(2nd meeting) Plenary Session, Global Mechanism on ICTs in the Context of International Security (20-24 July)

I call to order the 2nd meeting of the 2026 substantive plenary session of the Global Mechanism on Progress in ITC in the Context of International Security. security and fostering responsible state behavior on the use of ICTs. Distinguished delegates, as I announced this morning, we will begin by finishing our list of speakers under the item organization of work. As stated before, we already have a list of speakers, and I'm just going to read out the list as I have it right now. Brazil, Republic of Korea, China, Kiribati, Oman, New Zealand, Germany, Croatia, Argentina, Chile, France, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Singapore, and Belarus. I give the floor then to the distinguished delegation of Brazil.

Muchas gracias, señora presidenta. Madam Chair, my delegation would like to thank you and your team for the efforts you have been undertaking since your election to lay out the foundations for the work of this mechanism. We welcome your designation of co-facilitators for both DDGs and stand ready to cooperate with them in their discharging of their duties. For the DTGs to perform their functions most effectively, they should focus their discussion on a limited number of priority topics on each cycle. They should also feed on the expertise of a wide variety of sources, including stakeholders, with due regard for geographic balance. Madam Chair, my delegation presented some options in March for topics for DDG 1, such as more in-depth discussions of the voluntary checklist on norms implementation, the continued operationalization of the points of contact directory, or further discussion on the application of international law in cyberspace, taking into account the growing number of national positions that have been published. Other delegations have mentioned the protection of critical infrastructures, which is also a topic of utmost relevance. We remain ready to engage constructively with other delegations in order to reach agreement on DTG's Agenda, the DDGs One Agenda. The creation of DDG on ICT Security Capacity Building was of particular importance to my country. This— the interconnected and transactional nature of cyberspace means that security is even more a collective endeavor than in other arenas. No country can be safe from threats in the digital domain in isolation. We are only as as strong as our weakest link. My country, along with many others, has advocated for greater United Nations involvement in this domain. Centralizing the many existing capacity-building initiatives under the UN umbrella would facilitate access by those who need them and ensure a closer alignment with priorities issued— priority issues identified by the OEWG and the GMAC Plenary and better compliance with the capacity building principles adopted by the OEWG. In this regard, it would be beneficial for the DTG on capacity building to commence its work with a diagnostic assessment of the current landscape in the field, identifying existing initiatives, evaluating their strengths and weaknesses, and making recommendations for its optimization. While it will be important to ensure synergy between both DTGs, they are each autonomous bodies, and DTG II's mandate should not in any way be tied to DTG I's. Madam Chair, it will be key to ensure that discussions within the DTGs adequately feed the work of the plenary. For that to happen, we must establish a clear procedure to elevate DTG's report and negotiated recommendations to the plenary so that they may be formally adopted. My delegation looks forward to continue working with you and your team and to engage constructively with all delegations as we embark on this new chapter in the pursuit of our common goal of an open, secure, stable, peaceful, accessible, and interoperable ICT environment. I thank you.

Thank you very much. I give the floor now to the Republic of Korea.

Thank you, Madam Chair. We welcome the— you, Chair's appointment of the co-facilitator and express our appreciation for their willingness to undertake this important responsibility. We look forward to working closely with the co-facilitators under your leadership, and we're confident that through their efforts and continued engagement with member states, the Global Mechanism will make meaningful progress in advancing substantive work. With regard to work of DTG1, we believe that ransomware and the protection of critical infrastructure could serve as important agenda topics, particularly in light of their growing significance and the broad support they have received from member states. Chair, we recognize that the previous OEWG report may not explicitly address every procedural issue that may arise during the work of the global mechanism. By its very nature, a multilateral process inevitably cannot fully reflect every individual preference of all member states. In such cases, we're prepared to support the chair's proposals where they are based on broad consultations with and due considerations of the views of member states, because we believe it is very important that the global mechanism now move forward with substantive discussions in order to achieve our shared objective which is to promote a cyberspace that is secure, stable, open, and peaceful. I thank you.

Muchísimas gracias. Doy a—

Thank you very much. Now I give the floor to the delegation of China.

Thank you, Chair. With regard to the future DTGs, it is a very important question. About DTG II, we seem to have very rather clear consensus on that. But as for DTG I, relatively speaking, its mandate is broad. That is because— When we were negotiating the final document of the OEWG, we couldn't reach consensus on the mandate of the TG1. Countries all have their preferences and priorities. Based on the discussions, we can see that the divisions remain.

Thank you.

Therefore, with regard to the topics of the TG1, either we reach consensus on certain specific topics or countries have the right to propose those important questions that they believe need to be raised in DTG I. There shouldn't be such a procedure by which the chair or certain people will decide that certain topics seem to have received certain— more support and therefore they deserve our discussions. Such a practice is to turn consensus into a certain kind of voting. We can all agree that for substantive— major substantive and procedural issues of the global mechanism, we need to reach consensus. Well, that practice is a deviation from the consensus. I don't believe it should be any kind of UN practice. Therefore, informal meeting is not a blank check. In other words, you can just abandon consensus. Second, about the selection of experts for DTGs. I'd like to remind all the colleagues that we invite experts to our discussions for the purpose to better our understandings about certain topics or certain backgrounds. Therefore, the selection of experts should be closely tied to the topics we discuss. The topics we decide on discussing will decide what kind of experts we should invite. Instead of having experts telling us what topics we should discuss, Third, a point on UN practice because many countries have mentioned UN practice. In the UN system, there are many practices. In the First Committee of the General Assembly, all resolutions are voted on. If consensus cannot be reached, but in the second or third committees, their approach is to reach consensus on all resolutions. There is no such an option of vote. Both of this is both of this are UN practices. So when you talk about UN practice, it doesn't make this word any more authoritative because the key to this question is in. This global mechanism in this context of DTG, what kind of UN practice should we adopt here? That is the question that we should really pay attention to. The DTGs have its own rules of procedure. Rules of procedures of other bodies or other committees will not automatically apply here. I hope in our future discussions. Let's talk about what kind of rules we should use here instead of talking about UN practice because I don't really know what kind of UN practice you're talking about. Cyber issue became a UN topic in 1998. It's been 20, 30 years. Over this history, we never saw the appointment of facilitators without consensus. So this is not a practice of the global mechanism. I do understand that many countries regard ETGs as an innovation or an experiment, but the purpose of innovation is to make our discussions better. Instead of increasing our divisions. Many countries hope that NGOs can join the discussions without any limitation. They could totally go to a conference room in a building and all the interested countries can join voluntarily. They can talk about anything. Many countries also said that they want to learn from the experiences of these NGOs. If you find these experiences useful, you can really bring them back and make them your national practice. No one will be stopping you from doing that. Why do we have to introduce this practice into this global mechanism? With this mechanism, we hope that the conclusions that we reach here can be accepted by all countries. Only when all countries can accept this, Will they become important to global rule? So the key is whether the NGOs' participation is useful or not or whether you can actually learn from discussions. The crux is whether we respect an important practice of this global mechanism which has been developed over the last 20 or 30 years. There is an old Chinese saying which means to the effect of trying to take practice from faraway places instead of close by. We hope that in our future discussions we can look at What is the practice that has emerged over the past 20 or 30 years here? In a few days, there will be a side event by UNIDIR where the history of OEWG will be shared. I hope that UNIDIR will share what is our practice here with so many new colleagues here. Thank you. Thank you, Chair.

Gracias.

Doy ahora la palabra.

Thank you. Now I give the floor to the delegation of Kiribati, followed by Oman and New Zealand.

Madam Chair, we thank you for your dedication in bringing us to the point where we can now turn our minds to the dedicated thematic groups. Madam Chair, Kiribati approaches the DDTs with one clear conviction. Their purpose is to build on what we have already agreed, not to reopen it. The cumulative and evolving framework for responsible state behavior reaffirmed through the successive reports of the open-ended working group and carried into this mechanism through Annex I of A/AT/257 and Annex C of A/79/214 is our common foundation. It was hard-won by consensus. Kiribati's firm view is that the DTCs should take that consensus as their starting point and devote their energy to implementation rather than litigating questions that the membership has already settled. Madam Chair, we have listened carefully to the concerns some delegations have raised regarding the establishment of the co-facilitators of the dedicated thematic groups. Does not seek to reopen that discussion here. Our concern is a practical one that however this matter is resolved, it is resolved swiftly and in a spirit of consensus so that the dedicated thematic groups can become— can begin their substantive work in December as planned. For a small state that has placed its hopes in the promise that this mechanism will act, the outcome we most wish to avoid is one in which the intercessional period is lost to procedure. We say this deliberately. This mechanism was established to be action-oriented. The DTC's are the instrument through which that ambition is meant to become real, the space, in the words of the framework we adopted, for focused and practical exchanges that produce action-oriented recommendations. If the groups spend their first biennium reaccuing settled ground, they will squander the very feature that this that distinguishes this mechanism from what came before, and they will do so at the expense of the states that can least afford lost time. Kiribati's message is therefore simple: we should consolidate before we expand. We already have a framework, 11 agreed norms, and a body of confidence-building and capacity-building commitments The immediate task is to make this operational, to move from what states have agreed to do to how they will actually do it. That is a full agenda in itself and it should come first. Within that, the DDGs cannot do everything at once and delegations like ours cannot follow an endless list of subtopics. We would encourage the groups to prioritize a small number of concrete deliverables with broad support so that their outputs are substantial enough to matter and focused enough to survive in the plenary. And for the work of the groups that carry weight, there must be a clear and predictable way for the recommendations to be brought back to and taken up by disciplinary. Without that link, the group risks becoming discussions to lead nowhere, and Kiribati would welcome clarity on this point during this session. Madam Chair, we also recall that this mechanism operates in 5-year cycles with a review conference at what we'll collectively take stock. That gives us the space to sequence our work sensibly, to act first on what is agreed and impactful, to learn the experience of this first biennium, to consider new questions in due course on the basis of evidence rather than assertion. 2 final points that are, for Kiribati, non-negotiable. The DDCs must be conducted in a genuinely hybrid format. For a delegation based as far from New York as Tarawa, our capital, hybrid participation is the difference between contributing and being absent. And an implementation party that cannot hear from the states most in need of implementation will defeat its own purpose. And the DG should draw on the expertise of stakeholders in line with the modalities we have agreed, because practical implementation is precisely where their technical knowledge is most valuable. Kiribati stands ready to engage constructively and to help this mechanism prove in December and beyond that it can convert where we have agreed into what states can actually do. I thank you, Madam Chair.

Muchísimas gracias.

Thank you very much. Now I give the floor to Oman, followed by New Zealand and Germany.

Madam Chair, the Sultanate of Oman congratulates you for taking up the role of chair during this cycle of the Global Mechanism on Developments in the Field of ICTs. We congratulate you and we wish you every success in your work. To strengthen the work of this mechanism for advancing responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs. This is something that must be protected and safeguarded, and developments in the private sector and in academia are things that must be taken into account, and they must be able to participate in this endeavor. The conclusion of this mechanism must be realistic and it must be implementable, the outcomes of it. As for the parties who have a lot of experience, they need to be mentioned. First of all, if we leave these parties to one side? Well, we might not have a proper understanding of certain challenges if they're not involved. So they need to be consulted on databases and other topics. And these parties can identify cyber threats. They can help us to counter these threats. And this information is not always available to governments. So if these parties are not involved, then we can't access their experience, and we need their experience in our discussions. Secondly, capacity building is a pillar of the work of this mechanism, of its programs, including the global manual.

Which—

and we need experience, not only government experience, but also from the private sector and other parties in order for us to be able to implement the principles of the manual. And this is particularly the case in developing countries. Thirdly, we need to review the role of the recommendations. Practical experience in management helps us to implement recommendations. If we can't access all of these different contributions, then it will have an impact on the final outcome. So what we need are policies that are in step with reality. And this in line with the 3rd report of the group of experts. We need to listen to the experts and all of the different parties. Otherwise, the mechanism won't be able to strengthen trust in the field of ICTs. In particular, when it comes to responsible state behavior. Madam Chair, the recommendations must be applicable. They must be implementable. And in order to achieve this, we need participation from the different parties that have experience in this area. Thank you.

Muchísimas gracias.

Thank you very much. Now I give the floor to New Zealand.

Thank you, Chair.

