrument, so we urge delegations to show flexibility here as we enter the final days of the GGE. We also do not support introducing design 2, which would present another loophole, further narrowing the scope. And finally, Chair, our views on the lethality debate are well known and we can support your package compromise text as it is drafted. It strikes an appropriate balance and it is a result of extensive discussion and compromise from all sides on this issue. Suggestions to insert lethal force in the chapeau undermines that careful balance struck through the inclusion of 25B. And we can support the rest of the text in this section as drafted as well. Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Ireland for commenting on the text. Next on my list is Colombia, to be followed by Bangladesh, the ROK and New Zealand. But let me pass the floor now to the distinguished representative of Colombia. You have the floor.
Thank you, Chair. I would like to greet you and the Secretariat and congratulate you on your leadership as you guide our work. Also, we would like to convey our condolences to the Government of Norway in connection with the passing of King Harald V. My delegation shares the sentiments that were expressed in joint statements that were made earlier today to reaffirm our commitment to ensure that we successfully conclude our work this week, and this can be done on the set of elements that we have in front of it. On 25, we can accept the language that is proposed, especially the characterization that may be considered, what can be considered as a lethal autonomous weapon system. It's a responsibility of human beings, is something that is clear in order to ensure accountability in the functioning of these technologies. in terms of changing the language related to functionally integrated and replace it with language that was suggested this morning, we can be flexible as long as it does not affect the balance and package that we have built over the years of our discussions. Subparagraph A, these components that we see here and what is inclusions helps us ensure human control over these weapons as part of this text. In terms of the word "specific" and where it is placed, we can accept what was suggested by the ICRC and other delegations. and have language that says group of specific targets. Now, on 25B specifies that we are clearly talking about lethal weapons. The fact that it leads to the loss of life cannot exclude these weapons from such a characterization. for other reasons. This is why we support the inclusion of this sub-paragraph and also the other language is also acceptable to us because it takes into account the technological progress that is happening in this area. Thank you.
And I thank the distinguished representative of Colombia. And next on my list is Bangladesh, to be followed by the ROK and New Zealand. Let me first pass the floor now to the distinguished representative of Bangladesh.
Thank you, Mr. Chair, for your hard work in guiding us towards consensus on a set of elements. My delegation would like to make a general comment on the GGE process before commenting specifically on para 25. History teaches us that arms control is rarely an act of goodwill. It is a calculation of security. States constrain weapons when doing so serves their security better than retaining them. We are concerned that delaying negotiations risks allowing technological and strategic realities to overtake the convergences developed in the GGE. Negotiating now is therefore prudent strategic risk management. This is not intended to make a choice between security and technology. but about ensuring that technological progress strengthens strategic stability and guarantees individual, equal, and undiminished security for all. Commenting specifically on PERA 25, as my delegation has explained, we are not in quest of perfection over the characterization of laws. What we emphasize is early commencement of negotiation on regulation of laws. To be more specific on target selection in para 25 subpara, we support the formulation "a group of specific targets". This distinction is important. A specific group of targets could allow the system to identify individual targets within a broader category. In contrast, a group of specific targets makes clear that the individual targets within that group have been determined by a human. This better reflects meaningful human control, enhances predictability, and reduces the risk of unintended engagements. Human control should not end with defining a category of targets. It should extend to determining the specific targets against which force may be applied. We therefore see a group of specific targets as the clearer and more appropriate formulation. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Bangladesh for commenting on the tax proposals. Next on my list is the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea, to be followed by New Zealand, Spain and Finland. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea. You have the floor.
Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor. Good afternoon, colleagues. At the outset, my delegation would like to express our sincere gratitude to you and your team, Chair, for your leadership and dedication in guiding our work over the past three years. We firmly believe that the progress we have made thus far would not be possible without your skillful chairmanship. As many noted, we have made a substantive progress toward a common understanding on laws. This is not a small achievement, but a meaningful step forward. You can count on my delegation to continue working closely with you and do our best to help achieve the consensus outcome by the end of this week. The working characterization is one good example of our substantive progress we collectively achieved. While we recognize that there is still room for improvement, given the limited time available and the carefully crafted language that reflects a delicate balance, my delegation is ready to join the consensus on closing this part of the draft report. That being said, let me respond to some of the suggestions made by other delegations this morning. We can support the grammatical change from "determines" to "determine", and we also can support changing "description" to "characterization" in paragraph 25C, as suggested by our colleagues from UAE. We likewise support changing "a human" to "a human being" in paragraph 25, as suggested by the US, one of the masters of the language. On the addition of "specific" in the last line of 25A, we agree with the Chair that placing "specific" before the targets would make it redundant. We can consider the suggestion made by Pakistan to refer simply to "specific target" or "targets". Alternatively, we could move forward on the basis of a general common understanding of what we mean by the specific group of targets and accept the Chair's text as it stands. Lastly, with regard to the suggestion by the US delegation to change "functionally integrated" to "whose integrative functions enable the system to", we understand this is an effort simply to clarify what we mean by "functionally integrated". Therefore, we support this change and with a view to facilitating a consensus. These are, by and large, technical changes, I think. And now, let me move on to the most difficult part of the suggestive changes. As a delegation that was deeply involved in the discussion on the element of lethality, we agree with India that we should not seek to reopen the entire debate. We also agree with the Chair that we should preserve the package that we have carefully developed. At the same time, we concur with the Chair that where possible, we should fix the problem with as few words as possible. In this regard, we would again suggest adding the with lethal force or causing death to a person to the chapeau of 25 in order to accommodate the concerns raised by other delegations. Our understanding was that the package on the lethality was intended to retain lethal, which is an important element of our mandate, as understood in its plain meaning, while also incorporating the exception clause set out in paragraph 25B. Against this backdrop, adding with little force would not, in our view, compromise the carefully negotiated balance. Particularly, we have 25B untouched. We therefore believe that this limited change could help adjust the concerns expressed by a number of delegations while preserving the balance of the package we have reached. To conclude, we concur with the room that we are close to the finish line with the characterization, and we support the Chair's approach that we make minimal changes to the paragraph 25 and quickly move on to the paragraphs on human elements, since we have only less than 30 hours remaining. Thank you, Chair.
Let me thank the distinguished representative of the ROK. Next on my list is New Zealand, to be followed by Spain, Finland and Czechia. But let me first pass the floor now to the distinguished representative of New Zealand. You have the
Thank you, Chair. New Zealand appreciates the work that you and your team have undertaken to develop additional drafting options aimed at helping this group move toward consensus. We remain open to options that could help bridge the remaining differences, and we will engage with your suggestions and others made today in that constructive spirit. At the same time, we note any accommodation on particular paragraphs should be considered as part of a balanced package covering the text as a whole. Chair, New Zealand considers paragraph 25 close to a landing zone. We do, however, continue to see some ambiguity in the second sentence of paragraph 25A, as we have noted before, and those concerns were well expressed by Brazil earlier. Our preference would be to avoid an over-prescriptive exclusion. We do, however, understand the importance of this element to others. If the sentence is retained here, it should be understood narrowly and should not imply that such systems or uses are exempt from otherwise relevant safeguards. We are open to the additional use of specific if it assists consensus. We would agree with the comments from the ICRC and others that shifting specific to before targets could be a helpful clarification. We also think Brazil's suggested addition for the end of the sentence could be a useful one. And Chair, I'll try and react to some of the other proposals that have been made today. New Zealand can work flexibly on the exact formulation of functionally integrated if the present formulation remains an obstacle for some delegations. The important point for us is that the relevant weapons and technological components operate together to enable the identification, selection, and engagement functions. And we've heard proposals and options today, and we will consider those carefully. We also recognize that a number of delegations wish to see lethality reflected more expressly in the text. For us, the current text is clear on this point. We think Norway set out very well that understanding this morning, and we consider paragraph 25 to be carefully balanced. We would be somewhat cautious about inserting a further element of lethality into the chapeau. as that could overly narrow the characterisation or sit inconsistently with subparagraph B. Nevertheless, we've heard suggestions today that we will consider carefully. As an initial reaction, we think including lethality in the chapeau would also require expressly stating and understanding that lethal refers to the capability of the weapon system, while preserving the point that an individual use need not result in loss of life and may instead cause injury or damage or destroy objects. and so we think there is a risk by adding an additional element that we open up a whole other set of issues here, Chair, but as I say, we will reflect on those proposals that have been made today. Thank you, Chair.
Let me thank the distinguished representative of New Zealand for stating the position of his delegation and also his preparedness to look into the proposals made by other delegations on the way forward to consensus. Next on my list is Spain, to be followed by Finland, Czechia, Japan, Bulgaria, Mexico, Australia and Cameroon. That is it so far on the list. But first, the distinguished representative of Spain, you have the floor.