As has been noted already, the DTGs are a key innovation of this process, and we appreciate your work to set them up for success. We know that in accordance with Annex 1 of the final OEWG report, DTG meetings are informal. This is a feature, not a bug. Informality provides space for inclusive, detailed discussions on novel or complex subjects in a way that is not possible during formal meetings. The informal dynamic will support the development of practical, action-oriented initiatives. And when it comes to what the DTG should focus on in December, we support the views shared by Kiribati just now. Less is more. Trying to do too much at once in the DTGs risks doing nothing at all. Focusing initially on a narrow set of issues that are of widespread interest and enjoy broad support will be more productive and serve as a proof of concept for the DTGs. It's also consistent with what we agreed in Annex I, that the DTGs should avoid duplicating the discussions of the plenary and instead be more action-oriented. between the work of the 2 DTGs.

Thank you.

Muchas gracias. Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of Germany, followed by Croatia, Argentina, and Chile.

Thank you very much, Chair. Germany aligns itself with the statement of the European Union and delivers the following remarks in a national capacity. Germany welcomes the appointment of co-facilitators of the dedicated thematic working groups, which we continue to view as the prerogative of the chair. Your working paper on the DTGs provided valuable clarity on the roles and responsibilities of co-facilitators and how you intend to work with them under your leadership. Germany views this week's plenary meeting as an important opportunity to engage with all member states on remaining open modality questions to ensure that the first meeting of the dedicated thematic working groups December can create meaningful, action-oriented, and substantive discussions. We see some open points that require specification, in particular the program of work of the DTGs, their topics, the reporting from the DTGs to the plenary, and the practical arrangements of the stakeholder selection from the pool of experts that you have proposed in your working paper. In our view, DTGs, the plenary meetings, and the Global Roundtable on Capacity building play distinct roles. The plenary will discuss each pillar of the framework separately and provide guidance to the DTGs. DTGs will provide a forum for cross-cutting discussions on specific issues. Thereby, they can generate concrete, actionable recommendations and identify best practices to address these issues using all elements of the framework in a balanced way. We have already mentioned the crucial importance of the participation of stakeholders in this regard earlier today. Having them and their expertise at the discussion at UN level would benefit all of us, not only the organization they happen to be part of or the country they happen to stem from. This would also contribute to enhancing the common understanding of challenges. Germany sees value in thematic cohesion between the meetings of DTG I and DTG II, meaning that they should take the same challenge as a starting point. This challenge should be proposed by the chair and the co-facilitators after consultation with states. 2 topics with numerous delegations echoed over the course of consultations so far were the protection of critical infrastructure as well as addressing ransomware attacks targeted at essential services such as the healthcare sector. Lastly, as regards reporting, Germany believes that the co-facilitators and/or you, Madam Chair, could provide an oral update at the next plenary meeting on discussions that we had at the preceding DTG meeting. Additionally, written action-oriented consensus recommendations could be transmitted in writing to the plenary for consideration, provided that they were agreed by states in the spirit of consensus in the intersessional period between DTG meetings and a plenary meeting. A neutral summary of proceedings report by the Secretariat could also be issued. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of Croatia.

Thank you, Madam Chair, dear colleagues. It is a privilege to address you on behalf of the Republic of Croatia during this first substantive session of the UN Global Mechanism. I would like to first join in expressing my gratitude to you, Madam Chair, and to your team for everything done in the lead-up to this first session of the Global Mechanism. We would like to fully align with the EU statement, especially on the work on the DTGs, but also on the need to ensure the participation of relevant stakeholders in the work of the Global Mechanism. Furthermore, we welcome the appointment of the co-facilitators of the DTGs, with whom we look forward to further engage with. The plenary, the dedicated thematic groups, and intersessional activities should remain coherent and mutually reinforcing transparent, and focused on practical outcomes while avoiding duplication and preserving the ability of all delegations to participate meaningfully. The Republic of Croatia is committed to strengthening the framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, and we are eager to work with you and member states in a constructive and action-oriented manner to achieve concrete and tangible results in implementing, implementing the framework. In this sense, we look forward to fruitful and constructive discussions during the next week. In order to provide guidance to the work of the DTGs in December. Thank you.

Muchas gracias.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to Argentina.

Señora Presidenta. Madam Chair, my delegation wishes to begin by congratulating you for assuming this very important responsibility of presiding over this first substantive session of the Global Mechanism, and we're so aware of how important this moment is. The setting forth of this mechanism is a milestone for the United Nations and will require leadership, capacity for dialogue, and constant efforts to build consensus. In this regard, please allow us to express our conviction that this process is in the right hands, and we wish to reiterate you the fact that my delegation stands fully ready to work constructively with you and alongside other delegations. Madam Chair, we believe that the dedicated thematic groups constitutes one of the most important opportunities that the global mechanism provides in order to make progress from a normative point of view to the practical implementation of the global mechanism on responsible state behavior. We believe that this group can provide particularly important added value through discussions focused on concrete issues and focused on identifying practical solutions. That would strengthen cooperation between states. In our judgment, the success of the thematic groups should not be measured by the amount of documents they produce, but rather by their capacity to contribute to the effective implementation of the consensus already reached. On this, please allow me an opportunity to refer to the agendas of the different groups. We believe that the work of each and every one of these dedicated groups must be horizontal in their nature. So this means that the— it should not be subordinate to the discussions of another dedicated group. We believe that the DTGs have an essentially complementary nature vis-à-vis the plenary, and their role should be to consist in going into depth on the technical analysis of particular thematics and to facilitate the identification of possible courses of action that could subsequently be considered by the plenary, preserving this body as the ultimate and one and the natural environment for making decisions based on census. The outcomes that could come out of the DTGs will be all the more useful when they can contribute to the deliberations between states and facilitate the identification identification of areas of convergence for the consideration of the plenary. Madam Chair, my delegation attaches particular importance to the participation of the technical community in these DTGs. We're convinced that our deliberations will be significantly more fruitful if we have experts from academia, the private sector, and the tech community the Group on Responding to Incidents, Critical Infrastructure, and other institutions with recognized experience in the subjects under review. The experience of those who develop, operate, and protect the digital ecosystem is an essential input for us to be able to make headway towards technically robust and operationally useful solutions. At the same time, we understand that the participation of other interested parties will be strengthened if we continue to develop it on transparent, neutral, and predictable criteria that enable us to consider the technical nature of contributions with adequate geographical diversity and full respect for the intergovernmental nature of the mechanism. When it comes to civil society organizations, we believe that it would be beneficial to use already consolidated institutional accreditation systems within the UN system, and this is already a robust and predictable process. So we would suggest using that. We believe that the credibility of the global mechanism will largely depend on our ability to strike the right balance between openness to specialized technical knowledge, the preservation of the intergovernmental nature of the mechanism, and—

Thank you.

Constant focus on concrete and tangible results for states. We're convinced that these 3 elements are fully compatible with one another and constitute the best guarantee possible for these DTGs to be successful. Finally, Madam Chair, we wish to reiterate our support to your work and the work of your team, and the fact that we stand ready to continue to work with flexibility in a constructive spirit to ensure that this new mechanism can yield concrete results that will strengthen the security and stability of cyberspace. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to Chile, followed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, then Singapore, Belarus, the Netherlands, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and France.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Chile is grateful for the leadership that you've shown organizing this work, and we express our full support to the nomination of the co-facilitators of the DTGs. For us, the— it's inclusive and, um, well-balanced and in line with UN practice, and that's why we will actively support the work that they engage in. In our view, the dedicated thematic groups are one of the most significant institutional inventions of the global mechanisms, and they will contribute to the debates of the plenary, providing spaces to engage in more specialized, in-depth, continuous discussions focused on the implementation of the commitments already acquired. Chile wishes to particularly underscore the creation of DTG2, on capacity building. For us, this is recognition of the strategic importance of this pillar to strengthen the implementation of the Framework for Responsible State Behavior and to be able to respond to the needs and priorities of all states, in particular the priorities and needs of developing states. In this context, we believe that the groups must focus on a practical approach based on the sharing of national experiencing— experiences, identifying common challenges and extending recommendations that can enrich the discussion of the plenary, and implementing effective recommendations for advancing responsible state behavior. We believe that the mandate for these groups contains informal working methods that were designed to facilitate open and substantive exchanges between member states. And for this reason, we believe that their deliberations must prioritize dialogue and the search for consensus without reproducing formal negotiating dynamics or the adoption of decisions by consensus in each step of their work. Furthermore, for us, it's important for each DTG to have a clear and predictable program of work for the biennium drafted through consultations with the states participating in them that's sufficiently flexible to be able to respond to the changes in the ICT sector. On DTG 1, given the breadth of its mandate, we believe that its work could benefit from progressive limits on the themes that will be addressed in each meeting that would facilitate substantive results-focused discussions. They could use guiding questions or specific themes prepared by the co-facilitators for each session on— and this would involve consultations with states. Chile also believes that the participation of technical experts and other stakeholders could bring significant added value to these discussions, strengthening the exchange of specialized knowledge and practical experience. We therefore align ourselves with Colombia's approach to use multilingualism to facilitate the broad participation of experts. Given the cross-cutting nature of so many of the current challenges for Chile, we should promote adequate coordination between the different DTGs, avoiding duplication and focusing on a coherent approach to the implementation of the 5 pillars of the manual. We believe that these groups will be a dynamic space for dialogue, cooperation, and strengthening practical knowledge, significantly contributing to the success of the global mechanism. Thank you very much.

Muchísimas gracias. Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to be followed by Singapore. And Belarus. Democratic Republic of the Congo? Okay, we go with Singapore then.

So thank you, Madam Chair, and your team firstly for all the hard work done. In preparing for this meeting. Allow me at the outset to extend my delegation's appreciation to you for your steadfast leadership and dedication in moving the discussions forward. We welcome your appointment of the co-facilitators and will support their work. Madam Chair, it would be productive for a comprehensive discussion during the DTGs where countries could express a wide range of views on key topics of interest to states expressed during plenary meetings, which could then be reported to the plenary in their totality. This will allow small states to prepare— having focused discussions will allow small states to better prepare, given limited resources for discussions at the DTGs. In our estimation, this would allow the DTGs to best serve their purpose which is to add perspectives and enhance the depth of our discussions at the Plenary. We encourage the co-facilitators to provide a robust and comprehensive report on the DTGs' work to the Plenary. Recalling Para 12 of Annex I in the Final Report of the OEWG, we note that the DTGs would report to the substantive Plenary sessions with updates and recommendations. It reads further that the facilitators of the DTGs will provide updates to the global mechanism at its substantive plenary sessions on the work of their respective DTG. We note that the facilitators of the DTGs, in consultation with States, could also transmit action-oriented draft recommendations for consideration by States. We hope for inclusive discussions where the voices of all States, large and small, are heard and considered. We may not agree on everything, but this should not stop us from listening to each other and making progress on areas we agree on. Madam Chair, we therefore see value in allowing in-depth discussions on selected and focused topics with guiding questions by the Chair on issues of clear relevance and importance to all states, linking to how the Cyber Stability Framework can be strengthened to better help all states meet these issues of concern to all of us. And for these discussions in DTG I to be linked for discussions in DTG II on capacity building To ensure coherence, to better support these discussions, it may be in our interest to invite non-government experts to contribute to our understanding of these issues where needed. Madam Chair, we support the co-facilitators raising the key recommendations issues from DTG discussions in the plenary for further discussions and consensus decisions. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Muchas gracias. Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of Belarus, followed by the Kingdom of the Netherlands and France, who is the last speaker for this segment.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. The delegation of Belarus welcomes the launch of the work of the global mechanism and wishes all delegations and States success in their work. We also wish you success, Madam Chair. You're taking on this work in a very challenging context, which we're seeing from the very outset of our work, and we hope that the outcome of the work of our global mechanism will live up to its name and can become something tangible and concrete for the whole world. The delegation of Belarus fully endorses the approach of the group of like-minded states set out in the joint statement delivered by the delegation of Nicaragua I won't waste time reiterating the argumentation there. I think everyone understands perfectly well what I'm referring to. I will just touch on one point in particular. If we are prepared from the very outset to spend time criticizing states that act in accordance with the rules on some issues while at the same time we allow ourselves to break the rules on other issues, it will be very difficult to expect an overall positive outcome in that context. General Assembly resolutions 79/237 and 80/16 have already set out the fundamental principle for decision-making by our body, and that is consensus. Deviating from that view, from that consensus principle, is in our view something that is not acceptable, neither for states nor for the chair. From your statement, Madam Chair, we understand that you fully appreciate the consequences of your decision on the appointment of the co-facilitators, and your words about accepting responsibility command our sincere respect. It was indeed a challenging situation. An entire group of states distanced itself from the procedure used to appoint coordinators for the DTGs, and we hope that the current situation will not harm our work on the important area of ensuring information security. We also can't say that the situation we're facing is unique. It's just another testament to the profound crisis of multilateralism that our organization is going through. Despite all this, we express our readiness to work constructively with all states, with all exception, in a spirit of mutual respect, dialogue, and consensus. Thank you.