Thank you very much indeed, Mr. Chairman. If I may add my voice to all those other delegations who before me have voiced to the delegation of Norway the condolences for the recent passing away for His Majesty King Harald. Spain would like to thank you, Mr Chairman, and your team and the Secretariat for your tireless work in preparing this last session. And for the preparation of all the informal session that preceded this session, we would also like to, all of us, that is, demonstrate political will and as much flexibility as possible in order to fulfill the mandate of this group by the end of the week and to come up with a text agreed on by consensus. So initial comments on 25, which we're looking at at the moment. Our understanding is that this paragraph broadly reflects an agreement between diverse positions voiced over the last three years we've been working on this. In our view, therefore, this is the best consensus-based text possible. We would also like to underscore, as other delegations have also underscored, that subparagraph is the outcome of an agreement between two diverging positions and, therefore, should be understood as so the first sentence, which is inclusive, should be considered as a package with the second sentence, which is exceptional in nature or an exclusion. It's exclusion in nature. Specifically on this paragraph, may I make some more specific comments now with regards to your new proposal, sir, namely to include the word specific before the words group of targets. In our view, does not provide anything to the text, given that in the word specific, which is placed on the screen before targets, is subsumed. But it would also apply to the group of, the concept of group of targets. That meaning is already subsumed in specific. Now, if it was important, out of interest to some delegations, to add the second word "specific" to the text, then we could accept it, as long as we keep the location proposed by the Chair. In other words, we do not want to move the work of Group of With regards to what was said this morning, we'd like to voice our support to the following proposals. On C, we support what was proposed by the UAE, namely to change the word "description" to "characterisation". This change, in our view, would give better consistency to the whole of paragraph 25. Secondly, also appropriate is what the US proposed, namely to include the word "being" after "human" in the introductory paragraph of 25, to make it consistent with the reference we make in subparagraph. And finally, whilst we believe that the proposal made by India to change the verb "can" to "designed to", we understand that your proposal, sir, is the one which, at this stage, attracts the greatest number of support votes. Spain will continue to work to ensure that we can move forward constructively, thanks to you this week, with this aim of us as I was saying before, fulfilling a mandate by the end of the week. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the distinguished Ambassador of Spain for stating the position of her delegation and commenting on proposals made. Next on my list is Finland, to be followed by Czechia. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Finland.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. Let me first express our condolences to the Norwegian delegation on the passing of King Harald. Then, Finland would like to join other delegations in extending our appreciation to you, Mr. Chair, and to your team for the skillful and constructive work carried out throughout this process. We believe that the overall evolution of the text has, in many respects, progressed in a positive direction. During this final stage of our work, we hope that the delegations will be able to build on the progress achieved and find consensus on the remaining issues. We are especially looking forward to the productive evening consultations. Regarding paragraph 25 of the characterisation, Finland is ready to accept the Chair's proposed text, including the chapeau and the subparagraphs a, b and c. The text under discussion should be viewed as a balanced package that brings together different approaches. We believe that at this stage of the process, we all need to demonstrate a constructive spirit. Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Finland for stating the position of the delegation. And next on my list is Czechia, to be followed by Japan. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Czechia.
You have the floor.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. Let me begin by expressing our sincere appreciation to you and to your team for your leadership and dedicated efforts throughout this mandate. We hope that the progress achieved so far will enable this group to reach a balanced outcome, and we remain committed to working constructively and in a spirit of compromise. Turning to paragraph 25 and its subparagraphs, we welcome the continued use of the term "characterization", as the purpose of the present text is not to establish a final or a legal definition of loss. but rather to facilitate the work of this group and to identify those systems that fall within the scope of the discussions conducted under this mandate. At the same time, we believe that reaching a sufficiently clear and broadly supported characterization would constitute a valuable outcome of the group's work and contribute to a common understanding of the systems under discussion without prejudging the nature or scope of any future instrument or other possible measures. We also consider it important that the characterization remains sufficiently precise and does not inadvertently broaden the scope of the text beyond what is necessary for the purpose of this process. In particular, care should be taken to avoid interpretations that could automatically encompass defensive systems operating under strict time constraints in response to incoming material threats. such as air and missile defense systems, active protection systems for vehicles, or similar defensive capabilities designed to protect civilian populations, critical infrastructure, and armed forces. In our view, the relevant consideration is not solely the technical infrastructure, architecture, sorry, of a system, but also the respective functions performed by human personnel and autonomous capabilities in a particular operational context. In this regard, we consider it important to distinguish between the prior establishment by human beings of target parameters or criteria and determination by human beings of a specific target or group of targets to be engaged. This distinction is relevant to assessing whether the system itself performs the identification and selection functions contemplated in the characterization. We therefore support maintaining a flexible and context sensitive characterization that preserves room for future discussions while avoiding unintended consequences for legitimate defensive capabilities. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Czechia for commenting on the text. Next on my list is Japan, to be followed by Bulgaria. I would like to first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Japan. You have the floor.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. At the outset, the delegation of Japan expresses its sincere appreciation to the Chair, his team, friends of the Chair, and the ISU for their continuous efforts throughout the sessions as well as the inter-sessional periods. Under your able stewardship, substantive and focused discussions have advanced over the past three years, and our delegation remains fully committed to fulfill the mandate of this Group in a constructive manner together with all delegations. On paragraph 25, We also consider that we are very close to finishing line, and we are open to fine-tune language to better articulate common understanding and work towards consensus, including alternative language and functionally integrated, while bearing in mind that the paragraph does reflect a careful balance to cater to different concerns. We listened carefully to other delegations' remarks this morning. and concur with the need to consider what we need to clarify and address at this point to fulfill our mandate and what we should perhaps deepen discussion in future deliberations. In this regard, we consider that a proposal made by the United States to add "including" by setting criteria to engage a target in sub-paragraph alpha have the potential to be general enough to encompass concerns expressed with regard to the temporal and geospatial aspect, and act as a marker to deepen discussion in future deliberations. With regard to the Chair's additional suggestion to add "specific" before "group", we originally understood that "specific" applies both to targets and groups of targets in the previous rolling text. But in a flexible spirit, we are open to inserting this word if it facilitates consensus. But we'd like to point out that group of specific targets does seem to render the word group superfluous. But we remain open to further discussions. I thank you, Mr. Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Japan for stating the position of her delegation. Let me now pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Bulgaria, to be followed by Mexico. But first, Bulgaria, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. At the outset, allow me to thank you and your team for your dedicated and creative leadership. Bulgaria assures you of its full support in bringing the GGE work to a successful conclusion this week. Bulgaria takes a positive and well-balanced view of the draft report. We consider it to be well-structured and sufficiently mature text, one that reflects the convergence achieved over the past years and offers a solid basis for a meaningful outcome. In this regard, Bulgaria recognises Article 25 as a good compromise and we are able to support it, including the latest refinements introduced in the Chair's
additional suggestions.
on the subsection A. We place particular value on the functional and technology agnostic nature of these characterizations. Thus, the text remains sufficiently comprehensive to state relevant and valid irrespective of the future technological developments. Consistent with the position we have expressed throughout, we consider it essential to avoid unnecessarily narrowing the scope of the characterization.
Thank you.
And I thank the distinguished representative of Bulgaria for commenting on the text. Next on my list is Mexico, to be followed by Australia and Cameroon. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico.
Thank you very much indeed, Chair. First of all, I voice the condolences of my delegation to the delegation of Norway for the passing away of King Harald. may also thank you and your team and the Secretariat also for your efforts in drafting these proposals and for having organized this meeting. Thirdly, we join what was said by Brazil on behalf of a group of countries at the beginning of this session and point out that we consider that the rolling text is sufficient progress for us to fulfill our mandate. A few general points and then specific proposals. On the characterisation issue, the text should allow for broad characterisation, which is why, once again, may we say that, from our point of view, the introduction of the term "lethal" or "by design" would be prejudicial because it would exclude a whole range of laws. Similarly, as we've said on other occasions, given the nature of laws, the inclusion of "functionally integrated" functionally integrated, quote unquote, is crucial to reflect the fact that the system doesn't have to be physically integrated. We reiterate that the group should only examine and formulate by consensus a set of elements on an instrument without prejudging on its nature, which is why any additional clarification about the characterization of laws can be made during the negotiation, which is why we support 25 C like Pakistan, Switzerland, the ICRC and many other delegations. In fact, we would like to support the proposal made by Brazil to add a reference to the moment of the circumstances at the end of the second sentence of paragraph 25 A. Finally, on that same paragraph 25 A, having heard all of the exchange of views throughout this morning and what has been said this afternoon on the introduction of the word "specific" and having read the instructions we received from our capital, Mexico would like to propose the elimination of the words "specific" and "group of". It's not just an elimination, it would be a clarification. This wording would refer to attacks which involve multiple objectives, but it would also ensure that the exclusion applies when these objectives have been indeed determined by humans who are responsible for the decision and not when people have merely defined the universe within which the system would subsequently make the selection. We consider that this clarification would strengthen the legal security of this text and we avoid diverging interpretations about what a group of specific, a specific group of targets would mean. It would also make it possible for both sentences of 25 A, B, mutually reinforcing. So we are setting characteristics or a set of would not be sufficient. We need to set the objectives or the concrete objective that would be targeted or attacked. Specifically, what we are proposing, therefore, is this, and I'll read it in English.
That a human being designs, programs, or otherwise determines a set of potential targets or characteristics thereof does not exclude the system from this characterization. A system included in this characterization when the personal planning Deciding upon or carrying out the attack determines the specific target or targets to be engaged by the system.
Mexico will continue to work throughout this week in a constructive spirit for us to successively conclude the work of this group. Thank you very much indeed.
And I would like to thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for commenting on the proposals. Next on my list is Australia to be followed by Cameroon. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Australia. You have the floor.
Chair, as this is the first time our delegation is taking the floor, I would like to assure you of our full support as this group works to achieve consensus. In respect of paragraph 25, we understand that this is a working definition. and on that basis, Australia can support the current text. We are also open to other proposals and will respond to a few made in the room today. We have listened to the views of delegations this morning on lethality. We have heard a number of perspectives on this point. The text must be anchored in the notion of lethality, yet it must be capable of capturing lethal weapons that are used in a non-lethal way. The effect of inserting "with lethal force" in the chapeau would be to clarify that the weapon system must have the capability of using lethal force. It would not change the operation of paragraph B, which, read together with the chapeau, would not exclude lethal autonomous weapon systems that can be used in a non-lethal way. We see this insertion as maintaining the delicate balance reached in the text. On functionally integrated, we understand that it is not the objective of the current text to capture decision support systems that provide information to a laws. However, we are open to proposals to amend this if it assists in providing greater clarity in this regard. On 25A, we see these two sentences as providing a delicate balance of positions. However, we would be open to the Brazil proposal if it can help us find consensus. Thank you.
I would like to thank the distinguished representative of Australia for his flexibility and looking at the proposals made by other delegations. And then the last one on my list is Cameroon. Then I would like to come back to you with some text proposals on the basis of the discussion we have had so far today. So those of you who have still some comments might wish to keep their powder dry. But let me first now pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Cameroon.
You have the floor.
Thank you, Chair. From the outset, we would like to, like people who took the floor before us, address our condolences to Norway following the passing away of King Harald V. May I also, Mr. Chairman, pay tribute to your leadership and thank the Secretariat for its support to help us meet the objectives of the mandate of the GGE on laws. My delegation is ready to be flexible, generally speaking. My delegation supports what was said by Algeria on behalf of the African Group And in the following on from that, we support the joint statement made by Brazil on behalf of a group of countries, underscoring the importance of the progress made by the GGE. Mr. Chairman, in connection with Article 25, my delegation considers that the characterisation proposed is an important basis for our work. In particular, we welcome the stress placed on the ability of a system to identify, select, and engage a target without human intervention at the moment when it happens. For Cameron, this characterisation raises a crucial issue, namely when the decision on the use of force is delegated wholly or partly to a machine, then it's essential to preserve human control or judgment, thanks to which the guarantee that the use of force is subject to a human decision which is responsible in nature. The fact that a system has been designed and programmed by human beings is not enough in itself to establish the existence of meaningful human control at the moment when force is used. In this perspective, we consider that the rapid evolution of military capabilities calls for us to think carefully about tailoring our regulatory framework.
Paragraph.
25c recognizes that the characterization can be re-examined and potentially modified in the future, represents therefore a particularly important element for Cameroon. What is crucial is that the international framework is not set in stone in the light of technologies which are rapidly evolving and which could modify the nature of the degree of autonomy of laws. The future instrument, therefore, should be sufficiently robust to meet to keep pace with current technologies, whilst being adaptable to future evolutions to ensure that future evolutions do not cause voids in the protection afforded by international law. Finally, Mr. Chairman, we are in favor of keeping paragraph 25 as a working basis, whilst also considering that it is necessary to continue to talk to strengthen the link between characterization, control, human control, responsibility and accountability in a context which balances military objectives and humanitarian imperatives. Thank you very much.
Let me thank the distinguished representative of Cameroon for commenting on the text and proposals made by other delegations. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, thank you very much for sharing your views and comments on the additional suggestions as circulated by the Chair concerning para 25. And my team and I, we have carefully taken note of the views expressed during our discussions. And my sense is that we are very close to reaching a common understanding on the working characterization. Let me, again, stress working characterization. Although a number of targeted adjustments are still required, I already explained that I would like to keep them as minimal as possible because every word added is a possible bone of contention. We have now prepared a revised version and I would like to ask the Secretariat to display the revised version on the screen. And it will also be circulated to high contracting parties and uploaded to UNODA meeting space, so you can find it there and put it in your computer. So we start by a revision of functionally integrated. in the chapeau of power 25. And we spent, I daresay, considerable time discussing this issue, and it has been reflected in the text through various formulations and in different locations. While there have been divergent views on the precise terminology to be used and where, or if it should appear, it seemed that there was a common understanding of what the provision was intended to achieve. I therefore decided to replace it with simpler language, namely, that operate together. This ultimately conveys the same meaning while avoiding terminology that may be understood differently by different delegations and sound differently in different languages. In my view, this should provide sufficient clarity while allowing us to move forward. Then, the issue of lethal force in the chapeau of para 25. This is a proposal that has been widely discussed and we have long heard calls for its inclusion, just as we have heard requests for its omission. Its addition is intended to help us move beyond the current impasse and enable us to reach agreement, as for some delegations, it is a prerequisite for being able to accept the para and the sub-paras. At the same time, I would like to reiterate that the concerns raised regarding its inclusion are addressed through sub-para 25. That is also why I keep stressing that this is a package, the chapeau, together with 25. It remains important in this regard to read para 25 together with the sub-paras, rather than considering any of its elements in isolation. Then, the addition of and the moment of engagement to 25 alpha. This is to address what has become known as the temporal concern, which refers to systems that remain dormant for an extended period of time while targets have been set previously by personnel planning, deciding upon, or carrying out an attack. In addition to that, I have made two simple editorial adjustments, namely the addition of "being" after "human" in the chapeau, as well as the deletion of "description" in 25 Charlie to avoid labelling the above paras. Having carefully considered the discussions held this morning and this afternoon, this text represents, in my view, the best possible compromise currently available. Accordingly, I propose that this version of Power 25 be incorporated into the revised draft final report. To allow delegations time to review the revised text and consult as necessary, I propose that we suspend the meeting for 15 minutes and resume at 4... 25. Let me underline again that, in my view, the characterisation has come a long way. At this stage, I'm not looking for new ideas, nor am I looking to engage in extensive drafting. What I would very much appreciate from you is to hear from you whether this is a way forward. It should not make the text perfect. It's only whether you can accept it or whether you can be unhappy with it without that we are crossing any red lines. So, if you have any comments, I would like you to react with concrete proposals for addressing those concerns and also being cognizant of the concerns of other delegations, because if we cross their red lines, we are turning around in circles. That was it. And let me now suspend until 4:25. Thank you very much. Excellencies, distinguished delegates, could you please take your seats again? Just allow me to say two more things with regard to the text. I forgot to mention that we deleted an S, so we no longer have determines, but determine. And the other thing is, again, let me once more say something about specific. As I stated this morning, and let me repeat it, because we had some discussions also over lunch break with certain delegations trying to explain it, so perhaps I should repeat it again, that it was a very conscious decision to suggest specific group of targets and not group of specific targets. Because if we would do the second thing, this would imply treating the components of that group as individual targets. which would make adding the group before of specific targets superfluous, because it could then simply read the attack, determine the specific target or targets, and et cetera, et cetera. So that's probably not helping. So for that reason, we have proposed what we have proposed. Having said that, I saw a lot of movement in the room. and discussions. So let me now open the floor to hear from you what I have done wrong. Who would like to kick off? I recognize the distinguished representative of Panama. Madam, you have the floor.
Muchas gracias, Senor President.