Muchísimas gracias. Y doy ahora— Thank you very much. And I now give the word to the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Thank you, Madam Chair. And the Kingdom of the Netherlands aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union this morning. And please allow me to make some further comments in my national capacity. During the previous open-ended working group, all states in this room worked together to establish a global mechanism capable of delivering practical results. Now, having arrived at this first plenary session of this mechanism, we share a responsibility to ensure it delivers on its promise. For the Kingdom of the Netherlands, this means a smoothly functioning mechanism in which all elements fulfill their role. The plenary should serve as a formal space to take stock of our collective efforts to implement the agreed normative framework, while the DTGs should serve to substantiate the process we collectively seek. The Kingdom of the Netherlands appreciates your efforts to come to a workable solution for the program work. We believe it to be important that the careful balance struck in the Open-Ended Working Group's consensus report remains respected in its entirety. The found compromise reflects this adequately. Allow me to underline 2 elements next to the multistakeholder participation which we discussed earlier. That deserve specific consideration within the mechanism's programme of work to ensure that it can deliver. First, regarding the functioning of the DTGs, the Netherlands' position on how the DTGs are best set up to address cyber threats from a practical angle aligns well with your vision. Concretely, we believe that structuring the DTGs along the lines of concrete and action-oriented work items, including fictional scenarios pertaining to a specific cyber threat or dilemma, will help considerably to make the DDGs more effective. Guiding questions can then prompt states to answer for themselves what responsible state behaviour, in line with the normative framework, looks like within a given context, and can help states structure their suggested recommendations on how to implement the normative framework accordingly. Second, regarding the reporting between the DTGs and the plenary sessions, we believe it's the most effective if co-facilitators report verbally to the plenary on the results of the DTGs. Negotiating language on written recommendations would place a heavy burden on delegation resources. and significantly reduce the time available within the DTGs for substantive work, which especially affects smaller delegations. To ensure co-facilitators reflect the spirit of consensus in their verbal reporting to the plenary, the intersessional period could be used to consult with delegations on the recommendations to be included. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of France.

Thank you, Madam Chair. My delegation aligns itself with the statement made by the EU and would like to add a few remarks in its national capacity. Allow me first of all to thank you, Madam Chair, and your team, as well as the Secretariat, for the work carried out during the intersessional period, including the adoption of an agenda, program of work, and the appointment of 5 co-facilitators for the DTGs. France once again reaffirms its support to you, reflecting the importance my country attaches to the success of the global mechanism in a context of increasing cyber threats. Dear colleagues, during the March session, a majority of states emphasized the need to produce tangible results. Otherwise, the mechanism would not be worthy of the precious diplomatic resources devoted to it. This will require tangible progress in the implementation of the agreed-upon framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. However, this goal cannot be achieved if states and their diplomats become inward-looking and work in isolation. The responses to the challenges we face require the participation of all stakeholders, each of whom holds a part of the solution. In that regard, we— yesterday we watched the final of the World Cup, and We would like to congratulate our Spanish colleagues on their victory, because like in football, cyber diplomacy is a team sport, and non-state stakeholders also have a role to play if we want the mechanism to be relevant. I would even go so far that including them will enable states to retain the central role that they currently play; otherwise, they will be marginalized. As Italy recalled, the time for procedural discussions is now behind us. That is why I would like to present the 3 main priorities for France for the coming year. We need to make progress in implementing the regulatory framework, building on in-depth work and the expertise of specialists within the 2 thematic groups. In this regard, Madam Chair, I commend the paper you circulated on this topic. Second, we must continue our work on the application of existing international law to cyberspace. France reaffirms its historic commitment to existing international law and in particular to the UN Charter. My delegation regrets that those promoting an alternative treaty are also the first to violate this foundational text. Third, we must continue our efforts to keep pace with the technological advancements we are witnessing. And this, of course, includes artificial intelligence. Yet the rhythm of diplomacy cannot always match the speed of technological progress, but this should not prevent us from collectively improving our understanding of challenges and opportunities that AI presents in cyberspace. We must also fully assess the consequences of significant disparities in capabilities between states and how this impacts international security and stability. I thank you.

Thank you very much. We have heard the last delegation that has requested to take the floor under this item. I reiterate my gratitude to all of you on your statements on this topic and your vision on how we can organize the work of the dedicated thematic groups. We— I will continue working with delegations during the intersessional period, during the program and other organizational aspects of the work of the DTGs. You can rest assured that I will continue dedicating active efforts to this matter, and I will organize consultations in coordination with the co-facilitators to that end. Now that we have concluded our organization of work, we may proceed to the We will now move to the substantive discussions under Agenda Item 5, as contained in Document A/AC.304/2026/CRP.2. We will begin with the topic, Existing and Potential Threats Arising from the Use of Information and Communications Technologies in the Context of International security. I look forward to a very robust exchange. As previously indicated, there is no pre-established list of speakers. Delegations may request the floor by pressing the button. And if you could please indicate right now all delegations that are interested in making statements so that together with the Secretariat, we can be clear on the amount of time that will be necessary to dedicate to this agenda item. While there is no pre-established time limit for statements, I would be enormously grateful if you could consider delivering a shorter version of your statement and sending in the full text of your statements to e-statements as well as our chair's team. This will allow us to ensure that all delegations can be heard given that we have limited resources. For the reference of all delegations, further on the Secretariat will project a countdown clock or a clock on the screen. This will make it easier for you to refer to exercise the necessary discipline in that regard. Thank you for already having indicated your interest in speaking. We already have a rather lengthy list of speakers. I will read the first 3: Tonga, Nigeria, and the European Union.

Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you, Chair. I have the honor to deliver this statement on behalf of the members of the Pacific Islands Forum with a presence at the United Nations, namely Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and my own country, Tonga. Chair, our region continues to be affected by malicious activity in the use of ICTs. Ransomware remains a severe and growing concern for Pacific states, as do threats to critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure. The protection of critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure is a core priority for the Pacific, and one we would encourage this mechanism and Dedicated Thematic Group 1 in particular to take up as an early focus topic. Many of our essential services from health to finance to government administration, now depend on a small number of systems whose disruption would be felt immediately and across the whole of society. The integrity of our undersea cable infrastructure, vital to our economic and social resilience, and in many cases our only link to the global internet, is increasingly at risk from both natural hazards, man-made disasters, and malicious activity. For the Pacific, this is not an abstract vulnerability, but a lifeline. We also see AI-related cybersecurity threats as another potential area for practical discussion as part of the threats pillar of this work. AI may increase the speed, scale, and accessibility of malicious cyber activity, including through more convincing social engineering, automated vulnerability discovery, disinformation, and the abuse of AI-enabled tools by criminal and other malicious actors. When it comes to the DTGs, We think discussions should focus on practical outputs. In DTG I, these could include accessible threat briefings, shared risk typologies, lessons from national and regional incidents, or best practice guidance. We also see value in clearly connecting these discussions with exchanges on cyber capacity building, including in DTG II, so that identifying threats is directly linked to support for mitigation, preparedness, and response. We do not need a global mechanism to simply restate that threats are growing. We need it to help states understand how those threats affect them, what practical steps can reduce risk, and how international cooperation can support national and regional resilience. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much to the distinguished representative of Tonga. Thank you for that statement on behalf of the Pacific Island Forum. I now give the floor to the representative of Nigeria, speaking on behalf of the African Group.

Madam Chair, I'm delivering the statements in our national capacity, not on the group, not on the— not representing African Union. The question— statement.

Go ahead.

Very well, go ahead.

I'd like to commend your sterling leadership in guiding our discussions towards practical and forward-looking outcomes. You may count on Nigeria's continued commitment to working constructively with all member states to promote an open secure, stable, accessible, peaceful, and interpretable ICT environment. The rapid advancement of technological has transformed societies, accelerated economic growth, and expanded opportunities for innovation and sustainable development. Yet these same technologies has also created an increasingly complex cyber threat landscape. Malicious cyber activities are growing in scale, sophistication, and impact, undermining national security, economic stability, public trust, and well-being of individuals. Nigeria continues to confront a broad spectrum of civil— of cyber threats, including ransomware, malware, phishing, business email compromise, supply chain attacks, data breaches, attacks on cloud infrastructure, critical information infrastructure, and Internet of Things systems. The malicious use of artificial intelligence has further amplified further risks through deepfakes, synthetic media, identity theft, online fraud, disinformation, and other forms of cyber-enabled crime. These threats increasingly target critical sectors such as finance, energy, telecommunications, transportation, healthcare, electoral systems, and other essential public services, with significant economic and social consequences. In response, the Government of Nigeria has placed cybersecurity at the center of its national security and digital transformation agenda. Through the implementation of the National Security Policy and Strategy, Nigeria has designated certain sectors as national critical information infrastructure and continues to strengthen its protection through risk-based and all-of-government approaches. The National Cybersecurity Coordination Center leads national efforts to enhance cyber resilience by coordinating threat monitoring, incident response, cyber threat intelligence, vulnerability assessment, and digital forensic capabilities, cyber exercises, and capacity building programs. Nigeria has also strengthened its legal and institutional framework through Cyber Crimes and Cyber Crimes and Prevention Acts, while deepening partnership with the private sector, academia, regional organizations, and international partners to improve preparedness against both existing and emerging threats. Recognizing that cyber threat knows no border, Nigeria remains committed to strengthening national and international cooperation, particularly within the ECOWAS and the African Union, through information sharing, confidence-building measures, capacity building, and closer collaboration among computer emergency response teams. We believe that timely exchange of technical information best practices, and threat intelligence is indispensable to building collective cyber resilience. Nigeria also supports scenario-based discussion under the dedicated thematic groups of this global mechanism. Such practical exchanges enhance our collective understanding of evolving threats, strengthen preparedness, and contribute to the effective implementation of the UN Framework for Responsible State Behavior the cyberspace. Madam Chair, the effectiveness of this global mechanism will ultimately be measured by its ability to strengthen national capacities, foster practical cooperation, and improve our collective resilience against an evolving cyber threat landscape. Nigeria remains committed to working with all member states and stakeholders to ensure that cyberspace remains secure, stable, peaceful, and conducive to sustainable development for the benefit of present and future generations. I thank you.

Muchísimas gracias.

Thank you very much. I'm now going to read the next few delegations on our list of speakers who have requested the floor. We have the European Union, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Costa Rica, Mexico, South Africa, and Algeria.

Thank you, Chair. Colleagues, it's my honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the EU and its member states. The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Georgia, and the EFTA country Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as San Marino, aligned themselves with this statement. The start of our discussions under the UNGGEs and the open-ended working groups has always been, and should also continue to be, under the global mechanism to enhance our common understanding of the cyber threat landscape. Understanding cyber threats and challenges allows us to exchange upon the best practices to tackle them and can help us to identify also the topics that we need to address in more detail as a matter of priority during our work in the dedicated thematic groups. The continued proliferation of new threats in the cyber domain, paired with a more hostile geopolitical context, continue to be of concern to the EU and its member states. To enhance our collective resilience against such threats, discussions like today remain ever more relevant. Developments in the threat landscape are manifold. Malicious actors continue to target our government services, our critical infrastructure such as hospitals, financial institutions, and energy grids. We see cyber tools being used as fully integrated instruments of war, even being used against international humanitarian organizations. And we see how new AI models are used to exploit zero-days, vulnerabilities, nearly instantly upon their discovery. Cyber threats continue to target our societies, economies, and democracies, having a profound effect, causing disruptions in essential services and directly affecting our citizens. Particularly, for instance, the healthcare sector has become a prime target for ransomware actors due to the vast amount of sensitive data it holds and the criticality of its operations. Discussing this issue could be one of the topics to be discussed under the DTGs in December. The EU would, for instance, be keen to share its experiences gained through the implementation of its action plan to protect the healthcare sector from cyberattacks. We could share our experiences on enhancing cyber threat detection, reinforce crisis preparedness, and fostering closer coordination. Furthermore, we are increasingly seeing non-state actors supporting their— the conduct of malicious cyber activities. Non-state actors that are tolerated by, linked to, or controlled by a state that function and are leveraged as highly effective and deniable proxies. The tolerance or even the incentivization of such actors increases the threat of attacks against third parties, as well as the risk of uncontrolled spillover effects globally. This evolving threat represents a maturation of the proxy model. Where a state keeps its distance in order to claim plausible deniability and thus avoid complying with the obligations arising from its responsibility. And it's a concerning trend that we should not allow to develop further. Actively using or encouraging proxies is irresponsible behavior, contrary to the UN norms of responsible state behavior to not allow your territory to be used for malicious cyber activities and to not target the critical infrastructure of others. It is important that states take responsibility and are held to account for their deliberate activities, including if they are using proxies to execute, execute them in line with the law of state responsibility. Therefore, last week, the EU and its member states alongside the United Kingdom exposed and condemned the misuse by Russia of an ecosystem of Russian actors, including a government agency private sector, hacktivists, and criminals to target the EU, its member states, and its partners consistently through cyberattacks. Its security services are using private companies and individuals to conduct malicious activities for them. They contract such companies and individuals to secure technical infrastructure, vulnerability research, malware development, development, specific hardware, and any other relevant enabling activities that allow to target us. The EU has therefore imposed sanctions on those individuals and entities that support Russia in their malicious behaviour. And it is for this reason also that Estonia, supported by the EU and all member states, objected to the stakeholder JSC Positive Technologies, who we already knew was supporting Russian cyber operations. Behaviour that again contradicts the ambition of this global mechanism. I refer to further details to the letter published by Estonia giving transparency to the objection.

Provided.

The EU member states see a need to ensure international security and stability by raising awareness on the most pertinent threats. The trends of malicious behavior that pose risk to the security and stability of us all should be known, so we are able to uphold responsible state behavior and exchange on the best practices to prevent, mitigate, and respond to these type of threats. To this end, we will continue to raise awareness about cyber threats. Threats, including through threat advisories such as by our cybersecurity agency ENISA and our CERT for the institutions, agencies, and bodies, CERT-EU. We will raise attention on particular advanced persistent threats that continue to conduct malicious cyber activities against our businesses, our citizens, and our governments, and likely target also other governments around the world. We will continue also to cooperate with partners. To promote an open, free, stable, and secure cyberspace, and also support states in the understanding and their response to cyber threats. The DDGs could support this work, allowing us to formulate concrete recommendations as to how to enhance national resilience and how to enforce responsible state behavior by advancing the implementation of the framework. We look forward to this work.

Thank you very much. For all of the delegations who have requested the floor, if you would like to take the floor on behalf of a group of states, then please approach the Secretariat for the necessary arrangements to be made. I am informed that Nigeria wishes to take the floor again, this time on behalf of the African Group. I therefore give Nigeria the floor right now for that statement, and I'll also read the list as it stands right now. However, I would be grateful if you could all express your interest to take the floor if you're going to, and just like I said, please say if you will be speaking on behalf of a group of states for the rules. So Nigeria, please, on behalf of the African Group.

Thank you, Madam Chair. At the onset, the group warmly congratulates you, Madam Chair, on your leadership of the first biannual meeting. The group encourages the indicative program of work circulated by Your Excellency. The African group commends the nomination of Egypt, Malaysia, Netherlands, and Australia as co-facilitators of dedicated thematic who will serve in their individual expert capacities and under the chair's overall guidance in strict observance of neutrality, impartiality, and inclusivity, and look forward to their work benefiting all delegations. The group highlights that the mechanism must remain state-led. Single-track, and conscious base, with consensus serving as a driver of progress rather than an obstacle to it. Madam Chair, Africa's engagement in this first substantive plenary will focus on 3 mutually reinforcing priorities. One, strengthening implementation through capacity building and operational cooperation. 2, leveraging regional and continental framework as implementation pathways. And 3, understanding the evolving ICT threat landscape presented by emerging technologies and possible cooperative measures to address them. Let me stress on the first one, strengthening implementation through capacity building and operational cooperation. Capacity building is a strategic, cross-cutting priority requiring sustainable, need-based support, particularly for developing countries. In this regard, the African Group considers DDG 2 a key platform for advancing practical cooperation, confidence-building measures, and capacity building. DDG 2 should be allocated adequate time that will effectively contribute to concrete and measurable outcomes that will include early operationalization of the Global ICT Security Cooperation and Capacity Building Portal, the Point of Contact Directory, Cyber Exercise Stronger National Sets, a United Nations Voluntary Fund for ICT Security Capacity Building designed to ensure efficiency, transparency and equitable access, and a United Nations ICT Security Fellowship Program. Encouraging voluntary reporting on the implementation of voluntary norm-binding norms of responsible state behavior in the use of ICT, recognizing that it is the prerogative of member states to structure their implementation efforts in accordance with national policy and capacities. Strengthening regional and continental framework as implementation pathways. The group considers regional and continental framework to be essential foundation for translating global commitment into practical implementation. In this regard, Africa's existing instruments, including the Malabo Convention, and the common African position on the application of international law in cyberspace provides solid base— solid basis for the continent's contribution to the global framework. To this end, the African Union is at an advanced stage of validating the AU guidelines for the implementation of norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace and the Declaration on Peace peace and security in cyberspace. These instruments will provide practical guidance to member states on implementing the UN Framework for Responsible State Behavior while reflecting African peace and security priorities. The group supports the continued use and further development of voluntary checklists of practical action as a practical tool to assist member states in implementing the agreed norms while recognizing that national approaches should remain flexible and adapted to national circumstances and priorities. On understanding the evolving ICT threat landscape presented by emerging technologies and possible cooperative measures to address them, the group remained deeply concerned by the growing scale and sophistication of cyber threat targeting critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure. These include ransomware attack, vulnerability in supply chains, threat to undersea cables and electoral processes, the spread of disinformation and misinformation, and the malicious use of artificial intelligence, all of which have a disproportionate impact on developing countries. On this, the DTG1 should advance focused discussions on critical infrastructure protection, evolving threats, responsible approaches to emerging technologies, norm implementation, and practical cooperation among member states. The African Group reaffirmed that international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, applies fully to the use of ICT and remain fundamental to maintaining international peace, security, and stability. Consistent with the common African position, the African Group underscores the principle of sovereignty, due diligence, and non-intervention, as well as the applicability of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Madam Chair, the group recognizes the valuable contribution of relevant stakeholders, including civil society, academia, and the private sector, whose expertise complements the intergovernmental and state-led nature of the mechanism. We encourage the Chair to continue consultation toward a pragmatic resolution of the outstanding participation issues. For the African Group, the global mechanism must become a platform that delivers practical outcomes, strengthen global cooperation, support implementation, and enable all member states to safely, securely, and meaningfully benefit from digital technologies. The Group Therefore, look forward to the intersectoral consultation and the first DTG meeting in December 2026. On this note, I thank you, Madam Chair, and I thank you all.

Muchas gracias. Doy ahora la palabra.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to Portugal, followed by Saudi Arabia.

Madam Chair, we align with the intervention of the European Union, but would like to complement it. With an overview of our national threat landscape. Portugal continues to observe a marked intensification and diversification of malicious cyber activity directed at its national cyberspace. These activities span the full spectrum of threat actors, from sophisticated state and state-sponsored operations to increasingly professionalized non-state criminal enterprises and loosely organized collectives of younger, digitally native offenders. Critical infrastructure operators, namely in the energy, transport, financial, health, and telecommunication sectors, as well as public administration networks and other sensitive systems, have all registered a sustained increase in reconnaissance, intrusion attempts, and disruptive or destructive incidents. This convergence of threat vectors represents a growing risk not only to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of national networks, but by extension to the continuity of essential services and the trust of citizens in the digital domain. Portugal would like to take this opportunity to note with concern the persistence and evolution of malicious cyber activity Attributable to state actors and to networks operating under their direction, sponsorship, or tolerance. This activity is conducted through an ecosystem of proxy actors, criminal affiliates, and self-styled activist collectives that operate with the acquiescence, encouragement, or direct support of governments. As the EU and its member states have acknowledged. Once again last week. Portugal also draws the attention to a distinct pattern of state-linked activity conducted by other actors, oriented principally towards the large-scale and systematic collection of private and commercially sensitive data, including personal data of citizens, intellectual property, and strategic technological know-how. This activity is frequently associated with efforts to advance geopolitical and economical objectives, including the shaping of technical standards, supply chains, and digital dependencies in a manner favorable to the interests of the sponsoring state. Such conduct raises serious concerns about the compliance to the norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace repeatedly endorsed by the UN General Assembly In particular those relating to the protection of critical infrastructure and the due regard owed to the sovereignty and economic interests of other States. A further pattern of concern involves the use by certain States of offensive and intrusive cyber capabilities to monitor, harass and repress dissidents and diaspora communities present within or connected to Portuguese territory. Portugal considers such practices to be fundamentally incompatible with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the digital environment, and calls upon all states to refrain from the extraterritorial use of cyber tools for purposes of transnational repression. Beyond the state dimension, Portugal's national cyberspace, together with that of numerous partner states, is increasingly affected by 2 distinct categories of non-state threat actors. The first category comprises organized criminal networks operating from jurisdictions that function, whether by design or by omission, as areas of relative impunity. These networks have professionalized their operations to an industrial scale, running ransom as a service— ransomware as a service enterprises and large-scale scam and fraud hubs that target victims across Portugal and across the wider international community, including through so-called pig butchering and investment fraud schemes, business email compromise, and extortion campaigns directed at hospitals, municipalities, and small and medium enterprises. The transnational and highly monetized nature of this criminal economy demands reinforced international judicial and law enforcement cooperation, robust mutual legal assistance mechanisms, and sustained pressure on jurisdictions that host or tolerate such infrastructure. The second category of growing concern to my government consists of loosely structured transnational collectives composed predominantly of minors and young adults whose activity blurs the line between the digital and physical domains. These groups engage in intrusion, extortion, swatting, and coordinated harassment campaigns, often motivated less by financial gain than by the pursuit of online notoriety and media exposure. Their operations have, on occasion, escalated into real-world harm, including through the incitement of physical violence or intimidation against targeted individuals. Portugal considers that this phenomenon requires a response that combines criminal justice measures with preventive, educational, and safeguarding approaches in view of the age profile of many of those involved. Taken together, the cumulative effect of these state and non-state threats is a heightened risk of service disruption. Data compromise, and erosion of public trust in digital systems that underpin daily life and economic activity. Portugal underscores that the protection of critical infrastructure, as recognized in the Norms of Responsible State Behavior, is not merely a national imperative but a shared international interest, given the interconnected and borderless nature of cyberspace. In light of the foregoing, Portugal reaffirms its full commitment to the framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, including the applicability of international law, the voluntary norms endorsed by the General Assembly, and the confidence-building measures developed within these and other relevant fora. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you very much. I give the floor now to Saudi Arabia, followed by Costa Rica and Mexico.

Chair, at the outset, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as we begin the first substantive session of the Global Mechanism, wishes to congratulate you and the Republic of Salvador upon your assumption of the chairmanship of the Global Mechanism. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are confident that your chairmanship will steer our work towards success and further cooperation and consensus amongst member states. We wish to also congratulate the co-facilitators of the DTGs, and we wish them every success in discharging their duties. To achieve the desired progress within the global mechanism. Chair, while cybersecurity remains one of the most important pillars of the maintenance of international peace and security, our world today faces a mounting challenge, namely a lack of experts in cybersecurity. This demonstrates the need for capacity building at all levels. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia last October, during the Global Cybersecurity Forum in 2025, launched the Global Initiative for Capacity Building in Cyberspace with the United Nations and its specialized agencies. In order to support international efforts for capacity building and ensuring cyber readiness at the global level. His Excellency, Secretary-General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, in his statement during the GCF in 2025 and upon the launching of the initiative, reiterated the importance of collective action to ensure that cyberspace remains a global public good through further investments in human capacities, upskilling, and inclusivity. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in order to implement this initiative, launched the capacity-building program for representatives of member states participating in the global mechanism in partnership between the GCF and the UNODA. The launching of this initiative demonstrated the commitment of the Kingdom to promoting international cooperation in cybersecurity and ensuring capacity building to contribute to to a safe and secure cyberspace, one that enables growth and prosperity for all peoples of the world. This program includes a full cycle that ensures capacity building, one that was designed to support the representatives of member states during their participation in the global mechanism and before this participation as an important platform at the United Nations to strengthen collaboration on ICT in the context of international security. And this program was a continuation of a series of capacity-building initiatives launched by the GCF to contribute to resilience and stability in the cyberspace space. The various programs launched by the GCF have benefited more— or the experts, or the cybersecurity experts of more than 80 states. Madam Chair, as we kickstart the work of the first substantive session of the Global Mechanism, we reiterate our readiness to cooperate with member States to find an inclusive mechanism, one that ensures a consensus and one that furthers international cooperation for a more resilient cyberspace for the benefit of all of humanity. I thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you. I now give the floor to Costa Rica.