Thank you very much indeed. Good icebreaker. The effects of coffee are now being felt. Thank you for the proposal made by you in the light of the comments we made this morning. This being said, you asked very kindly, what is the cause of concern? For us, it is the addition of lethal force, the reference to lethal force. In our understanding, when We include this clause in B. It was because some delegations were insisting that the qualifier lethal should stay in the chapeau in line with the language of actually the title, the title of the GGE. in adding this reference once again in the paragraph makes it look redundant and appears to contradict B. It also adds a new difficulty given that within international humanitarian law, this concept is not defined. So to answer the question, we don't have an answer to the question, what does lethal force mean? We're talking about weapons systems designed to bring about death. If I'm a civilian attacked by an autonomous weapon system, I might lose a limb but not die. Does that mean that with this characterization, this element suddenly this kind of weapons no longer falls within the scope of what we are drafting. That's my concern, because once we said, as we said in this morning, this contradicts norms of international humanitarian law and international humanitarian customary law that already exists, given that it applies. So that what applies is civilian protection, independently of whether civilians are killed or injured. Perhaps to understand things better, we would like to know from the delegations proposing this how they understand this concept of lethal force. What is the scope? How should it be interpreted? Otherwise, we enter into a vicious circle of having to introduce new elements to define concepts we've added. We're not at this stage anymore. We are at the bridge-building stage. So we would like that kind of explanation, thank you, in anticipation, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank the distinguished representative of Panama. Yes, it's a very pertinent question. Let me be very blunt. I would say that we need with little force to get consensus in the room. But of course, consensus we can only get if everybody in the room sees no reason to object to the text. I'm not asking you to agree with the text. I just ask you whether you can live with it. And as you have noticed earlier today, I went at great length in against certain interventions where, for instance, was proposed to delete 25 Bravo. Because I think, no, I don't think, I'm convinced that 25 Bravo protects your position. So the question now is, can we accept the text, this proposal? where those who want to have with lethal force in it. So another reference with lethal, although there is already lethal autonomous weapons systems in it. And there is a reference to the concept of lethal in 25. Bravo. While on the other hand, we protect the position of those who say that laws that do not, the youth could have to text for you. That makes my life easier. Yes. The fact that the laws can also be used in a way that does not result in loss of life does not exclude it from this characterization. And then again, let me also make clear that this characterization is not about protecting civilians. This characterization is not about human control. This is a characterization of laws. And all the other issues we are going to address in the following on So don't try to solve all the problems in 25. Otherwise, para 25 is no longer a para, but becomes a kind of a book. And that's not what we have been asked to do here. So that is my question to you. Can you live with the explanation that I have given so far? Then, looking at my list, I have the Russian Federation to be followed by Cuba, but let me first pass the floor to the Russian Federation.
Thank you very much, distinguished Chair. We're grateful to you for yet another attempt to find compromise-based language in connection with paragraph 25, a very important paragraph for our understanding of the subsequent paragraphs. As we said earlier, the delegation of the Russian Federation is ready to be fully involved in this work in order to achieve results that we're all looking forward to. And in this case, for us, it'll be critically important to follow the mandate that this group has. in order not to go beyond the scope of that mandate, especially since we're laying down the foundation for the future work of this GGE. At least that is the way we see our task. Secondly, it is critically important for us to reflect in the text the concerns, or rather alleviate the concerns that, for example, my delegation has, without linking it to any specific words, but through the presentation of certain understandings and notions that could alleviate and remove those concerns. Now, if we talk specifically now, we would be ready in order to find a compromise, to agree that the replacement of the words "functionally integrated" with the words "that operate together". Now, with that, distinguished Chair, we find it important to keep the language that relates to the three critical functions as reflecting the capability of the system to carry out those functions. And in that respect, we would prefer to have instead of "to" to add "and" and to once again have the word "can" in the text. And in that case, we would have an understanding that we're talking about systems that operate together, that have components that operate together, and that are capable or can carry out the functions that we spell out in the text after that. Now, in reference to lethality, We do not insist on the language that we proposed earlier, namely the words "causing death to a person", even though we find it to be more appropriate. Nevertheless, in order to be able to find a compromise, we are ready to work with a language with a reference to lethal force. Nevertheless, we have certain questions that are similar to those that were expressed by the delegation of Panama before us. What exactly do we mean when we say lethal force, a term that has not been defined by international law? And moreover, it is not used in documents that have been internationally accepted. Instead of that, we believe that we could perhaps use the words with lethal consequences or with a lethal impact instead of lethal force in order to be able to include the understanding that the carrying out of the three critical functions will be accompanied with a lethal impact or would have lethal consequences. And in that case, we believe that the language blend quite well with subparagraph B that describes the situation where in a specific case, loss of life of a human being did not take place and everything was limited to damage to infrastructure. But nevertheless, as the capability of this system, the potential remains to carry out three critical functions with lethal consequences, namely the loss of human life. lethal impact. On subparagraph a, we believe that the language you are proposing is the balance that takes into account, on one hand, the concerns raised by a number of countries that wanted to add some language related to the moment when the target is engaged, and on the other hand, reflects or alleviates the concerns of countries that would prefer to keep the language related to the specific group of targets. And in case that the language that you're proposing right now would enjoy indeed consensus in the room, then my delegation would be ready to agree to this language. On sub-paragraph c, Here, as we believe, this is rather a question of style more than anything else. And in this case, our question perhaps should be addressed to those who have English as their mother tongue. How appropriate is the use of the words "the above" in this document? Instead of this option, we can consider some alternative language, paragraph 25, for example, or simply have a separate paragraph that would be made out of subparagraph c that would have a reference to paragraph 25 and the characteristics that are in paragraph 25. Overall and in conclusion, Chair, we would like to say that the text you are proposing is a step in the right direction, and we believe that in many ways it does take into account the concerns that were presented by my delegation. Thank you.
Let me thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation for actively engaging on the proposals made and for sharing the views of his delegation. With regard to the words with lethal force, I think earlier we had in the text, or we had suggestions that can cause death or cause harm to, what we had, loss of life we have had, it's more or less mirroring what we have now in 25B. Of course, if we describe already a result of it, that would be strange because you don't know that. You only know after a weapon has been used whether it indeed will cause death or injury to persons. So for that reason, we have used the words we have used now. With regard to functionally integrated now, indeed operate together. Thank you for welcoming that. We will look again at your proposal and can identify, select and engage. We had, of course, earlier, can, so I'm inclined to consider that. And I'm not With regard to 25C, let's hear the views of the masters of the language, but not further complicate it. I think it's clear what we want to do by taking out description, but if there's another way for it, I'm totally open for that. Let me have a look at the list. I have Cuba to be followed by China and the United Kingdom, but let me first pass the floor to the representative of Cuba. You have the floor.
Thank you very much indeed, Chair. I thank you for trying to seek a proposal that meets the necessary convergence. This being said, We share the concern with the Panorama voiced, namely the inclusion here of the term with lethal force, quote unquote, would overcomplicate somewhat the delicate balance which had been achieved in this paragraph 25 in introducing a term which doesn't appear to enjoy consensus under international law and which to a certain extent also contradicts what we say in other parts of the text like B for example with regards to the characterization and other paragraphs such as 31. paragraphs which speak about the concern or the fact that some systems whilst they might not be lethal in nature, might nevertheless cause unnecessary damage or harm and suffering, which at the end of the day is a violation of international humanitarian law. Which is why we think that the inclusion in 25 would not add to or contribute to the convergence we need for this paragraph. Thank you.
Let me thank distinguished representative from Cuba for commenting on the tax proposals circulated. Next on my list is China, to be followed by the UK and Austria. But let me first pass the floor to distinguished representative of China. You have the floor.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your efforts to converge the different views. China has noted that the current text, with regard to the definition of laws, only mentions that the system can engage targets in a lethal way, but it did not mention the design function and main function. We believe that this represents a risk of unduly expand the scope of definition. With regard to the logic at hand for the description, if an autonomous system's main function of design is to remark or identify a target in a battlefield, for example, it is to, such as the weapons to shed light on the battlefield. In extreme circumstances, they could hit humans and lead to death. Therefore, they should also be included in this definition. This will contradict to our intention of regulating highly lethal weapons. The regulation of laws should have the purpose of targeting the autonomous weapons that are lethal to personnel instead of weapons that has the potential of lethal forces or include the weapons that do not have the core function of kill somebody. Therefore, China would like to suggest that in relevant part of the text, we might want to add the design intention and primary function to be included in the text, so that the definition will not be unduly expanded. More precisely, we would like to propose the following. I would read in English.
"Identify, select, and engage a target with lethal force where the system is designed primarily to cause death to persons without intervention by a human being operating the system.
I thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of China for stating the positions of his delegation. I'm not going to repeat what I said earlier today with regard to design, too, because I think that's not a way we should go. Also because in history, many weapons were designed for something and then used for something else. And even with traditional conventional weapons, we have lots and lots of them. We have the famous example of the 88-millimeter anti-aircraft gun, which what was then suddenly discovered as being the most effective anti-tank weapon. So it's always difficult if you design it for what in the end will be used of. Also, intentions is always not entirely clear. Adding that here to the definition or to the characterization would increase a lot of problems, I think. With lethal force, I think It would even make it, it would certainly make it consistent with 25 Bravo because it's not about a guaranteed effect, but it is indeed with a capacity to create lethality or cause death, how you want to call it. But it doesn't always happen. And then we have 25 Bravo dealing with that case. and you only know after use whether it has the effect or not, so there's no use of having it here in the characterization as a kind of a condition. I don't think this will help us in the discussion, it will only create new problems and I think it's clear that overwhelming majority in the room would also not like to embark on that discussion and I as Chair now have to look for solutions and not for new problems, so we can work on the three words, but we should not overload ourselves with new problems. Next on my list is the United Kingdom, to be followed by Austria, Singapore, Ireland, Nigeria, France and Ukraine. But let me first hear the views of the UK delegation.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. Just a couple of short comments. On the first, on the chapeau to paragraph 25, we can accept the use of "operate together" here and prefer it to "functionally integrated", which we agree with the points that were made this morning that that doesn't have any sort of understood definition. One of the concerns that we've already heard in relation to "operate together" here is that there seems to be now introduced a bit of an inconsistency between that and. That is in part because when we say "operate together to identify, select and engage a target with lethal force", that does not leave room for what is being provided in sub-section This can be rectified by reintroducing the can. So we could say this can be the technological components that operating together can identify, select, and engage a target with lethal force. And then that gives the opportunity for B to provide the clarification it does. Moving on to subparagraph A of the chapeau and the suggestion of and the moment of engagement. The concern that we have here is that things like mines, loitering munitions, or even PGMs are all examples of cases where the precise moment of engagement is not determined. That is, if you take engagement to mean the critical moment of the weapon meeting the target, the relevant concern is not whether, as we understand it, is not whether the exact moment of engagement is specifically identified, but rather whether the circumstances around engagement are those that might feed into autonomous functioning. We would probably prefer, as we heard this morning, that we use circumstances of engagement here rather than moment of engagement, so that that takes into account the necessary consideration of the circumstances of engagement but does not draw in the sorts of munitions that we already see in use. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of the UK and also for reflecting on already a proposal made by another delegation with regard to reintroducing CAN, and I think I would tend to take that on board already. if there are no strong objections raised by other delegations. And thank you for your explanation with regard to and the moment of engagement and the proposal you made. I would like to invite also other delegations to reflect on that. Having said that, other delegations, next on my list is Austria, to be followed by Singapore. Let me first pass the floor to distinguished representative of Austria. You have the floor.
Thank you, Chair, and thank you for your efforts to find compromise on this para 25 in light of the different views that were expressed today. On the introduction of lethal force in the chapeau, in our view, this would contradict the language in 25B, and we would need to take another look at the para altogether, afraid that this would take us back to earlier discussions. term definitely does is create uncertainty, as it's not commonly used in IHL, about what it means and how we aim to characterize here, and how IHL is interpreted here. So in our view, this rather brings us back by opening what we found was already a very careful compromise that you had found with your text that you presented us today that made the bridge between the chapeau and the 25B. If I may, very briefly, on the specific group of targets, just one comment. I heard a proposal by Pakistan, an alternative proposal to the one that we referred to earlier, to speak of specific target or targets simply. We think we would very much prefer this to the current version in the text. that we expressed concerns about earlier, as many other delegations. On all other proposals presented, we are prepared to look at them. And thank you very much for your efforts.
Let me thank the distinguished representative of Austria for commenting on the text. And I would indeed, with regard to lethal force, it's something we might not have seen in I tell, but it is, of course, something that is known in criminal law as any physical force, weapon or action that a reasonable person would consider likely to cause death or serious bodily injury. And then we would come in power 25, bravo, to protect the position of others. So please reflect on that. Next on my list is Singapore, to be followed by Ireland and Nigeria. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Singapore. You have the floor.
Thank you, Chair. As this is the first time my delegation is taking the floor, we wanted to put on record our appreciation to you and the ISU for the work thus far, and in particular, Chair, for your leadership in stewarding the process. We wanted to echo aspects of the interventions made earlier today by Switzerland and the ROK, in that paragraph 25 of the additional suggestions indeed present a delicate balance. Our delegation's preliminary reaction is that the Chair's revised text is an improvement and brings us very close to consensus. On paragraph 25 alpha, to echo some of the earlier comments as well as that of our distinguished colleague from Japan, the other formulation of specific target or group of targets was acceptable to us. We can still, in the spirit of being constructive, accommodate the addition of the word specific in front of group of targets. However, as we are keen on the technical fidelity of the text, the addition of "and the moment of engagement" raises a few questions for us as well. Our delegation's understanding is that "moment of engagement" means the operator would need to specify the exact time at which the weapon would strike its target. This is not a level of precision that can be reasonably expected or practically implemented, even for existing weapons that are widely used today, such as missiles and torpedoes. The fact that the target interacts, moves, and is not static means that the exact moment of engagement cannot be determined upfront when the weapon is launched. Moreover, considerations on the temporal nature of the use of laws already well covered in paragraph 38, Bravo, and in greater specificity, which reflects geographical scope, duration, scale of the operation, and types of targets. So, Chair, short of a shared clear understanding of the moment of engagement, my delegation at the moment would suggest reverting to the original formulation in the last issued additional Chair suggestions, that being, I quote, "specific target or group of targets to be engaged by the system," end quote. I thank you, Chair.
Let me thank the distinguished representative of Singapore for sharing the views of his delegation, commenting on the proposals. May I please also recall the proposal made by the UK, circumstances of engagement, whether that would then help to address the concerns as now also were voiced by the distinguished representative of Singapore. Um, with that said, and next on my list is Ireland. followed by Nigeria, France and Ukraine. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Ireland. So you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair, and thanks for all the continued efforts here. We know it's no easy task. The good news, we see merits in several of the proposed changes outlined in paragraphs A to C. and while we can live with the addition of "being after human" in the chapeau of paragraph 25, our concern is that the other elements, as amended, risk, in our view, in doing the wider package approach. We could live with the inclusion of "force", but, as others have mentioned, the introduction of "lethal" does not correspond with paragraph B as currently outlined. Our concern is that we will require additional clarification that will ultimately bring us back to square one to balance out the paragraph. We also note that there are types of non-kinetic targeting that do not involve force, such as the use of surveillance assets. Ultimately, if we start from the point of the amendments in the chapeau, we will likely have to get into the same definitional issues that we have been spending a number of years over. We think that there is further tweaking and amending here that can go back to the spirit of the package. I make a similar point to that made by the United Kingdom. The removal of CAN is problematic in our view and should be retained in an updated version. The current phrasing "operator together to" could be read as implying simply a reference to the design and intent of such systems, rather than to their actual potential effects. which many delegations have already expressed concern about. As such, a potential solution, in our view, is amending the language to "operating together can". So that's, quote, "operating together can". And we also note the with interest proposal by the UK in A on circumstances of engagement, which we'll study further, but on first read, it looks like it could be a good basis to move forward here. Again, we stand ready to find solutions, Chair, and we do hope we can move forward. Thanks.
I thank the distinguished representative of Ireland for commenting on the text and also constructively thinking aloud with regard to the text we have drafted. I think that I, as Chair, would certainly be prepared to consider your suggestion with regard to operating together again. But let's also hear others. And also, thank you for reacting to the remarks made by the UK. Next on my list is Nigeria, to be followed by France, Ukraine, Switzerland, Brazil, Turkey, Pakistan, Niger, and Bangladesh. But first, distinguished representative of Nigeria, you have the floor, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation appreciates your effort to find bridging languages. I want to join other delegations to say that we can demonstrate flexibility regarding some of the proposed changes, including operate together, human being, and specific group of targets. However, We would have difficulty accepting the proposal in its present form, in particular the phrase "with little force". It appears to narrow the characterisation and create an inconsistency with subparagraph 25, which confirms that injury or damage not resulting in loss of life does not exclude a system from the characterisation. We also remain concerned about the addition of in quote, and the moment of engagement in sub paragraph 25A, as this could broaden the exclusion and create ambiguity regarding systems that continues to perform the critical function of identification, selection, and engagement autonomously. My delegation could therefore live with the revised formulation if those two additions are removed. Otherwise, our preference remains the careful, balanced language of 5 June. I thank you, Mr. Chair.
And I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria for sharing the comments of his delegation. Next on my list is France, to be followed by Ukraine. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of France. You have the floor.
Thank you very much, Chair, for your efforts aimed at finding a compromise. At the outset, I'd like to say the objective of the work of our group is to specify how international humanitarian law can apply to a specific group of weapons that we are trying to characterize. Therefore, if some systems fall out from our characterization, that does not mean that their use is not covered by the requirements of IHL. So we do not create a legal void. Your new language presented in paragraph 25 is something that we can accept. You're focusing on the most contentious points, and we have to join our efforts, otherwise we will endlessly continue to do this. Now, adding lethal force in the chapeau of 25 does not have an impact on 25B. The characterization continues indeed to include weapon systems that have been designed to kill or wound people, but also to damage or destroy objects. So it is something that we can accept. To add the word "can" as proposed by the United Kingdom helps us clarify the language of this paragraph. On the components that operate together, with this new language, the new characterization covers complex systems that include several components. So it's something that we can also accept. On the critical functions, we are studying the language you added in paragraph 25A. We believe that the language proposed by the UK, "circumstances of engagement", is something that is more specific, covering military personnel, and it is something that we will probably prefer. Thank you.