Madam Chair, As this is the first time we take the floor, Costa Rica would like to congratulate you on your election, and we commend the intense, committed work that you and your team have carried out in preparing and convening this first substantive meeting of the Global Mechanism on ICTs in the Context of International Security. This new space will allow us to build on the knowledge accumulated in previous working groups to respond with greater clarity, inclusivity, and practicality to the evolving nature of threats in cyberspace. For Costa Rica, cyber threats are not abstract. Our own experience with the 2022 cyber attacks demonstrated that ransomware and other malicious operations can impact state functions, public services, institutional continuity, and public trust. Assets such as hospitals, financial, energy, water, telecommunications, transport, and education systems, emergency services, state digital platforms, and public databases are indispensable components of human well-being and the democratic functioning of our societies. Third, threat analysis must always incorporate a human dimension and consider the differentiated nature of harm caused. Women and girls, the elderly, persons with disabilities, migrants and refugees, journalists, human rights defenders, and other groups may face specific risks such as undue surveillance, digital harassment, fraud, information manipulation, or exclusion from digital services. Finally, Costa Rica considers it important to address emerging and systemic threats. Such as attacks on ICT supply chains, the growing use of artificial intelligence in criminal activities, and the actions of transnational criminal actors. These challenges require international cooperation, responsible disclosure regarding capabilities and vulnerabilities, and the exchange of information and technical assistance to effectively build capacity. Madam Chair, Costa Rica hopes that this global mechanism will be an inclusive, technical, and action-oriented forum. The identification of threats must translate into practical cooperation, greater resilience, and the effective protection of people, essential services, and through that, public trust. Thank you.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of Mexico, followed by South Africa, Algeria, Türkiye, and Italy.

Muchas gracias.

Thank you very much, Chair. Mexico recognizes that the threat landscape is evolving rapidly and identifies as a priority ransomware directed against critical infrastructure and essential services. Risks to ICT supply chain— chains and the activity of organized criminal groups that employ increasingly sophisticated techniques, tactics, and methods. When it comes to artificial intelligence, the concerns are not limited to its malicious use. They include risks associated with the life cycle of AI systems themselves. These include model security, data integrity, the IA supply chain, and incident response capacities insofar as artificial intelligence is becoming a cross-cutting layer on which critical infrastructure depends. Mexico also underscores the cybernetic dimension of major international events. The recently concluded 2026 FIFA World Cup is an example of the importance of close coordination between Mexico, Canada, and the United States to protect critical infrastructure during large-scale events. That experience constitutes a valuable experience of sub-regional cooperation, exchange of information, and joint preparation that could contribute to strengthen Mexico underscores the human and social impact of cyber incidents, particularly those directed against critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure on which essential services depend. Attacks on hospitals and healthcare services illustrate how cybernetic operations go beyond merely technical damage and directly affect people. This reinforces the relevance of evaluating threats from a civilian protection perspective. We must also recognize the gender dimensions of this issue. Digital violence and its various forms disproportionately affect women and girls and can limit their participation in public, economic, and social life. These consequences must be reflected both in the analysis of threats as well as in public policy responses through information and disaggregated data that will enable the design of more effective responses. Finally, Mexico favors linking the identification of threats to a comprehensive and cross-cutting approach that takes into account the 5 pillars of responsible behavior. Thank you.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to South Africa, followed by Algeria and Türkiye.

Chairperson, South Africa aligns with the statement delivered by Nigeria on behalf of the African Group. South Africa would like to join others in expressing its appreciation to you Your team and the Secretariat for the preparations leading up to the convening of this inaugural substantive session of the Global Mechanism. You have our full support and commitment to continuing the achievement of consensus in moving this process forward. Regarding the participation of other stakeholders, South Africa supports the proposal for the Chair to maintain engagement and urge for the speedy resolution of this issue to enable the global mechanism to focus on its core mandate given the limited time available. With only 4 substantive plenary sessions and dedicated thematic groups meetings before the review conference, we must swiftly and smoothly transition into substantive discussions. The Global Mechanism, with a universal membership and operating on the basis of consensus, is well equipped to analyze the evolving cyber threat landscape and formulate cooperative measures to address it. We underscore the importance of the Global Mechanism and the DTGs building upon the achievements of the previous 2 OEWGs and GGEs in order to advance towards the establishment of an open, safe, secure, stable, accessible, peaceful, and interoperable ICT environment. We must be concerned about the significant increase in recent years in the frequency and devastating impact of cyberattacks on critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure. Technological innovations, particularly in AI, have dramatically increased the scale, frequency, and sophistication of cyberattacks, posing a significant threat to national development agendas. We are confronted with a plethora of AI-driven threats: ransomware, phishing, distributed denial-of-service attacks, the theft of personal credentials, extortion, misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation. These incidents are eroding trust and confidence in the use of ICTs. Chair, in this regard, my delegation proposes the inclusion of these threats in the priorities for the meeting of DTG1 in December, in order to collectively identify collaborative measures to address them. As emerging technologies amplify systems' exposure to exploitable vulnerabilities, their secure deployment is crucial to prevent further digital divides and ensure that AI-driven growth benefits everyone. The same AI technologies that empower attackers also offer defenders powerful tools to strengthen their cybersecurity defense strategies. It will be equally important to identify practical ways to address these challenges through capacity building. This, in our view, should be the DTG's preoccupation. My delegation believes that this new process presents an opportunity to consolidate our efforts, building on the previous processes to achieve significant and meaningful progress in the years ahead. I thank you, Chair.

Muchísimas gracias. Thank you very much. I wish to indicate the following. We have We have 1 hour and 15 minutes remaining in the meeting today, and we currently have 40 delegations that have requested the floor just under this agenda item. This means that we will certainly not conclude with the list of speakers today.

Thank you.

And this will also delay us when it comes to the consideration of other agenda items. And it is important that you recall that we need to finalize by 6:00 PM today, but also throughout the whole plenary session needs to be finished by 1:00 PM on Friday. You're all aware of the limitations the UN is currently under right now. Therefore, I appeal to you for your cooperation so that we can— if you could possibly reduce your statements and deliver them more succinctly. And as I also indicated at the beginning, there are various tools that you all have available That will allow you to share your positions in greater detail. Therefore, please, from the very beginning, do take this into consideration so that all of those who have requested the floor will be able to make their statements. Now, as you can see, we have the clock on the screen. Again, it is indicative. It can help you because we know sometimes that when the microphone is blinking, it's difficult to see it when one is speaking, and that is the entire purpose of having the clock on the screen. Thank you very much. And I now give the floor to Algeria, followed by Turkey, Italy, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Colombia, and Estonia. Algeria, you have the floor.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Algeria welcomes the convening of the first substantive session of the Global Mechanism on ICT Security and congratulates you on your election as Chair of its first biennial cycle. The establishment of the Global Mechanism represents a significant achievement for multilateral diplomacy. It provides an inclusive action-oriented and permanent forum for dialogue and cooperation on security, often in the use of ICTs, under United Nations auspices, at a time when this field has become central to international cooperation, international peace and security, and sustainable development. Madam Chair, cyber threats are not abstract risks. They affect public institutions, essential services, social cohesion, and the trust among states upon which peaceful international relations depends. Building on the cumulative and evolving framework developed through more than 3 decades of UN discussions, and reaffirmed in the final report of the OEWG, Algeria underlines that existing and emerging threats in cyberspace continue to intensify. And evolve in scale, sophistication, and impact. Against this backdrop, I would like to highlight the following points. First, Algeria stresses that attacks against critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure, ransomware, supply chain compromises, ICT-enabled disinformation and propaganda campaigns, and the malicious use of intrusion capabilities remain among the most threats. Within this broader threat landscape, the proliferation and misuse of spyware and intrusive cyber capabilities represent a particularly serious concern. Recent investigations by credible international media and human rights organizations have provided evidence that such tools have been systematically abused to target state officials, diplomats, journalists, lawyers, human rights defenders, and civil society actors. Such unlawful conduct constitutes a serious violation of fundamental human rights, international law, state sovereignty, diplomatic inviolability, and the well-established principle of non-interference in internal affairs and good neighborliness, with direct consequences for regional stability and international peace and security. Algeria therefore stresses that this threat should be explicitly included in the reports of the global mechanism, accompanied by clear recommendations for stronger international norms and effective accountability mechanisms. Second, the current cyber threats landscape is being amplified by the rapid evolution of emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence. AI offers significant opportunities, but also serious risk and is becoming increasingly connected to cybersecurity. It can strengthen cyber defense by improving detection, threat analysis, and incident response. However, without appropriate safeguards, it can also be misused to identify vulnerabilities, automate attacks, enhance malware, scale disinformation campaigns, and conduct cyber operations beyond existing existing defensive capacities. Third, this evolution raises particular concerns for developing countries. If advanced AI-enabled cyber capabilities remain concentrated in the hands of few actors, while many countries lack the infrastructure, expertise, and access to secure technologies needed to detect, defend against, or respond to malicious ICT activities, the digital divide risk becoming a security divide, thereby undermining sovereignty, resilience, and collective stability. In conclusion, Madam Chair, as emerging technologies continue to develop at a pace that exceeds the capacity of our existing governance framework to adapt and respond, the challenge before us is whether we can collectively, within this global mechanism, keep our discussion focused on the most pressing issues and translate them into concrete and coordinated actions that strengthen international cooperation, preserve the sovereignty of states, and protect regional stability and international peace and security.

Thank you. Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of Türkiye.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Türkiye wishes to underline the growing threat posed to critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure, including energy, finance, health, transport, telecommunications, and undersea cable systems, as well as the increasing frequency of ransomware attacks, supply chain compromises, and attacks targeting national computer emergency response teams. Türkiye wishes to highlight the evolving security implications of emerging technologies, including advanced AI models, quantum computing, and proliferation of insecure connected devices. These developments have the potential to significantly alter the cyber threat landscape and may warrant consideration as standing items under this pillar. In particular, the deployment of advanced general-purpose AI models raises specific concerns from an international security perspective. The capabilities of such models in areas such as code generation, vulnerability discovery, automation, and large-scale social engineering may increase the speed, scale, sophistication, and effectiveness of malicious cyber operations. A key concern is the widespread availability of such capabilities may lower the barrier for entry for less resourced actors, including criminal networks and terrorist organizations. Capabilities that were previously accessible through only a limited number of highly capable actors may now become increasingly available, creating risks that extend beyond individual incidents and potentially affecting international peace and security. In this context, within the Mechanism's mandate and while avoiding duplication of existing UN processes, Türkiye proposes to the Mechanism to consider exploring the following approaches: Share risk assessments concerning AI-enabled ICT threats. Second, voluntary norms and safeguards for the responsible development and deployment of high-capacity AI models. Third, responsible access consideration for the most sensitive capabilities. Fourth, structured information sharing on AI-enabled incidents. And fifth, enhanced coherence with international efforts on AI governance. Türkiye believes that any such measures should remain balanced, technology-neutral, and designed in a manner that preserves the legitimate and beneficial civilian uses of emerging technologies while addressing potential security risks. I thank you.

Muchísimas gracias. Doy ahora la palabra. Thank you very much, and I'll give the floor to

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Italy fully aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union and wishes to add a few, uh, slightly shorter, as per your request, considerations from its national perspective, also benefiting from contributions of the 4 stakeholders objected by the Russian Federation. Italy follows with great attention and concern the developments in cyberspace as regards existing and potential threats. In fact, not only do we witness an increasing number and sophistication of malicious cyber activities, but the latter are also part of broader hybrid campaigns aimed at destabilizing our national, political, economic, and social life. Indeed, the cyber threat landscape continues to evolve in both scale and complexity, with malicious cyber activities increasingly targeting critical infrastructure, public services, democratic institutions, and digital supply chains. Italy has seen last year an increase of cyber events by 38% and incidents targeting the public sector by 68%. And in the public sector, 75% of attacks were directed towards local and central administrations. Ransomware remains one of the most impactful cyber threats, and attacks by ransomware actors mainly affects small manufacturing companies with limited capacity, often causing prolonged service disruption. At the same time, rapid advances in artificial intelligence are reshaping the threat environment. AI is taking cybersecurity risks and threats to the next levels. AI-powered attacks are speeding up. Defense mechanisms struggle to keep up. AI discovers vulnerabilities and generates exploits at a pace that is incompatible with traditional cyber response. We need a new way of working, and also we need a new way of co-working vis-à-vis these threats. In parallel, the prospective impact of quantum computing also requires governments and organizations to begin a timely transition towards post-quantum cryptography to safeguard long-term confidentiality and integrity of sensitive information. Addressing these evolving challenges requires stronger cyber resilience, secure-by-design approaches, but also enhanced cooperation among governments, industry, academia, and the experts community. In fact, cyber incidents can simultaneously affect government bodies, critical infrastructure, private companies. No single affected party has complete visibility of the threat landscape. And more so with artificial intelligence. Hence, cyber resilience depends less on the strength of individual organizations and more on the ability of institutions and companies to act as a coordinated ecosystem. We have practices that we can share from Italy, including our experience coordinating with various national administrations through our cybersecurity cell, Our public-private partnership model, which allows us to pool information and resources to counter malicious cyber activities to the benefit of shielding not only critical infrastructure but also SMEs who represent the backbone of our national ecosystem. And also, we are updating our national cybersecurity strategy so that our country can be equipped even better from an organizational and technical point of view leveraging a whole-of-society approach to prepare society for future challenges. We'll be happy to share that. And to conclude, Italy would like to highlight the importance of concrete exchanges we can have in DTG1 to deepen the understanding of specific threats, benefiting from the contribution of technical experts and other stakeholders. I would like to mention in particular the topic— the topics of ransomware, the nexus between AI and cybersecurity, and the role of non-state actors in malicious cyber activities, and cyber resilient digital transformation as possible topics for discussion. We stand ready to provide contribution through governmental bodies as well as through relevant stakeholders. Thanks a lot.

Muchísimas gracias. Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of Kazakhstan, followed by Colombia.

Thank you, Chair, for giving the floor. At the outset, Kazakhstan would like to thank you, your team, and the Secretariat for the dedicated efforts and work throughout the process. We advocate maintaining the consensual nature of the global mechanism's work and convinced that its activities should remain action-oriented and address all 5 main pillars of the OEWG. As noted earlier, the implementation of the Global Agenda must take into account the needs and priorities of different regions. For Central Asia, and as a landlocked country, the key areas are strengthening the national and regional capacities, developing human resources, as well as increasing the resilience of critical infrastructure. Today, states face a growing range of cyber threats, which include data breaches, ransomware, DDoS attacks, online fraud, misinformation, risks associated with the rapid development of AI, supply chain threats, and the shortage of qualified cyber professionals. As technologies evolve and threats become more complex, legal and policy frameworks must keep pace, including the cloud technologies. They are intended not to limit innovation but to ensure that technological progress contributes to sustainable development. On that, following the outcomes of the national referendum March this year, Kazakhstan's new constitution highlights the right to protection of personal data, including in the digital environment. In addition, the digital code and the law on AI adopted, and the law on cybersecurity has been updated within the principles of the privacy by design and the security by default. The low level of cyber hygiene remains one of the main factors contributing to the occurrence of the cyber incidents. In this regard, Kazakhstan has amended the labor code, establishing the responsibilities of employers to promote the cyber culture and ensure the compliance with these cybersecurity requirements within organization. As cyber threats continue to evolve, Our focus should extend beyond responding to threats. Greater emphasis should be placed on the prevention and the capacity building as essential pillars of effective international cooperation and mutual trust, including the work of the Global POC Directory. On that, Kazakhstan will continue to work constructively with all member states and stakeholders to promote an open, secure, stable, stable, accessible, and peaceful ICT environment. I thank you.

Thank you very much for your statement and for being so brief. Thank you. I now give the floor to the delegate of Colombia.

Madam Chair, like we said during the organizational meeting, Colombia identifies 2 priority issues that stand out in the pillar under existing and potential threats, and that we believe must be addressed swiftly. First of all, for my delegation, it's important to delve into understanding of the risks that new and emerging technologies such as AI pose to the safe and responsible use of ICTs. While it is important to recognize the potential of these technologies in strengthening cyber resilience by identifying technological vulnerabilities and reducing the impact of cyber incidents, it is also necessary to recognize the risks that derive from their undue use. We can cite automatized phishing, the creation and diffusion of artificial content, disinformation campaigns, scanning for critical vulnerabilities, and other modalities of malicious use that can undermine security and trust in the digital environment. In this regard, having said that, in addition to considering the undue use of this type of technologies, it's relevant to think about the risks associated with attacks against artificial intelligence systems themselves, as well as the adoption of effective measures for their protection. Secondly, Colombia wishes to underscore as a priority ransomware attacks levied against critical infrastructure and state institutions, which compromise the continuity and stability of essential services. This threat is aggravated by the use of artificial intelligence to engage in more sophisticated, precise campaigns that are more difficult to detect, which makes it essential to strengthen cybersecurity capacities and to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure. Madam Chair, against this backdrop, trust is a fundamental asset for the digital environment in an increasingly complex geopolitical environment. We have a responsibility to build bridges that enable us to make progress in understanding these shared challenges and to build innovative solutions to respond to these pressing threats. Colombia launches an appeal to make the most of this space and use it as a space to focus in the thematic groups on strengthening intersectoral dialogue and identifying practical tools that will enable us to move towards a safer, more resilient, and more reliable cyberspace. Thank you very much.

The Chair, thank you very much. I now give the floor to Estonia.

Thank you, Chair. Estonia aligns itself with the statement by the European Union and adds the following in its national capacity. The Global Mechanism occupies a distinct place within the United Nations architecture. It is the only universal forum entrusted with examining cyber threats that affect international peace and security. Our responsibility is therefore not simply to catalogue malicious cyber activity, but to focus on those incidents and trends whose scale, sophistication, or consequences have the potential to destabilise states, heighten tensions, and increase the risk of conflict. This shared understanding of the threat environment is the foundation upon which all other aspects of our work must rest. While we have made important progress, the cyber threat landscape continues to evolve at an unprecedented pace. Artificial intelligence is fundamentally reshaping the cybersecurity landscape. The Global Mechanism is, of course, not intended to serve as a forum for negotiating international rules on AI governance. These important discussions are taking place in other dedicated processes. That said, the global mechanism should not ignore the impact of AI on the cyber threat landscape, but address it where it clearly falls within our mandate. Under the first pillar of existing and emerging ICT threats, the dedicated thematic group should take into account that AI is increasing the scale, speed, and sophistication of malicious cyber activity, from AI-enabled phishing, ransomware, and vulnerability discovery to attacks targeting AI systems through manipulation or poisoning. As AI becomes increasingly integrated into government services, financial systems, and critical infrastructure, it also expands the attacks surface, creating new vulnerabilities and attractive targets for malicious cyber activity. These developments have direct implications for the resilience of critical infrastructure and the implementation of the frameworks for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. On Wednesday, Estonia and Latvia, together with Oxford Information Labs, will host a technical briefing titled frontier AI and the cyber threat landscape. The briefing will provide practical insight into how frontier AI is transforming cyber threats and what governments should understand as we design a future mechanism capable of responding to rapidly evolving technological developments. We invite all delegations to participate. A trend deserving of particular attention is the growing use of proxy actors, as also highlighted by the European Union. Such proxy models undermine international security and stability, are inconsistent with the agreed UN norms that states should not knowingly allow their territory or infrastructure to be used for internationally wrongful cyber activities, or target the critical infrastructure of other states. States, and may give rise to the international legal responsibility of the states engaging the proxy actors. Ensuring states' peer responsibility for using proxies to engage in malicious cyber activity is an important element of strengthening responsible behaviour in cyberspace. Finally, integrating legal considerations and capacity building across the dedicated thematic groups is essential to facilitate practical discussions on how specific rules and principles of international law apply, while identifying concrete capacity-building gaps and ensuring that all states are better equipped to implement the agreed framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. Thank you.

Muchísimas gracias.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who will be followed by Vanuatu, Botswana, and Cuba.

Madam Chair, while we align ourselves with the statements of the European Union, I would like to add some remarks in my national capacity. Since this is the first time I'm taking the floor, allow me to congratulate you, Ambassador Lopez, on your election as the first chair of the Global Mechanism. I would also like to thank you and your team, as well as the Secretariat, for the efforts invested in preparing this plenary session. It is a great pleasure to participate in the work of the Global Mechanism. On that note, I would like to thank the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for supporting my participation in this session through the Project Partnership for Strengthening Cybersecurity. I also wish to thank GIZ for its facilitation. Madam Chair, information and communication technologies continue to transform our societies and economies, bringing significant opportunities but also increasing our exposure to cyber threats. At the same time, new technologies are enhancing resilience while creating new risks when misused for malicious purposes. In this regard, we wish to emphasize 2 points. First, we are deeply concerned by the growing number of cyber activities targeting democratic institutions and electoral processes. We are increasingly alarmed about the impact of such activities on the states with limited capacities, including those in post-conflict and transition contexts, which may be especially vulnerable to these threats. Second, we also remain concerned by the way ICTs are being misused by both state and non-state actors, particularly when such activities begin to affect supply chains, critical infrastructure, and the delivery of essential services. Addressing these challenges requires a collective response based on greater awareness, timely information sharing and cooperation to maintain stability and security in cyberspace. From our perspective, it is essential that mechanism supports all states regardless of their size or level of capacity so that they engage meaningfully and benefit from these discussions. Finally, Madam Chair, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains committed to contributing within its capacities and fully support the success of this important process. I thank you.

Muchísimas gracias.

Doy ahora—

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to Vanuatu.

Madam Chair, Vanuatu aligns itself with the statement delivered by Tonga on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum members and speaks now on its national capacity. Vanuatu is consistent recently assessed as the most disaster-exposed nation on Earth. In 2023, the twin cyclones Judy and Kevin struck us within 72 hours of each other. In December 2024, an earthquake devastated Port Vila. Each time, alongside homes and roads, we lost the digital systems on which modern crisis response depends. at the very hour we depended on them most. In the context in which Vanuatu reads the threat landscape, for us, cyber risk and climate risk are not parallel concerns, but a single compounding one. A malicious ICT incident during a disaster window would not be an inconvenience. It would cost lives. When this mechanism catalogs threats to critical infrastructure, Vanuatu asks it to recognize that early warning systems, emergency communications, and disaster coordination platforms belong at the top of that catalog. At the same time, the threats themselves are changing shape. When we addressed the organizational session in March, we highlighted the shift from ransomware towards AI-enabled risks. 4 months on, the trajectory has only steepened. Artificial intelligence is lowering the cost of convincing deception, and in a country where a fabricated evacuation notice or a falsified weather warning could send communities towards danger rather than away from it, synthetic content is a safety-of-life issue. Not merely an information one. Madam Chair, Vanuatu's response to this environment is ambition, not retreat. We are pursuing one of the most forward-leaning digital agendas among small island developing states, building towards cloud-based continuity of government so that our services and records survive even when our buildings not, expanding secure digital public services and assessing emerging technologies deliberately so that we adopt them on our terms. But ambition— sorry, we do this because for a country like ours, the riskiest technology strategy is to have none at all. But ambition of this kind is only sustainable in a digital ecosystem that is trustworthy. And ours is both fragile and exposed. Throughout the OEWG, Vanuatu and our Pacific partners argued that the resilience of digitalizing states depends on the restraint and responsibility of all states. We carry that argument into this mechanism, and we ask that its threat discussions keep the connection between technological opportunity and state state behavior firmly in view. I thank you, Chair.

Muchísimas gracias por su intervención.

Thank you very much for your statement. I now give the floor to Botswana.