Let me thank the French Ambassador for commenting on the text and reacting to other proposals. And indeed, if you read the entire set of elements, there is language on the applicability of international law and in particular on international humanitarian law. So nowhere is to be read that if it's not in the specific characterization, that it would fall outside. Next on my list is Ukraine, to be followed by Switzerland, Brazil and Turkey. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Ukraine. So you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair. Our delegation would like to express our appreciation for your efforts and for the efforts of the team to reach the final version of the text. We find the existing text a safe landing ground and believe that it's time to wrap up the discussion. Everything that could be said has already been said. With that in mind, we would like to provide several commentaries. With regards to the chapeau, we see no reason to once again open the discussion on the definition of force, whether it is lethal force, kinetic force, or any other kind of force. We believe that the term lethal is perfectly suitable as it reflects the mandate of this work group of experts on lethal autonomous weapons systems. The absence of a definition does not mean the absence of a notion.
Many notions are intentionally left undefined in international humanitarian law, including fundamental notions like violence or collateral damage.
Such notions must be understood on the case-by-case basis and on the basis of common sense.
As for clauses Alpha.
And Bravo, the delegation of Ukraine expresses its agreement with the existing formulations as satisfactory working definitions. But we also find helpful the statements made by the delegation of the United Kingdom and supported by several other delegations that the term the moment of engagement
can be replaced with circumstances of engagement, as such that includes a broader situation and not only its temporal dimension. This concludes our statement.
Thank you.
Let me thank the distinguished representative of Ukraine for commenting on the text and reacting to proposals by other high contracting parties. Next on my list is Switzerland, to be followed by Brazil and Turkey. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Switzerland. You have the floor.
Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you for trying to find solutions. This clearly pushes delegations, including us, to come out of their comfort zones. As we said in the morning, we are trying to show utmost flexibility, but we are very concerned that we are dramatically limiting the scope of a working definition. What exactly should this exclude? Would the characterization become clearer? We should now better understand what others want to exclude from the scope. For us, IHL clearly applies to all attacks against persons and objects, and the concerns of autonomous weapons relate to both, not only anti-personal systems. We should cover both in our work For us, it is thus important that a working definition is not limited to systems causing deaths. One possible way to perhaps make us less uncomfortable could be to reintroduce on the third line the words "can identify" et cetera with "force" without "lethal", so "that operate together and that can" and so on. On sub-paragraph, regarding specific groups of targets, we still believe that that formulation risks being too broad, and we would still prefer a group of specific targets. That said, we understand that that might also not work. The proposal by some to revert back to specific target or targets might be a way forward, in our view. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Let me thank the distinguished representative of Switzerland commenting on the tax proposals. Next on my list is Brazil, to be followed by Turkey, Pakistan and Niger. But let me first pass the floor now to the distinguished representative of Brazil. So you have the floor.
Thank you. Thank you very much, Chair, and thanks to you and your team for coming back to us with alternative language suggestions, which, in our view, help us get closer to a consensus solution for this section. My delegation would be in agreement with the replacement of "functionally integrated" with "operate together", which, in our view, retains the important element of not excluding systems that are not contained in one single physical space. And we also support and accept the inclusion of being after human at the end of this of this paragraph. Turning to what in our view still requires some improvement. First, the first and foremost would be the issue of the inclusion of with lethal force. we our delegation will not belabor the points that were already made eloquently by Panama and others regarding the the fact that this inclusion upsets the balance that we were trying to achieve by including 25 Bravo as a way of clarifying the term lethal in the beginning of this paragraph but making lethal force an intrinsic characteristic of the weapon systems that we are trying to characterize here would certainly have an unduly restrictive effect that is not in line with the objectives of this group. In this regard, and in particular, given that the terms lethal and lethality are not defined here or elsewhere, this would create great uncertainty and potential for unduly restrictive interpretations. As a potential compromise, we suggest the possibility of replacing lethal with physical This would do away with the debates about whether the effects of these weapons need to cause death or not, or if the effects would necessarily be restricted to damage to persons, which in our view is sterile and potentially dangerous for this group, a dangerous path for this group to take. So physical, I think, would do the job that many delegations want this characterization to do, which is to exclude systems that are used in warfare but do not necessarily cause kinetic or physical effects. And going beyond this would certainly require those delegations to be much more much clearer as to what exactly they want to exclude, because the physical force, the physical effects in our view, is what we are focusing on here. Alternatively, our delegation would also be able to support the suggestion just made by the Swiss delegation to simply strike the word "lethal" and refer to "with force" at the end. Chair, turning now to sub-paragraph 25. We appreciate the efforts you and your team have made to take on board the proposal made by my delegation earlier this day. We believe, however, like the United Kingdom delegation, that the temporal element, while important, is not the most important element of our proposal. Circumstances would be a more appropriate term to retain here, given the fact that an assessment of not just the precise time of the engagement but the circumstances, the operational circumstances, in which the engagement takes place is much more important. Our preference would be, as the UK has suggested, to strike moment and replace it with circumstances. And that is all, Chair, from our side at this point. Thank you very much.
Let me thank the distinguished representative of Brazil for commenting on the text and developing thoughts on proposals made by other delegations. Next on my list is the distinguished representative of Turkey, to be followed by Pakistan. But first, the distinguished representative of Turkey, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair, for your proposals. We're still studying them carefully, but can share the following initial reactions. I will limit my remarks to the second sentence of 25A, which is dear to our heart. Like the UK, Singapore and Nigeria, we have concerns about the proposed addition to the end of second sentence of 25A. We have noted in the past that broadening the exception could inadvertently capture systems that operate under continuous human oversight and determination, which was not, we understood, the intention of this characterization. Adding "and the moment of engagement" broadens the characterization. Paragraph 25 is an exclusion clause. It says a system is not a loss if humans determine certain things. In its original formulation, that test has one prong, namely specific target group. Adding and the moment of engagement makes it conjunctive. To escape law's characterization, personnel must determine both the target and the timing. Any system where a human designates the target, but the system itself selects the firing moment, such as loitering munitions, Fire and forget systems, systems with an autonomous engagement window, would now fail the exclusion test and fall inside the law's definition, where before it might have qualified for exclusion on target designation alone. A stricter and narrower exit door means more systems get swept into the broader category. So we're against this addition. Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Turkey. Next on my list is Pakistan, to be followed by Niger and Bangladesh. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Pakistan. You have the floor.
Chair, thank you. Pakistan appreciates your efforts to land the paragraph, and we can work with it. The addition of "and the moment of engagement" in 25 is, in our view, the most important improvement in this text. And we thank you for it and Brazil for proposing a similar formulation. We read the requirement as cumulative. A system falls outside the characterization only where personnel determine both the specific target or group and the moment at which it is engaged. On that reading, a system released against a set of targets over an extended period where the system itself determines when to strike remains within the characterization. That is precisely the case my delegation described this morning. Pakistan would ask that this cumulative reading be confirmed. If that is the case, we can drop our earlier suggestion to move the position of "specific" before the word "targets". On lethality, Pakistan did not seek "with lethal force" and we continue to think it adds interpretative risk. Panama voiced some questions. My delegation can consider such a phrase, but only as an integral package with sub-paragraph and on the understanding that "lethal force" describes the nature of the force the system is capable of applying, not the outcome of any particular engagement. Otherwise, one could not determine whether a system is a loss until after it had fired. Having said that, it would be difficult for us to support any language that focuses on the consequences of lethality. Pakistan also wishes to state that we could not support any subsequent proposal to delete or weaken sub-paragraph, the two stand or fall together. Chair, another drafting point in the chapeau, we would also rather restore "can" in the chapeau, "components that can operate together to identify, select and engage a target." The characterization has always rested on what a system is capable of doing, and we would not want that anchor lost inadvertently. Finally, on operate together, Pakistan can live with this in place of functionally integrated, on the understanding that it also covers systems whose components are distributed across separate units rather than housed in a single device. I thank you, Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan for his reflections on the proposals made and also the comments of other delegations. And let me again repeat that indeed 25 and 25 Bravo is a package within the wider package of 25 ABC. Next on my list is the distinguished representative of Niger, to be followed by Bangladesh and Senegal. But first, the distinguished representative of Niger, you have the floor.
Thank you very much, Chair. Since it is the first time that my delegation is taking the floor, I would like to join other speakers in congratulating you on the way you preside over our work, and we wish you full success. On the paragraphs that we're discussing, starting with the easiest, my Delegation welcomes the change from "functionally integrated" to "operate together". It makes the paragraph more legible. We also welcome the adding of the word "being" to talk about a human being. And also the deletion of "description" in does not create any problems for us. There have been some discussions about operate together to or can. And perhaps, Chair, you could reflect that on the screen because when I'm trying to translate English into French, operate to and operate can in French will present something that is completely different if we say operate together to or operate together can. So perhaps you could reflect those two versions in full, and then we can then look at it more closely to decide whether to accept to or can we would like to translate that text. Now, on the question of lethal force, we listened to the different comments that were made, concerns that were raised, especially the fact that lethal force is not defined by IHL. With full respect to those comments, we believe that we should not necessarily only focus on what has already been pre-established in IHL. We're here to define perhaps new notions and decide what lethal force means, whether this is only death or also serious injury. So this will be related to the actual decision and some of the consequences of that decision that may not be covered by IHL when we do not have a definition in IHL. Now, if we understand in the room that lethal force leads to death, serious injury, and also other things, then that action will be covered by IHL. So, Chair, we appreciate your work as you try to find a compromise here, and my delegation is grateful to you for that. Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of Niger for sharing the views of the delegation. Next on my list is Bangladesh, to be followed by Senegal, the United Arab Emirates, and the Republic of Korea. But first, the distinguished representative of Bangladesh, you have the floor.
Thank you, Mr. Chair, for coming up with alternative text proposals at some places of paragraph 25. Mr. Chair, we have concerns with the phrase "with lethal force" in the chapeau. It risks making the characterization dependent on the nature or effect of the force rather than on the autonomous functions performed by the system. The inclusion of the word "lethal" in the chapeau contradicts the sub-para at 25, use of physical force instead of lethal force, as proposed by the distinguished delegate from Brazil, can be acceptable to my delegation. The phrase "operate together" could create uncertainty for distributed or networked systems, where different components perform different functions. We would therefore favour language that focuses on the system's ability to autonomously identify, select and engage targets, regardless of whether those functions are performed by multiple interconnected components or by a single integrated platform. We prefer the word "can" instead of the phrase "operate together to". We also see a potential ambiguity in requiring the human to determine the moment of engagement. A broad time parameter could arguably satisfy that requirement while leaving the system to autonomously decide when, within that period, to apply force. The exclusion should therefore not be triggered merely by a general authorisation or temporal window, but by meaningful human determination of the specific target or targets and the decision to engage. That would provide greater clarity and ensure that systems retaining autonomous target selection or engagement decisions are not inadvertently excluded from the characterisation. As we need to converge on article on para 25, we can also accept the UK and Brazilian proposal for the word circumstances instead of the word moment. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I thank the distinguished representative of Bangladesh for sharing the views of his delegation. Next on my list is Senegal, to be followed by the UAE and ROK. But first, let me pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Senegal.
You have the floor.
Much appreciated, Mr. Chairman. I would like, first and foremost, to thank you for efforts made so far, attesting to your determination to reach results based on consensus. My delegation is in a position to support most of the proposals made, in particular that pertaining to human being specific, operate together, as well as the proposal to delete description, the word description. But as to the proposal to add the expression with lethal force, our we have mixed feelings about that. Why? Because on the one hand, we understand the rationale behind that proposal, because a lethal system is different from a system that has lethal force can cause human life lost, but it could also give rise to other type of suffering, such as inflicting injury to people or to cause material damage to infrastructure. and to the environment, for example. So from that point of view, it can be compatible with paragraph 25B in our view, because what is targeted here is not the lethality per se as an outcome, as a result, but rather the potential, the capacity to cause death. On the other hand, the proposal could restrict somewhat the scope of implementation of the notion of laws to the extent that it can exclude those systems that do not have lethal force, but which have sufficient autonomy in their essential functions and capable to cause harm as defined by international humanitarian law. So from that point of view, we asked the following question. Should we exclude the autonomous systems from the categories of laws just because they do not have lethal force? That would be the question. So for that reason, we are not for the moment in a position to support that wording. Thank you.
Let me thank the distinguished representative of Senegal. And I think the answer of his question is, as he also referred already to, is in 25B. that they are also included as they call damage or destroy objects or cause injury. Next on my list is the United Arab Emirates, to be followed by the Republic of Korea and the United States. But first, the United Arab Emirates. You have the floor.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your efforts. And we thank delegations who took the floor and who have made comments. As to the expression "with lethal force", we have reservations. 25 stipulates that "does not exclude from this characterization", is what it says. And here we're talking about the destruction or damage to objects. So if we say with lethal force in the chapeau, it might contradict 25B. Must the system have lethal force intrinsically to fall within the scope of characterisation, or it merely be a system which causes injuries without lethal force? Would that be covered by this paragraph or not? In the light of these reasons, I think the initial wording was more flexible, so to speak. Now, as to getting rid of functionally operated and put operate together to, the former wording, we think, was technically more precise. Operate together to, admittedly, is more straightforward, but perhaps that wording is broader, but if you say functionally integrated, that expression shows that the components are functional from a weapons standpoint at the moment of engagement now in 25A, speaking to that and the moment of engagement, that is a substantive addition. It's not just editorial in nature. It is the human being that determines when the moment of engagement occurs. And therefore, if we make laws not subject to that requirement, then that is a game changer. The systems engage when circumstances or requirements are gathered. If we say at the moment of engagement instead, then laws will no longer fall under that characterisation because it is the human being who must determine what the moment of engagement is. So we're just wondering what is the rationale or the legal rationale behind this expression, the moment of engagement. Moving on now to 25C, we've got rid of description, that's good. It is consistent with our previous comment. This being said, I think it would be better to replace description by characterisation. Thank you.
I thank the distinguished representative of the United Arab Emirates. Next on my list is the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea, to be followed by the United States and Peru. But first, the distinguished representative of the ROK, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair, for providing the compromise text to find convergence in the room. Let me try once again on explaining our understanding with the term "with little force" and how it does not seriously affect the current balance. The most of the delegations who supported inserting this term "with little force" did not oppose what we have in the subparagraph B, where we agreed to include the systems that can damage or destroy objects or cause injury. I hope the delegations opposing the term acknowledge this important point. I think the Chair elegantly expressed the logic by reinserting the verb "can". The chapeau shows that the laws can be characterized as a system that can engage with lethal force, but even if the lethal force does not result in loss of life, the sub-par B applies, therefore the system can be included in the characterization. I do not see any contradiction, nor the broken balance. I see the balance is still preserved in the paragraph. I'd like to emphasize once again, as the Chair mentioned, that the plain meaning of lethality is already specified in the first sentence of subpar B. We are simply moving the definition to the chapeau. And again, as the Chair mentioned, the outcome and goal is to find the text that all of us can live with. Now moving on to subpara and the moment of engagement. We share the similar concerns with various delegations that practically it wouldn't be enough technically possible to determine the precise moment of engagement. In the spirit of compromise, we can consider the term the circumstance of engagement But even with the circumstances, I find it difficult to see how the personnel can determine the precise circumstance of engagement as there will be many moving parts on the battleground. Personnel can have a general understanding of anticipated circumstances of engagement. So we can consider circumstances, but I think we need to put anticipated or general circumstances. Alternatively, we can also consider the general timeframe or timing of engagement instead of the moment, which can give more flexibility. I thank you, Chair.
Let me thank the distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea for reflecting on the proposals made. Next on my list is the distinguished representative of the United States, to be followed by Peru and Sweden, but first the distinguished representative of the United States, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair, for giving us the floor. We welcome this new text, Chair. I think it shows a lot of promise. And maybe just to make two or three more specific comments about and to react to some of the observations from the floor. So first on operate together, I think like many delegations, We do think this is an improvement, but like a number of delegations, we do prefer retaining "can". And I think there have been two or three different suggestions. The Russian Federation made a suggestion, the UK made a suggestion. I think can operating together, which was the UK suggestion, does strike us as a good suggestion. I think our colleague from the ROK also just explained that the inclusion of the word can does also address a number of the concerns that we've heard from delegations about including the term lethal in the chapeau, and that's an added benefit of reverting to the can formulation. On the lethal force suggestion, our delegation had also made this suggestion earlier, so we are able to support this. But we have heard a number of other delegations, including suggestions from the Swiss delegation, to refer to force without the term lethal. I think we could be open-minded about a formulation along those lines. Third, the moment of engagement, I think, Chair, like Singapore, Turkey, the Republic of Korea, and other delegations, I think for us, this is a difficult phrase to understand. It does seem a bit broad and a bit vague, and so we've been trying to try to think of ways to refine what's being conveyed here. The circumstances of engagement, I think for us is also a bit hard to understand. As we look at this, the first part of the sentence is very focused on the concept of attack. And the premise of the first part of the sentence is to say, is to focus on the personnel planning, deciding upon or carrying out the attack and what those personnel are doing. I think from our delegation's perspective, we think one way to address this would be to replace and the moment of engagement with and the timing of the attack. And so that links back to the idea of attack, attack brings with it its own temporal limitations. And so it already is a narrower framing than engagement. And so in that sense, we think it's a little bit more precise. And then the timing of the attack acknowledges that it may not be possible to identify with precision the exact moment of the attack. But I think what is important is that the personnel who are engaged in the planning are actively considering the timing element and are thinking about the parameters around timing. And so, Chair, we think that may be a more precise way to get at at least part of the problem. We heard what the delegation of Brazil said a moment ago, that for them, circumstances in addition to timing remains quite important. So it may not be a 100 percent solution, but we do -- we would suggest considering that as one possibility. And then finally, with respect to the three other proposed edits, we support the addition of "being" after "human," "human being." We are, as we said earlier, okay with adding "specific" before "group of targets." and are also fine with deletion of description in subparagraph C. Thank you.