Thank you, Chair. Chair, the Republic of Botswana congratulates you on convening the first substantive session of this global mechanism. We are confident that under your leadership, this body will successfully transition our shared commitments from normative consensus into actionable global resilience, and we remain ready to assist you in that regard. The Republic of Botswana aligns itself with the statement of the African Group as delivered by the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Chair, Botswana knows that— knows the rapid evolution of the cyber threat landscape. As Botswana drives its national agenda towards a digitalized and knowledge-based economy, we recognize that international security in the cyberspace is not solely focused on protecting just the physical borders but on preserving human dignity, protecting citizen data, and ensuring that emerging technologies do not become tools of oppression or destabilization but of drivers of economies. Chair, transitioning into a fully interconnected society presents a huge benefit for economic growth for us, but we are also aware that this comes with significant challenges. Botswana notes with concern the rising threat of AI-driven manipulation and the integration of AI to produce highly sophisticated deepfakes, phishing, and mass disinformation campaigns, posing a direct risk to social cohesion, institutional trust, and democratic governance. When weaponized across borders, these technologies can manipulate public discourse and destabilize societies. Furthermore, algorithmic biases embedded within AI systems risk automating discrimination, not only at national level in a developing country like Botswana, but also on a global scale, threatening fundamental human rights and economic development. Chair, the borderless nature of cyberspace has amplified data protection risks. As governments and corporations accumulate unprecedented volumes of sensitive personal data, Botswana anticipates escalating threats for both state and non-state actors targeting these repositories. Large-scale data breaches, unauthorized cross-border data tracking, and data exfiltration undermine the state's sovereignty and violate individuals' rights to privacy. Without robust protections, massive centralized data become soft targets for malicious cyber operations. We are deeply concerned by the risk inherent in unregulated surveillance technologies and intrusive digital tools. ICTs are misused to conduct unauthorized mass surveillance and restrict multiple human rights. The cyberspace must remain an enabler of human potential, not an instrument for human rights violations. The Republic of Botswana knows that malicious ICT activity threatens physical disruption to its critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure, where access to critical services are under threat. Disruption to these systems carries severe consequences on our economy. Further, the weaponization of malware, often driven by AI-assisted capabilities, allows malicious actors to bypass traditional protocols with the potential to cause cross-border failures. The Internet of Things proliferation in Botswana, as in the rest of the world, has caused massive security vulnerabilities as malicious actors are perfecting the skill of hijacking these devices to launch novel DDoS attacks against digital infrastructure. Additionally, while cloud migration offers scalability on a massive level, the potential risks that come with with it cannot be avoided, as just one misconfiguration or targeted cyberattack within a major cloud provider can instantly compromise entities and cut off access to essential public services. We also note the increase in ransomware in its magnitude and complexity. To counteract these threats and ensure a human-centric approach to digital security, Botswana has actively implemented progressive interventions at national level. This is through, among other things, the enactment of legislation such as the Data Protection Act, which enforces mandatory data protection impact assessments for high-risk processing operations, specifically including the deployment of AI systems. We have fully operationalized the Information and Data Protection Commission to serve as an independent watchdog, ensuring that state and private data controllers are held accountable. We have also enacted the Cybersecurity Act, which establishes clear and enforceable standards for risk management, mandatory risk reporting, and security-by-design principles for manufacturers, service providers, and operators of critical infrastructure. Botswana calls to member states to prioritize regional and international cooperation in sharing threat intelligence, capacity building, and adherence to the normative framework of response responsible state behavior in cyberspace.

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you. I now give the floor to the delegation of Cuba, who will be followed by the United Kingdom, Singapore, Vietnam, and Serbia. Cuba, please.

Thank you, Madam Chair. The trend of deregularizing and the complication of the different threats we face as member states make it more necessary than ever to become more aware of them and to demand us having better detection, response, and resilience capacities. In this regard, we underscore threats such as the growing development of cyber-offensive capacities and the inclusion in national security strategies of some states the use of cyber weapons and the carrying out of cyber offensive operations by those states. The possibility to engage in cyber attacks that are supposedly preventive to dissuade adversaries, the proliferation of doctrines that consider the use of force as a legitimate response to a cyber attack, and the COVID and illegal use of the information systems of other nations, by individuals, organizations, and states to engage in IT attacks against third countries, as well as the false and politically motivated use of cyberattacks to justify hostile actions against other states. The undue use of ICTs and media platforms, including social networks and radio and electronic transmissions as tools for the interference in the internal affairs of states through the promotion of hate speech, incitation of violence and terrorist acts, subversion, destabilization, the dissemination of fake news and distorting of reality against any state for political purposes and as a pretext for the threat or the use of force. This is called 4th generation warfare that seeks to use the information stored and processed in violation of personal data rights. And often this is— this model of action becomes a business. So we underscore the need to continue to develop and to apply cooperation measures in order to confront existing and potential threats in cyberspace. In order to counter threats to security and the use of ICTs, we require on a global level to prioritize the following issues: striking a global compromise and commitment for the use of ICTs for exclusively peaceful purposes to benefit the development of peoples, the prohibition of the use of ICTs as a pretext to start wars or to threaten to use or use force. And the militarization of cyberspace, the military— dealing with the digital gap and the lack of capacity of certain developing countries to invest in ICT development and the use of unilateral coercive measures such as the embargo against my country, given these measures limit our capacities to deal with existing and potential threats. The negotiation and adoption within the United Nations of an international legally binding instrument that complements applicable international law and that responds to the significant legal loopholes that currently exist in the area of cybersecurity. Other measures that could be adopted to counter threats in cybersecurity and in the use of ICTs, such as increasing cooperation in order to deal with cyber events by exchanging information that does not compromise the privacy of states with respect to their capacities or being against national legislation, implementing technical cooperation mechanisms to increase capacities including to improve the protection of critical infrastructure based on the respect of the national legislation of states, standardizing as much as possible responses to cyber attacks, having common terminology, and using the multilateral system to determine in an unequivocal and unbiased way the origins of the use of ICT in these incidents. Thank you very much.

The Chair thanks Cuba and gives the floor to the United Kingdom.

Thank you, Chair. The cyber threat landscape continues to evolve in both scale and complexity. States, their proxies, and cybercriminal networks increasingly run coordinated campaigns, often alongside information, economic, and other hybrid operations, to erode trust in institutions, threaten economic and national security, and shape geopolitical outcomes. Cyber threats are no longer isolated incidents but are part of persistent, ongoing malicious campaigns. These campaigns of malicious cyber activity cause financial loss, psychological distress to victims, disruption to services, and risks to critical national infrastructure, democratic institutions, and media. The cybercriminal ecosystem remains highly adaptive. Ransomware can continues to be one of the most acute and pervasive threats. The threat from ransomware has been resilient in spite of sustained international action to counter this phenomenon. Meanwhile, artificial intelligence is transforming cyber activity by increasing the sophistication, scale, and pace of operations whilst at the same time lowering barriers to entry. This differentiated and evolving threat landscape reinforces the importance and the challenge for the UN global mechanism to promote strategic stability through responsible state behavior in cyberspace. In response to malicious state activity, the UK works with international partners to hold malicious actors to account and raise the cost of such activity through coordinated attribution, Sanctions, diplomacy, and other lawful measures. Last week, the UK issued our first joint cyber sanctions package with the European Union. These sanctions target the Russian state, including senior Russian intelligence officers and closely associated criminal and proxy networks responsible for orchestrating reckless and destructive cyber attacks across Europe. We also supported the attribution of a recent attempted attack on Poland's energy infrastructure by Russian intelligence services. The attack failed, but could have left up to 500,000 people without electricity during winter. We condemn this malicious cyber activity. Thank you, Chair.

Muchísimas gracias.

Thank you very much. I give the floor to Singapore.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Cyberspace has become an indispensable pillar of our global economy, governance, and daily lives. While cybersecurity is the key enabler of a thriving digital economy, it is also an imperative for security and resilience. Digital technologies have indeed created unprecedented opportunities for innovation and prosperity, but they've also introduced new vulnerabilities that transcend national borders. The rise in cyber threats, including attacks by APTs or advanced persistent threats, the increase in ransomware, as well as threats to emerging technology, continue to threaten not just national security but also the economic well-being and ability of many states. First, I'd like to turn to the increased malicious cyber activity from APT groups, cybercriminals, and hacktivist groups. These sophisticated campaigns, often conducted by highly capable and well-resourced actors, are characterized by stealth, persistence, and strategic intent. Rather than seeking immediate financial gains, APT actors frequently target government institutions, critical information infrastructure, or preposition themselves for future disruptive activities. The increasing complexity of these operations and their ability to remain undetected for extended periods poses serious risks national security, economic resilience, and international stability. It is all— it is in all our interests as an international community to discuss how we can better implement the Cyber Stability Framework and foster international understanding and cooperation to counter the threats posed by APTs, including in the protection of CIIs. Madam Chair, the APT threat is most acutely pertinent to the protection of critical information In 2025, cybersecurity researchers have reported close to 8,000 cases worldwide based on data leak site postings. The ransomware ecosystem has also continued to evolve and fragment, shaped in part by intensifying law enforcement pressure, internal competition, and weak affiliate loyalty. International cooperation is essential to countering ransomware, which is inherently a transnational threat. Through the Counter-Ransomware Initiative, a multilateral platform that fosters international cooperation against ransomware, a group of states have been working together with industry partners to strengthen collective resilience by sharing best practices, exchanging information, and developing practical guidance that countries and organizations can adapt to their own contexts. Madam Chair, next, developments in quantum technologies and AI present both remarkable opportunities and security risks. While quantum computing has the potential to transform fields like scientific research, medicine, logistics, and communications, it also threatens the existing cryptographic systems that secure our digital infrastructure today. Threat actors are expected to exploit quantum computing to break encryption, putting sensitive data and digital trust at risk, therefore necessitating migration to quantum-safe cryptography before quantum computers become powerful enough to break today's system. We've heard many delegations speak about the nexus between AI and cybersecurity. AI is not just improving existing attacks; it is fundamentally changing cyber operations. AI accelerates attacks in 3 ways: on speed, it compresses vulnerability discovery and exploitation timelines; on scale, AI enables thousands of attacks to be conducted simultaneously at a low cost. On accessibility, AI lowers the barrier to entry for phishing, malware, and reconnaissance. Therefore, Madam Chair, at this global mechanism, we need to build a common understanding of AI cyber risks and the sharing of best practices on how states may better prepare themselves to address AI as a threat. And to work with AI as a tool, and to defend AI as a target. We welcome the integrated, policy-oriented, and cross-cutting nature of DTG I, which draws on the 5 pillars and the framework. We encourage DTG I to ensure that the areas we've highlighted here feature prominently in our discussions. DTG II could then look at the capacity building required to support our efforts in these domains. I thank you, Madam Chair.

Many thanks. I now give the floor to Vietnam, followed by Serbia, Brazil, and Ireland.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Since it is our first intervention in the meeting, we wish to express our sincere appreciation to you and your team for your continued engagement with member states. Chair, Vietnam is facing increasing malicious ICT activities, particularly larger-scale advanced persistent threat campaigns targeting critical national information infrastructure and information technology platforms, as well as ransomware attacks directed against data servers of government and private Nowadays, emerging technologies including artificial intelligence and quantum computing enable sophisticated cyberattacks with broader and more far-reaching impacts. The dissemination of false and misleading information in cyberspace continues to contribute to information disorder. Undermining credibility and reputation of states, organizations, and individuals, adversely affecting national security and public order. Cybercrime continues to evolve in both scale and sophistication, posing significant challenges to law enforcement. This includes the illicit trade in user information and personal data, Phishing and other online fraud schemes, as well as the use of ICTs to facilitate trafficking in persons. We believe DTG ICE should focus on the challenges to the international community and make workable recommendations to the plenary.

I thank you, Chair.

Muchísimas gracias. Thank you very much. I now give the floor to.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Dear colleagues, I'm truly pleased to take the floor for the first time on behalf of the Republic of Serbia in the Global Mechanism. It is a privilege to join this important forum, and I welcome the opportunity to contribute to our shared efforts to further strengthen international cooperation on ICT-related issues. Thank you, Madam Chair. Related issues. Republic of Serbia warmly congratulates Ambassador Lopez on your appointment as the chair of the Global Mechanism and expresses its confidence that under your leadership, the mechanism will foster inclusive dialogue, effective cooperation, and achieve meaningful outcomes. The cyber threat landscape continues to become more challenging, and Serbia's experience reflects this reality. Our national data shows that a steady increase in malicious ICT activity targeting systems of special importance, including government networks and critical infrastructure. What we observe at the national level is consistent with the findings of the final report of the OEWG. Malicious ICT activity by both state and non-state actors continues to increase in volume and complexity, while some non-state actors now possess capabilities that were once available only to states. These activities strike beyond national borders, affecting our citizens' daily life. This underlines a simple reality: no state is immune to these threats, and no state can address them alone.

Alone.