I thank distinguished representative of the United States for commenting on the proposals, reacting to proposals of others. and also making some new or ventilating some new ideas for us all to think about. Next on my list is Peru, to be followed by Sweden, New Zealand and India. But let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Peru. You have the floor. Gracias.
Thank you, Chair. For this revised version, we are ready to be involved Constructively, however, we believe that there is a change which deserves special consideration. I'm referring to the inclusion of the words with lethal force as others have done. The addition of this expression with lethal force could, in our view, limit potentially this characterisation to introducing an additional criterion based on the nature or the effect of the attack. which is why we're concerned that the systems capable of identifying, selecting and engaging a target autonomously could be excluded from the characterisation just because a concrete attack mode cannot be described as lethal. In addition, this raises, as other delegations have said, a matter of consistency with B, which specifically says that the lack of the loss of life does not exclude a system from the characterisation, which is why we'd be in favour of keeping the functional, the original version, functional, functionally, or to propose an alternative, such as the one proposed by Switzerland, supported by Brazil and others, namely to say can and get rid of the word lethal and keeping with force. Thank you.
Let me thank the distinguished representative of Peru. Next on my list is Sweden, to be followed by New Zealand and India. And then I think we still have four or five requests for the floor that would then be for tomorrow morning. But let's see. Let me first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of Sweden. You have the floor.
And thank you, Chair, for your efforts to find a compromise acceptable to all. We find this a constructive proposal to capture today's discussion. And to Sweden, we can live with this text proposal. We can also support the amendments proposed by the UK. I thank you.
This is the kind of brevity the Chair really loves. Next is New Zealand, to be followed by India. But first, the distinguished representative of New Zealand, you have the floor.
Thank you, Chair. New Zealand appreciates the effort to bring the different positions together with these revisions. We will, of course, approach the proposals with the flexibility required at this late stage of our negotiations. For now, I can just share some initial reactions. Like others, our main concern is around the introduction of with lethal force here in this way. We understand the position you're in, in that some delegations have said it is necessary for them, and you're seeking to find a consensus balance. For us, we would need to be satisfied that the reference to lethal force is read consistently with paragraph B, and at the moment we do struggle to reconcile the two, though I have appreciated the comments from others this afternoon reacting to the proposal, which gives us something to mull over. For New Zealand, the substance of paragraph B is essential. A system should not fall outside the characterisation merely because a particular use results in injury or damage to or destruction of an object rather than loss of life, and we want to ensure that this is not muddied with the addition of lethal force in the chapeau. We think the points the UK raised around reinserting "can" is at the minimum an important clarifying point. We also thought the Swiss proposal to strike "lethal" and to refer to "with force", this could be a potentially good middle ground, and we appreciate that there's been openness to this as a possible formulation. In subparagraph A, we would also agree with the comments of the UK to replace "moment" with "circumstances" for that additional text at the end of that sentence. Those are just some initial thoughts. We may have further thoughts to share in due course as Wellington will be waking up shortly to consider all of this. Thank you, Chair.
Let me thank the distinguished representative of New Zealand for sharing the views of his delegation, and we look forward to Wellington waking up. Next and last on my list is India, and then we still have Germany, Israel, Japan and Norway, but that's for tomorrow morning, because I would also like to make a few remarks before we have our drinks. But let me now first pass the floor to the distinguished representative of India. You have the floor.
Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. Mr. Chair, before we address this paragraph, we just want to acknowledge the contributions of the non-governmental organizations, particularly the ICRC and all others. We have benefited from the expertise that they've shared, which has enriched our perspectives, and we appreciate their emphasizing the humanitarian imperatives in the context of armed conflict, upholding IHL, which my delegation instinctively shares. Mr. Chairperson, on the characterization that you provided, we want to thank you for that. We believe that this is a net improvement. We have some course reviews to share right now with you. We appreciate the edits in para 25 in the chapeau. We would request that a word there be inserted before the word "technological components" because essentially we are talking of technological components linked to these weapons. We also can accept the formulation that you have provided with respect to "operate together to" and it draws on the two diverging views that we had heard, one on design two and on the other on CAN, and I think it overcomes that difference. So we feel that that is an elegant proposal that you have suggested, and we would be happy to go along with that. On para 25A, my delegation would just like to echo in some of the views which others have expressed, particularly the delegation of Singapore. which is that the exact moment of engagement may not be known in a number of weapons, nor it is reasonably expected or practically possible. And by introducing the temporal aspect, we risk introducing in this characterization many weapons which are not supposed to be autonomous weapons, including trigger-based weapon systems or even cruise missiles, for instance, where exact moment of engagement may not be known, while the specific targets are known in advance. We have some concerns on that, and we wanted to submit that to you. We have also heard very carefully from the delegation of the United Kingdom on referring to a possible alternate formulation on circumstances of engagement. We would like to ask what the term circumstances of engagement really means, what it entails and what the provenance of the term is. Where does the term come from? We also have the verb determining the circumstances of engagement. the meaning of the verb attached with the noun, which is circumstances of engagement, we would like to understand what it really means. We have also heard the US delegation suggesting a proposal on timing of engagement. We have taken note of that proposal. But we do want to just say that we are, you know, by suggesting proposals on engagement, we are putting the cart before the horse because Many of these aspects have been addressed in the measure section, like in paragraph 38, where we talk about the scale of operation and geographical limits, et cetera. So we would suggest that those aspects on engagement and how that moment of engagement is to be addressed be addressed in the measure section and not in the characterization section. And lastly, Mr. Chair, we have heard very carefully on the debate on lethality as a concept. and of course you've introduced the term with lethal force in para 25. We have heard concerns that this risks setting a different bar for laws outside that of international humanitarian law. If that is the concern, we would support the insertion of the paragraph 22 D of the 2018 report, which can be conjuncted to subpara B of, you know, of this characterization that lethality as made explicit in the mandate of GGE does not prejudice the application of and respect for all rules relevant to the conduct of hostilities. If that can provide sufficient, you know, strength to paragraph B so that all delegations can come together on that. So we would suggest if that, you know, element and that paragraph could be considered. And with this, Mr. Chairperson, I'll stop, but we will continue to engage constructively in the deliberations going forward. Thank you.
Let me thank the distinguished representative of India. Let me thank you all. This has been a most interesting and an interesting in a positive way afternoon with thorough engagement from all of you, although, thank God, not with lethal force. Let me now try to summarize a bit what are my takeaways. And if you could just put the text again on the screen, because I'm not so interested in looking at. I think we have or we're very close to consensus with regard to that can operate together. The human being has been accepted universally, I think. Specific target or specific group of targets, either we keep what I have now proposed here or we get rid of specific, the second time, and we have just specific target or targets. I take the point of with regard to the moment of engagement, and then in my view we have two options, we have the option proposed by the United Kingdom, the circumstances, and the other one was by the US and the timing of the attack. But I think that those two we have to think and drink around, I would say, at the reception. The above description, the above, let's see, either we cross description out or we add characterization. I'm pretty agnostic to that. And that's, of course, one thing I have not yet addressed, and that's with lethal force. I think some wise words have been said by a number of delegations on that, so I'm not going to quote delegations, but I'm just repeating also some of the things I said myself earlier, that we really, please, really read this text 25 Chapeau in conjunction with 25 Bravo. And also, indeed, consider it that we now have components that can operate together to identify, select, et cetera, a target. Then, of course, the discussion about is lethal defined. Certainly, what we are not trying to have in the text is that we describe a necessary result. No. So, I hope that's also clear, that has been made clear by a number of delegations. I recognize the proposals also from a number of delegations now to have, to identify, select and engage a target with force. And there was also a proposal with physical force. I have a bit of my doubts about that. So, for me, it's either with lethal force or with force. And I would invite you to continue discussing that over drinks. Drinks, by the way, also, of course, the observers are invited for the drinks. I apologize because the invitation was in a letter to the high contracting parties that you did not receive. But please, that is part of the inclusive approach of the chair. So I look forward to seeing you there in a few minutes. Then I'm looking at the Secretary, what do I have to say now in order to make sure that everything goes as it should go? Yes, oh that's right, I may have the great pleasure now to invite you to a reception, yes, that will start here until 7:15. And indeed open to all delegates, I already told you so. So that's it, looking forward to see you at the drinks and Thank you for your attention, and we continue our discussion tomorrow. Thank you.