Serbia is paying close attention to the risk arising from the malicious use of the new and emerging technologies. Artificial intelligence is already changing the nature of cyber threats, making malicious ICT activities more sophisticated and more difficult to prevent and mitigate. Our national experience reflects this wider trend. We are also concerned by the growing availability of commercial intrusion tools, the misuse of the AI and cryptocurrencies for cybercrime, and the security of ICT supply chains. Globally speaking, the changing DNA of cybercrime— these developments reinforce the importance of discussing threats on the basis of facts, technical expertise, shared evidence. This is fully consistent with the agreed UN framework, which calls on states to consider all relevant information and, and the broader context when assessing cyber incidents. For Serbia, this is not only a matter of principle but also of practice. We systematically monitor and analyze incidents affecting in our critical systems and believe that sharing such experience can strengthen our collective understanding of the evolving threat landscape. We therefore support regular expert exchanges, especially within the dedicated thematic groups, and stand ready to make our national experience available. Thank you for your attention.

Muchísimas gracias. Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the delegation of Brazil, followed by Ireland, Nauru, Sweden, and Switzerland.

Madam Chair, the pervasive use of ICTs and the exponential increase they have brought to our vulnerability to malicious cyber operations continue to be one of the most complex challenges to international peace and security, and to the development of our societies. Rapidly evolving technologies continue to bring new threats to critical infrastructure and other essential services. We've done important work throughout the GGEs and the OEWGs in developing common understanding on many of those threats and on recommendations to address them, and this global mechanism should build upon that previous work. We will need to continue to strive to have our recommendations to be as technology-neutral as possible to avoid having their reach limited to specific technologies, with the recognition that some specific technologies or acts can have particularly strong implications to national and international security. Of particular concern to my delegation are the impacts of artificial intelligence and quantum computing, particularly post-quantum cryptography. While we welcome the inclusion of references to them in the OEWG reports, we believe there can still be deeper discussions on those issues within this mechanism. We are weakly concerned by the uses of generative AI in misinformation and disinformation campaigns, particularly but not limited to the use of so-called deepfakes. In the context of an armed conflict, this could cause grave harm to civilians and would constitute a violation of international humanitarian law. The use of AI for misinformation and disinformation purposes is also of particular concern in electoral processes, where it poses a significant threat to states' political stability. The global mechanism must allow room for, through one or more of its DTGs, in-depth discussions with a view to reach consensus recommendations on how to collectively address new threats and challenges. Discussions currently underway in ad hoc processes outside the UN on issues such as ransomware, AI implications to cybersecurity, or intrusive tools must be integrated to the global mechanism. Their borderless nature means that we need to— the engagement of all nations to adequately tackle them. Keeping discussions within the echo chambers of our like-minded groups will reduce their reach, effectiveness, and legitimacy. Madam Chair, cooperation and capacity building which has been rightfully recognized by the EWG as a cross-cutting element to all issues under its mandate, will continue to play a key role in countering threats. Narrowing the digital divide is essential to promote broad cybersecurity. Furthermore, we must not forget that the ultimate objective of our efforts in countering threats is to build resilience to ensure the maximum benefit from digital technologies to promote the development of societies. In this regard, we continue to support discussions of proposals that can help us build that resilience, such as the creation of a threat repository, the adoption of common terminology, and the sharing of good practice practices in threat mitigation. I thank you.

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to Ireland.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Ireland aligns itself fully with the intervention of the European Union and makes the following comments in our national capacity. Malicious actors continue to target our government and public services, our democratic processes, and our private institutions, and our critical infrastructure, including undersea infrastructure.

Understanding the cyber threats that we face allows us to identify the topics that we need to prioritize for deeper examination during the DTGs in December.

The protection of the healthcare sector against malicious cyber activity is a topic that we would like to see discussed under the DTGs.

Ireland has direct and recent experience of this threat.

Our health service was targeted by a hugely disruptive criminal ransomware attack in 2021.

The DTGs should provide a forum for exchanges on the evolving cyber threats that we all face and facilitate discussion on reinforcing responsible state behavior and our collective resilience. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Many thanks. I now give the floor to Nauru, followed by Sweden, Switzerland, Egypt, and Kiribati. Nauru, you have the floor.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Nauru aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the Pacific Island Forum members and makes the following remarks in its national capacity. Nauru is one of the smallest members of this organization, and until recently, we were also one of its least connected. That has changed. Last year, the East Micronesian Cable came ashore at Yaren, the first international submarine cable in our history, ending decades of dependence on the satellite links alone. For the Naurus, this is a special opportunity. This is a welcome opportunity to expand possibilities for our students, our businesses, our government services, and our place in the digital world. Nauru is candid about what else it brings. A country that connects late meets the full threat landscape on day one that others encounter gradually. Our people are encountering online fraud and scams engineered against those newest to the internet. Our government systems join a region in which the essential services of small states— health systems, telecommunication operators— have been held to ransom by criminal groups operating from the other side of the world. And the cable itself, our single fiscal link, concentrates our national connectivity in one piece of infrastructure. We cannot take for granted its protection. Nauru's answer is to build our defenses at the same speed as our connectivity. Our government is finalizing the most comprehensive digital reform program in our history, a cybersecurity bill establishing a framework for critical information infrastructure protection, which includes a national CERT, And incident reporting, and a data protection bill to follow. There are also considerations of revising the Cybercrime Bill, modernizing our criminal law for the digital age. Simultaneously, our National Cybersecurity Strategy and our National Child Online Protection Strategy are both under active development. This is what taking threats seriously looks like for a state.

Thank you.

for a state of our size. Madam Chair, Nauru asks one thing of this mechanism's work on threats: make it usable. Threat discussion serves the smaller states when they produce shared assessments in plain terms, early warning that reaches small administrations, and cooperation that helps us act on what we learn. Nauru has shown what a small state is prepared to do at home. We look to this mechanism to match that effort internationally. Thank you.

Muchísimas gracias. Thank you very much. I now give the floor to Sweden.

Thank you, Madam Chair. This is the first time I'm taking the floor, so I'd like to begin by commending you for your strong leadership in preparing for this inaugural plenary session of the Global Mechanism. Count on the full support from my delegation. Sweden fully aligns itself with the statement delivered by the EU, and I would like to highlight 3 points in the national capacity. Firstly, it's evident that the warring context to this meeting is an increasingly complex and challenging cyber threat landscape which affects large parts of societies. The backdrop is a geopolitical environment which continues to deteriorate. In my country, cyber threats involve critical infrastructure, public institutions and services at national, regional, and municipal levels, businesses, and private citizens, potentially endangering national security as well as economic prosperity. To successfully deal with such extensive challenges, a whole-of-society approach is necessary to build resilience, in particular, effective public-private partnership. Is indispensable. In Sweden, a reinforced national cybersecurity center sits at the core of our cybersecurity ecosystem, but interacts with a wide range of public and private actors. By the same token, for the global mechanism to be able to address these threats effectively, it will be crucial to draw on the expertise which resides uniquely within the multi-stakeholder community. Secondly, the evolving nexus between state and non-state actors is an increasing concern. It raises questions regarding responsibility of non-state actors and the relationship between malicious cyber activities conducted by non-state actors and state responsibility, particularly in situations where non-state actors act with varying degrees of state support. We expect all states to use cyber capabilities in accordance with international law and in line with the UN norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace and to take necessary measures to stop malicious actors operating within their jurisdictions. In this connection, Sweden welcomes the latest EU cyber sanctions package adopted last week. And thirdly, the potentially far-reaching implications of emerging technology for cybersecurity. Cyber threat actors continuously develop new techniques and rapidly adopt technological developments. To be clear, artificial intelligence offers tremendous opportunities. At the same time, it can dramatically lower barriers for malicious actors, enabling cyber operations of a heretofore unimaginable scale and speed. Harnessing the promises of AI while preventing that it's being weaponized to exploit vulnerabilities will be an essential task going forward. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you.

Madam Chair. Thank you. I now give the floor to Switzerland, followed by Egypt.

Thank you, Madam Chair. The cyber threat landscape continues to deteriorate. According to the latest assessment by the Swiss National Cybersecurity Center, the frequency, sophistication, and strategic significance of malicious cyber activities are increasing A trend accelerated by the rapid development of large language models. While financially motivated cybercrime remains prevalent, a significant threat to Switzerland comes from state and state-sponsored actors. These actors conduct cyber espionage against governments, international and humanitarian organizations, research institutions, and industry. Seek persistent access to critical infrastructure, exploit supply chains, including through managed service providers and telecommunications operators, and increasingly integrate cyber operations into broader geopolitical strategies. The use of proxies and the growing convergence between state interests and cybercriminal ecosystems poses an additional accountability challenge and increases risk to international peace and security. Malicious cyber operations are commonly routed through infrastructure in third countries, including rented servers and compromised consumer devices, to obfuscate their origin. Consistent with the agreed norm that states should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs, Switzerland actively works to prevent the misuse of infrastructure on its territory and stands ready to share its experience in this regard. Switzerland also continues to observe a high level of hacktivist activity motivated by geopolitical developments. These groups and individuals have demonstrated the ability to rapidly mobilize and carry out disruptive campaigns, including distributed denial denial-of-service attacks, website defacements, and data leaks. While these operations often have limited technical impact, they contribute to instability, amplify political narratives, increasing the risk of escalation of existing conflicts. Such activities are criminal offenses under Swiss law, as in most states, irrespective of whether civilians act alone or collectively, act out of political motives or in the interest or on behalf of another state. Switzerland recalls that in line with Norm 13, states should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs and should take appropriate measures to prevent non-state actors on their territory from conducting such activities. Recent armed conflicts have demonstrated that cyber operations are now an integral part of modern warfare. Cyber activities are employed alongside conventional military operations for purposes such as gathering intelligence, disrupting communications, targeting critical infrastructure, and influencing public perception. In that regard, Switzerland is concerned about the heightened threat to the technical infrastructure essential to the general availability and integrity of of the internet, including submarine cables, orbital communication networks, and data centers. These developments highlight the importance of minimizing the risk of escalation, safeguarding civilian infrastructure, ensuring respect of existing international law, in particular international humanitarian law, and that the agreed framework of responsible state behavior continues to inform state conduct in cyberspace. Switzerland continues to strengthen its national resilience. The introduction of mandatory reporting of cyber incidents affecting critical infrastructures has improved situational awareness and reinforced cooperation between public authorities and private operators. Experience confirms that timely information sharing is an essential element of effective cyber resilience. Switzerland stands ready to share this experience. Including on mandatory incident reporting and public-private information sharing, as a concrete contribution to the capacity-building work of this mechanism. Chair, artificial intelligence is transforming cybersecurity. Every new generation of AI models offers significant new opportunities to strengthen cybersecurity by improving vulnerability detection, incident response, and threat analysis. However, they're also used by malicious actors to conduct sophisticated or even autonomous cyber operations with greater speed, scale, and sophistication, thereby lowering the barriers to advanced attacks, social engineering, and creating new vulnerability sets associated with the AI systems themselves. Current AI models furthermore overwhelm many software providers, in particular, particular open-source maintainers. Jeopardizing the ability to fix vulnerabilities in a timely manner. Switzerland believes that these developments deserve increased international attention. Discussions within this mechanism should help shaping a common understanding of AI risks, consider how states can use AI responsibly whilst respecting and implementing existing international law, voluntary norms, and CBMs, and contributing to capacity. Building. In our view, there is no need to adopt new voluntary norms or specific CBMs for AI. The existing ones were not created for any particular technology and are generally broad enough to enable us to address the challenges posed by AI in cybersecurity as well. It is also important to keep in mind the mandate of the global mechanism and that we do not conduct this discussion in isolation from an other ongoing processes or duplicate work being carried out within them, such as in the Global Dialogue on AI Governance. Madam Chair, given your involvement in both processes, I'm confident that you will skillfully guide us through these discussions. Thank you.

Muchas gracias. Thank you very much. We have We have exhausted the amount of time available to us this afternoon. We still have 29 delegations on the list of speakers under this item, and I will read out the first 5 who will be the first to speak tomorrow at 10:00 a.m. Egypt. Kiribati.

Kiribati.

New Zealand. Tonga, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. These are the first 5 speakers for tomorrow morning. We will reconvene in this room at 10 AM tomorrow to continue the consideration of this agenda item. And according to the program of work, as I indicated, just after this discussion on threats, we will begin with voluntary non-binding norms on response responsible state behavior and ways for their implementation, recognizing that additional norms could be developed over time. As I mentioned this morning, as we complete each item in the program, I will immediately move on to the next item. That is to say, we will continue with the agenda of the session. Thank you very much, and see you all tomorrow.